Mr I Siddique v London Domestic Appliances (UK) Ltd: 3201281/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 3201281/2023

Between

Mr I SiddiqueClaimant

London Domestic Appliances (UK) LtdRespondent

Before

Employment Judge B Elgot

Members

Ms M Legg

Mr P Lush

Date 8 December 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The claim for accrued and unpaid holiday pay SUCCEEDS. The Claimant is entitled to the sum of £ 1496.96 which the Respondent agrees is owed plus £480 for 5 days in January and February 2023. The total sum of £ 1976.96 must be paid to the Claimant by the Respondent within 21 days.

[2]The claim for breach of contract (unpaid notice pay) SUCCEEDS and the Respondent must pay to the Claimant the sum of £458.77 which represents one week’s average pay calculated gross.

[3]The claim for unauthorised deductions under section 13 Employment Rights Act 1996 (the 1996 Act) including unpaid wages SUCCEEDS in part and the Respondent is ORDERED to pay the following amounts to the Claimant: i) In respect of unlawfully deducted speeding and parking fines and tolls £710+£9.94=£719.994 ii) His wages at an hourly rate of £12 for time spent travelling from his final job of the day back to the Respondent’s depot. 138 hours x £12= £1656 + £50 agreed travel costs from Bournemouth to Hainault. Total £1706

[4]The complaints of disability discrimination do not succeed and are DISMISSED. The Tribunal finds that the Claimant was not subjected to direct disability discrimination under section 13 Equality Act 2010 (the 2010 Act) and neither did the Respondent fail in its duty to make reasonable adjustments to avoid the disadvantage the Claimant experienced as a disabled person (section 20 Equality Act 2010) The Tribunal is satisfied that the Claimant was treated unfavourably and particularly was dismissed because of something arising from his disability. However, the Tribunal also finds that the Respondent has shown that the unfavourable treatment was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. Therefore, the disability discrimination claim under section 15 of the 2010 Act also fails.

[5]Pursuant to the Tribunal’s powers in Rules 72-77 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 the Respondent is ORDERED to pay the sum of £360 to the Claimant in respect of the Claimant’s preparation time while not legally represented. The Tribunal considers that the Respondent acted unreasonably in the way that the proceedings were conducted by it and breached tribunal orders. The hourly rate is £45 and we have assessed that it is reasonable and proportionate for the Claimant to have spent 8 hours on additional preparatory work resulting from the Respondent’s unreasonable conduct. 8x £45=£360.

[6]The total payable to the Claimant within 21 days is £5221.67 (£1976.96+458.77+719.94+1706+360)

REASONS

[1]The background to these claims1.1 The Claimant makes claims of disability discrimination under sections 13,15 and 20 of the Equality Act 2010 and for monies owed to him in respect of unpaid notice pay, for accrued and unpaid holiday pay and for unauthorised deductions from his wages.

1.2 The Claimant and the Respondent, as unrepresented parties, had the benefit of directions and guidance from three other Employment Judges sitting alone (EJ) before these claims came to this Final Hearing. There were preliminary hearings (PH) before Employment Judge S Knight on 2 November 2023, Employment Judge Crosfill on 8 October 2024 and Employment Judge Sugarman on 12 March 2025. At each of those PHs the parties were enabled to agree a summary of the case background, to understand the case management orders with which they were ordered to comply and to have the claims and issues clarified in preparation for this final Hearing. The parties have been sent electronic links to useful information published online about Employment Tribunals and their procedure.

1.3 Copies of the pleadings (Claim and Response forms) and of the relevant tribunal case management orders and PH summaries are not all in the file/ bundle of documents for this Hearing and in this respect the Respondent has breached paragraph 50.1 of EJ Sugarman’s Order.

1.4 Importantly, there is a List of Issues (LOI) at Part C of the PH documents produced by EJ Sugarman on 12 March 2025 and updated from the PH on 2 November 2023. The LOI has not been disputed by the parties in any aspect. This Tribunal has therefore treated it as an agreed LOI and used this document as a comprehensive list of the matters in dispute between the Claimant and the Respondent at this final Hearing and as a summary of the questions this Tribunal is required to determine during the Hearing, in the light of all the verbal and oral evidence available to it.

[2]Documents2.1 The Claimant gave evidence on his own behalf, was cross examined by the Respondent’s representative and was asked questions by the Tribunal. He prepared and submitted a witness statement dated 21 June 2025 as ordered originally by EJ Crosfill on 8 October 2024 and as confirmed by EJ Sugarman at a third Preliminary Hearing (PH) on 12 March 2025 in paragraphs 52 and 53. No supplementary witness statements were sent. We are satisfied that the Respondent was sent a copy of this witness statement and has seen it.

2.2 However, the Claimant’s witness statement does not contain page references to documents in an agreed File of Documents, as ordered in paragraphs 48- 51 of EJ Sugarman’s Order, because the Respondent failed to agree, prepare or supply copies of a complete File properly indexed and paginated (sometimes called a ‘Bundle’ of documents).

2.3 Instead, the Claimant identified at the end of his witness statement a long appendix of ‘Supporting Documents’ upon which he apparently sought to prove his case and which were categorised by reference to his own indexing and identification system e.g. AAD ( his correspondence with Aadil Mahmood) AMB (which is messages and correspondence with Ambreen Mahmood) and LDA (London Domestic Appliances) Group Chat messages. There are other abbreviations such as PAY (pay slips) and PCN (penalty charge notices for parking and speeding contraventions.)

2.4 We note that the LDA Group Chat participants do not include any of the Respondent’s managers who gave evidence in this case and we find it is unlikely that they saw those messages.

2.5 The Tribunal explained to the Claimant that not only was this appendix of documents not compliant with previous case management orders regarding preparation of a File of Documents and of witness statements but also that it was unfeasible to read, even in the context of the Tribunal’s duty to make reasonable adjustments for the Claimant’s disability consisting of the mental impairment of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD).It was not possible to identify and read each of the documents in that appendix and analyse its significance and relevance to the Claimant’s evidence without drastically extending the time allocated for the final Hearing or indeed onerously affecting the fairness of the Hearing.

2.6 We are satisfied that in all respects adjustments for the Claimant’s disability were reasonably made by the Tribunal, for example, he was permitted to send digital copies of his AMB and LDA messages to the Tribunal and to the Respondent by way of a Supplementary File so that he could be reassured that his documentation was disclosed and complete. The Tribunal confirms that it received and read those messages. The Claimant was given breaks and additional time to review and collate the documents in his preferred way.

2.7 The responsibility for preparation of an agreed joint File /Bundle was clearly placed upon the Respondent. Paragraphs 48 to 51 of EJ Sugarman’s Order (and previous orders by EJs Knight and Crosfill) make it clear in plain language what must be done. We are certain that a sufficient and detailed verbal explanation of this responsibility was given to the Respondent and its representative, Mr Sajawal (Saj) Mahmood the Respondent’s Customer Services Manager who attended on the Respondent’s behalf at all three PHs. The work required was in a substantial part not done by the Respondent. The Notice of Hearing for the final Hearing is dated 17 March 2025. There has been not only a breach of the relevant orders but this failure to produce a workable File for the Tribunal, the Claimant and the witnesses to use was part of a pattern of incompetence, discourtesy and disrespect shown by the Respondent to the Tribunal and to the Claimant causing delay to the proceedings originally listed for four days and extending to eight days.

2.8 The Respondent was unwilling to attend at all on the first day of these proceedings on 8 July 2025 because it had been warned by the HMCTS administrative officer that, although listed, a Tribunal may not be available to hear the case. However, when a Tribunal was ready at 2pm the Respondent, having been informed of this at 11 am, should have already been prepared in anticipation of this event. The File of Documents was ordered to be prepared by 4pm on 7 June 2025, over one month earlier.

2.9 The Tribunal is satisfied that it further assisted the parties by taking a pragmatic and robust approach to the preparation of a useful Bundle in so far as this could be achieved in all the circumstances of the Respondent’s breach of its obligations including, for example, agreeing to find documents overnight and then not looking for or eventually producing them. Thus, for example, we arranged for the available documents to be placed behind generically numbered tabs with a description of the content e.g. tabs 26 and 27 contain messages from AAD to the Claimant.

