A Lateef v Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd: 3200571/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 3200571/2024

Between

Abdul LateefClaimant

Compass Group UK & Ireland LimitedRespondent

Before

Employment Judge S Povey

Date 24 March 2026

REASONS

[1]This hearing was ordered by Employment Judge Lewis at the case management preliminary hearing on 30 October 2025. It is not in dispute that the Claimant presented his claims out of time and the purpose of the hearing was to decide whether the Tribunal should exercise its power to extend time and allow the claims to proceed.

[2]In summary, the Claimant was dismissed on 5 September 2023. He did not commence ACAS Early Conciliation until 1 March 2024 and did not submit his claim to the Tribunal until 8 March 2024. Given the date of his dismissal (which forms the basis of his complaints), the latest he should - 1 - have presented his claim (or started Early Conciliation) was 4 December 2023. As such, the claims were presented over three months out of time.

[3]The Claimant’s application for an extension of time was, in summary, premised on the following: 3.1. That due to his health, he was not capable of presenting the claim any earlier. 3.2. The cause of his health conditions were the combination of the stresses of losing his job, his wife’s health and the death of his mother-in-law. 3.3. It was not until he was better, toward the end of February 2024, that the Claimant spoke with a friend who advised him of the process and procedure to bring his claim, which he duly did.

[4]As directed by Employment Judge Lewis, the Claimant provided evidence he sought to rely upon in support of his application. This included a witness statement and supporting documents, most of which pertained to his wife’s health and treatment.

[5]At the hearing, I heard oral evidence from the Claimant (via an interpreter) and received oral submissions from the Claimant’s friend, Mr Abdul (who is also a lawyer qualified in India) and from Mr Moss for the Respondent.

[6]The Claimant was employed as a Vending Operator from 5 December 2005 until his dismissal on 5 September 2023. The Respondent says that it dismissed the Claimant because he took unauthorised leave and failed to respond to contact from his managers. It was not in dispute that the Claimant took authorised leave to travel to India but the Respondent says that the Claimant continued to be absent without permission. That, it says, is why he was dismissed. The Respondent says it was also an act of gross misconduct and so dismissed the Claimant without notice. The Respondent says that the Claimant has been paid all the sums owed to him.

[7]The Claimant says that his dismissal was unfair and was also an act of age discrimination (the Claimant was 68 at the time of his dismissal). He also claims notice pay and unpaid wages. The relevant law Time limits: reasonably practicable

The relevant law

[8]The time limits for complaints of unfair dismissal, unpaid notice pay (wrongful dismissal) and unpaid wages (unauthorised deductions from wages) is three months from the date of the detriment or failure complained of, subject to the provisions regarding ACAS Early Conciliation. - 2 -

[9]If complaints are not presented within the requisite three month time limits, they can only proceed if the Claimant can show that they were presented within such further period as the Tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three months.

[10]In effect, the Claimant must show that it was not reasonably practicable to present the complaints in time. If he cannot, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider and determine those complaints. If he can, he must also show that the complaints were presented within a further period which in itself was reasonable.

[11]In considering whether the test of reasonable practicability has been made out, the Tribunal should adopt a liberal interpretation in favour of the employee, regard should be had to what, if anything, the employee knew about the right to complain the Tribunal (including the time limits to do so) and also to what knowledge the employee should have had, had they acted reasonably in the circumstances (per Marks & Spencer plc v Williams-Ryan

[2005] EWCA Civ 470

[12]Whether illness is sufficient to make it not reasonably practicable to submit a claim in time will be a question of fact for the Tribunal. It may be relevant to consider what else the Claimant was able to do at the material time but each case will turn on its own facts and evidence (see, for example, Thorpe v Sainsbury's Supermarket Ltd

[2023] EAT 20

; Cygnet Behavioural Health Ltd v Britton

[2022] EAT 108

; University Hospitals Bristol NHS Foundation Trust v Williams

UKEAT/0291/12

). Time limits: just & equitable

[13]The time limits for presenting discrimination claims is in section 123(1) of the Equality Act 2010 (‘the EqA’): (1) Subject to section 140B proceedings on a complaint within section 120 may not be brought after the end of— (a) the period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or (b) such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable.

[14]If a complaint is presented out of time and not within another period which is just and equitable, the Tribunal has no power to consider it. However, for the purposes of calculating when the three month period begins to run, conduct extending over a period of time is treated as having been done at the end of the period (per section 123(3)(a) of the EqA 2010).

[15]The Tribunal has a wide discretion when considering whether it is just and equitable to extend time (Bexley Community Centre (t/a Leisure Link) v Robertson

[2003] EWCA Civ 576

; Jones v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care

[2024] EAT 2

). When a claimant applies to extend time - 3 - under section 123(1)(b), it is for them to show that the extension is just and equitable (Polystar Plastic Ltd v Liepa

[2023] EAT 100

). 16. ‘Just and equitable’ includes consideration of why the claim was presented out of time and what the respective prejudice to the parties would be if time was or was not extended (such that the claim could or could not proceed). The discretion is wide enough to also include a consideration of the merits of the case being pursued (Kumari v Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust

[2022] EAT 132

). Findings & conclusions The reasons why the claim was presented out of time

[17]It was not in dispute that the claims were all presented out of time.

[18]I considered the Claimant’s explanations for why he presented his claims when he did and whether those explanations were adequate.

[19]The Claimant relied upon the impact of his wife’s health, the loss of his mother-in-law and the loss of his job on his own health and submitted that he was in effect incapacitated and unable to act from September 2023 until March 2024.

[20]Losing employment is an understandably common feature in Tribunal claims and was, to that extent, not an unusual or significant factor. Rather, it appeared that what was being presented by the Claimant were a number of stressors which, when combined, rendered the Clamant incapable of taking any action regarding his Tribunal claim until March 2024.

[21]The Claimant relied upon a fit note from his GP and upon his wife’s medical records.

[22]The fit note was dated 27 February 2024, which was the date when the GP assessed the Claimant’s health. The fit note certified the Claimant as unfit for work from 29 September 2023 until 29 March 2024.

[23]The GP concluded that the Claimant was not fit for work because of “stress due to work related issue”. Contrary to the Claimant’s submissions, the fit note made no reference to any stress caused by bereavement or family matters (like his wife’s health issues). The fit note did not suggest that the Claimant was suffering from depression, as claimed in the Claimant’s witness statement and submissions. There was no evidence of any treatment the Claimant was receiving for his stress specifically, or his health more widely.

[24]Crucially there was no evidence whatsoever of how the Claimant’s symptoms of stress impacted his ability to find out about and start Tribunal proceedings. - 4 -

[25]It is important to remember what else the Claimant was doing during the time when he says, in reliance on the fit note, he was too incapacitated to start Tribunal proceedings: 25.1. He submitted his appeal against dismissal on 18 September 2023 and then prepared for, attended and engaged in the appeal hearing on 13 October 2023. 25.2. He tells me that at the end of February 2024, he sought advice from a friend who had been through a similar process and found out about the Tribunal procedure. 25.3. He started ACAS Early Conciliation on 1 March 2024 and was able to draft and issue his claim form on 8 March 2024.

[26]Turning then to the Claimant’s wife’s health, of which there was extensive evidence before me.

[27]The Claimant claimed that his wife received treatment in India for bowel cancer in summer 2023 (per his witness statement at paragraphs 8 – 9). However, that was at odds with both the documentary evidence and the Claimant’s own oral evidence under cross-examination. There was no evidence of the Claimant’s wife receiving treatment in India for anything, still less bowel cancer. Rather, according to her disclosed medical records, she underwent chemotherapy and an operation for bowel cancer in 2016.

[28]There was a copy of a scan which was undertaken in India but no evidence of any treatment. In his oral evidence, the Claimant confirmed that the scan was arranged because his wife had some pain, which turned out to be a hernia.

[29]As a result, it was difficult to see how, in circumstances where the Claimant and his wife had been living with the fact that she was treated for cancer in 2016, discovering that she had a hernia in summer 2023 would have incapacitated and stressed the Claimant to the extent claimed. As already alluded to, the Claimant’s own GP did not diagnose the cause of his stress in February 2024 as being related to anything other that his work situation

[30]In my judgment, the medical evidence relied upon fell short of supporting a finding that the Claimant was generally incapable of functioning or engaging with the sort of activities necessary to bring Tribunal proceedings.

[31]For those reasons, I was unable to accept the Claimant’s evidence that his wife’s cancer in 2016 and her treatment in India in 2023 caused him to be unable to explore and pursue his Tribunal claim sooner than he did. - 5 -

[32]Similarly, whilst the loss of a parent is always sad and difficult, there was no evidence that the loss of the Claimant’s wife’s mother incapacitated the Claimant in pursuing his Tribunal claim. Again, the Claimant’s own GP did not consider that his stress symptoms were related to his mother- in-law’s death, otherwise he would have said so in the fit note.

[33]Drawing those threads together, the Claimant has not provided an adequate explanation for why he presented his claims outside the permitted time limits. The complaints of unfair dismissal, wrongful dismissal and unauthorised deductions form wages

[34]Despite his health and personal issues, for which he consulted his GP in February 2024, the Claimant was able to engage in the appeal process with the Respondent, start ACAS Early Conciliation, and draft and issue his Tribunal claim.

[35]Any alleged ignorance of the applicable time limits for Tribunal proceedings was unreasonable, since the Claimant has failed to show that he was incapable of making even the most cursory of enquiries whether via the internet or by obtaining advice. It was reasonable for him to have made those enquiries or to have undertaken at least cursory investigations.

[36]For all those reasons, in my judgment, it was reasonably practicable for the Claimant to have presented the complaints of unfair dismissal, wrongful dismissal and unauthorised deductions from wages within the requisite three month time limit. As such, there is no power to extend time, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider them, they have no reasonable prosects of success and they are struck out. The complaints of age discrimination

[37]I reminded myself of the medical evidence and of what the Claimant was capable of doing at the relevant time (as detailed above). I also reminded myself that it was reasonable for the Claimant to have been aware of the applicable time limits.

[38]Having regard to those factors, I was unable to find on balance that the Claimant’s health issues (that is, the stress he was suffering as a result of losing his job, his wife’s health and the loss of his mother-in-law) had rendered him incapable of presenting his claim in time. That conclusion was reinforced by his engagement in the appeal process at the relevant time.

[39]It follows that it was reasonable for the Claimant to have been aware of the Tribunal time limits and his mental health did not incapacitate him to such an extent that he was unable to act on or within those time limits. - 6 -

[40]The discretion afforded to the Tribunal under section 123 of the EqA 2010 is wide (and more generous than the test of reasonable practicability). However, the failure to provide an adequate explanation for why the complaints were presented out of time is a significant factor. The test is whether they were presented within such other period of time as the Tribunal considers just and equitable. Inherent in that exercise is an understanding of why the original, statutory time limit was missed. The Claimant has failed to provide a satisfactory answer to that aspect of the exercise.

[41]It is for the Claimant to explain the delay and to show that it is, in effect, just and equitable to extend time and allow the complaints to proceed. I repeat my primary finding. The Claimant was not prevented from presenting his claim in time or at any time before 8 March 2024 because of his mental health or his personal circumstances or his knowledge or otherwise of the Tribunal time limits.

[42]Although I was not expressly addressed on it by the parties, I went on to consider the relative prejudice to the parties of allowing and refusing the discrimination complaints to proceed.

[43]Refusing to allow them to proceed would deprive the Claimant of the opportunity to have his allegations considered and determined by the Tribunal. It was not suggested that there was any other prejudice to the Claimant, over and above that self-evident one.

[44]Allowing them to proceed would require the Respondent to answer allegations which, to a degree, it was entitled to consider had been addressed and resolved by way of the disciplinary procedure. The Respondent was under the reasonable impression, at least until March 2024, six months after the dismissal, that the Claimant was not proposing to pursue his complaints by way of legal proceedings.

[45]In my judgment, the balance of prejudice fell in favour of the Respondent. The explanation for why the Claimant did not bring these complaints in time was unsatisfactory. That weighed heavily against the Claimant. The Respondent was entitled to conclude that it was not being pursued via the Tribunal, by the Claimant’s failure to act until some time after the applicable deadline for starting the ACAS Early Conciliation process had passed.

[46]For all those reasons, the discrimination complaints were presented out of time and not presented within a further period which was just and equitable, having regard particularly to the reasons for them being out of time and the relative prejudice to both parties of allowing and refusing the extension of time application. - 7 -

[47]It follows that Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider them, they have no reasonable prospects of success, and they are struck out. Approved by: Employment Judge S Povey Date: 24 March 2026 Notes Judgments (apart from judgments under rule 52) and reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimant(s) and respondent(s) in a case. If a Tribunal hearing has been recorded, you may request a transcript of the recording. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, you will have to pay for it. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings and accompanying Guidance, which can be found at www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation-practicedirections/ - 8 -