Miss M Moore v Ms S Skelton and Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust: 3200609/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 3200609/2024

Between

Miss M MooreClaimant

(1) Ms S Skelton (2) Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS TrustRespondent

Before

Employment Judge L Townley

Members

Miss S Harwood

Ms J Isherwood

In person for claimant

Date 9 March 2026

JUDGMENT

[1]Having heard from the Claimant and the Respondents, it is the unanimous decision of the Tribunal that the Claimant’s claims for discrimination on the ground of race, discrimination on the ground of age, and harassment related to race are not well founded and are dismissed.

REASONS

[1]The Claimant contacted ACAS on 29.02.24 (Day A) and was issued with the ACAS Early Conciliation certificate on 04.03.24 (Day B). An ET1 was filed with the Tribunal on 11.03.24. The Claimant brings the following claims:(a) Direct Age Discrimination (s 13 Equality Act 2010 (‘EqA’));

(b) Direct Race Discrimination (s 13 EqA);

[2]At a preliminary hearing on 17.01.25, EJ Elgot set the case down for seven days. The Claimant was represented at that hearing, but she appeared in person thereafter. At a preliminary hearing on 30.09.25 before EJ Allen KC it was directed that the hearing be reduced to four days by agreement of the parties on application by the Respondent’s solicitors. At the full merits hearing there were a number of preliminary issues and the evidence took three full days. The Claimant was also afforded a half day to review the evidence and prepare her closing submissions because she was unrepresented. It was therefore necessary to reserve judgment and to extend the overall length of the hearing by two further days (from which the parties were excused) to allow the Tribunal time for deliberation.

[3]On Day 1 the Claimant made an application to amend her claim to include an allegation that Ms Skelton had intentionally undermined her diligent efforts by ‘consistently burdening her with an excessive workload and issuing vague threats of termination’. These allegations, and the arguments in support of their inclusion, had already been considered in substance by EJ Elgot at the preliminary hearing on 17.01.25 when the application was refused.

[4]The Tribunal also considered that the allegations were not sufficiently particularised in any event. The Claimant had also said (both in her grievance and in her application to amend before EJ Elgot) that the alleged threats about termination of her employment were made by Ms Chagger. In her application before this Tribunal, she changed this to say that they were made by Ms Skelton. There was, in the Tribunal’s view, insufficient detail given about the reasons for this change, which was both substantial and made at a very late stage in the proceedings. In all the circumstances the Tribunal ruled that the balance of prejudice fell upon the Respondents if such a late and substantial amendment were to be permitted and the Claimant’s application to amend was refused.

The hearing

[5]The Tribunal was provided with a Bundle of documents by the Respondents’ solicitors consisting of 336 pages plus additional documents of 17 pages (numbered 337 – 353), a bundle of witness statements (20 pages), a chronology, and a List of Issues (dated 16.01.25). The hearing took place over four days (with a further two days for deliberation). The Claimant gave evidence on her own behalf. The Respondents called Ms S Skelton (Ward Manager, General Surgical Ward and the Claimant’s Line Manager) and Ms Chagger (Surgical Matron, and Manager General Surgical Ward and Line Manager of Ms Skelton). The Claimant gave her evidence under affirmation and Ms Skelton and Ms Chagger both gave their evidence under oath. The evidence concluded at 1.20 pm on 09.10.25 (day 3) and both parties made submissions on 10.10.25 (day 4).

[6]Both parties made submissions and the Respondents additionally provided written submissions. The tribunal is grateful to both parties for their submissions and has given these careful consideration.

Findings of Fact

[7]The Second Respondent is an NHS trust employing in the region of 8,000 staff operating from two main hospital sites. The Claimant was employed by the Second Respondent on the General Surgical Ward (Iris Ward) at King George’s Hospital, Romford, as a Full-Time Band 2 Health Care Assistant from 07.12.22 until she was dismissal on grounds of ill-health capability on 30.01.25. The First Respondent, Ms Skelton, was employed by the Second Respondent as the Ward Manager on the General Surgical Ward. Ms Skelton was responsible for the overall running of the ward and the line manager of all staff on the ward, including the Claimant. Ms Skelton’s Line Manager was Ms Chagger, a Surgical Matron who had overall responsibility for the General Surgical Ward in addition to other responsibilities.

[8]The Claimant was interviewed for her role on 01.10.22. The handwritten notes on the Claimant’s Interview Scoring Form state ‘Can do parttime/full time’ and ‘mother of 4, single’ (Bundle, pp 345 – 346).

[9]The Claimant received a conditional offer of employment which she accepted in writing on 14.10.22 (Bundle, pp 348 and 249). The Claimant’s job description (Bundle, p 329) states that she was assigned to Iris Ward. It also says: ‘full time (part time vacancies may become available)’. It was a requirement of the role that the Claimant complete a course of self-learning in order to obtain her ‘Care Certificate’. The role was also subject to a probationary period of six months. 10. ‘Care certificates’ were compulsory training packs which all Health Care Assistants had to complete at the Second Respondent. The usual procedure was that the Intern Team at the Second Respondent provided new Health Care Assistants with a ‘Care Certificate Pack’ when they commenced employment. Each Health Care Assistant was responsible for completing the pack and the objectives within it. Each objective was then signed off by a Registered nurse. The completion of the Care Certificate was signed off by the employee’s Line Manager or another Senior Manager. This was then sent to the Intern Team who awarded the certificate which was delivered by hand to wards. There was an expectation that all Health Care Assistants completed their Care Certificates within three months of commencing their employment. When the certificate was completed there was a formal presentation and a picture of the relevant cohort was taken. On Iris Ward a message of congratulations was also posted on the ward’s ‘WhatsApp’ group to celebrate the achievement.

[11]Health Care Assistants were required to wear a uniform and abide by the Dress and Uniform Standards Policy (Bundle, p 170). The Tribunal were only supplied with Version 8 of that Policy, dated May 2025. It states that ‘Bare legs are not acceptable’.

[12]The Claimant undertook four days of induction training in December 2022 at the start of her employment. The Claimant mistakenly believed that she received a Care Certificate upon completion of this induction training. This was not the case (see para 7).

[13]On 29.12.22 the Claimant sent an email to Ms Chagger asking to reduce her hours from full time to 20 hours per week stating (Bundle, p173): ‘… I’m struggling with this full time position at the moment because from the start I’ve asked for part time and was told that wasn’t a problem by the recruitment team. I’ve waited for them to get back to me but no response and I end up starting the full time position on Iris Ward … I’m a single mother of 4 children and really need the help and support to change to part time as soon as possible please so I can work around my children with drop off and pick up …If I can reduce my hours to 20 that would help.’

[14]Ms Chagger was on leave at the time, but on her return on 04.01.23 she sent an email to Ms Beverley Sawer of the Recruitment Team stating: ‘…I do not feel this can be supported on Iris ward as we are already short staffed and not sure how we recruit to the 17 hours [the Claimant] would like to drop? Please let me know what her options are as you see she is struggling with full time hours’.

[15]Ms Sawer replied to Ms Chagger stating (Bundle, pp 173 – 174): ‘We could move her but we will be setting a precedent with other HCA’s as they are advised that they need to complete their probationary period before moving’.

[16]Ms Sawer also told Ms Chagger that she had reviewed the paperwork from the Claimant’s interview and that she had indicated that she was happy to work full time or part time and had signed her contract as working full time (email chain, Bundle, pp 173 – 174). Ms Sawer also informed Ms Chagger that it was her decision as to whether the Claimant could reduce her hours.

[17]Ms Chagger informed the Claimant that it was not possible to grant her request due to service needs and that no part-time posts were available. She also told the Claimant that they could discuss it again in three months’ time to see if anything had changed.

[18]The Claimant went on sick leave from 08.02.23 until 08.06 23.

[19]While the Claimant was on sick leave she sent an email to the Recruitment Team (dated 08.03.23) inquiring about undertaking the ‘Nurse Associate Course’. She received a reply from Mr Ray Gotto (HCA Lead Intern and Care Certificate Facilitator), setting out the requirements that needed to be fulfilled before an application could be made to undertake that course. Prior to an application the applicant had to(i) complete the Care Certificate,

(ii) hold Level 2 functional skills in English and Maths (the Claimant already had these qualifications and Mr Gotto told her that she did not need to do them again), and

(iii) to complete probation or be in post for at least a year. (Bundle, p 235).

[20]Ms Chagger invited the Claimant to a number of meetings to discuss her sickness absence, including on 07.03.23 and 28.03.23. On 05.04.23, Ms Chagger sent a letter to the Claimant headed ‘Invite for an Informal LongTerm Meeting – 4th invite’ stating (Bundle, p 177): ‘… you have been invited to meet with either myself or [Ms Skelton] on four occasions … to discuss your absence … on 17 February you did not feel well enough to attend and when [Ms Skelton] suggested a telephone consultation you did not respond …’

[21]Ms Chagger invited the Claimant to another meeting on 12.04.23. While one of these meetings was cancelled by management, the Claimant failed to attend a number of others without notifying Ms Chagger in advance.

[22]The Claimant returned from her sick leave on 08.06 23.

[23]On 03.08.23, the Claimant had a meeting with Ms Skelton during which she raised her childcare issues. The meeting was a positive one where they shared their respective struggles with childcare due to them both being single mothers.

[24]On 08.08.23 the Claimant had a one-to-one supervision meeting with Ms Skelton during which Ms Skelton asked her if there were any training courses relevant to her role that she might wish to undertake. The Claimant replied: ‘not at the moment’. At this meeting, Ms Skelton reminded the Claimant that she had not yet satisfactorily completed her Care Certificate Pack.

[25]The Claimant’s First Formal (probation) Review was delayed as her result of her sickness absences (08.02.23 – 07.06.23 and other shorter periods of sickness absence). At the Second Respondent, an employee’s First Formal Review of probation was required to take place no later than the end of the employee’s first three months in a new post. The Claimant’s review took place with Ms Skelton on 15.08.23. Ms Skelton determined that the Claimant had not satisfactorily completed the First Formal probation review. The Claimant had only completed 14% of her mandatory training and Ms Skelton gave the Claimant a key objective ‘to complete care certificate’ and informed the Claimant that she anticipated another review in three months’ time (Bundle, pp 180 – 182).

[26]Ms Shelton sent a reminder email to the Claimant asking her for her Care certificate pack so that she could ‘sign it off’ (Bundle, p 188). Nurse Teddy Musni ‘signed off’ the Claimant’s Care Certificate as having been fully completed on (p 319) on 30.09.23 (Bundle, p 319).

[27]The Claimant’s comparator (in respect of her race discrimination claim), Naheece Rashid, completed her Care Certificate pack on 02.07.23 and received her Care Certificate soon thereafter (Bundle, p 320).

[28]The Claimant went on sick leave on 07.11.23. The Claimant’s Care Certificate was awarded by the Intern Team and was delivered to the ward on the same day. As the Claimant was on sick leave, Ms Skelton locked the certificate away for safe-keeping. This was because, as noted above, when staff completed their Care Certificates, the usual protocol on Iris Ward was that the certificates were handed over to staff in person and a photo was taken and the member of staff was celebrated. The protocol was to arrange for the member of staff to receive the certificate in person and for arrangements to be made for this to be celebrated on the ward.

[29]The Claimant returned from sick leave on 12.12.23.

[30]On 18.12.23 she arrived at work at 9.10 am when her shift was supposed to have started at 07.30 am. This was due to the Claimant having a sick child who she had needed to take to hospital. Ms Skelton informed the Claimant that she had missed a telephone Occupational Health appointment and that Occupational Health Team had tried to call her without success. On the same day, the Claimant had two meetings. One with Ms Skelton and the other with Ms Chagger. The time of the meeting with Ms Skelton is not clear but it is more likely than not that it took place in the morning or, in any event, before the meeting with Ms Chagger. The meeting with Ms Chagger was at 4pm. It was to discuss a complaint that Ms Chagger had received about the Claimant from another Health Care Assistant. No further action was taken regarding this.

[31]On 20.12.23 the Claimant went on sick leave.

[32]On the same day the Claimant sent an email to Ms Skelton asking for an update in relation to her Care Certificate. Ms Skelton relied stating: ‘Yes your care cert was delivered whilst you were on sick leave and has been stored in your file and available for you’ (Bundle, p 192). The Care Certificate was usually presented in person but as the Claimant was on sick leave Ms Skelton made an exception and arranged for it to be posted to the Claimant’s home address in April 2024 (Bundle, p 212).

[33]On 14.01.24 the Claimant filed grievance (dated 30.12.23) about Ms Skelton and Ms Chagger (Bundle, p 193).

[34]On 16.02.24 Ms Jalina Maiden, Employee Relations Partner of the Second Respondent, was appointed to carry out an investigation and a formal grievance meeting was held on 15.04.24. On 17.04.24 the Claimant was informed by letter that her grievance was not upheld following investigation.

[35]On 29.04.24 the Claimant made a flexible working request to reduce her hours to 23 per week (2 x 11.5 hour shifts) (Bundle, p 284). On 14.06.24 the Claimant’s request was agreed at 23 hours to be spread across two shifts per week, either days or nights (Bundle, p 262).

[36]On 13.05.24 the Claimant appealed the outcome of her grievance. By letter dated 23.05.24 she was informed that her appeal was not upheld (Bundle, p.214).

[37]On 11.07.24 the Claimant attended a formal long-term sickness meeting with Ms Chagger. The Claimant indicated that she could only work on Thursday and Friday nights. Ms Chagger told her that she would need to put in a new flexible working request (Bundle, pp 264 – 265).

[38]On 17.07.24 the Claimant made a further flexible working request (Bundle, p.267) requesting to work Thursday and Friday nights only and some weekends when available. On 24.07.24 Ms Chagger held an exploratory meeting with the Claimant to discuss her request. Ms Chagger referred the Claimant’s request to Ms Sandra Mahoney, Head of Nursing for Surgery, for review (Bundle, pp.268 – 269).

[39]On 27.06.24 and 27.07.24 Human Resources wrote to the Claimant to inform her about a contractual reduction in her pay due to the length of time that she had been on sick leave. On 27.07.24 the Claimant was overpaid in her monthly salary. This was due to the rotas being out of date and in August 2024, the Claimant received a letter from Human Resources stating that she had been overpaid in July and that it would be recouped from her (see email from Karen Tilbrook dated 15.08.24) (Bundle, p 305).

[40]By letter dated 30.07.24 the Claimant’s request to work only Thursday and Friday nights was refused by Ms Mahoney (Bundle, pp 270 – 271). It stated: ‘The request for part-time hours was previously granted to you and this remains approved at 23 hours. However, unfortunately, I am unable to approve the request to work only Thursday and Friday nights and occasional weekends for the following reasons: Detrimental impact on service delivery and/or quality: - Working nights only would result in you not having access to important training and development which would impact performance and service delivery. - It would also result in you not having sufficient contact with your line manager for management discussions such as appraisals and 1-2-1s. Meeting service demand: - The rota needs to be fair to all staff and meet the service needs. - Permanent set nights will reduce the ability to accommodate roster requests from the rest of the team while ensuring sufficient cover for the unit. You dismissed the alternative option of coming to work after you have dropped your children to school but unfortunately this again does not meet patient and service needs in the ward environment as you would miss handovers which are important for continuity of care, and it would not be possible to cover the hours you are not present with another staff member. I remain sympathetic to your needs and as stated I am happy to grant the 23 hours but with some flexibility to be fair to everyone.’

[41]On 10.10.24 the Claimant unfortunately fractured her ankle. She remained on sick leave and did not return to work prior to the termination of her employment on 30.01.25.

[42]On 28.11.24 the Claimant attended a formal absence review meeting via MS Teams with Ms Chagger. The Claimant was unaccompanied at that meeting (Bundle, pp 273 – 274)

[43]Occupational Health had recommended that the Claimant would be fit to return to a sedentary role. The Claimant indicated to Ms Chagger that she did not feel comfortable returning to work alongside her Line Manager, Ms Skelton (Bundle, p 274).

[44]By letter dated 28.11.24, Ms Chagger invited the Claimant to a final formal meeting on 30.01.25 (Bundle, pp 272 – 273). The letter informed the Claimant that a potential outcome of this meeting could be termination of her contract of employment on the grounds of ill health capability. At the meeting, at which it appears that the Claimant was again unaccompanied, Ms Chagger presented the management case. The meeting was chaired by Kerry Chapman, General Manager, with Kamogelo Makhele on the panel.

[45]Thereafter the Claimant was informed by letter (undated) signed by Kerry Chapman that her employment was terminated on 30.01.25 and that she would receive pay in lieu of notice. The letter stated (Bundle, pp 226 – 227): ‘The panel determined that: - All reasonable adjustments had been made to support your return to work. - Despite these accommodations, you have remained absent for a significant period. - Your sickness absence has had a detriment impact on service provision and has required additional cover, placing a strain on resources. - Given your minimal attendance since December 2022 and your lack of engagement in return-to-work opportunities, the only viable option is dismissal for reasons of capability.’

[46]The Claimant appealed against her dismissal. An appeal hearing was held on 14.04.24 over MS Teams. The Claimant was unaccompanied. The Claimant’s appeal was not upheld (Bundle, p 230). The Law to be applied

[47]The relevant law is as follows: Direct Race and Age Discrimination Section 13(1) of the Equality Act 2010 provides: ‘(1) A person(a) (A) discriminates against

(b) (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others … The critical factor is the thought processes of the person making the allegedly discriminatory decision must be motivated by the presence of the characteristic in question (CLFIS (UK) Ltd v Reynolds

[2015] ICR 1010

). Harassment related to race The Equality Act 2010, section 26, insofar as material, provides: (1) A person (A) harasses another (B) if – (a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and (b) The conduct has the purpose or effect of – (i) Violating B’s dignity, or (ii) Creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B ... (4) In deciding whether conduct has the effect referred to in subsection (1)(b), each of the following must be taken into account – (a) the perception of B; (b) the other circumstances of the case;

(c) whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect. (5) The relevant protected characteristics are – … race … The test for whether conduct achieved the requisite degree of seriousness to amount to harassment was considered (in the context of the formulation of s 3A Race Relations Act 1976) by the EAT in Richmond Pharmacology v Dhaliwal

[2009] IRLR 336

per Underhill P. at [22]: ‘We accept that not every racially slanted adverse comment or conduct may constitute the violation of a person’s dignity. Dignity is not necessarily violated by things said or done which are trivial or transitory, particularly if it should have been clear that any offence was unintended. While it is very important that employers, and Tribunals, are sensitive to the hurt that can be caused by racially offensive comments or conduct on other grounds covered by cognate legislation to which we have referred), it is also important not to encourage a culture of hypersensitivity or the imposition of legal liability in respect of every unfortunate phrase.’ Elias LJ in Land Registry v Grant

[2011] ICR 1390

at [47] held that sufficient seriousness should be accorded to the terms ‘violation of dignity’ and ‘intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment’. The EAT in Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board v Hughes [2014]

UKEAT/0179/13/JOJ

at [12], referring to Elias LJ’s observations in Grant, stated: ‘We wholeheartedly agree. The word “violating” is a strong word. Offending against dignity, hurting it, is insufficient. “Violating” may be a word the strength of which is sometimes overlooked. The same might be said of the words “intimidating” etc. All look for effects which are serious and marked, and not those which are, though real, truly of lesser consequence.’ The Burden of Proof in Discrimination Claims In relation to the burden of proof relevant to claims under the EqA, section 136 provides that: ‘136 Burden of proof (1) This section applies to any proceedings relating to a contravention of this Act. (2) If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred. (3) But subsection (2) does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the provision.’ In Mrs A Field v Steve Pye & Co (KL) Limited and others

[2022] EAT 68

, HHJ James Tayler gave the following guidance relating to the burden of proof in case alleging breaches of the EqA (at paras [36] – [38]): …The revised Barton guidance. As this is the first time that the Barton guidance has been considered by this court, it may be helpful for us to set it out again in the form in which we approve it ... We repeat the warning that the guidance is only that and is not a substitute for the statutory language. Annex (1) Pursuant to section 63A of the 1975 Act, it is for the claimant who complains of sex discrimination to prove on the balance of probabilities facts from which the tribunal could conclude, in the absence of an adequate explanation, that the employer has committed an act of discrimination against the claimant which is unlawful by virtue of Part 2, or which, by virtue of section 41 or section 42 of the 1975 Act, is to be treated as having been committed against the claimant. These are referred to below as “such facts”. (2) If the claimant does not prove such facts he or she will fail. (3) It is important to bear in mind in deciding whether the claimant has proved such facts that it is unusual to find direct evidence of sex discrimination. Few employers would be prepared to admit such discrimination, even to themselves. In some cases the discrimination will not be an intention but merely based on the assumption that “he or she would not have fitted in”. (4) In deciding whether the claimant has proved such facts, it is important to remember that the outcome at this stage of the analysis by the tribunal will therefore usually depend on what inferences it is proper to draw from the primary facts found by the tribunal. (5) It is important to note the word “could” in section 63A(2). At this stage the tribunal does not have to reach a definitive determination that such facts would lead it to the conclusion that there was an act of unlawful discrimination. At this stage a tribunal is looking at the primary facts before it to see what inferences of secondary fact could be drawn from them. (6) In considering what inferences or conclusions can be drawn from the primary facts, the tribunal must assume that there is no adequate explanation for those facts (7) These inferences can include, in appropriate cases, any inferences that it is just and equitable to draw in accordance with section 74(2)(b) of the 1975 Act from an evasive or equivocal reply to a questionnaire or any other questions that fall within section 74(2) of the 1975 Act. (8) Likewise, the tribunal must decide whether any provision of any relevant code of practice is relevant and, if so, take it into account in determining such facts pursuant to section 56A(10) of the 1975 Act. This means that inferences may also be drawn from any failure to comply with any relevant code of practice. (9) Where the claimant has proved facts from which conclusions could be drawn that the employer has treated the claimant less favourably on the ground of sex, then the burden of proof moves to the employer. (10) It is then for the employer to prove that he did not commit, or as the case may be, is not to be treated as having committed, that act … In some cases there may be no evidence to suggest the possibility of discrimination, in which case the burden of proof may have nothing to add. However, if there is evidence that discrimination may have occurred it cannot be ignored.’

Conclusions

[48]The conclusions are set out with reference to the List of Issues, dated 16.01.25 (Bundle, pp 64 – 70). Jurisdiction Time Limits (List of issues 3 – 7)

[49]The Respondent’s position is that the allegations in the ET1 which arose before 30 November 2023 are out of time (claims 9(a), 9(b), 9(c); 9(g); 11; 16(b), 16(c), 16(d)) as a result of the statutory time limits as set out in s 123(1)(b) of the EqA. Claims in the ET1

[50]The original claims contained in the ET1 relate to the following allegations:(a) race discrimination in relation to the Claimant’s late receipt of her Care Certificate (December 2022) ( issue 9(a)); Ms Skelton denying the claimant an opportunity for a nursing training course ( issue 9(b)) (September 2023); Ms Skelton commenting that the Claimant’s legs were a bit dark (issue 9(c)) (December 2023), Sinead Skelton breaching confidentiality by telling others on the ward about the Claimant’s appointment at the breast clinic (issue 9(g) (December 2023));

(b) racial harassment ( issue 11 - same alleged conduct as claim/ issue 9(c) (December 2023));

(c) age discrimination - Ms Skelton commenting that the Claimant looked too young to have four children and who stayed at home with them (December 2023) (issue 16(b)), Ms Skelton asking why the Claimant had children so young (issue 16(c) (December 2024) and Ms Skelton breaching the Claimant’s confidentiality telling others on the ward that the Claimant was off work as she had had breast surgery (issue 16(g)) (December 2023) (same alleged conduct as at claim/issue 9(g)).

[51]The tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the claims if it finds that those acts or omissions formed part of a course of conduct by the Respondents extending over a period of time such as to render them in time or, if not, whether it was just and equitable to extend time in respect of those allegations.

[52]The tribunal finds that claims 9(a) (December 2022 relating to the Care Certificate) and 9(b) (December 2023 relating to the training opportunity) are discreet claims not forming part of any course of conduct related to the later claims that post-date November 2023. No argument has been advanced as to why it would be just and equitable to extend time in relation to these claims and so the tribunal finds that they are brought out of time and it has no jurisdiction to consider them. Further Claims by Amendment

[53]The Claimant was granted permission to amend her claim on 16.01.25 to include allegations of direct age and race discrimination on (claims 9d, 9e, 9f and 16a). The Respondent’s position is that all of the amended allegations are out of time as they arose prior to 17 October 2024.

[54]The claims that were later added by way of amendment were race discrimination – Ms Skelton asking the Claimant whether she normally wore leggings (9(d)) (December 2023), Claimant’s being misled by the recruitment team regarding her being able to change to working part-time when they would not allow her to do so (July 2024) (9(e)); Claimant’s overpayment in her July 2024 salary (9(f)) ; age discrimination – Ms Skelton’s remarks about the Claimant being too young to have four children (16(a) (January 2023)).

[55]All of these claims are prima facie out of time. The Claimant submitted her ET1 on 11.03.24. She was dismissed on 30.01.25. The Claimant argues that she did not understand what to put in her claim form. However, she would have been aware about the allegations encompassed in issues 9(d) and 16(a) at the time that her claim form was submitted and we do not find that it just and equitable to extend time in relation to those.

[56]Claims 9(e) and 9(f) post-date the claim form allegedly occurring in July 2024. The Claimant’s application to amend was granted in January 2025. However, the Claimant had been on notice following a preliminary hearing in September 2024 that she would be required to make the application to amend as these claims went beyond that alleged in the ET1 (Bundle, p 54). The judge ordered that the Claimant write to the tribunal in relation to the amendments that she sought by 30.10.24. The Claimant did not submit her application until 20.11.24. While this was a delay we do not consider it to be substantial. We therefore consider it just and equitable to extend time in respect of these claims. This is particularly so in relation to Claim 9 (e) as the issue of part-time working underlies the whole claim.

[57]In the event that we are wrong in respect of the claims that we have found to be out of time and outwith the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, we will go on to consider the substantive claims in respect of all the Claimants claims, including those that we have found to be out of time. Direct Race Discrimination (Claims/Issues 9(a) – 9(g))

[58]The Claimant describes her race as Black Caribbean. In respect of Claim 9 (a) she compares herself to Naheece Rashid (Asian) and Claim 9(b) she compares herself to Lisa Quinn (White). Claim 9(a)

[59]The Claimant’s allegation is that she was treated less favourably because of her race than Naheece Rashid. The Claimant’s allegation is that between 5 – 8 December 2022 she finished her training certificate along with Naheece Rashid and they should have received their Care Certificates upon completion of the same. Naheece Rashid received her Care Certificate shortly after completing her Care Certificate which the Claimant says was in around late 2022 – early 2023 but the Claimant says that she only received hers ‘in April 2023’.

[60]The Claimant is mistaken in her assertion that she and Naheece Rashid finished their training enabling them to receive their Care Certificates on 5 – 8.12.22. What the Claimant refers to as her ‘training certificate’ was in fact her four-day induction course attended by the Claimant and her cohort of Health Care Assistants. The Care Certificate training package was distinct from the induction training. The Care Certificate training consisted of a compulsory training pack with a number of objectives that had to be completed through selflearning. On completion, each separate module had to be ‘signed off’ by a registered nurse. Once all modules were completed the pack had to be ‘signed off’ by the Ward Manager/Line Manager or another Senior Manager. Completion of the pack involved a considerable amount of work which was why staff were usually expected to take around three months to complete it and it was a requirement that staff completed it within three months of starting work. Naheece Rashid completed her Care Certificate Training Pack on 02.07.23 and received her certificate soon afterwards in accordance with the usual procedure on the Iris Ward following sign-off.

[61]The Claimant is mistaken when she says that she ‘received’ her Care Certificate in ‘April 2023’. In fact, she did not receive it until April 2024. There was an explanation for this delay. The Claimant did not complete the final objective of her Care Certificate training pack until 30.09.23 when it was ‘signed off’ by Nurse Munsi (the Claimant’s belief that she received her Care Certificate in April 2023 was mistaken). In accordance with standard procedure on the ward, once the Claimant had completed all of her objectives in the pack by way of selflearning it had to be forwarded to the Intern Team who issued the certificate and returned it to ward. Thereafter, Care Certificates were normally presented in person followed by a celebration and a photograph on Iris Ward. The Claimant’s Care Certificate arrived on the ward on 07.11.23 which was the first day of a period of sick leave from which she returned on 12.12.23. The Claimant went off on sick leave again on 20.12.23 and did not return to work on the ward again. The Claimant asked about her Care Certificate on 12.12.23 and Ms Skelton said that it was stored on file. This was the usual procedure as the ward would hold the certificates until they could be presented in person so that a celebration could take place. This did not happen as the Claimant did not return to work on the ward and Ms Skelton said that the certificate was then posted to the Claimant in April 2024 which was an exception as normal procedure was to present it in person. It follows that there was a valid explanation for the Claimant’s certificate arriving later than Naheece Rashid’s certificate. It was not as a result of any differential treatment between the Claimant and Naheece Rashid. There is no evidence from which the Tribunal could infer that the Claimant was treated less favourably than Naheece Rashid on the grounds of race or otherwise. This claim is therefore not made out. Claim 9(b)

[62]The Claimant’s alleges that she was treated less favourably because of her race than Lisa Quinn, who is white, in that she was denied a training opportunity by Ms Skelton who had not put her forward for a ‘nursing course’ on 29.09.23.

[63]O 08.03.23 the Claimant made an inquiry by email to the Recruitment Team about whether she could undertake the ‘Nurse Associate Course’, She received a reply from Mr Ray Gotto (Health Care Assistant Lead Intern and Care Certificate Facilitator) setting out the eligibility requirements for that course. He informed the Claimant that she had to(i) complete her Care Certificate,

(ii) hold Level 2 Functional Skills in English and Maths and

(iii) complete probation or at least be in post for one year.

[64]The Claimant had a one-to-one supervisory meeting with Ms Skelton on 08.08.23, during which Ms Skelton asked her if there were any training courses relevant to her role that she might wish to undertake. The Claimant replied: ‘not at the moment’. At this meeting, Ms Skelton noted that the Claimant’s Care Certificate was not yet satisfactorily completed.

[65]On 29.09.23 the Claimant had not yet fulfilled two of three the requirements necessary before an application could be made for participation on the Nurse Associate Couse. While she had obtained her Functional Skills in English and Maths (and Mr Gotto had told her that she was not required to undertake these again), she had not completed probation or been in post for at least a year, and her Care Certificate had not yet been awarded (although she completed the outstanding objectives the following day). Therefore, at the date of the allegation, the Claimant was not eligible to apply for the Nurse Associate training course. There is no evidence that Ms Skelton had denied her any training opportunity as at the supervisory meeting on 08.08.23 Ms Skelton had asked her if she wanted to undertake any training courses and the Claimant had said ‘not at the moment’. In any event the Claimant is mistaken about her eligibility to undertake the particular training course at the time that she avers it was not offered to her. She was not eligible for the training as she had not yet met the requirements and it follows that she was not treated less favourably than Lisa Quinn in not being able to avail herself of that opportunity. The Claimant’s claim of less favourable treatment on the ground of her race is therefore not made out in relation to his claim and it is dismissed. Claims 9(c) and 9(e)

[66]These relate to allegations that on 18.12.23 Ms Skelton told the Claimant: ‘your legs are a bit dark aren’t they’ and that Ms Skelton asked the Claimant if she normally wears leggings when the Claimant was not wearing leggings at the time as she says it was not part of her Health Care Assistant work dress. Ms Skelton in her evidence stated that she had never seen the Claimant’s legs and she also stated that the Uniform Policy does not permit bar legs at work. The Tribunal was supplied with Version 8 of the Dress and Uniform Standards Policy, dated ‘May 2025’, by the Respondents’ solicitors. It states that ‘Bare legs are not acceptable’. Unfortunately, we did not have access to the version of that policy that was in place on the 18.12.23 but we find that it is unlikely that it would have changed substantially in this respect. We accept Ms Skelton’s evidence on this point that she had not seen the Claimant’s leg and also find that it is unlikely that the Claimant would have come to work with bare legs in violation of the relevant uniform and dress policy. In relation to the ‘normally wear leggings’ comment, Ms Skelton denied asking this question. While the Claimant said that Ms Skelton asked her if she normally wore leggings and that she had considered it to be racist as Ms Skelton would not have asked a white or Asian colleague the same question. We cannot conclude that this comment, if it were indeed made, would have amounted to less favourable treatment on the grounds of race. Any such comment if it were made was more likely than not to have related to uniform compliance. This claim is therefore dismissed. Claim 9(e)

[67]The Claimant alleges that the Recruitment Team misled her on 31.07.24 that she would be able to change to part-time working, but they did not allow her to do so. The Claimant had already made a flexible working request on 29.04.24 to reduce her hours to 23 per week. This was granted on 14.06.24. The Claimant then made a further flexible working request on 17.07.24 that she work only on Thursday and Friday nights. Ms Chagger held an exploratory meeting with the Claimant about this on 24.07.24 and then referred the Claimant’s application to Ms Mahoney for review. Ms Mahoney wrote to the Claimant on 30.07.24 explaining that her request for part-time hours previously granted remained approved at 23 hours, however the request to work only on Thursday and Friday nights was refused for reasons of service delivery and also because it would deny the Claimant access to training and not permit her sufficient contact with her Line Manager to support her development (Bundle, pp 270 – 271). Ms Mahoney was clear in the letter that the request to work part-time stood, stating ‘I remain sympathetic to your needs and as stated I am happy to grant the 23 hours but with some flexibility to be fair to everyone’. Therefore, the tribunal does not find that the Claimant was misled by the Recruitment Team in the way as alleged or at all and this claim is dismissed. Claim 9(f)

[68]The Claimant alleges that the recoupment of an overpayment of her salary in July 2024 amounted to less favourable treatment due to her race. While the tribunal does not underestimate how upsetting this would have been for the Claimant, it was an administrative error that could not be attributed to the Claimant’s race. The Claimant’s salary was reduced in July 2024 under the terms of her contract due to the length of time that she had been on sick leave. The over payment was made due to the rotas being out of date and the Second Respondent sought to recoup that overpayment the following month (Bundle, pp 305 – 307). While this was unfortunate and upsetting for the Claimant it was not a violation of the EqA and the claim is dismissed. Claim 9(g)

[69]The Claimant alleges that on or around 18.12.23 Ms Skelton breached her confidentiality on Erica Ward. The Claimant alleges that she went for an appointment at the breast clinic and ‘when she got back to the ward, her colleague asked her why she was off work as Ryan and Angela knew that the Claimant had breast surgery’.

[70]In her evidence to the Tribunal, the Claimant gave a different account in respect of this allegation. She introduced a witness to the incident called Syed not previously mentioned by her, who she said was a male nurse. The Claimant said that he kept looking at her breasts and asked her if she had had surgery. When she asked him how he knew about this he said that he had heard people talking. The Claimant said that when she asked him who had told them, he had whispered: ‘you know who’ (without mentioning any name). The Claimant also mentioned another alleged witness ‘Amrat’. The Claimant was crossexamined about why she had not mentioned ‘Ryan’ and ‘Angela’ as witnesses to this incident in her grievance (when they were the only witnesses mentioned in the List of Issues) and she said that she did not want to cause issues for them. Given the inconsistency of the Claimant’s evidence in relation to this allegation, the Tribunal finds that it is unsubstantiated and this claim is dismissed. Harassment due to race (List of issues 11 - 14) Claim 11

[71]The Claimant’s alleges that she suffered racial harassment due to Ms Skelton telling her: ‘your legs are a bit dark, aren’t they?’. The tribunal finds this allegation is unsubstantiated for the same reasons as noted in relation to Claim 9(c) above. Direct Age Discrimination (list of issues 16 (a) – (d) Claims 16 (a), (b) and (c)

[72]The Claimant is 34 years of age and compares herself to the age group 30 – 40 years. The Claimant’s allegation is that Ms Skelton did not permit her to go parttime after she had raised her childcare issues with her on 01.01.23 and again on 03.08.23 and that they were not addressed. The Claimant also alleges that she had been told that this was not a problem by the Recruitment team; that on 03.08.24 Ms Skelton had also made remarks that the Claimant was too young to be the mother of four children; that on 18.12.23 Ms Skelton said that the Claimant ‘looks too young to have four children, who stays at home with them?’ and on the same date asked the Claimant why she had children so young.

[73]The Claimant’s applications for flexible working were not a matter for Ms Skelton and Ms Skelton was not involved in considering them. As far as the Recruitment Team are concerned the notes of the Claimant’s interview state ‘Can do parttime/full time’ and ‘mother of 4, single’ (Bundle, pp 345 – 346). The Claimant’s job description (Bundle, p 329) states ‘full time (part time vacancies may become available)’.

[74]The Claimant did discuss childcare issues with Ms Skelton at a meeting on 03.08.23, however, the meeting was a positive one where they shared their respective struggles with childcare due to them both being single mothers.

[75]On 29.12.22 the Claimant sent an email to Ms Chagger asking to reduce her hours. Ms Chagger dealt with this application on her return from leave on 04.01.23 and referred when she referred it to Ms Mahoney. Ms Skelton was not involved in dealing with this application. In any event, the Claimant was permitted to reduce her working hours to part-time in order to assist her with her childcare. She was refused a further application to work only on Thursday and Friday nights for reasons of service delivery and her own career development which were fully explained by Ms Mahoney in her letter to the Claimant (see para 40 above).

[76]The Claimant had meetings with both Ms Skelton and Ms Chagger on 18.12.23. Ms Skelton informed the Claimant that she had missed a telephone Occupational Health appointment and that Occupational Health had tried to call her without success (in her cross-examination of Ms Skelton the Claimant’s only allegation about comments made at this meeting was that Ms Skelton had said ‘I don’t help people like you’ (in relation to the Occupational Health telephone call) – Ms Skelton denied saying this). The Claimant then had a meeting with Ms Chagger later that day. This meeting was to discuss a complaint which Ms Chagger had received about a Claimant from another Health Care Assistant (no further action was taken about this complaint).

[77]In the Respondents’ cross-examination of the Claimant in relation to the allegations about the remarks made about the claimant looking too young and being too young to have four children, it was pointed out to the Claimant that she had named Ms Chagger in her grievance (which was much closer to the events in question in time) as being the one who had made these comments to her rather than Ms Skelton. The Claimant was unable to explain the inconsistencies in her evidence and why she had named different people as responsible for the comments complained of in Claims 16(b) and (c) in her grievance and in her later allegations before the Tribunal.

[78]Accordingly, we find that all claims 16(a), (b) and (c) are unsubstantiated and are dismissed. Claim 16(d)

[79]This relates to an allegation that Ms Skelton breached the Claimant’s confidentiality in identical terms as that set out at Claim 9(g). We find this claim to be unsubstantiated for the same reasons given in relation to Claim 9(g) above and it is dismissed.

[80]The Tribunal has sympathy with the Claimant on a personal level as she was balancing her working life with ill health, including a fractured ankle, while caring for her young family. However, the First and Second Respondents did not breach any of the provisions of the EqA as alleged in relation to their treatment of the Claimant.