2.10 There are documents produced by the Respondent such as the two printed copy contracts of employment, the notes of a disciplinary hearing on 20 January 2023 and a letter of dismissal dated 1 February 2023 (tab 6) which the Tribunal considers were either never sent or shown to the Claimant, were not received by him and/or were not produced contemporaneously with the events in question and have been written or otherwise generated later. The findings of fact about these documents is set out below.

2.11 We have identified the poor condition of the documentation compiled by the Respondent together with the necessity to photocopy, reproduce and re-label the File ,including digital additions, and to accommodate the Claimant’s OCD and mental health difficulties in order to explain that we have used best endeavours in the interests of justice to understand the written and verbal evidence in this case, to make findings of fact and to reach conclusions in accordance with the applicable law. For example, at the Claimant’s request the Respondent’s witness statements were read aloud. The Hearing was listed for four days and extended to eight days (including time for the determinations of the Tribunal) We are certain that the time and resources dedicated to these proceedings by the judiciary and the administrative staff has been sufficient and proportionate to the seriousness of the claims and issues.

2.12 Neither of the parties supplied equipment or made any other arrangements to play audio or video recordings. The Claimant is of no fixed abode and has no reliable access to the internet except through his mobile phone.

2.13 There is an updated Schedule of Loss sent by the Claimant to the Tribunal and the Respondent on 9 July 2025 filed behind tab 34.

2.14 In accordance with the usual practice of the Tribunal we did not read or take account of any documents to which our attention was not directed by the Claimant, the Respondent’s representative, or the witnesses.

[3]Witnesses3.1 The Respondent’s witnesses were Mr Aadil Mahmood (AAD) the Operations Manager and the Claimant’s day to day line manager, Mr Sajawal Mahmood (SM) and Ms Ambreen Mahmood (AMB) also sometimes referred to as Amber, and as Mrs Ambreen Hussain (this is her husband’s surname) gave evidence. AMB is the Respondent’s Human Resources and Payroll Manager. SM’s signed witness statement dated 25 February 2025 is at tab 22. AAD’s statement is under tab 17 and AMB’s two witness statements are tabs 18 and 19. None are signed. We are satisfied that the Claimant has seen copies.

3.2 We were given and have read witness statements from three of the Claimant’s ex-work colleagues, Messrs Humzah Arshad, Zunayre Hafeez and Rasel Ahmed (sometimes called Russell) none of whom attended the Hearing. It is not clear which of those witnesses are still employed by the Respondent. The Tribunal offered those witnesses the opportunity to participate by video ((with or without the camera turned on) but they declined to attend. It was explained to the Claimant and the Respondent that we would read the witness statements at tabs 20 21 and 23 dated 25 February 2025 none of which are signed. It was explained to the Respondent that we can give less weight to the evidence of witnesses who do not attend the Hearing in person or by video/telephone link and who do not therefore have to answer any questions or respond to any challenge to their evidence from the Claimant.

[4]The conduct of the Respondent and preparation time order made in favour of the Claimant4.1 The Respondent’s witnesses and its representative SM were frequently late without explanation or apology on several days of the Hearing causing delay and disruption to the proceedings.

4.2 AAD postponed his appearance as a witness in person on Days 1,2 and 3 as timetabled in the Hearing timetable prepared by EJ Sugarman and notified to the parties as a case management order (paragraph 34) on 12 March 2025. SM told us that AAD did not have time and could not leave the Respondent’s busy small business to operate without him. EJ Sugarman had already explained to SM at the PH on 12 March 2025 that it would be possible to sympathetically timetable the attendance of the Respondent’s witnesses for this reason but no request for any such arrangement was received and AAD failed to comply with the arrangements which were set. On 10 July 2025 (Day 3) he arrived but was obliged to almost immediately depart on an emergency visit to his wife in hospital. On Day 5 (23 September 2025) neither AAD nor AMB attended as witnesses even though they had both been directed to come. We were told that they were ‘unavailable’. This meant that Day 5 went short.

4.3 On 10 September 2025 a postponement request, made by the Respondent on 25 July 2025 in relation to the resumed part heard hearing, was refused.

4.4 On 24 September 2025 (Day 6) when AAD was due to be cross examined by the Claimant he again stated that he could not give his evidence in person and was permitted to participate by CVP video link. He said he was in Leeds caring for his mother although his surroundings on the video screen showed a street scene in London. His evidence was initially given from the car on a mobile phone and this was an unsuitable arrangement requiring yet further delay whilst he found another place and a reliable signal compliant with the clear instructions which are sent to all participants joining a hearing of any type using the CVP link.

4.5 AMB similarly said she was unable to come to give evidence on Day 5 as a result of childcare issues and refused the possibility of a CVP video appearance. She instead attended on day 6, 24 September 2025. This caused delay and disruption.

4.6 We are satisfied that the Claimant’s calculation that he was obliged to spend eight extra hours in re-preparing and reviewing his questions for the cross examination of AAD and AMB is correct. He is entitled to be compensated for the additional preparation time he has incurred as an unrepresented person. The set hourly rate is £45 x 8 = £ 360 and the Respondent is ordered to pay this sum to the Claimant within 21 days. We are satisfied that the Respondent’s conduct of these proceedings has in numerous respects been unreasonable and in breach of tribunal orders and directions. We are aware that the making of a preparation time order is not a punitive but a compensatory step for the Tribunal to impose. We have compensated the Claimant accordingly. However, we make the general observation that we have rarely come across the level of discourtesy and disrespect to the Tribunal and to the Claimant which has been demonstrated by this Respondent in its actions and the conduct of its witnesses and representative. This conduct has contributed to the fact that the extended length of the Hearing.

[5]Findings of fact about the Claimant’s employment5.1 The Claimant was employed by the Respondent as a Delivery Driver and Installer of domestic household appliances from 10 May 2022 until 24 February 2023. Driving was a significant part of his duties. He earned £12 per hour.

5.2 At the time of his dismissal he had not been employed for the qualifying period of two years’ continuous employment in section 108 Employment Rights Act 1996 (the 1996 Act) entitling him to make a claim of unfair dismissal. He does not rely on any of the exceptions in section 108(3) but he does contend that his dismissal was an act of disability discrimination.

5.3 The Respondent is a private limited company with a sole Director, Mr Shahid Mahmood, who did not give evidence. Mr Shahid Mahmood is the father of SM, AAD and AMB and there is another brother, Mr Bahawal Mahmood who works in the Respondent’s business but was not a witness in this case. The Respondent is a small family business which supplies, delivers and instals domestic appliances such as washing machines, dryers, fridge-freezers and dishwashers mostly across London and into Essex. It has a shop situated in Bethnal Green Road E2 and a warehouse unit on an industrial site at Hainault IG6. SM is based in the shop. AAD divides his working time between the shop and the warehouse. AMB works mostly from her home in Peterborough. We find that the Claimant’s operational line manager was Mr Aadil Mahmood (AAD). He drew up the work rotas and allocated jobs to the drivers and installers who work in a two or three man team. He was the manager who offered working hours to the Claimant and with whom the Claimant communicated when he could not work on certain days, for example, to attend health appointments and meetings regarding the implementation of his community service order (a criminal penalty imposed on the Claimant after an assault conviction) The Claimant also communicated and took instruction from Ms Ambreen Mahmood (AMB) in relation to all human resources and payroll matters including the submission to her of time records (i.e. hours worked and/or hours for which payment was claimed by him) and requests for alterations of those time records and payments.

5.4 We find that the Claimant was employed on a zero hours contract. He had no entitlement to be offered or to work any guaranteed number of hours per week although on days when he did work he was frequently working 10-12 hours per day. His claim that he is therefore entitled to a gross wage of £480 per week calculated as 40 hours guaranteed work x £12 is not accepted by the Tribunal. He has shown us no evidence to support a guaranteed hours arrangement. His pay slips under tab 5 show variable amounts earned each month. He was paid by bank transfer monthly in arrears.

5.5 By contrast the Respondent says that at a brief interview, initially in the shop in person with AAD, and then by telephone with AMB, the Claimant was verbally offered and accepted a zero hours contract. We find it more likely than not that this was the standard way of working for all the Respondent’s employees, as AAD and the other Respondent’s witnesses confirm. We find that the Claimant was sent to talk to AAD as a result of the intervention of his Wellness at Work Trust (WWT) advisor. WWT is a mental health support charity which has an in-work support service. The Claimant was helped by his WWT co-ordinator to look for ways in which he may find a way back in to employment. In those circumstances of vulnerability and insecurity it is unlikely, we find, that he would immediately be taken on permanently for a guaranteed 40 hours per week in the Respondent’s employment. We note that WWT gave the Claimant some support but not formal legal advice or representation after the end of his employment with the Respondent.

5.6 We are satisfied that the Claimant knew what his job entailed and received adequate training for his role. He was trained on the job over the course of two trial days when he was accompanied by Mr Shahid Mahmood. He always worked in a team of two or three with other experienced installers including on several days when he was accompanied by SM. He was tested and found capable of the physical heavy lifting of appliances.

[6]Written contracts of Employment6.1 There are two printed contracts of employment together with some printed ‘Policies and Procedures’ at tabs 32 and 33 in the File. Both are expressed to be zero hours contracts. The first is a ‘Statement of Main Terms and Conditions’ on a proforma supplied by Peninsula Business Services with whom the Respondent at one time had a retainer for employment and human resources advice. AMB told us that she completed the personalised details, names, addresses etc. typed on that document. It is not signed or dated by either the Claimant or the Respondent.

6.2 This contract which the Respondent has named ‘Imran Contract 1.1’ contains no provision for deductions from wages save in the event of an overpayment of wages. In the attached Safeguards and Standards Form SMT1 at paragraph F there is a ‘contractual right’ to deduct the cost of any damage to vehicles, stock or property caused by the carelessness, negligence, or deliberate vandalism of the employee. We were not told that the Respondent ever attempted to deduct such costs from the Claimant’s pay during his employment.

6.3 At paragraph N of the General Terms and Procedures Form it is stated that all speeding and parking fines are payable by the employee but that if the fine is at any time paid on the employee’s behalf by the ‘company’ then the cost will be deducted from the employee’s salary. It is unclear whether either the General Terms or the Safeguards and Standards Forms have contractual force and we heard no evidence in this respect.

6.4 There is also, behind tab 33 labelled ‘Imran Contract 1.2,’another printed contract of employment which is a proforma produced by Clarkslegal LLP in collaboration with the Simply Business insurance provider. Neither company are instructed by the Respondent so far as we are aware. This contract is also for 0 hours, it is undated and unsigned by either the Claimant or the Respondent and it entitles (at paragraph 15.1) deductions from salary only for ‘parking fines’, loss of tools and ‘loss to the properties belonging to the company [sic]’. Some individual information relating to the Claimant has been typed on to this standard form contract but some ‘optional’ parts in bold type have been left blank.

6.5 AMB told us that she sent the contract or contracts to the Claimant but could not recall the date when the documents were posted or likely to be received. She did not send them with any dated covering letter which is highly unusual HR practice. The Claimant is sure that he has never received any of this documentation or seen it before these tribunal proceedings began.

6.6 The contracts and policies are addressed to the Claimant at 24 Tibbatts Road London E3 3 PQ which AMB told us is the address printed on the Claimant’s driving license which she inspected before he began work. However, we are certain that the Respondent knew that the Claimant was not living at or regularly visiting this address. The Respondent knew that the Claimant was of no fixed abode, that he had been living in his car for over a year and intermittently staying at a hostel in Well Street, Hackney. SM told us he gave the Claimant a lift and dropped him off at that hostel on several occasions. Indeed, the Claimant had asked AAD whether he might sleep in his company van at the warehouse.

6.7 We conclude that the Claimant did not receive or read these contractual documents or know what was written in them. We can draw no safe conclusion about even an approximate date on which they were sent to Tibbatts Road, if at all. The Respondent made no attempt to follow up the despatch of these documents, it sent no covering letter, it never requested return of a signed copy from the Claimant, and no senior manager of the Respondent signed a copy. The Respondent took no steps to check the Claimant’s understanding of the contractual obligations in those documents particularly in relation to deductions from wages. SM told us ‘we reasonably agree he wasn’t going to get those letters and HR are not entirely sure the contract got to him. We agree he possibly didn’t get it.’

6.8 Section 13 of the 1996 Act (as slightly paraphrased below with our emphasis and underlining) provides for a strong presumption against deductions from pay and says that:- An employer shall not make a deduction from wages of a worker employed by him unless-

(a) the deduction is… authorised to be made by… a relevant provision of the worker’s contract, or

(b) the worker has previously signified in writing his agreement or consent to the making of the deduction. A ‘relevant provision’ of a contract means a provision of the contract contained in:- One or more written terms of the contract of which the employer has given the worker a copy on an occasion prior to the employer making the deduction in question. There is a similar statutory provision in section 13 (2) (b) where an employer has notified the worker in writing prior to the making of deductions.

6.9 We are satisfied that the Respondent did not, prior to the making of deductions from the Claimant’s pay, give him a copy of his contract or notify him in writing of the relevant terms and conditions of that contract/contracts which relate to deductions from wages. Therefore, the requirements of section 13 (1) (a) are not met and the deductions made are unlawful.

6.10 By reference to section 13 (1) (b) we have similarly decided that the Claimant did not ‘previously’, i.e. in advance of any deduction being made, agree or consent in writing to have such deductions from his wages made. We have seen correspondence at tab 9 between the Claimant and AMB in which he acknowledges that, where parking and speeding fines have been paid by the Respondent to obtain the early payment discount, he expects a deduction from his monthly pay and instead asks if he may pay the Respondent direct. (This seems to be because his OCD makes it very difficult for him to see an adjusted amount of pay on a payslip when he is expecting a precise amount.) This acknowledgment, even in written messages, of the ‘fait accompli’ and reality of the potential deduction does not however amount to compliance with the statutory requirements for a worker to signify, in writing, in advance of any deduction being made, that he agrees to the making of it. EJ Sugarman in paragraph 11 of the LOI does make it succinctly clear that the question is, ‘did the Claimant agree in writing to the deduction before it was made?’. We find that the Claimant did not so agree.

6.11 Accordingly, the deductions made by the Respondent have been made unlawfully. We accept, in the absence of any other financial, payroll or accounting evidence produced by the Respondent, that the Claimant’s calculation of the amounts deducted in the sum of £ 710 plus a toll of £ 9.94 is accurate. AMB gave us confirmation that no further amounts are outstanding and/or deemed by the Respondent as liable to be deducted from the outstanding holiday pay owed by the Respondent since the date of dismissal. This implies that £ £719.94 is the complete total.

6.12 The Respondent is ordered within 21 days to pay the sum of £719.94 to the Claimant.

[7]Other Unauthorised Deductions from Wages /Unpaid Wages7.1 We have already made a finding that the Claimant worked on a zero hours contract and his claim for unpaid wages in paragraph 16-18 of the Case Summary and in paragraphs 9.1-9.3 of the LOI, insofar as it depends on his alleged entitlement to be paid a guaranteed 40 hours per week, does not succeed.

7.2 He has withdrawn his claim in paragraph 9.1 of the LOI for unpaid hours in October, November and December 2022. This leaves a claim for a total of 5 hours 45 minutes in January and February 2023 at £12 per hour=£ 69. We do not award this sum. Again, we have made our best attempt to understand the financial and payroll information disclosed only in part by the Respondent and often re-calculated by the Claimant according to his own formulae. However, looking at tab 5 there are some comparative documents sent by the Respondent showing how the hours on the Claimant’s timecard tally with the hours on his pay slip. In respect of the month ending 31 January 2023 there is no discrepancy on the sixth page under tab 5 and the 3 hours 45 minutes claimed for January 2023 have not, we conclude, been underpaid. In relation to the month ending 28 February 2023 on the 7th page although there is an apparent under-payment of 2 hours there is a message on the following page from the Claimant to AMB in which he requests a deduction of 2 hours from his timecard ‘from my last shift of the month of February 2023 on [09/02/23] from [19.33]to [17.33] from[023.000HOURS]to021.000HOURS]..’ (sic) This request for alterations is typical of, and consistent with, the changes to his time cards which were frequently notified by the Claimant as a symptom of his OCD and an attempt to control his own numbering and timing systems which was accommodated by the Respondent as a reasonable adjustment for the disadvantage caused by his disability. We make further findings about this claim under section 20 of the 2010 Act in the paragraphs below. This part of his claim for unpaid wages does not succeed.

7.3 Finally, the Claimant says that a series of unauthorised deductions from his wages were made up to and including his final salary payment because he was not paid for time spent travelling from his last job of the day until arrival back at the Hainault depot. He has calculated a shortfall of 138 hours x £12 = £1656. We are faced with contradictory evidence from each of the three Respondent’s witnesses:

7.4 The two printed contracts in the File make no reference to time spent driving back to base at the end of the working day. AMB who says she sent those written contracts told us that this driving time is not paid unless it exceeds thirty minutes. AAD, the Claimant’s line manager, was adamant in his evidence that travel time over 15 minutes was paid. SM said that travel time back to the depot was never paid save in cases where AAD exercised his discretion to pay it and the parameters of that discretion were not described. 7.5. In these circumstances of unclear and inconsistent evidence we prefer to accept the contention of the Claimant that this time is due and owing to him and the Respondent is ordered within 21 days to pay £ 1656.00 together with an additional payment of £50 promised to the Claimant for a long journey home from Bournemouth to East London which was something of a ‘one-off’. £1656+50=£1706

[8]The Termination of the Claimant’s Employment8.1 We find that the Claimant was, as pleaded in his ET1 Claim, dismissed on 24 February 2023 with entitlement to one week’s notice pay to 1 March 2023.

8.2 He says that his dismissal was the final act in a course of discriminatory conduct extending over a period ending with the dismissal. We are satisfied by reference to section 123 of the 2010 Act that, given the date on which the claim form was presented on 14 July 2023 preceded by a period of mandatory early conciliation from 4 May to 15 June 2023, the disability discrimination complaints have been presented within the threemonth time limit of the final act to which those discrimination complaints relate.

8.3 Similarly, his wrongful dismissal/breach of contract claim for notice pay has been made on time. Under tab 5 the Claimant has produced (with his comments typed above) his final pay slip for the month ending 28 February 2023 which shows no amount for notice pay or indeed for holiday pay accrued. He was paid for 21 hours worked at £12 per hour in February 2023 and for 94 hours in January 2023 as the relevant pay slips show.

8.4 The dismissal was communicated in a message to the Claimant dated 24 February 2023 from AAD under tab 26. In his preceding message dated 22 February 2023 at 18.03 the Claimant makes it clear that he still regards himself as employed and asks for work. He had been complaining that since at least 29 January 2023 he had not been allocated hours. His message dated 22 February 2023 asks for his ‘discrepancy’ of hours for January, February and into March 2023 to be ‘assigned’ to make up the guaranteed hours to which he believes himself to be entitled (160 hours per month/ per 4-week period)

8.5 AAD responds at 18.06 on 22 February 2023 that ‘there is no work for you, when there will be, will contact you right away’ Thus, significantly, AAD does not tell the Claimant that he has already been dismissed because of his gross misconduct as the Respondent pleads and contends in these proceedings and as set out below.

8.6 We find that, after receipt of the Claimant’s response ‘you have left me out to dry in no man’s land’ in which he does acknowledge that colleagues have stated they no longer wish to work with him ‘without providing any valid or legitimate reason’, it is only at that point at 21:29, late on 24 February 2023 that the Respondent dismisses the Claimant :- ‘this is hard to say but I have to let you go’ And gives yet another reason summarised as a requirement for less employees (save the ‘highest performing’) because less work is available :- ‘We’ve had less and less work to do over the last several months. The company’s financial situation isn’t what it used to be and we can’t afford to keep operating with our current team. I can only keep a few of our highest-performing employees so I’m letting several people go, including you’ This is the only document we have seen produced by the Respondent in which it is said that the dismissal of the Claimant is, in effect, for redundancy. We have seen and heard no evidence of any other lay-offs or dismissals of the Respondent’s workforce for this reason.

8.7 AAD does then go on to reiterate the ‘other factors’ of generic misconduct and difficulty with the Claimant’s employment – Lateness, Drugs Behaviour Time Keeping, Punching in Punching Out etc. Constant complaints and other issues related to your overall attitude at work, seem not to have worked out for both of us’ . AAD does not state detail.

8.8 The series of messages ends with a threat of litigation from the Claimant and a request from AAD that all further communication between them takes place by post.

8.9 For the avoidance of doubt we find that the manner of the Claimant’s dismissal and the process and procedure followed was this one act by AAD of sending this message on 24 February 2023. We find below that no other procedure was implemented, no other correspondence was sent and no other communication with the Claimant about his threatened or actual dismissal occurred prior to the 24 February 2023 message. This finding of fact is important in relation to the successful defence of justification which the Respondent has established under section 15 (1)(b) of the 2010 Act (discrimination arising from disability) not least because the Claimant says, as recorded in paragraph 23.5 of the LOI, that ‘following an unfair disciplinary procedure’ was unfavourable treatment.

[9]The Respondent has pleaded and argued for alternative dates and methods of dismissal.9.1 In the ET3 Response it says 15 February 2023 and in the Amended Response the relevant date of dismissal is identified as 9 February 2023.

9.2 There is a letter dated 1 February 2023 at tab 6 which purports to be the letter of dismissal not signed by AMB but sent to the Claimant giving him notice to 13 February. Alternatively, in the third paragraph of the letter it is stated that the termination is with ‘immediate effect’, presumably meaning without notice. Again, the letter has been sent by post to 24 Tibbatts Road where the Respondent knew the Claimant was not living. There is no copy sent by hand, by email or in any message format which is how the Respondent usually communicated with him. The Claimant says he never received or saw the content of this letter and his evidence in this respect is credible and we believe him. We find that the letter was not sent to him on 1 February 2023 and therefore he was not aware of the specific allegations of misconduct made against him in numbered points 1-4 which are described as ‘some of the reasons for this dismissal.’

9.3 In circumstances where the dismissal is not properly and effectively communicated to an employee then the contract of employment has not been ended. Indeed, as we state above, AAD gave no indication that he knew or believed that the Claimant had been dismissed; in his messages of 24 February 2023 he tells the Claimant he will in due course receive an official email of termination and a final payslip at the end of the month. These messages do not make sense if the Respondent had already officially and formally dismissed the Claimant on 1 February 2023. AAD explained this contradiction by stating that he made a mistake in the What’s App messages when distracted by his children playing. The Claimant himself continued, until 24 February 2023, to ask for work and for working hours to be allocated to him; he gave no indication that he appreciated that he had been sacked. No other senior manager of the Respondent communicated with the Claimant throughout February 2023 in terms which referred to his previous dismissal.

9.4 The 1 February 2023 letter somewhat strangely refers to ‘our recent meetings and investigation into your conduct.’ We find that no such meetings or investigation occurred.

9.5 At tab 30 there are meeting notes which purport to be the minutes of a disciplinary meeting held between the Claimant, AAD and AMB (here named Ambreen Hussain) on 20 January 2023 at 9 am for exactly one hour; it is recorded that the Claimant ‘chose not to comment’ on any of the serious allegations which are stated to arise from the ‘findings of an internal investigation.’ We find this to be not credible. There was no such investigation, no invitation to or agenda for the meeting, no copy documents or witness statements for the Claimant to look at and the allegations of ‘gross’ misconduct were not put to the Claimant so that he had any opportunity to comment. All that can be said about these ‘minutes’ are that they provide some identification of the issues which were causing real consternation to the Respondent. But they did not act upon them promptly.

9.6 The Claimant denies that he attended this meeting or received a copy of the Minutes prepared by Ambreen Hussain as is written at the foot of the note behind tab 30. We prefer his evidence to that of the Respondent’s witnesses. For example, when asked about this alleged meeting AAD gave unreliable and contradictory evidence to that given by AMB and contained in the Minutes. He said, on oath that the Claimant and he were in the shop and AMB was ‘on the line.’ He strangely referred to buying the Claimant a coffee on that day to which the Claimant replied ‘you know I don’t drink coffee.’ First, we note that AAD and AMB make no subsequent reference to any such meeting in their messages to the Claimant leading up to 24 February 2023. Secondly, there are no other notes, records, minutes, reports, or correspondence in the File produced by the Respondent nor in the additional documentation submitted by the Claimant which make a reference to any other meetings or investigations into the Claimant’s conduct. This is the only alleged instance of a disciplinary meeting of any kind and we find that it did not occur. Finally, the P45 at tab 8 shows the Claimant’s leaving date to be 1 March 2023.

9.7 The Respondent’s case is that the result of this meeting is a final disciplinary warning. The words ‘final written warning’ are not used but the ‘Outcome’ states ‘Based on the investigation and conduct breaches, HR confirmed the decision to terminate employment should there be another act of Gross Misconduct’ (Tribunal’s emphasis and underlining) No time limit is set. We have not been referred by the Respondent’s representative or its witnesses to any provision of its Disciplinary Policy or Procedure.

9.8 We have carefully considered below whether the Claimant’s conduct during his employment was the reason or principal reason for his dismissal on 24 February 2023 and whether we can conclude and determine that there was no discriminatory reason for that dismissal, given his protected characteristic of disability.

9.9 One of the reasons why we have decided that the termination of the Claimant’s employment was an act of disability discrimination is that the Respondent’s case, in reliance on the 20 January 2023 meeting notes and the dismissal letter dated 1 February 2023, describe incidents and a chain of events which do not ‘add up.’ The Respondent has failed to show a rational, timely, well - advised approach compliant with employment law and the ACAS Code of Practice which demonstrates a conduct dismissal of the type it pleads in the ET3 and argues in its evidence.

[10]Notice Pay In all the circumstances of his dismissal the Claimant is entitled to one week’s notice pay. The Respondent has not shown that any such payment has been made. In view of our finding that the Claimant worked on a zero hours contract with no guaranteed wage per week we have done a calculation of his average wage over the three-month period from 1 October to December 2022. We have disregarded for the purposes of calculating an average, his reduced earnings in January and small amount of earnings in February 202310.1 There are copies of some of his monthly payslips under tab 5 which are difficult to read but we can deduce that in October 2022 he earned £ 1378.40, in November he earned £1571.53 and in December 2022 £3014.15. The average is £ 1988.03 over those three months. £1988.03 x 12 = £23,856.32 per annum divided by 52 weeks gives an average week’s earnings of £458.77 calculated gross.

10.2 We therefore award one week’s notice pay at £458.77 calculated gross and payable by the Respondent within 21 days.

[11]Holiday Pay11.1 The Respondent agrees that holiday pay is owed and has calculated the amount as £1496.96 as recorded in paragraph 14 of the Case Summary during the PH of 12 March 2025.

11.2 The holiday year for the Respondent’s employees runs from 1 January to 31st December in any year.

11.3 We have no reason to query the Respondent’s calculation of outstanding holiday pay. AMB told us that the holiday pay owing has been withheld so far in case further parking and traffic violation fines for which the Claimant was responsible were imposed and were to be the subject of deduction from his wages. We make detailed findings about these unauthorised deductions above.

11.4 The Claimant’s calculation of holiday pay due to him is based on his contention that he has a guaranteed 40 hours work per week, is paid £96 per day, and is entitled to 28 days holiday in 2022 making a claim of £2688 in total. We are satisfied that he was working on a zero hours contract with no minimum guaranteed hours. The Respondent’s calculation, which is done by an external payroll contractor and not by AMB herself, is based on actual hours worked over the course of 2022 and is more likely than not to be the correct calculation.

11.5 The Claimant is however also entitled to pro rata holiday pay for January and February 2023 for 4.66 days rounded up to 5 days. At a rate of £96 per day we award him an additional sum of holiday pay in the total amount of £480.

11.6 Total holiday pay which must be paid by the Respondent to the Claimant within 21 days is £1496.96+480= £1976.96.

[12]The reason for dismissal The Respondent contends that the Claimant was dismissed for reasons relating to his conduct and that the termination of his employment was not to do with his disability.12.1 The Claimant’s disability. The Respondent knew that the Claimant was disabled within the meaning of section 6 of the 2010 Act by a mental impairment which the Claimant describes in his particulars of claim as ‘conditions relating to mental health/neuro-diversity’ consisting of obsessive - compulsive disorder (OCD). His OCD manifests itself in ritualistic sometimes overwhelming behaviours including a need for him to order many of his daily activities by reference to numbering and counting systems and times, dates, and cycles of his own. He also has physical health problems and pain with Crohn’s disease.

12.2 There are consultant psychiatrist letters dated 2 August 2022, 19 January 2024 and 2 January 2025 behind tab 25 which give a detailed history and diagnosis of the Claimant’s mental health difficulties

12.3 Although the Respondent did not see these medical reports the Claimant did tell AAD about his OCD on or around 3 June 2022 as can be seen in the messages between them at tab 27 on the first eleven pages.

12.4 The messages behind the same tab show that Claimant requested reasonable adjustments because ‘I need you to recognise that my mental health has a huge impact on my way of life’ such as;

• Being permitted to sleep in his van at the warehouse. He points out that he slept in his car for a year outside his ‘families warehouse’ from April 2021 to April 2022.

• Amendments to his time cards by AMB so that his punch in and punch out times showed not the actual hours he punched in and out on a system called Punchbuddy but showed hours which fitted with the numerical pattern he required (see 22nd page tab 27)

• ‘full control over my working hours’ (see 21st page tab 27) and change of shift patterns with adequate rest (at least 12 hours)

• Changing the location for the pick up and drop off of his van from Hainault to Barking (at AAD’s home)

• Being permitted to arrange equipment and appliances in the van in a certain order

12.5 In no part of his evidence, at any point in these proceedings, has the Claimant said that his disability causes symptoms of uncontrollably angry, aggressive, and hostile behaviour and speech towards others meaning that many of his colleagues could not or would not work with him. This is important because no part of his case, as appears in the LOI and as told to us, consists of any contention that the Respondent should have made reasonable adjustments to avoid any disadvantage caused by any of its provisions, criteria or practices (PCP) which caused or exacerbated such symptoms. Neither does the Claimant plead or argue that any such symptoms of angry, aggressive or reckless behaviour including dangerous driving are things arising in consequence of his disability which resulted in unfavourable treatment imposed by the Respondent.

12.6 The Claimant’s conduct. The Claimant does not in his witness statement contest the incidents of misconduct described in the ET3 Response at paragraph 6, the ET3 Attachment or the Respondent’s chronology under tab 1. In only one small part of his evidence does he concede that, following a road rage incident against him on 4 November 2022 resulting in the other driver slashing the tyres on the work van, the Claimant followed the man and attempted to photograph him on a phone for ‘too long, to the point where felt isolated’ and in danger.

12.7 He also agrees that on 6 December 2022 he scraped the work van and damaged another vehicle when turning left into a narrow street with parked cars on either side. He blames this driving incident on a damaged wing mirror.

12.8 His three ex colleagues Messrs Hafeez, Ahmed and Arshad describe his disruptive and erratic behaviour. Mr Hafeez says that the Claimant ‘often engaged in shouting matches, particularly with me…I observed behaviour which seemed indicative of underlying issues and I believe he may have been suffering from a condition like bipolar disorder although this was never confirmed.’

12.9 Mr Hafeez also describes in paragraph 3 of his statement ‘road rage and aggressive driving…I witnessed Imran get into road rage incidents with other drivers. What stood out most was his tendency to target women and children. When other men were involved in traffic, Imran would remain in his vehicle, refusing to engage or confront other drivers. However, if women or children were nearby, he would randomly shout at them, often causing a scene… happened repeatedly and were witnessed by several colleagues.’

12.10 Mr Hafeez refers to being made anxious and uncomfortable by hostile, aggressive and unpredictable behaviour from the Claimant towards him, shouting and ‘looking for confrontation’ with ‘many of my colleagues.’ The result of this conduct was, he says, that it was difficult to work alongside the Claimant, there was a toxic and uncomfortable work environment and the Claimant’s actions were, in his view, ’simply too disruptive to be ignored…his behaviour not only jeopardised the safety and wellbeing of the staff but also negatively impacted the reputation and operations of the company.’

12.11 Mr Ahmed’s witness statement says that he was asked to work with the Claimant because ‘everyone else had problems with him…I had a few issues with him in regards to his unprofessional behaviour and his tone of voice was very loud plus his driving was no good at times…I then decided to report him to my manager about his overall behaviour and attitude was not up to working standards so manager decided to change new partner.’ Mr Ahmed’s evidence confirms the difficulties the Respondent faced in persuading its other employees to work with the Claimant and be driven by him.

12.12 Mr Arshad’s evidence is consistent with the other two ex- colleagues. Mr Arshad found it ‘extremely difficult to work alongside him…he would experience episodes of extreme madness...he would become irrational, loud and difficult to reason with…his outbursts were frequent and unpredictable, making it increasingly challenging to work together.’ He describes these outbursts as consisting of ‘abusive behaviour…alarming to witness his treatment of women…he would often shout at women in the road…It became clear that every single person in the company who worked with him felt the same way-no one felt safe around him… as a senior installer …I have never encountered someone who caused such widespread discomfort and fear among the team.

12.13 The Conclusion section of Mr Arshad’s witness statement contains an eloquent summary of his opinion that the Claimant’s behaviour created an unsafe and hostile working environment which was detrimental to the Respondent’s team and its business.

12.14 We find the evidence given in these three written statements to be accurate and truthful. Of course, as stated above, the Claimant had no opportunity to cross examine or question the evidence given in writing by Messrs Arshad, Hafeez or Ahmed. One of the reasons put forward by the Respondent for the failure of these three witnesses to attend the Hearing was that they were intimidated and fearful of encountering the Claimant again.

12.15 However, the Claimant was able to challenge the evidence of Mr Sajawal Mahmood whose witness statement is at tab 22. SM states that several colleagues raised concerns with him about the Claimant’s ‘aggressive road rage’, volatile nature and ‘hostile behaviour towards women and children when driving company vehicles’ SM occasionally partnered the Claimant on delivery and installation jobs himself, for example on 27 January 2023, and describes how he ‘acted very unprofessionally’ by leaving SM to manoeuvre and install heavy appliances without assistance while the Claimant looked at his phone in the van. He witnessed the Claimant’s bad driving, speeding, and undertaking but was fearful of criticising him in case of physical violence. SM recounts the Claimant’s unpleasant and distasteful ‘extremist’ misogynistic views which SM felt would impact the Claimant’s professional interactions. He became aware, through conversation with the Claimant, of a criminal conviction for assault which the Claimant had failed to previously disclose and concluded that ‘his apparent willingness to engage in violent behaviour raised serious concerns about workplace safety.’ By 27 January 2023 SM told us he had decided that the Claimant was ‘dangerous to work with an 18 year old’ such as Humza.

12.16 SM’s Conclusion is set out in paragraph 4 of his witness statement and ends with the opinion that the Claimant ‘posed a direct risk to both employees and the company’s reputation… his continued employment was untenable…his dismissal was necessary to protect the wellbeing of the workplace.’

12.17 No evidence has been received from Mr Romaine Pearson who was the Foreman at the warehouse in Hainault and the administrator of the LDA Group Chat with membership of the drivers and installers rather than senior members.

[13]Was the Claimant dismissed by reason of his conduct?13.1 In view of the repeated and consistent allegations of serious misconduct against the Claimant including violence, dangerous driving, drugtaking at work, and a breakdown of working relationships so fundamental that most of his co-workers would not work with him in a team, there seems to be a rational and inevitable direct connection between this conduct and the termination of his employment.

13.2 However, we have found below that the dismissal was a discriminatory one and that the Claimant was dismissed (clear unfavourable treatment) because of something arising in consequence of his disability. The ‘something arising’ was the necessity for the Respondent in every month to make complex alterations to his pay calculations and amendments to time records, as notified by him to AMB and occasionally to AAD, to accommodate his unique personal requirements for specific numerical values, together with changes to his working times and rotas including additional time spent arranging the content of the van in a particular order. An example of a confused and confusing discussion between AAD and the Claimant about this is at the 5th to 7th pages of tab 31. Eventually, as we describe more fully below, the Respondent was unable to tolerate, process and implement those requirements any longer. AAD told us that he frequently received complaints from AMB that the Claimant was contacting her with numerous messages and calls sometimes late at night.

13.3 We have concluded that the more ‘obvious’ conduct reason was not the direct catalyst for the Claimant to lose his job for the following reasons:- i) the Respondent took no prompt and timely action in relation to many of the allegations of even the most serious misconduct such as drugtaking and dangerous driving but instead let these incidents pass and, for whatever reason, let the situation continue. For example, when working with him in the van SM, a senior manager. made no comment, let alone took any action, concerning the Claimant’s speeding, undertaking, abuse of pedestrians and generally very poor driving. He let it pass because he was afraid of the Claimant, he said. At tab 31 is the Claimant’s recording of a conversation on 3 August 2022 six months before the date of dismissal in which AAD is highly concerned about the Claimant’s arguments with his colleagues, in this case Mr Hafeez and another colleague RV. AAD says ‘over the last 50 years I’ve never had two people not get on with each other. You’re out there to do a job’. He concludes, ’I’ve sent you with two different people and both of them are complaining about you. That is my annoyance with you.’ ii) The Respondent took no contemporaneous performance/capability/disciplinary action and yet on 21 September 2022, the 11th page behind tab 31, there is the transcript of another audio recording where AAD tells the Claimant that’ Russel [another co-worker] doesn’t want to work with you’ because of persistent lateness (30 or 40 minutes late in the mornings), ‘terrible’ driving and an incident where the Claimant deliberately kicked and damaged a cooker worth £40. There is also mention of complaints from two building concierges and of a road rage incident which was the Claimant’s fault. These incidents apparently occur five months before the dismissal and were not acted upon by the Respondent. iii) We repeat that no disciplinary or performance records were kept by the Respondent or acted upon by way of warnings/reprimands and/or performance improvement plans etc. iv) Even the incidents referred to in the ‘dismissal letter’ (as the Respondent calls it in the File index it prepared) and which is tab 6, dated 1 February 2023 are historic matters. There is reference to ‘abusive behaviour’ six months earlier on 3 August 2022, previous damage to a private resident’s vehicle, an argument and physical confrontation with the concierge of a building and ‘substance abuse’ when taking cannabis at work. Even if, as we have concluded, this letter was not properly sent to the Claimant or received by him and even if it was not in fact prepared at the time of his dismissal or shortly before, it is nonetheless indicative of the serious conduct matters which seem to have been in the contemplation of the Respondent. It refers to historic incidents which, however significantly unacceptable, the Respondent did nothing about. v) This leads us to the conclusion that the Respondent did not take these actions of the Claimant so seriously in February 2023 that it decided to sack him for reasons relating to his conduct. There was another reason for his dismissal arising out of his disability of OCD. vi) Finally, the Respondent did not identify or communicate to the Claimant any act of ‘Gross Misconduct’ which eventually precipitated the termination of his employment despite the reference to this in the alleged meeting between AAD, AMB and the Claimant on 20 January 2023 which is said by the Respondent to be recorded in minutes behind tab 30. There was no follow up after the issue of this apparent final warning. The Claimant was not chased to approve or sign the minutes. He is sure he never saw them and points out that he was away from work sick between 16 and 22 January 2023.No notification of the final and decisive act which caused his dismissal was ever sent to him by AMB (HR) or told to him verbally or in messages by AAD (his line manager). vii) In fact, AAD on 24 February 2023 communicates an alternative reason of lack of work and redundancy of employees (other than the ‘highestperforming’) to add to the ‘other factors- Lateness, Drugs, Behaviour, Time Keeping, Punching In Punching Out etc.’’ viii) The Respondent has identified no ‘final straw’ of misconduct causing the Claimant’s dismissal and in their oral evidence in response to cross examination and the Tribunal’s questions neither AAD nor AMB could name it although they were both decision makers. ix) Indeed, when giving her evidence AMB unpredictably and without reason withdrew a part of her witness statement (tab 18) i.e. in paragraph 4 the five lines which refer to the Claimant’s aggressive, disruptive and verbally abusive behaviour and ‘unpredictable and hostile demeanour.’ AMB’s withdrawal of that section of her evidence shows that she does not believe it or stand by it in the context of her tribunal evidence. She wanted to convey, she said, that the Claimant’s demands put her under what she called ‘manipulative pressure’ but he was not aggressive to her. This statement supports our conclusion that she sought to terminate the Claimant’s employment because she did not want to continue to suffer the disruptive pressure and aggravation of making changes to his time recording and payroll records. We are unable to conclude that the Claimant’s serious and long running misconduct, which we are certain occurred throughout his employment, did in the end cause his dismissal.

[14]Direct disability discrimination-section 1314.1 We have heard and seen no evidence adduced by the Claimant which leads us to potentially conclude that the Claimant was treated less favourably than others because of his disability. Section 13 of the 2010 Act says that direct discrimination occurs when ‘A person [the R] discriminates against another [the Claimant] if, because of a protected characteristic[disability] R treats C less favourably than R treats or would treat others.

14.2 This means that the Claimant must show facts from which we could conclude that this less favourable treatment has occurred and particularly the less favourable treatment itemised in the LOI at paragraphs 17-20 has occurred. The initial burden of proof is on the Claimant and is set out in section 136 of the 2010 Act. In summary, it says that if there are facts from which we could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that the Respondent contravened section 13 of the 2010 Act then we must hold that the contravention occurred. This does not apply if we find that no contravention occurred.

14.3 We have not found any facts from which we could conclude that the Claimant was subjected to the less favourable treatment in paragraphs of the LOI because of his disability i.e. that he was directly discriminated because he has the mental impairment of OCD. We conclude that the treatment he received was not less favourable under section 13 than a hypothetical comparator whose circumstances were not materially different would have been subjected to. A hypothetical comparator would be someone not disabled in the same way as the Claimant whose reputation, behaviour and conduct at work was the same or very similar to that of the Claimant. The Claimant was not, we find, treated worse because of his disability of OCD than his actual named comparators-Messrs Arshad, Hafeez and Ahmed (LOI paragraph 18)

14.4 We refer to the Claimant’s witness statement in those paragraphs headed ‘Failure to Provide Training & Unsafe Working Conditions’ and then under ‘Bullying and Failure to Respond to Safety Incidents’ and to the content of his oral evidence on Days 2 and 3 ( 9th and 10th July 2025) in which he complains that he has been forced to work in circumstances amounting to an unsafe workplace, suffered accidents and violent attacks upon him at work and witnessed health and safety breaches. None of those incidents and events are listed in the LOI as examples of less favourable treatment (i.e. less favourable than others who do not have his disability*) occurring because of his mental impairment. They may be examples of unfair and unconscionable treatment but not of acts of direct disability discrimination. *in relation to the comparison with others the relevant statutory wording is at section 23 of the 2010 Act ‘on a comparison of cases there must be no material difference between the circumstances relating to each case.’

14.5 In his responses to cross examination by SM on Days 2 and 3 (9 and 10 July 2025) the Claimant freely conceded that his fall on ice, a driving accident caused , he says, by a missing wing mirror on the van, the Respondent’s refusal to allow him to park the van at AAD’s residential address, the Respondent’s response to his altercation with Zunayre Hafeez and the Respondent’s refusal to escalate an incident of violence perpetrated by a member of the public against the Claimant were not alleged events of direct disability discrimination At one point the Claimant said, ‘not everything is disability[related]’

14.6 By reference therefore to paragraphs 17.1 to 17.6 of the LOI we find that no contravention of section 13 of the Equality Act 2010 occurred.

[15]Duty to make Reasonable Adjustments-sections 20 & 21 of the 2010 Act15.1 As was explained to the parties at the PHs and in the LOI at paragraphs 28- 33 where the Respondent has a policy, criterion or practice (often called a PCP) which puts the Claimant at a substantial disadvantage compared to someone without his disability then a duty arises for the Respondent to take reasonable steps to avoid that disadvantage. This is called making reasonable adjustments.

15.2 We find that the Claimant persistently requested amendments to the time cards which he was required to complete. It was a PCP of the Respondent that the drivers and installers should complete accurate time cards in relation to their daily work and send those time records to AMB for payroll purposes. As can be seen on the 22nd page of tab 27 on or around 31 August 2022 the Claimant asked he be permitted to punch in and out only on the quarter -hour mark e.g. [18:00, 18:15, 18:30, 18:45]. He says ‘Honestly Boss this is the only way…this is the best compromise I could make whilst keeping my soundness of mind but still being true and fair to you and the company, please allow me to continue to do so, it’s all I ask, I’ll leave it to you’

15.3 This was permitted by the Respondent as a reasonable adjustment for the Claimant’s disability of OCD which was disclosed to AAD in June 2022. After adjusting his punch in and punch out times in the way he needed the Claimant would message or telephone AMB (quite often late in the evening) to make adjustments to his pay records to deduct time/pay in order to reflect the actual time worked. This was so that he could ensure that he was only claiming for and being paid for the hours he worked rather than the time/pay which the punch in and punch out records showed.

15.4 Paragraph 3 of AMB’s witness statement describes the process and she says the result was that ‘the constant adjustment caused significant complications with workforce planning, creating logistical challenges that negatively impacted both the team and the company as a whole. As well as adding on a lot of administrative work for myself. Despite our best efforts, it became clear that continuing to make such adjustments was no longer feasible without severely disrupting operations’ (our emphasis and underlining) Her conclusions in paragraph 5 of her witness statement reiterate ‘his later demands and scheduling issues caused significant operational strain on the company’ and made it ‘increasingly difficult to continue his employment’

15.5 We are sure that the necessity for this adjustment was confusing, onerous, and time-consuming for AMB and, to a lesser extent to AAD who was often asked to ‘authorise’ such adjustments- ‘you’ll still have the ability to cross check my punch in/punch out times to confirm that they match the last job to a certain extent.’

15.6 In her witness statement AMB states in paragraph 2 that ‘the impact of his OCD caused significant disruptions to business operations that we had not anticipated’ and she sets out in the first of two bullet points that there were excessive delays in the Claimant starting work which created scheduling issues for the work and the workforce.

15.7 Nonetheless, by reference to sections 20 and 21 of the 2010 Act we find that these adjustments were initially and then consistently made by the Respondent with the aim of reasonably removing the substantial disadvantage caused to the Claimant by the impact of the PCP on his symptoms of OCD and particularly his need for certain numerical patterns and order. The Claimant told us there was always ‘pushback’ and AMB would not help him except ‘with a fight’ every time. We do not agree that this was the case. We find that he obtained the help he needed and was treated with courtesy and respect by AMB as can be seen in the messages behind tabs 15 (first three pages) and 35 supplemented by further digital messages re-sent to us by the Claimant (originally sent to the Tribunal on 18 December 2024) which are not printed in the File but which we have seen.

15.8 SM told us that he had a good working relationship with the Claimant and that he would always encourage AMB to ‘just do it’ in relation to what he calls the ‘time edits’ even if the Respondent appeared to be owed money. He said he told AMB ‘just leave it here or there if a few hours.’ We find that the Respondent did listen to the Claimant’s concerns and requests in a patient and cordial way particularly before his conduct began to deteriorate. There was no failure under sections 20 and 21 in this respect. Tab 11 contains time cards which show these adjustments.

15.9 The Respondent also permitted the Claimant to spend extra paid time at the end of the working day, and sometimes during the working day in between jobs, to arrange the appliances and other equipment in the van in a particular order, usually by height. AMB describes this as ‘extended post-shift time.’ Sometimes this necessitated the Claimant’s workmate for the day either waiting until the re-ordering was complete or completing the installation by himself whilst the Claimant organised the van in his preferred way at the end of the day. There was therefore a possibility of daily delay and extra paid time for both employees in the team. The PCP of requiring the van to be orderly, stacked efficiently and loaded ready for deliveries and installations, insofar as it caused substantial disadvantage to the Claimant, who could only tolerate the type of arrangement and order in the van which he devised, was ameliorated by the agreement of the Respondent to allocate extra time, money and resources to permit the Claimant to follow his own system as his disability required. As such a reasonable adjustment was made by the Respondent in this respect.

15.10 We find that the Respondent reasonably refused the Claimant’s request to always pick up the van from AAD’s home address (see the 26th page of tab 27) The refusal was because of residential parking restrictions and for insurance reasons, The vans had to be parked up at the Hainault warehouse even though this involved extra travelling time for the Claimant and, presumably, several of his colleagues living in East London. We also find that this was not a request for an adjustment likely to relate to the disadvantage of the Claimant’s particular disability of OCD, as he himself said in his evidence.

15.11 By reference to the other reasonable adjustments which the Claimant suggests could have been implemented to avoid the disadvantage caused to him and which are listed in paragraphs 28-31 of the LOI we find that the Respondent did not implement any PCPs consisting of:

• Taking action to cause the Claimant to miss psychology or therapy sessions. The Claimant was permitted to take time off, even at short notice, for medical and counselling appointments and to comply with his community service order and communicate with his probation officer. In any event he was contracted to work zero hours and was therefore able to refuse hours and shifts which conflicted with such appointments albeit that he obviously lost income as a result.

• There was no PCP requiring 12 hours’ work a day followed by a rest period of less than 12 hours. The Claimant worked under a zero hours contract and could decline back to back shifts which gave him insufficient rest.

• There was no provision, criterion or practice (PCP) of the Respondent which involved ‘following an unfair disciplinary procedure.’ The factual and legal implications of the disciplinary steps actually taken by the Respondent are set out elsewhere in this Judgment and Reasons.

15.12 We find that the Respondent did rarely give advance notice of working hours and mostly notified its drivers and installers where, when and on what job they were working only the day before. This was a PCP applied to all the Claimant’s co-workers and is very typical of a small local business with limited employees and vehicles which must, of necessity, apply a flexible rota subject to frequent change. Paragraph 28 (2) of the agreed and un-contested LOI however identifies the relevant PCP more specifically as ‘not giving advance notice of working hours, which would allow the Claimant to attend psychological appointments’ (our emphasis and underlining) We have already made a finding of fact that the Respondent did not apply any PCP which resulted in the substantial disadvantage of this disabled Claimant missing any such appointments. Taking into account the exhaustive list of PCPs identified above and our conclusions in relation to each of them we find no failure by the Respondent to make reasonable adjustments.

15.13 We note also that no formal or even informal grievance or employee complaint was made by the Claimant to the Respondent during his employment. There are expressions of discontent by him (and others) on the LDA Group Chat of which we have seen some digital copies but the Claimant has failed to show that the managers of the business i.e. AAD, SM, AMB, Bhajawal Mahmood or their father saw any of these complaints.

[16]Discrimination arising from Disability- section 15 of the 2010 Act16.1 We are satisfied that the Claimant was discriminated against as a result of matters or ‘things’ arising from his OCD/mental impairment and that he was subjected to unfavourable treatment by the Respondent when he was dismissed on 24 February 2023 following an unfair procedure. For the avoidance of doubt and at the risk of repetition we are certain that the unfavourable treatment alleged in paragraphs 23.1-23.4 did not occur and therefore the ‘something arising’ identified in paragraphs 24.3 and 24.4 is not relevant.

16.2 However, under section 15 (1)( b) of the 2010 Act we are further convinced and satisfied that the Respondent can and has shown that its treatment of the Claimant, in dismissing him following that procedure, was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. This is sometimes called the justification defence and we find that it applies.

16.3 The reasons for both these conclusions, by reference to the findings of fact already stated above are as follows: 16.3.1 In consequence of the Claimant’s disability of OCD he required and requested amendments to his time cards (punch in and punch out times) and adjustments to his recorded working hours and pay which the Respondent and particularly AMB agreed to do, usually at the end of each pay month. This resulted in significant additional correspondence and consequent work and stress for AMB and, to a lesser extent, the rest of the Respondent’s managers with whom she regularly consulted and double checked what she should do. 16.3.2. In addition, the Claimant’s disability meant that he needed and insisted on arranging the contents in the back of the van in a very particular way causing delay and the requirement for the Respondent to pay extra hours to him and sometimes to his coworkers in his team for that day. 16.3.3. Eventually, and in the context of the limited administrative and other resources (including specialist HR and legal advice and expertise) available to the Respondent as a small family business it was not prepared to continue with these adjustments and the consequent disruption to its business. AMB was effectively the main person coping with the ongoing time recording and pay adjustments required by the Claimant, conveyed by messages at various times outside office hours including in the late evening. She told us that she was involved in reviewing the Claimant’s hours worked and his pay on an almost daily basis and, for example, at the month-end, would have to deduct or carry/roll forward hours worked in one month into the next month. 16.3.4 Thus, she told us, the Claimant’s start and finish times were not accurate meaning that, at the relevant time and also retrospectively, the time cards did not accurately reflect where he was and what he was doing on a given day. For example, we were taken to the 7th page behind tab 11 where, as AMB and SM credibly told us that in order to make the required time adjustments AMB added 4.5 hours worked on 8 December 2022 on a day when the Claimant did not actually work. 16.3.5 AMB expressed her concern in her oral evidence and in response to cross examination by the Claimant and questions from the Tribunal, that she began to fear that there might be insurance, safety and crime prevention problems in producing time records for the Claimant which were inaccurate in this way. 16.3.6 The Respondent therefore dismissed the Claimant following little or no compliant or reasonable procedures relating to discipline, capability or performance on 24 February 2023 and the reason for that dismissal, by way of messages from AAD to the Claimant, was because of something arising from the Claimant’s disability as identified above. It is self-evident that the failure of compliant procedures and the dismissal itself were unfavourable treatment.

16.4 We have concluded above that the Respondent’s identified and stated reason for the Claimant’s dismissal i.e. his serious misconduct and his colleagues’ refusal to work with him (as the Claimant half- knew) was not communicated properly or fully to him nor was followed through under any disciplinary process or procedure consistently applied by the managers of the Respondent. In those circumstances we find that the reason for the dismissal and the rationale behind the very limited disciplinary procedure applied was instead a reason arising in consequence of the Claimant’s disability i.e. that the Respondent could no longer tolerate the onerous implementation of adjustments in the context of the Claimant’s serious misconduct and in the circumstances of the strain upon AMB and her worries about how, in manipulating the time and pay data in the way requested by the Claimant, she might accurately account for his whereabouts by reference to factually unsafe time and work records. The Respondent decided that it was no longer prepared to make the adjustments relating to the time/pay records and the re-ordering of the back of the van (which cost time and money) and therefore dismissed the Claimant for this reason on 24 February 2023 with one week’s notice to 1 March 2023.

16.5 The disability discrimination claim under section 15 therefore succeeds but the justification defence applies as analysed below.

[17]Justification Defence17.1 In paragraph 26 of the LOI there is a record of the justification defence described by the Respondent to EJ Sugarman. The Respondent states that it had a legitimate aim in overall reasonable management of the company and its business. It says that it was attempting to run its business to treat all its employees (including the Claimant’s co-workers) fairly and to ensure that it could organise the rotas and find employees who would work productively and cooperatively with the Claimant.

17.2 In addition, the Respondent had the legitimate aim of protecting its workforce, customers and members of the public from the Claimant’s actions including highly volatile and abusive behaviour and language, dangerous and antisocial driving, suspected drug taking and damage to property to the extent that he alienated his team members. These were health and safety concerns.

17.3 Was the dismissal of the Claimant a proportionate means or, put in another way, a reasonably necessary and appropriate way of achieving these legitimate aims or was there something less discriminatory that could have been done?

17.4 It is important to balance the needs of the Claimant and the Respondent. We find that the needs of the Claimant in keeping his job and continuing to have the relevant adjustments made despite the inconvenience, time and stress caused to AMB and other managers are outweighed by the Respondent’s need to reasonably manage its business and achieve the legitimate aims set out above in all the circumstances we have described.

17.5 For the sake of completeness we reiterate that we have already made a finding that there has been no relevant failure to make any reasonable adjustment. We repeat that the disinhibited sometimes potentially criminal behaviour of the Claimant at work and his inability to control his anger and frustration and maintain reasonable working relationships were not characteristics ever described by him to the Respondent as being symptoms or consequences of his OCD in respect of which he would require or expect adjustments in relation to any identified PCP.

17.6 Against the background of serious and even potentially dangerous misconduct perpetrated by the Claimant and as described in the written and oral evidence in this case the Respondent’s decision to promptly remove him from its business when he continued to ask for hours to be allocated to him from 29 January 2023 onwards, continued to attack and criticise his colleagues, and threatened to ‘take alternative courses of action and ‘escalate’ the situation if an agreement could not be reached on his allocation of work hours ( see tab 27) was appropriate and reasonably necessary to achieve its legitimate aims.

17.7 We have considered, as we are required in law to do, whether the Respondent could have taken any less or non- discriminatory measures to avoid the Claimant’s dismissal and the very poorly executed disciplinary procedures ((if any) which preceded the dismissal. We conclude that, by reference to the conceptual analysis in the recent case of Hindmarch v North East Ambulance NHS Foundation Trust

2025 EAT 87

, which is not strictly a case concerning the justification defence but which contains a useful analysis of the futility of a Respondent making adjustments which have no reasonable prospect of removing the substantial disadvantage identified by the Claimant, that the Respondent had no real prospect of making any adjustments or taking any lesser options than dismissal. In carrying out the balancing exercise of weighing the needs of the employer against the discriminatory effect of the action the Respondent took then we are certain that the section 15 defence applies.

17.8 The justification defence succeeds and therefore the claim of section 15 disability discrimination ultimately fails.