S Abrahams v London Borough of Newham: 3201480/2023
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 3201480/2023
Between
Sasha AbrahamsClaimantLondon Borough of NewhamRespondent
Before
Employment Judge G. King
Members
Ms P. AlfordIn person for claimantMs S. Sullivan - solicitor for respondentDate 2 May 2025
JUDGMENT
[1]The Claimant’s claim of unfair dismissal is not well founded and is dismissed.[2]The Claimant’s claim of discrimination arising from disability (s.15 Equality Act 2010) is not well founded and is dismissed.[3]The Claimant’s claim of victimisation succeeds in part, in relation to the allegation of 20 December 2022. The claim in relation to the other allegations is not well founded and is dismissed.[4]The Respondent shall pay the Claimant the sum of £2,000.00 in respect of injury to feelings. The Respondent shall also pay interest from 20 December 2022, amounting to £378.74. The total sum payable is therefore £2,378.74. Approved by:
REASONS
[1]The Claimant presented a claim to the Tribunal on 11 August 2023 of unfair dismissal, disability discrimination, redundancy payment, and breach of the Fixed Term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2002. This followed a period of ACAS early conciliation from 24 May 2023 to 5 July 2023.[2]At a Case Management Hearing on 8 December 2023, the Claimant confirmed that the redundancy payment had now been paid, and that she did not intend to bring a claim of automatic unfair dismissal (or any other claim) under the Fixed Term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2002. The Claimant stated that those claims could Case Number: 3201480/2023 2 be dismissed upon withdrawal, the effect of which was explained to her at
the hearing.
[3]Only one lay member was available for the Final Hearing. Both parties consented in writing to the hearing going ahead with the Judge sitting with one lay member. Claim Summary[4]The Claimant was employed by the Respondent local authority from 17 March 2021 to 31 March 2023 as a health and wellbeing development officer.[5]The Claimant says that she was subject to detrimental treatment by her line manager from 17 August 2022 until the termination of her employment. The Respondent admits that the Claimant was disabled at all material times by virtue of the impairment of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and that the Claimant informed her line manager of that on 24 June 2022. The Claimant says that she was subject to detrimental treatment after disclosing her disability, and that the reason for that was because she required adjustments and was therefore (seen as) an inconvenience.[6]The Respondent accepts that the Claimant raised an informal grievance on 16 December 2022 about the Respondent’s alleged failure to make reasonable adjustments. The Respondent denies that this was a protected act, as they say that it was false and made in bad faith. The Claimant says that she was subject to further detrimental treatment by her line manager thereafter because she had done a protected act. The Claimant says that her dismissal was unfair. She denies that there was a redundancy situation because she says that there was funding for her post.[7]The issues for the Tribunal to determine are set out in the List of Issues [A61 – A65]. For ease of reference, these are each set out below in the Findings and Deliberation section of this Judgment, along with the Tribunal’s decision on each point.
The Law
[8]The law relevant to the issues before the Tribunal is set out below. Time Limits[9]Section 123 of the Equality Act 2010 provides that no complaint may be brought after the end of the period of three months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates or such other period as the Employment Tribunal thinks just and equitable. For the purposes of this section conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of that period and failure to do something is to be treated as occurring when the person in question decided on it.[10]An act will be regarded as extending over a period if an employer maintains and keeps in force a discriminatory regime, rule, practice or principle which Case Number: 3201480/2023 3 has had a clear and adverse effect on the complainant. The concepts of ‘policy, rule, practice, scheme or regime' should not be applied too literally, particularly in the context of an alleged continuing act consisting of numerous incidents occurring over a lengthy period, Hendricks v Metropolitan Police Comr. [2003] IRLR 96, CA at paras 51-52.[11]Where there are numerous allegations of discriminatory acts or omissions, the complainant must prove thata. the incidents are linked to each other, andb. that they are evidence of a 'continuing discriminatory state of affairs'. The focus should be on the substance of the complaints to determine whether there was an ongoing situation or continuing state of affairs as distinct from a succession of unconnected or isolated specific acts.