Ms L Thomas v London Borough of Redbridge: 3200207/2022

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 3200207/2022

Between

Ms L ThomasClaimant

London Borough of RedbridgeRespondent

Before

Employment Judge W A Allen KC

In person for claimant

Mr Adamou (instructed by counsel) for respondent

Date 17 December 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The Claimant’s claim for 1.5 days unpaid accrued holiday entitlement is conceded by the Respondent and succeeds.

[2]The Claimant’s claim for automatic unfair dismissal under section 103A Employment Rights Act 1996 (protected disclosures) fails and is dismissed.

[3]The Claimant’s claims for direct race discrimination under the Equality Act 2010 fail and are dismissed.

[4]The Claimant’s claims for less favourable treatment on the ground that she is a fixed term employee under Regulation 3 of the Fixed-term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2002 are dismissed.

[5]The Claimant’s claims under the Employment Relations Act 1999 (Blacklists) Regulations 2010 / section 104F Employment Rights Act 1996 (blacklisting) fail and are dismissed.

REASONS

[1]Following a period of early conciliation between 10 November 2021 and 21 December 2021, the Claimant’s claim form was presented on 21 January 2022.

[2]The final hearing of this matter was initially listed over 8 days from 9 to 12 September 2025; and 16 to 19 September 2025. The listing was altered shortly before the start of the hearing to 8 to 11 September 2025 and 16 to 19 September 2025 (notice was sent on 5 September 2025). During the hearing, the listing was altered again to 9 to 11 and 15 to 17 and 19 September 2025. The reasons for these alterations are set out in detail in the records of the Case Management Orders dated 8 September 2025, 9 September 2025, 10 September 2025 and 17 September 2025 and referred to in summary below.

[3]The first attempt at getting the hearing started was on 8 September. It had been allocated a Judge and a single lay member (Mr Webb). From 9 September 2025 onwards, because the Claimant did not agree to proceeding with a single lay member, the hearing proceeded with the Judge sitting alone.

[4]In part due to the travel difficulties occasioned by industrial action by transport workers; and subsequently due to counsel for the Respondent contracting Covid, the took hearing place by video (CVP).

[5]The hearing did not get under way on 8 September 2025 because the Claimant did not attend. The tribunal was sufficiently concerned that she may not have received the late notice that the hearing was due to start that day (a day earlier than previously notified) and the start of the hearing was adjourned to 9 September 2025. The Claimant had not sent her witness statement to the Respondent (or to the tribunal). She was ordered to do so immediately. That order was not sent out by the tribunal until 9 September 2025. The Claimant complied with that order at about 11am on 10 September 2025.

[6]All day on 9 September 2025 was taken up with the Claimant’s strike out application – which was unsuccessful; and the Claimant’s application to postpone the hearing – which was also unsuccessful. The reasons for refusing the strike out and the application to postpone were given orally. The Claimant requested written reasons – which are set out below. Strike Out

[7]Rule 38 of the ET Rules 2024 states: Striking out 38.—(1) The Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party, strike out all or part of a claim, response or reply on any of the following grounds—(a) that it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success;

(b) that the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by or on behalf of the claimant or the respondent (as the case may be) has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious;

(d) that it has not been actively pursued;

(e) that the Tribunal considers that it is no longer possible to have a fair hearing in respect of the claim, response or reply (or the part to be struck out). (2) A claim, response or reply may not be struck out unless the party advancing it has been given a reasonable opportunity to make representations, either in writing or, if requested by the party, at a hearing. (3) Where a response is struck out, the effect is as if no response had been presented, as set out in rule 22 (effect of non-presentation or rejection of response, or case not contested). (4) Where a reply is struck out, the effect is as if no reply had been presented, as set out in rule 22, as modified by rule 26(2) (replying to an employer’s contract claim).

[8]When considering whether to strike out a claim, a tribunal must first consider whether any of the grounds set out in rule 38(1)(a)–(e) have been established; and then, having identified any established grounds, it must decide whether to exercise its discretion to order strike-out. The proportionality of doing so must be taken into account as must the effect of any conduct on the possibility of a fair trial.

[9]The Claimant applied to strike out the respondent’s response based on ET rules 38(1(b) and 38(1)(c) (underlined above) and she also stated that she did not consider that it was possible for her to have a fair hearing. That application was refused.

[10]The Claimant contended in summary that because of the Respondent’s actions or failures to act, combined with her treatment by the tribunal service, a fair hearing was not possible.

[11]The Claimant’s application is set out in her e-mail of the 21st of July 2025 which she amplified in her oral submissions in which she took me through the chronology of events since commencing her claim.

[12]Strike out is a draconian sanction and requires consideration of whether a fair trial is possible - which is the ultimate test for an employment tribunal.

[13]The Claimant is acting in person. I have not taken into account any substantive content of any without prejudice correspondence referred to by her. I have no jurisdiction concerning subject access requests - albeit that a failure to respond or failure to respond adequately to such requests could be relevant background information for me. I have no jurisdiction concerning complaints to HMCTS about alleged administrative failings - albeit that it may be relevant background to any alleged failings on the part of the Respondent.

[14]In relation to the employment tribunal service, I note that the employment tribunal system, like the justice system in general, is under considerable strain. It is operating in a far from perfect manner. This is not so much evidenced in hearings themselves but is a problem more widely in terms of administration and timely response to correspondence.

[15]This problem is particularly evident in cases such as this, where litigants such as the Claimant send correspondence to the employment tribunal, which is not responded to at all or at least not in a timely fashion and certainly not according to the claimant’s assessment of what a timely fashion should be. That failure is not the fault of the Respondent. It is no doubt deeply frustrating for all litigants. The system relies on the ability of parties to agree administrative matters between themselves. Agreement is difficult between parties to litigation who may lack the necessary degree of trust. The employment tribunal simply doesn't have the resources to manage disputes over matters such as the constitution of bundles of documents in a timely way (if at all).

[16]The Claimant took me in considerable detail through the parties’ interactions with one another and the tribunal since the claim was presented in 2021. She had made a previous strike out application on 24 February 2024 – which at para 23 of EJ Green’s record of the preliminary hearing on 16 August 2024 is stated to have been refused. I permitted the Claimant to address all of her concerns so that I could understand the context.

[17]The Claimant complained that she had not received communications from the tribunal including tribunal orders. I cannot understand why this would be – the tribunal file did not indicate that there had been any failure to send such communications to the Claimant.

[18]The Claimant complained that the tribunal had not properly dealt with the witnesses that EJ Green had ordered to attend the tribunal. [This is addressed further elsewhere in these Reasons].

[19]The claimant is so dissatisfied with the London East Employment Tribunal that she had also applied to have her claim transferred to another region. That has already been dealt with and refused by Regional Employment Judge Burgher by a response dated 4 September 2025. The claimant has told me that she has not received the decision about that. I requested that she be sent that response. [She subsequently indicated that this response had been received.]

[20]The Claimant complained that the Respondent had not complied with the orders that had been made to exchange witness statements (most recently to exchange on 30 May 2025).

[21]The Claimant stated that she had had a witness statement ready to send from October 2024. [This was not however the witness statement subsequently sent to the Respondent and the Tribunal on 10 September 2025 which makes reference to events up to an including on the 9 September 2025].

[22]The Claimant complained that the Respondent had not complied with its duty to supply documents on time (or at all in some regards); and that the Respondent did not appear to have preserved relevant documents as it should have done (and which the Claimant has been asking it to do from as early as 5 October 2021).

[23]The Claimant asserted that she believed that the Respondent was communicating with the tribunal without copying her into such communication. I did not see any evidence that this had happened.

[24]The Claimant complained that the Respondent had told the tribunal (falsely) that it had not received documents which she had sent to them. I was not satisfied that this had been made out. The tribunal had also failed to receive documents that the Claimant says that she sent (e.g. her extended particulars and Agenda document).

[25]The Claimant specifically complained that the Respondent has not supplied documents relating to remedy including in relation to pension benefits.

[26]The Claimant complained that the Respondent should have told her at an earlier stage that it was only calling 1 witness.

[27]The Claimant complained that different solicitors within the same firm had been dealing with her case.

[28]The Claimant complained that the Respondent had not included all relevant documents in the bundle – including e.g. some of the documents that she wished to have included and all of the correspondence between the tribunal and the parties; and that she had not received the final version of the bundle from the Respondent.

[29]More generally the Claimant complained that the Respondent had a history within the litigation of failing to comply with tribunal orders on the dates ordered.

[30]Counsel for the Respondent did not seek to argue that the Respondent had conducted itself perfectly throughout this litigation but retorted that ‘what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander’. The Respondent argued that the Claimant had conducted herself unreasonably in the litigation including in failing to engage with the compilation of the bundle and that it had provided her with a bundle on 28 March 2024 (which it said she failed to engage with); and further documentation following the hearings on 16 August 2024 and 1 November 2024. The Respondent asserted that it had been trying to agree a date for exchange of witness statements since July 2025 and pointed to an email to the Claimant dated 8 July 2025 asking when she would be ready to exchange, which had not been engaged with. The Respondent pointed to the large number of unsuccessful applications made by the Claimant in this litigation which had complicated matters. The Claimant denied that she had not been cooperating and argued that she was the party that had battled to keep the litigation alive despite the problems that she had encountered with the tribunal service and the Respondent. The Claimant asserted that she considered that the tribunal listened to the Respondent’s assertions about any defect in her conduct of the litigation (despite her being a litigant in person) but that the tribunal has been ignoring her repeated assertions about the deficiencies in the Respondent’s conduct of the litigation.

[31]The Claimant asserted that she was firmly of the view that she would not get a fair hearing at London East Employment Tribunal.

[32]The Claimant accepted that she had the March 2024 bundle and that she had had the single 12 page witness statement from the Respondent since 29 August 2025.

[33]I am not conducting a public enquiry into everything that happened during the Claimant’s employment at the Respondent or all of the actions of the Respondent towards the Claimant and others. I will be determining the issues set out in the list of issues.

[34]Some of the matters raised before me in this application are plainly complaints about the service provided to the Claimant by the tribunal. The Respondent is not responsible for the manner in which the Claimant has been treated (or perceives that she has been treated) by the justice system. I will look at the documents which the Claimant says she sent to the tribunal (including her extended particulars). I will deal with the outstanding matter relating to witness orders.

[35]Some of the matters raised before me relate to the period leading up to the previous application for strike out which EJ Green has recorded was refused.

[36]Some of the matters raised before me in this application are matters e.g. concerning documents and disclosure that largely seem to have been dealt with by EJ Green in a large number of decisions made at preliminary hearings on 16 August 2024 and 1 November 2024. I have gained an impression that the Claimant sees any document that might be relevant to her or which may have come into existence during her period of employment as disclosable in the litigation – whereas it is only documents relevant to the issues set out in the list of issues which need go before the tribunal.

[37]Some of the matters raised before me concern alleged irregularities in relation to SARs made by the Claimant – which are not under the tribunal jurisdiction.

[38]It was clear to me that the Respondent had failed to comply with some of the deadlines set out in tribunal orders. However there has also been delay caused by the Claimant in the history of this litigation and a failure to engage with the Respondent and, at times, the tribunal service has not dealt with matters as efficiently as it might have done.

[39]I did not consider that the Respondent’s failure to comply with the deadlines imposed by the tribunal formed sufficient basis for exercising my discretion to strike out the response. There were also defects in the Claimant’s conduct of the litigation – in particular that she had failed to engage with the finalisation of the bundle (or to supply a bundle of her own as suggested by the tribunal); and she had not yet supplied her witness statement, even after receipt of the Respondent’s witness statement. She was clearly frustrated with the progress of the litigation – and some of her frustrations with the tribunal service were understandable – but these were not something that could be laid at the feet of the Respondent. It was still open to the Claimant to suggest in due course in submissions that inferences be drawn from any stance taken by the Respondent towards disclosure of documents.

[40]The Respondent had included a large number of documents in the bundle which the Claimant said that she wished to rely on (pages 491 to 1110 of the bundle are labelled ‘Claimant’s additional documents’). The Claimant was informed in the record of the hearing on 1 March 2024 (which she did not attend) that if she wished to put additional documents before the tribunal not included in the bundle prepared by the Respondent bundle, then she could create her own bundle. That was repeated in the record of the case management hearing on 16 August 2024. She has not done so. It is not necessary to include all correspondence between the tribunal and the parties in the hearing bundle.

[41]A failure to preserve documents (particularly having been expressly asked to do so by the Claimant) is the sort of matter that could amount to unreasonable conduct. However, I did not consider that any lack of preservation of documents on the part of the Respondent was deliberate and I did not hear about any specific document or class of documents that had been deleted which was of particular relevance to the issues before me. The Claimant would be able to make reference to any lack of documentation in her cross examination and submissions and inferences could be drawn at that time.

[42]The Claimant’s arguments about disclosure were explored in detail at preliminary hearings on 16 August and 1 November 2024. I was not satisfied that the respondent had failed to disclose any relevant document in its possession or control.

[43]The Respondent was not obliged to tell the Claimant at an earlier stage that it was only calling 1 witness. It is not unreasonable for the Respondent to use different solicitors at the same firm to deal with the Claimant’s case.

[44]I did not consider that the Respondent’s failures amounted to scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious conduct of the proceedings.

[45]I considered that a fair trial of the Claimant’s claims is still possible and the strike out application was refused. Postponement

[46]Following her unsuccessful application for strike out, on 9 September 2025, the Claimant applied to have the hearing postponed. That application was refused. The Claimant’s submissions made reference to the submissions made in relation to strike out - including those relating to the alleged failings of the tribunal and those relating to the Respondent’s alleged actions and failures to act (many of which were historical). The Claimant highlighted that she had not had sufficient time to get to grips with the bundle of documents in its current form (which she was asserting that she had only just received) or the witness statement from the Respondent (sent to her on 28 August 2025 – which she accepted she received on 29 August 2025).

[47]The respondent opposed the application making the point that another postponement put the fairness of the hearing in jeopardy given the time that had elapsed since the matters complained of.

[48]I took those submissions into account; and I also took into account the needs of other users of this tribunal amid the pressures currently on the employment tribunal system. I took into account that this was the 3rd time that this claim had been listed for a final hearing and that if it was relisted, it could be up to 2 years before dates are available.

[49]At the time at which EJ Green was determining preliminary matters at the preliminary hearings on 16 August 2024 and 1 November 2024, a 1110 bundle of documents already existed and was in the possession of both parties. That was updated by the Respondent merely to add 57 pages to the end of the previous bundle (of which 22 pages contained a record of the preliminary hearing of 1 November 2024; and 13 pages contained correspondence between the parties and the tribunal). Although the Claimant asserted that she did not receive that bundle until 9 September 2025, I did not consider that she was greatly disadvantaged by that.

[50]EJ Green had ordered that witness statements be exchanged by 30 May 2025. That did not happen. The Respondent has been trying to arrange a date for exchange of witness statements since early July 2025. The Claimant was sent the Respondent’s single witness statement (12 pages from Rebecca Ellis) on 28 August 2025 and she states that she received it on 29 August 2025. The Respondent has still not seen the Claimant’s witness statement.

[51]Having decided that this hearing would not sit on Wednesday 10 September 2025 (save for a 30 minute case management hearing at 4pm) – to allow the Claimant to get to grips with the additional pages in the revised bundle; and to permit the Respondent to get to grips with the Claimant’s witness statement (which I ordered to be sent immediately); and taking into account that the tribunal was not going to be sitting on Friday 12 September 2025 in any event, I determined that: 1 day for the Respondent’s counsel to prepare at least the start of his cross examination of the Claimant; and 1 day with the documents for the Claimant prior to having to be cross examined; and a minimum of 4 days (including the weekend) for the Claimant to finish preparing her cross examination of the Respondent’s one witness and her closing submissions at the conclusion of the case – was sufficiently fair to both parties to enable a fair hearing to proceed.

[52]I also determined on 9 September 2025 that this hearing would deal with liability only (and not remedy) – which lessened the burden on both parties. It also served to ‘park’ any issue relating to outstanding disclosure relating to remedy – which could have further delayed the start of the hearing – and it already seemed to me that it was likely that a reserved decision on liability would be necessary in this case.

[53]The Respondent had the benefit of experienced counsel. The Claimant had had the Respondent’s single witness statement since 29 August 2024 and the Respondent’s statement was only 12 pages long. The Claimant did have the bundle prepared previously up to page 1110 and 35 of the additional 57 pages were documents relating to the tribunal process which she would already have seen. I considered the overriding objective and I considered that a fair hearing could take place in these circumstances, albeit that they were not ideal. Respondent’s applications

[54]At the case management hearing at 4pm on Wednesday 10 September 2025, the Respondent applied:54.1 to have the Claimant’s case struck out (on the basis of unreasonable conduct of the litigation - Rule 38(1)(b)); or her witness statement excluded from evidence (and the Claimant forced to rely on the ET1, her 17 page additional background and details document; and her further and better particulars as her witness evidence), on the basis that her 85 page witness statement was overly lengthy, had been supplied very late in the day (on 10 September 2025) and contained considerable references to matters that were not in the list of issues. The Respondent described itself as ‘blindsided’ by the content of the witness statement;

54.2 (in the event that the claim was not struck out) for postponement of the hearing in its entirety or failing that, for a further postponement of the start of the oral evidence to an additional hearing day on Monday 15 September 2025 (which had not been part of the listed hearing at that point in time), on the basis that counsel had not yet finished preparing cross examination of the Claimant and had struggled to get instructions in the available time on some of the matters set out in her lengthy witness statement.

[55]The Claimant resisted the strike out application and objected to the addition of Monday 15 September 2025 to the tribunal timetable on the basis that she had anticipated having Friday, Saturday, Sunday and Monday to prepare her crossexamination questions for the Respondent’s witness and her questions for the witnesses who were attending under witness order. The Claimant disputed that her witness statement was overly long or that it contained irrelevant material. She contended that any material not directly addressing the issues was relevant background.

[56]The Respondent’s applications for strike out and / or a postponement of the hearing were refused. The Respondent had also been late in providing its witness statement to the Claimant and as noted in my response to the Claimant’s strike out application, the Respondent’s conduct of the litigation had been imperfect. I was not inclined to strike out a claim on the basis that a witness statement prepared by a litigant in person might be bigger than it needs to be. The tribunal is experienced and can distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information in a witness statement – particularly when there is a list of issues, as there is in this case. The witness statement did not immediately strike me as being outrageous in its content or amounting in some other way to unreasonable conduct of the litigation. As the Respondent’s counsel had commented on the previous day ‘what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander’. It had been made clear to the parties that the claim is about the issues set out in the list of issues.

[57]That said, given that counsel for the Respondent was saying that the Respondent was not yet in a position to deal with the Claimant’s evidence and given that the tribunal was able to add an additional day on Monday 15 September 2025, the start of the oral evidence could be put off until that day. The Claimant will still have the 4 days that were allowed for her preparation of her case – in that she will now have Thursday, Friday, Saturday and Sunday. Documents

[58]Both parties had been in possession of a bundle of documents running to page numbered 1110 since March 2024 – it is referred to in paragraph 34 of EJ Green’s record of the preliminary hearing on 16 August 2024 as running to page 1115 including a 5 page index. The Respondent asserted that this had been provided to the Claimant on 28 March 2024.

[59]The bundle produced for this 2025 hearing contained the same initial 1110 pages and was updated by the Respondent to add 57 pages to the end of the previous bundle (of which 22 pages contained a record of the preliminary hearing of 1 November 2024; and 13 pages contained correspondence between the parties and the tribunal). The Claimant did not receive that bundle until 9 September 2025. The Claimant subsequently demonstrated admirable command of the bundle of documents when questioning witnesses.

[60]On 9 September 2025, the tribunal was supplied with a chronology by the Respondent.

[61]During the hearing, the Claimant supplied the tribunal and the Respondent with the document which she says was attached to her ET1 and an Agenda which she says was submitted prior to the hearing in August 2022. Witness orders

[62]The Claimant had originally applied for 15 witness orders. EJ Green considered these applications at a preliminary hearing on 1 November 2024, at which hearing the Claimant reduced the number of application to 10. EJ Green granted the Claimant’s request for 3 witness orders for Ms Stephenson, Ms Scott; and Ms McKoy and rejected the others. However, the witnesses had not been sent witness orders at that time, because the tribunal did not have their addresses. The Claimant was ordered to supply contact information for the witnesses. The Claimant supplied their addresses and email addresses to the tribunal on 10 June 2025. However, the tribunal mistakenly interpreted that correspondence from the Claimant on 10 June 2025 as being a request for witness orders (rather than merely the supply of address details) and the tribunal wrote to the Claimant on 1 August 2025 stating that “Regional Employment Judge Burgher has directed me to write to you as follows: The request for witness order is refused. There is no indication of the evidence that the witnesses will give or why they will not attend voluntarily.” Given that this was a mistake, I re-made the witness orders – which were emailed to the witnesses on 10 September 2025 requiring them to attend the tribunal on Tuesday 16 September 2025. All of those witnesses attended at short notice by CVP and I am grateful to them. The Claimant questioned them in chief and counsel for the Respondent cross examined them. Witness Statements

[63]There were witness statements from the Claimant; and on behalf of the Respondent from Rebecca Ellis (who had line managed the Claimant’s line manager) both of whom attended (on video) to give their evidence. The Respondent’s witness statement was sent to the Claimant on 28 August 2025, received on 29 August 2025. The Claimant’s witness statement was not sent to the Respondent until the morning of 10 September 2025 – it had clearly been updated as it included reference to Ms Ellis’s witness statement and indeed it included references to things said at the hearing on 9 September 2025. Oral evidence

[64]I heard evidence from the Claimant on Monday 15 and Wednesday 17 September 2025. On Tuesday 16 September 2025, the evidence of Ms Stephenson, Ms Scott; and Ms McKoy, who had all attended under witness orders, was interposed.

[65]Ms Ellis, the Respondent’s only witness gave evidence in chief in the afternoon of Wednesday 17 September 2025 and her cross examination by the Claimant commenced late on that afternoon – that cross examination was mainly focused on the conversation between them on 20 July 2021. Ms Ellis returned on Friday 19 September 2025 to resume being cross examined. On Thursday 18 September 2025, neither the Claimant nor Ms Ellis were available and the tribunal did not sit on this case on that day at the urging of both parties. It was made clear to the parties that the evidence and submissions would need to be concluded by the end of the day on Friday 25 September 2025 but that the decision itself would now inevitably be reserved. Last day of hearing

[66]On Friday 19 September 2025, the final day of the hearing, the Claimant attended but indicated that she was not going to participate in the hearing any longer – meaning that she would not conclude her cross examination of Ms Ellis or make oral or written submissions. She said that the last straw was that she had identified that the Respondent had not provided me with some relevant documents. I asked her if she would like me to have a look at those documents but in reply she said: ‘I’m done’. She stated that she wasn’t going to resume cross examination or make submissions. She made it clear that she was not withdrawing her claim. She was given an opportunity to reflect on her position and there was a short adjournment. When the hearing resumed, the Claimant did not resile from her position that she was not going to participate in the hearing any longer and she then left the hearing. Given that the Claimant had given her evidence, along with the witnesses attending by witness order and that the Respondent’s only witness had presented her evidence in chief and that some cross examination of Ms Ellis had taken place, taking account of ET Rule 47, I decided to complete the hearing and I heard submissions on behalf of the Respondent (largely based on written submissions). Submissions

[67]The Respondent produced written submissions at the end of the hearing. The Respondent made oral submissions. The Claimant did not make submissions as she declined to participate in the last day of the hearing.

[68]In the Respondent’s submissions, the issue of the amount of 1.5 days of accrued holiday entitlement was conceded on behalf of the Respondent. Claims and Issues

[69]The Claimant’s Claim Form at section 8.1 had listed a large number of types of claim:69.1 some of which were within the jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunal (subject to any time limit arguments or other jurisdictional points such as qualification period for unfair dismissal): direct race discrimination, indirect discrimination, ‘Equality Act’ [specific claim unspecified], Victimisation, Unfair Dismissal, Fixed Term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations, Working Time Regulations, Breach of Contract, Employment Relations Act [specific claim unspecified], Employment Relations Act 1999 (Blacklists) Regulations, ACAS Code, Equal Pay;

69.2 some of which were outside the jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunal: Public Sector Equality Duty, Data Protection / GDPR, European Convention on Human Rights / Human Rights Act, Health and Safety at Work Act, ‘Harassment Act’ [presumed to be Protection from Harassment Act], Defamation.

[70]The Respondent’s ET3 Grounds of Resistance stated that the Claimant had failed to particularise her claims; and following a tribunal order dated 24 May 2022, the Claimant supplied Further and Better Particulars dated 4 July 2022 setting out the specific acts which amounted to less favourable treatment because of race / fixed term employee detriment; a list of comparators; the blacklisting detriment(s); and other elements of her claim.

[71]The claim had initially been listed to be heard on 20-21 October 2022. That listing was subsequently postponed.

[72]As identified at a preliminary hearing on 25 August 2022 (and confirmed at preliminary hearings on 16 August 2024 and 1 November 2024), the Claimant’s Claims which went forward from that date were for:72.1 Automatic Unfair Dismissal (because of whistleblowing) – a103A Employment Rights Act 1996;

72.2 Direct Race Discrimination;

72.3 Failure to pay for accrued statutory leave on termination of employment;

72.4 Detriment under the Fixed Term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2002;

72.5 Detriment under Regulation 9 Employment Relations Act 1999 (Blacklists) Regulations 2010.

[73]The following claims were dismissed upon withdrawal at the preliminary hearing on 25 August 2022 (recorded in a Judgment made on that date):73.1 [Ordinary] Unfair dismissal under s.98 Employment Rights Act 1996;

73.2 Indirect race discrimination;

73.3 Victimisation

73.4 Wrongful dismissal;

73.5 Breach of contract;

73.6 Equal pay (Equal value)

[74]The issues were identified by EJ Brewer at the preliminary hearing on 25 August 2022 and were set out in the list of issues at pages 77 to 84 of the bundle before me.

[75]In the record of the hearing on 25 August 2025, EJ Brewer made reference to the Claimant’s assertion that she had attached a lengthy document to her ET1 setting out the details of her claims. The Judge also noted that neither he nor the Respondent had seen this document. EJ Brewer went on to record that: “39. At the preliminary hearing I took the claimant through all of the claims she said she was making, and the vast majority of the issues set out below are not included in the ET1. 40. We agreed that the claimant would re-send the attachment to the respondent and the Tribunal. The respondent will then consider whether and if so to what extent it wished to assert that any of the claims I set out below need to be the subject of an application to amend the claim by the claimant, and if so to write to the Tribunal setting out their position.”

[76]There was no such document in the bundle before me and there was nothing on the tribunal file to indicate that any such document had been received prior to the start of the hearing before me. The Claimant told me that she had made multiple attempts to submit it. I directed the Claimant to send the document to the tribunal and to the Respondent and she did so on the late evening of 9 September 2025, along with a case management Agenda which she asserts she sent prior to the hearing on 25 August 2022. There is nothing on the tribunal file to indicate that any such Agenda had been received at that time from the Claimant. At the point at which the issues were being discussed at the start of the hearing, the Respondent’s position on the document was unclear and counsel was not at that point able to assert that the Respondent had not received the document before. I read the document (and the Claimant’s 2022 Agenda).

[77]The hearing was listed for a 2nd time for 8 days in March 2024. That listing was postponed by EJ Volkmer at a preliminary hearing on 1 March 2024, on the basis that the parties were not ready for the hearing to proceed. It was relisted for this hearing in September 2025.

[78]EJ Green at preliminary hearings which took place on 16 August 2024 and 1 November 2024 re-confirmed the list of issues as set out in the order of EJ Brewer in August 2022; and dealt with a large number of preliminary issues including in relation to specific disclosure and the witness orders referred to above.

[79]I considered that the list of issues in the bundle, which had been determined by EJ Brewer and confirmed by EJ Green, accurately reflected the claim brought by the Claimant, taking into account the matters within the tribunal’s jurisdiction listed in the claim form (subject to the subsequent withdrawals); and the Claimant’s further and better particulars; and the matters that she raised at the hearing on 25 August 2022 with reference to the content of the document which she was asserting had been attached to her ET1. The Respondent does not appear to have objected to that list of issues (as EJ Brewer had permitted them to do following the hearing on August 2022). I made it clear at the hearing that I would be following the list of issues in the bundle and neither party sought to make any substantive amendment at the hearing (save for the minor corrections referred to in the next paragraph).

[80]Minor amendments / clarifications were made to the list of issues during the hearing before me in that it was clear that:80.1 The time limits jurisdictional point was potentially applicable to the fixed term employment less favourable treatment claim as well as the direct race discrimination claim;

80.2 the date at paragraph 5.2.10 should have been 28 September 2021 (not 23 April 2021);

80.3 the date at paragraph 5.2.14 should have been 19 August 2021 (not 9 August 2021);

80.4 the date at paragraph 5.2.16 should have been 21 September 2021 (not 20 July 2021);

80.5 paragraph 5.3 of the List of Issues was incorrect in that the Claimant had (in her further and better particulars) named the following comparators:80.5.1 Julian Ellerby- Director of Strategy

80.5.2 Rebecca Ellis – Group Director of HR

80.5.3 Lynn Lane- Assistant Director of HR

80.5.4 Lesley Seary- ex CEO

80.5.5 Edith Galliers – Head of Policy, Equalities & Communities

80.5.6 Paramjit Binning- HR Business Partner

80.5.7 Jacqueline Anel -- HR Business Partner

80.5.8 John Irvine - HR Business Consultant

80.5.9 Kelsey Morris – Early Years & Child Care Improvement Team Manager

80.5.10 Adrea Bradley – ex Group Director of HR

80.5.11 Shoyeb Osbourne -- HR Business Partner

80.5.12 Inclusion Schools HR Business Consultants LBR12 (Asian women – identified in the Claimant’s witness statement as Samira :Jahangir and Shobhana)

80.5.13 Colin Stewart, Director of Education and Inclusion

80.5.14 Lyn Downey, HR Business Partner

80.6 The manner in which the Claimant’s Blacklist claim was pleaded made it clear that she was also making an automatic unfair dismissal claim under s104F Employment Rights Act 1996;

80.7 The issues under the Fixed Term Employee claim had omitted to state that the tribunal had to determine whether any less favourable treatment was on the ground that the employee is a fixed-term employee. That is a necessary part of any tribunal’s decision making under the Regulations and I have added it. There was also no reference in the list of issues to potential justification under Regulation 3 of the Fixed Term Employee Regulations. I did not however add that to the list of issues, as I considered that if the Respondent wished to rely upon justification, it should have included such an argument in its pleaded response or raised it during case management preliminary hearings (which it did not).

[81]In the Claimant’s witness statement (at para 32 and again at the end of her statement) she set out a lengthy list of types of claim that she wishes to make – which went beyond the claims articulated in the List of Issues. It was made clear to the parties that the tribunal was going to consider the claims contained in the List of Issues (and potentially any matter relating to the non-provision of terms and conditions (albeit that the important date by which such terms and condition must be provided to engage the tribunal’s jurisdiction is the date of presentation of the claim)).

[82]With those amendments made, the issues which I considered at this hearing were therefore as follows (removing the remedy elements but retaining the original numbering for ease of reference). The order in which I addressed the issues in my conclusions changed – but I have not sought to change the order in this part of the Reasons. 1. Time limits1.1 Given the date the claim form was presented and the dates of early conciliation, some of the complaints may not have been brought in time.

1.2 Were the discrimination complaints made within the time limits in section 123 of the Equality Act 2010 / Regulation 7 of the Fixed-term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2002 The Tribunal will decide:1.2.1 Was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the act to which the complaint relates?

1.2.2 If not, was there conduct extending over a period?

1.2.3 If so, was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the end of that period?

1.2.4 If not, were the claims made within a further period that the Tribunal thinks is just and equitable? The Tribunal will decide:1.2.4.1 Why were the complaints not made to the Tribunal in time?

1.2.4.2 In any event, is it just and equitable in all the circumstances to extend time? 2. Unfair dismissal (protected disclosure) 2.1 Was the reason or principal reason for dismissal that the claimant made a protected disclosure? If so, the claimant will be regarded as unfairly dismissed. 3 [Remedy] 4. Protected disclosure

4.1 Did the claimant make one or more qualifying disclosures as defined in section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996? The Tribunal will decide:4.1.1 What did the claimant say or write? When? To whom? The claimant says she made the following disclosure (I have quoted what the claimant says because despite seeking clarification I remained unclear what the disclosure was) 4.1.1.1 “The potential risk to the respondent, a school and a limited company in relation to the procurement of services to the school that could breach TUPE and notification to OFSTED and the LBR policies and procedures with potential financial ramifications to the school and the respondent” (sic)

4.1.2 The claimant says she made this disclosure on:4.1.2.1 9 July 2021,

4.1.2.2 15 July 2021,

4.1.2.3 19 July 2021,

4.1.2.4 20 July 2021, and

4.1.2.5 21 July 2021.

4.1.3 The claimant says that on each of the above occasions she disclosed to:

4.1.4 The claimant says that on 20 and 21 July she also disclosed to Colin Stewart and Emma Vick.

4.1.5 Did she disclose information?

4.1.6 Did she believe the disclosure of information was made in the public interest?

4.1.7 Was that belief reasonable?

4.1.8 Did s/he believe it tended to show that:4.1.8.1 a criminal offence had been, was being or was likely to be committed;

4.1.8.2 a person had failed, was failing or was likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation?

4.1.9 Was that belief reasonable?

• Jacqueline Anel,

• Parminder Billing,

• Rebecca Ellis,

• Kelsey Morris,

• Nicole Stevenson,

• Kenny Scott and

• Shoham Osborne.

4.2 If the claimant made a qualifying disclosure, it was a protected disclosure because it was made to the claimant’s employer. 5. Direct race discrimination (Equality Act 2010 section 13)

5.1 The claimant describes her race as black British.

5.2 Did the respondent do the following things: 5.2.1 Fail to provide documents to the claimant when she asked for them; 5.2.4 Fail to pay 1.5 days accrued untaken statutory leave on termination of the claimant’s

5.3 Was that less favourable treatment? The Tribunal will decide whether the claimant was treated worse than someone else was treated. There must be no material difference between their circumstances and the claimant’s. If there was nobody in the same circumstances as the claimant, the Tribunal will decide whether s/he was treated worse than someone else would have been treated. The Claimant’s names comparators are: Julian Ellerby- Director of Strategy Rebecca Ellis – Group Director of HR Lynn Lane- Assistant Director of HR Lesley Seary- ex CEO Edith Galliers – Head of Policy, Equalities & Communities Paramjit Binning- HR Business Partner Jacqueline Anel -- HR Business Partner John Irvine - HR Business Consultant Kelsey Morris – Early Years & Child Care Improvement Team Manager Adrea Bradley – ex Group Director of HR Shoyeb Osbourne -- HR Business Partner Inclusion Schools HR Business Consultants LBR12 (Asian women – identified in the Claimant’s witness statement as Samira :Jahangir and Shobhana) Colin Stewart, Director of Education and Inclusion Lyn Downey, HR Business Partner

5.4 If so, was it because of race?

5.5 Did the respondent’s treatment amount to a detriment? 6 [Remedy] 7. Holiday Pay (Working Time Regulations 1998) [This claim was conceded by the Respondent who will pay 1.5 days pay to the Claimant] 8. Employment Relations Act 1999 (Blacklists) Regulations 2010

8.1 Was the claimant on a prohibited list as defined in regulation 3?

8.2 Did the respondent subject the claimant to a detriment under regulation 9 by failing to extend the claimant’s fixed-term contract because she is on a prohibited list? In the alternative, did that amount to automatically unfair dismissal under section 104F Employment Rights Act 1996?

8.3 If so, did the respondent also contravene regulation 3 or in the alternative, rely on information supplied by a person who contravened regulation 3 in relation to the prohibited list and did the respondent know or ought it reasonably to have known that the information it relied on was supplied in contravention of regulation 3?

8.4 [Remedy] 9. Fixed-term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations

9.1 Did the respondent treat the claimant less favourably by:9.1.1 Not providing her with a s.1 ERA statement;

9.1.2 Not dealing with her grievances in a timely manner;

9.1.3 Failing to pay her the same rate as a comparable permanent employee; 9.1.5 Fail to provide her with documents she asked for; and If so, was that less favourable treatment on the ground that the employee is a fixed-term employee?

9.2 [Remedy]

[83]For the avoidance of doubt, the dismissal (non-renewal of fixed term employment) claim only related to the whistleblowing and blacklisting parts of the claim. The race discrimination and fixed term employment claims did not cite dismissal as parts of those claims.

Findings of Fact

[84]The Claimant, who describes herself in the further and better particulars as ‘Black Caribbean’ and in her witness statement as ‘Black British’ is a human resources professional. She was employed by the Respondent local authority as a Human Resources Business Consultant between 9 June 2021 and 30 September 2021 on a fixed term contract. The contract was not extended at the end of the fixed term. During her period of employment the Claimant was not disciplined or put through any form of performance management process and she was not informed of any complaints made against her.

[85]The Claimant’s line manager was Nicole Stephenson, who attended the tribunal to give evidence under a witness order. Nicole Stephenson was acting up into this management role and Ms Stephenson’s line manager was Rebecca Ellis – who gave evidence to the tribunal on behalf of the Respondent.

[86]John Irvine and Kelly Scott (both white British) were engaged at about the same time as the Claimant in similar roles. Unlike the claimant, they were both appointed permanently at the end of their fixed term contracts. John Irvine is one of the Claimant’s comparators for elements of her direct race discrimination claim. As I have noted, the race discrimination claims did not include an allegation that the Claimant’s contract was not renewed because of race.

[87]The Claimant has stated that she was not given a statement of terms and conditions when she should have been, however she accepts that she was given such a statement prior to the end of her employment and prior to the presentation of her ET claim. The Respondent accepts that it was late in supplying the Claimant with her terms and conditions – having done so on 24 August 2021. The Claimant states that John Irvine told her that he was given his terms and conditions in June 2021. I did not see any documentary evidence of that communication to him.

[88]The Respondent needed additional human resource professionals in 2021 in order to get the number of HR cases within the Respondent down. The Claimant was aware when she was recruited that her contract was for a fixed term to 30 September 2021. During her employment, she advised on matters such as grievances, harassment cases, capability, sickness absence and disciplinaries.

[89]Ms Scott gave evidence that at the time when the Claimant was engaged, the workplace was ‘rocky’ and ‘unsettled’ and that there had been significant changes in personnel including the departure of Ms Ellis’s predecessor and the arrival of Ms Ellis (which was on 5 July 2021 – about 4 weeks after the Claimant started).

[90]The Claimant strongly asserts that she has been placed on a blacklist due to matters arising from former employment with a different local authority and her trade union activities in that employment. The Claimant did not put any allegation about blacklisting (or knowledge of former trade union activities) to Ms Ellis.

[91]The Claimant’s witness statement states at paragraphs 17 and 128 and 140 that Lynn Lane and Rebecca Ellis shared information that they had obtained about the Claimant with Paramjit Binning. The Claimant suggests that this information was that she “was / is violent / aggressive towards vulnerable adults and children” (which the Claimant firmly denies). The Claimant did not put any allegation about that to Ms Ellis, who in her evidence denied obtaining or sharing any information about the Claimant.

[92]Aside from the Claimant’s assertions, I did not hear or see any evidence that any decision manager or decision maker at the Respondent was aware of anything that had taken place during the Claimant’s period of former employment and / or that the Respondent made use of or was aware of any blacklist and / or that individuals at the Respondent had shared derogatory information about the Claimant. I asked the Claimant why she thought that such a list had been seen by the Respondent and part of her reply was that she had ‘got a feel’ that something was circulating out there. She said that she had received job offers from local authorities but then for some reason those offers were retracted. She did not point towards any documented evidence to back up her feeling.

[93]Due to ongoing Covid restrictions, the Claimant’s role was largely working from home. The Claimant’s evidence is that upon her starting in her role, Ms Stephenson requested that the Claimant be sent a chair, screen and if possible a desk from the office – the Claimant also sought some additional items, but that the organisational response was that such items could be collected but would not be delivered. I saw correspondence to that effect. The Claimant’s evidence is that she believed that Ms Ellis and Ms Downey (both white) did have such items couriered to them. However, the Claimant did not put this to Ms Ellis and when she put it to Ms Stephenson, she said that she did not recall and did not know. I did not see any documentation suggesting that Ms Ellis and / or Ms Downey received different treatment.

[94]The matter stated in the List of Issues to have been a protected disclosure is as follows: 4.1.1.1 “The potential risk to the respondent, a school and a limited company in relation to the procurement of services to the school that could breach TUPE and notification to OFSTED and the LBR policies and procedures with potential financial ramifications to the school and the respondent”

[95]In setting out the list of issues, EJ Brewer states that he was quoting what the Claimant says because despite seeking clarification he remained unclear what the disclosure was.

[96]In the Claimant’s witness statement, the precise nature of the disclosure remained a little unclear but she does explains that an issue that she was raising was that the Respondent was attempting to TUPE someone working in an early years function at a primary school in September or October 2021 whose fixed term contract was to have come to an end prior to that and would therefore have had to have been extended for a second time which was outside the Respondent’s usual policy (which required advertising). Although the Claimant did attempt to explain this in her oral evidence, it was initially not altogether clear to me why the Claimant was suggesting that she reasonably believed this to be ‘unlawful’ as she described it in paragraph 95 of her witness statement. The Claimant also referred to some ‘other serious ramifications’ including in relation to Ofsted. I initially struggled to understand the significance of those but I accepted that the Claimant had raised concerns in emails including in emails on 20 and 21 July 2021 (see further below) in which she referred to ‘potential issues / risks’ to the Respondent and to the school and to a query over whether the new arrangements complied with Ofsted requirements as well as the TUPE matter.

[97]The Claimant said that she had also made verbal disclosures. I accepted that she had also had verbal conversations surrounding those matters but when I asked the Claimant to explain exactly what she had disclosed and when and to whom, and how she said that this led to the non-renewal of the fixed term contract, save for stating that she had made a verbal disclosure to Ms Ellis on 20 July 2021, the Claimant’s response did not provide me with a coherent account. The Claimant maintained that the Respondent had not provided the tribunal with the documents that would indicate what was potentially risky about the arrangements at the school. On Wednesday 17 September 2025, (many days into the hearing), the Claimant asked for the hearing to be postponed / adjourned so that this evidence could be provided. The Claimant made reference to: the Redbridge Transform Project IO August 2019; the contractual documents relevant to the employee that may have been subject to TUPE (contract and offer letter) and the early years job description and person specification. However, I did not need that documentation, I merely needed to know what the Claimant had communicated (in order to determine whether that was a protected disclosure) and then if it was a protected disclosure, the focus shifted to whether her dismissal was for the reason or principal reason that she had made such a protected disclosure). I do not need to determine whether the disclosure was accurate or whether there was actually a breach of a legal obligation. I therefore decided that I did not need to call for additional documentation of the nature referred to by the Claimant on the basis that it was insufficiently relevant to the matters which I had to decide. I declined that application on the basis that it had been made clear to the Claimant in the record of the 1 March 2024 preliminary hearing that she could provide her own bundle of documents if she was unsatisfied with the Respondent’s bundle and in any event, that I could not see how the class of documents referred to by the Claimant would help me determine whether a protected disclosure had been made.

[98]A managerial meeting or meetings took place in relation to the early years provision at the school. The Claimant was not invited to that meeting or meetings.

[99]The Claimant’s witness statement sets out that from June / July 2021, she felt that she was excluded from meetings, her emails were tampered with, her email account was monitored and she was under surveillance. She did not put any of that to Ms Ellis.

[100]The list of issues records the alleged protected disclosure as having been made on 9, 15, 19, 20 and 21 July 2021 to Jacqueline Anel, Parminder Billing, Rebecca Ellis, Kelsey Morris (Early Years and Childcare Improvement Team Manager), Nicole Stevenson, Kenny Scott and Shoham Osborne; and also on 21 July 2021 to Colin Stewart and Emma Vick.

