Ms N Shpak v E11 Backstage Studio Ltd: 3200341/2025
JUDGMENT
FOLLOWING RECONSIDERATION The Claimant’s application dated 5 May 2026 for reconsideration of the judgment sent to the parties on 24 April 2026 (referred to me on 17 May 2026) is refused. The remedy hearing remains listed for 25 June 2026 if the parties are unable to agree a settlement using the guidelines already provided in the judgment.REASONS
There is no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked, for the following reasons:[1]The Claimant’s application relates to whether Regulation 32 of the National Minimum Wage Regulations 2015 should have been considered across the whole of the worker relationship, rather just from 1 January 2025 when the judgment found there was a change in the working relationship, such that ‘idle time’ was payable from this date.[2]Rule 70(2) Tribunal Rules 2024 does not require the Respondent’s input at the initial consideration stage, but the Respondent has in any event responded to the application on 7 May 2026.[3]Turning to each of the Claimant’s grounds in the application, ground 1 was on the basis that an undecided issue was whether the Claimant’s time when already present at the salon/nearby for pre-booked appointments, was ‘time work’ under Regulation 32 (application para 4.2). Case Number: 3200341/2025 2[4]Para 31 of the judgment deals with this issue. This finding expressly covers the situation of both a day with no pre-booked appointments or a day with pre-booked appointments but with gaps in between those appointments. Para 32 addresses both the situation of no pre-booked appointments or a day with gaps between appointments. Para 33 addresses the situation of a day with no pre-booked appointments at all and a day with gaps between appointments. Para 42 (Reasons) covers both days with no pre-booked appointments at all and days with gaps between appointments.[5]This issue has therefore already been decided in the judgment and was not an undecided issue.[6]Ground 2 is about the date from which the judgment decided that the Claimant’s situation changed so that she was now entitled to be paid during ‘idle time’ because it was from that date (1 January 2025) that she was now required to attend the salon, even when she had no pre-booked appointments. The Claimant disagrees with the date the Tribunal decided but the judgment explained why the 1 January 2025 date is the relevant date. It was not a date ’selected’ but a date based on the evidence before the Tribunal, noting that there was no evidence from the Claimant about being told to come in irrespective of bookings between November 2024 and the message on 27 February 2025. The judgment could have found that it was only a date closer to that 27 February 2025 message that the duty to attend/remain irrespective of bookings arose but I took into account the other evidence that there was increased control by the Respondent from January 2025 which made it more likely that the obligation to attend/remain was in fact already in place before 27 February 2025. The 1 January 2025 date was based on the evidence of the additional control from January 2025. The evidence set out in the Claimant’s application at para 6 was evidence considered but the finding was that up to 22 November 2024 at least the Claimant was not required to attend if she did not have a booking (para 30). The Claimant seeks to re-argue the point but the evidence was considered.[7]The Tribunal has already decided that the start date for the ‘idle time’ claim is 1 January 2025. The Claimant is conflating the finding that she was a worker from the beginning of the relationship with the claim for ‘idle time’; just because she was always a worker does not mean that she was required to attend/remain at the salon on days or throughout periods within a day when she had no pre-booked appointments. The Claimant may have attended at these times in order to pick up walk-ins but it was not until 1 January 2025 that the Respondent required her to do so.[8]The remedy hearing on 25 June 2026 remains listed on the basis of paras 44-45 of the judgment. The Respondent should note that the claim for idle time has been determined for the period from 1 January 2026 as regards liability and that para 2(5) of the Orders does not seek to re-open that issue. The Claimant has set out when she claims she had to attend from this date and unless the maths is wrong or she claims on a day or for a period when the Respondent provides evidence she was not in fact there (because for example she was off sick or on holiday or because the salon was closed) then the calculation will be based on the hours she has claimed for this Case Number: 3200341/2025 3 period, as set out on page 262.