J Stone v London College of Professional Studies Ltd: 3200088/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 3200088/2025

Between

J StoneClaimant

London College of Professional Studies LtdRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Searley

In person for claimant

Date 15 May 2026

JUDGMENT

Under rule 28 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024, the Claimant’s claims, set out in the ET1 dated 31 January 2025, are dismissed because the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider them. FULL WRITTEN REASONS

[1]I announced my decision at the hearing and gave summary oral reasons under rule 60(4A)(b)(i) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024.

[2]The claimant made a request for full written reasons at the hearing. I have provided full written reasons in accordance with rule 60(4E) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024. Introduction

[3]On 13 February 2026 the matter was listed before Employment Judge Crosfill for a preliminary hearing for the purposes of case management. In his Case Management Order, dated 13 February 2026, Employment Judge Crosfill summarised the essential background information in relation to the Claimant’s claims in the following way: “3. The Claimant was employed by the Respondent as a Tutor/Administrator. There appears to be no dispute between the parties that the Claimant was dismissed by the Respondent. The Claimant says that he was dismissed on 4 November 2024.

[4]On 31 January 2025 the Claimant presented his ET1 to the Tribunal. In that form he indicated that he was bringing the following claims: 4.1. A claim for unfair dismissal under Part X of the Employment Rights Act 1996 4.2. Claims for discrimination relying on age and race as the relevant protected characteristics. 4.3. A ‘whistleblowing claim’. 4.4. A claim for a redundancy payment 4.5. A claim for notice pay 4.6. A claim for holiday pay 4.7. A claim for arrears of pay 4.8. A claim for other payments 4.9. A claim relying on ‘Flagrantly unfair and offensive behaviour by my employer and it’s officers’ (with no legal basis identified).

[5]In Section 2.3 of the ET1 the Claimant did not include an ACAS early conciliation certificate number. He placed a tick in the box explaining that omission that says: ‘Acas does not have the power to conciliate on some or all of my claim’.

[6]When the claim was vetted under rule 12 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure rules 2024 it appears that no referral was made by the administration to a judge or legal office as the administrator apparently accepted the Claimant’s assertion that Acas did not have the power to conciliate the claims. Accordingly, the claim was not rejected pursuant to rule 13. …

[10]The Claimant has provided an ACAS certificate. It states that the Claimant contacted ACAS on 31 January 2025 (the day he presented his claim) and the certificate is dated 3 February 2025. It would appear therefore that the Claimant did not have an Acas certificate on the day that he presented his claim.” 4. Employment Judge Crosfill then drew the parties’ attention to s.18A of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 and the Court of Appeal case of Reynolds v Abel Estate Agent Ltd and others

[2025] EWCA Civ 1357

. He noted that it was very possible that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal with the Claimant’s claims as they were presented before he had an ACAS certificate. He also explained to the Claimant that the Claimant could issue fresh claims, but that were he to do so it might be that the claims would be barred because of the statutory time limits. 5. The outcome of the preliminary hearing was that Employment Judge Crosfill directed that the matter should be listed for a preliminary hearing in public to decide the following issues:a. Whether the claims should be struck out under rule 28 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 because the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear them; and/or

b. Whether the claims should be struck out under rule 38 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 because they have no reasonable prospects of success (for the same reasons). 6. The matter was listed before me today, at a preliminary hearing in public to determine those issues. At the outset of the hearing, I indicated to the parties that Employment Judge Crosfill had used imprecise terminology when describing how the Tribunal should treat a claim under rule 28 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024. Under rule 28 a claim cannot be struck out; rather it can be dismissed. For that reason, and with the agreement of the parties, I decided that the issues that I needed to determine at the hearing were as follows: a. Whether the claims should be dismissed under rule 28 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 because the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear them; and/or b. Whether the claims should be struck out under rule 38 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 because they have no reasonable prospects of success (for the same reasons). 7. I heard oral submissions on those issues from the Claimant. Following that, I indicated that the Respondent did not need to address me. I decided to dismiss the Claimant’s claims in their entirety, giving my decision orally with summary reasons. Relevant law 8. The relevant parts of Section 18A of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 (as amended) provide as follows: 8A Requirement to contact ACAS before instituting proceedings

(1) Before a person (“the prospective claimant”) presents an application to institute relevant proceedings relating to any matter, the prospective claimant must provide to ACAS prescribed information, in the prescribed manner, about that matter. This is subject to subsection (7).

