Ms J Ikechi-Iro v Urbis Academy Trust: 3200365/2020 and 3219924/2020

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 3200365/2020, 3219924/2020

Between

Ms J Ikechi-IroClaimant

Urbis Academy Trust Heard: East London Tribunal Hearing Centre (Hybrid hearing)Respondent

Before

Employment Judge S Shore

Members

Ms J Houzer

Ms S Jeary

Ms E Godwins (instructed by Solicitor) for claimant

Mr T Cordrey (instructed by Counsel) for respondent

Date 15 April 2026

JUDGMENT

[1]All the claimant’s claims of direct discrimination because of the protected characteristic of race are dismissed.

[2]All the claimant’s claims of harassment related to the protected characteristic of race are dismissed.

[3]All the claimant’s claims of victimisation because she made a protected disclosure are dismissed.

[4]All the claimant’s claims of harassment related to the protected characteristic of disability are dismissed.

[5]All the claimant’s claims of discrimination arising from disability are dismissed.

[6]All the claimant’s claims of failing to make reasonable adjustments are dismissed. 1 of 51

[7]The claimant’s claim of unfair dismissal is dismissed.

[8]The claimant’s claim of breach of contract (wrongful dismissal) is dismissed.

[9]Because all the claimant’s claims have been dismissed, there is no requirement to hold a remedy hearing.

REASONS

[1]The claimant was employed by the respondent from 1 September 2014 until 16 July 2020, latterly as Assistant Head Teacher (Learning and Knowledge) from 1 May 2018. The claimant was one of three Assistant Head Teachers. The claimant was one of the School’s Senior Leadership Team (“SLT”).

[2]The claimant started early conciliation for the first time against the respondent on 29 November 2019 and obtained an early conciliation certificate on 29 December 2029. She presented her first ET and Particulars of Claim [14-34] on 28 January 2020 [14-34]. Ms Godwins, who appeared for the claimant today, was identified as the claimant’s representative in paragraph 11 of the ET1 [22].

[3]The claimant started early conciliation with ACAS for the second time on 22 September 2020 and obtained an early conciliation certificate dated 22 October 2020 [80]. The claimant presented her second ET1 and Particulars of Claim [83-106] on 21 November 2020.

[4]On 29 April 2020, the Tribunal sent the parties a standard case management order [55-58] that confirmed that a preliminary hearing would take place on 15 June 2020 to determine the length of the final hearing and make case management orders. The claimant was required to provide further information about any disabilities that she relied on in the claim. The claimant was required to provide a schedule of loss by 28 May 2020. The parties were ordered to disclose documents and create a bundle by 16 July 2020 and exchange witness statements on 6 August 2020.

[5]On 12 June 2020, the claimant provided further information about her disability claim [59-60]. The claimant indicated that the disabilities relied upon were severe depression, anxiety, and stress.

[6]A preliminary hearing took place on 15 June 2020 [61-72] before Employment Judge Gardiner when the claimant was represented by Ms Godwins. It was agreed that the final hearing would take five days (the dates were not set at the hearing, but were later set for 5 days commencing on 24 August 2021).

[7]The claims were identified as being of: 7.1. Direct race discrimination; 2 of 51 7.2. Victimisation 7.3. Failure to make reasonable adjustments; and 7.4. Discrimination arising out of disability.

[8]EJ Gardiner noted that the respondent contended that some of the claims were out of time. He varied the case management orders so that exchange of witness statements would be on 14 December 2020.

[9]The parties agreed on a List of Issues, subject to further information being given about some of the issues identified. The List was set out using the same numbering convention and order that appeared in the final List presented to this Tribunal. We find that the jurisdictional (time limit) matters listed in EJ Gardiner’s case management order [62-64] are identical to the those produced in the final agreed List of Issues.

[10]We therefore find that the claimant has been on notice that the issue of jurisdiction/time has been clearly spelled out since 15 June 2020.

[11]We find that the claimant’s claims of direct discrimination because of race are identical to the final list, save that further information about paragraph 2.1.1. a. ivi has since been provided.

[12]The claimant was dismissed on 16 July 2020. The respondent states that the reason for dismissal was misconduct. The second claim brought new claims of unfair dismissal, breach of contract (failure to pay notice pay) and disability discrimination. The two claims were consolidated.

[13]We set out the continuing history as recorded by Employment Judge Crosfill in his case management order dated 23 May 2023: “6. There was a further Preliminary hearing on 13 May 2021 before EJ McLaren. A further 3 days were added to the existing listing. Thereafter it appears that nothing of substance was heard from the Claimant’s side. The date for the exchange of witness statements had long gone by. On 4 October 2021, only 2 months before an 8 day final hearing, it was the Respondent who chased the claimant’s side proposing directions which, had they been complied with, would have enabled the hearing to proceed. A date of 26 November 2021 was proposed for the exchange of witness statements. The correspondence on behalf of the Claimant showed no contrition that there had been no progress in complying with the orders of the tribunal. 7. On 22 October 2021, having failed to comply with any of the revised directions proposed by the Respondent, the Claimant sought a postponement. The application was in part based upon the fact that there was an impending criminal trial and that there was an overlap between the allegations in that trial and the present proceedings. A further ground for the postponement was that the Claimant said that by reason of her mental health she was not well enough to proceed. 3 of 51 8. A postponement was granted and the hearing was listed for 8 days commencing 23 May 2023. That provided the Claimant with an additional 19 months to comply with directions that had first been set in 2020. 9. It appears that there was no correspondence between the parties between 29 November 2021 and 23 February 2023. There was a wholesale failure to do anything that might ensure that the matter was ready for a final hearing. On 23 February 2023 Ms Godwins wrote to the Respondent proposing a short but workable timetable to progress the matter to a final hearing. 10. The Respondents agreed to this and with some short delays by both parties efforts were made to prepare a bundle of documents. The Claimant complains about late disclosure form the Respondent. I consider this disingenuous. The Respondent says, and I accept, that its disclosure included nothing that the Claimant had not already seen. Furthermore if the Claimant was concerned about late disclosure she had had months if not years to make requests from the Respondent rather than leaving things to the last minute. 11. On 2 May 2023 in response to a readiness letter sent by the Tribunal Ms Godwins informed the Tribunal that the case management orders had not been complied with and ‘the Claimant has been prejudiced by the delay’. This was a delay entirely of her own making. A proposal was made that the hearing proceed but adjourn part heard. Having been pressed by the Respondent for a date for the exchange of witness statements on 5 May 2023 Ms Godwins suggested that she would ‘see what could be done’ about the exchange of witness statements. 12. In her letter of 2 May 2023 Ms Godwins told the Tribunal that her client had severe depression and needed more time to read and to prepare documents. That may very well be so but the Claimant had years to prepare her case. 13. EJ Walker refused the Claimant’s application to postpone the hearing by a letter dated 15 May 2021. She ordered that witness statements should be exchanged by 17 May 2023 and that the hearing would proceed.

[14]EJ Walker’s decision had been made before she became aware of additional information that included an assertion that the Claimant’s mental health had been effected by a notice of eviction from her home. She directed that a redacted version of that information be served on the Respondent and that the application could be renewed.

[15]The possession order was dated 25 April 2023. There was no warrant of possession.

[16]Such medical evidence as had been provided by the Claimant to support her application for a postponement was entirely inadequate for that purpose. Far from suggesting that the Claimant could not attend a hearing the Claimant’s GP made recommendations for adjustments to facilitate her participation. The GP recommended that she had additional time to prepare a witness statement. I assume he was unaware that the Claimant had over 2 years to do that. 4 of 51

[17]Shortly before I was to give judgment Ms Godwins provided a letter from a Helen Vaux an ‘associate practitioner’ in the Enhanced primary Mental Health Team. She said that the most recent events of the possession order had had an impact on the Claimant’s mental health and that she had been unable to complete her witness statement.

[18]I announced my conclusions that the Claimant was in breach of numerous case management orders. As such, the threshold for making an order under rule 37 was crossed. As an alternative to that straightforward route I found that the Claimant had not being actively pursuing her claim. Additionally I considered that the failure of the Claimant to comply with orders and the fact that she had let the action fall asleep not once but twice was unreasonable conduct of the proceedings.

[19]I was prepared to accept that the latest crisis in the Claimant’s life would have had an impact on her ability to prepare a witness statement. What is also clear is that it is the fact that there is to be a final hearing which unsurprisingly adds to stress and anxiety. If the Claimant had begun her statement in a timely manner in my view it could have been completed years before and she could have been fully ready for a hearing. Whether she would then have been able to overcome the additional issue of the possession order can now never be known.” 14. As recorded by EJ Crosfill above, on 2 May 2023, the claimant’s solicitor applied to postpone the final hearing due to start on 23 May 2023 because witness statements had not been exchanged and the claimant was not well enough to attend. Regional Employment Judge Burgher converted the first day of the final hearing to a preliminary hearing, which was attended by Ms Godwins for the claimant and Mr Cordrey for the respondent, as at this hearing. 15. Employment Judge Crosfill conducted the preliminary hearing on 23 May 2023 and decided not to strike out the claimant’s calms in their entirety by what appears to have been a fine margin. He relisted the final hearing for the dates that we heard the case and made an unless order that the claimant must exchange witness statements with the respondent by 20 June 2023. Issues 16. The List of Issues agreed by the parties at the final hearing on 12 November 2024 are as set out below. Whilst we do not usually use letters and Roman numerals in Judgments and Reasons, it is appropriate here as the numbering used in the List was used in the parties’ documents and some statements. We will use the numbering when referring to items from the List in the Reasons. 1. JURISDICTION 5 of 511.1 In respect of the Respondent’s acts or failures to act in breach of the provisions of the EqA set out below, what are the dates of the discriminatory acts alleged by the Claimant? The Claimant’s allegations are as follows: 1.1.1. RACE DISCRIMINATION Direct race discrimination

a. Colleagues complaining about her accent and the way she speaks - Between May 2018 to September 2018 (Par 11 and 37(a) 1st ET1)

b. Advertising and recruiting for her role during her suspension, and an assistant head teacher being recruited to her permanent position – The role was advertised from 14 September 2018 to 6 October 2018, the assistant headteacher was recruitment to her role in November 2018 and left around April 2019. (Par 15 and 37(b) 1st ET1)

c. Suspended and subjected to a disciplinary investigation - 20 July – 22 November 2018 (Par 13,14 and 37(c) 1st ET1)

d. Lorraine Barella ignoring her and speaking only to her white MIND representative - 23 October 2019 (Par 27 and 37(d) 1st ET1) Harassment on the grounds of race

e. Lorraine Barella ignoring her and speaking only to her white MIND representative - 23 October 2019 (Par 27 and 38(a) 1st ET1)

f. Lorraine Barella treating her in a hostile manner from the moment she met her - 23 October 2019 (Par 27 and 38(b) 1st ET1)

g. Lorraine Barella falsely accusing her of attempting to take 6 boxes from the school - 23 October 2019 (Par 29 and 38(c) 1st ET1)

h. Lorraine Barella showing her a letter of advice from the Respondent’s lawyer and the contents of the letter threatening to call the police even though she had done nothing wrong - 23 October 2019 (Par 29 and 38(d) 1st ET1)

i. Lorraine Barella mocking her and speaking to her in a condescending manner and interrogating her when she went through what she had put in 6 boxes - 23 October 2019 (Par 31 and 38(e) 1st ET1) Victimisation on the grounds of race

j. Not being consulted when arranging occupational health appointments - January – October 2019 (Par 18 and 39(a) 1st ET1)

k. Being accused of missing occupational health appointments despite her providing a reasonable explanation at the time January – July 2019 (Par 22 and 39(b) 1st ET1)

l. Having £320 deducted from her pay in August and September 2019, which was not refunded until November 2019 - August and September 2019 (Par 22-23 and 39(c) 1st ET1)

m. Being threatened with further costs if she was unable to attend a further occupational health appointment - January – October 2019 (Par 24 and 39(d) 1st ET1)

n. Being refused her request to return to school and collect her belonging and make copies of document in her folders for her grievance and disciplinary hearings – Between October 2019 and December 2019 (Par 32-35 and 39(e) 1st ET1) 1.1.2. DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION Harassment on the grounds of disability (as per (e) - (i) above) Discrimination arising from disability

o. Not being consulted when arranging occupational health appointments - January October 2019 (Par 18 and 40(a) 1st ET1)

p. Walter Harding disregarding her explanation and reasons for not being to attend the appointments or being late - January – July 2019 (Par 22-24 and 40(b) 1st ET1)

q. Having money deducted from her salary for missed appointments - August and September 2019 (Par 22-23 and 40(c) 1st ET1)

r. Being threatened with deductions in the future if she did not attend subsequent 6 of 51 appointments - January – October 2019 (Par 24 and 40(d) 1st ET1)

s. Being refused to return to school to collect her belongings and take a copy of documents she needed - Between October 2019 and December 2019 (Par 32-35 1st ET1) Failure to provide reasonable adjustments

t. Failing to adjust the request to provide a detailed list of documents - Between October 2019 and December 2019 (Par 33-35 and 41(a) 1st ET1)

1.2 Did the Claimant make a complaint to the Tribunal before the end of a period of three months beginning on the date of that act or failure to act (taking into account such extension of time as is provided for by s.207B ERA)?

1.3 Where such acts or failures to act were part of a continuing act of discrimination, did the Claimant make a complaint to the Tribunal before the end of a period of three months beginning on the date that such a continuing period ended (taking into account such extension of time as is provided for by s.207B ERA)?

1.4 Where the Claimant did not make a complaint before the end of the period of three months in either case, would it be just and equitable for the Tribunal to extend the time limit within the meaning of s.123(1)(b) EqA? 2. RACE DISCRIMINATION

2.1 Direct discrimination 2.1.1. Did the Respondent subject the Claimant to the following treatment: a. Colleagues complaining about her accent and the way she speaks: i. From around May 2018 Alison Varndell made a statement to Ms Russell, the head teacher, that the Claimant does not speak clearly like her British born Nigerian colleague Ms Atuona; ii. Between May 2018 and July 2018, in staff meetings when the Claimant was speaking, she could hear Ms Varndell say to other colleagues what is she saying, I don’t understand her; iii. Around June and July 2018, the Claimant asked Tobi Dennett to carry out a work-related task, he said he didn’t understand her and told others I don’t understand her. Lorraine Barella then reported the Claimant to Ms Russell complaining that colleagues do not understand her because of her accent; iv. Between July and September 2018 Nicky Sandhu stating that the Claimant’s verbal communication was not clear because of her strong accent; v. Between July and September 2018, Ale Rasul complaining that the Claimant was incoherent; vi. Shamshad Shah between July and September 2018 stating that she could not understand the Claimant because of her accent and that the children could not understand her too, which was not true; b. Advertising and recruiting for her role during her suspension, and an assistant head teacher being recruited to her role as permanent position c. Suspending and subjecting her to a disciplinary investigation d. Lorraine Barella ignoring her and speaking only to her white MIND representative 2.1.2. If the Respondent did subject the Claimant to any of the above treatment, did the Respondent treat the Claimant less favourably in so doing than it did or would have treated 7 of 51 others? The Claimant relies on the following actual comparators and/or draws similarities from their treatment compared to hers for the purposes of a hypothetical comparator: Alison Vandell, Lorraine Barella, Ale Rasul and Siobhan Kennedy. The Respondent contends that they are not appropriate comparators because there are material differences in their circumstances compared with the Claimant’s. 2.1.3. If so, did the Respondent subject the Claimant to the less favourable treatment because of the Claimant’s race?

2.2 Harassment 2.2.1. Did the Respondent engage in the following unwanted conduct: a. Lorraine Barella ignoring her and speaking only to her white MIND representative b. Lorraine Barella treating her in a hostile manner from the moment she met her c. Lorraine Barella falsely accusing her of attempting to take 6 boxes from the school d. Lorraine Barella showing her a letter of advice from the Respondent’s lawyer and the contents of the letter threatening to call the police even though she had done nothing wrong e. Lorraine Barella mocking her and speaking to her in a condescending manner and interrogating her when she went through what she had put in 6 boxes 2.2.2. If so, was the above conduct related to the Claimant’s race? 2.2.3 Did the conduct have the purpose or effect of violating the Claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the Claimant? The Tribunal in determining whether the conduct had the above effect will take into account the matters at s.26(4) Equality Act 2010.

2.3 Victimisation 2.3.1. Did the Respondent subject the Claimant to the following detriments because she committed a protected act (submitting a grievance on 12 February 2019 complaining of race discrimination and harassment related to religion) Par 16, 1st ET1 and Par 2 and 7 2ND ET1: a. Not being consulted when arranging occupational health appointments b. Being accused of missing occupational health appointments despite her providing a reasonable explanation at the time c. Having £320 deducted from her pay in August and September 2019, which was not refunded until November 2019 d. Being threatened with further costs if she was unable to attend a further occupational health appointment e. Being refused her request to return to school and collect her belongings and make copies of documents in her folders for her grievance and disciplinary hearings 3. DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION

3.1 Is the Claimant disabled? 3.1.1. Is the Claimant is disabled within the meaning of s.6 EqA, in particular:

• Does the Claimant have a physical or mental impairment?

• Does that impairment have an adverse effect on the Claimant's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities? 8 of 51

• Is that effect substantial?

• Is that effect long-term? 3.1.2. Did the Respondent know, or could the Respondent reasonably have been expected to know, of the Claimant’s disability?

3.2 Harassment 3.2.1. If the Claimant is found to be disabled at the material time, did the Respondent engage in the unwanted conduct set out in paragraphs 2.2.1 (a) – (e) above? 3.2.2. If so, was the above conduct related to the Claimant’s disability? 3.2.3 Did the conduct have the purpose or effect of violating the Claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the Claimant? The Tribunal in determining whether the conduct had the above effect will take into account the matters at s.26(4) Equality Act 2010.

3.3 Arising from disability 3.3.1. If the Claimant is found to be disabled at the material time, did the Respondent treat the Claimant unfavourably by: a. Not being consulted when arranging occupational health appointments b. Walter Harding disregarding her explanation and reasons for not being to attend the appointments or being late c. Having money deducted from her salary for missed appointments d. Being threatened with deductions in the future if she did not attend subsequent appointments e. Being refused to return to school to collect her belongings and take a copy of documents she needed f. Refusing to postpone the Claimant’s disciplinary hearing. (Par 38 2nd ET1) g. Refusing to hold the disciplinary hearing in weekly intervals (Par 38 2nd ET1) h. Dismissing the Claimant (Par 43 2nd ET1) i. Sending the police to Claimant’s house (Par 44 2nd ET1) j. Refusing to give the Claimant additional time as requested to submit grounds for appeal and refusal to set appeal hearing to date after 16 November 2020 (Par 48 2nd ET1). 3.3.2. Did the following arise in consequence of the Claimant’s disability? Difficulty in attending meetings and/or missing them because of severe depression and antidepressant medication and sleeping tablets, confusion, difficulty concentrating, forgetfulness, panic attacks, sleeplessness, emotional breakdowns, being suicidal. Was the unfavourable treatment because of any of those things? 3.3.4. 3.3.4. Can the Respondent prove that the treatment was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim?

3.4 Failure to make reasonable adjustments 3.4.1. If the Claimant is found to be disabled at the material time, did the Respondent apply a provision, criteria, or practice (PCP) and if so, did it put the Claimant at a 9 of 51 substantial disadvantage compared with persons who are not disabled? The provision, criteria, or practice that the Claimant relies on is: a. to provide a detailed list of documents b. Not to consult when arranging occupational health and disciplinary meetings Par 40 1st ET1, Para 37 2nd ET1) c. Not to arrange occupational health appointments at employees request d. not to postpone disciplinary hearings until employee well enough to attend e. requirement to conduct disciplinary hearings in 2 day intervals f. conducting disciplinary hearing in employee’s absence g. sending letter of dismissal directly to employee h. Not to arrange an appeal hearing in absence of grounds of appeal 3.4.2. Did the Respondent take steps as it was reasonable to avoid the disadvantage? 3.4.3. Did the Respondent know that the Claimant was disabled and was likely to be placed at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with persons who are not disabled? 3.4.4. If not, should the Respondent ought to have known both that the Claimant was disabled and that the Claimant's was likely to be placed at a substantial disadvantage? 4. UNFAIR DISMISSAL

4.1 Was the Claimant dismissed for a potentially fair reason pursuant to s.98(1) ERA, namely conduct?

4.2 Was the Claimant’s dismissal fair or unfair in all the circumstances? 5. WRONGFUL DISMISSAL 5.1 Was the Claimant entitled to be paid for her notice period? 6. REMEDY

6.1 What remedy does the Claimant seek?

6.2 If the Claimant is successful with her claim for unfair dismissal: ii. What is the basic award? iii. What is the compensatory award? iv. Should any compensatory award be reduced on the basis that the Claimant might have been dismissed in any event pursuant to Polkey? If so, by how much? v. Should any compensatory award be reduced on the basis of the Claimant’s contributory conduct? If so, by how much? vi. Should any compensatory award be adjusted under s.207A Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 on account of a failure to follow the ACAS Code? If so, by how much? 10 of 51

6.3 Has the Claimant taken reasonable steps to mitigate her loss?

6.4 What financial losses has the discrimination caused the Claimant?

6.5 What injury to feelings has the discrimination caused the Claimant and how much compensation should be awarded for that? 17. As we did not find that any of the claimant’s claims were successful, we do not need to deal with the issues concerning remedy. Law 18. The statutory law relating to the claimant’s claims of discrimination is contained in the Equality Act 2010 (EqA). The relevant sections of the EqA were sections 13 (direct discrimination); 15 (discrimination arising from disability); 26 (harassment); 27 (victimisation); 123 (time limits); and 136 (burden of proof). The relevant provisions are set out here: 13. Direct discrimination A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others. If the protected characteristic is disability, and B is not a disabled person, A does not discriminate against B only because A treats or would treat disabled persons more favourably than A treats B. The relevant protected characteristics are— (a) age; (b) disability; (c) gender reassignment; (d) race (e) religion or belief; (f) sex; (g) sexual orientation. 15. Discrimination arising from disability (1) A person (A) discriminates against a disabled person (B) if— (a) A treats B unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of B's disability, and (b) A cannot show that the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply if A shows that A did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, that B had the disability. 11 of 51

Law

[26]Harassment(1) A person (A) harasses another (B) if— (a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and (b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of— (i) violating B's dignity, or (ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B.

(2) A also harasses B if— (a) A engages in unwanted conduct of a sexual nature, and (b) the conduct has the purpose or effect referred to in subsection (1)(b).

(3) A also harasses B if— (a) A or another person engages in unwanted conduct of a sexual nature or that is related to gender reassignment or sex, (b) the conduct has the purpose or effect referred to in subsection (1)(b), and (c) because of B's rejection of or submission to the conduct, A treats B less favourably than A would treat B if B had not rejected or submitted to the conduct.

(4) In deciding whether conduct has the effect referred to in subsection (1)(b), each of the following must be taken into account— (a) the perception of B; (b) the other circumstances of the case; (c) whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect.

(5) The relevant protected characteristics are— age; disability; gender reassignment; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation. 12 of 51

[27]Victimisation(1) A person (A) victimises another person (B) if A subjects B to a detriment because— (a) B does a protected act, or (b) A believes that B has done, or may do, a protected act.

(2) Each of the following is a protected act— (a) bringing proceedings under this Act; (b) giving evidence or information in connection with proceedings under this Act; (c) doing any other thing for the purposes of or in connection with this Act; (d) making an allegation (whether or not express) that A or another person has contravened this Act.

(3) Giving false evidence or information, or making a false allegation, is not a protected act if the evidence or information is given, or the allegation is made, in bad faith.

(4) This section applies only where the person subjected to a detriment is an individual.

(5) The reference to contravening this Act includes a reference to committing a breach of an equality clause or rule. 123. Time limits (1) Subject to sections 140A and 140B proceedings on a complaint within section 120 may not be brought after the end of— (a) the period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or (b) such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable. (2) Proceedings may not be brought in reliance on section 121(1) after the end of— (a) the period of 6 months starting with the date of the act to which the proceedings relate, or (b) such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable. (3) For the purposes of this section— 13 of 51 (a) conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period; (b) failure to do something is to be treated as occurring when the person in question decided on it. (4) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a person (P) is to be taken to decide on failure to do something— (a) when P does an act inconsistent with doing it, or (b) if P does no inconsistent act, on the expiry of the period in which P might reasonably have been expected to do it. 136. Burden of proof (1) This section applies to any proceedings relating to a contravention of this Act. (2) If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred. (3) But subsection (2) does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the provision. (4) The reference to a contravention of this Act includes a reference to a breach of an equality clause or rule. (5) This section does not apply to proceedings for an offence under this Act.

(6) A reference to the court includes a reference to— (a) an employment tribunal… 19. The statutory provisions relating to unfair dismissal are in section 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996: Section 98 Employment Rights Act 1996 (1) In determining for the purposes of this Part whether the dismissal of an employee is fair or unfair, it is for the employer to show- (a) the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal, and (b) that it is either a reason falling within subsection (2) or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the employee held. (2) A reason falls within this subsection if it14 of 51 (a) Relates to the capability or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do, (b) Relates to the conduct of the employee, (c) Is that the employee was redundant, or (d) is that the employee could not continue to work in the position which he held without contravention (either on his part or on that of his employer) of a duty or restriction imposed by or under an enactment. (3) In subsection (2)(a)— (a) “capability”, in relation to an employee, means his capability assessed by reference to skill, aptitude, health or any other physical or mental quality, and (b) “qualifications”, in relation to an employee, means any degree, diploma or other academic, technical, or professional qualification relevant to the position which he held. (4) Where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (1), the determination of the question whether the dismissal was fair or unfair (having regard to the reason shown by the employer)- (a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer’s undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and (b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case.” 20. The statutory provisions relating to breach of contract (notice pay) are contained in Article 3 of the Employment Tribunals (Extension of Jurisdiction) Order 1994: Extension of jurisdiction 3. Proceedings may be brought before an employment tribunal in respect of a claim of an employee for the recovery of damages or any other sum (other than a claim for damages, or for a sum due, in respect of personal injuries) if— (a) the claim is one to which section 131(2) of the 1978 Act applies and which a court in England and Wales would under the law for the time being in force have jurisdiction to hear and determine; (b) the claim is not one to which article 5 applies; and (c) the claim arises or is outstanding on the termination of the employee’s employment. Housekeeping and Hearing Day 1 – 12 November 2024 15 of 51 21. The Tribunal was not able to read many documents before the start of the hearing on the first day, as we had been sent the wrong bundles by email on the evening before the hearing. On the day itself, a matter arose concerning one on the NonLegal Members who could not sit on this case, so we swapped with a Non-Legal Member who was scheduled to sit on another case. 22. We read the supplementary hearing bundle that the respondent had supplied and called the parties in at 10:10am to do case management. 23. The Supplementary Hearing Bundle contained a timetable that had been drafted by Mr Cordrey [SB 8-10]. Ms Godwins had one point that she wished to make: she felt insufficient time had been allocated to her cross-examination of the respondent’s witnesses. Her specific point was that the respondent’s witnesses had not dealt with the claimant’s claims of disability discrimination in any great depth in their witness statements. Ms Godwins wished to ask them more questions that addressed the claimant’s claims of disability discrimination. 24. Mr Cordrey objected to the application on the grounds that the timetable allowed two days for cross-examination of the respondent’s witnesses. Their evidence consisted of 28 pages. 25. The Tribunal suggested to Ms Godwins that the case had been allocated 8 days to deal with liability and remedy and that we intended to manage the hearing in accordance with the overriding objective with a view to delivering a Judgment and Reasons on 22 November. If the respondent’s witnesses had not provided evidence that rebutted the claimant’s claims of disability discrimination, we considered that she may wish to consider whether to ask cross-examination questions that would allow then to ‘backfill’ the void in their written evidence. The decision was hers, however. 26. We made it clear to the representatives that we would stick to the timetable suggested by Mr Cordrey but would keep the situation under review. We would seek to keep the representatives appraised of time and approaching deadlines to cross-examination. If we felt that we needed more time, we could be flexible with start and finish times and breaks. 27. The Supplementary Hearing bundle contained a List of Issues that was agreed save for one point: in paragraph 2.3.1 [SB 14], which set out the claimant’s claims of victimisation, sub paragraph f referred to: “Handling of grievance appeal and outcome.”

[28]The claimant said that the claim was set out in the Particulars of Claim of her second ET1 dated 21 November 2020 [83-106] at paragraphs 2 [98], 7 [98] and 25 and s6 [101-102].

[29]It was agreed that the respondent had asked for further information about the claim of victimisation in the second claim. It was agreed that the claimant did not respond to the request other than to seek to insert paragraph 2.2.1 f into the List of Issues. 16 of 51

[30]We heard the submissions of Ms Godwins and Mr Cordrey and said we would consider our decision after completing the case management matters that remained.

[31]We discussed reasonable adjustments with the parties. Ms Godwins said that the claimant may need breaks to manage her mental health. We had no difficulty in granting that request. Mr Cordrey said that one of his witnesses, Ms Shah had a visual impairment so he had asked Ms Godwin to provide the page numbers that she would be asking Ms Shah to refer to in cross-examination. The respondent would then provide large-type versions of the documents.

[32]As there were two witnesses with disabilities, we reminded ourselves of the Presidential Guidance: Vulnerable parties and witnesses in Employment Tribunal proceedings dated 22 April 2020 and sought to apply it where appropriate. At all times, we considered the claimant to be a person who has depression and anxiety when making any decisions about reasonable adjustments or case management orders, although disability was not conceded.

[33]Whilst we hoped to complete the whole case in the time allotted, Mr Cordrey suggested that we may only have time to deal with liability, contributory conduct and Polkey and may have to deal with remedy at a later date. We suggested that the parties attend at 11:00am on the second day in case we had completed our reading earlier than the timetable had allowed for.

[34]As will be seen below, events transpired that meant that we had to revisit the timetable of the case.

[35]Mr Cordrey mentioned that the claimant’s Schedule of Loss only contained claims for injury to feelings and personal injury. Ms Godwins said that there was an amended Schedule of Loss that had not been sent to the Tribunal or the respondent. She was ordered to send a copy to the Tribunal and respondent by 11:00am on 13 November 2024.

[36]Mr Cordrey then sought to narrow the issue of the dates that the Tribunal have to determine whether the claimant net the definition of disability in section 6 of the Equality Act 2010. After discussion, it was agreed that the clamant alleged that she had been discriminated against because of or related to disability between January 2019 and 21 September 2020.

[37]We retired to make our decision on the List of Issues at 10:50am and returned at 11:08am.

[38]We refused to allow paragraph 2.3.1 of the List of Issues to remain for the following reasons: 38.1. We found that the Particulars of Claim in the claimant’s second claim did not include a victimisation claim. We made that finding because: 38.1.1. There was no mention of victimisation in paragraphs 25 or 26 of the Particulars of Claim [101-102]; 17 of 51 38.1.2. Paragraph 2 of the Particulars of Claim muddied the waters by referring to both claims but not differentiating between them. 38.1.3. The facts alleged in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the Particulars of claim were vague; 38.1.4. Paragraphs 25 and 26 only expressed concerns about the grievance appeal but it did not say what the detriment was any clear detail; 38.1.5. The claimant had not provided a response to the request for further information about the claim of victimisation in the respondent’s ET3; 38.1.6. There is nothing that resembles the words in paragraph 2.3.1 f of the List of Issues in paragraph 25 of 26 of the Particulars of Claim; 38.1.7. The ET1 is not something to ‘set the ball rolling” - Chandhok v Tirkey

[2015] IRLR 195

, per Langstaff J; and 38.1.8. The claimant was represented by a lawyer throughout.

[39]We asked Mr Cordrey to email a copy of the finalised List of Issues to the Tribunal, which he did.

[40]Ms Godwins then advised the Tribunal that she did not think the claimant’s witness statement in the witness statement bundle was the latest version that included page references. Ms Godwins checked the bundle and confirmed that the copy of her client’s witness statement within was not the latest version. We asked Ms Godwins to email the correct version to the Tribunal and Mr Cordrey, which she did within minutes of the end of the hearing at 11:20am. The revised version was inserted into the bundle of witness statements in place of the original version.

[41]We then broke for the day to complete our reading. The timetable prepared by Mr Cordrey had allowed reading time to 12:00pm on the second day. We asked the parties to attend at 11:00am on the second day and to be ready to start the evidence if we had finished our reading.

[42]The parties produced a joint bundle of 2,603 pages with a 12-page index. If we refer to pages in the bundle, the page number(s) will be in square brackets with no letter prefix (e.g. [43]). We would comment that many of the documents in the bundle were entirely irrelevant and were not referred to by either party in evidence in chief or cross-examination.

[43]On the first morning, the respondent produced a Supplementary Hearing Bundle (which was copied to the claimant) that contained: 43.1. Mr Cordrey’s opening note by way of an introduction to the case; 18 of 51 43.2. The respondent’s proposed timetable; 43.3. The draft List of Issues that was agreed save for the disagreement about paragraph 2.3.2., which we have resolved; 43.4. The Reserved Judgment and Reasons of the Employment Tribunal in case number 3200844/2020 between Ms C Russell v Urbis Academy Trust (R1) and Mayville Primary school (R2); 43.5. The Record of a Preliminary Hearing dated 23 May 2023 before Employment Judge Crosfill in this case; 43.6. An agreed Cast List; and 43.7. An agreed Chronology.

[44]We read all the documents in the Supplementary Hearing Bundle before the start of the first day and found them useful as a summary of the history of the claim. The Opening Note contained matters of opinion that we did not consider to be facts that were agreed. We made no findings of fact based on the document. We had to hear the evidence before making those findings.

[45]The decision in Ms Russell’s clam (she was the Headteacher of the respondent who was dismissed in circumstances that arose out of the same or similar facts as the dismissal of the claimant in this case) was included as background. We are not bound by the findings of fact in Ms Russell’s case. We use the Judgment and reasons as useful background to the matters that we would have to determine and no more.

[46]Other documents were produced during the hearing that we will deal with as they arise. Day 2 – 13 November 2024

[47]The Tribunal continued its reading at 9:00am and finished at approximately 10:45am. The parties had attended for a possible 11:00am start, so we were able to begin at 11:00am

[48]Ms Godwins advised the Tribunal that one of the claimant’s witnesses, Vivian Ukwunna, had indicated to her that she may not be able to attend the hearing in person. She was scheduled to give evidence on the third day. Ms Godwin asked if the witness could give evidence by remote video link. We saw no reason why the request could not be accommodated. Mr Cordrey was without instructions on the point. We asked Ms Godwins to clarify Ms Ukwunna’s position in the lunch break.

[49]Notwithstanding this, we arranged to a video link to be set up and the joining details to be sent to Ms Godwins.

[50]Ms Godwins had submitted the claimant’s revised Schedule of Loss as we had ordered on the previous day. 19 of 51

[51]The claimant gave evidence on oath beginning at 11:18am. She relied on her witness statements that was undated and unsigned. It ran to 59 pages and 368 paragraphs. Ms Godwins asked the claimant no supplementary questions.

[52]Ms Godwins had indicated on the first day that the claimant may require breaks because of her mental health. We took frequent breaks and whenever the claimant became distressed. Mr Cordrey cross-examined the claimant thoroughly and in a manner that we found to be consistent with the Presidential Guidance.

[53]The claimant repeatedly answered allegations of misconduct by saying that the Crown Court had found her innocent, as if that was a binding finding of fact that she had not committed the disciplinary acts for which she was dismissed. It is understandable that the claimant, as a lay person, may not have understood the difference between a jury finding her not guilty and finding her innocent. The two are not the same. The burden of proof in the criminal courts is on the prosecution to show that the defendant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The defendant in a criminal trial has nothing to prove. There are several significant differences in a case before the Employment Tribunals: 53.1. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities; 53.2. The allegations in the criminal case were not the same as the disciplinary allegations in the Employment Tribunals, although there was some overlap; and 53.3. The burden of proof in the Employment Tribunals is sometimes with the claimant (for example, proving disability), sometimes with the respondent (for example showing that an act is not discriminatory if the burden of proof switches in a discrimination claim), and sometimes neutral (for example in determining whether a dismissal is unfair).

[54]When we reminded the claimant of the above points, she repeated the statement that she had not done the alleged disciplinary acts because the Crown Court had found her innocent. We would also add that the matters that the claimant was acquitted of in the Crown Court were different to those she faced in the disciplinary hearing. All the matters that the claimant faced in the Crown Court were matters of alleged child cruelty. The matters that the claimant faced in her disciplinary included some matters of child cruelty but also included allegations of bullying staff and contacting Ms Russell contrary to the School’s policy and the instruction given to her.

[55]We took a break at 12:16pm when the claimant became distressed. We warned the claimant that she could not speak to anyone about the case in all the breaks we took. We gave every witness the same warning if their evidence was interrupted by a break. We returned at 12:31pm and continued to 1:00pm, when we took lunch for an hour. We resumed at 2:00pm. On the resumption, Ms Godwins indicated that she had no update on Ms Ukwunna and Mr Cordrey indicated that he had no instructions from his client on whether it objected to the witness giving evidence by video link. 20 of 51

[56]We continued with the cross-examination of the claimant until 3:34pm, when she became distressed. We took a break until 3:49pm, when the claimant was able to continue. We continued until 4:06pm when we broke for the day.

[57]During her cross-examination, the claimant had made reference to a document of which the Tribunal had no recollection. Ms Godwin said that it was in a supplementary bundle of 89 pages that had not been produced to the Tribunal. Mr Cordrey indicated that the respondent had seen the bundle and had no objection to its production, although he was uncertain as to how useful the documents were to the Tribunal in determining the Issues.

[58]We asked Ms Godwin the send a digital copy to the Tribunal and Mr Cordrey and to bring 4 paper copies of the bundle to the hearing the following day.

[59]We also asked Mr Cordrey for a digital copy of the supplementary bundle and the witness statements. He indicated that there had been further disclosure of documents and he would submit them to the Tribunal the following day. Ms Godwin pointed out that she could not take her client’s instructions on the documents and whether the clamant objected to their production until she had finished her evidence. We said that we would adjudicate on the documents after the claimant had given evidence and Ms Godwin had taken her instructions.

[60]At the end of the day, Ms Godwins advised the Tribunal that the claimant had not taken some of her medication that day to avoid the side effect of drowsiness and that had an effect on her ability to participate. We noted that this had not been raised at any point earlier in the hearing. Day 3 – 14 November 2024

[61]The third day started at 10:05am. Ms Godwin had submitted an electronic copy and produced the four paper copies of the Second Supplementary Hearing Bundle of 89 pages (SSHB). If we refer to any page from this bundle, we shall use the prefix “SSHB” and the number(s) of the relevant pages in square brackets (e.g., [SSHB 36]).

[62]Ms Godwins indicated that Ms Ukwunna would not be attending to give evidence. We advised the parties that we could give her written evidence very little weight.

[63]Mr Cordrey produced a bundle with the documents he wished to add to the bundle. He did not have any cross-examination questions for the claimant on the documents, but we deferred the decision on admissibility until Ms Godwins had opportunity to take her client’s instructions.

[64]Ms Godwins then mentioned that the claimant, the School, and the pupils named in Court had been granted anonymity by the Crown Court Judge. She had been considering whether some form of anonymity order might be appropriate in this hearing.

[65]Our first reaction was that this case was already nearly five years old and no application had been made. We had no intention of naming any of the children involved in the case and would substitute their names for random letters. We 21 of 51 instructed Ms Godwins that if any application was to be made, it would have to be made in writing with reference to appropriated parts of Rule 50 and the Employment Tribunals Act 1996.

[66]The cross-examination of the claimant resumed at 10:20am and continued until 11:18 am, when we took a break until 11:29am. We took another break at 12:25pm until 12:41pm and broke for lunch at 1:00pm until 2:00pm. On the resumption, Mr Cordrey indicated that he had about 90 minutes of questions left for the claimant. During the session, the claimant expressed the opinion that cards given to her by pupils were her property and that she was justified in removing the. We expressed our unanimous opinion that the claimant’s opinion was wrong on the principle that any document brought into being as part of an ongoing business belongs to the business. A card given to a teacher is, in our opinion, the property of the school.

[67]The cross-examination continued until 2:50pm when the claimant became upset and we took a break. On the resumption at 3:05pm, the claimant said she did not think she could carry on. We heard from Ms Godwins and Mr Cordrey and retired to consider the situation. We returned at 3:11pm and spoke to the claimant.

[68]Mr Cordrey indicated a preference to finish the claimant’s evidence rather than slot in Ms Russell, who had been waiting all day. Ms Godwins indicated that she could not agree to Ms Russell giving evidence as she could not take instructions on that evidence and the claimant could not follow the proceedings. We did not give much weight to either of Ms Godwins’ arguments, as it was difficult to see what instructions she would need about the claimant’s own witness, but we decided that it was in the interest of the overriding objective to break for the day and resume the following morning after Ms Russell indicated she could attend on the fourth day. We closed the third day at 3:15pm and gave the claimant the usual warning about not speaking to anyone about the case.

[69]After the hearing closed for the day, we asked our Clerk to write to the parties’ representatives to remind them of Rule 45 and Guidance Note 5 of the Presidential Guidance on Case Management and put them on notice that we may exercise our powers under Rule 45 to keep the hearing on track to complete by 22 November. Day 4 – 15 November 2024

[70]The fourth day started at 10:07am. Both Ms Godwins and Mr Cordrey acknowledged receipt of the email from the Tribunal the previous evening. We indicated that we would discuss timetabling if we felt that we needed to later in the day.

[71]Mr Cordrey continued his cross-examination of the claimant at 10:11am and continued until 11:13am. Ms Godwins asked her client re-examination questions until 11:22am. The Tribunal had no questions for the claimant.

[72]We took a break and at 11;40am discussed timetabling with the parties. Mr Cordrey thought he would be 20 minutes with Ms Russell. The representatives 22 of 51 had spoken and had agreed that Ms Godwins would be one hour with Shamshad Shah and two hours with Walter Harding.

[73]Carnett Russell gave evidence on oath. She started her evidence at 11:45 am and relied on her unsigned and undated witness statement that consisted of 30 paragraphs over 5 pages. Ms Godwins asked the witness supplementary questions and Mr Cordrey then cross-examined the witness until 12:02pm. Ms Houzer asked the witness a question. There were no questions from the other members of the Tribunal. Ms Russell ended her evidence at 12:12pm and was released with the agreement of the respondent.

[74]We indicated that we would read the witness statement of Vivian Ukwunna, which was dated 23 June 2023, and which had a typed signature. It consisted of 7 paragraphs over half a page. The claimant’s case was closed at that point.

[75]Shamshad Shah gave evidence on affirmation and relied on her witness statement dated 23 June 2023 that consisted of 5 paragraphs over one page. Ms Shah has impaired vision, and Ms Godwins had indicated which page numbers in the bundle she would be taking the witness to in advance. This enabled the respondent to provide enlarged pages for Ms Shah to use. Mr Cordrey asked the witness supplementary questions until 12:17pm. Ms Godwins cross-examined the witness until12:30pm when we took a break to discuss a disagreement about a question that Ms Godwins asked the witness which concerned crossexamination in the claimant’s criminal trial in 2022. The question was about a child witness in the criminal trial that we have given the initials WX.

[76]On the resumption at 12:35pm, we decided that the question could not be put as it was based on a factual premise that was not in the claimant’s evidence in chief or oral evidence. The question had been sprung on the witness unfairly. No transcript of the criminal trial had been produced. This witness’s written evidence was that she personally witnessed the claimant’s conduct towards WX [2246]. The decision in the claimant’s disciplinary was made before the criminal case went to Court, so whether WX subsequently withdrew their statement or not was immaterial to the matters that we had to consider.

[77]Ms Godwins had no further questions for Ms Shah. The Tribunal had no questions for the witness. The witness was released at 12:45pm with the agreement of the claimant.

[78]We then took lunch from 12:45pm to 1:45pm.

[79]On the resumption, Walter Harding gave evidence on oath. He relied on his witness statement dated 21 June 2023 that consisted of 24 paragraphs over 9 pages. There were no supplementary questions.

[80]Ms Godwins cross-examined Mr Harding until 4:29pm. Ms Houzer asked the witness questions until 4:23pm. The other members of the Tribunal did not ask the witness any questions. Mr Cordrey asked the witness re-examination question until 4:35pm when he was released with the agreement of the claimant and we closed the hearing for the day. 23 of 51

[81]We reminded the parties that the 15-page bundle produced by the respondent had not been added to the bundle. Ms Godwins indicated that the claimant objected to its inclusion. We indicated that we would make a determination on the documents as a preliminary matter at the start of the fifth day. Day 5 – 19 November 2024

[82]The start of day 5 was delayed because my train was cancelled due to snow and I had to find an alternative route to the Tribunal. We were able to start at 10:48am. We apologised to the parties for the delay and heard the respondent’s application to admit 15 pages of documents that concerned allegations made about Ale Rasul, the other Year 6 teacher at the School, who the claimant compared herself to. The claimant’s allegation was that the accusations she made about Mr Rasul were not investigated, whilst those made against her were.

[83]There were three documents: 83.1. An In-School Risk Assessment following an Allegation dated 10 January 2020 [2610-2611]; 83.2. Waltham Forest LADO Referral Form dated 14 January 2020 [2612- 2615]; 83.3. LADO Internal Investigations & Safeguarding Management Review report dated 30 January 2020 [2613-2624].

[84]Mr Cordrey acknowledged that a redacted copy of the third document appeared in the bundle [684-693]. It was submitted that the documents were essential to rebut the claimant’s claims that she had reported Mr Rasul’s conduct but he had not been investigated, whereas she had been subjected to suspension and made the subject of a disciplinary investigation. This was issue 2.1.1. c) in the agreed List of Issues.

[85]Ms Godwin’s objection to the inclusion of the documents in the bundle was: 85.1. They were produced late; 85.2. The respondent had known of the nature of the allegation since it received Ms Ukwunna’s witness statement on 23 June 2023; 85.3. The third document was already in the bundle; 85.4. The complaint about the claimant was in the notes of a meeting between the LADO and Mr Harding, Ms Barella, and others on 26 July 2018 [SSHB 21-25].

[86]We asked Mr Cordrey why the documents had been supplied so late. He did not have an explanation.

[87]We retired to consider our decision at11:01am. We decided that the documents should be admitted for the following reasons and delivered our decision at 11:02am with the following reasons: 24 of 51 87.1. There is an ongoing duty of disclosure in all cases; 87.2. The third document was already in the bundle in redacted format; 87.3. The late disclosure was unfortunate but did not place the claimant at a disadvantage (Ms Godwins had not suggested that it did); 87.4. The claimant’s witness had made the allegation about Mr Rasul’s conduct and had not attended to back up her witness statement; 87.5. The claimant claimed a difference in treatment between herself and Mr Rasul because of race; and 87.6. The documents were material evidence that went to the issue.

[88]The documents were admitted to the bundle and given the page numbers set out above. We reminded Ms Godwins that the timetable was that we would finish the evidence on this day. We acknowledged that we had started 48 minutes late and would give her 48 minutes on the following morning, less any time we were able to make up in the day.

[89]Steve Hall, the chair of the panel that decided to dismiss the claimant, gave evidence on oath from 11:06am. He relied on a signed witness statement dated 16 May 2023 that consisted of thirty-five paragraphs over ten pages.

[90]Mr Cordrey asked supplementary questions about the disciplinary outcome letter [1048-1060] until 11:11am.

[91]Ms Godwins cross-examined the witness from 11:11am to 11:50am, when the claimant became upset, and we took a break until 12:19pm. The crossexamination continued until 1:00pm, when we took lunch. Mr Cordrey and Ms Godwins agreed to foreshorten lunch. We resumed at 1:50pm. We reminded Ms Godwins of the need to ensure that the witnesses were finished today plus 38 minutes (we had made up 10 minutes by only taking 50 minutes for lunch). Ms Godwins stated that she thought the claimant may only be able to participate until 4:00pm. We said we would assess the situation nearer that time.

[92]During the continued cross-examination of Mr Hall and Ms Barella (who followed Mr Hall), we noticed that the claimant was engaged and animated. She frequently communicated with Ms Godwins.

[93]Mr Hall’s evidence ended at 2:31pm and he was released with the agreement of the claimant. We took a break until 2:46pm. On the resumption, we heard the evidence of Lorraine Barella, the Business Manager of the School, who gave evidence on affirmation. She relied on a witness statement dated 21 June 2023 that consisted of thirty-seven paragraphs over eight pages.

[94]Ms Godwins cross-examined the witness until 4:12pm. We checked with Ms Godwins that she was content to continue after 4:00pm because the claimant seemed engaged and alert. 25 of 51

[95]We indicated to Ms Godwins that we had made up 15 minutes of lost time by reducing the lunch break to 45 minutes and a further 10 minutes by extending the cross-examination beyond 4:00pm. That meant that Ms Godwins would have 23 minutes on the sixth day in which to complete her cross-examination of Ms Barella.

[96]Ms Godwins suggested that she would ask for more time. We indicated that we would deal with that eventuality if it arose but suggested she looked at her list of remaining questions as there was no guarantee that additional time would be granted.

[97]Ms Barella was given the warning not to speak anyone about the hearing overnight. We briefly discussed how closing submissions would work with the parties. We agreed that after cross-examination of Ms Barella had finished, the parties would submit their written submissions. The tribunal would then take a break of 30 minutes, during which we would read the submissions and the parties would reach each other’s submissions. We would then hear from each party for 30 minutes.

[98]The hearing closed for the day at 4:14pm. Day 6 – 21 November 2024

[99]Before the hearing started, our Clerk advised us that Ms Godwins had requested 30 minutes to finish her cross-examination of Ms Barella. Given that it would take more time to hear the application and make a decision, we relayed the message that Ms Godwins could have the additional time.

[100]The hearing started at 10:05am. We confirmed the additional minutes for crossexamination. Ms Godwins indicated that she had not been through her closing submissions with the claimant, to whom she had sent the submissions that morning. Ms Godwins said she would need an hour to take her client’s instructions on her own closing submissions before submitting them.

[101]Mr Cordrey was ready to submit his submissions. We indicated that at the end of the cross-examination of Ms Barella, Mr Cordrey would submit his written submissions. Ms Godwins would have an hour from the end of cross-examination to submit her submissions. It was 10:10am at this point. Ms Godwin’s crossexamination would finish at 10:40am, at which time Mr Cordrey would submit his submissions. Miss Godwins would submit her submissions at 11:40am. Mr Cordrey and Ms Godwins would then have 20 minutes to read each other’s submissions before addressing the Tribunal at 12:00pm for 30 minutes each.

[102]The cross-examination of Ms Barella continued at 10:10am and ended at 10:45am, which was five minutes more than the extension we had allowed. The Tribunal had no questions for the witness. Mr Cordrey said he had no reexamination questions. The witness was released.

[103]Ms Godwins then raised a point that the claimant wanted her to raise about the literacy teaching method called Six +1Traits. The evidence had closed. There 26 of 51 was no relevance to the witness who had given evidence, so we indicated that it would be a submission point.

[104]Mr Cordrey said that a witness statement of Ale Rasul had been tendered. He was not going to be called. We indicated that we could give the statement little weight, as we had with the statement of Ms Ukwunna. Mr Rasul’s signed statement was dated 26 June 2023 and consisted of six paragraphs over a single page.

[105]Mr Cordrey submitted his written to the Tribunal office at 11:13am. We received them at 11:15am and read them.

[106]Ms Godwin’s written submissions did not arrive at 11:40am. We asked our Clerk to make enquiries and were told that she had not finished going through her submissions with the clamant. She asked for more time to submit her submissions. We reluctantly agreed and sent an indication to the parties that we would hear oral submissions at 12:30pm.

[107]Ms Godwin’s submissions were received by the Tribunal office at 12:17pm and were forwarded to us at 12:20pm. We read them. The hearing restarted at 12:36pm.

[108]Mr Cordrey spoke to his submissions from 12:36pm to 12:55pm. He had not addressed Polkey or contributory fault and indicated that the respondent would seek a 100% reduction under both heads.

[109]Ms Godwins spoke to her submissions from 12:55pm to 1:30pm. After she had finished, she briefly spoke to the claimant. Ms Godwins then said she wanted to refer us to a document about the Six Plus One Traits programme that had been mentioned at the end of Ms Barella’s cross-examination. I indicated to her that her submissions had closed, the evidence had closed, and that a document related to the programme was irrelevant to the issues in the case.

[110]Notwithstanding this, Ms Godwins continued with her assertions that the Tribunal should see the document. I reminded her of her obligation as an officer of the court and her obligation under the overriding objective of achieving a just and fair hearing, which included avoiding delay, as far as that is compatible with a proper consideration of the issues.

[111]Ms Godwins repeated that her client felt the document was important because one of the allegations she had made was about teaching staff alleging that they did not understand her explanation of the programme because of her accent. I pointed out that the claim was about the claimant’s accent, not what she was speaking about, so the details of the programme were irrelevant. I indicated that Ms Godwins was wasting the Tribunal’s time. We should make it clear that this comment related to the point raised about the Six +1 Traits programme.

[112]We reminded Ms Godwins that the Tribunal had made significant efforts to make adjustments for the claimant and had also bent over backwards to allow Ms Godwins more time at various points in the hearing. I had to express myself 27 of 51 assertively as Ms Godwins would not accept the decision I had made to not allow the document to be admitted.

[113]We indicated to the parties that we would email them around 10:00am on Friday 22 November to advise if we would deliver an oral Judgment and Reasons on that day and, if we were, what time they should attend. If we decided to make a reserved decision, then we will indicate as much at 10:00am on Friday.

[114]The Tribunal took a shortened lunch break and began considering our decision at 2:15pm and continued for the rest of the day. Day 7 – 21 November 2024

[115]We continued our deliberations from 9:30am on the seventh day and continued for the full day. We decided that we were going to be able to deliver an oral Judgment and Reasons on the eighth day. Day 8 – 22 November 2024

[116]We asked our Clerk to email the parties at 10:00am to request them to attend at 3:00pm to receive the oral Judgment and Reasons. We delivered our oral Judgment and Reasons from 3:00pm until 4:56pm. The claimant requested written reasons. We indicated that we would send a written Judgment and Reasons.

[117]Note form EJ Shore – I offer my unreserved and sincere apologies to the parties, the representatives, and my colleagues for the excessive delay in producing this written Judgment and Reasons. The reason for the delay was a combination of my own ill health and that of several immediate members of my family, which has persisted. My duties as a parent and carer have limited the time available to me to complete this document, as have my continuing responsibility for other work at the Employment Tribunals in East London and East Midlands. Findings of Fact Preliminary Comments

Findings of Fact

[118]All findings of fact were made on the balance of probabilities. If a matter was in dispute, we will set out the reasons why we decided to prefer one party’s case over the other. If there was no dispute over a matter, we will either record that with the finding or make no comment as to the reason that a particular finding was made. We have not dealt with every single matter that was raised in evidence or the documents. We have only dealt with matters that we found relevant to the issues we have had to determine. We have dealt with the case based on the documents and evidence produced to us and the claim as set out in the List of Issues.

[119]The factual nexus of the individual elements of this case are closely interwoven. The claimant relies on the facts of incidents which are the basis of multiple heads of claim. That means that in dealing with the individual allegations within a particular head of claim on an individual basis, we must make findings that are 28 of 51 also relevant to other claims. Because we have to consider the merits of a claim when deciding whether to exercise our discretion to extend time under section 123 of the Equality Act 2010, we have set out our findings of fact in the order in which the claims appear in the List of Issues starting from paragraph 2, Direct Race Discrimination. That has necessarily meant that we have relied on facts made in the claims at the top of the List of Issues in determining the claims that are based on the same facts further down the List. We have either referred to the paragraph numbers of the Reasons in the early claims where the relevant facts can be found for the later claims or made fresh findings. The claimant has made the same allegations of fact and detriment under a number of legal headings.

[120]It is rare for a witness to be entirely not credible or unreliable in their evidence. Similarly, it is unusual for a witness to be entirely credible. We have made no general findings that any witness was either entirely credible, or entirely not credible. Where we have made findings that one witness was more credible than another on a particular point, we will explain why we made the finding.

[121]We would, however, make one finding about the claimant’s oral evidence that has relevance to the claims. The claimant complains that some of her colleagues were racist in making complaints about her communication style. Some alleged that they and the pupils could not understand what the claimant was saying because of her accent, which it was agreed was Nigerian. Others complained that some of her communication was unintelligible or incoherent. We find the two types of complaint to be about different things: the first type of complaint was about accent; the second type was about content. In effect, the first type was about the accent in which something was said, and the second type was about what was said. We found that we were able to follow everything that the claimant said in this hearing, even though she sometimes spoke quietly, and we had to ask her to repeat some answers.

[122]On some occasions, however, we understood the words that the claimant was saying but could not understand what she meant. Her language (not her accent) was unintelligible. On the occasions when the claimant was unintelligible, she was not answering the question that had been put to her, so it did not affect the evidence as such. Undisputed Facts

[123]We should record as a preliminary finding that several relevant facts were not disputed, not challenged, or actually agreed by the parties. These were: 123.1. The first respondent is an academy trust that operates one school in Waltham Forest and Redbridge (“the School”); Mayville Primary School. 123.2. The claimant was employed by the respondent from 1 September 2014 and was promoted to the post of Assistant Head Teacher (Learning and Knowledge) on 1 May 2018. The claimant was one of three Assistant Head Teachers. The claimant was one of the School’s Senior Leadership Team (“SLT”). 29 of 51 123.3. The claimant also taught one of two Year 6 classes in the school. The other class was taught by Ale Rasul. 123.4. It was agreed that at the end of the academic year 2017/2018, the trustees of the School held a meeting to discuss the high attrition rates in teaching staff who had left or were due to leave at the end of the academic year. The trustees decided to conduct exit interviews with eight of the teachers who were leaving and then interviewed two other teachers who were remaining because of what the teachers who were leaving had said. The motivation for both sets of interviews is disputed so we have only recorded the fact that the interviews took place in this section. 123.5. Following the interviews, the respondent received complaints in writing about the claimant and the Head Teacher, Carnett Russell. The claimant and Ms Russel were suspended on 20 July 2018. 123.6. The respondent appointed Browne Jacobsen LLP, who represented the respondent in this hearing, to investigate the complaints it had received. An investigation report was produced on 22 November 2018 [2160-2179]. 123.7. By a letter dated 5 December 2018 [420], the claimant was invited to attend a disciplinary hearing on 17 December 2018. For reasons that we will explore in the Disputed Facts section below, the disciplinary hearing did not take place until 6, 8 and 10 July 2020. The claimant complains of the failure of the respondent to make reasonable adjustments in the way that the disciplinary hearing was to take place. 123.8. The claimant did not submit an appeal against her dismissal in the timescale set out in the respondent’s policies but was given several extensions of time to appeal that she did not utilise. The claimant’s claims include complaints about the failure of the respondent to extend time for her appeal. 123.9. In the period between 11 December 2018 and her dismissal, the claimant was signed off by her GP as unfit to work. In the period, she had six appointments with an Occupational Health specialist and submitted two grievances. The claimant appealed the first grievance outcome. The first grievance was submitted on 12 February 2019. The outcome was delivered on 19 July 2019. The claimant appealed the first outcome on 9 October 2019. The outcome of the first grievance appeal was dated 5 June 2020. 123.10. The claimant attended the School on 23 October 2020 to collect personal items and access her work email account. She alleges that she was subjected to disability and race discrimination during her visit to the School. 123.11. The claimant submitted her second grievance on 18 November 2019. 30 of 51 123.12. The claimant started early conciliation with ACAS for the first time on 29 November 2019 and obtained a certificate dated 29 December 2019 [13]. 123.13. The claimant presented her first ET1 and Particulars of Claim on 28 January 2020 [14-34]. 123.14. The outcome of the second grievance was sent to the claimant on 11 June 2020. The claimant’s unchallenged evidence was that she did not appeal the second grievance outcome because she had issued proceedings in the Employment Tribunal and wanted the Tribunal to resolve her claims. 123.15. The claimant started early conciliation with the respondent for the second time on 22 September 2020 and obtained a conciliation certificate dated 22 October 2022 [80]. 123.16. The claimant presented her second ET1 and Particulars of Claim [83- 106] (3219942/2020) on 21 November 2020. Points of Dispute General Points

[124]We have not made findings of fact on much of what is alleged by the claimant in her lengthy witness statement because we did not find that many of the matters referred therein were relevant to the issues that we had to determine.

[125]The Tribunal must deal with matters in a proportionate way – we must allocate time and resources to a question that is proportionate to its importance or value. This must be done through the lens of the List of Issues, which sets out the claims, and in a way that ensures that we only address matters that are relevant to the issues we must determine. This case was timetabled for 8 days to include remedy, if required, as recently as 23 May 2023, when Employment Judge Crosfill made a set of case management orders [2610-2615]. Neither side has suggested to the Tribunal since that order was made that we would need more than 8 days. It is therefore necessary to complete the case within the time allocated to it, particularly as the first claim will have been submitted five years ago in January 2025.

[126]The timetable for this hearing was agreed between the parties at the outset of this hearing. Ms Godwins repeatedly commented that she was being placed under time constraints. We respectfully disagree with her view. The length of hearing was agreed by the parties. The timetable was agreed by the parties. There are tens of thousands of cases waiting to be heard in the Employment Tribunals in England & Wales, so it is neither unreasonable nor unfair to require the parties to stick to a timetable and time estimate that they have agreed. The Tribunal allowed for adjustments to be made to enable the claimant to participate in the hearing, so that is not a justification to ask for additional time. 31 of 51

[127]Jurisdiction, particularly time limits and extensions of time under section 123 of the Equality Act 2010 are in play in this case. Part of the process of deciding whether it is just and equitable to extend time is the merits of the case. We will therefore address the jurisdictional issues at the end of our reasons.

[128]We will address the findings of fact in the order of the Issues set out in the list of issues, starting with the substantive claims. It may be that some findings made in the earlier issues are relevant to later issues. The respondent has not conceded that the claimant met the definition of disability at all relevant times because of depression, anxiety, and stress. Neither has it conceded that it had or should have had knowledge of the claimant’s disabled status at the relevant times between January 2019 and November 2020. Direct Discrimination because of race (s.13 EqA)

[129]The allegations are in paragraph 2.1.1. a) i to vi), b), c), and d) of the List of Issues. We make the following general findings about the direct race discrimination allegations.

[130]We repeat our findings above (paragraph 115) about the difference between complaints about the claimant’s accent and complaints about what words the claimant used.

[131]We find that none of the claimant’s comparators were true comparators in claims involving the claimant’s accent as none of them were accused of not communicating clearly, whether because of an accent or the content of the communication.

[132]We found that we understood every word that the claimant said. She had an accent but that did not obstruct our understanding of the words she used. However, there were times where we understood the words the claimant used but the meaning of them was incoherent or unintelligible.

[133]We find that many of the issues that staff had with the claimant’s communication were about what she said, not the accent in which she said it. 2.1.1.) a) i) and ii) – Alison Varndell

[134]Ms Varndell was the Safeguarding Lead at the School. The claimant made two allegations against her: i. From around May 2018 Alison Varndell made a statement to Ms Russell, the head teacher, that the Claimant does not speak clearly like her British born Nigerian colleague Ms Atuona. ii. Between May 2018 and July 2018, in staff meetings when the Claimant was speaking, she could hear Ms Varndell say to other colleagues what is she saying, I don’t understand her.

[135]We found that the evidence of Ms Russell was not internally consistent. It was not consistent with her oral evidence, and it was not consistent with the documents or the other witnesses. 32 of 51

[136]For example, Ms Russell stated (paragraph 22 w/s) that the claimant “…has a speech impediment, a disability.”

[137]At paragraph 14 of her witness statement, Ms Russell said “Teachers did raise issues with me about [the claimant] but it was always mainly to do with her Nigerian accent and speech impediment.”

[138]The claimant’s own oral evidence was that she had a speech impediment until she had a medical procedure at the age of twelve that removed it. The claimant said she no longer had the impediment, and we heard no evidence of an impediment when the claimant spoke. We therefore find that Ms Russell’s evidence about the speech impediment cannot be relied upon.

[139]Ms Russell deals with the actual allegation in paragraph 30 of her witness statement. She said “I have been asked about whether I recollect if Ms Varndell made a statement about [the claimant] not speaking as clearly as Ms Atuona [a Black British Nigerian Teacher at the School]. I do remember, but I do not remember when, it was like a passing comment and just referring to…” We find that evidence to be vague.

[140]Under cross-examination, Ms Russell was referred to paragraph 22 of her witness statement about the claimant’s speech impediment. We found her answers to be vague and evasive. Mr Cordrey asked Ms Russell about paragraph 21 of her witness statement in which she had stated that she had begun receiving complaints about the claimant around 2016 that teachers could not understand the claimant’s accent and that she shouted. Ms Russell said that she was talking about how the claimant expressed her words; how she talked. We find that to be undermining about the allegation about complaints concerning the claimant’s accent. It was about what she said.

[141]The allegation by the claimant is one of direct race discrimination. We find it unlikely that Ms Russell would not have recognised race discrimination when it was spoken to her and would not have done something about it. This is particularly true when Ms Russell’s evidence is that staff were complaining about not understanding the claimant from 2016 (paragraph 21 of her w/s). Ms Russell’s evidence meant that she did nothing to coach, admonish, or discipline numerous teachers who, she now says, were racially discriminating against the claimant for a period between 2016 and 2018.

[142]We find that the claimant did not move the burden of proof. If she had done, however, we would have found that the respondent had shown on the balance that the reason for the alleged less favourable treatment was not discrimination.

[143]In respect of matter 1.2.1.a) ii), we do not find that the claimant’s evidence is credible. The allegation in the issue does not say that that Ms Varndell said that the claimant could not be understood because of her Nigerian accent.

[144]The claimant’s witness statement dealt with the allegation. We found the statement to be inconsistent with the issue to which it relates and inconsistent with the evidence of other witnesses, particularly Ms Russell. 33 of 51

[145]We find that it is more than coincidental that the claimant’s evidence concentrates on the period immediately before her suspension and names all the staff who subsequently made allegations against her that led to her suspension and dismissal.

[146]The allegation, if correct, is one of prolonged direct race discrimination. The claimant made a complaint about the former Assistant Head, Mandy May, so we find that she knew how to make a formal complaint. The claimant also made an earlier complaint about Ms Varndell.

[147]We find that the claimant’s first grievance dated 19 February 2019 [433-440] to be a significant document for several reasons: 147.1. It is a contemporaneous document. 147.2. It was produced with the help of her legal representative. 147.3. It was eight pages long and dealt with the whole history of the claimant’s employment with the respondent in great detail. 147.4. The section titled “Racial discriminatory treatment” [438] raised accusations that other teachers had been the subject of complaints and were never suspended; and alleged that Ms Varndell had physically assaulted her in 2017; but made no mention of a two-year campaign of race discrimination about her accent.

[148]We find that the claimant’s explanation that she did not remember the two years of discrimination about her accent when raising this grievance because of her mental health is not credible.

[149]We will deal with the Jurisdiction issue of time below. 2.1.1.) a) iii) – Toby Dennett

[150]The allegation is: iii. Around June and July 2018, the Claimant asked Tobi Dennett to carry out a work-related task, he said he didn’t understand her and told others I don’t understand her. Lorraine Barella then reported the Claimant to Ms Russell complaining that colleagues do not understand her because of her accent.

[151]The allegation against Mr Dennett does not mention the claimant’s accent. The allegation is that the discrimination took place around June and July 2018. The claimant’s witness statement (paragraph 81) identifies the date as 2017. The claimant references an exchange of emails between her and Mr Dennett on 8 and 9 July 2017 [532-531].

[152]The claimant emailed Mr Dennett on 8 July 2017 at 1:41pm [532] to chase him for adviser assessment report forms for pupils. We find the tone of the claimant’s email to be impatient and frustrated. 34 of 51

[153]Mr Dennett replied on the same date at 3:04pm [532] stating “Sorry but I have to admit I don’t understand what you want me to do. Can you give me an example of the kind of thing I need to write for each of the headings?”

[154]We find that Mr Dennett’s email contains no mention of the claimant’s accent.

[155]We find the claimant’s response dated 9 July 2017 at 5:22pm [531] to be angry and dismissive of Mr Dennett. She stated that she found it “…very difficult to comprehend why you complain not to understand me.” The claimant did not make any allegation that Mr Dennett’s failure to understand was because of her accent or any other racial factor. We find that unlikely if the claimant’s evidence in chief was correct (paragraph 81). The claimant alleges that Ms Russell told the claimant that Ms Barella had told her (Ms Russell) that “Tobi (sic) is struggling to understand [the claimant] because of [her] accent.”

[156]Ms Russell’s evidence in chief was silent on this incident.

[157]We find the claimant has not shown facts in relation to the part of the allegation concerning Mr Dennett which could lead us to find that she had been discriminated against. The claimant’s case is entirely predicated on what she says Ms Russell told her. Ms Russel provided no evidence that corroborates the claimant. The burden of proof does not move.

[158]There is no evidence apart from the claimant’s third-hand hearsay that Ms Barella reported the claimant to Ms Russell.

[159]The claimant made no complaint about this incident at the time. Ms Russell did not take any action in relation to what was, if true, an account of race discrimination. 2.1.1.) a) iv) – Nicky Sandhu

[160]The allegation was: v. Between July and September 2018 Nicky Sandhu stating that the Claimant’s verbal communication was not clear because of her strong accent.

[161]We find that the factual allegation is made out. In her interview with Daniella Glynn on 18 September 2018 [2242] at paragraph 37, Ms Sandhu said the words alleged.

[162]We find that Ms Sandhu said she may have mentioned it to Ms Vandell at some point, so we find that Ms Sandhu complained about the claimant’s accent. The claimant dealt with this in paragraph 88 of her witness statement. Although the issue gives the date of “between July and September 2018”, the claimant’s witness statement identifies that Ms Sandhu said the words complained of “in her statement”. We find that the statement can only mean Ms Sandhu’s interview with Daniella Glynn on 18 September 2018 [2240-2243]. We differentiate this claim from that made against Ms Shah (below) because Ms Sandhu complained about 35 of 51 the claimant’s accent, whilst Ms Shah did not. 2.1.1.) a) v) – Ale Rasul

[163]The allegation is: v. Between July and September 2018, Ale Rasul complaining that the Claimant was incoherent.

[164]We find that Mr Rasul wrote to the governors on 16 July 2018 [1420-1422]. He alleged that the claimant “would often deliver INSETs that were utterly unintelligible… [the claimant’s] explanations were incoherent, and she would frequently contradict herself.”

[165]We read the witness statement of Mr Rasul. We give it little weight, but that does not mean it carries no weight. He denied that he complained about the claimant’s accent.

[166]The claimant relies on the words in Mr Rasul’s letter of 16 July 2018 [1420-1422] (paragraph 91 of the claimant’s witness statement). We do not find Mr Rasul’s words to be discriminatory. The claimant was criticised for being incoherent, not that he could not understand her because she had a strong Nigerian accent.

[167]The claimant did not complain at the time. When she did raise a grievance on 19 February 2019, she did not make any complaint about anyone discriminating against her because of her accent.

[168]We have found that the claimant could become incoherent (although her words were entirely understandable) at times in this hearing. We find that the claimant has not shown facts that would switch the burden of proof. 2.1.1.) a) vi) – Shamshad Shah

[169]The allegation is vi. Shamshad Shah between July and September 2018 stating that she could not understand the Claimant because of her accent and that the children could not understand her too, which was not true.

[170]The allegation gives a time window of between July 2018 and September 2018. The claimant’s witness statement (paragraph 96) clarifies that allegation as being what Ms Shah said to Daniella Glynn in an interview on 19 September 2018 [2244-2252].

[171]The words the claimant complains about were “…sometimes I thought they couldn’t understand [the claimant] due to her strong accent. There were times when I couldn’t understand her…Especially when she was really upset and angry the children wouldn’t understand what she said.”

[172]We find that the claimant has shown facts from which we could conclude that she 36 of 51 had been discriminated against.

[173]However, we find that the respondent has shown that the reason for the treatment was not race. We make that finding because Ms Shah did not complain about the claimant’s accent at the time and therefore did not subject her to a detriment at the time that she though the claimant’s accent may have led to misunderstanding amongst the pupils. We also find that the claimant’s comparators are not true comparators. We find that there were no actual comparators among the staff and that a true comparator would be a teacher who had a non-British accent that pupils and staff could not understand.

[174]We find that such a hypothetical comparator would have engendered the same response as Ms Shah had to the claimant, which we find would not have been a detriment. 2.1.1. b) – The Respondent

[175]The allegation is: b. Advertising and recruiting for her role during her suspension, and an assistant head teacher being recruited to her role as permanent position.

[176]The claimant was suspended from work on 20 July 2018. The claimant was one of three Assistant Headteachers (AHTs). The other two AHT’s had resigned and left the school at the end of the academic years 2017/2018. The respondent therefore had no AHTs in post.

[177]We find that the respondent advertised for the post of AHT Learning and Teaching on 14 September 2018. The advert was for a permanent post [391- 392], not an interim post. We find that the job advertised was the claimant’s job. We do not find that Mr Harding’s evidence that the three AHTs were interchangeable portfolio positions was likely, given that the claimant was recruited to a specific Learning and Teaching role and the advert asked for the same specific skill set. We appreciate that the School was desperate and was trying to recruit at a time when all the best candidates had probably found other positions.

[178]We appreciate that the post may not have been advertised as interim to avoid putting off potential candidates. We found Mr Harding’s evidence that the claimant would have been welcomed back if she successfully negotiated the disciplinary matter (and subsequent criminal case) to be credible.

[179]We find that the claimant has switched the burden of proof to the respondent to show that the reason that her post was advertised was not because of her race.

[180]We do not find that advertising the claimant’s role during her suspension and appointing a permanent replacement to the role of AHT Learning and Teaching was because of the claimant’s race. We make that finding because: 180.1. We found Mr Harding’s evidence on the point to be credible; and 37 of 51 180.2. We find that the named comparators in paragraph 2.1.2. of the List of Issues were not true comparators. We find that the only comparator would be a hypothetical comparator. The hypothetical comparator would be an AHT who was not Black Nigerian who had been suspended at the end of term at the same time as two other AHTs had resigned. We find that in those circumstances, the respondent would have advertised the hypothetical comparator’s post in the same way that it advertised the claimant’s and would have appointed a permanent replacement. 2.1.1. c) - The Respondent

[181]The allegation is: c. Suspending and subjecting her to a disciplinary investigation

[182]The facts of the allegation are not in dispute. The claimant was suspended on 20 July 2018 and was the subject of a disciplinary investigation. We note that the Headteacher, Ms Russell, was also suspended on 20 July 2018 was also the subject of a disciplinary investigation. Ms Russell is Black but is not Nigerian. In her own Tribunal claim (3200844/2020), Ms Russell based her race discrimination claim on her colour.

[183]We find that in the light of the allegations made by current and former staff about the claimant in the exit interviews conducted by Mr Harding and the subsequent interviews and letters there was enough in the allegations to seek the advice of the LADO and suspend the claimant. We find the accusations against the claimant to be serious and, at the time that they were made, potentially gross misconduct. We find that the respondent’s concerns were genuine. We found Mr Harding’s evidence in chief about this (paragraphs 10 and 12) to be credible and corroborated by the notes at pages 493-503.

[184]We find that the claimant’s allegations of a widespread conspiracy to dismiss her carried no evidential weight other than her assertions. There were no documents that supported her allegation. Ms Russell did not suggest in her evidence that such a conspiracy existed, having run the same argument in her own Tribunal. We find that there was no motive whatsoever for the respondent to manufacture the exit interviews and all that flowed from them because we found Mr Harding’s evidence that he thought the claimant was one of the School’s “stars” until he sat with the teachers in the exit interviews and found what they said to be truthful and compelling.

[185]We find that the claimant’s named comparators, Alison Varndell, Lorraine Barella, Ale Rasul and Siobhan Kennedy are not true comparators because none of them faced the same volume and seriousness of allegations as the claimant; and some were not of the same level of seniority.

[186]Mr Ale was referred to the LADO (Local Authority Designated Officer), but it was decided that the allegation should not proceed [2610-2624]. 38 of 51 2.2.1. d) – Ms Barella

[187]The allegation is: a. Lorraine Barella ignoring her and speaking only to her white MIND representative.

[188]This allegation emanates from the claimant’s visit to the School on 23 October 2023 to collect personal items, access emails and collect copy documents to assist her case in the disciplinary matter that she faced.

[189]We will come back to the visit later, as it is part of a suite of claims of harassment related to race and disability.

[190]The parties produced four stills from CCTV taken of the visit. The claimant attended the School on 23 October 2019 with an Employment Advisor from MIND, Ben Meyer-Lewis (who is the “white MIND representative” referred to in the allegation) and friend named Daniel.

[191]We cannot make any findings related to this allegation from the CCTV stills that we were shown.

[192]We find that the claimant’s evidence on the visit on 23 October 2019 is totally contradictory of the claim itself. She makes multiple references to the claimant talking to Lorraine Barella during the visit in her witness statement (nonexhaustive examples, paragraphs 164 and 166) and actually alleges that Ms Barella spoke to her in allegations 2.1.1. c), d), and e).

[193]Further, Mr Meyer-Lewis provided an account of the visit [2609] that does not support the claimant’s account.

[194]We found Ms Barella’s evidence on this point to be consistent and credible. It was corroborated by the witness statement of the late Ms Jory (the Receptionist).

[195]We have no hesitation in finding that the claimant has not shown facts from which the Tribunal could conclude that she had been directly discriminated against because of her race. Harassment related to race (s.26 EqA)

[196]These allegations all arise from the claimant’s visit to the School on 23 October 2019. We find that the clamant had requested to visit the School to collect personal belongings that had been left there when she had been suspended on 20 July 2018; look through her emails to gather evidence in respect of her disciplinary and grievance cases; and take copies of documents. It is clear from the correspondence we were shown that the claimant had asked to take copy documents, not originals.

[197]We find that it was agreed between the claimant and the PA to the Headteacher that the claimant would attend on 23 October 2023. It took some time and several emails to agree the date and time of the visit. The School told the claimant that she would be accompanied by Mr Maherally, who was the School’s Site Service 39 of 51 Officer on her visit.

[198]The School had CCTV cameras covering the reception area. We were shown 4 stills from the footage taken of the claimant’s visit but found it of no evidential use other to identify who was in the room at four points in time. In making findings of fact, we have not relied on the CCTV stills at all.

[199]As we have found above, the claimant was accompanied by an Employment Advisor from MIND, Ben Meyer-Lewis and her friend, Daniel. The claimant was initially greeted by the School Receptionist, Jo Jory. Mr Maherally then joined the group followed by Ms Barella. All the allegations under this head of claim are against Ms Barella. 2.2.1. a)

[200]This allegation is the same factual allegation as paragraph 2.1.1. d) that we have dealt with above: a. Lorraine Barella ignoring her and speaking only to her white MIND representative

[201]As we have found that the claimant has not shown that the facts alleged happened (see paragraphs 180 to 188 above), we repeat those findings and find that the claimant has not switched the burden of proof. 2.2.1. b)

[202]This allegation is: b. Lorraine Barella treating her in a hostile manner from the moment she met her

[203]We find that Mr Meyer-Lewis provided an account of the visit [2609] that does not corroborate the claimant’s account.

[204]We found Ms Barella’s evidence on this point to be consistent and credible. It was corroborated by the witness statement of the late Ms Jory.

[205]We found the claimant’s evidence to be internally inconsistent and not as credible as that of Ms Barella.

[206]We find that the claimant has not shown facts from which the Tribunal could conclude that she had been harassed related to race. 2.2.1. c)

[207]The allegation is: c. Lorraine Barella falsely accusing her of attempting to take 6 boxes from the school.

[208]We repeat our findings in paragraphs 196 to 199 above. We would add that we find that the claimant took 6 boxes from the School, so the allegation is factually incorrect. 40 of 51 2.2.1. d)

[209]The allegation is: d. Lorraine Barella showing her a letter of advice from the Respondent’s lawyer and the contents of the letter threatening to call the police even though she had done nothing wrong.

[210]We find that this allegation is factually incorrect. On the claimant’s own case, Ms Barella showed the letter to Mr Meyer-Lewis, not the claimant. The letter did not threaten to call the police. It advised Ms Barella that if the claimant refused to leave the School, she may want to call the police.

[211]The claimant has not switched the burden of proof. 2.2.1. e)

[212]The allegation is: e. Lorraine Barella mocking her and speaking to her in a condescending manner and interrogating her when she went through what she had put in 6 boxes

[213]We repeat our findings in paragraphs 180-188 above. We find that the allegation is in direct contradiction of the allegation above that Ms Barella ignored the claimant. We find it highly unlikely that the claimant’s supporter from MIND would have stood back and done nothing if the claimant’s allegations were true. We note that Mr Meyer-Lewis’s note [2609] makes no mention of the matters alleged and is generally unsupportive of all the allegations that the claimant makes about the visit to the School on 23 October 2023.

[214]We find that the claimant tried to remove original documents from the School that were the property of the School and which contained sensitive personal data about pupils and staff. We find that the claimant was not entitled to remove any such documents. We find that Ms Barella was placed in an invidious position of trying to protect confidential information whilst attempting to assist the claimant. We find that there was no evidence that Ms Barella acted unlawfully or inappropriately. It was not disputed that the claimant left the School after more than four hours with a flat trolley that one usually sees in a DIY store, that was full of boxes. It was also not disputed that the claimant was given full access to her School email account and was able to send over 350 emails to her home account.

[215]We find that the claimant has not shown facts from which we could conclude that she was harassed related to race. Victimisation (s.27 EqA)

[216]We find that the claimant did a protected act by submitting her first grievance on 12 February 2019 because it was agreed by the respondent and was evidently a protected act. The claimant makes five claims of victimisation that appear in paragraphs 2.3.1. a) - e) of the List of Issues. The first four allegations related to 41 of 51 OH appointments. The fifth allegation relates to the claimant being refused permission to return to the School after 23 October 2023. 2.3.1. a)

[217]This allegation is: a. Not being consulted when arranging occupational health appointments.

[218]We find that the claimant could not have any reasonable expectation to be consulted when arranging OH appointments. In the experience of the Tribunal, we take judicial notice that OH providers give dates for appointments without consultation with the patient and give enough notice for the patient to contact them to rearrange if the date is inconvenient.

[219]We find that there was no possible detriment.

[220]The claimant has not shown facts that switch the burden of proof to the respondent. 2.3.1. b)

[221]The allegation is: b. Being accused of missing occupational health appointments despite her providing a reasonable explanation at the time.

[222]The claimant admitted that she received the letter dated 21 January 2019 [1844] from Mr Harding advising her of the first appointment. Mr Harding advised the claimant of an appointment on 28 January 2019 and gave the address of the OH provider. She denied receiving the letter from the OH provider that contained its contact details dated 16 January 2019 [1843]. We do not find the claimant’s denial of receipt to be credible. If the claimant had not received the letter from the OH provider, there was nothing stopping her from contacting Mr Harding and asking him for the details. In any event, she had the time, date, and place of the appointment from Mr Harding.

[223]We find that the claimant was accused of missing OH appointments because she had missed them, not because she had made a grievance.

[224]The claimant’s case is that she missed the first appointment because she did not have the OH provider’s details. We do not find that to be a reasonable explanation given that we find that she had the letters from the OH provider and Mr Harding. We find that she only needed the letter from Mr Harding.

[225]The claimant was advised by Mr Harding on 4 February 2019 that she had an OH appointment on 19 February [1845].

[226]The claimant missed the appointment on 19 February 2019 because she said she fell asleep on the train. We do not find that to be a reasonable explanation.

[227]The claimant missed the appointment in July 2019 because she said she was 42 of 51 stuck in traffic. We do not find that to be a reasonable explanation.

[228]If we are wrong about the reasonableness of the explanation, we find that the claimant has shown no link between the claims of detriment and the protected act. We find that there was no detriment. 2.3.1. c)

[229]The allegation is: c. Having £320 deducted from her pay in August and September 2019, which was not refunded until November 2019.

[230]The claimant had a clause in her terms of employment that permitted the respondent to pass on to her the cost of missed appointments that the OH provider invoiced the respondent for. The respondent delayed in seeking reimbursement until August 2019, for appointments that were missed in January and February 2019. The claimant has shown no evidence linking the deductions to her February 2019 grievance. We find that there was no detriment. 2.3.1.d)

[231]The allegation is: d. Being threatened with further costs if she was unable to attend a further occupational health appointment

[232]We found Mr Harding’s explanation of the respondent’s position to be credible and reasonable. The respondent is a single-school academy trust. The claimant missed three medical appointments that delayed the diagnosis of her medical condition and her return to work. Her failure to attend three appointments cost the school hundreds of pounds.

[233]We find that there was no link between the deduction of monies (which were later reimbursed) and the claimant’s grievance in February 2019. We find there was no detriment. 2.3.1. e)

[234]The allegation is e. Being refused her request to return to school and collect her belongings and make copies of documents in her folders for her grievance and disciplinary hearings.

[235]We repeat our findings above that the claimant removed boxes of possessions and documents on 23 October 2023. The claimant’s visit on 23 October 2023 was upsetting for her on her own evidence. It was disruptive for the School. The School afforded the claimant remote access to her email box, which we find to be more than adequate.

[236]We do not find it unreasonable or a detriment to require the claimant to provide a 43 of 51 list of the documents or property that she wished to recover.

[237]We find that the claimant has shown no connection between the refusal to allow her to return to the school and her February 2019 grievance. The claimant does not move the burden of proof to the respondent. We find that there was no detriment. Disability Discrimination

[238]We find that the claimant has shown that she was a disabled person as defined by section 6 of the Equality Act 2010 between January 2019 and September 2020 because of depression, anxiety, and stress.

[239]We find that the claimant’s behaviours, including an email that caused the respondent to call the police because of concerns for her health and wellbeing together with her absence record mean that the respondent should have known that the claimant met the definition. Harassment related to disability (s.26 EqA)

[240]The allegations are factually identical to those in paragraph 2.1.1. a) – e) of the List of Issues and appear in paragraph 3.2.1. of the List of Issues.

[241]We repeat out findings of fact in relation to allegations 2.1.1 a) to e). We find that none of the allegations were factually correct for the reasons set out above. Discrimination Arising from Disability (s.15 EqA)

[242]The claimant makes ten claims under this head that appear in paragraph 3.3.1. a) to j). The first five instances of unfavourable treatment are factually the same as the claimant’s victimisation detriments in paragraph 3.2.1. a) to e) of the List of Issues.

[243]We find that as we found there were no detriment in the victimisation claim, we cannot find that there was unfavourable treatment in the first five allegations under section 15. We repeat our findings of fact above. There was no evidence that any of the acts alleged were done because of something arising from disability. 3.3.1. f)

[244]The allegation is: f. Refusing to postpone the Claimant’s disciplinary hearing.

[245]We find that the claimant was first invited to a disciplinary hearing on 5 December 2018 [420]. We find that the claimant’s contention that it was unfavourable treatment to insist that a disciplinary hearing went ahead on 6 July 2020 is not sustainable. We find that it is a fact of life that disciplinary hearings cannot be delayed indefinitely.

[246]We find that the respondent made strenuous efforts to conduct a fair hearing: 44 of 51 246.1. On 24 June 2020, the claimant was granted a further postponement of the disciplinary hearing and was warned that if she did not attend, the hearing might go ahead in her absence [1006]; 246.2. The Fit Note the claimant provided on 2 June 2020 said she was unfit for work, not unfit for hearings [222] – that contrasted with other Fit Notes from the same doctor that had previously said she was unfit to attend disciplinary hearings [219]; 246.3. On 29 June 2020, the claimant’s GP said (in a letter that was not sent to the respondent) “It is likely that these problems will continue until the disciplinary matters at work have been settled. Once these problems have been settled I would expect a gradual but complete recovery” [255]; 246.4. The claimant did not ask for a postponement of the PH on 15 June 2020 [61], nor orders to provide further information by 13 July 2020 and a Schedule of Loss by 13 July 2020 [69]; 246.5. If the disciplinary hearing was not completed by the end of the summer term, on or around 20 July 2020, it would have led to a further significant delay until September 2020 at the earliest [1020]; 246.6. The claimant was given plenty of notice that the hearing would be going ahead, and given the option of submitting written representations or sending her lawyer on her behalf who had been actively involved in matters for several years by that stage and knew the claimant’s position very well [1020]; and 246.7. We find Steve Hall’s evidence to be credible when he stated in oral evidence that he rejected the idea of a further postponement in part because “the matter had gone on for almost 2 years and causing concern on both sides, to delay longer might impact on witnesses’ memories and ability to give evidence, on that basis I felt it was reasonable to proceed”.

[247]We find that the claimant produced no evidence to show that the refusal to further postpone the hearing was done because of something arising in consequence of C’s disability. 3.3.1. g)

[248]The allegation is: f. Refusing to hold the disciplinary hearing in weekly intervals.

[249]We find the evidence of Steve Hall that holding a hearing in weekly intervals was unworkable to be credible. The hearing was before a panel of three members, none of whom worked at the school. The hearing had to accommodate the panel, a clerk and three other people who attended. There were also remote witnesses. 45 of 51 The concept of holding one day of a hearing per week over three weeks would have been a logistical nightmare. We would also comment, as observed by EJ Crossfill, that the claimant had form for seeking postponements.

[250]We find that there was no evidence before us that the decision was because of something that arose from the claimant’s disability. 3.3.1. h)

[251]The allegation is: g. Dismissing the Claimant.

[252]We find that the claimant was dismissed because of her conduct. It is not alleged by the claimant that her conduct that led to her dismissal was something arising from disability.

[253]There was no evidence before us of any connection between anything arising from the claimant’s disability and her dismissal. 3.3.1. i)

[254]The allegation is: i Sending the police to Claimant’s house.

[255]We find that the claimant’s e-mail to the respondent on 17 July 2020 included a statement that she was going to take her own life. We agree with Mr Cordrey’s submission that the respondent took the reasonable step, out of concern for the claimant, of notifying the police who, in turn, made their own decision to attend the claimant’s house. This was not in any sense unfavourable treatment, and it was not done because of something arising in consequence of disability. 3.3.1. j)

[256]The allegation is: j. Refusing to give the claimant additional time as requested to submit grounds for appeal and refusal to set an appeal hearing date after 16 November 2020.

[257]We find that the claimant failed to attend the disciplinary hearing and failed to provide any written submissions or send a representative the hearing. She was notified of her dismissal by letter and e-mail dated 15 July 2020. The respondent’s policy allowed the claimant to submit an appeal at any point on or before 10 September 2020; nearly two months later. The respondent notified the claimant of the appeal deadline on 17 July 2020 [1061].

[258]We find that on 8 September 2020 the claimant’s legal representative asked for an extra day’s grace for the lodging of the appeal [1067]. The respondent agreed 46 of 51 to the request. The claimant’s representative then asked for a further six days [1066], which was also granted by the respondent [1067].

[259]We find the respondent’s refusal to allow a further extension of five days, in an email on 18 September 2020 [1069] to be reasonable. We find that the respondent then reconsidered its position and had a change of heart and granted a longer extension than the claimant had sought. On 6 October 2020 the respondent advised the claimant that her appeal hearing would take place after the expiry of her Fit Note on 16 November 2020 and that she could still submit grounds of appeal [1071].

[260]We find that by 20 November 2020 the claimant had not supplied grounds of appeal, some 4 months after the dismissal decision. The respondent gave the claimant a further seven days to lodge an appeal, failing which it would assume that no appeal was pursued [1073]. The claimant’s representative replied on 23 November 2020 to state that the claimant did not wish to engage in the appeal process [1076].

[261]We therefore find that the claimant’s allegation was not made out on the clear and indisputable facts. We find that the respondent did not refuse to give C additional time as requested to submit grounds for appeal and did not refuse to set an appeal hearing after 16 November 2020. There was no unfavourable treatment. R acted wholly reasonably and no element of the decision making was done because of something arising in consequence of disability. We therefore find that there were not facts that showed, in the absence of explanation, that the Equality Act was breached by the respondent. Failure to make Reasonable Adjustments (ss. 20/21 EqA)

[262]The claimant contends for eight PCPs under this head of claim, which appear at paragraph 3.4.1. a) to h) of the List of Issues: 262.1. PCP 1: to provide a detailed list of documents following the visit to the School on 23 October (List of Issues §3.4.1 a.). 262.2. As set out above, following her visit to the School on 23 October, the claimant was asked to provide a list of documents (and personal property) that she wanted from the School with a view to the respondent providing the same. We repeat our findings above and find that this did not place the claimant at a substantial disadvantage compared to someone without her disability. 262.3. PCP 2: Not to consult when arranging occupational health and disciplinary meetings (List of Issues §3.4.1 b.). 262.4. We repeat our finding above that OH not consulting with the claimant about dates for medical consultations did not place the claimant at a substantial disadvantage compared to someone without her disability. 262.5. PCP 3: Not to arrange occupational health appointments at 47 of 51 employees’ request (List of Issues §3.4.1 c.). 262.6. We repeat our findings on this matter above. C was not placed at a substantial disadvantage and R’s approach was a proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aim of ensuring that staff receive OH support and a fair and timely disciplinary process. 262.7. PCP 4: Not to postpone disciplinary hearings until employee was well enough to attend (List of Issues §3.4.1 d.). 262.8. We repeat our findings above. The claimant was first invited to a disciplinary hearing in 2020. That disciplinary hearing was put off at the claimant’s request on numerous occasions until 2022. This did not place the claimant at a substantial disadvantage compared to someone without her disability and was reasonable. 262.9. PCP 5: requirement to conduct disciplinary hearings in weekly intervals (List of Issues §3.4.1 e.). 262.10. We repeat our findings above. The refusal to hold the disciplinary hearing one day at a time did not place the claimant at a substantial disadvantage compared to someone without her disability and was reasonable. 262.11. PCP 6: conducting disciplinary hearing in employee’s absence (List of Issues §3.4.1 f.). 262.12. We repeat our findings above. There was no medical evidence before the respondent that meant it should have postponed the hearing again. The decision to conduct the hearing in the absence of the claimant did not place the claimant at a substantial disadvantage compared to someone without her disability and was reasonable. 262.13. PCP 7: sending letter of dismissal directly to employee (List of Issues §3.4.1 g.). 262.14. We find that the claimant never asked the respondent not to send the outcome letter from her disciplinary hearing to her home address. We find that the claimant was not placed at a substantial disadvantage as it is the responsibility of an employer who dismisses an employee to communicate the dismissal to the employee for it to take effect. 262.15. PCP 8: Not to arrange an appeal hearing in absence of grounds of appeal (List of Issues §3.4.1 h.). 262.16. We repeat our findings above. The claimant was given every opportunity to submit her grounds of appeal over a long period and failed to do so. We find that the claimant, advised the respondent that she did not wish to continue with her appeal as she wanted the Employment Tribunal to deal with her case. 48 of 51 Unfair Dismissal Reason for Dismissal

[263]We find that the respondent has shown that the reason for the claimant’s dismissal was conduct. We make that finding because: 263.1. Given that we have dismissed all the claimant’s claims of discrimination in the Reasons set out above, we have found that the dismissal was not tainted by discrimination. 263.2. We find that the sole reason for the claimant’s dismissal was her conduct. 263.3. We find that the outcome letter [1048] set out the genuine reason for the respondent’s decision to dismiss the claimant. 263.4. We find that the claimant faced genuine disciplinary charges that arose out of her conduct. 263.5. We find that conduct is a potentially fair reason for dismissal. Fairness of Dismissal

[264]On balance, after considering all the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the respondent’s undertaking) in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case, we find that the respondent acted reasonably in treating the claimant’s conduct as a sufficient reason for dismissing her. We make that finding because of the following findings: 264.1. It was within the band of reasonable responses for the respondent to proceed with the disciplinary hearing in the absence of the claimant, or at all, after a delay of two years and after giving the claimant every opportunity of attending. 264.2. The claimant did not produce medical evidence that a reasonable employer would consider warranting a further delay in the process because of the claimant’s health. 264.3. The claimant did not appeal the dismissal. 264.4. We find the respondent conducted a thorough investigation of the allegations against the claimant that met the reasonableness test in Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd v Hitt. 264.5. We find that the fact that the disciplinary hearing found in the claimant’s favour on some of the allegations is indicative of a fair and reasonable process and a lack of bias or predetermination. 264.6. The claimant was unable to make a case that there had been a conspiracy against her that led to her dismissal. 264.7. The claimant cannot rely on the fact that the respondent advertised her role whilst she was off sick for the reasons we have set out above. 49 of 51 In any event, the person who took the role two years before the claimant’s dismissal left the post soon after they were appointed. 264.8. We find that the respondent had a reasonable suspicion amounting to a belief that the claimant was guilty of the misconduct that she was found to have committed. 264.9. We find that the respondent had reasonable grounds to sustain its belief that the claimant had committed the acts of misconduct she was found to have committed. 264.10. We find that the respondent carried out a thorough investigation of the matters alleged against the claimant. The investigation was reasonable in all the circumstances. We find that the respondent’s investigation was within the band of what a reasonable employer would be expected to have done. 264.11. We find that dismissal was within the band of reasonable responses to the findings made in the disciplinary hearing. We find the matters that the claimant was found to have committed were very serious. The disciplinary hearing considered the disciplinary charges carefully and did not find the claimant guilty of all the matters alleged, which indicates to us that the process was fair and balanced. 264.12. The respondent paused the disciplinary process to take account of the claimant’s health and to hear her grievances before proceeding with the disciplinary where there was no legal reason to have done so. 264.13. We find the dismissal to have been fair.

[265]The claimant had positive testimonials, but these could not be accepted as evidence of the claimant’s innocence. Their relevance was to the penalty imposed.

[266]We repeat that the claimant’s acquittal of criminal charges is not determinative of her guilt or innocence of the disciplinary charges she faced for the reasons we have set out above.

[267]We find that the two members of staff that the claimant said should have been interviewed would have made no difference to the outcome of the disciplinary hearing. Wrongful Dismissal (Breach of Contract)

[268]We find that the claimant was not entitled to be paid for her contractual notice period because we find that she was found to have committed numerous acts of misconduct which the respondent found to be gross misconduct [1048]: 268.1. Speaking about Matthew Bishop in a derogatory manner. 268.2. Speaking to Rebecca Wylie in a derogatory manner. 50 of 51 268.3. Speaking to Toby Dennett in a derogatory manner. 268.4. Denied children with specific needs the support of the learning mentors. 268.5. Referring to a child as stupid. 268.6. Discussing matters with Ms Russell.

[269]We find that the respondent’s determination of all the above matters was reasonable.

Summary

[270]We have found that all the claimant’s claim are dismissed. Accordingly, there is no requirement for a remedy hearing. Approved by: