Ms V Junkaitis and Ms C Niculae v Travelodge Hotels Ltd: 3200917/2023 and 3202354/2023
JUDGMENT
[1]The first claimant’s protected disclosure claim is dismissed.[2]The second claimant’s protected disclosure claim is dismissed. _REASONS
[1]The first claimant brings a claim for detriments on the grounds of public interest disclosures (claim 3200917/2023). The second claimant brings a claim for detriments on the grounds of public interest disclosures (claim 3202354/2023).[2]The claims were brought within the jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunal, which has no jurisdiction to deal with personal injury claims or health and safety claims. Such claims are for another jurisdiction.[3]The first claimant engaged ACAS on 24 March 2023. An ACAS certificate was issued on 21 April 2023. The claim was lodged on 19th May 2023.[4]The second claimant engaged ACAS on 5 December 2023. An ACAS certificate was issued on 7 December 2023. The claim was lodged the same day, 7 December 2023.[5]The final hearing took place on 6, 7, 8, 12 and 13 November 2024. At the conclusion of the hearing, the claimants’ claims were all dismissed. A sixth day, 14 November 2024, had been set aside to complete the hearing but the hearing was concluded in five days.[6]At the start of the hearing the claimants produced a number of documents, images and messages, which they claimed should be in the bundle. A number of them were in the bundle. The others were admitted as evidence without objection.[7]During the course of the hearing, the respondent sought to adduce the respondent’s Grievance Policy. The claimants objected on the grounds of lateness. The respondent did not pursue the application and I agreed that it was very late to be adducing evidence in a case involving two unrepresented claimants.[8]On 8 November 2024, the second claimant sought to adduce a number of e-mails, which had not previously appeared in the bundle. The respondent objected on the basis that they were late and one was privileged. I did not look at the correspondence in respect of which privilege was asserted but briefly looked at the others. In my judgment, they were, at best, of peripheral relevance to the case and, in my judgment, it was too late to fairly admit them.[9]By e-mails dated 15 November 2024, each claimant has requested written reasons for that decision. FACTS: First claimant’s case: Alleged disclosures:[10]The first claimant’s pleaded case is that she made three disclosures, namely:a. On 2 March 2023 the first claimant sent a message on the team WhatsApp group complaining that the room she was cleaning smelled of chemicals and chlorineb. On 2 March 2023 the first claimant completed the respondent’s accident report form stating she had been injured because of the chemical/chlorine smellc. On 6 March 2023 the first claimant submitted a written grievance to head office complaining that she had been told to clean a room that had smelled of chemicals and chlorine and that this had caused her injury Alleged disclosure at para 7.a.:[11]In my judgment, the first alleged disclosure is not made out. The messages to which I was referred during the course of the hearing disclosed no information suggesting a health and safety breach or covering up such. Specific reference was made in the list of issues to “a message”. In evidence the first claimant referred to two pages of messages. None of the messages on those pages bore out the alleged disclosure in the list of issues. The closest any of the message got to disclosing information is one reads: “The same smell in 909”. There were no other messages that put this message in context. There was no message referring to any smell in any other room. Even if one takes all the messages collectively, nothing more was disclosed.[12]In my judgment, this is not information. It lacks sufficient factual content to be a disclosure of a health and safety issue. It does nothing to convey a concern about harsh chemicals, danger from fumes or any other health and safety risk. It appears the message about room 909 followed on from an earlier conversation or messages. However, no earlier written messages have been provided and no evidence was given about the content of any earlier messages. In any event, the list of issues refers to disclosure in a single message. Alleged disclosure at para 7.b.:[13]The respondent conceded the second alleged disclosure did contain information relating to health and safety but not concealing of such. I agree that there is nothing about concealing information. Alleged disclosure at para 7.c.:[14]The third alleged disclosure does set describe the extent of the smell and the effect that it had on the first claimant’s health and, again, does come within the definition of a disclosure of information. It is capable of tending to show a relevant failure. Again, there is nothing to suggest the concealing of information. Public interest:[15]However, none of these three disclosures, in my judgment, were made in the public interest. It was abundantly clear during the course of the first claimant’s evidence that she was saying the respondent was deliberately doing things to her, victimising her, in her words “provocation”. She said, during the course of her evidence, that this had been going on since a meeting in January 2023, thus before she claimed to have made protected disclosures.[16]There is little in any of the alleged disclosures to support any contention that they are being made out of a concern for others. The closest any of the disclosures comes to suggesting the disclosures were made in the public interest is that at the end of the grievance complaint (alleged disclosure at 7.b.), the first claimant asks if the rooms had been sold to anyone on that day. In my judgment, given all the other evidence tending to show the first claimant was complaining out of concern for herself, this is insufficient. In my judgment, this was an afterthought to bolster her complaint, when she realised that if things affected her they could affect others, and not true concern for the wider public interest.[17]Although there is a second claimant, and in the documents there are references to others, it is clear to me from what is said in each of the disclosures and how the first claimant gave her evidence, that the complaints were motivated solely out of self interest and concern for her own wellbeing. That is not a criticism. The first claimant is completely entitled to express concerns that her working environment is damaging her health. It is only natural when a complaint is made to think about other arguments and reasons to support the contention being made. However, the reasonable belief any disclosures of information were made in the public interest must be held at the time of the disclosure being made and must be at least part of the motivation for making that complaint. It cannot be a throwaway remark to bolster a complaint motivated by self-interest or a subsequent realisation that others may be affected.[18]There was later reference, from 14th March 2023 onwards, to other employees but not in the complaints of 2nd and 6th March 2023, which are the only statements alleged to be protected disclosures. If the first claimant later found others were concerned, or later, in discussion with others, shared their concerns, that in my judgment does not prove on the balance of probabilities that earlier complaints, making little reference to others, were made in the public interest. Therefore, I find that none of the alleged disclosures were made in the public interest. Detriments:[19]Although the first claimant’s case fails on the absence of there being any protected disclosures, I heard a lot of evidence about the alleged detriments.[20]The first claimant listed a total of 10 detriments arising from her disclosures. There are a number of different people involved in the allegations and there is no evidence that there was an orchestrated conspiracy against the first claimant between all those individuals. Some of the allegations amount to no more than confusion or misunderstanding. Some, in my judgment, were the respondent positively trying to help the first claimant, on some occasions where she was not helping herself. Further, as I have already mentioned, during the course of the hearing, the first claimant repeatedly referred to “provocation” against her. In cross-examination of Mr Kanon, she put that this was arising from a meeting in January 2023. If the “provocation”, to use her word, was ongoing since January 2023, then it cannot be because of any protected disclosure in March 2023 and there is no causal link between the two.[21]The first alleged detriment was that the housekeeping supervisor ignored her complaint on 2nd March 2023. It is quite clear this was untrue. The evidence adduced during the hearing demonstrated he responded within 20 minutes.[22]The first claimant maintains this delay of 20 minutes was a detriment. In my judgment, this cannot reasonably amount to a detriment. In an environment the first claimant alleged was exceptionally busy, a response within 20 minutes cannot, on any view, be considered unreasonable. In my judgement, this cannot be considered to be a detriment. In any event, the allegation was that the complaint was ignored. There was a response the same day and it cannot be said the complaint was ignored.[23]The second was that the receptionist, Ella, laughed at her when she handed in her fit note on or around 5 March 2023. The fit note alleged stress, not any injury from inhalation. Therefore, there was nothing in the fit note for Ella to make the connection between any protected disclosure (had she known about them) and the fit note. I did not hear from the receptionist, Ella, but the first claimant accepted in evidence that there was no evidence to link the receptionist laughing to the alleged disclosures, other than the first claimant’s own belief. There is no evidence the receptionist was aware of the alleged disclosures on 2 March 2023. This alleged detriment is said to have taken place on 5th March. Therefore, the third alleged detriment had not even occurred at that time.[24]The third was that the first claimant had been discouraged from completing the accident form and laughed at by the hotel manager, Mohammed Kanon, and the manager of reception. I do not accept the first claimant was discouraged from making the report. I heard from Mohammed Kanon. Although there is conflicting evidence about how it came into being and whether Mohammed Kanon was present, a report was made and Mohammed Kanon’s name appears at the bottom of it. The report contains little suggestion of any actual injury, the report records that the first claimant declined any first aid and it may be there was a conversation about whether it was necessary. However, I do not accept the any of the respondent’s staff actively sought to dissuade her from making a report. I do accept in both these instances that the individuals concerned may have smiled or laughed during their interactions with the first claimant. However, I do not accept they were laughing at her. People often smile and joke with each other, sometimes even in serious situations, and sometimes that can be taken the wrong way. The information and details contained in the accident report suggest the incident was taken seriously.[25]In any event, this alleged detriment must, logically, have occurred before the accident report was lodged. The accident report was the second alleged disclosure. Therefore, the only alleged disclosure that had taken place at the time was the ones alleged in the messages. For the reasons set out above, those messages did not comprise a disclosure of information and therefore, as a matter of law, cannot be the foundation for a detriment.[26]The fourth alleged detriment is that there were comments made between Marie Muscutt and Mohammed Kanon that the cleaners would all be sacked. The first claimant accepted in evidence she had not heard these comments and they were reported back to her by another. She said she trusted that other. However, the first claimant did not name that other in advance of the hearing, so no enquiries could be carried out by the respondent. Further, whilst the strict rules of evidence do not apply in the Employment Tribunal, I have not heard direct evidence from that person and their evidence has not been tested under cross-examination. I therefore bear in mind this is untested evidence from an anonymous source. I have heard from Mohammed Kanon and Marie Muscutt. Mohammed Kanon denied there was any such conversation and said sacking the entire cleaning team was not within his remit in any event. Mr Kanon was identified, gave evidence on oath and the first claimant was given the opportunity to challenge him. Ms Muscutt, similarly, said there was no such conversation. I accept the evidence of Mr Kanon and Ms Muscutt. Having heard the evidence and looked at various documents, there is nothing to suggest the respondent wanted to get rid of the first complainant. On the contrary, in my judgment they went to considerable efforts to consider and investigate her concerns. They treated took her allegations seriously and treated her as one would expect them to treat a member of staff they wanted to keep. I accept their evidence that good housekeepers are hard to find and they did not want to lose the first claimant. That is supported by the fact that the first and second claimant remain employed by the respondent despite lengthy absence through sickness and expressions, at least by the first claimant, that she wanted her employment to terminate.[27]In any event, the first claimant alleged she had heard that the housekeeping supervisor said she was no good and wanted to get rid of her. The first claimant remains employed by the respondent. This is not an unfair dismissal case. If there was a supervisor, or even a group of supervisors and managers, who wanted to get rid of her, which, again, I heard no evidence support (over and above the first claimant’s firm belief), if it was because she was not considered to be a good worker, as she claimed, this has nothing to do with any alleged protected disclosures.[28]The fifth detriment refers to a conversation with Malik Cessay in a grievance meeting, where he was alleged to have said the grievance was because she had been sacked and she wanted a full-time job. If true, this statement is clearly inaccurate. The first claimant had not been sacked and Mr Cessay would have known that. He was holding a grievance meeting with her. In evidence the first claimant said that he said she may be sacked and was looking for another job. The respondent says the meeting was terminated because the line was unclear. The first claimant says there was nothing wrong with the connection. I do not accept the first claimant’s evidence. Efforts were made to rearrange the meeting face to face because of the connection issue. If there was no connection issue, there is no reason the meeting could not have been concluded virtually and the respondent need not to have gone to such lengths to try and arrange an in-person meeting. In any event, if those words, or similar words, were spoken, in my judgment this is evidence of nothing more than a misunderstanding, which the first claimant was able to correct. In my judgment the words, if spoken, could not reasonably amount to a detriment.[29]The sixth detriment is an allegation that Beth Pelopida did not understand the grounds of her complaint, did not meet with her and she was not given the right to appeal. It is clear the first claimant ignored efforts to rearrange the grievance meeting. She was offered meetings and did not respond, as she did not want to travel all over London to meetings. It is clear from the evidence that Beth Pelopida made numerous requests for further information. There were a number of e-mails from the first claimant setting out her concerns in detail but she did not specifically answer the question asked of her by Ms Pelopida. Answers to the questions posed by Ms Pelopida were necessary for the grievance to progress. The first claimant was told that, on the limited information provided, the grievance was not made out but the door was left open for her to return with further information. She was told she could not be given a grievance outcome letter as she had not attended any of the meetings. Although she was not given a right to appeal, in my judgment, the grievance at first instance had not concluded. The door was left open for her to revisit the grievance and provide further information, at which point the investigation would have continued. The first claimant had not properly engaged in the process, had not provided the information requested and had failed to respond to invitations to a meeting. Therefore, in my judgment, there had been no final conclusion at first instance, the complaint was not actively pursued and there was therefore no need to offer an appeal. Having heard from Ms Pelopida, I find that she tried to fully investigate, and arranged for others to investigate, the first claimant’s complaints to the extent that she was able on the limited information available. Ms Pelopida was not able to investigate complaints in respect of others without speaking to them but no details were provided by the first claimant. In my judgment, Ms Pelopida tried her hardest to understand the complaints being made and was diligent. In my judgment, this cannot reasonably be considered to be a detriment. It is clear to me that the reason the grievance went no further was nothing to do with any alleged protected disclosures but, instead, it was because of the first claimant’s lack of proper engagement in the process.[30]The seventh alleged detriment is that the first claimant received a call asking why she was not in work, and why she had missed the day before. The first claimant said she was told that she could be sacked for missing two days. This is disputed. The respondent says there was no new supervisor because the previous supervisor had returned from a period of suspension. In any event, supervisors would have known who was on long term sick leave. That second reason rather misses the point. The allegation, as I understand it, is that the supervisor made this call out of spite because the first claimant had made protected disclosures. During evidence, it became clear that the allegation was that it was a new temporary deputy manager who had made the call and the reference to “supervisor” in the list of issues was an error. That person was never identified. However, even if this was said, there is no evidence to suggest it was anything more than a mistake by a manager. There is no supporting evidence that any such call was made, from either records or witnesses. Therefore, I do not find it proved that this call was made. However, even if the call was made, if it was a mistake by a new member of staff, in my judgment, it could not reasonably be a detriment. There is no evidence that a new manager would know anything about the alleged disclosures that were made some months earlier. There is no evidence that any such new manager had become part of an ongoing conspiracy to seek retribution for the first claimant’s alleged disclosures. There is nothing to link it to any protected disclosures.[31]The eighth alleged detriment is that on 15 May 2023 the first claimant met with Ms Muscutt and an HR advisor. The first claimant said she thought it was a grievance meeting but it was not, it was a health review. In my judgment, on the evidence placed before me, this allegation is ill-founded. I have been shown the minutes of that meeting, which lasted over an hour and a half, and the first claimant was clearly given every opportunity to set out her concerns, which she did at length. I am not being critical, she was asked for detail, but it is a fact she did set out her concerns in some detail. The minutes of the meeting reflect it was much more akin to a grievance meeting than a health review and, therefore, I do not find this allegation proved. Even if it were a health review, in my judgment, that is not a bad thing and cannot be considered to reasonably amount to a detriment.[32]The ninth alleged detriment is that the HR Advisor was rude during that meeting and said he was not interested in this. Again, the minutes of the meeting suggest a lengthy discussion where the first claimant was able to articulate any concerns she had in detail and at length. The minutes suggest a meeting where she was given considerable latitude to express herself. We did not hear from the HR Advisor but the witness evidence from Ms Muscutt is, in my judgment, consistent with these minutes. The meeting was not short. There is no indication the first complainant was hurried when first setting out her complaints. There is even evidence that she was asked for further detail about them. It may be the first claimant’s impression of the meeting was different but, viewing the evidence objectively, there is nothing to suggest the HR Advisor was rude or said he was not interested. Therefore, I do not find this allegation proved.[33]The tenth alleged detriment also arises from 15 May 2023, that the first claimant asked Ms Muscutt if she would be sacked and Ms Muscutt replied no but we may recommend you work in another hotel. Ms Muscutt says she offered to move the first claimant to another hotel because of an obvious breakdown in relationship between the first claimant and Mr Kanon, her manager. It is right to observe that the first claimant was never sacked. She remains on long-term sick for the same hotel. She was never moved to another hotel. In my judgment, this is consistent with it being an offer, rather than a forced move. It would be entirely reasonable for the management to offer the first claimant a move, when she was so clearly not happy with her direct line manager. In my judgment, this was an offer, not a compulsory move and, in those circumstances, far from being a detriment, the respondent was treating the first claimant favourably. Second claimant’s case: Alleged disclosures:[34]The second claimant alleges she made three disclosures, namely:a. In November 2022, the second claimant orally told Osman Abdi, the previous hotel manager, that dangerous chemicals were being used for cleaning purposesb. In January 2023, the second claimant told Mr Kanan, the hotel manager, that dangerous chemicals were being used for cleaning purposesc. On 23 January 2023 Mr Kanon asked the second claimant to ask her colleague, Marianna, to wash a shower curtain by hand using chlorine in a bucket. The claimant refused to do so and explained tat it was dangerous.[35]The second claimant lists 13 alleged detriments.[36]The respondent says any alleged detriment before 8th September 2023 is out of time. The ET1 was submitted on 7th December 2023, with ACAS having been involved from 5th to 7th December 2023. I agree with the respondent’s calculation that any act before 8th September 2023 would, on the face of it, be out of time.[37]I considered whether the alleged detriments, taken together, could amount to a course of conduct. If they do, all are in time, provided there is at least one other detriment that is within time. I shall therefore consider the merits of detriment that the second claimant said she was under pressure to resign from May 2023 and the last two detriments (that she was removed from the hotel’s WhatsApp group on 16 November 2023 and that she was not told the outcome of her complaint between 10 September 2023 and 19 November 2023) first, as one of those detriments would need to be established to bring the others within time if they form part of a course of conduct.[38]All of the alleged protected disclosures were made orally and it is disputed that these conversations even took place. There was no detail of any of the alleged conversations until the second claimant provided evidence, nearly 2 years after the alleged disclosures were allegedly made. There is no evidence detailing them in the witness statements or the papers. All are said to have been made orally. On the balance of probabilities, I do not find it proved that the alleged disclosures were made.[39]In any event, according to the evidence of the second claimant, the first alleged disclosure was not a statement that the chemicals were dangerous but a question about who had ordered the chemicals. The question contains no information about alleged Health and Safety breaches or attempts to conceal such. Therefore, whilst Mr Abdi was unavailable to give evidence, in my judgment, even on the second claimant’s case, there is no disclosure of information.[40]Further, Mr Abdi left the respondent in December 2022. The first alleged detriment was in January 2023. There is no evidence to suggest Mr Abdi did anything that would have led to others subjecting the second claimant to a detriment after he had left or that he would want to do so, even if, contrary to the evidence he gave in his statement, that conversation had actually taken place.[41]The second claimant’s second alleged disclosure was that they had new chemicals that they had not used before and they were strong. Mr Kanon said he could not recall such a conversation. I have doubts as to the evidence given by the second claimant, given that nearly 2 years has passed since this alleged conversation and that there was no evidence of the words used before this hearing. On the balance of probabilities, as set out above, I do not find this allegation proved. However, even if I take the second claimant’s evidence at face value, in my judgment this does not disclose information in relation to health and safety or about anything being concealed. There is no specific information given. It is a statement of fact that they are new and strong but there is no information about their use, that they may be dangerous or how health and safety may be put at risk.[42]Further, there is nothing on the face of the statement to suggest the second claimant was making the statement in the public interest, rather than her own interest or those of a very limited number of colleagues.[43]It is accepted that the third alleged disclosure, if made, amounts to a disclosure of information but not concealment. However, the evidence from the respondent’s witnesses was that Mr Kanon would not have been issuing direct instructions to the housekeeping team. I heard a lot about how he provided training. It is said his evidence was inconsistent in that he said he provided training to the housekeepers but then said he did not directly train the housekeeping staff and did it through the supervisors. In my judgment this evidence is not inconsistent. He did not say he provided training directly to housekeeping. His evidence was consistent with him instigating training through the supervisors. I find nothing inconsistent with this and I do not find the allegation in respect of the shower curtain proved. However, even if this conversation took place, in my judgment there was no reasonable belief it was in the public interest. The second claimant’s concern was in relation to one individual member of staff, that being Marianna. Timely alleged detriments:[44]It is accepted by the respondent that the three alleged detriments I chose to consider first are in time. The allegation that the second claimant was pressurised to resign from May 2023 is unfounded. I have heard lengthy evidence from the respondent’s witnesses. In my judgment, as with the first claimant, there is nothing to suggest they wanted rid of the second claimant. Quite the contrary. They set out how good housekeepers are hard to find, how they wanted to keep the second claimant and I observe that the second claimant is still employed despite lengthy sickness absence. I therefore do not find this detriment proved.[45]Looking at the other two alleged timely detriments, the second claimant says she was removed from the hotel’s WhatsApp group after she accompanied the first claimant to a preliminary hearing in her case. This was before the second claimant issued proceedings herself. It is right the second claimant was removed from the group immediately after the hearing, along with the first claimant (who, I note, did not list this as a detriment) and another, unknown person.[46]The respondent says the claimants were removed from the WhatsApp group because there was no need for them to be members of that group anymore. They were on long term sick and it was not appropriate they be messaged about work things and it was for their welfare. In my judgment, that explanation is entirely reasonable. I note the claimants were not the only two to be removed at that time. The preliminary hearing was not the only thing to happen that day. Immediately before the three individuals were removed, the first claimant sent three messages, which she then deleted. In view of that, there is no evidence to suggest that the removal from the WhatsApp group was because of the alleged disclosures, rather than the messages the first claimant sent, which may well have reminded the person administering the group that the second claimant was, unintentionally, still in the WhatsApp group. The removal from the WhatsApp group was initiated by Mo Kanon. He was not directly involved in the litigation, as that was dealt with by another department. In all the circumstances, there is no evidence that the reason for the removal from the group was for any other reason than those articulated by the respondent. In my judgment, it would be entirely reasonable to remove those on long-term sick from a work group. In fact, it may be thought there is a positive duty to do so, when the reason for the absence, or one of the reasons, is cited as work-related stress (as appeared on the second claimant’s fit note). Further, the second claimant said she never looked at the messages. The effect of her evidence was that she felt excluded because of the removal. However, given her absence, the reason for her absence, that she had no need to be part of the group at that time, that she said she did not look at the messages anyway, in my judgment, this cannot be reasonably considered to be a detriment.[47]The other detriment is that she was not provided with the outcome of her grievance between 10 September 2023 and 19 November 2023. The respondent acknowledges there was a delay in dealing with the grievance. The respondent’s witnesses say they were overworked and dealt with it as quickly as they could. That assertion is supported by e-mail correspondence between those responsible for looking into the grievance. Therefore, whilst this may be viewed as a detriment, it was not, in my judgment, on the grounds of any protected disclosure and the respondent has discharged the burden in section 48 of the Employment Rights 1996.[48]In my judgment, neither of the three allegations that were potentially in time amount to detriments on the grounds of a protected disclosure. Therefore, the alleged detriments that are, on the face of it, out of time, cannot be considered to be part of a course of conduct. Disclosures prima facie out of time:[49]I have therefore considered whether it was reasonably practicable to bring allegations in respect of the other alleged detriments in time. In my view, it was and, therefore, the other alleged detriments are out of time and I have no jurisdiction to make any findings on them.[50]The second claimant’s evidence on why the claims were brought late was contradictory. She initially said she did not realise that there was a potential claim for protected disclosures until she went to Romania in July/August 2023. She said she was ill and stressed. She said that she did not want to make a claim because she still wanted to work for the respondent. She said she did not want to bring a claim at that time because she did not trust management. I do not accept any of those explanations, taking singly or together. She still does work for the respondent and has brought a claim. Not trusting the respondent may be the very reason to bring a claim. I asked her for greater clarity about when she first realised the detriments she allegedly suffered were as a result of the alleged protected disclosures she made. She said in January 2023. That was at odds with her other evidence and, if that were the case, undermines any suggestion she was not able to bring the claim sooner.[51]My attention was also drawn to the fact on 28 February 2023 there had been a meeting between a number of members of staff and the first claimant. The second claimant was present. On that occasion ACAS conciliation was discussed. That appears in one of the statements made by the second claimant. The second claimant said she did not understand what the reference to ACAS meant and did not understand that contact with ACAS was a precursor to a claim. I do not accept that explanation. It is clear what was being discussed and, if she did not know what the others were talking about, I find it inconceivable she would not have asked.[52]Further, the second claimant attended a meeting with the first claimant on 19 May 2023 in which the first claimant threatened to go to the Tribunal. The first claimant engaged ACAS within weeks of that meeting and lodged her (in time) claim on 19 May 2023. The second claimant herself threatened tribunal proceedings on 13 September 2023. Given that the claimants worked closely together and went to meetings together where the issues were discussed (and ACAS was discussed), that the two claimants were close enough that the second claimant attended the first claimant’s preliminary hearing at the Employment Tribunal, and the second claimant threatened legal proceedings long before issuing a claim or engaging ACAS, I do not accept that the second claimant’s claim could not reasonably practicably have been brought before the other detriments became out of time.[53]The second claimant was also challenged about the time between 16th November 2023, when she attended the first claimant’s preliminary hearing and 7th December 2023 when she submitted a claim. She said she was stressed and busy and that is why she did not submit a claim sooner. That period was nearly three weeks. I do not accept that it was reasonable to take so long to lodge a claim, even if it had not been reasonably practicable to lodge it earlier. The remaining detriments are therefore out of time. LAW:[54]Section 47B of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides: Protected disclosures. (1) A worker has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by his employer done on the ground that the worker has made a protected disclosure. (1A) A worker (“W”) has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, done— (a) by another worker of W's employer in the course of that other worker's employment, or (b) by an agent of W's employer with the employer's authority, on the ground that W has made a protected disclosure. (1B) Where a worker is subjected to detriment by anything done as mentioned in subsection (1A), that thing is treated as also done by the worker's employer. (1C) For the purposes of subsection (1B), it is immaterial whether the thing is done with the knowledge or approval of the worker's employer. (1D) In proceedings against W's employer in respect of anything alleged to have been done as mentioned in subsection (1A)(a), it is a defence for the employer to show that the employer took all reasonable steps to prevent the other worker— (a) from doing that thing, or (b) from doing anything of that description. (1E) A worker or agent of W's employer is not liable by reason of subsection (1A) for doing something that subjects W to detriment if— (a) the worker or agent does that thing in reliance on a statement by the employer that doing it does not contravene this Act, and (b) it is reasonable for the worker or agent to rely on the statement.[55]Section 48 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides: Complaints to employment tribunals. [...] (1A) A worker may present a complaint to an employment tribunal that he has been subjected to a detriment in contravention of section 47B. [...] (2) On a complaint under subsection... (1A) it is for the employer to show the ground on which any act, or deliberate failure to act, was done. [...] (3) An employment tribunal] shall not consider a complaint under this section unless it is presented—(a) before the end of the period of three months beginning with the date of the act or failure to act to which the complaint relates or, where that act or failure is part of a series of similar acts or failures, the last of them, or(b) within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three months. (4) For the purposes of subsection (3)— (a) where an act extends over a period, the “date of the act” means the last day of that period, and (b) a deliberate failure to act shall be treated as done when it was decided on; and, in the absence of evidence establishing the contrary, an employer shall be taken to decide on a failure to act when he does an act inconsistent with doing the failed act or, if he has done no such inconsistent act, when the period expires within which he might reasonably have been expected to do the failed act if it was to be done. (4A) Section 207B (extension of time limits to facilitate conciliation before institution of proceedings) applies for the purposes of subsection (3)(a). [...] CONCLUSIONS:[56]The first claimant’s claim for detriments arising from protected disclosures is dismissed. The first alleged disclosure contained no information and none of the statements said to be protected disclosures were made in the public interest. The alleged detriments were not on the grounds of protected disclosures being made and a number of the alleged detriments were not made out.[57]The second claimant’s claim of detriments arising from protected disclosures is dismissed. The alleged disclosures were all made orally and were not detailed until the course of the hearing. I find none of them proved on the balance of probabilities. In any event, the first alleged disclosure was actually a question and, in my judgment, did not amount to a disclosure of information. Even taking the second claimant’s case at its highest, there is no evidence any alleged disclosures were made in the public interest. For the reasons set out above, the three alleged detriments that were in time were not made out. The remaining alleged detriments were out of time.[58]For those reasons, each of the claimants’ claims is dismissed.