(2) On receiving the prescribed information in the prescribed manner, ACAS shall send a copy of it to a conciliation officer.

(3) The conciliation officer shall, during the prescribed period, endeavour to promote a settlement between the persons who would be parties to the proceedings.

(4) If— (a) during the prescribed period the conciliation officer concludes that a settlement is not possible, or (b) the prescribed period expires without a settlement having been reached, the conciliation officer shall issue a certificate to that effect, in the prescribed manner, to the prospective claimant. (5)-(6)… (7) A person may institute relevant proceedings without complying with the requirement in subsection (1) in prescribed cases. The cases that may be prescribed include (in particular)— cases where the requirement is complied with by another person instituting relevant proceedings relating to the same matter; cases where proceedings that are not relevant proceedings are instituted by means of the same form as proceedings that are; cases where section 18B applies because ACAS has been contacted by a person against whom relevant proceedings are being instituted. (8) A person who is subject to the requirement in subsection (1) may not present an application to institute relevant proceedings without a certificate under subsection (4). (9)… (10) In subsections (1) to (7) “prescribed” means prescribed in regulations made by the Secretary of State. (11) The Secretary of State may by ... regulations make such further provision as appears to the Secretary of State to be necessary or expedient with respect to the conciliation process provided for by subsections (1) to (8). 9. Relevant proceedings (as set out in s.18A(1) above) are defined in section 18 ETA 1996. Section 18 defines relevant proceedings as including: a. A complaint to the Tribunal under s.111 Employment Rights Act 1996, that a person was unfairly dismissed by their employer (s.18(1)(b) ETA 1996). b. A complaint to the Tribunal under s.120 of the Equality Act 2010 (s.18(1)(e) ETA 1996). Section 120 of the Equality Act 2010 gives the Employment Tribunal jurisdiction to determine a complaint relating to a contravention of part 5 (work) of the Equality Act 2010. Part 5 contains s.39 which includes at s.39(2) the prohibition on an employer discriminating against an employee.

c. A complaint to the Tribunal under part 5 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (s.18(1)(b) ETA 1996). Part 5 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 contains the protection from suffering detriment in employment as a result of making a protected disclosure (commonly known as whistleblowing).

d. A complaint to the Tribunal under s.23 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 that an employer has made an unauthorised deduction of wages (s.18(1)(b) ETA 1996)

e. A reference to the Tribunal under s.163 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 as to the right of an employee to a redundancy payment and the amount of any payment (s.18(1)(b) ETA 1996).

f. A contract claim brought under Article 6 of the Employment Tribunals Extension of Jurisdiction (England and Wales) Order 1994 (s.18(1)(g) ETA 1996). 10. Rule 13 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 provides, where relevant, as follows: Rejection: substantive defects 13.(1) Tribunal staff must refer a claim to the Tribunal if they consider that the claim, or part of it, may be— (a) –(c) … (d) one which institutes relevant proceedings and is made on a claim form which contains confirmation that one of the early conciliation exemptions applies, and an early conciliation exemption does not apply, (e)-(g)… (2) The Tribunal must reject a claim, or part of it, if it considers that the claim, or part of it, is of a kind described in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (c) or (d) of paragraph (1).

[11]Rule 28 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 provides as follows: Dismissal of claim 28.(1) If the Tribunal considers either that it has no jurisdiction to consider the claim, or part of it, or that the claim, or part of it, has no reasonable prospect of success, it must send a notice to the parties—(a) setting out the Tribunal’s view and the reasons for it, and

(b) ordering that the claim, or the part of it, is to be dismissed on such date as is specified in the notice unless before that date the Tribunal has received written representations from the party advancing the claim explaining why the claim, or part of it, should not be dismissed. (2) If the Tribunal has not received written representations before the date specified in the notice under paragraph (1)(b), the claim is dismissed without further order and the Tribunal must write to the parties to confirm what has occurred. (3) If the Tribunal receives written representations before the date specified under paragraph (1)(b), the written representations must be considered by the Tribunal, who must either permit the claim, or part of it, to proceed or fix a hearing for the purpose of deciding whether it should permit the claim, or part of it, to do so. The party responding or replying to that claim may, but need not, attend and participate in the hearing. (4) If the claim or any part of it is permitted to proceed, the Tribunal must make a case management order.

[12]Rule 38 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 provides as follows Striking out 38. (1) The Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party, strike out all or part of a claim, response or reply on any of the following grounds— (a) that it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success; (…)

[13]Rule 6 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure provides as follows: Irregularities and non-compliance 6.(1) An irregularity resulting from a failure to comply with any provision of these Rules, a practice direction, or any order of the Tribunal does not of itself render void the proceedings or any step taken in the proceedings. (2) In the case of non-compliance with these Rules, any practice direction or any order of the Tribunal, the Tribunal may take such action as it considers just, which may include any of the following—(a) waiving or varying the requirement;

(b) striking out the claim or the response, in whole or in part, in accordance with rule 38 (striking out);

(d) awarding costs in accordance with Part 13 (costs orders, preparation time orders and wasted costs orders). (3) This rule does not apply to rules 10, 17(1), 24(1) or 26(1), or an order made under rule 28(1)(b), 29(1)(b), 39 or 40.

[14]In Reynolds v Abel Estate Agent Ltd and others

[2025] EWCA Civ 1357

, the Court of Appeal considered the rules requiring claimants in the Employment Tribunal to notify ACAS prior to commencing proceedings. In that case Mrs Reynolds had failed to contact ACAS prior to commencing her proceedings, and she was seeking to pursue a claim that fell within the definition of relevant proceedings under s.18A. That failure was not noticed by the Tribunal on its initial consideration of the claim, the claim was not therefore rejected, and the issue was raised for the first time at a Preliminary Hearing for case management.

[15]The Court of Appeal decided that the requirements imposed by s.18A of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 go to the jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunal to hear a claim. Where a claimant fails to comply with those provisions, when required under s.18A to do so, the result is that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the claim (paragraph 47).

[16]The Court of Appeal explained that the effect of a jurisdictional limit of that type is that the Tribunal is precluded by statute, irrespective of the wishes of the parties, from exercising the jurisdiction over the claim which it would otherwise have to determine the dispute (paragraph 49).

[17]The Court of Appeal expressly considered the point that the longer the interval between the non-compliance being detected by the Tribunal the greater the risk to the claimant that any fresh claim, brought to remedy the non-compliance, is brought out of time. It decided that, even when the non-compliance with the requirement to consult ACAS is not detected until it is too late to start fresh proceedings, that consequence did not justify construing section 18A as not imposing a limit on the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that, in some cases, the operation of this absolute bar would be harsh, but noted that it arises because of a failure by a claimant to invoke a process which Parliament regarded as mandatory (paragraph 62).

[18]The Court of Appeal concluded that the correct approach, if the Tribunal has not rejected the claim under rule 13, is either to dismiss the claim under rule 28 for lack of jurisdiction or to strike it out under rule 38 because a claim which the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over can have no prospect of success (paragraph 72). The Claimant’s submissions

[19]The Claimant made the following points in his oral submissions.

[20]Despite being informed by Employment Judge Crosfill in February 2026 of his right to do so, the Claimant had not sought to issue fresh claims. His understanding from the discussion about the matter with Employment Judge Crosfill was that there would be a problem with time limits if he did so. He felt he was in a catch 22 situation.

[21]He had experience of bringing a prior Tribunal claim, around fifteen years ago, and the Respondent in that matter had “kicked the can down the road” and settled the day before the hearing. Accordingly, whilst the Claimant had no problem with involving ACAS, there seemed to be no incentive for a Respondent to settle a case. Rather, there was an incentive to delay.

[22]The Claimant understood his rights, having been through the process before, and he deliberately left it late to issue his claim because he did not want the Respondent to have time to “get their story straight”.

[23]The Claimant did not believe his claim for racial discrimination required him to contact ACAS. There were various other claims that didn’t require it either. I asked the Claimant to direct me to which claims these were and he stated that he was not sure which claims required it, and the box on the ET1 was not helpful in that regard.

[24]He had ticked the box on the ET1 form indicating that ACAS did not have the power to conciliate on some or all of his claim because he thought that box could be used if there was any other particular reason ACAS were not contacted.

[25]When the Claimant contacted ACAS he had five days left. He took the view that the thing to do was to file the claim and then call ACAS. The Claimant’s claims were accepted by ACAS. When he contacted ACAS he was given a case number and then a certificate. He had not understood there was anything wrong with the process he had followed. Had ACAS informed him to withdraw his claim and to issue a fresh one, he would have done so. But ACAS did not; rather they allocated him a case number.

[26]ACAS is not a process most employers feel inclined to engage with. It is voluntary. The Claimant knew the Respondent would not engage with it. He went through the early conciliation process, very swiftly, and as he expected the Respondent indicated it would defend the claim.

[27]The Employment Tribunal’s purpose is to allow employees to challenge behaviour. It should not set up arbitrary procedural pitfalls or hurdles for Claimants. It certainly should not do that retrospectively once a claim has been accepted.

[28]The Tribunal made a procedural mistake in accepting the claim but the fault for that mistake should lie with the Tribunal. It should have rejected his claim, and the Claimant would then have been in time to return to ACAS and issue fresh proceedings. Nobody told him of the problem until almost a year after he issued his claim. The original date for the Preliminary Hearing, in October 2025, was postponed by the Tribunal for lack of judicial resources.

[29]The Claimant’s claim was accepted, by both ACAS and the Tribunal and he went through the early conciliation process. To the extent that there was a procedural problem, it was for the Tribunal or ACAS to deal with it.

[30]The Claimant could not imagine a more blatant example of unfair dismissal. The details of the claims show the Tribunal how angry he is about how he has been treated by the Respondent. If the Respondent was honest with itself, it would accept his treatment was unfair. The Respondent’s response to the claim was so ridiculous it should be dismissed.

[31]At his earlier claim the Respondent to that claim had sought to argue about time limits. The questioning of jurisdiction is a recurring theme.

[32]It was extremely unfair to the Claimant to dismiss his claims now in these circumstances. Fundamentally, given the Tribunal accepted the claim the Tribunal should accept the consequences of the mistake. It is not right for the Tribunal to accept the claim, for ACAS to accept it and to give it an EC number only for the Tribunal to raise the matter a year later. It was a procedural matter, and he should be given special dispensation. Analysis and decision

[33]The claims in the Claimant’s ET1 are relevant proceedings which required the Claimant to provide the prescribed information to ACAS in accordance with subsection (1) of section 18A of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996. The only possible exception is the complaint relying on ‘flagrantly unfair and offensive behaviour by my employer and it’s officers’, which I deal with separately below.

[34]In accordance with subsection (8), the Claimant could not institute the relevant proceedings, set out in the ET1, without a certificate from ACAS issued under subsection (4).

[35]The ET1 is dated 31 January 2025. The ACAS certificate is dated 3 February 2025. The Claimant therefore did not have an ACAS certificate as required under subsection (4) when he presented his claim form for the purposes of instituting proceedings.

[36]I am bound by the decision in Reynolds. In those circumstances, and in accordance with the decision of the Court of Appeal in Reynolds, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider any of the claims in the ET1.