[101]There were communications from the Claimant about this TUPE matter in July 2021. The documented communications refer to ‘risks’ but don’t articulate what they are. The Claimant relied on verbal communications and the fact that the recipients of her communications would have been aware of what risks she was referring to.

[102]When the Claimant’s line manager, Ms Stephenson, was on leave on 20 July 2021, the Claimant had a meeting or phone call with Rebecca Ellis that day to discuss a number of matters including the TUPE / risk matters. That was their first meeting. The Claimant’s witness statement suggests that Ms Ellis cancelled this meeting – but in oral evidence, the Claimant accepted that it had taken place, albeit that it was conducted by telephone. The Claimant and Ms Ellis agreed that some specific cases that the Claimant was working on were discussed. The Claimant’s evidence was that that these were the only things discussed at that meeting (which was put to Ms Ellis in cross examination and denied by her). Ms Ellis gave evidence that also at that meeting, the Claimant expressed some unhappiness with the way that the Respondent operated; that the Claimant told her that she was not doing as many cases as others; that the Claimant knew she was not performing well; and that she gave the impression of being exasperated by the Respondent. Ms Ellis’s evidence was that it was also communicated to the Claimant at that meeting that her contract would end on 30 September as planned.

[103]Rebecca Ellis’s evidence was that she jotted down some handwritten notes at or following the meeting / call on 20 July 2021 in readiness for Ms Ellis’s upcoming meeting with Ms Stephenson on 11 August 2021 [bundle 117/118]. Amongst the matters jotted down was that it had been noted that “Contract still stands 30/9 . . . No contract extension . . . Assume cases can be closed by 30/9 . . . Lerleen said ‘So my contract ends on 30/9. I said yes . . . Assume cases can [conclude] by 30/9. Well that’s a day I look forward to.”

[104]Following the meeting on 20 July 2021, the Claimant sent an email to Ms Ellis [bundle page 556] referring to the part of the conversation that related to specific cases including making reference the TUPE matter and to risks / issues concerning the primary school early years service. The email stated: Rebecca further to our telephone discussion this afternoon you confirm the following:- 1. Case 1 Allegation , that the Management decision made by the Head of Education should be followed. Kelsey to meet with the employee informally tomorrow 21/7/21. I will advised Kelsey accordingly 2. Case 2 Fixed Terms- I should hold off terminating the employee contract of employment (which is due to end on 31/8/21 notice will need to be given If the decision remains to terminate), because Paramjit Binning EE Business Partner and Kelsey Morris is holding A TUPE meeting today. I will wait the outcome of the meeting/ feedback from Paramjit) 3. That I should summaries the risk/ issues to LBR (having reviewed all the correspondences that has been sent to me, inclusive of the business case for creating and launching of an Early Years' service within Mannford primary school (on behalf of LBR) . To the School removing/ terminating the current arrangements of tailgating of its OFSTED registration wef 22.6.21 etc (during our call this afternoon I verbal summaries the issues/ risks ) I will provide a written summary of the issues/ risks in the next few days. If not sooner

[105]On July 2021, the Claimant sent an email to Kelsey Morris, Nicole Stephenson, Paramjit Binning and Jacqueline Anel, copied to Ms Ellis, which Ms Morris says in her reply to the Claimant had been forwarded to Colin Stewart and later that day formed part of a chain forwarded by the Claimant to Emma Vick. The Claimant’s email stated [bundle page 567]: You have been kind enough to provide back ground information, communications /information pertaining to 'setting up, creating and launching of the Early Years programme within Manford Primary School on the behalf of LBR. It has come to my attention that there may be potential issues/ risks with the operation side of things/ the running of the programme following the School removing the tail gating (and consequences) that was in place last year until 22/6/21. Also whether it complies/ meets OFSTED regulation requirements/ and if the new arrangements have been signed of by OFSTED. (I could not see anything in the paperwork, but you would be able to confirm). On the behalf of LBR, it is important that we minimise any risks and also any potential risk to the School. This is my attempt to ensure diligence. In addition there may be potential issues in regards to TUPE over of our permanent staff (eg whether one team member would be able to pass the assessment and or whether they have been assesses prior to the launching of the programme), Extending the fixed term contract for further 6 months (I understand that the service will be going back to the school on 1st October 2021 and this employees fixed term contract is due to come to an end on 31/8/21). There could also be issues with LBR funding a post for 6 months. Has a business case been signed off as yet? There is a cross over and a close link between my remit and that of our EE HRBP colleagues. I am proposing that we all meet asap so I can appraise you of the issues/ risks. But it will also give you an opportunity to confirm what processes/ sign offs are in place since the tail gating as ceased and whether this process has been signed off by OFSTED. I want to ensure that all the appropriate checks and balance are in place, should we ever get audited internal or external we can demonstrate that we have met all the requirements. (inclusive of any unannounced visits/inspections by OFSTED etc) In addition in regards to TUPE over our staff, should there be any issues arising before or after TUPE both the school and LBR could be held accountable and responsible financial.”

[106]I found it difficult to determine whether to accept the evidence of Ms Ellis or the Claimant as to whether their conversation on 20 July 2021 had touched upon the Claimant’s attitude towards the Respondent and her own performance and the end of her contract. They both agreed that the matters set out in the Claimant’s email of that date were discussed. Ms Ellis’s handwritten note did not record those matters but did record some things that Ms Ellis said were said at a subsequent meeting with the Claimant on 19 August 2021 (including the Claimant saying: ‘well that’s a day I look forward to’) and on balance, I find that the handwritten note is not a note of the meeting on 20 July 2021 but of some other meeting – probably that with the Claimant on 19 August 2021 or perhaps with Nicole Stephenson in part about the Claimant or even a mixture of the two. I find that Ms Ellis is mistaken in her recollection about this note reflecting the meeting on 20 July 2021. However, I find that Ms Ellis is accurately describing the impression that she was given at some point by the Claimant about her attitude towards the Respondent, the Claimant’s performance and the Claimant’s expression about the impending end of her contract.

[107]In relation to the alleged TUPE / risk disclosure, it was not put to Ms Ellis at the tribunal hearing that she (or anyone else) took any specific action against the Claimant as a result of such a disclosure. When both Ms Ellis and Ms Stephenson were asked about the Claimant’s disclosure, it was clear that they had only a vague recollection and I gained the impression that they had not considered it a significant communication at the time.

[108]On 5 August 2021 the Claimant requested 17 and 18 August 2021 as time off in an email to her line manager, Ms Stephenson.

[109]A meeting of the Claimant’s team was held on 9 August 2021 to discuss an upcoming restructuring of duties and reporting lines which would come into effect from 6 September 2021. This was followed up by an email dated 20 August 2021 which was shared with the Claimant.

[110]Ms Ellis’s unchallenged evidence was that on 11 August 2021, she and Ms Stephenson discussed the Claimant and that she was not doing as many cases as the others and was poorly managing her time. Ms Ellis gave oral evidence that Ms Stephenson was the primary source which informed the decision not to renew the Claimant’s contract.

[111]On 27 July 2021, the Claimant’s line manager, Ms Stephenson had emailed ‘Recruitment Campaigns; Pay and Contracts’ telling them that the Claimant had not received a contract of employment. On 16 August 2021, the Claimant emailed Ms Stephenson and Ms Ellis noting that her contract of employment had not been issued; that no discussion had taken place with her about contract extension or contract termination; and asking what the new structure would look like. Ms Ellis sent a reply the same day in which she said that she was unaware that the Claimant had never received a contract and would follow that up and that there would be an upcoming meeting about ‘future plans’.

[112]The notice of engagement and statements of particulars document was sent on 24 August 2021 under cover of an email apologising for it having ‘slipped through the cracks’. The document clearly states that the contract is due to end on 30 September 2021. It also states that “employees leaving the employer are not entitled to pay in lieu of untaken annual leave, except in exceptional circumstances”. During the hearing I queried whether this was open to an employer given the statutory rights involved.

[113]The possibility of contract extensions was discussed with other members of the team on 17 August 2021, but the Claimant was on leave that day. A separate meeting took place between the Claimant and Nicole Stephenson.

[114]The Claimant says that she had been given the impression by a number of people including Ms Stephenson, prior to August 2021 that her contract may or would be extended beyond the end of September. Ms Stephenson accepted in cross examination that any suggestion that she made to the Claimant about contract extension would have been a wish or a hope rather than any sort of guarantee as the decision would have been made at a higher level.

[115]Both the team restructure and the Claimant’s future were discussed with the Claimant at a meeting with Ms Ellis on 19 August 2021. Ms Ellis’s unchallenged evidence was that the Claimant raised the fact at that meeting that she had not been given a contract of employment. Ms Ellis gave unchallenged evidence that the Claimant was made aware that she could apply for any vacancies (which were publicised on internal and external websites) – but that she did not do so; and that the Claimant asked at that meeting if her contract would be extended, to which the Claimant was told that the business was not looking to extend it and then the Claimant responded that it was a day that she was looking forward to (something which is recorded in the handwritten note at bundle pages 117-118 – which Ms Ellis thought (but I don’t agree) was a record of the earlier 20 July 2021 meeting). Ms Ellis’s unchallenged evidence was that the Claimant seems quite happy about the prospect of leaving the Respondent and that the Claimant told her that she did not like the culture at the Respondent. The Claimant’s witness statement stated at paragraph 157 that Ms Ellis at this meeting had given a false impression that there had been a previous meeting with the Claimant. However, the Claimant has accepted that there was a previous meeting / conversation on 20 July 2024 – albeit that I have not accepted all of Ms Ellis’s evidence about the content of that July meeting. The Claimant did not ask Ms Stephenson about the meeting on 19 August 2021.

[116]I accept Ms Ellis’ evidence that at least on 19 August 2021 a meeting took place with the Claimant at which it was made clear that the Claimant’s contract would not be extended and that the Claimant seemed content with that. Any suggestion by the Claimant that there was no discussion with her about contract extension is rejected.

[117]On 1 September 2021 Ms Stephenson sent an email to the Claimant recording that the Claimant’s contract would end on 30 September 2021.

[118]As part of the restructure, Ms Stephenson reverted to her substantive role of HR Business Consultant and Jacqueline Anel became the Claimant’s line manager on 6 September 2021.

[119]Ms Ellis’s unchallenged evidence was that:119.1 the criteria applied for extension of contracts was “performance, performing a broader role beyond just the casework, integrating into the team, and satisfactory customer satisfaction.”; and that

119.2 John Irvine (who was engaged on essentially the same basis as the Claimant and at the same time) applied initiative in his role and applied himself to the business in a way that the Claimant did not and that on that basis, Mr Irvine had his contract converted to a permanent contract.

[120]Ms Ellis’s unchallenged evidence was that the Claimant’s contract was not renewed due to performance and capability concerns, namely:120.1 less cases were being solved by the Claimant compared to others such as Mr Irvine who was working the same hours as her and also on a fixed term contract;

120.2 her style of work was slower and inefficient; and

120.3 the HR Business Partners found it difficult to work with her due to the response times and her being very critical of others. This tended to make others who worked with her uncomfortable.

[121]The Claimant’s evidence (which in part commented on Ms Ellis’s evidence) challenged those assertions but the Claimant did not participate in the hearing long enough to put those challenges to Ms Ellis so that the tribunal could hear what Ms Ellis had to say in response.

[122]Ms Ellis’s unchallenged evidence was that she never retracted any statement that the Claimant could apply for vacancies.

[123]A collective grievance was submitted on 6 September 2021 by a number of people: Ms Stephenson, Ms McKoy, Ms Scott and the Claimant, which was said to concern equal pay. Two of the complainants were fixed term employees (the Claimant and Ms Scott at that time). Two of the complainants were permanent employees (Ms Stephenson and Ms McKoy). Three of the complaints were black (the Claimant, Ms Stephenson and Ms McKoy); one was white (Ms Scott).

[124]According to Ms Ellis’s unchallenged evidence, the collective grievance was not upheld. It had been previously raised informally (specifically by Ms Stephenson) long before the Claimant starting her employment with the Respondent. The outcome letter to the Claimant is dated 3 November 2021. The complainants wished to compare their grade 10 roles with a role of ‘schools and education business advisor’ paid at a higher Grade 12 (and who, the Claimant says, are entitled to 2 months’ notice, as opposed to the 1 month entitlement at Grade 10). No male comparator was identified. The two roles were evaluated by Havering Borough Council who concluded that the ‘schools and education business advisor’ role should have been evaluated at the same grade as the Claimant’s role (Grade 10). The Claimant’s witness statement at paragraph 369 states that the Havering Job evaluator confirmed that the posts should be Grade 12 - but the letter of 3 November, which is in the bundle, states “both roles were evaluated at a Grade 10. What this appears to demonstrate is that you have, in fact, been paid correctly but the Grade 12 positions within schools have been overpaid . . . I am therefore unable to uphold your grievance.”

[125]The Claimant does not consider that an adequate fair process was followed. However, there was no appeal against the collective grievance outcome.

[126]On 7 September 2021, the Claimant emailed Ms Anel indicating that she would be handing over to Ms Stephenson on 17 September 2021 (in view of her fixed term contract being about to expire) and that she would be taking TOIL on 20 September 2021 and then would be on annual leave from 21 to 30 September 2021.

[127]On 15 September 2021, the Claimant emailed Ms Stephenson, copied to Ms Anel stating that she would be taking TOIL on 17 September 2021.

[128]On 16 September 2021, Ms Stephenson emailed the Claimant telling her that she had 8.5 days of annual leave to take before her employment ended and asking her to confirm another suitable date for the handover meeting.

[129]On 20 September 2021, the Claimant did not attend a meeting with her line manager to discuss handover of her cases.

[130]On 21 September 2021, the Claimant attended an induction meeting.

[131]Ms Ellis gave unchallenged evidence that it was unreasonable on the part of the Claimant to attend an induction meeting rather than prioritise her handover.

[132]On 21 September 2021, Jacqueline Anel (HR Business Partner) sent an email to the Claimant, copied to Ms Stephenson and Ms Ellis which stated: “Many thanks for your e-mail to let us know that you that were at Corporate Induction this morning. I am aware that you are entitled to 8.5 days leave until your last day of service the 30 September 2021, however, as we have not had your leave request through iTrent, the LBR policy is that employees take all their accrued/outstanding leave prior to the last day of service and therefore, you are now currently in this leave period. Nicole e-mailed you and scheduled a meeting on the 20 September 2021 at 11.30am to discuss your handover, Nicole has advised that you did not join the meeting. It is unfortunate that the meeting did not take place on the 20 September 2021. However, as you now in your annual leave entitlement period, we need to make arrangements for you to return your LBR laptop, ID cards and any other LBR property." If it helps, I will be at Lynton House tomorrow from 9am to 11.45am, Floor 8, please could you come along to Lynton House between this time to handover the items to me. If this is not convenient please let me know by return e-mail of a convenient date and time for the handover of the equipment.

[133]In her witness statement, the Claimant stated that this email effectively placed her on garden leave. I did not understand this perspective, given that the Claimant had already told the Respondent that she would be on annual leave from 21 to 30 September 2021. Between Wednesday 22 September and Thursday 30 September (inclusive) there were 7 working days. The Claimant was therefore ending her employment with 1.5 annual leave days outstanding.

[134]Ms Stephenson gave evidence that it was normal practice at the Respondent to require people who were leaving the organisation to use up their annual leave.

[135]The Claimant complains about being excluded in the period after 22 September – but the Claimant’s employment with the Respondent had now effectively come to an end, given that she was covering the last 7 days of her employment with annual leave.

[136]On 24 September 2021, Ms Stephenson told the Claimant by email that there would be a Teams meeting concerning the collective grievance on 28 September 2021. The Claimant had not been included in the Teams invite sent by Lynn Lane (Assistant Director of HR). The Claimant contacted Ms Lane asking for an invite and the Claimant subsequently attended the meeting.

[137]On 24 September 2021, the Claimant emailed Jacqueline Anel, copying Ms Stephenson and Ms Ellis stating that Ms Anel’s original email to the Claimant had been copied to people other than Ms Stephenson and Ms Ellis but that it had been removed from the Claimant’s inbox; and asking that it be put back in the Claimant’s inbox. Ms Anel replied enclosing all recent emails to the Claimant since 13 September 2021. Ms Anel during the subsequent grievance investigation denied having removed the email from the Claimant’s inbox. Ms Ellis’s unchallenged evidence to the tribunal was that Ms Anel would not have been able to do so.

[138]At the collective grievance meeting on the morning of 28 September 2021, the Claimant alleges that Ms Lane spoke sharply to her about the fact that the Claimant was taking notes at the meeting and that Ms Lane stated: ‘I hope that you will share your notes as this was an informal discussion’. The Claimant challenged the assertion that it was an informal meeting. The Claimant states that she considered Ms Lane to have spoken in ‘an aggressive and very intimidating manner’. The Claimant did not question Ms Ellis (who was at the meeting) on Ms Lane’s tone – or as to whether Ms Ellis should have challenged Ms Lane on her tone. Ms McKoy gave evidence that Ms Lane’s comment about taking notes was ‘not said in a nice manner’; and that her manner towards the Claimant at that meeting ‘could be perceived as being hostile’.

[139]The Claimant submitted an individual grievance dated 28 September 2021 [bundle pages 316-319]. It stated: “During my employment I have raised several issues pertaining to my employment and how I have been treated / or what I am experiencing, these issues were raised with the Senior Human Resources Management Team (Rebecca; Lynn and my Manager Nicole Stephenson directly/indirectly). Unfortunately, I am / was subjected to less unfavourable treatment, discriminatory and unlawful conducts/behaviours, different treatment, isolations; segregation; demeaning; violation of my dignity, humiliation; hurt, hostile, oppressive degrading and humiliating work environments. Which has led to my demise. The conduct of the Senior Management Team (and others) can be summoned up either being unable / unwilling to act, act of omissions, failure to act, action or inaction. Which gives rise for concerns, this has led to breaching the Equality Act; Public Authority Equality Duty, Data Protection Act / GDPR, Human Rights Act, Fixed Term Employees (prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations; Health and Safety at Work Act and several Regulatory Codes of Practices. I am not a Human Resources Practitioner who goes out of her way to say something that has not happen and or make things up. It gives me no satisfaction to raise a complaint against my fellow colleagues and I gave it some thought before I decided that to say nothing and to do nothing was not an option. If I didn’t raise my concerns, it would send a message that it’s ok to be treated in this way, it’s not ok. The following is some of the things that I have been subjected to / experienced and it just does not sit well: -• The HR Senior Management and others have obtained information about me, it was published, processed, shared and disclosed. The content / claims that were / has been made is malicious, untrue, false, hurtful, damming, damaging to my reputation/ future employment etc both in the context as human being and as a HR Professional. To date my employer has failed to investigate / substantiate the claims that have been made and or present me with their findings. This has led to me been treated differently by my colleagues and an awkwardness when I am around (virtual / face to face)

• This information was obtained (whether orally / writing) without my consent or knowledge. To date I have not been furnished with a copy of the disclosure and or why it was obtained

• To be placed on public sector blacklist / red flag list is unlawful and discriminatory and to know that my employer is party to such practices gives rise for concern. I consider such conduct / behaviour to be a continue act that has led to my demise

• My concerns in regard to the following matters is threefold

(1) what led up to the meeting and why

(2) Nicole being deliberately misled by Rebecca

(3) what took place during the meeting of 19th August 2021, to say that it gives rise for concerns is an understatement. In attendance at the meeting was Rebecca Ellis and Nicole Stephenson. Here are some examples of what took place, (a) Rebecca told Nicole that I had met with her in regards to my Employment, aspirations etc and she told Nicole what I had said (no such discussion took place and no meeting between Rebecca and myself took place. (Meetings with Rebecca and my other colleagues took place in regard to their employment/contract extensions) (b) Rebecca told me that within Param team there are / was two HR Business Consultants vacancies and that I could apply, within a split-second Rebecca retracted the statement. (c) I asked about my contract extension Rebecca said no, (d) Rebecca said that she did not discuss me with anyone else (that was not true she had and they have confirmed discussions took place and my contract was going to be extended etc) (e) Rebecca also made a statement about me working in the private sector. It would be fair to say that I was uncomfortable, humiliated, hurt, demeaning, awkward, undermined, untruthful statements had been made , misleading and potential I was / had lied (this was not the case) , I was very concern with what was being played out in this forum and also what was running concurrently / and is sitting alongside this. (f) prior to the meeting I was / is concerned about the discussions that have taken place between Rebecca, Lynn, Nicole and the other HRBPs in regards to my employment. which has led up to Nicole instigating several discussions with me that just didn’t sit right.

• All my colleagues have had meetings with Rebecca (fixed term and permanent employees) about their employment, aspirations; contract extensions. But I have not, Rebecca had sent an invite but this was later removed and cancelled by Rebeca no explanation was given. The two fixed term HR Business Consultants contract was extended mine was not

• I have been excluded from meetings, my name being removed from invites, emails being tampered with and adjusted and a general feeling that my email account is being monitored / under surveillance and or being re routed

• I have been asked to attend meetings at the last minute and or told that it’s a catch up meeting / 1-2-1 and when I attend its completely unrelated to the title of the meetings. When I attend these meetings, I have no idea of the purpose of the meetings (either prior to the meeting and or during the meetings). Or the real reasons why they were being convened

• On or around 21st September 21 Jacqueline Anel sent me an email informing me that I was being placed on immediate annual leave, this email was sent to myself and cc to several of my colleagues. Not only was the content of the email in accurate it was also misleading and was one sided. When I went back into my email the original email was removed from my inbox (which had been cc to all of my colleagues) and it was replaced with cc just to Nicole and Rebecca.

• The general conduct / behaviour of some of my colleagues within Human Resources give rise for concerns, for example Andrea had informed us during a team meeting with HR Business Consultants and HRBPs that she had shared an email / discussed with the HRBP’s something about the HR Business Consultants and when I asked her to provide us with a copy, she said she would. To date this remains outstanding, and I have not been furnished with a copy of this email. This email and or the content has been shared with Lynn and Rebecca

• My contract of employment, inclusive of the terms and conditions have been unilateral varied without consultation and in addition the restructuring of the HRBP’s and HR Business Consultant reporting lines etc was changed without consultations

• I was the lead in two ER cases within Early Years and Child Care Team and during my involvement it came to light there were several concerns inclusive of TUPE arrangements for this team who were/ is going to be transferring to the School. As this area of work sat with the HRBP’s. I had sent out an invite to my HR colleagues inviting them to attend a meeting with the Service Manager and Head of Operations, two of my colleagues did not respond to the email and or acknowledge my email. So, the meeting did not take place. I was later informed during a team meeting by Shoyeb Osbourne that the HR Senior Management team had attended a meeting(s) and did I want to add anything, however I was not invited to the meeting (s) and or made aware that a meeting or meetings had taken place. Or that further meetings will be taking place. Nor was I asked to attend / participate or contribute (after events)

• There is a highly visible and noticeable difference in the treatment between the HRBP’s and the HR Business Consultants and even when there are shortfalls when carrying out HR activities one group is elevated and protected, and the other group is not availed such treatment (HR Business Consultants)

• At no time during my employment have I been made aware that my employer has received any complaints (orally / writing) about me or about my practices / behaviour that may give rise for concerns. (if they have I have not been informed/ provided with copies of any complaints that they may have)

• I am a professional Human Resources Professional, who happens to be black and female and yes, my reputation and life does matter. In order to ensure impartially, fairness, openness / transparency, the principal of natural justice being prevailed I am requesting that my grievance is facilitated externally by an individual(s) or an organisation(s) who are subject matter experts on Equality, Defamation and Human rights. It would not be reasonable of fair for my grievance to be heard and or facilitated in house as it is important that a separation of power is maintained and at the forefront that an open and transparent process is maintained, and that line of boundaries are not blurred or in conflict. Should my employer not extend my contract of employment, I would like to proceed with my grievance after my employment comes to an end 30th September 2021 and this is in accordance with their policies and procedures. The expected outcome : 1 I am treated with dignty, fairness equality, respectful, open and in transparent manner 2 my contract of employment is extended and i am treated in the same way as my two HR Business Conultants who are also on fixed term contracts and have had their contracts extended 3 I am treated in the same way at the permanent employees inclusive of two HR Business Consultants 4 Should any of my concerns be upheld that my employer invokes appopriate policies and procedures 5 That external interventions is put in place in order to address the issues that i have raised and that a corecive and collaborative HR team is built, develop and is able to recognise culture differences and able to enbrace these differences 6 That LBR follows it's Policies/Procedures, Employment / leglisations, Regulations, Regulatory Codes of Practices and is in line with their ED & I Agenda and which is demonstrated / evidenced within their practices and behaviours”

[140]When the Claimant attended the office on 30 September 2021 to hand back the Respondent’s property to Ms Stephenson, her entry pass had already been cancelled, which the Claimant felt was humiliating and embarrassing.

[141]On 5 October 2021 [bundle pages 879], the Claimant asked that her IT account be retained including her folders in the shared drive; and that emails sent / received by individuals identified in her grievance also be retained (in light of the ongoing grievance) – with specific reference made to the fact that Ms Stephenson would be leaving the Respondent imminently. The Claimant also requested copies of all documents set out in her grievance ‘no later than 13/10/21’.

[142]The Claimant also requested written reasons within 21 days for less favourable treatment that she received as a fixed term employee under the 2002 Fixed Term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations (without specifying the nature of the less favourable treatment); and payment for 1.5 days outstanding leave. I have seen no evidence that the Respondent responded to that request.

[143]The Claimant on the same date made a written request to Ms Stephenson [bundle 881] asking for copies of communications and other materials relevant to the Claimant and a signed witness statement regarding discussions with Ms Ellis prior to the meeting on 19 August 2021; and about that meeting; and about discussion with Ms Anel regarding the Claimant’s leave / handover; and in regard to discussions with Ms Lane and Ms Anel concerning the Claimant’s employment and contract extension. The Claimant also asked Ms Stephenson to retain relevant documents. Ms Stephenson responded suggesting that the Claimant make a SAR.

[144]Ms Stephenson left the Respondent at the end of October 2021.

[145]The Claimant’s grievance was investigated including a meeting with the Claimant on 25 November 2021 (and also meetings with Ms Scott, Ms Ellis, Ms Lane and Ms McKoy). Ms Stephenson was not interviewed.

[146]The Claimant’s claim form was presented on 21 January 2022 and is confined to matters up to that date.

[147]The Claimant’s grievance allegations were not upheld. This was communicated to the Claimant on 24 February 2022. The conclusions were very briefly set out. The Claimant appealed. In a letter concerning the appeal dated 18 May 2022 [bundle page 466], the Respondent noted that she had been sent documents relevant to the appeal but that there was no obligation to share other documents. An appeal outcome was sent to her dated 31 May 2022. The appeal was not upheld. This was also expressed very briefly. The Claimant considers that the grievance and appeal process was fundamentally flawed and was unduly protracted.

[148]During the grievance investigation process, on 19 December 2021, the investigator asked the Claimant to provide answers to a number of questions including what the nature of the information was that the Claimant alleged had been shared about her; and why the Claimant considered that she had been placed on a blacklist. The Claimant’s answers to those questions were uninformative – largely referring the questioner back to the Claimant’s grievance record form.

[149]Notably the Claimant when questioning Ms Stephenson, who had not been a fixed term employee at that time, did not ask her to comment on whether race or blacklisting or fixed term employment status were reasons for any treatment of the Claimant. The Claimant did not put to Ms Stephenson that the making of protected disclosures by the Claimant led to the non-renewal of the Claimant’s fixed term contract – despite alleging in the Claimant’s own oral evidence (after Ms Stephenson had given her evidence) that Ms Stephenson was one of those responsible for treating her poorly as a result of the protected disclosure. None of these matters were put to Ms Ellis by the Claimant.

[150]Ms Scott commented in her evidence that she had been a fixed term employee and that she was made permanent and that she considered that everyone was treated exactly the same way (she had also made such comments when interviewed as part of the Claimant’s grievance). She also stated that everyone knew about the new structure and that emails were sent to them all.

[151]Ms McKoy gave evidence that she was a permanent employee. The Claimant did ask her if ‘we all faced race discrimination’ and also asked Ms McKoy to comment on the treatment of black employees compared to Asian employees. Ms McKoy’s answers were non-committal. Ms McKoy felt that they were not consulted on the restructure – just informed. Ms McKoy was of the view that Ms Stephenson had not been treated well (in particular given the short notice of the end of her period of acting up); and she repeated an assertion that all of those who had submitted the collective grievance were not treated well. Ms McKoy also felt that the HR Business Consultants were not respected as much as the HR Business Partners – and that Ms Stephenson was spoken down to including by the previous manager before Ms Ellis. Ms McKoy suggested that Ms Scott (who is white) was not treated in the same manner as the others involved in the collective grievance (who are all black). However when the Claimant asked Ms McKoy why she thought that was, Ms McKoy said ‘who knows’ – she did not refer to race. The Law Direct Race Discrimination

The Law

[152]The relevant sections of the Equality Act 2010 state: 13 Direct discrimination(1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others. (5) If the protected characteristic is race, less favourable treatment includes segregating B from others. 23 Comparison by reference to circumstances (1) On a comparison of cases for the purposes of section 13, 14, or 19 there must be no material difference between the circumstances relating to each case. 123 Time limits (1) Subject to sections 140A and 140B, Proceedings on a complaint within section 120 may not be brought after the end of— (a) the period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or (b) such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable. (3) For the purposes of this section— (a) conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period; (b) failure to do something is to be treated as occurring when the person in question decided on it. (4) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a person (P) is to be taken to decide on failure to do something— (a) when P does an act inconsistent with doing it, or (b) if P does no inconsistent act, on the expiry of the period in which P might reasonably have been expected to do it. 136 Burden of proof (1) This section applies to any proceedings relating to a contravention of this Act.

(2) If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred.

(3) But subsection (2) does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the provision.

(4) The reference to a contravention of this Act includes a reference to a breach of an equality clause or rule.

[153]An employee can suffer a detriment if a reasonable worker would or might take the view that they have been disadvantaged in the circumstances in which they had to work. However, an unjustified sense of grievance is not sufficient to establish a detriment (Shamoon v Chief Constable RUC

[2003] UKHL 11

[154]If a Claimant can establish a prima facie case of direct discrimination – which requires ‘something more’ than a difference in treatment and a difference in protected characteristic, then the burden passes to the Respondent to provide an adequate non-discriminatory explanation for its actions.

[155]It is very unusual to find direct evidence of discrimination. Motivation can be conscious or subconscious. A tribunal is not looking for the sole or principal reason for the Respondent’s actions – only whether the protected characteristic had a significant influence on the outcome. A tribunal can draw inferences not only from the specific incidents and acts detailed in the claimant’s claim taken in isolation but also from the full factual background of the claim, including evidence about the conduct of the respondent before and after the act about which the complaint is made including during the litigation itself. However a finding of unreasonable behaviour will not automatically lead to a finding of direct discrimination. Whistleblowing Automatic Unfair Dismissal

[156]The relevant sections of the Employment Rights Act 2010 state: 43A Meaning of “protected disclosure” In this Act a “protected disclosure” means a qualifying disclosure (as defined by section 43B) which is made by a worker in accordance with any of sections 43C to 43H.] 43B Disclosures qualifying for protection (1) In this Part a “qualifying disclosure” means any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show one or more of the following— (a) that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed, (b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject, (c) that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur, (d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered, (e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or (f) that information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding paragraphs has been, or is likely to be deliberately concealed. 95 Circumstances in which an employee is dismissed (1) For the purposes of this Part an employee is dismissed by his employer if (and, subject to subsection (2) …, only if)— (b) he is employed under a limited-term contract and that contract terminates by virtue of the limiting event without being renewed under the same contract, or 103A Protected disclosure An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes of this Part as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employee made a protected disclosure.

[157]It is not relevant whether a disclosure made by Claimant is true. What is important is whether she subjectively believes that the information disclosed tends to show that the relevant failure has occurred or is likely to occur and that her belief is, in the tribunal's view, objectively reasonable (Babula v Waltham Forest College

[2007] IRLR 346

(CA).

[158]In a case, such as this, where the employee lacks the 2 year qualifying service, to bring an ordinary unfair dismissal claim, the Claimant has the burden of showing the reason for dismissal (Kuzel v Roche

[2008] IRLR 530

). However such cases rarely turn on the application of the burden of proof.

[159]A tribunal can draw inferences from findings of fact in determining the reason for dismissal. Employment Relations Act (Blacklists) Regulations 2010

[160]The relevant parts of the Regulations state: 3 General prohibition(1) Subject to regulation 4, no person shall compile, use, sell or supply a prohibited list.

(2) A “'prohibited list'” is a list which— (a) contains details of persons who are or have been members of trade unions or persons who are taking part or have taken part in the activities of trade unions, and (b) is compiled with a view to being used by employers or employment agencies for the purposes of discrimination in relation to recruitment or in relation to the treatment of workers.

(3) “'Discrimination'” means treating a person less favourably than another on grounds of trade union membership or trade union activities.

(4) In these Regulations references to membership of a trade union include references to— (a) membership of a particular branch or section of a trade union, and (b) membership of one of a number of particular branches or sections of a trade union; and references to taking part in the activities of a trade union have a corresponding meaning. 9 Detriment (1) A person (P) has a right of complaint to an employment tribunal against P's employer (D) if D, by any act or any deliberate failure to act, subjects P to a detriment for a reason which relates to a prohibited list, and either— (a) D contravenes regulation 3 in relation to that list, or (b) D— (i) relies on information supplied by a person who contravenes that regulation in relation to that list, and (ii) knows or ought reasonably to know that information relied on is supplied in contravention of that regulation. (2) If there are facts from which the tribunal could conclude, in the absence of any other explanation, that D contravened regulation 3 or relied on information supplied in contravention of that regulation, the tribunal must find that such a contravention or reliance on information occurred unless D shows that it did not. (3) This regulation does not apply where the detriment in question amounts to the dismissal of an employee within the meaning in Part 10 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

[161]Section 104F of the Employment Rights Act 1996 states: 104F Blacklists(1) An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes of this Part as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal relates to a prohibited list, and either— (a) the employer contravenes regulation 3 of the 2010 Regulations in relation to that prohibited list, or (b) the employer— (i) relies on information supplied by a person who contravenes that regulation in relation to that list, and (ii) knows or ought reasonably to know that the information relied on is supplied in contravention of that regulation.

(2) If there are facts from which the tribunal could conclude, in the absence of any other explanation, that the employer— (a) contravened regulation 3 of the 2010 Regulations, or (b) relied on information supplied in contravention of that regulation, the tribunal must find that such a contravention or reliance on information occurred, unless the employer shows that it did not.

(3) In this section— “the 2010 Regulations” means the Employment Relations Act 1999 (Blacklists) Regulations 2010, and “prohibited list” has the meaning given in those Regulations (see regulation 3(2)).

[162]The list of issues did not specifically refer to section 104F Employment Rights Act 1996 but given that Regulation 9(3) excluded dismissal from the definition of ‘detriment’ and given that section 95(1)(b) includes non-renewal of a fixed term contract as a form of dismissal, I considered section 104F in the alternative. Fixed-term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2002

[163]The relevant parts of the Regulations state: 2 Comparable employees(1) For the purposes of these Regulations, an employee is a comparable permanent employee in relation to a fixed-term employee if, at the time when the treatment that is alleged to be less favourable to the fixed-term employee takes place, (a) both employees are— (i) employed by the same employer, and (ii) engaged in the same or broadly similar work having regard, where relevant, to whether they have a similar level of qualification and skills; and (b) the permanent employee works or is based at the same establishment as the fixedterm employee or, where there is no comparable permanent employee working or based at that establishment who satisfies the requirements of sub-paragraph (a), works or is based at a different establishment and satisfies those requirements.

(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1), an employee is not a comparable permanent employee if his employment has ceased. 3 Less favourable treatment of fixed-term employees (1) A fixed-term employee has the right not to be treated by his employer less favourably than the employer treats a comparable permanent employee— (a) as regards the terms of his contract; or (b) by being subjected to any other detriment by any act, or deliberate failure to act, of his employer. (2) Subject to paragraphs (3) and (4), the right conferred by paragraph (1) includes in particular the right of the fixed-term employee in question not to be treated less favourably than the employer treats a comparable permanent employee in relation to— (a) any period of service qualification relating to any particular condition of service, (b) the opportunity to receive training, or (c) the opportunity to secure any permanent position in the establishment.

(3) The right conferred by paragraph (1) applies only if— (a) the treatment is on the ground that the employee is a fixed-term employee, and (b) the treatment is not justified on objective grounds.

(4) Paragraph (3)(b) is subject to regulation 4.

(5) In determining whether a fixed-term employee has been treated less favourably than a comparable permanent employee, the pro rata principle shall be applied unless it is inappropriate.

(6) In order to ensure that an employee is able to exercise the right conferred by paragraph (1) as described in paragraph (2)(c) the employee has the right to be informed by his employer of available vacancies in the establishment.

(7) For the purposes of paragraph (6) an employee is “informed by his employer” only if the vacancy is contained in an advertisement which the employee has a reasonable opportunity of reading in the course of his employment or the employee is given reasonable notification of the vacancy in some other way. Main Menu Sub-menu 4 Objective justification (1) Where a fixed-term employee is treated by his employer less favourably than the employer treats a comparable permanent employee as regards any term of his contract, the treatment in question shall be regarded for the purposes of regulation 3(3)(b) as justified on objective grounds if the terms of the fixed-term employee's contract of employment, taken as a whole, are at least as favourable as the terms of the comparable permanent employee's contract of employment. (2) Paragraph (1) is without prejudice to the generality of regulation 3(3)(b). 5 Right to receive a written statement of reasons for less favourable treatment (1) If an employee who considers that his employer may have treated him in a manner which infringes a right conferred on him by regulation 3 requests in writing from his employer a written statement giving particulars of the reasons for the treatment, the employee is entitled to be provided with such a statement within twenty-one days of his request. (2) A written statement under this regulation is admissible as evidence in any proceedings under these Regulations. (3) If it appears to the tribunal in any proceedings under these Regulations— (a) that the employer deliberately, and without reasonable excuse, omitted to provide a written statement, or (b) that the written statement is evasive or equivocal, it may draw any inference which it considers it just and equitable to draw, including an inference that the employer has infringed the right in question. (4) This regulation does not apply where the treatment in question consists of the dismissal of an employee, and the employee is entitled to a written statement of reasons for his dismissal under section 92 of the 1996 Act. 7 Complaints to employment tribunals etc (1) An employee may present a complaint to an employment tribunal that his employer has infringed a right conferred on him by regulation 3, or (subject to regulation 6(5)), regulation 6(2). (2) Subject to paragraph (3), an employment tribunal shall not consider a complaint under this regulation unless it is presented before the end of the period of three months beginning— (a) in the case of an alleged infringement of a right conferred by regulation 3(1) or 6(2), with the date of the less favourable treatment or detriment to which the complaint relates or, where an act or failure to act is part of a series of similar acts or failures comprising the less favourable treatment or detriment, the last of them; (b) in the case of an alleged infringement of the right conferred by regulation 3(6), with the date, or if more than one the last date, on which other individuals, whether or not employees of the employer, were informed of the vacancy. (2A) Regulation 7A (extension of time limits to facilitate conciliation before institution of proceedings) applies for the purposes of paragraph (2). ( (3) A tribunal may consider any such complaint which is out of time if, in all the circumstances of the case, it considers that it is just and equitable to do so. (4) For the purposes of calculating the date of the less favourable treatment or detriment under paragraph (2)(a)— (a) where a term in a contract is less favourable, that treatment shall be treated, subject to paragraph (b), as taking place on each day of the period during which the term is less favourable; (b) a deliberate failure to act contrary to regulation 3 or 6(2) shall be treated as done when it was decided on. (5) In the absence of evidence establishing the contrary, a person shall be taken for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b) to decide not to act— (a) when he does an act inconsistent with doing the failed act; or (b) if he has done no such inconsistent act, when the period expires within which he might reasonably have been expected to have done the failed act if it was to be done. (6) Where an employee presents a complaint under this regulation in relation to a right conferred on him by regulation 3 or 6(2) it is for the employer to identify the ground for the less favourable treatment or detriment.

[164]Section 92 of the ERA 1996 states: 92 Right to written statement of reasons for dismissal(1) An employee is entitled to be provided by his employer with a written statement giving particulars of the reasons for the employee's dismissal— (a) if the employee is given by the employer notice of termination of his contract of employment, (b) if the employee's contract of employment is terminated by the employer without notice, or (c) if the employee is employed under a limited-term contract and the contract terminates by virtue of the limiting event without being renewed under the same contract.

(2) Subject to subsections (4) and (4A), an employee is entitled to a written statement under this section only if he makes a request for one; and a statement shall be provided within fourteen days of such a request.

(3) Subject to subsections (4) and (4A), an employee is not entitled to a written statement under this section unless on the effective date of termination he has been, or will have been, continuously employed for a period of not less than two years ending with that date.

[165]I note that the Claimant has not suggested that the failure to renew her fixed term contract amounted to either a detriment under Regulation 3 or a separate claim of automatic unfair dismissal under Regulation 6.

[166]I note that the Respondent has not sought to rely on justification.

[167]My reading of Regulation 5(4) with Section 92(3) is that the right to request reasons under Regulation 5 does apply to the Claimant because she did not have a right to request reasons under section 92, because she did not have 2 years of qualifying service. The Claimant can therefore seek to rely on a failure to supply a written statement or an evasive or equivocal statement in asking a tribunal to draw inferences that may lead to a conclusion that the Respondent has infringed her rights under Regulation 3.

[168]A less favourable treatment comparison under Regulation 3 requires an actual comparator (i.e. not a hypothetical comparator).

[169]To find less favourable treatment, a tribunal has to find that the treatment was ‘on the ground that the employee is a fixed-term employee’ (Regulation 3(3)(a)). The burden of proving the reason for any less favourable treatment is on the Respondent following Regulation 7(6). This means that there is an inference that the treatment in question is on the ground of an employee’s fixed-term status, which can be displaced if the employer provides satisfactory evidence of some other reason.

[170]In light of the uncertainty in the law in this area – in the parallel field of part time worker discrimination – soon to be addressed by the Supreme Court in Augustine v Data Cars which was reported in the Court of Appeal at

[2025] EWCA Civ 638

, I have considered both whether fixed term status is the ‘sole’ reason for any less favourable treatment (with reference to the word ‘solely’ being used in the EU Fixed-term Work Directive (No.99/70) which the 2002 Regulations were originally intended to implement; and also whether it is a ‘effective and predominant cause’ (which is the test preferred but not actually adopted by the EAT and the Court of Appeal). ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures

[171]The ACAS Code does not give rise to any rights in itself. However it should be taken into consideration by tribunals when considering relevant cases. It expressly states that it is not applicable to the non-renewal of fixed term contracts – but that does not mean that it is not potentially relevant to at least parts of the grievances brought by the Claimant. Written particulars of employment

[172]Section 1 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 states: 1.— Statement of initial employment particulars.(1) Where a worker begins employment with an employer, the employer shall give to the worker a written statement of particulars of employment.

(2) Subject to sections 2(2) to (4)— (a) the particulars required by subsections (3) and (4) must be included in a single document; and (b) the statement must be given not later than the beginning of the employment.

(3) The statement shall contain particulars of— (a) the names of the employer and worker , (b) the date when the employment began, and (c) in the case of a statement given to an employee, the date on which the employee's period of continuous employment began (taking into account any employment with a previous employer which counts towards that period).

(4) The statement shall also contain particulars, as at a specified date not more than seven days before the statement (or the instalment of a statement given under section 2(4) containing them) is given, of— (a) the scale or rate of remuneration or the method of calculating remuneration, (b) the intervals at which remuneration is paid (that is, weekly, monthly or other specified intervals), (c) any terms and conditions relating to hours of work including any terms and conditions relating to— (i) normal working hours, (ii) the days of the week the worker is required to work, and (iii) whether or not such hours or days may be variable, and if they may be how they vary or how that variation is to be determined, (d) any terms and conditions relating to any of the following— (i) entitlement to holidays, including public holidays, and holiday pay (the particulars given being sufficient to enable the worker's entitlement, including any entitlement to accrued holiday pay on the termination of employment, to be precisely calculated), (ii) incapacity for work due to sickness or injury, including any provision for sick pay, (iia) any other paid leave, and (iii) pensions and pension schemes, (da) any other benefits provided by the employer that do not fall within another paragraph of this subsection, (e) the length of notice which the worker is obliged to give and entitled to receive to terminate his contract of employment or other worker's contract, (f) the title of the job which the worker is employed to do or a brief description of the work for which he is employed, (g) where the employment is not intended to be permanent, the period for which it is expected to continue or, if it is for a fixed term, the date when it is to end, (ga) any probationary period, including any conditions and its duration, (h) either the place of work or, where the worker is required or permitted to work at various places, an indication of that and of the address of the employer, (j) any collective agreements which directly affect the terms and conditions of the employment including, where the employer is not a party, the persons by whom they were made, (k) where the worker is required to work outside the United Kingdom for a period of more than one month— (i) the period for which he is to work outside the United Kingdom, (ii) the currency in which remuneration is to be paid while he is working outside the United Kingdom, (iii) any additional remuneration payable to him, and any benefits to be provided to or in respect of him, by reason of his being required to work outside the United Kingdom, and (iv) any terms and conditions relating to his return to the United Kingdom, (l) any training entitlement provided by the employer, (m) any part of that training entitlement which the employer requires the worker to complete, and (n) any other training which the employer requires the worker to complete and which the employer will not bear the cost of.

(5) Subsection (4)(d)(iii) does not apply to a worker of a body or authority if— (a) the worker's pension rights depend on the terms of a pension scheme established under any provision contained in or having effect under any Act, and (b) any such provision requires the body or authority to give to a new worker information concerning the worker's pension rights or the determination of questions affecting those rights.

(6) In this section "probationary period" means a temporary period specified in the contract of employment or other worker's contract between a worker and an employer that— (a) commences at the beginning of the employment, and (b) is intended to enable the employer to assess the worker's suitability for the employment.

[173]The section has been in that form since April 2020. Previously the statement of particulars had to be given to employees within 2 months of their start date.

[174]Section 38 of the Employment Act 2002 states: 38 Failure to give statement of employment particulars etc(1) This section applies to proceedings before an employment tribunal relating to a claim by an employee under any of the jurisdictions listed in Schedule 5.

(2) If in the case of proceedings to which this section applies— (a) the employment tribunal finds in favour of the employee, but makes no award to him in respect of the claim to which the proceedings relate, and (b) when the proceedings were begun the employer was in breach of his duty to the employee under section 1(1) or 4(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (c 18) (duty to give a written statement of initial employment particulars or of particulars of change) [or under section 41B or 41C of that Act (duty to give a written statement in relation to rights not to work on Sunday)], the tribunal must, subject to subsection (5), make an award of the minimum amount to be paid by the employer to the employee and may, if it considers it just and equitable in all the circumstances, award the higher amount instead.

[175]The amount of compensation which can be awarded under section 38 of the 2002 Act is between 2 to 4 weeks pay.

[176]The power to award compensation given to tribunals in section 38 of the 2002 Act does not require a Claimant to have set out a specific claim in their claim form. However, the power is only in relation to a failure to provide employment particulars when the proceedings were begun. It does not therefore apply to the Claimant’s case because, although the Respondent has admitted that they were supplied late, the particulars had been supplied to her on 24 August 2021, prior to the presentation of the claim form on 21 January 2022.

[177]That does not stop the Claimant from relying on the failure to supply the statement of particulars as a detriment in the direct race discrimination claim and less favourable treatment on ground that she was a fixed-term employee.

Conclusions

[178]The conclusions on the list of issues were as follows (the order has necessarily been changed – but the numbering from the list of issues is retained below): 4. Protected disclosure4.1 Did the claimant make one or more qualifying disclosures as defined in section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996? The Tribunal will decide:4.1.1 What did the claimant say or write? When? To whom? The claimant says she made the following disclosure (I have quoted what the claimant says because despite seeking clarification I remained unclear what the disclosure was) 4.1.1.1 “The potential risk to the respondent, a school and a limited company in relation to the procurement of services to the school that could breach TUPE and notification to OFSTED and the LBR policies and procedures with potential financial ramifications to the school and the respondent” (sic)

4.1.2 The claimant says she made this disclosure on:4.1.2.1 9 July 2021,

4.1.2.2 15 July 2021,

4.1.2.3 19 July 2021,

4.1.2.4 20 July 2021, and

4.1.2.5 21 July 2021.

4.1.3 The claimant says that on each of the above occasions she disclosed to:

4.1.4 The claimant says that on 20 and 21 July she also disclosed to Colin Stewart and Emma Vick.

4.1.5 Did she disclose information?

4.1.6 Did she believe the disclosure of information was made in the public interest?

4.1.7 Was that belief reasonable?

4.1.8 Did s/he believe it tended to show that:4.1.8.1 a criminal offence had been, was being or was likely to be committed;

4.1.8.2 a person had failed, was failing or was likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation?

4.1.9 Was that belief reasonable?

• Jacqueline Anel,

• Parminder Billing,

• Rebecca Ellis,

• Kelsey Morris,

• Nicole Stevenson,

• Kenny Scott and

• Shoham Osborne.

4.2 If the claimant made a qualifying disclosure, it was a protected disclosure because it was made to the claimant’s employer.

[179]It was surprisingly difficult to establish what the Claimant says that she disclosed and when and to whom. I was satisfied that she had made relevant communications verbally and in writing on 20 July 2021 to Ms Ellis (given the reference in the Claimant’s email to Ms Ellis of the same date following their meeting that day). I was also satisfied that the Claimant had made a relevant communication by email on 21 July 2021 to Kelsey Morris, Nicole Stephenson, Paramjit Binning, Jacqueline Anel, copied to Ms Ellis, which Ms Morris says in her reply to the Claimant had been forwarded to Colin Stewart and later that day part of a chain forwarded by the Claimant to Emma Vick. I find that those communications (taken individually and in particular taken together) disclosed information about a misuse of the interplay between TUPE and the extension of an employee’s fixed term contract for a further 6 months. Although I did accept that other verbal conversations including the Claimant took place which touched upon those issues and that such conversations would have helped the recipients of the 20 and 21 July communications to understand what the Claimant was trying to convey, I was not able to conclude that any other specific verbal communication conveyed information in a manner that potentially qualified as a protected disclosure.

[180]I was content that the Claimant did subjectively believe that her the information she conveyed on 20 and 21 July 2021 tended to show a breach of a legal obligation. Her belief that the TUPE / 6 month extension was unlawful may not have been correct – but I accept that she considered it to be correct. Similarly her belief that there was a risk of being criticised by Ofsted or breaching Ofsted requirements may not have actually identified a breach of a legal obligation but I accept that she believed that it did.

[181]I find that it was reasonable for the Claimant to have that belief.

[182]Given the nature of the disclosures and the fact that a local authority and a school were involved, I accept that the Claimant believed that her disclosures were made in the public interest (in that the public interest formed a part of her motivation).

[183]I find that it was reasonable for the Claimant to have that belief.

[184]It is not in dispute that the disclosures were made to the Claimant’s employer.

[185]The disclosures were therefore protected disclosures. 2. Unfair dismissal (protected disclosure) 2.1 Was the reason or principal reason for dismissal that the claimant made a protected disclosure? If so, the claimant will be regarded as unfairly dismissed.

[186]It was not put to Ms Ellis that she or anyone else decided not to renew the Claimant’s contract by sole or principal reason of the making of protected disclosures.

[187]Ms Ellis explained in her evidence that the non-renewal of the Claimant’s contract (or failure to give her a permanent contract) was done because of the attitude of the Claimant towards the Respondent and Ms Ellis’s unchallenged evidence was that: the criteria applied for extension of contracts was “performance, performing a broader role beyond just the casework, integrating into the team, and satisfactory customer satisfaction.”; and that the Claimant did not apply herself to the business in the way that others had done; and that her contract was not renewed due to performance and capability concerns, namely fewer cases being solved by the Claimant compared to others; and her style of work being slower and inefficient; and the HR Business Partners finding it difficult to work with the Claimant due to the response times and her being very critical of others, which tended to make others who worked with her uncomfortable.

[188]Had the Claimant continued to participate in the hearing, she could have challenged Ms Ellis on those assertions but as they were not challenged, I accept them as being the reason for the non-renewal of the fixed term contract. I find that the making of the protected disclosures was not the reason or principal reason for the non-renewal of the fixed term contract.

[189]It follows that the claim for automatic unfair dismissal (protected disclosures) under s103A Employment Rights Act 1996 fails and is dismissed. 5. Direct race discrimination (Equality Act 2010 section 13)5.1 The claimant describes her race as black British.

5.3 Was that less favourable treatment? The Tribunal will decide whether the claimant was treated worse than someone else was treated. There must be no material difference between their circumstances and the claimant’s. If there was nobody in the same circumstances as the claimant, the Tribunal will decide whether s/he was treated worse than someone else would have been treated. The Claimant’s named comparators are: Julian Ellerby- Director of Strategy Rebecca Ellis – Group Director of HR Lynn Lane- Assistant Director of HR Lesley Seary- ex CEO Edith Galliers – Head of Policy, Equalities & Communities Paramjit Binning- HR Business Partner Jacqueline Anel -- HR Business Partner John Irvine - HR Business Consultant Kelsey Morris – Early Years & Child Care Improvement Team Manager Adrea Bradley – ex Group Director of HR Shoyeb Osbourne -- HR Business Partner Inclusion Schools HR Business Consultants LBR12 (Asian women – identified in the Claimant’s witness statement as Samira :Jahangir and Shobhana) Colin Stewart, Operational Director of Education and Inclusion Lyn Downey, HR Business Partner

5.4 If so, was it because of race?

5.5 Did the respondent’s treatment amount to a detriment? 5.2.1 Fail to provide documents to the claimant when she asked for them;

[190]There are material differences between the Claimant and many of the comparators suggested by the Claimant. I therefore considered a hypothetical comparator unless (e.g. in some cases in relation to John Irvine) the comparator suggested was appropriate in which case I considered both that comparator and a hypothetical comparator. During her oral evidence, the Claimant clarified that the documents that she is referring to were the documents requested on 5 October 2021, after her employment with the Respondent had ended. I did not consider that there was any reason that the Respondent should comply with the demand made by the Claimant in her email of 5 October 2021. The Respondent did supply the Claimant with the documents relevant to her grievance / appeal (as noted in the letter concerning the appeal dated 18 May 2022 [bundle page 466]). I did not consider that any hypothetical comparator would have been treated more favourably. I did not consider that any failure to comply with the Claimant’s demand was because of race.

[191]This complaint is not made out given that the Respondent did progress the Claimant’s grievance. It was investigated, a meeting was helped with the Claimant and interviews were conducted with other witnesses, a (terse) outcome letter was provided, the Claimant was given and exercised a right of appeal and a (similarly terse) appeal outcome letter was provided. It may not have been an exemplary process but I did not consider that any hypothetical comparator would have been treated more favourably. I did not consider that any failure to progress the Claimant’s grievance was because of race.

[192]The Claimant did make a request for written reasons on 5 October 2021. The Respondent did fail to respond. The request did not specify the less favourable treatment. The Claimant’s recent grievance dated 28 September 2021 also made reference to the Fixed Term Employee Regulations but also did not make clear which things were said to be less favourable treatment on that basis. The Respondent should have responded, even if just to say that it did not understand the request, but I did not consider that any hypothetical comparator would have been treated more favourably. I did not consider that any failure to comply with the Claimant’s request was because of race. 5.2.4 Fail to pay 1.5 days accrued untaken statutory leave on termination of the claimant’s

[193]The Respondent did fail to pay the Claimant for the 1.5 days that the Respondent now accepts that she was owed at the termination of her employment. The reason for that was not race but that the Respondent’s contracts of employment / statement of terms and conditions state that there is no such entitlement to accrued holiday pay, save in exceptional circumstances. That may not be something that the Respondent is entitled to do, given that such payments are a statutory right, but Ms Stephenson made it clear that pressure to take all outstanding leave before departure was ‘normal’ in the organisation – and there was correspondence to the Claimant prior to her departure which supports that evidence. The Respondent may have been wrong to fail to pay the Claimant – however I did not consider that any hypothetical comparator would have been treated more favourably. I did not consider that any failure to pay the Claimant was because of race.

[194]The Respondent did fail to interview Ms Stephenson as part of the investigation into the Claimant’s grievance. The reason was plainly that Ms Stephenson had left the organisation by the end of October 2021. That does not stop her being contacted – but it is not uncommon for organisations to be wary of getting in touch with former employees. I did not consider that any hypothetical comparator would have been treated more favourably – in the sense that Ms Stephenson would have been contacted if e.g. there was an investigation into a white former fixed term worker’s grievance. I did not consider that any failure to interview the Claimant’s manager was because of race.

[195]This complaint is not made out in the facts. The Respondent did not fail to act. The Claimant was part of a collective grievance about grading. The Respondent had a re-grading exercise conducted by another local authority. The complainants were informed of the outcome. They were given a right of appeal but they did not appeal. The complainants may not have been happy with the outcome but the Respondent did not fail to act. I did not consider that any hypothetical comparator would have been treated more favourably. I did not consider that any failure in relation to the Respondent’s approach to job grading was because of race and I note that one of the 4 complainants was white.

[196]A request was made through the Claimant’s manager for equipment to be sent to her to assist her to work from home. The Respondent did reject this request. The reason for that was that at the time that the request was made, the organisation would agree to items being collected but would not deliver them to employee’s homes. The Claimant asserted that Ms Ellis and Ms Downey (both white) did have such items couriered to them. There was no evidence of this other than the Claimant’s assertion. Ms Stephenson was not able to corroborate the Claimant’s evidence and the allegation was not put to Ms Ellis. I did not consider that there was sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of direct race discrimination. In any event the reason (good or bad) did not appear to be race.

[197]The Claimant was provided with a contract of employment (statement of particulars) on 24 August 2021. She should have received it earlier. She received it not long after raising the issue with Ms Ellis and it was sent with an apology that it had ‘fallen through the cracks’. This was certainly a detriment – and something that the Claimant was concerned about at the time. The Claimant asserted in evidence that her direct comparator John Irvine (white), who started at the same time as her, also as a fixed term HR Business Consultant, told her that he was given a contract of employment in June 2021. There was no documented evidence of this, but I accept the Claimant’s evidence on that point as to what she was told. Therefore, she suffered a detriment, and she was treated less favourably than a white direct comparator. I was not content that the ‘something more’ existed that would have transferred the burden of proof to the Respondent but in any event, on balance, I accepted that the failure to supply the contract was because the Claimant had ‘fallen between the cracks’ which was a non-discriminatory explanation.

[198]The Claimant was informed about the changes to the reporting line and these were discussed with her at the meeting on 19 August 2021. There were no changes to her contract of employment. The Claimant was not treated differently to anyone else. She was not treated less favourably. Race did not play a part.

[199]The Respondent did fail to invite the Claimant to a collective grievance meeting on 28 September 2021. It should have invited her. I find that the reason that she was not invited was because although still technically employed by the organisation, she was using up annual leave prior to her last day of employment on 30 September 2021 and the Respondent was already treating her as a former employee. Her comparators included two other black women (Ms Stephenson and Ms McKoy) as well as one white woman (Ms Scott) who were all invited, which, although not determinative on its own, does not suggest that a white fixed term employee in the same circumstances as the Claimant, who had almost left the organisation, would have been treated more favourably by being invited to the meeting. The Respondent’s failure to invite her may not have been exemplary practice but it was not because of race. In any event, having been alerted to it by Ms Stephenson, the Claimant did attend the meeting.

[200]Both the Claimant and Ms McKoy gave evidence that Ms Lane was hostile at this meeting – in particular when addressing the fact that the Claimant was taking notes. Ms McKoy repeatedly indicated that the Respondent did not treat well those who had brought the collective grievance. I conclude that this (and perhaps a desire not to have an informal meeting recorded), rather than race, was the reason for any poor behaviour by Ms Lane towards the Claimant at this meeting.

[201]The Claimant did not address Ms Ellis’s conduct in her witness statement. Ms Ellis did not address this in her witness statement and the Claimant did not put this matter to Ms Ellis (because she declined to participate in the final day of the hearing). I therefore had insufficient evidence to conclude whether this allegation was made out on the facts.

[202]The dishonesty alleged was the Ms Ellis sought to give the impression that she had had a previous conversation with the Claimant about her aspirations for her role. The Claimant’s cross examination of Ms Ellis did not get as far as the meeting on 19 August 2021 and therefore this matter was not put directly to her. As a result, I do not have sufficient evidence before me to conclude whether this allegation was made out on the facts. I do find on the basis of the unchallenged evidence of Ms Ellis, that the Claimant did give the impression on 19 August 2021, even if she had not done so before, that she was ‘looking forward’ to the day when her contract with the Respondent came to an end.

[203]This was asserted by the Claimant in her witness statement and challenged by the Respondent in cross examination. The Claimant did not put this allegation to Ms Ellis. On 16 August 2021, in an email from Ms Ellis to the Claimant in response to an email on that day from the Claimant asking about her contract / contract extension and the new structure, it was made clear that there would be an upcoming meeting about ‘future plans’. Even if it wasn’t flagged up explicitly, I find that the Claimant must have expected that the purpose of the meeting on 19 August 2021 would have covered those matters, which I find that it did. Therefore, the Claimant did not suffer a detriment. Ms Ellis had an informal approach – the Claimant preferred a formal approach. That difference between them does not indicate that a hypothetical comparator would have been treated differently in relation to the notification for the meeting on 19 August, nor that race played a part in any lack of notification.

[204]I have found that the Claimant was not invited to a meeting or meetings that took place at which the risks that she had identified about TUPE and Ofsted may have been discussed. The Claimant did not put this matter to Ms Ellis and therefore I cannot come to a conclusion as to whether a prima facie case has been made out. I cannot conclude that a hypothetical comparator would have been treated any differently. I cannot conclude that race played any part in this decision.

[205]The Claimant was not placed on annual leave on 21 September 2021. The Claimant had already informed the Respondent on 7 September 2021 that she intended to take leave from 21 September to the end of her contract on 30 September 2021. In fact, the Claimant attended an induction on 21 September 2021. On 21 September 2021, the Claimant’s manager wrote to her referring to her outstanding annual leave entitlement and that the Claimant was ‘in your annual leave entitlement period’. Ms Stephenson gave evidence that it was normal practice at the Respondent to require employees to take their annual leave entitlement before their employment ended. There is no detriment here. In any event, a hypothetical comparator would have been treated in the same way. I do not consider that race played any part in the Claimant being on annual leave at the end of her period of employment.

[206]It follows that all of the Claimant’s claims of direct race discrimination fail and are dismissed. 9. Fixed-term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 9.1 Did the respondent treat the claimant less favourably by:9.1.1 Not providing her with a s.1 ERA statement;

9.1.2 Not dealing with her grievances in a timely manner;

[207]This is linked to the race discrimination allegation. 5.2.8 addressed above. The Claimant was provided with a contract of employment (statement of particulars) on 24 August 2021. She should have received it earlier. She received it not long after raising the issue with Ms Ellis and it was sent with an apology that it had ‘fallen through the cracks’. This was certainly a detriment – and something that the Claimant was concerned about at the time. The Claimant asserted in evidence that John Irvine who was also a fixed term HR Business Consultant, told her that he was given a contract of employment in June 2021. That suggests that any treatment of the Claimant was not on the ground that she was a fixed term employee. I accepted that the failure to supply the contract was because the Claimant had ‘fallen between the cracks’. 9.1.2 Not dealing with her grievances in a timely manner;

[208]This is linked to (but not the same allegation as) race discrimination allegation 5.2.2 addressed above. The Claimant’s grievance was presented on 28 September 2021. It was investigated, a meeting was held with the Claimant on 25 November 2021 and interviews were conducted with other witnesses, a (terse) outcome letter was provided dated 24 February 2022, the Claimant was given and exercised a right of appeal and a (similarly terse) appeal outcome letter was provided dated 31 May 2022. The process was not conducted speedily but it was not egregiously slow nor unusually slow for a local authority grievance process. The Claimant has not named a permanent employee comparator who brought a grievance which was completed more speedily. I did not consider that any failure to proceed more speedily was on grounds of fixed term status. 9.1.3 Failing to pay her the same rate as a comparable permanent employee;

[209]The Claimant was one of 4 people to bring a collective grievance about pay. Two of them were fixed term and two of them were permanent employees. She has not identified permanent employees that were treated more favourably. Given that each of the collective complainants was treated the same way (in relation to pay), I find that fixed term status did not play a part in that treatment. If the comparator permanent employees referred to are those incorrectly graded at Grade 12, then I also find that fixed term status did not play a part in that treatment.

[210]This is linked to race discrimination allegation 5.2.4 addressed above. The Respondent did fail to pay the Claimant for the 1.5 days that the Respondent now accepts that she was owed at the termination of her employment. The reason for that was not her fixed term status but that the Respondent’s contracts of employment / statement of terms and conditions state that there is no such entitlement to accrued holiday pay, save in exceptional circumstances. That may not be something that the Respondent is entitled to do, given that such payments are a statutory right but Ms Stephenson made it clear that pressure to take all outstanding leave before departure was ‘normal’ in the organisation – and there was correspondence to the Claimant prior to her departure which supports that evidence. The Respondent may have been wrong to fail to pay the Claimant but the Claimant has failed to identify a comparator who was treated more favourably and I did not consider that the failure to pay the Claimant was on grounds of fixed term status. 9.1.4 Fail to provide her with documents she asked for;

[211]This is linked to race discrimination allegation 5.2.1 addressed above. During her oral evidence, the Claimant clarified that the documents that she is referring to were the documents requested on 5 October 2021, after her employment with the Respondent had ended. I did not consider that there was any reason that the Respondent should comply with the demand made by the Claimant in her email of 5 October 2021. The Respondent did supply the Claimant with the documents relevant to her grievance / appeal (as noted in the letter concerning the appeal dated 18 May 2022 [bundle page 466]). The Claimant has not identified any comparator who was treated more favourably. I did not consider that any failure to comply with the Claimant’s demand was because of her fixed term status.

[212]This is linked to race discrimination allegation 5.2.3 addressed above. The Claimant did make a request for written reasons on 5 October 2021. The Respondent did fail to respond. The request did not specify the less favourable treatment. The Claimant’s recent grievance dated 28 September 2021 also made reference to the Fixed Term Employee Regulations but also did not make clear which things were said to be less favourable treatment on that basis. The Claimant has failed to identify a comparator who was treated more favourably. I did not consider that any failure to comply with the Claimant’s request was on grounds of fixed term status but rather it was because there was nothing to say.

[213]I also considered whether it would be just and equitable to draw an inference that the Respondent has infringed the Claimant’s Regulation 3 rights on the basis of the Respondent’s failure to respond to her Regulation 5 request. I reconsidered each of the allegations of Regulation 3 less favourable treatment above in that light. However, I did not change my conclusion in relation to any of them. The Claimant did not come near to a finding of Regulation 3 less favourable treatment on grounds of fixed term status in relation to any of those allegations.

[214]It follows that all of the Claimant’s claims of less favourable treatment under Regulation 3 of the 2002 Regulations fail and are dismissed. 8. Employment Relations Act 1999 (Blacklists) Regulations 2010

8.1 Was the claimant on a prohibited list as defined in regulation 3?

[215]Even taking into account that by its nature, it is difficult to establish that a blacklist exists, on the evidence before me, I was not satisfied that any such blacklist existed or that the claimant was on any such blacklist. I was not satisfied the Respondent made use of or was aware of any blacklist. The Claimant did not put the existence of any such blacklist to Miss Ellis. Given that the Claimant was engaged by the Respondent and given that she completed her period of fixed term employment, there was nothing from which I could draw an inference that she was included on a blacklist.

[216]I cannot therefore conclude on the evidence before me that the Claimant was on a prohibited list or even come near to a conclusion that she was subjected to a detriment under Regulation 9 or automatically unfairly dismissed by nonrenewal of her fixed term contract by reason of such a list.

[217]It follows that the Claimant’s blacklisting claims fail and are dismissed. 1. Time limits1.1 Given the date the claim form was presented and the dates of early conciliation, some of the complaints may not have been brought in time.

1.2.2 If not, was there conduct extending over a period?

1.2.3 If so, was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the end of that period?

1.2.4 If not, were the claims made within a further period that the Tribunal thinks is just and equitable? The Tribunal will decide:1.2.4.1 Why were the complaints not made to the Tribunal in time?

1.2.4.2 In any event, is it just and equitable in all the circumstances to extend time?

[218]The Claimant’s claims of race discrimination and fixed term less favourable treatment have all failed and therefore there is no need to address the issue of time limits.

[219]Given that the only matter on which the Claimant has succeeded is the conceded issue of the 1/5 days accrued holiday pay, I would not expect there to be any need for the matter to return to the tribunal.

Conclusions

[1]The Claimant has applied for reconsideration of the Judgment sent to the parties on 17 December 2025.

[2]Her application dated 1 January 2026 is in time in relation to the Judgment itself. In so far as it seeks to apply to reconsider case management orders made during the hearing, such orders lie outside of the reconsideration regime, however I have considered the reconsideration application as a whole in that the Claimant is clearly contending that she did not have a fair trial.

[3]In summary, the points raised in the Claimant’s application for reconsideration were matters raised and considered and where necessary dealt with at the hearing in September 2025 including deficiencies in the manner in which the Tribunal Service had dealt with the litigation; deficiencies in the manner in which the Respondent had conducted litigation; and deficiencies in the manner in which the Claimant had conducted litigation.

[4]I consider that there is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked.

[5]Some of the points raised in the Claimant’s application for reconsideration relate to matters that were decided prior to the September 2025 hearing. There had been a number of preliminary hearings including on 25 August 2022, 1 March 2024, 16 August 2024 and 1 November 2024, at which a large number of specific disclosure applications brought by the Claimant were determined.

[6]Contrary to the Claimant’s assertions, matters such as procedural difficulties on the part of the Tribunal Service prior to the start of the hearing (including all pretrial applications that had not yet been dealt with or had not been dealt with fully) were fully taken into account and dealt with at the hearing – witness orders which had been made were sent out and those witnesses attended to give evidence; the ET1 attachment was taken into account (and I satisfied myself that it had previously been taken into account in drawing up the list of issues); no strike out penalty had been imposed on the Claimant; the Claimant’s strike out application was heard (and rejected); the Claimant’s application to postpone was heard (and rejected); proportionate measures were taken to ensure that both sides had sufficient opportunity to consider documents and witness statements, including: delaying the start of the hearing; dealing with liability only; adding to the days over which the matter was heard; and using the days that had been set aside for deliberation and giving Judgment (which is one reason why the decision ultimately had to be reserved).

[7]The Claimant was permitted on 9 September 2025 to take the tribunal through all of the procedural history and the history of her interactions with the tribunal and the Respondent during the litigation, which was all taken into account, including permitting the Claimant to go back over matters that had been raised and dealt with at previous Preliminary Hearings.

[8]Contrary to the Claimant’s assertion, all witnesses who attended the tribunal gave evidence on oath or affirmation.

[9]Contrary to the Claimant’s assertion, during the hearing, she confirmed that she had now received all of the case management orders, including those made by me on 8, 9 and 10 September 2025.

[10]Contrary to the Claimant’s assertions, she was given sufficient time to respond to all documents placed before the tribunal.

[11]The Claimant had been in possession of nearly all of the final bundle (pages 1 to 1110) since 2024. She demonstrated during the September 2025 hearing that she was very familiar with the documents and their location in the bundle. She had had the single 12 page witness statement from the Respondent since 29 August 2025. She was given additional time to consider that witness statement and indeed her own witness statement, finally sent to the Respondent on 10 September 2025, made reference to the content of the Respondent’s witness statement. Until the point at which she withdrew from the hearing, the Claimant impressively dealt with the witnesses who attended under witness orders; and with the Respondent’s witness.

[12]I considered all of the points raised in the Claimant’s reconsideration application during the September 2025 hearing and, having taken measures that assisted both parties, I determined that it was possible for a fair hearing to take place.

[13]The Claimant had repeatedly been told (including as long ago as 1 March 2024, as recorded in the record of the preliminary hearing on that date) that she could place additional documents before the tribunal if she considered them relevant and if the Respondent had not done so, but she did not do so. In relation to specific documents referred to in the reconsideration application, on the final day of the hearing the Claimant raised that she had identified there were documents that had not been placed before the tribunal. I asked if she wanted me to look at these documents, but she merely responded that she was “done” and despite being given time to reflect, she withdrew from the hearing. From the Claimant’s description of those documents at the time and in her reconsideration application, it would appear that they went towards her assertion that the information that she disclosed amounted to protected disclosures. That was an issue which was broadly determined in her favour in any event.

[14]It was a shame that the Claimant withdrew from the hearing when she did, as she had been successful in challenging some of the Respondent’s evidence on the previous hearing day.