Ms J Simpson and Others v The Vocational Academy Essex (in creditors’ voluntary liquidation): 3200253/2025
JUDGMENT
[1]the case is dismissed under rule 47.REASONS
[1]The claim form was presented on 26 March 2025, after an ACAS early conciliation period between 18 February 2025 and 24 March 2025. The claims are for notice pay, holiday pay, arrears of pay and a redundancy payment.[2]The Respondent is a private limited company providing vocational education and training services.[3]Ms Simpson was employed by the Respondent from 1 November 2022 to 8 November 2024. In her ET1 she alleged that she and the other two Claimants were made redundant on 8 November 2024, that they were not paid wages for October and part of November 2024, and that although the employer indicated a liquidator would be appointed to enable claims to the government, this had not occurred by the date of presentation.[4]Ms Simpson further alleged that she was owed over £10,000 in unpaid salary (the relevant period is not specified) and that HMRC had been informed she had been paid in full.[5]The Respondent did not present an ET3. On 18 July 2025 a letter was sent to it, warning that default judgment may be issued.[6]The case was listed for a one-hour final hearing on 7 August 2025, but that hearing was vacated due to lack of judicial resources.[7]A hearing was listed on 22 October 2025 before Employment Judge Povey. The Judge ordered that the case be re-listed for a three-hour final hearing by video on a date to be notified.[8]He further indicated that, in advance of the re-listed hearing, the Claimants should provide further information, including their employment dates, roles, pay, ages at termination, the periods and calculations of any unpaid wages and holiday pay, and the calculations of notice pay. He also identified a potential time limit issue arising from the termination date of 8 November 2024 and the ACAS early conciliation period, indicating that the Claimants would need to address whether it had been reasonably practicable to present their claims in time. He directed that this further information, together with any supporting evidence, be provided at least 14 days before the re-listed final hearing.[9]A further final hearing was fixed for 11 March 2026 but was again postponed due to lack of judicial resources.[10]The case was relisted today for three hours. None of the Claimants attended. My clerk phoned Ms Simpson, who did not answer. My clerk left a message; there was no reply. I asked my clerk to send an email to the Claimants, explaining that if none of them attended the hearing by 10.30, I would assume that they were no longer pursuing the case and I would dismiss it.[11]By 10.30 none of the Claimants had attended. I closed the hearing.[12]At 10:45, Ms Simpson wrote emailed the Tribunal: ‘I have the tribunal as the 26th that’s why no one has attended. We still want to pursue the case. I am at university in class.’[13]I checked the notice of hearing, which was sent to the parties on 10 March 2026. The hearing date on the notice is 23 June 2026.[14]I had regard to the Court of Appeal case of Roberts v Skelmersdale College [2004] IRLR 69. Although it was decided under the old rules, there is sufficient similarity between the two rules that it remains good law. The following principles emerge (so far as they apply to new rule 47): 14.1. the rule confers a very wide discretion; 14.2. the rule does not impose on an employment tribunal a duty of its own motion to investigate the case before it, nor to satisfy itself that on the merits the Respondent has established a good defence to the claim of the absent employee; 14.3. the Tribunal has a discretion to require the employer to give evidence, but no duty to do so; 14.4. before making a decision the Tribunal shall have regard to the information required under the rule.[15]I considered it significant that none of the Claimants had submitted any further information pursuant to EJ Povey’s order. Without that information, it would not have been possible to decide any of the claims in any event.[16]Furthermore, they had not provided any evidence on the basis of which time could have been extended in relation to the claims were out of time.[17]I had regard to the fact that the dismissal of a case under rule 47 is a severe sanction. I considered whether it would be right, as an alternative, to adjourn the hearing to another occasion. I decided that it, in the circumstances, it would not. If the case were relisted, given the current caseload being dealt with by the Tribunal, it would be several months before it could come on for hearing. The delay would be inherently undesirable in a case which has already been postponed several times.[18]I also had regard to Tribunal resources. There is huge demand for hearings in this region. It would not be right for further days to be allocated to the Claimants’ case in circumstances where the matter could have been dealt with today, had they complied with the orders of EJ Povey and attended the hearing.[19]In all the circumstances, I dismiss the Claimants’ case under rule 47, because the Claimants have neither attended nor been represented at this hearing.