[12]If the claim is presented outside the primary limitation period (that is, after the relevant three months), the Tribunal may still have jurisdiction if, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to extend time. This is essentially an exercise in assessing the balance of prejudice between the parties, using the following principles:a. The Claimant bears the burden of persuading the Tribunal that it is just and equitable to extend time. There is no presumption that time will be extended but nor is there any magic to that phrase and it should not be applied too vigorously as an additional threshold or barrier.b. The Tribunal takes into account anything which it finds to be relevant and may form a fairly rough idea of whether the claim appears weak or strong. It is generally more onerous for a Respondent to be put to defending a late, weak claim and less prejudicial for a Claimant to be deprived of such a claim;c. This is the exercise of a wide, general discretion and may include the date from which a Claimant first became aware of the right to present a complaint. The existence of other, timeously presented claims will be relevant because it will mean, on the one hand, that the Claimant is not entirely unable to assert his rights and, on the other, that the very facts upon which he seeks to rely may already fall to be determined. Consideration here is likely to include whether it is possible to have a fair trial of the issues. This will involve an assessment of two types of prejudice as referred to in the authorities. The first is the general prejudice that inherently follows from being required to respond to a claim which is presented out of time (the prejudice of meeting the claim). The second is the effect upon the evidence of the delay (sometimes referred to as forensic prejudiced. There is no requirement to go through all the matters listed in section 33(3) Limitation Act 1980, provided no significant factor has been left out of account, British Coal Corporation v Keeble (length and reason for delay, effect on cogency of evidence, cooperation, steps taken once knew of the possibility of action). Case Number: 3201480/2023 4[13]The best approach for a Tribunal considering the exercise of its discretion to extend time is to assess all the factors in the particular case. These will include the public interest in the enforcement of time limits and the undesirability in principle of investigating stale issues, Adedeji v University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust [2021] EWCA Civ 23. Unfair Dismissal[14]Section 98(1) and 98(2) of the Employment Rights At 1996 (ERA) establishes that there must be a fair reason for a dismissal.[15]Section 98 ERA(1) In determining for the purposes of this Part whether the dismissal of an employee is fair or unfair, it is for the employer to show— (a) the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal, and (b) that it is either a reason falling within subsection (2) or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the employee held.(2) A reason falls within this subsection if it— (a) relates to the capability or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do, (b) relates to the conduct of the employee, (c) is that the employee was redundant, or (d) is that the employee could not continue to work in the position which he held without contravention (either on his part or on that of his employer) of a duty or restriction imposed by or under an enactment.[16]If an employer shows a fair reason for dismissal, the question of fairness is then determined by section 98(4) of the ERA.[17]Section 98 ERA (4) Where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (1), the determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair (having regard to the reason shown by the employer)—(a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer’s undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and(b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case.[18]In Abernethy v Mott, Hay & Anderson [1974] ICR 323 it was confirmed that Case Number: 3201480/2023 5 “the reason for the dismissal is a set of facts known to the employer, or it may be of beliefs held by him, which cause him to dismiss the employee”.[19]In Kelly v Royal Mail Group Ltd EAT 0262/18 Mr Justice Choudhury (President of the EAT) observed “Whilst absence-related dismissals can fall under the rubric of capability within the meaning of S.98… there is no hard and fast distinction such that all absence-related dismissals must be so categorised. In the present case, the issue is not so much whether or not the Claimant was capable or unable to do his work as a result of ill health, but that his attendance was unreliable and unsatisfactory. That, it seems to me, is perfectly capable of falling into the residual category of some other substantial reason”.[20]In Iceland Frozen Foods v Jones [1982] IRLR 439. The correct approach to reasonableness was given by Browne-Wilkinson J, the then President of the EAT: “We consider that the authorities establish that in law the correct approach for the Industrial Tribunal to adopt in answering the question posed by s.57(3) of the 1978 Act [now s.98(4) of the 1996 Act] is as follows.(1) the starting point should always be the words of [s.98(4)] themselves;(2) in applying the section an Industrial Tribunal must consider the reasonableness of the employer's conduct, not simply whether they (the members of the Industrial Tribunal) consider the dismissal to be fair;(3) in judging the reasonableness of the employer's conduct an Industrial Tribunal must not substitute its decision as to what was the right course to adopt for that of the employer;(4) in many (though not all) cases there is a band of reasonable responses to the employee's conduct within which one employer might reasonably take one view, another quite reasonably take another;(5) the function of the Industrial Tribunal, as an industrial jury, is to determine whether in the particular circumstances of each case the decision to dismiss the employee fell within the band of reasonable responses which a reasonable employer might have adopted. If the dismissal falls within the band the dismissal is fair: if the dismissal falls outside the band it is unfair.”[21]In Taylor v OCS Group Ltd [2006] ICR 602 CA, it was confirmed that the appeal is part of the overall process of a dismissal and is always relevant to the Tribunal’s determination of fairness. Discrimination arising from disability[22]Section 15 of the Equality Act 2010 states that: S 15. A person(a) (A) discriminates against a disabled person(b) (B) if – A treats B unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of B’s disability, and Case Number: 3201480/2023 6 A cannot show that the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.[23]The way in which a Tribunal should approach section 15 claims was set out by Simler J (then President) in the case of Pnaiser v NHS England [2016] IRLR 170 as follows: -[24]The Tribunal should first identify whether there was unfavourable treatment and by whom.[25]The Tribunal must then determine what caused the impugned treatment, or what was the reason for it. The focus is on reason in the mind of the alleged discriminator at this point (the subjective test).[26]The causal link between the “something” that causes unfavourable treatment and the disability may include more than one link. In other words, more than one relevant consequence of the disability may require consideration, and it will be a question of fact assessed robustly in each case whether something can properly be said to arise in consequence of disability. It must have at least a significant or more than trivial influence on the unfavourable treatment, and so amount to an effective reason or cause of it (objective test). The more links in the chain of causation, the harder it will be to establish the necessary connection. This stage of the causation test involves an objective question and does not depend on the thought processes of the alleged discriminator.[27]Motive is irrelevant.[28]The knowledge required is of the disability only, and does not extend to knowledge of the ‘something’ that led to the unfavourable treatment.[29]It does not matter in which order these are considered by the Tribunal.[30]For discrimination arising from disability to occur, a disabled person must have been treated ‘unfavourably’ or put at a disadvantage. The definition of discrimination arising does not involve any comparison with a non-disabled person; it requires unfavourable treatment, not less favourable treatment. (See also Griffiths v Secretary of State for Work & Pensions [2015] EWCA Civ 1265). Persons may be said to be treated unfavourably if they are not in as good a position as others generally would be.[31]The Tribunal considered the case of IPC Media Ltd Millar [2012] IRLR 707 in which it was held that the Employment Tribunal has to consider whether the proscribed factor operated on the mind of the alleged discriminator – whether consciously or unconsciously – to a significant extent. The Tribunal would need to identify the person whose mind is in issue and who, in an appropriate case – becomes A above. Victimisation[32]Section 27 of the Equality Act 2010 prohibits victimisation. S. 27 Victimisation Case Number: 3201480/2023 7(1) A person (A) victimises another person (B) if A subjects B to a detriment because— (a)B does a protected act, or (b)A believes that B has done, or may do, a protected act.(2) Each of the following is a protected act— (a)bringing proceedings under this Act; (b)giving evidence or information in connection with proceedings under this Act; (c)doing any other thing for the purposes of or in connection with this Act; (d)making an allegation (whether or not express) that A or another person has contravened this Act.(3) Giving false evidence or information, or making a false allegation, is not a protected act if the evidence or information is given, or the allegation is made, in bad faith.(4) This section applies only where the person subjected to a detriment is an individual.(5) The reference to contravening this Act includes a reference to committing a breach of an equality clause or rule.[33]The Claimant does not need to show a comparator but she must prove that she did a protected act and that she was subjected to a detriment because she had done that protected act. As with direct discrimination, it is not necessary for the Claimant to show conscious motivation, it is sufficient that the protected characteristic or protected act had a significant influence on
the outcome.
[34]In considering the burden of proof, the Tribunal referred to s.136 Equality Act 2010 and the guidance set out in the case of Igen Ltd v Wong [2005] IRLR 258, CA as approved in Madarassy v Nomura International Plc [2007] IRLR 246, CA. This guidance reminds the Tribunal that it is for the Claimant to prove facts from which the Tribunal could conclude, in the absence of adequate explanation, that the employer has committed an act of unlawful discrimination. The outcome at this stage of the analysis will usually depend upon what inferences it is proper to draw from the primary facts found by the Tribunal. Where the Claimant has proved such facts, the burden of proof moves and it is necessary for the employer to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the treatment was in no sense whatsoever on the prohibited ground.[35]In considering whether the burden of proof has shifted, the Tribunal should not adopt an overly mechanistic approach but rather consider whether discrimination can properly and fairly be inferred from the evidence, Laing v Manchester City Council [2006] IRLR 748. A Tribunal will be setting an impermissibly high hurdle, however, if it asks if discrimination is the only inference which could be drawn from the facts, Pnaiser v NHS England and Coventry City Council [2016] IRLR 170, EAT. Findings and Deliberation Unfair Dismissal Case Number: 3201480/2023 8[36]This has always, in the Tribunal’s view, been a very weak claim. Both parties agree that the Claimant was on a fixed term contract, which ended in March 2023. The Respondent was under no obligation to renew this contract. The Tribunal accepts that there were some conversations and emails which suggested that the contract could be extended, subject to funding, but these fall very far short of any actual agreement to do so. The Claimant was informed on 27 January 2023 [B41] that her fixed term contract was coming to an end on 31 January 2023. She did not challenge this.[37]It is also clear from the FoI request that funding for the project that the Claimant worked on was renewed, but it is a matter for the Respondent to decide how this funding was allocated. There was no obligation on the Respondent to renew the fixed term contract even if there was funding for the project. This was therefore not even a redundancy situation; the Claimant was on a fixed term contract which came to an end, and she was dismissed as a result of that contract ending. The claim of unfair dismissal therefore fails. Discrimination arising from disability[38]In a s.15 claim, which is how the Claimant’s claim has been pleaded, the Tribunal must find two things if the claim is to succeed. First, there must be “unfavourable treatment”; and second, the unfavourable treatment must be “because of something arising in consequence of disability”. If either of those two elements are present, then the claim fails.[39]It is important to note that a feeling of being singled out or being “invalidated” or “gaslighted” – which are both terms that the Claimant used – are not on their own claims that can be brought in the Employment Tribunal. The Tribunal can only apply the law as it stands currently.[40]Taking things in reverse order, the Tribunal first considered what things arose in consequence of the Claimant’s disability.[41]As per 5.2 of the List of Issues: Did the following things arise in consequence of the Claimant’s disability: 5.2.1 The Claimant needed support / adjustments at work.[42]This was not challenged by the Respondent and is clearly the case. The Respondent did make adjustments for the Claimant. 5.2.2 The Claimant was, or was perceived by the Respondent / Mrs Ur-Rehman to be, an inconvenience because she needed support / adjustments.[43]The Tribunal does not accept this was the case. The Tribunal found that Ms Ur-Rehman was an honest and credible witness and the Tribunal accepts her evidence that she, and the other managers she worked with, took a very serious view of disability. This is supported by the workshop she attended on reasonable adjustments when the Claimant told her about her disability. Case Number: 3201480/2023 9 The Tribunal accepts that significant adjustments were made, and Ms Ur- Rehman went to considerable efforts to implement these.[44]Any inconvenience, if there was any, was directed at the Respondent’s own internal processes and the difficulties in getting the reasonable adjustment’s put in place. The Tribunal is satisfied that the Claimant was not, nor was perceived to be, an inconvenience because she needed support / adjustments.[45]Therefore, the only thing arising in consequence of the Claimant’s disability was the need for support / adjustments. The Tribunal has gone on to consider each of the allegations raised, and considered if they amount to unfavourable treatment, and if so, was that unfavourable treatment because of the Claimant’s need for support / adjustments.[46]At 5.1 of the List of Issues, the question for the Tribunal is: Did the Respondent treat the Claimant unfavourably by: 5.1.1: On 17 August 2022 did Ms Ur-Rehman state “this is what the job requires”, and that the Claimant “should be grateful for the opportunity”?[47]Ms Ur-Rehman doesn’t recall saying this. Her recollection is that the comment was that that the role was a good fit for the Claimant. On the balance of probabilities, the Tribunal finds that this is more likely to be what was said. That does not amount to unfavourable treatment.[48]The Tribunal is also satisfied that there is nothing unreasonable about a manager telling an employee what the job requires. This is not unfavourable treatment.[49]However, if the Tribunal is wrong, even if the words were said as the Claimant says, and this did amount to unfavourable treatment, it was not said because the Claimant needed support / adjustments and therefore does not succeed as a claim of discrimination arising from disability.[50]Looking at issue 5.1.2, the question is: 5.1.2: On 13 September 2022 did Ms Ur-Rehman say to the Claimant that she didn’t understand her confusion, and felt this was a good job for the Claimant?[51]The Tribunal accepts that Ms Ur-Rehman said she didn’t understand the Claimant’s confusion. It is not unreasonable for her to explain she didn’t understand, and the Tribunal finds that this does not amount to unfavourable treatment.[52]The Tribunal further finds that the “Good job for you” comment is a supportive comment and does not amount to unfavourable treatment.[53]The Tribunal is further satisfied that neither comment was said because the Claimant required support / adjustments and therefore does not succeed as a claim of discrimination arising from disability. Case Number: 3201480/2023 10[54]Issue 5.1.3 is: 5.1.3: On 25 October 2022 did Ms Ur-Rehman deny the complaints brought to her by the Claimant, and state that the Claimant was being aggressive towards her?[55]The Tribunal accepts that the meeting on 25 October 2022 was a heated one. The Tribunal finds that Ms Ur-Rehman did deny the complaints being brought against her.[56]The Tribunal accepted that Ms Ur-Rehman repeatedly asked the Claimant to stop speaking in a raised voice. Her evidence on this point was credible. The Tribunal further accepts that Ms Ur-Rehman was intimidated by the Claimant. Ms Ur-Rehman’s witness statement says that the Claimant was aggressive, and the Tribunal finds that Ms Ur-Rehman’s account of the Claimant’s behaviour in this meeting was an honest and credible one. The denial of complaints was because of the Claimant’s behaviour in the meeting, and not because the Claimant needed support / adjustment and therefore does not succeed as a claim of discrimination arising from disability.[57]The next issue the Claimant’s s.15 claim is at 5.1.4. 5.1.4: On 31 October 2022 did Ms Ur-Rehman refuse to engage in mediation with the Claimant?[58]The Tribunal accepts the Claimant’s evidence on this point that Ms Ur- Rehman did decline to engage in mediation with the Claimant, which was also accepted by Ms Ur-Rehman. There was no evidence that the proposed mediation would take two days, which was Ms Ur-Rehman’s case. The Claimant did not challenge the evidence that it would take one whole day (as it was with an external mediation service). The Tribunal accepts that Ms Ur-Rehman was very busy with upcoming deadlines, and this is the reason she chose to decline the mediation. She also believed, rightly or wrongly, that other suitable arrangements were in place, having consulted her line manager and HR. Her decision to decline to participate in mediation was not because the Claimant needed support / adjustment and therefore does not succeed as a claim of discrimination arising from disability.[59]Considering issue 5.1.5: 5.1.5: In the period 3 November 2022 to 5 December 2022 did Ms Ur-Rehman fail to discuss the reasonable adjustments assessment with the Claimant?[60]The Claimant was off sick between 28 Nov and 5 December 2022. Ms Ur- Rehman met with her on 1 November, 16 November and when she returned on the 05 December to discuss any work issues. The Tribunal accepts that these meetings did take place, and the Claimant had the opportunity to discuss any adjustments at these meetings. The Tribunal therefore finds this allegation to be factually incorrect, and it cannot succeed. Case Number: 3201480/2023 11[61]In the middle of the above period, issue 5.1.6 arose: 5.1.6: On 16 November 2022 did Ms Ur-Rehman bring another officer on PO7 scale to a meeting with the Claimant for the stated purpose of there being a breakdown in their relationship, even though she had not engaged in mediation which the Claimant had proposed for that purpose?[62]The Tribunal is satisfied that this did happen. The Tribunal accepts Ms Ur- Rehman’s evidence that this was advised by her line manager and by HR, based on the events of the previous meetings. This advice was given because Ms Ur-Rehman felt she needed support at the meeting. Ms Ur- Rehman felt that the Claimant’s behaviour was becoming difficult, and she felt it would be better to have support at the meeting.[63]The Tribunal also accepts Ms Ur-Rehman’s evidence, which was credible, that the Claimant and the other manager had a good relationship.[64]The Tribunal finds that the Respondent did consider the Claimant’s request to being a colleague from her team. The Tribunal also accepts that the Respondent’s position – namely that this put the colleague in a difficult position – was a reasonable one. The HR advice was that there should be another person present, and that the third person should be a manager, and this was to aid both the Claimant and Ms Ur-Rehman. The Tribunal does not accept this that was done to create a power imbalance in the meetings. It was not unfavourable treatment.[65]Once the Claimant had returned from her sick leave, the issue at 5.1.7 is: 5.1.7: On 5 December 2022 did Ms Ur-Rehman not accept the Claimant’s stated need for an adjustment of compressed hours, and did she instead say that she needed to ask occupational health for their advice?[66]The context of this issue is in relation to the Claimant’s request to work a compressed week. This being something that would benefit the Claimant was only confirmed in November, in the OH report of 3 November.[67]During cross-examination of Ms Ur-Rehman and during her submissions, the Claimant spoke of her lived experience and asked why this could not have been accepted by Ms Ur-Rehman, and the adjustment put in place straight away. The Tribunal is satisfied that this is an unrealistic and unreasonable expectation on the part of the Claimant. The important word in reasonable adjustments is “reasonable”. Any adjustment has to be considered to see if will be workable for the business. It has to be sufficiently explored and managed and the process put in place. This, inevitably, takes some time. Various people and departments of the business have to be consulted. This could involve further referrals to OH and HR. The Tribunal does also accept that Ms Ur-Rehman was motivated by a genuine concern for the Claimant and how longer working days would affect her, given that the Claimant has been complaining about burnout, and Ms Ur-Rehman had her own experience of working compressed hours and how this could affect a person. Case Number: 3201480/2023 12[68]This arrangement was put in place by January 2023, which in the Tribunal’s view is a reasonable timeframe.[69]The Tribunal is satisfied that the request was considered properly and that the correct processes were followed. Adjustments such as this are not put in place immediately and not just on the basis of being asked for. While it is therefore true that the Claimant’s stated need for compressed hours was not immediately accepted on 5 December, this was entirely reasonable and did not amount to unfavourable treatment, as the process was being followed.[70]Following the findings above, the claim of discrimination arising from disability fails.[71]The Tribunal then considered issue 6, which is the Victimisation claim pursuant to s.27 of the Equality Act 2010.[72]For a claim of victimisation to succeed, there must be a protected act, and there must be a detriment caused because of that protected act.[73]Issue 6.1 is therefore: Did the Claimant do a protected act as follows: 6.1.1 The parties agree that the Claimant lodged an informal grievance on 16 December 2022 alleging failure to make reasonable adjustments. The Respondent says that this was not a protected act because they say that it was a false allegation made in bad faith.[74]The Tribunal does not accept the Respondent’s argument on this point. The Claimant believed she had legitimate concerns regarding her reasonable adjustments, and she was entitled to raise these in a grievance. She did so in an email to Ms Ur-Rehman on 16 December 2022 [B35]. The grievance is therefore a legitimate protected act.[75]The Tribunal must therefore go on to consider each of the allegations. In doing so, the Tribunal must apply a two-stage test. First, has the Claimant established facts from which the Tribunal could conclude that, in the absence of any other explanation, discrimination has occurred. If so, the burden of proof reverses, and the Respondent must prove a non- discriminatory reason for the conduct.[76]Issue 6.2 is: Did the Respondent do the following things: 6.2.1 On date 28, 30 Nov and 15 Dec did Ms Ur-Rehman cancel the Claimant’s appraisal meeting, having previously stated that it was postponed (on the Claimant’s request)?[77]The Tribunal is satisfied that the Claimant’s appraisal meeting was postponed as the Claimant was off sick on 28 and 30 November. The Claimant was not in work and therefore the meeting could not go ahead. Case Number: 3201480/2023 13[78]The appraisal meeting was postponed again on 15 December. The Tribunal accept Ms Ur-Rehman’s evidence that this postponement was due to her workload. The grievance was not submitted until 16 December. The postponements therefore cannot be because of the grievance, as they pre- date it. The postponements had nothing to do with the Claimant’s protected act.[79]The next issue in the Victimisation claim is at 6.2.2: 6.2.6: On 20 December 2022 was the Claimant excluded from a team day out invitation which was sent by email? Was the Claimant only subsequently invited on the team day out because she raised this omission?[80]This took place only four days after the Claimant’s grievance was submitted. The Claimant says she was the only person not invited to this event. This was not challenged, and the Tribunal accepts this. The burden of proof therefore passes to the Respondent.[81]The Respondent’s case is that Ms Ur-Rehman did not send the email; it was sent by her line manager, Mohamed Hammoudan. The Respondent’s stated case in the Grounds of Resistance is that Mr Hammoudan did not know about this grievance. This has been demonstrated to be incorrect, as Mr Hammoudan was clearly copied into the email sending the grievance [B35]. The Respondent has not provided the original email to show the distribution list or explain how the Claimant came to be missed off it. The Tribunal only has the email where the Claimant asks why she wasn’t included in the original distribution list [B38].[82]The Tribunal has not heard from Mr Hammoudan for his explanation of why the Respondent says he was not aware of the grievance when it was cc’d to him. The Tribunal finds that the Respondent has not discharged the burden of proof in showing a non-discriminatory reason for this treatment. This allegation of victimisation is therefore upheld.[83]Allegation 6.2.3: 6.2.3: On 10 January 2021 did Ms Ur-Rehman blank the Claimant by not replying to the Claimant when she said good morning?[84]This allegation turns purely on a factual basis. The Tribunal accepts Ms Ur- Rehman’s evidence on this point, which the Tribunal found to be honest, credible and convincing. Accept that she was working with her back to the room and she did not intentionally blank the Claimant. If she did blank the Claimant, it was not because of the Claimant’s protected act.[85]Allegation 6.2.4 is stated as: 6.2.4: On 14 March 2023 did Ms Ur-Rehman inform the Claimant that her team were planning a surprise leaving event, thus ruining the surprise? Case Number: 3201480/2023 14[86]This allegation again turns purely on a factual basis. Ms Ur-Rehman gave a credible account that she didn’t know that the leaving event was supposed to be a surprise. She gave a consistent and believable account of seeing an email chain relating to a lunch, and she had not intended to ruin any surprise. The Tribunal is satisfied that her actions were unintentional, and not because of the Claimant’s protected act.[87]Allegation 6.2.5: 6.2.5: On or before 14 March 2023 did Ms Ur-Rehman request that the Claimant’s leaving event take place after office hours, at a time when Ms Ur-Rehman would be unable to attend?[88]The Tribunal is satisfied that this was a suggestion, not a request or instruction. The Tribunal accepts Ms Ur-Rehman’s evidence that she made the suggestion stated that two members of the team were working remotely across Newham to promote the Volunteers programme and they would not be able to attend the lunch. The Tribunal is satisfied that the Claimant’s grievance played no part in the thought process of Ms Ur-Rehman when she made this suggestion.[89]The penultimate issue for the Tribunal is at 6.2.6: 6.2.6: It is admitted that on or around 28 March 2023 Ms Ur-Rehman did not sign the Claimant’s leaving card.[90]The Tribunal accepts Ms Ur-Rehman’s explanation, which was credible, that she missed the deadline to sign the online card. It was put to her that there was a physical card, and she appeared genuine when she said that was the first time she had heard of that, and she wasn’t aware of the physical card. The Tribunal accepts that this was a genuine oversight on Ms Ur-Rehman’s part, and that this was not done because of the Claimant’s grievance.[91]The final issue is 6.2.7: 6.2.7: It is admitted that after 28 March 2023 (which was the Claimant’s last day in the office) her account access was blocked.[92]The 28 March was the Claimant’s last day of work due to her taking three days of annual leave. The Tribunal is satisfied that for her account assess to be block on her last day is standard procedure, and there is no evidence that is subjected the Claimant to a detriment.[93]The Claimant’s claim of victimisation therefore succeeds in part.[94]The part that has succeeded is, however, out of time, as it predates 25 March 2023. There is no automatic right to extend time limits. A Tribunal can extend time limits if is it just and equitable to do so. The Tribunal has a wide discretion in this regard. Here, we have a proven instance of victimisation. All forms of discrimination are unlawful and should be addressed. Using its wide discretion, the Tribunal finds that it is just and equitable to extend the time limits in relation to this claim. Case Number: 3201480/2023 15[95]The part that has succeeded will attract an award in the lower Vento band. In respect of claims presented on or after 6 April 2023, the “Vento bands” shall be as follows: a lower band of £1,100 to £11,200 (less serious cases) Invite short submissions on remedy because we make our decision.[96]This was a less serious example of a detriment. The Claimant was omitted from an email notifying of an event that she wanted to go to. She only found out about it from overhearing colleagues, and she had to contact her manager to ask if she could attend and why she had been omitted. She was then forwarded the original email late on the same day. There was no apology or explanation for why she had been omitted from the original email. She did attend the event.[97]This would have caused some, but relatively minor injury to feeling. In the Tribunal’s assessment, the appropriate award is £2,000.00 plus interest. Approved by: