Employment Judge IllingMr Elvis Anoma-Amoabeng for claimantMr Max Gordon (instructed by Counsel) for respondentDate 22 October 2025
JUDGMENT
[1]The claimant’s application to amend the grounds of claim dated 08 October 2025 is refused.[2]The claim of unfair dismissal was not presented within the applicable time limit. It was reasonably practicable to do so. This claim is therefore dismissed.
REASONS
[1]The Claimant presented a claim on 09 February 2025 for unfair dismissal (“February Claim”).[2]As part of the Tribunal referral process, the Claimant’s claim was rejected by REJ Burgher on 24 March 2025 as the Claimant did not have an Acas Early Conciliation certificate and this was not a case where an exemption applied.[3]On 07 April 2025, the Claimant contacted Acas and obtained an Early Conciliation certificate, which is dated 08 April 2025 and has the reference R159080/25/79.[4]On 07 April 2025, the Claimant applied for REJ Burgher to reconsider his decision. They also provided a copy of the Acas certificate referenced above on 08 April 2025 (“April Claim”).[5]On 22 April 2025 the Tribunal informed the claimant that the Acas certificate had been accepted. It then asked the claimant for their employment dates as these were not on the claim form. The claimant replied on 23 May 2025 confirming that he had been employed from 27 March 2015 until 07 November 2024.[6]The acceptance of the Acas certificate was confirmed by the Tribunal on 29 May 2025 and REJ Burgher determined that because the original decision to reject the claim was correct, but the defect which led to the rejection had since been rectified, the claim form was to be treated as having been presented on 08 April 2025.[7]On 08 October 2025 the claimant submitted an application to amend the claim to include the following claims: 7.1. Direct race discrimination 7.2. Victimisation 7.3. Unfair dismissal for making protected disclosures relating to food safety.
The Hearing
[8]The Parties attended and raised the preliminary issues of the Claimant’s application to amend and the time limit and jurisdictional issue for the unfair dismissal claim.[9]I determined to consider the application to amend the claim first and then the jurisdictional issue regarding the time limit for the original unfair dismissal claim. This is following the case of Cox v Adecco and others UKEAT/0339/19, I understand that in order to determine the question of jurisdiction, I must first understand the claims and the issues between the Parties.[10]Both parties had prepared written submissions.[11]Both parties were permitted to make oral submissions. I asked both representatives to address me on both the application to amend and then the jurisdictional issue and confirmed that I would hear from the Claimant’s representative on both first. Having concluded the respondent’s submissions, the Claimant’s representative advised that he had not addressed the jurisdiction point. He explained that he had not heard the instruction. The Respondent’s representative did not object to the Claimant making submissions regarding the jurisdiction.[12]The Claimant’s representative is not legally qualified; in the circumstances he was permitted to make submissions in relation to the jurisdictional issue for the unfair dismissal claim and the respondent’s representative was also permitted to make further submissions.[13]The Tribunal was provided with the following documents: 13.1. Written submissions from both parties. 13.2. Email correspondence with the Tribunal, including: 13.2.1. The application to amend dated 08 October 2025, which includes an amended ET1. 13.2.2. The respondent’s objections to the Claimant’s application dated 09 October 2025 and email of 10 October 2025. 13.2.3. Email 10 October 2025 the Claimant’s reply to the Respondent’s jurisdictional objection 13.2.4. Email 12 October 2025 from the Claimant. 13.2.5. Email correspondence between the Claimant, or his representative, and Acas dated 03 December 2024 and 15 October 2025[14]No witness evidence was heard and my decision is based on the written and oral submissions.
Background
[15]The Claimant was employed as a HGV Driver from the Harlow Depot throughout his employment until the effective date of termination on 07 November 2024. The respondent admits dismissing the Claimant and provides the reason of conduct as the potentially lawful reason for the dismissal.[16]The respondent is a national wholesale food company.[17]The effective termination date of 07 November 2024 for the Claimant is not disputed.[18]It is not disputed that the Claimant has, for the purpose of this application, provided a copy of an email from Acas dated 03 December 2025. This email states: You told us that you do not wish to take advantage of our Early Conciliation Services at this time. We will therefore close your case and send you your certificate within 5 working days of receipt of your notification. If you wish to discuss the opportunity to make use of Acas’s Early Conciliation Services, or if you require your certificate sooner, please contact the Early Conciliation Support Team using the number below.[19]The Claimant asserts that they did not receive the early conciliation certificate and that this failure was culpable conduct by Acas. This email provides the claimant with reference number of R301671/24.[20]The Claimant did not produce any evidence or further emails of communication with Acas in relation to this certificate.[21]It was the respondent’s position that the claimant was aware of the Employment Tribunal process and that the onus is on the claimant to obtain the certificate.[22]The effect of this email is disputed and I will consider each of the Parties submissions on this as I review this application to amend and the jurisdictional issue.[23]With an effective date of termination of 07 November 2024, the initial limitation date is 06 February 2025. This limitation date is subject to any extension provided by the early conciliation process.[24]Following the rejection of this claim by the Tribunal, the Claimant contacted Acas again on the 07 April 2025. Acas issued a certificate with the reference R159080/25/79.[25]It is not disputed that the Claimant has referred to additional claims in his witness statement as exchanged for the purpose of this hearing. This is dated 20 August 2025.[26]The Claimant is a litigant in person and is using the assistance of a non-legally qualified representative today. It is not disputed that the claimant sought the assistance of Citizen’s Advice and also stated that they acted in accordance with that advice.[27]On 15 October 2025 the claimant’s representative contacted Acas in relation to the email of the 03 December 2024.[28]The reply on 15 October 2025 @ 1604 states: From the below Email chain, the Early Conciliation certificate for R301671/24 would have been issued to nimohjustice@yahoo.com As the notification was received on the 3rd December 2024, the certificate would have been issued at 6 weeks after this date, at the latest. The copy of the claim form ET1 of case number 3200106/2025 we have on file, does not state an Early Conciliation certificate number. As you did not use the certificate number from this notification R301671/24 to lodge this Tribunal claim, it was not linked to this Tribunal claim. As no Tribunal claim was received linking the Early Conciliation certificate number, the record of the Early Conciliation certificate has been archived and not available on the case file.[29]On asking again, the claimant was informed on 15 October 2025 @ 5.15pm: As noted in my below Email, the record of the Early Conciliation certificate in R301671/24 has been archived and not available on the case file to forward a copy.[30]I find that the certificate issued on 08 April 2025 was a new certificate as this claim was not linked to the original case as held by Acas. Application to Amend[31]The claimant submitted an application to amend to the Employment Tribunal on 08 October 2025.[32]The application to amend included an amended ET1. The amendments include the following: 32.1. Ticking of the discrimination / race box in section 8.1. 32.2. The addition of details in the free text box in section 8.1. as: 32.2.1. Victimisation 32.2.2. Unfavourable Discriminatory Treatment 32.2.3. Injury to feelings[33]The amended ET1 has no amendment to the wording in section 8.2 which, including any typographical and formatting errors, states: I have been unfairly dismissed without any concrete evidence. I appealed and my appeal has been ignored. I have in several occasions contacted the management to look into my appeal but they completely ignore me. i have a history with the manager who heard the chase and issues a dismissal leller lo me. I had challenged him in the past when he issued an order which I thought was not right. This dismissal was his way of punishing me for that challenge. he refused to review a CCTV camara directly looking at the location where the incident happened. His decision was made based on a 20sec, video a third party who is a Friend of the other party involved in the incident took. I have attended an appeal meeting with a different manager, who assured me that's the CCTV footage will be looked Into. It been 2 months and all my efforts to the manager to issue a formal letter explaining hor final decision have proved abortive. The company disciplinary procedure has not been followed. I would like to sue for a full years wage to the tune £34000.[34]This wording is identical to the wording of the original ET1, including the typographical errors. Section 14 of the amended ET1, additional information, is blank on the amended claim. I have taken the wording from the original claim into consideration, which refers to the CCTV footage in section 14.[35]I must consider this application under Rule 30 (Case Management) and Rule 3 (Overriding Objective) of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024. The test to apply in relation to the amendment application has developed through a significant number of cases, the most well known being Selkent Bus Company Limited v Moore [1996] ICR 836 (Selkent) and as endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Ali v Office of National Statistics 2005 IRLR 201, CA.[36]Selkent sets out the tests which are to be applied by the Tribunal in considering an application to amend. These Selkent factors should be applied alongside Vaughan v Modality Partnership UKEAT/0147/20/BA (Vaughan) to ensure that there is balance in the consideration of the injustice and hardship in allowing or refusing the application.[37]In brief the Selkent factors are: 37.1. The nature of the amendment i.e. whether the amendment sought is one of the minor matters or is a substantive alteration pleading a new cause of action; 37.2. The applicability of time limits. If a new complaint of cause of action is proposed to be added by way of amendment it is essential for the Tribunal to consider whether that complaint is out of time and if so whether the time limit should be extended; and 37.3. The timing and manner of the application. An application should not be refused solely because there has been a delay in making it. There are no time limits laid down in the rules for making amendments, but delay is a discretionary factor. It is relevant to consider why the application was not made earlier and why it is now being made (for example the discovery of new facts or new information).[38]Additionally, a central question to be answered by the Tribunal in determining whether an amendment application should be allowed or refused is what the real practical consequences are of allowing or refusing the application. (Vaughan). Vaughan is quoted as follows: “Representatives would be well advised to start by considering, possibly putting the Selkent factors to one side for a moment, what will be the real practical consequences of allowing or refusing the amendment. If the application to amend is refused how severe will the consequences be, in terms of the prospects of success of the claim or defence; if permitted what will be the practical problems in responding. This requires a focus on reality rather than assumptions. It requires representatives to take instructions, where possible, about matters such as whether witnesses remember the events and / or have records relevant to the matters raised in the proposed amendment. Representatives have a duty to advance arguments about prejudice on the basis [of] instructions rather than supposition. They should not allege prejudice that does not really exist. It will often be appropriate to consent to an amendment that causes no real prejudice. This will save time and money and allow the parties and tribunal to get on with the job of determining the claim.”[39]Vaughan acts as a reminder that the core test in considering applications to amend is the balance of injustice and hardship in allowing or refusing the application. The exercise starts with the parties’ submissions on the practical consequences of the amendment being refused or allowed. This is a fundamental balancing exercise and the above Selkent factors are not a list to be ticked off.[40]I have also been directed to the Presidential Guidance for the amendment of claims, specifically Guidance Note 1, and refer to the principles to take into account when considering the Selkent factors.[41]For each of the factors, there are further cases to take into consideration, and I do so by taking into consideration both the written and oral submissions heard. The nature of the amendment[42]The claimant is seeking to amend his claim to add in direct discrimination, victimisation and an automatic unfair dismissal because of a protected disclosure. It is their submission that the details for all of these claims are within the original claim and that this application is simply a relabelling exercise. They state that there would be no requirement for additional witnesses or documentation.[43]The claimant submits that the factual matrix is unchanged and relies on the following: i. the 24 Oct incident; ii. the Respondent’s investigation/disciplinary/appeal conduct; iii. the stereotyping (“aggression”) and comparator treatment (Ana); iv. the safety disclosure about chilled food handling and request for CCTV.[44]It is the respondent’s position that these claims are not within the scope of the original claim. They submit that to deal with these claims, further particulars would be required and that it is likely that additional documents and witnesses may need to be called.[45]The respondent stated that the comparator referred to is, in fact, an employee of third party and that any disclosure regarding chilled food would require a further investigation and enquiry as it has not previously been raised.[46]The Presidential Guidance directs me to consider whether the amendment applied for is a minor or a substantial alteration describing a new complaint (para. 5.1)[47]I must consider whether the claims that are the subject of the application arise out of the same facts or whether the add a new claim unconnected with the original (para. 6.1).[48]This is an application where the claimant relies on exactly the same wording within the amended claim as in the original and cites that the facts pleaded for the amended claim are the same as for the original.[49]The wording of the claim, I find, does refer to the incident and the investigation, disciplinary and appeal process and the request for the CCTV footage, but I am not satisfied that it identifies or indicates a cause of action for direct discrimination because of the claimant’s race. There is no reference to stereotyping and there is no reference to comparator treatment (Ana). For this claim to be included, further particulars and documentation would be required.[50]With regards to any victimisation claim, there must first be a protected act. I have reviewed the wording of the claim and I find that there is no reference to any conduct that may amount to a protected act as defined by s.27 of the Equality Act.[51]With regards to a claim for automatic unfair dismissal for raising a protected disclosure, the nearest the claim comes to is the wording “I had challenged him in the past when he issued an order which I thought was not right.”. However, this is not the disclosure being pleaded.[52]I am satisfied that this is not an amendment for the relabelling of a claim. I am satisfied that the amendment requested is for three entirely new factual allegations that change the basis of the existing claim. This is a substantial alteration. The applicability of time limits[53]Given that I have determined that the application to amend is for new claims, I must consider whether those complaints are out of time and if so, whether the time limit should be extended. (Presidential Guidance para. 5.2)[54]It is the claimant’s submission that the new claims demonstrate a continuous act and that the time limit should run from the date of the last act. They state, in submission, that the claimant was stonewalled until January 2025 and that the pleaded facts show a continuum that justifies a short extension of time to permit these claims. Citing Barclays Bank plc v James [2003] IRLR 284, the claimant submits that the limitation period should run from the date of the last act. The Claimant states that the appeal outcome letter remains outstanding.[55]I have reviewed the wording of the claim and of the amended claim and I do not have any dates from which time could be said to run from. The failure to provide the appeal letter, the claimant asserts, is a continuing act.[56]Discrimination includes acts or omissions. If the failure to provide an appeal outcome letter is an act of discrimination or victimisation, then this is an omission. I am satisfied that there is no continuing act. At its highest, the limitation clock would run from the date of the omission and the appeal meeting was on 13 December 2024. Even allowing 3-months from January 2025 for the appeal outcome letter to be produced, so until 13 April 2025, to give a date from which limitation could run, the claims within the amendment application are still some 6 or 7-months out of time.[57]I am satisfied that, on the face of it, the claims within the application to amend are out of time.[58]Even though the claims are out of time, this is not an outright bar nor is it automatically barred, as both representatives have helpfully submitted. Transport and General Workers Union v Safeway Stores Ltd UKEAT/0092/06/LA at para 10 of the judgment: ‘the reason why it is “essential” that a tribunal consider whether the fresh claim in question is in time is simply that that is a factor — albeit an important and potentially decisive one — in the exercise of the discretion.’[59]As the claims within the application to amend are out of time, I am obliged to consider whether it is just and equitable to extend time. I will consider this when considering the balance of injustice and hardship. The timing and manner of the application.[60]The application to amend has been made a week before the listed final hearing of the unfair dismissal claim. This is after disclosure for the unfair dismissal claim and after the exchange of witness statements.[61]The claimant submits that any lateness should be weighed against other factors including prejudice to the parties and the explanation for the delay.[62]The claimant did not in his original submissions give a reason for the delay, but in re-addressing his submissions advised the Tribunal that the delay was because he was not aware that he had to submit an application to amend. He stated that it has been clear and apparent in the dealings with the respondent what the nature of the claims were and that these were included in the claimant’s witness statement. The claimant submits that the respondent is not prejudiced as they had this knowledge.[63]The respondent has submitted that there is no explanation as to why the application to amend to include these claims was not raised earlier, even following the exchange of witness statements. They submit that the respondent has been prejudiced during disclosure and during the preparation of evidence.[64]The respondent further submits that acceptance of the application to amend would lose this hearing and impact the claimant, the respondent and other Tribunal users because of its adjournment. The claimant submitted that the respondent was on notice of the content of his claim and that the hearing could continue without an adjournment.[65]The claimant’s representative is not legally qualified. His written and oral submissions are clear and comprehensive. This amendment application seeks to introduce new claims and widens it considerably, whilst I accept that the claimant’s representative is not qualified, there has been a further significant delay between the exchange of statements (August 2025) and the submission of the application to amend (October 2025). Balance of injustice and hardship[66]Even if no new facts are pleaded, I must still balance any injustice and hardship in allowing or refusing the amendment application.[67]With regards to any prejudice to the parties, I have determined that this is an application for new claims. There will be prejudice, to both parties. If the application is permitted, the claimant would be required for fully particularise his claim, and the respondent would have to respond and carry out further enquiries and investigations to respond fully. This will introduce a cost and time issue for both parties.[68]Additionally, these amendments are referring to acts that were a year ago. This in itself will introduce prejudice to both parties, particularly the respondent, in relation to the recollection of events and the discovery of evidence.[69]Furthermore, disclosure and exchange have taken place, this would, submits the respondent, place them at a disadvantage.[70]Another real practical consequence for both parties, if permitted, is that this hearing would be adjourned and relisted. For the respondent the practical consequences are as I’ve detailed above.[71]For the claimant, when asked about the real practical consequences, it was submitted that if the application was refused, this would give the respondent the opportunity to operate unfairly and outside of the law. The consequences for the claimant are that he was unable to find alternative work as he was away on holiday during February to March 2025 and so didn’t work for 5-months. The claimant submits that no employer who operates an unfair process should be permitted to think they can do this.[72]For the respondent, if the application to amend is refused, the real consequences are that, subject to the jurisdiction issue, the unfair dismissal claim would continue. The respondent would not be prejudiced by the requirement for further enquiry or disclosure.[73]A refusal of the application to amend would not subject either party to any further time / cost to prepare for a hearing. However, the claimant states that a refusal is more prejudicial to them due to the consequences of their being unable to address the discrimination and / or protected disclosure claims.[74]There is hardship for both parties if the amendment is permitted as this claim would be, in effect, restarting. However, this restart would be from a position where disclosure and witness statements have already been exchanged.[75]I have found that the amendments sought by the claimant are not particularised within the ET1, original or amended, and would required further and better particulars for each allegation. I have found that these are new allegations that are not from the same factual matrix as pleaded.[76]The claimant submits that the real practical consequence to him is, in fact, the injustice of the respondent not being required to face the consequences of their actions in the Tribunal. The respondent submits that the manner in which the claimant has prepared this claim, using the witness statement in August to identify the new allegations and leaving the application to amend until only a week before the final hearing has significantly prejudiced it. Disclosure and witness evidence have been exchanged and, as stated above, the claim would need to be restarted.[77]If this case is to be re-started, this would mean additional case management hearings, possibly a listing hearing and a final hearing of a minimum of 3 or 4 days to address the discrimination and protected disclosure allegations.[78]I have also considered whether the application to amend should be permitted in part.[79]I am satisfied that if the application to amend is permitted, even for part of the amendment, the balance of hardship and injustice will fall more greatly against the respondent. The claimant asserts that the claim, including the amendments, is ready to be heard as prepared for today’s hearing. I do not agree.[80]I have considered the delay in the making of the application to amend, and I am satisfied that the delay was not reasonable.[81]Is it just and equitable to extend time? I have determined that the application to amend refers to claims that are over 6 – 7 months out of time. I have considered the length of the delay and the reason given; I have considered the requirement of additional evidence and investigations and statements that would be required from the respondent. I have also considered that the claimant had had advice from Citizens Advice and is now being assisted by a non-legal representative.[82]I have taken into account the hardship and the injustice to each party and I have considered the context of this application as is required of me Jones v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care 2024 EAT 2[83]In all of the circumstances, I do not find that it is just and equitable to extend time.[84]I conclude that the application to amend by the claimant is refused. Time limits and jurisdiction for the Unfair dismissal claim
The Law
[85]Parliament has set down the time limits for bringing claims to the Employment Tribunal. It is for a claimant to show on the balance of probabilities that it was not reasonably practicable for him to present his claim to the Tribunal in time.[86]The relevant law is contained in section 111 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 S.111(2) An Employment Tribunal shall not consider a complaint under this section unless it is presented to the tribunal –(a) before the end of the period of three months beginning with the effective date of termination, or(b) within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three months”: s. 111(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”).[87]When the Tribunal considers the first limb of the test – whether it was “not reasonably practicable” to present a claim in time – three general rules apply:a. The relevant statutory provision should be given a liberal construction in favour of the employee: Dedman v British Building and Engineering Appliances Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 171 (“Dedman”) at p.176E;b. What is reasonably practicable is a matter of fact for the Tribunal to decide: “The test is empirical and involves no legal concept. Practical common sense is the keynote and legalistic footnotes may have no better result than to introduce a lawyer’s complications into what should be a layman’s pristine province”: Wall’s Meat Co Ltd v Khan [1979] ICR 52 (“Wall’s Meat Co”) at p.57D; andc. The burden of proving that presentation in time was not reasonably practicable rests on the claimant: “That imposes a duty upon him to show precisely why it was that he did not present his complaint”: Porter v Bandridge Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 1145 at p.1150A. Thus, the burden of proof on claimants falls to be discharged by providing documentary and/or witness evidence.[88]In Palmer v Southend-on-Sea Borough Council [1984] 1 WLR 1129 (“Palmer”) at p.1141DE, the Court of Appeal held that “reasonably practicable” does not mean “reasonable”, which would be too favourable towards an employee, and does not mean physically possible, which would be too favourable to employers, but means “reasonably feasible”. In Asda Stores v Kauser EAT 0165/07 (“Asda Stores”) at §17, the relevant test was described as “not simply a matter of looking at what was possible but to ask whether, on the facts of the case as found, it was reasonable to expect that which was possible to have been done”.[89]In this case, the claimant was dismissed on the 07 November 2025 and the claim was initially presented on 09 February 2025. I have determined that, subject to early conciliation, the initial limitation period ends on 06 February 2025. This means that, on the face of it, the claim was issued 3-days late.[90]The claim was issued without an early conciliation certificate and the ET1 had been ticked to indicate that the claimant did not have a certificate and did not need one as they were seeking interim relief (box 2.3) when answering why there was no certificate number.[91]The claimant was sent the notice of rejection of the original claim by the Tribunal on 24 March 2025. This gave the reason for the rejection, which was because of the failure to provide an early conciliation certificate and that his was not a claim for interim relief.[92]On 08 April 2025, the claimant provided the Tribunal with an Acas early conciliation certificate. From the certificate, it determined that the date of receipt was 07 April 2025. No other evidence regarding contact with Acas at this time was provided.[93]Upon reconsideration by REJ Burgher, the claim was accepted and deemed presented to the Tribunal with effect from 08 April 2025.[94]It is the claimant’s submission that Acas were contacted on 03 December 2024, and they have produced an email from Acas that states: You told us that you do not wish to take advantage of our Early Conciliation Services at this time. We will therefore close your case and send you your certificate within 5 working days of receipt of your notification.[95]There is no certificate from this time, nor is there any evidence from the claimant of any endeavours to follow up this email, including calls or emails. The Claimant had the conciliator’s email and there is a telephone number on the email and the Claimant was invited to call if he required the certificate sooner.[96]In subsequent emails from Acas on 15 October 2025, Acas state that the original reference (R301671/24) was never linked to a Tribunal claim.[97]It is the Tribunal’s understanding that the claimant had a non-legal representative and that he was seeking advice from Citizens Advice at the time.
Consideration
[98]The first question to consider is whether the unfair dismissal claim made within the time limit in section 111 of the Employment Rights Act 1996? Given that this claim was issued originally on 09 February 2025 (“February Claim”) and then deemed to have been received on 08 April 2025 (“April Claim”), I will address each.[99]The Tribunal will decide: Was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the effective date of termination? and If not, was it reasonably practicable for the claim to be made to the Tribunal within the time limit?[100]Turning first to the February Claim; it is the Claimant assertion that they contacted Acas on 03 December 2024 and that this acted to stop the clock.[101]The email from Acas states clearly that the Claimant did not want to take advantage of early conciliation and that the case would be closed. Early conciliation can only take place if the employee wishes to engage and start the process as Acas will only contact the employer with the employee’s consent.[102]I am satisfied that given that the claimant did not wish to engage in early conciliation, the clock did not stop.[103]I must consider whether it was reasonably practical for the claimant to issue their claim in time.[104]The claimant asserts that the conduct of Acas in failing to provide the Early Conciliation certificate is culpable and a reason for the late filing of the February claim. I have considered whether there was a failing by Acas in not providing an Early Conciliation certificate for the February Claim.[105]I have seen the email of the 03 December 2024 and whilst the claimant states that he does not have a certificate from this contact with Acas, he was using a different representative at that time. Acas state in their October 2025 correspondence with the claimant that the certificate would have gone to this original representative and that they don’t hold a copy of the certificate, because the reference given in December was not used on a Tribunal claim form. This is why it was archived.[106]The initial contact with Acas was on 03 December 2024, less than one month after the effective termination date. The claimant had a further two months in which he could issue his claim. He was clearly minded to present a claim but did not do so immediately.[107]The email of 03 December 2024 from Acas includes a contact email and telephone number to enable the claimant to contact the conciliator. There is no evidence that any attempt to contact Acas further was made.[108]It is the claimant’s submission that he was a litigant in person being assisted by a non-legal person. Neither had employment tribunal experience. It is submitted that the claimant acted in good faith in trying to obtain a certificate and that in issuing the claim late, it was only a couple of days late and that the delays were excusable and he was taking advice. If there was a mistake, it was a genuine and reasonable one and this was because the claimant believed that he had to wait for the outcome of the internal appeal. Porter v Bandridge Ltd [1978] ICR 943 (EAT)[109]The claimant also submits that it was not reasonably practicable to submit the claim in time as he was relying on the Citizens Advice advice and that “not reasonably practicable” should be interpreted flexibly. (Wall’s Meat Co.) Given that there was confusion and that the delay was caused by the employer, the delay is excusable. (Asda Stores).[110]The respondent has directed the Triibunal to the gov.uk website in relation to Acas and how to bring a claim. It is also submitted that the claimant knew that a certificate was needed but ticked “no” and proceeded in any event when submitting the claim.[111]It is the respondent’s submission that the internal procedure is not in itself enough to find that it was not reasonably practicable to present in time. Palmer v Southend-on-Sea Borough Council [1984] 1 W.L.R. 1129. “Whilst harsh” it does not alter whether it was reasonably practicable to present a claim in time.[112]Specifically, the respondent has submitted Stratford on Avon District Council v Hughes EAT 0163/20 (Stratford on Avon DC) where the question to be determined is, in all of the circumstances, would it have been reasonably practicable for the claimant to have obtained the EC certificate sooner, not whether he behaved reasonably in waiting. The concept of reasonable practicability involves a heavier onus than just behaving reasonably but is not to be equated with what is physically possible.[113]The respondent submits that the claimant had no basis to present his claim late.[114]I do accept that the claimant was waiting for the resolution of internal processes before issuing, however, given that the claimant had spoken to Acas and to Citizen’s Advice, I am satisfied that he would have been aware of the time limit.[115]More than 2-months passed between the contact with Acas and the presentation of the February Claim. No evidence of other contact with Acas has been provided nor any explanation given. It is common sense that the claimant could have called Acas or emailed them to make enquiries about the certificate. This did not happen. In the circumstances, I do not accept that Acas were culpable for the claimant’s late presentation of the claim. The claimant had made contact with Acas and could have done so again at any time during this period. The burden rests with the claimant to show why he did not present the claim in time and common sense would dictate that the claimant would call or email Acas to follow up the email of the 03 December 2024. In circumstances where the early conciliation certificate did not arrive as expected, it is reasonable to expect that the claimant would have followed the Acas email up.[116]I am satisfied that the February Claim was issued out of time, however before reaching a conclusion, I must also consider the April Claim and when it was presented to determine if it was reasonably practicable to present the claim in time, or if not, if it was presented in a reasonable time thereafter.[117]There is an inherent delay with regards to the Employment Tribunal process in that the rejection of the claim by REJ Burgher was communicated to the claimant on 24 March 2025. This is a delay due to the administrative process and outside of the control of the claimant. I have taken this into account.[118]The application for reconsideration of the rejection of the claim, with the early conciliation certificate, was submitted to the Tribunal on 08 April 2025, some 14- days after the claimant had been informed that the claim had been rejected because of the failure to provide the early conciliation certificate. Acas had been approached on 07 April and provided the certificate on the 08 April. The claimant had emailed this to the Tribunal with the application for reconsideration on the same day.[119]The claimant submitted that the delay in providing the certificate was due to the claimant seeking advice from Citizens Advice to determine what action to take. The respondent submits that this delay was unreasonable as it was reasonably feasible for the claimant to act promptly to rectify the issue.[120]This is a circumstance where the February Claim is, on the face of it, out of time. It was rejected for the failure to provide an early conciliation certificate and when rectified, it was deemed received on 08 April 2025. Therefore, this April Claim is also, on the face of it, out of time.[121]The burden rests with the Claimant to show the Tribunal that it would not have been reasonably practicable for him to present the claim in time, not just that he has behaved reasonably (Stratford on Avon DC).[122]The claimant made contact with Acas before his appeal meeting in December 2024. The claimant has missed the initial limitation period, which flows from the effective date of termination, and has presented his claim without a certificate and ticked the box stating that one was not required.[123]Following the rejection of the claim, the claimant has waited 14-days before contacting Acas, who have issued a certificate the following day.[124]I have taken into consideration that the claimant is a Litigant in Person, however, I conclude that it was reasonably feasible and therefore reasonably practicable for the claimant to present his claim in time.[125]I conclude therefore that the claim of unfair dismissal was not presented within the applicable time limit where it was reasonably practicable to do so. This claim is therefore dismissed.