[37]I can see no reason to distinguish the circumstances of the Claimant’s case from those considered in Reynolds. In that case, Mrs Reynolds’ claim was, like the Claimant’s case, not rejected when it should have been, and was allowed to proceed. Like the Claimant, it was not until a preliminary hearing that Mrs Reynolds failure to contact ACAS before instituting proceedings was identified.

[38]The Court of Appeal expressly considered the potential unfairness that may arise in a case like the Claimant’s, where issuing fresh proceedings in order to remedy the failure to consult ACAS may result in a risk that the fresh claim is brought out of time. The fact that this may be a harsh outcome in certain cases could not justify construing s.18A as not imposing a limit on the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

[39]Further, I am satisfied the decision in Reynolds expressly considered the unfairness of the late identification of the issue by the Tribunal, relied on by the Claimant in his submissions. As noted in Reynolds, the root cause of the issue is the failure by the Claimant to invoke the process of early conciliation. Therefore, whilst I understand the Claimant’s frustration that the Tribunal erroneously accepted his claim with the consequence that he was not informed of the problem in a timely way, I do not accept the root cause of the failure is that of the Tribunal.

[40]I have considered the Claimant’s argument that his claim is a good one, and the response a poor one. At this stage, the merits of the Claimant’s claim are not relevant to the decision I must make as to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

[41]I have considered the Claimant’s argument that he believed the process of early conciliation was unlikely to bear fruit. In drafting the legislation in the way it did, Parliament clearly regarded the process as mandatory. The likelihood of its success is not a relevant factor. The obligation is on the Claimant to comply with the provisions of s18A whether or not he considered it was worth doing so.

[42]Finally, as to the complaint relying on ‘flagrantly unfair and offensive behaviour by my employer and it’s officers’, to the extent that complaint is different from the others identified by Employment Judge Crossfill in his Case Management Order of 13 February 2026, I cannot identify the legal basis for it. Therefore, I am not satisfied that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over it.

[43]For those reasons, I dismiss the claimant’s claims set out in the ET1 in full, pursuant to rule 28 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024. I am satisfied that the substantive requirements of fairness imposed by that rule have been met through the process of(i) Employment Judge Crosfill drawing the Claimant’s attention to the matter at the Preliminary Hearing on 13 February 2026,

(ii) the passage of time between 13 February 2026 and today’s hearing which allowed the Claimant the opportunity to consider his position and prepare his representations; and

(iii) the opportunity the Claimant had today to make his oral arguments to me in advance of my decision.

[44]To the extent that there has been any non-compliance with the requirements of rule 28, in that written representations were not ordered to be provided by the Claimant, I consider it is just to waive the requirement for written representations. This is because the requirements of fairness imposed by rule 28 have been met in substance if not in form.

[45]In any event, even if I am wrong that rule 28 is the appropriate rule of procedure by which to deal with this issue, or wrong that it is just to waive the requirement for written representations, I would have struck out the Claimant’s claims in the ET1 under rule 38(1)(a) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 in the alternative. As the Court of Appeal explained in Reynolds, a claimant can have no reasonable prospect of succeeding with a complaint the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to entertain.

[46]At the end of the hearing, I explained to the Claimant that he was entitled to ask me to reconsider my decision, and that I would need to consider whether there is no reasonable prospect of my judgment being varied or revoked when deciding whether to reconsider my judgment. I also explained that the Claimant can appeal my decision to the Employment Appeal Tribunal and informed the Claimant that he should research and comply with the time limits for doing so, if he wanted to pursue an appeal.

[47]Finally, I should record that at the conclusion of the hearing, I explained again to the Claimant, as Employment Judge Crosfill had done at the preliminary hearing on 13 February 2026, that he is entitled to issue fresh proceedings relying on his ACAS certificate and completing the ET1 correctly. I indicated again that were he to do so, it might be that the claims would be barred because of the statutory time limits. I explained that, should the Claimant bring fresh proceedings, the Claimant would be entitled to advance the arguments made to me today as to the reasons for the delay and where the fault should lie for those reasons to an Employment Judge dealing with the question of time limits in relation to any fresh proceedings. Approved by: