Ms A Adegbite v BB Healthcare Solutions Ltd: 3201673/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 3201673/2023

Between

Ms A AdegbiteClaimant

BB Healthcare Solutions LtdRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Brewer

Members

Ms A Berry

Ms G McLaughlin

In person for claimant

Dr O Ogusanya (instructed by Solicitor) for respondent

Date 17 January 2025

REASONS

[1]This case was heard over three days. The evidence was completed at the end of the second day. We heard submissions, deliberated and gave an oral judgment on day three.

[2]The claimant represented herself and the respondent was represented by Dr Ogusanya, a solicitor.

[3]We had witness statements and heard oral evidence from the claimant Elizabeth Olusoga, Manager and Dr Olubenga Odutola, Medical Director who has overall responsibility for the respondent.

[4]We note that the claimant is well educated and has a Masters degree in law. At a preliminary hearing for case management held on 24 April 2024 Employment Judge Randall agreed the issues with the parties and made case management orders. Those orders included that there be an agreed file of documents to be prepared for this final hearing and in relation to witness statements the order states that the witness statements must contain “everything relevant the witness can tell the tribunal” and that “witnesses will not be allowed to add to their statements unless the tribunal agrees”

[5]During the preparation for this hearing the claimant sent to the employment tribunal a large number of documents. These were unpaginated and unindexed.

[6]Towards the end of 2024 it seems that the claimant disagreed with what the respondent had included in the hearing bundle. She said that a number of documents she had provided to the respondent had not been included that she raised the matter with the tribunal.

[7]As a result, in late October 2024 Employment Judge Gardiner ordered that if agreement on the hearing bundle could not be reached, either party could bring a file of disputed documents to the hearing. The claimant did not do this.

[8]The claimant's witness statement is 8 paragraphs long. Each paragraph is short, no more than one sentence. The witness statement refers to none of the documents and it does not deal with any of the issues in the case.

[9]During cross examination the claimant referred to documents that she said she had, which were not in the bundle but which she insisted would assist her. In the circumstances the tribunal exercised its discretion, and we allowed the claimant to give evidence which was not in her witness statement. We also invited her to send in further documents initially over the lunchtime period on the first day and again overnight in readiness for the second day. The claimant did so although we note that a number of those documents were already in the hearing file.

[10]We would add that the tribunal was also concerned that the file prepared by the respondent was inadequate as it did not contain documents which are obviously relevant to some of the issues, in particular evidence of where and when the claimant worked. The respondent provided these documents during the tribunal reading time on the morning of day one of the hearing.

Issues

[11]There was an agreed list of issues in this case as follows:

[12]The claimant says that since 6 March 2023 the respondent has:a. decreased her weekly hours from an average of 40 to 50 hours per week to an average of 15 hours per week,

b. stopped allowing the claimant to work as many hours as she requested to work,

c. stopped the claimant from working shifts with either Dr Ope-ewe or Mrs Ope-ewe, despite the claimant working shifts with each of them, with no issues, before the settlement agreement was reached,

d. stopped the claimant from working at the Shotgate Surgery, the surgery closest to her home. The claimant claims that her manager, Elizabeth Olusoga, told Caroline Adeletan, a colleague of the claimant, that this was because of the ‘incident’ with Dr Ope-ewe

e. told the claimant’s colleagues, Brenda Shubet, Leslie Lisle, Sharon Reeves and Larne Fijabi, confidential information about the settlement agreement reached with her previous employer, the specific amount paid to the claimant, and the amount paid to the barrister who represented the employer,

f. failed properly or efficiently to respond to the claimant’s grievance raised on 7 May 2023,

g. unreasonably refused to provide a copy of the claimant’s application form when she attended the respondent’s premises to request the copy on 21 June 2023, and

h. unnecessarily and unreasonably called the police when the claimant attended the respondent’s premises to request a copy of her application form on 21 June 2023.

[13]The claimant resigned by e-mail on 21 June 2023. The claimant claims that the conduct listed above amounted to a course of conduct which breached the implied term of trust and confidence and that she resigned in response to it.

[14]The claimant further claims that the conduct listed above amounted to detriment and that it was done because of a protected act, pursuing a claim under the Equality Act against London Road Surgery.

Law

[15]We set out here a brief note of the law relating to the claims of constructive unfair dismissal and victimisation. Constructive dismissal

[16]The claimant claimed that she had been constructively dismissed. She resigned following, she says, a series of acts, faults and omissions by the respondent which, she says, amounted to a breach in the implied term of trust and confidence. The relevant law is as follows.

[17]The guidance given for deciding if there has been a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence is set out in Malik v BCCI; Mahmud v BCCI

1997 1 IRLR 462

where Lord Steyn said that an employer shall not: "…without reasonable and proper cause, conduct itself in a manner calculated [or] likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee."

[18]The burden of proving the absence of reasonable and proper cause lies on the party seeking to rely on such absence — RDF Media Group plc and anor v Clements

2008 IRLR 207

, QBD. As in that case, this will usually be the employee.

[19]In Hilton v Shiner Ltd — Builders Merchants

2001 IRLR 727

, EAT, for example, Mr Recorder Langstaff QC stated in connection with a submission by counsel as to the proper legal test for establishing a breach of the implied term in the context of a case where the employer was alleging that the employee’s misconduct had destroyed trust and confidence: “When Mr Prichard identified the formulation of the trust and confidence term upon which he relied, he described it as being an obligation to avoid conduct which was likely seriously to damage or destroy a mutual trust and confidence between employer and employee. So to formulate it, however, omits the vital words with which Lord Steyn in his speech in Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (in compulsory liquidation) (above) qualified the test. The employer must not act without reasonable and proper cause… To take an example, any employer who proposes to suspend or discipline an employee for lack of capability or misconduct is doing an act which is capable of seriously damaging or destroying the relationship of trust and confidence between employer and employee, whatever the result of the disciplinary process. Yet it could never be argued that an employer was in breach of the term of trust and confidence if he had reasonable and proper cause for the suspension, or for taking the disciplinary action.”

[20]Section 95(1)(c) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA) states that there is a dismissal when the employee terminates the contract, with or without notice, in circumstances such that he or she is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer’s conduct. That is commonly called constructive dismissal.

[21]In the leading case in this area, Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp

1978 ICR 221

, CA, the Court of Appeal ruled that, for an employer’s conduct to give rise to a constructive dismissal, it must involve a repudiatory breach of contract. As Lord Denning MR put it: ‘If the employer is guilty of conduct which is a significant breach going to the root of the contract of employment, or which shows that the employer no longer intends to be bound by one or more of the essential terms of the contract, then the employee is entitled to treat himself as discharged from any further performance. If he does so, then he terminates the contract by reason of the employer’s conduct. He is constructively dismissed’

[22]In order to successfully claim constructive dismissal, the employee must establish that:a. there was a fundamental breach of contract on the part of the employer;

b. the employer’s breach caused the employee to resign;

c. the employee did not delay too long before resigning, thus affirming the contract and losing the right to claim constructive dismissal.

[23]I note that a constructive dismissal is not necessarily an unfair one — Savoia v Chiltern Herb Farms Ltd

1982 IRLR 166

, CA.

[24]A course of conduct can cumulatively amount to a fundamental breach of contract entitling an employee to resign and claim constructive dismissal following a ‘last straw’ incident even though the last straw by itself does not amount to a breach of contract — Lewis v Motorworld Garages Ltd

1986 ICR 157

, CA. However, an employee is not justified in leaving employment and claiming constructive dismissal merely because the employer has acted unreasonably. This was confirmed in Bournemouth University Higher Education Corporation v Buckland

2010 ICR 908

, CA, where the Court upheld the decision of the EAT that the question of whether the employer’s conduct fell within the range of reasonable responses is not relevant when determining whether there has been a constructive dismissal.

[25]There is no need for there to be ‘proximity in time or in nature’ between the last straw and the previous act of the employer — Logan v Customs and Excise Commissioners

2004 ICR 1

, CA.

[26]In Omilaju v Waltham Forest London Borough Council

2005 ICR 481

, CA, the Court of Appeal explained that the act constituting the last straw does not have to be of the same character as the earlier acts, nor need it constitute unreasonable or blameworthy conduct, although in most cases it will do so. But the last straw must contribute, however slightly, to the breach of the implied term of trust and confidence. An entirely innocuous act on the part of the employer cannot be a final straw, even if the employee genuinely, but mistakenly, interprets the act as hurtful and destructive of his or her trust and confidence in the employer. The test of whether the employee’s trust and confidence has been undermined is objective. And while it is not a prerequisite of a last straw case that the employer’s act should be unreasonable, it will be an unusual case where conduct which is perfectly reasonable and justifiable satisfies the last straw test. In that context, in Chadwick v Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd EAT 0052/18 the EAT rejected a tribunal’s finding that a threat of disciplinary action was ‘an entirely innocuous act’ that could not constitute a last straw.

[27]Where the act that tips the employee into resigning is entirely innocuous it will be necessary to consider whether any earlier breach has been affirmed. In Williams v Governing Body of Alderman Davies Church in Wales Primary School EAT 0108/19 a teacher, W, was suspended for an alleged child protection matter. He was also subject to disciplinary proceedings for alleged breach of the school’s data protection policy. He was dissatisfied with the process and resigned after several months, stating that the last straw was learning that a colleague, under investigation for a connected data protection breach, had been instructed not to contact him. The tribunal found that this instruction was reasonable in the circumstances and entirely innocuous. It held that, following Omilaju, this act could not contribute to a breach of the implied duty of trust and confidence and was not a last straw entitling W to treat his employment contract as terminated. On appeal, the EAT held that, where there is conduct by an employer that amounts to a fundamental breach of contract, a constructive dismissal claim can succeed even if there has been more recent conduct by the employer which does not in itself contribute to a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence, but which is what tips the employee into resigning. Crucially, however, the employee must not have affirmed the earlier fundamental breach and must have resigned at least partly in response to it.

[28]In terms of causation, that is the reason for the resignation, a tribunal must determine whether the employer’s repudiatory breach was ‘an’ effective cause of the resignation. However, the breach need not be ‘the’ effective cause — Wright v North Ayrshire Council

2014 ICR 77

, EAT. As Mr Justice Elias, then President of the EAT, stated in Abbycars (West Horndon) Ltd v Ford EAT 0472/07, “the crucial question is whether the repudiatory breach played a part in the dismissal’, and even if the employee leaves for ‘a whole host of reasons’, he or she can claim constructive dismissal ‘if the repudiatory breach is one of the factors relied upon”

[29]Where an employee has mixed reasons for resigning their resignation will constitute a constructive dismissal provided that the repudiatory breach relied on was at least a substantial part of those reasons (see Meikle v Nottinghamshire County Council

[2004] EWCA Civ 859

[2005] ICR 1

[30]Thus, where an employee leaves a job as a result of a number of actions by the employer, not all of which amounted to a breach of contract, they can nevertheless claim constructive dismissal provided the resignation is partly in response to a fundamental breach. Victimisation

[31]In determining allegations of victimisation three questions should be askeda. did the alleged victimisation arise in any of the prohibited circumstances covered by the EqA?

b. if so, did the employer subject the claimant to a detriment?

c. if so, was the claimant subjected to that detriment because he or she had done a protected act, or because the employer believed that he or she had done, or might do, a protected act?

[32]Section 39(4) provides that an employer (A) must not victimise an employee of A’s (B):a. as to B’s terms of employment

b. in the way A affords B access, or by not affording B access, to opportunities for promotion, transfer or training, or for any other benefit, facility or service

c. by dismissing B or

d. by subjecting B to any other detriment. Detriment

[33]Tribunals need to make findings as to the precise detriment pleaded (see for example Ladiende and ors v Royal Mail Group Ltd EAT 0197/15).

[34]Generally, a detriment is anything which the individual concerned might reasonably consider changed their position for the worse or put them at a disadvantage. This could include being rejected for promotion, denied an opportunity to represent the organisation at external events, excluded from opportunities to train, or overlooked in the allocation of discretionary bonuses or performance-related award. A detriment might also include a threat made to the complainant which they take seriously and it is reasonable for them to take it seriously. The claimant will not succeed simply by showing that he or she has suffered mental distress: it would have to be objectively reasonable in all the circumstances.

[35]Where it is not entirely obvious that the claimant has suffered a detriment, the situation must be examined from the claimant’s point of view (Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Khan

2001 ICR 1065

, HL, Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary

2003 ICR 337

, HL and Derbyshire and ors v St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council and ors

2007 ICR 841

, HL). Because of protected act

[36]To succeed in a claim of victimisation the claimant must show that he or she was subjected to the detriment because he or she did a protected act or because the employer believed he or she had done or might do a protected act. Where there has been a detriment and a protected act but the detrimental treatment was due to another reason, e.g. absenteeism or misconduct, a claim of victimisation will not succeed.

[37]It is not necessary for the protected act to be the primary cause of a detriment, so long as it is a significant factor (Nagarajan v London Regional Transport

1999 ICR 877

, HL). If protected acts have a ‘significant influence’ on the employer’s decision making, discrimination will be made out.

Findings of fact

[38]We make the following findings of fact.

[39]The respondent is a company supplying locum staff to GP surgeries. The staff includes GPs, administrative and clerical staff. The respondent is owned by the surgeries it services.

[40]Doctor Odutola is the Medical Director. Elizabeth Olusoga is responsible for managing the administrative and clerical staff. Her duties include setting rotas, allocating shifts and dealing with timesheets.

[41]The claimant was employed by the respondent from 2016 until she resigned on 21 June 2023. She was employed as a peripatetic receptionist. She worked at a number of surgeries during her employment with the respondent.

[42]For much of the time the claimant was employed by the respondent she had a second job. Relevant to this claim is the fact that she was employed by the London Road Surgery until she left that job in October 2022.

[43]For our purposes it is relevant to note that one of the GP's at London Road Surgery was Dr Ope-ewe. He also did local work via the respondent. Dr Ope-ewe’s wife also worked London Road Surgery.

[44]In January 2022 the claimant brought an ET claim against London Road surgery. She asserts that this was a claim under the Equality Act. There is no evidence of this in the documents.

[45]That claim was settled by a COT3 agreement on 6 March 2023. A small payment was made to the claimant.

[46]The core allegation by the claimant in this case is that after the settlement referred to above, the respondent treated the claimant detrimentally as set out in the list of issues. She says that the detrimental treatment was done because she had brought the employment tribunal claim against London Road Surgery and that this was a protected act under section 27 of the Equality Act 2010. The claimant also says that the detriments amounted to a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence as a result of which she resigned.

[47]In relation to the hours of work worked by the claimant, which touches on the first 4 allegations, which are all aspects of this same complaint, we have analysed the claimant’s timesheets and this shows the claimant having worked the following hours:a. December 2021 - 80.45

b. January 2022 - 67.45

c. February 2022 - 78.45

d. March 2022 - 77.30

e. May 2022 - 72.45

f. July 2022 - 61.00

g. August 2022 - 62.15

h. October 2022 - 85.15

i. January 2023 - 163.00

j. February 2023 - 103.30

k. April 2023 - 58.00

l. May 2023 - 52.45

[48]In relation to where the claimant worked, there is a mixed picture. In most months the claimant worked at a number of surgeries, but in August 2022 she worked almost exclusively at the New Surgery apart from two shifts at Shotgate Surgery.

[49]In April 2023 and May 2023 the claimant worked exclusively at the New Surgery.

[50]In March 2023 the claimant worked at a number of surgeries, to be precise, both before she said she was being subjected to detriments and afterwards (we note that the claimant says that the detriments started once her claim against London Road Surgery was settled on 6 March 2023).

[51]On 17 May 2023 the claimant raised a grievance. She says in that grievance that “upon London Road surgery settling out of court I have been experiencing hatred, bullying, intimidation, manipulation and victimisation by my manager Elizabeth Olusoga and this is unlawful under the Equality Act 2010”. She does not set out what the “hatred, bullying, intimidation, manipulation and victimisation” was. The claimant also asserts that she is being blackmailed that refers to ‘harassments’ with no further elucidation.

[52]The grievance was being dealt with by another GP Dr Rasheed. She only worked part time.

[53]At some point shortly after the grievance was submitted Dr Rasheed met the claimant and in fact met her on more than one occasion. This is clear from her e-mail at page 47 of the bundle. She emailed the claimant on 30 May 2023 after she returned from leave and provided notes of the meetings. She explained the next steps which included some further investigation by her including interviewing a number of the staff. She says in her e-mail that as she works part time “this is taking a bit of time”.

[54]Dr Rasheed also said that as the issues being raised by the claimant were personal they must be fully investigated and asks the claimant to “bear with us”. Finally Dr Rasheed asked the claimant for permission to disclose the allegations to the staff who were being interviewed.

[55]The reason for asking this permission was set out by Dr Rasheed in a second e-mail also sent on 30 May 2023. Dr Rasheed is clear that some of the interviewees may need to take legal advice and states “you will need to be prepared for a lengthy wait” as the matters raised were complex and could not be resolved speedily.

[56]The claimant responded to Dr Rasheed on the same day confirming that she could disclose as requested and the claimant also said that she appreciated that as Dr Rasheed works part time, that explained the length of time the grievance was taking, although we note that by this time only two weeks had passed since the date the grievance was raised.

[57]In a second e-mail on the same day the claimant said that she was prepared to wait “as long as the waiting time is reasonable”.

[58]The claimant does not appear to have expressed any concerns or chased Dr Rasheed for a response to her grievance at any point after 30 May 2023.

[59]On 21 June 2023 the claimant attended the respondent’s premises. She went into Ms Olusoga's office and asked for a copy of her 2016 application form to the respondent. At the time Ms Olusoga was holding a meeting with another staff member and she asked the claimant to leave and return the next day. At this point the claimant proceeded to open a draw in which personnel files were kept. Ms Olusoga tried to prevent the claimant doing this and she and the claimant struggled. In the struggle Ms Olusoga suffered an injury to her knee.

[60]As a result, Ms Olusoga asked a colleague to call the police, which she did. The police arrived although by that time the claimant had left the premises.

[61]At 6:10 PM on 21 June 2023 an e-mail was sent to the claimant by the respondent suspending her as result of the incident in the office.

[62]At 8:05 PM the claimant replied as follows “I can confirm that your suspension is of no use because I was only waiting for your response to my grievance before I resign, because that grievance gave birth to what transpired today”.

[63]At 8:22 PM on 21 June 2023 the claimant emailed her resignation.

[64]Early conciliation started on 27 June 2023.

[65]The claimant received her early conciliation certificate of three August 2023.

[66]The claimant presented her claim to the employment tribunal on 9 August 2023.

Discussion and conclusions

[67]We turn to our conclusions on the specific allegations.

[68]The claimant did not work a clear pattern of hours at any point. The claimant says in this allegation that she worked 40 to 45 hours per week before 6 March 2023 and this reduced to 15 hours per week after that.

[69]Before 6 March 2023 there was only one month where the claimant worked more than 40 hours per week which was January 2023. Between December 2021 and October 2022, the claimant worked an average of between 15 and 22 hours per week. In January and February 2023, she worked 163 and 111 hours respectively but these were exceptional months.

[70]In March 2023, the month the claimant says she started being victimised, she in fact worked an average of 25 hours per week. It is correct that in April and May 2023 the claimant worked 58 and 52 hours respectively but this is only slightly lower than the hours she worked in for example July and August 2022.

[71]The point is that there is no obvious pattern of less work after March 2023 and even if there was there certainly was not a decrease from the claimant’s stated 160 to 180 hours per month to the 60 hours per month she contends for.

[72]The claimant provided no evidence that the respondent allowed her to work as many hours as she wanted to, nor that if she did, this was stopped.

[73]Looking at the overall picture, we consider that the claimant has confused two different things. The fact that, if it was the case, she was given the hours she asked for is not evidence that she was allowed to work as many hours as she wanted. It is merely evidence that when she asked for work, that work was available and therefore allocated to her. But in any event as we have said there is not a shred of evidence provided by the claimant that she had asked for work and had not been allocated it after 6 March 2023. Allegations 3 and 4

[74]We take these allegations together as they appear to be the same.

[75]As the claimant puts her case, she was treated detrimentally following the settlement her claim against London Road Surgery. But after that settlement, the claimant worked at Shotgate Surgery and therefore worked with Dr, and/or Mrs Ope-ewe on 8, 15, 18 and 20 March 2023.

[76]It is correct that in April and May 2023 the claimant was allocated to the New Surgery but of course that begs the question why. The claimant asserts that, for reasons which are unclear, the respondent treated her detrimentally because she had brought a claim under the Equality Act against another organisation, London Road Surgery. Ms Olusoga is responsible for allocating work. We accept her evidence that the first she knew of a claim brought by the claimant against the London Road Surgery was when she was told this by the claimant on 4 May 2023 when the claimant mentioned it in a meeting she was having with Ms Olusoga and Dr Odutola. Even then there was no reference to the claimant having made a claim under the Equality Act.

[77]The claimant has provided no evidence to support this allegation and it is unclear why this respondent would know or need to know about a confidential settlement in a claim in which it was not involved and in which it had no interest.

[78]It is correct that as at 21 June 2023 the claimant’s grievance had not been concluded. But there is no evidence that it was not being dealt with. Dr Rasheed had warned the claimant that it would take some time to deal with the matters she had raised during their meetings and there is no evidence to suggest the claimant was concerned about or chasing Dr Rasheed for a resolution to her grievance. Nor was she raising concerns about it having not been concluded. By the date the claimant resigned, the grievance had been ongoing for just over 4 weeks which is not an unreasonable amount of time given the seriousness of the claimant’s apparent concerns.

[79]Further, there is no allegation or evidence that Dr Rasheed knew about or new any details of the claimant’s claim or settlement in relation to London Road Surgery.

[80]On 21 June 2023 Ms Olusoga was in a meeting which the claimant interrupted apparently to ask for her 2016 application form. It was not unreasonable for Ms Olusoga to wish to continue her meeting and in that context she in no way unreasonably refused to provide the document the claimant wanted. What Ms Olusoga did was perfectly understandable and reasonable in the circumstances.

[81]Given what is contained in the statements from staff about the incident on 21 June 2023 the tribunal fully understands why the police were called. Even if that was an overreaction, the fact is an incident did occur and an injury was sustained by Ms Olusoga. There is no evidence that the police were called as an act of victimisation.

[82]We conclude as follows.

[83]In relation to the claim for victimisation, we can find no evidence that the claimant did a protected act. We have not seen the claim form in the claimant’s case against London Road Surgery and there is nothing in the COT3 to say what the claim was about. There was nothing in the claimant's witness statement nor in her oral evidence about this. The absence of any evidence of a protected act means that the victimisation claim fails.

[84]However, even if we accept that the claimant did do a protected act, the only evidence we have that the respondent was aware of it is from the meeting on 4 May 2023, long after the claimant says victimisation commenced. For that reason, the victimisation claim also fails.

[85]Further, there is no evidence to substantiate any of the 8 allegations made by the claimant other than, as a matter of fact, the police were called by the respondent on 21 June 2023, but as we have said, that was for wholly understandable reasons. None of the other allegations stand up to even the most cursory scrutiny.

[86]For those reasons the claim under section 27, Equality Act 2010 fails and is dismissed.

[87]For essentially the same reasons the claim for constructive unfair dismissal also fails.

[88]In short,a. there was no reduction in hours from between 160 and 180 per month to 60 per month,

b. there is no evidence that the claimant was prevented from working when she wanted,

c. the claimant did work with Dr Ope-ewe and at Shotgate Surgery after 6 March 2023 and there is no evidence of any untoward motive from the claimant being allocated to the New Surgery in April and May 2023,

d. there is no evidence that the claimant's colleagues were given confidential information about the claimant’s settlement, and no evidence that the respondent even knew about it before they were told by the claimant,

e. at the date of resignation, the claimant’s grievance was ongoing and she was aware that Dr Rasheed worked part time and had been clear that given the complexity and number of complaints it would take some time for her to resolve the grievance, and

f. there was no evidence that Ms Olusoga refused to provide the claimant with the application form on 21 June 2023, she merely asked the claimant to return the next day when she would deal with the matter.

[89]There was therefore no course of conduct which amounted to a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence and for this reason the claim fails.

[90]We would also add that given the factual matrix we have described above we find that the claimant resigned following her suspension either because she was suspended or to avoid a disciplinary process which the respondent says, and we accept, would have followed given what had occurred at the meeting where Ms Olusoga was injured. Her claim would also therefore fail for lack of causation.

[91]In the circumstances the claim for constructive unfair dismissal fails and is dismissed.

Discussion and conclusions

[1]The decision is unjustly and unfairly biased. If the claimant wishes to challenge the judgment as biased an appeal is the appropriate method. The tribunal does not consider it was biased.

[2]The decision did not consider the challenges a litigant in person faces in Employment Tribunal cases. The case was determined on the facts found, based on the evidence before the tribunal and applying the law.

[3]The decision did not consider that, the Respondent falsely claimed not to have received the list of documents and evidences that the claimant requested to be included in the bundle, which were sent by post on 2 December 2023 and 15 May 2024 to the Respondent and their representatives, respectively, despite copies of the Next day guaranteed delivery service receipts sent to the court confirming postage and receipt of these documents. The tribunal allowed the claimant to add to oral testimony to her witness evidence and to provide the documents she says were missing from the bundle. She did so, so the tribunal had all of the evidence she wished to put before it.

[4]The decision did not consider that; the claimant and the respondent did not agree on which documents are going to be used at the hearing. This issue was dealt with at a preliminary hearing and a clear order was made that either party could bring a bundle of any documents relevant to the issues which were not in the main hearing bundle. The clamant failed to do so, nevertheless was given leave to, and did provide further documents during the hearing.

[5]The decision did not consider that the documents sent in by the Respondent to be used at the hearing did not contain the documents and evidence the Claimant wished to rely on. See above.

[6]The decision did not consider that the electronic pdf copies of documents and evidence sent and provided to the Tribunal by the Respondent’s representative was never agreed by the Claimant. See above.

[7]The decision did not consider that, the pdf copies of documents and evidence uploaded to the Tribunal’s Document Upload Centre were solely that of the Respondents and they were never agreed by the Claimant. See above.

[8]The decision did not consider Paragraph 32 of the Management order which states that “If any of these orders is not complied with, the Tribunal may:(a) waive or vary the requirement;

(b) strike out the claim or the response;

(d) award costs in accordance with the Employment Tribunal Rules”. The tribunal was not asked by either party to make any order to strike out, restrict participation or award costs in relation to case preparation.

[9]The decision did not consider that, the Respondent has repeatedly disobeyed court orders, such as deliberately failing to provide its defence within the 28-day time limit and conveniently claiming that they did not receive the list of documents and evidence the claimant requested to be included in the bundle. No application was made about this to the tribunal at the final hearing and any such failures were not relevant to the tribunal’s decisions.

[10]The decision did not consider that; the Respondent did not request the court's permission for an extension of time. It is not clear to what this is referring, but there was no application before the tribunal at the final hearing for any extension of time.

[11]The decision did not consider that, in much of the Respondent’s correspondence with the claimant, the Respondent has consistently used a tone of intimidation and/or manipulation. No evidence was led about this.

[12]The decision did not consider that; the Respondent based their arguments on grievances that have already been addressed. The case was not essentially determined by the respondent’s arguments but by the lack of evidence to substantiate the claimant’s case.

[13]The decision did not consider that; the Respondent based their arguments and relied on events that have previously been dealt with. See above.

[14]The decision did not consider that; the Respondent did not focus on the matter before the Tribunal but focused and relied on events that have previously been dealt with. See above.

[15]The decision did not consider that, all those concerned in this matter including the Respondent’s representative work and still works for BB Healthcare Solutions Ltd., and they are also stakeholders in BB Healthcare Solutions Ltd. Yes, the tribunal did consider that in assessing the evidence before it.

[16]The decision did not consider that, Dr Olumuyiwa Ope-ewe who is a partner in London Road Surgery, also works for BB Healthcare Solutions Ltd., and he is also a stakeholder in BB Healthcare Solutions Ltd. Yes, the tribunal was aware of that as it was part of the evidence, but it was not relevant to the issues in the case.

[17]The decision did not consider that, Abimbola Ope-ewe coerced and lured the claimant into working in her husband’s Surgery (London Road Surgery) (even though it came at the right time, but the claimant never at any time mentioned to Abimbola Ope-ewe that she was looking for work). No evidence was given about this by the claimant.

[18]The decision did not consider that, Abimbola Ope-ewe took over and worked the extended hours of Wednesdays and Thursdays as she secretly planned. As above.

[19]The decision did not consider that, Dr Olugbenga Odutola conveniently claimed he never received the email the claimant sent to him regarding the grievance. The grievance was clearly received and passed to Dr Rasheed to deal with as set out in detail in the reasons.

[20]The decision did not consider that, Dr Reshma Rasheed who is the one handling the grievance works for BB Healthcare Solutions Ltd., and she is also a stakeholder in BB Healthcare Solutions Ltd. Yes, it did – please read the reasons.

[21]The decision did not consider that, the Respondent hid under the guise of Zero- hour contract which still doesn’t give room for blackmailing, harassment, hostility, hatred, bullying, intimidation, manipulation, and victimization under the Equality Act 2010. These were not part of the issues agreed between the parties. 21. The decision did not consider that, the claimant started work for BB Healthcare Solutions Ltd., in 2016 and she has never had problems until Abimbola Ope-ewe started work with BB Healthcare Solutions Ltd., in 2020. This was never put as an issue. The claimant’s case was about the respondent’s alleged behaviour, not that of Abimbola Ope-ewe

[22]The decision did not consider that, before (London Road Surgery settling out of court), the claimant had a good and pleasant working and social relationship with Dr Olumuyiwa Ope-ewe and his wife Abimbola Ope-ewe. This was irrelevant – the issues in the case were agreed between the parties and the relationship between the claimant and Dr Olumuyiwa Ope-ewe and his wife Abimbola Ope-ewe was not relevant to those issues.

[23]The decision did not consider that, the investigation carried out by the Basildon Local Policing Team – A Shift was due to the ongoing grievance. Irrelevant to the agreed issues.

[24]The decision did not consider the investigation conducted by the Basildon Local Policing Team – A Shift, where they stated that “investigation has been closed with no further action”. Irrelevant to the agreed issues.

[25]The decision did not consider that the Respondent had manipulated their witness statements. There was no evidence of manipulation.

[26]The decision did not consider that, the Respondent failed to address the grievance promptly, despite its seriousness. Yes it did – please read the reasons.

[27]The decision did not consider that, the Respondent failed to address the grievance appropriately. Yes it did – please read the reasons.

[28]The decision did not consider that, the claimant continued to receive simultaneous communications from two representatives of the Respondent. This is not relevant to the tribunal’s judgment.

[29]The decision did not consider that, the Respondent failed to adhere to the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures. The ACAS Code was not relevant to this case.

[1]The claimant’s claim of constructive unfair dismissal fails and is dismissed,

[2]The claimant’s claim of victimization contrary to s.27 of the Equality Act 2010 fails and is dismissed.