Mrs G McLaughlinMr J QuinlanRepresented herself with assistance from Paul Vassallo for claimantDate 24 February 2025
JUDGMENT
[1]The complaint of unfavourable treatment because of something arising in consequence of disability is well-founded and succeeds.[2]The complaint of failure to make reasonable adjustments for disability is wellfounded and succeeds.[3]The complaint of unfair dismissal is well-founded. The Claimant was unfairly dismissed.[4]The complaint that the Respondent failed to pay the Claimant a redundancy payment is not well-founded and is dismissed.[5]The Respondent must pay the Claimant £54,897.56, composed of the following:(1) Basic award for unfair dismissal: £3,715.97; 1 of 2 Case Number: 3200045/2024(2) Compensation for loss of earnings (arising from a failure to make reasonable adjustments): £3,226.20;(3) Compensation for loss of earnings (arising from discrimination arising from disability resulting in dismissal): £22,955.39;(4) Compensation for injury to feelings (arising from a failure to make reasonable adjustments and discrimination arising from disability resulting in dismissal): £15,000;(5) Compensation for personal injury (arising from a failure to make reasonable adjustments and discrimination arising from disability resulting in dismissal): £10,000.[6]For the purposes of the Employment Protection (Recoupment of Benefits) Regulations 1996:(1) The total monetary award for unfair dismissal is £3,715.97.(2) The prescribed element is £0.(3) The prescribed element relates to 17 October 2023 to 24 February 2025.(4) The amount by which the total monetary award for unfair dismissal exceeds the prescribed element is £3,715.97. JUDGMENT having been sent to the parties on 4 March 2025 and reasons having been requested in accordance with Rule 60(3) of the Rules of Procedure 2024.
REASONS
[1]The Claimant was employed by the Respondent between 28 November 2005 and 16 October 2023. She was dismissed without notice. She was employed originally as a Health Care Assistant, and later as a Pathology Coordinator.[2]The Respondent is a company with approximately 8,600 employees, operating private hospitals. It provides a wide spectrum of medical and surgical services. 1 of 27
The claims
[3]The Claimant claims for the following:(1) Discrimination arising from disability;(2) Failure to make reasonable adjustments;(3) Unfair dismissal (the reason for dismissal being in dispute; the Respondent says that the reason was ill health capability, whereas the Claimant says that it was redundancy); and(4) Redundancy pay.[4]On 22 November 2023 ACAS was notified under the early conciliation procedure. On 3 January 2024 ACAS issued the early conciliation certificate. On 5 January 2024 the ET1 Claim Form was presented. On or around 2 April 2024 the ET3 Response Form was presented.
The issues
[5]In a Preliminary Hearing on 11 July 2024 Employment Judge Reid discussed the case with the parties and prepared a list of issues. That list of issues is contained in Case Management Orders made on 11 July 2024 and sent to the parties on 18 July 2024. It also appears at Annex A to this judgment. Procedure, documents, and evidence heard Procedure This has been an in-person hearing.[7]At the start of the hearing we checked whether any reasonable adjustments were required. The Claimant asked for regular breaks. Later on, the Claimant requested a suitable back support, which was provided. Documents[8]We were provided with a Hearing Bundle. Further, at the start of the hearing we read an opening note prepared by the Respondent’s representative. Further, during the course of the evidence we were shown medical records of the Claimant’s sister, and some evidence relating to attempts to obtain further work.[9]Witness statements were provided separately from the following witnesses:(1) Leanne Mifsud, the Claimant;(2) Maria Mifsud, the Claimant’s sister;(3) Michael Clements, the Claimant’s former manager;(4) Alison Moss, the Respondent’s Head of People Operations. 2 of 27 Evidence[10]We heard evidence under oath from the Claimant and Ms Moss. They adopted their witness statements and answered questions. Maria Mifsud and Michael Clements were not called to give oral evidence. We set out below how we have dealt with the weight to be attributed to their evidence. Closing submissions[11]The parties made oral closing submissions. Findings of fact Our approach to the evidence of witnesses[12]Ms Moss was placed in a difficult position by the Respondent. By her own admission, she was the wrong person to give evidence on many areas relevant to the dismissal and appeal processes. Neither the Claimant’s Line Manager (who made the decision to dismiss) nor the Appeal Officer were called as witnesses by the Respondent. An attempt was made to request the cooperation of each of them. We accept Ms Moss’s evidence that the Claimant’s Line Manager left the Respondent in difficult circumstances. We also accept her evidence that the Appeal Officer is in Iraq. However, no request was made for a witness order to compel the attendance of either witness. No request was made for the Appeal Officer to give evidence from Iraq, which is permissible according to the Taking of Evidence Unit of the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office. The attempt to contact each of these potential witnesses does not suggest a concerted effort to secure their cooperation in providing evidence. As a result of these potential witnesses providing no evidence, there is nothing that can challenge the Claimant’s account. Indeed, the Respondent’s representative in cross-examination was unable to challenge the accuracy of that account. The account was inherently credible, internally consistent, and consistent with other material available to us. Taken together, this all lends support to the Claimant’s account.[13]We have not been given any reason why Mr Clements could not attend as a witness. Ordinarily this would undermine the weight given to his evidence. However, no part of Mr Clements’ witness statement is in dispute. It relates to the background to the Claimant’s employment.[14]Maria Mifsud is the Claimant’s sister. The Claimant provided medical evidence showing that she is unwell. However, nothing in the medical evidence shows that she could not attend the Tribunal even remotely. As a result, this significantly reduces the weight that we are able to attach to her evidence.[15]The Claimant and Ms Moss were both impressive and honest witnesses. Each of them sought to assist the Tribunal and gave frank evidence, some of which was detrimental to their own side’s case. We accept the oral evidence of both witnesses as it related to matters within their personal knowledge. Both of them were telling the truth. 3 of 27 The Respondent’s activities and its policies[16]The Respondent operates a large number of hospitals across the United Kingdom. In particular, it operates the London Independent Hospital (“LIH”). The surgical services LIH provides include gynaecology and pain management.[17]The Respondent has policies covering all areas of its work. These include a Disciplinary Policy, a Parental Leave Policy, a Special Leave Policy, and a Sickness and Absence Management Policy (the last of which we refer to below as “the Policy”).[18]The Policy was authored by Hana Quttaineh, Head of People Operations and Resourcing. Ms Quttaineh now goes by the name Hana Search. She became directly involved in the latter stages of the Claimant’s dismissal process. At the time of the hearing in this case she was on maternity leave.[19]The Policy provides as follows in particular: “3.8 Managers should keep in contact with the member of staff if the absence is prolonged (over 7 days) to check on their progress.” “5.1 Self-certificates If an employee is sick for seven calendar days or less, they must complete a Form…” “5.2 Fit Notes (Medical Certificates) 5.2.1 If an employee is sick for eight calendar days or more, they must send their line manager a fit note from their GP covering the absence from the eighth day…” “18.8 At each meeting, staff and managers should discuss the likely duration of absence as well as any steps that can affect a return to work taking into account any advice from Occupational Health and the employee’s GP/specialist. After each meeting actions, timescales and the date of the next meeting should be decided and confirmed in writing.”[20]The Policy also provides that where an employee’s length of service exceeds 261 weeks they are entitled to 13 weeks of company sick pay in a 12-month rolling period. This can be extended on application.[21]In cases of long-term absence the Policy requires meetings to take place after 28 calendar days of absence (“Step 1”), 56 calendar days of absence (“Step 2”), and 84 calendar days of absence (“Step 3”). Step 3 is expressed as being analogous to a formal Disciplinary Hearing.[22]Where dismissal due to ill-health capacity is considered, the Policy sets the following requirements: “19.1 Dismissal on Grounds of Incapacity, before taking a decision to dismiss employees the Company will consider all the opportunities for 4 of 27 handling any medical conditions that may be affecting attendance at work. This will include:• giving a reasonable opportunity for attendance to improve;• considering a phased return to work;• taking account of medical advice;• thorough exploration of making reasonable adjustments to work;• thorough exploration of alternative employment; and• considering the wishes and views of the employee. 19.2 Decisions to dismiss employees on grounds of incapacity may be made by managers provided they are satisfied that the decision is fair taking into account:• up to date information and opinions on the extent and length of any medical condition;• overall attendance and sickness absence record;• any supporting action that has been considered or might further be considered;• the implications of any health and safety or other audit carried out in that work area; and• the overall reasonableness of the decision, following advice from Peninsula (HR Advice Line) / HR Business Partner.”[23]Where an employee is dismissed in line with the Policy, there is an internal right of appeal conducted in line with the Disciplinary Policy. The Claimant’s employment by the Respondent[24]The Claimant began her work for the Respondent as a Health Care Assistant. She was later promoted into the role of Pathology Coordinator. In this role she generally worked with one other person. In her role she would receive histology samples, which she would record, checking that no errors had been made on documentation by nurses. She would also receive blood samples from the whole hospital or go to collect them, process them, and record them appropriately so they could be tested. When not undertaking those tasks she conducted “revenue capture” work relating to the pathology work. She would also regularly receive calls from consultants and patients asking about samples: with consultants she would speak on a clinical level, whereas with patients she would speak on an administrative level. There were two shifts, one from 09:00 to 17:00, and one from 12:00 to 20:00. The Claimant’s work was carried out throughout the hospital, but specifically in a room dedicated to pathology. 5 of 27[25]The Claimant originally worked full time, 37.5 hours per week. Later, she reduced this to 30 hours per week. She remained working 30 hours per week until 15 June 2022, from which date her hours were reduced to 15 hours per week.[26]During the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic the Claimant continued to work in LIH, performing her duties as usual. However, she later became pregnant. Following her becoming pregnant the government health advice was that she should “shield”. As a result, she approached management about shielding. After some delay she was sent home to allow her to shield. Initially there was no work for her to do at home, because the Respondent did not provide her with a laptop computer to work from. However, after a short delay, a laptop computer was provided. Once this was provided, the Claimant worked her full hours from home conducting the revenue capture work.[27]On 25 March 2021 the Claimant gave birth to her first child. She then took maternity leave for a full year. At the conclusion of her maternity leave she took her accrued annual leave, in line with the Respondent’s policy. The Claimant returned to work on 15 June 2022. That return to work was physically in LIH. The development of the Claimant’s health issues[28]Whilst on maternity leave, the Claimant had begun to suffer health issues. The specific nature and severity of these health issues were initially unclear to the Claimant until she saw her GP in August 2021. She was diagnosed with Pelvic Organ Prolapse. The Claimant was referred to the gynaecology team at the Royal London Hospital, where she was placed on a waiting list for possible intervention. The specific impairments that the Claimant suffered are significant and are contained within her disability impact statement, but can be summarised as(1) urine incontinence;(2) lower back pain;(3) a protruding bulge;(4) discomfort and a dragging or heavy sensation in the genital area;(5) tiredness when standing or walking;(6) anxiety;(7) stress;(8) loss of confidence;(9) low mood;(10) difficulty lifting; and(11) limited mobility when walking.[29]On the Claimant’s return to work on 15 June 2022 no reasonable adjustments were put in place to allow the Claimant to perform her role.[30]On 5 September 2022 the Claimant self-certified as sick in line with the Policy. On 12 September 2022 the Claimant presented her first fit note from her GP. Fit notes were provided as follows:(1)12 September 2022: covering the period 12 September 2022 to 12 October 2022, because of stress and vaginal prolapse symptoms;(2)11 October 2022: covering the period 11 October 2022 to 11 December 2022, because of vaginal wall prolapse and ongoing stress;(3)12 December 2022: covering the period 12 December 2022 to 29 January 2023, because of stress and vaginal prolapse;(4)27 January 2023: covering the period 27 January 2023 to 27 February 2023, because of vaginal wall prolapse and stress; 6 of 27(5)24 February 2023: covering the period 24 February 2023 to 24 May 2023, because of vaginal wall prolapse and ongoing stress;(6)23 May 2023: covering the period 23 May 2023 to 25 August 2023, because of vaginal wall prolapse and stress;(7)22 August 2023: covering the period 22 August 2023 to 22 November 2023, because of vaginal wall prolapse and stress;(8)22 November 2023: covering the period 22 November 2023 to 28 January 2024, because of vaginal wall prolapse and anxiety, and for the first time providing commentary on return to work, which was as follows: “return back to work on January 29th 2024, appointment with gynae on the 24th January for correct size pessary. Please consider return phase back to work.” The treatment required by the Claimant[31]There were two treatments that could have alleviated the Claimant’s symptoms: surgery, or a pessary. The Claimant is of childbearing age, and if she had the surgery but then became pregnant again, the benefit of the surgery would be undone. As a result this was advised against, and the Claimant was prescribed a pessary. The pessary is a non-surgical intervention which is available over the counter. It is available in multiple sizes, and has to be sized correctly for the patient for it to be effective. However, when the Claimant needed the pessary there were global supply chain issues with obtaining them. She was unable to obtain the correct size from the NHS initially.[32]Since her dismissal the Claimant obtained the correct size pessary. This has significantly alleviated her symptoms to the extent that she is now able to work performing the sort of work that she was previously. The Claimant’s pay whilst on leave[33]The Claimant was paid sick pay and some annual leave pay from the date of her self-certification on 5 September 2022. After the conclusion of her contractual sick pay it was extended for 10 weeks at 75%, and her sick pay was extended again for 13 weeks to 24 July 2023 at 50%. She then took her accrued annual leave. From September 2023 she was unpaid. The notification of health issues and non-provision of reasonable adjustments to the Claimant[34]On 15 August 2022 the Claimant’s midwife wrote a letter to be given to the Respondent. This identified the health issues the Claimant experienced. Around the same time an email was provided by the Claimant’s physiotherapist, setting out her diagnosis, symptoms, treatment, and advice to avoid heavy lifting. These documents were provided to the Respondent around the time that they were created.[35]Following the provision of her first fit note, the Line Manager referred the Claimant to Occupational Health. A report was provided dated 29 December 2022. The report set out the Claimant’s situation at the time, the treatment that she had 7 of 27 received, and recommendations. The report writer was “hopeful” of a return to work on 1 February 2023. The report recommended providing a “high stool” for the Claimant so that she could sit down as needed and avoid lengthy periods of standing. It also recommended against long periods of standing, and advised against heavy lifting. It advised that assistance should be provided with significant manual handling tasks. The report noted that treatment would be reviewed in 6 weeks’ time.[36]The Claimant provided comments on the First OH Report, which were added to it by the writer of the report. She noted that the pessary that she required to alleviate her symptoms had been supplied but was the wrong size, so it did not provide much benefit. The correct size would be given at the next appointment when it would hopefully be in stock.[37]A Second OH Report was provided on 17 February 2023. The report noted that the Claimant had hoped to have a pessary provided, but the one provided was the wrong size, and so her symptoms were ongoing until an appropriate size one was provided. It noted the existence of a shortage of the pessaries in the UK, and that it would be more than 8 weeks before one was provided. The Second OH Report assessed the Claimant as not fit for work and recommended provision of a pessary appropriate for her needs, after which she should be referred back to OH. It recommended regular informal contact with management to manage the Claimant’s anxiety. It assessed her as being disabled.[38]A Third OH Report was provided on 12 April 2023. This report was prepared by a doctor, for the first time. It noted the issue with obtaining the pessary required. It noted that one was required to alleviate symptoms and permit return to work, but that permanent incapacity to work was not proven. It assessed return to work to take a further few months. It assessed her as disabled.[39]The Claimant was in regular contact with her Line Manager. It is her preference to communicate via telephone rather than via email. She regularly called her Line Manager and, when the Line Manager was unavailable, left messages with administrative staff. The Line Manager was aware of these attempts to contact her. The Claimant reached out to senior staff of the Respondent as a result of a lack of replies from the Line Manager. The Claimant was put in contact with HR staff, who asked whether the Claimant wanted to file a grievance. The Claimant declined, but the HR staff did say that they would speak to the Line Manager.[40]The Claimant’s communications with the Line Manager were particularly aimed at ensuring that reasonable adjustments were in place so that she could return to work. She initially specifically requested the provision of a high stool, an adjustable desk, and later of relocation of her office to an empty meeting room next to a toilet to account for her incontinence issues.[41]The Respondent never made the reasonable adjustments that were identified in any OH report. They never provided a high stool. Further, they never provided an adjustable desk, or moved the Claimant’s workspace. They never suggested to the Claimant when the reasonable adjustments might be available. They never informed the Claimant that if she returned to work then the reasonable adjustments would be made available for her either immediately or in the future. 8 of 27 In the period when the Claimant was in LIH between June and September 2022 she arranged with her pathology colleague for him to obtain the samples from around the hospital to avoid her having to undertake heavy lifting tasks, as no trolley was made available for her to put samples on.[42]The Claimant found out from staff of the Respondent that they had in stock a pessary in the right size for her. That pessary, if fitted, would have significantly alleviated her symptoms and facilitated her return to work. The Claimant asked her Line Manager if the Respondent could provide one for her. The Claimant specifically enquired about the possibility of her buying it from the Respondent. As with the other reasonable adjustments that had been identified for the Claimant, the Line Manager told the Claimant to leave the matter with her. Nothing further came of this. No pessary was supplied. The sickness management process[43]On 15 June 2023 the Line Manager emailed the Claimant, saying that she had attached a letter inviting her to a meeting. The Line Manager wrote in the email, “Please don’t worry this is policy.” In the same email the Line Manager informed the Claimant about having emailed HR about sick pay. The letter was not in fact attached to the email. The Claimant was eventually sent the letter by other means. The letter was a formal invitation expressed as a “Step 1 Formal Sickness Meeting”. The letter referred to supporting the Claimant to return to work. There was no mention of possible dismissal. The Claimant was left with the impression from the way that the invitation was provided that this meeting was not placing her on a track towards dismissal.[44]On 19 July 2023 the Step 1 Sickness Meeting took place in the Claimant’s absence. The Line Manager simply recorded in the minutes an email sent by the Claimant setting out her condition at that stage, and then noting “Leanne remains unaware of when she will return to work.” The minutes were never sent to the Claimant before Tribunal proceedings began.[45]On 17 August 2023 the Line Manager emailed the Claimant, attaching a letter inviting her to a meeting. The letter expressed that this was a “Step 2 Formal Sickness Meeting”. Again, the letter referred to supporting the Claimant to return to work. There was no mention of possible dismissal. The Claimant was left with the impression from the way that the invitation was provided and its contents that this meeting was not placing her on a track towards dismissal.[46]On the same date, the Claimant complained to the Line Manager about a lack of contact from the Line Manager and lack of responses to her attempted contact.[47]On 25 August 2023 the Step 2 Sickness Meeting took place by telephone. The Claimant provided an update on her medical condition and treatment proposals. The Claimant’s child was making noise in the background. The call lasted only a few minutes and was cut off and resumed part way through. The Line Manager asked, “I wish I could help you. Is there anything else I could support you?” The Claimant replied, “I would love to say yes… but I don’t know what else what you could do.” The Line Manager then said, “Yeah. I think I also exhausted any other means to help to be honest Leanne.” At this stage no reasonable adjustments 9 of 27 had been put in place for the Claimant. The minutes of the meeting were never sent to the Claimant before Tribunal proceedings began.[48]Some time around 4 October 2023 the Claimant was invited to a Step 3 Sickness Meeting. For the first time the invitation letter referred to the possibility of dismissal on the grounds of capability.[49]On 12 October 2023 the Step 3 Sickness Meeting took place via telephone. The Claimant had some difficulty participating in the meeting. The meeting was attended by the Line Manager, Hana Search, and the Claimant. The Claimant explained her up-to-date medical position and prognosis. She noted that her symptoms were neither worse nor better. She noted that she would have a consultation in January 2024 to discuss possible surgery and she would know more then. She noted her difficulty sitting or standing for a particularly long time. She noted her wish to return to work to improve her mental state by doing so. She was asked if she could do a different role but said she would not feel comfortable taking a different role without training. She asked what the options were at that point. Only after this, towards the end of the meeting, did Hana Search say that return to work, redeployment, and reasonable adjustments would be explored to support the Claimant back to work, and “Ultimately, if we cannot a decision could be taken to dismiss you on the grounds of ill health capability.” The Claimant noted that she would be protected “under the Disability Act” due to her condition, which Ms Search agreed with, noting that the Respondent was obliged to support staff with reasonable adjustments to return to work. The overall tone of the meeting was such that the Claimant was led to believe that immediate dismissal was not in prospect and that steps would be taken to facilitate her return to work. At no stage was it clarified that if she did not return to work, or identify how she could do so at the meeting, then she would be dismissed. Due to the lack of references by the Line Manager to dismissal, and the comments by Hana Search about the Claimant being protected, the Claimant was left with the unambiguous feeling that at that time she was protected from dismissal.[50]On 16 October 2023 the Line Manager wrote to the Claimant to inform her that she was dismissed without notice. No attempt was made to bring the Claimant back to work, to provide reasonable adjustments, or to redeploy the Claimant.[51]In the words of Ms Moss, there was no “catalyst” for the decision to dismiss. The Respondent simply decided it could no longer “tolerate” the Claimant’s absence. The Claimant’s appeal[52]On 20 October 2023 the Claimant received the dismissal letter. This came as a surprise to her.[53]On 24 October 2023 the Claimant appealed against the dismissal. She set out her diagnosis, symptoms, and prognosis. She noted that in the Step 3 Sickness Meeting she had said there would be a gynaecology consultation in January 2024. She alleged a failure to carry out a reasonable investigation, and noted that she had not been told that reasonable adjustments had been put in place, nor had she been offered reduced hours. 10 of 27[54]On 13 November 2023 the appeal hearing took place. It was chaired by the Appeal Officer, who was on friendly terms with the Claimant. There was a notetaker present. The Claimant explained her diagnosis and prognosis. She noted that she had a nurse appointment in the 1st or 2nd week of January and a gynaecology appointment in the 3rd or 4th week of January. The Claimant agreed to send the proof of the appointments to the Appeal Officer after the meeting, which she did. She made clear that she wanted to return to work in January 2024 but could not give an exact date as she did not have a GP appointment to establish that at that point. She explained that the correct sized pessary would allow her return to work. Towards the end of the meeting the Appeal Officer said that he would try to support bringing the Claimant back if the Claimant was well enough and he was supported by HR in this decision. After the minute-taker left the room he noted to the Claimant that the decision was out of his hands. The minutes of the meeting were not sent to the Claimant before she commenced Tribunal proceedings.[55]On 21 November 2023 the Appeal Officer wrote to the Claimant refusing her appeal. The reason given was that “The company considers your continued absence to be an unreasonable amount of time to keep your job open for a return as we need to recruit someone to fulfil your role. There was no indication from the meeting of a likely date of return as you [sic] severe symptoms continue to persist and your next appointment in January 2024 will only assess whether surgery is an option.”[56]The Claimant received the appeal outcome on 23 November 2023. On 24 November 2023, she wrote to the Respondent noting that her GP appointment was that day (that being the earliest she could get one), and she had made clear in the appeal meeting that this GP appointment would provide a return date for her. She submitted her final fit note, which provided the date for her to return to work and details about how to ensure she returned to work. The amount of work available in pathology[57]Throughout the period of the Claimant’s shielding, maternity leave, return to work, and sick leave, there was no reduction in the amount of work required in the pathology department. When the Claimant was working from home during the COVID-19 pandemic there was more revenue capture work to undertake than she and the other pathology staff had time to complete. That remained the case on her return to work, when she went on sick leave, and after her dismissal.[58]While the Claimant was on maternity leave her role was filled by bank staff. Bank staff were also used when the Claimant was on sick leave. Bank staff continued to be used after the Claimant was dismissed, in exactly the same way as when she was on sick leave. A member of bank staff was made permanent staff in September 2024, 11 months after the Claimant was dismissed. Relevant law Defining “disability”[59]Pursuant to section 6 of the Equality Act 2010: 11 of 27 “(1) A person (P) has a disability if—(a) P has a physical or mental impairment, and(b) the impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on P's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities.”[60]Pursuant to Schedule 1, paragraph 2(1) of the Equality Act 2010: “(1) The effect of an impairment is long-term if—(a) it has lasted for at least 12 months,(b) it is likely to last for at least 12 months, or(c) it is likely to last for the rest of the life of the person affected.” Discrimination arising from a disability[61]Pursuant to section 15 of the Equality Act 2010: “(1) A person(a) (A) discriminates against a disabled person(b) (B) if— (a) A treats B unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of B's disability, and (b) A cannot show that the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply if A shows that A did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, that B had the disability.” Failure to make reasonable adjustments[62]The duty to make reasonable adjustments pursuant to section 20 of the Equality Act 2010 comprises three requirements: “(3) The first requirement is a requirement, where a provision, criterion or practice of A's puts a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled, to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to avoid the disadvantage. (4) The second requirement is a requirement, where a physical feature puts a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled, to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to avoid the disadvantage. (5) The third requirement is a requirement, where a disabled person would, but for the provision of an auxiliary aid, be put at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not 12 of 27 disabled, to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to provide the auxiliary aid.”[63]Section 94 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA 1996”) provides that an employee with sufficient qualifying service has the right not to be unfairly dismissed by their employer.[64]Section 98 of the ERA 1996 sets out potentially fair reasons for dismissal: “(1) In determining for the purposes of this Part whether the dismissal of an employee is fair or unfair, it is for the employer to show—(a) the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal, and(b) that it is either a reason falling within subsection (2) or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the employee held. (2) A reason falls within this subsection if it— (a) relates to the capability or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do, […](c) is that the employee was redundant[…] (3) In subsection (2)(a)— (a) “capability” , in relation to an employee, means his capability assessed by reference to skill, aptitude, health or any other physical or mental quality[…] (4) Where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (1), the determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair (having regard to the reason shown by the employer)— (a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer's undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and (b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case.”[65]In East Lindsey District Council v Daubney [1977] ICR 566 the EAT considered the investigations required in a case of ill-health capability. They concluded that the employee should be consulted and steps should be taken by the employer to 13 of 27 discover the true medical position. In the case of DB Schenker Rail (UK) Ltd v Doolan [2010] UKEAT/0053/09 the EAT considered this requirement in East Lindsey District Council v Daubney and held that the level of investigation required in a capability case is no higher than that required in a conduct case: what is required is a reasonable investigation of the matter.[66]In O’Brien v Bolton St Catherines Academy [2017] EWCA Civ 145 the Court of Appeal concluded that in dismissals based on sickness, “the severity of the impact on the employer of the continuing absence of an employee who is on longterm sickness absence must be a significant element in the balance that determines the point at which their dismissal becomes justified, and it is not unreasonable for a tribunal to expect some evidence on that subject.” Conclusions on liability Discrimination arising from disability[67]By August 2021 the Claimant was suffering from the impairments we have set out. The impairments from August 2021 collectively had a substantial adverse effect on the Claimant’s ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. The impairments had not lasted for 12 months at that point. However, there was no prospect of their improving without treatment. As a result, the significant adverse effects were likely to last for more than 12 months. Therefore, as of August 2021 the Claimant was disabled.[68]By 12 September 2022, as a result of the information received from the Claimant (in particular the midwife’s letter and her own comments) and the first fit note, the Respondent was aware of the Claimant’s condition, and specific symptoms the Claimant experienced. Given that the Respondent was aware that the substantial adverse effect had been present by that point for over 12 months, the Respondent was aware that the Claimant was disabled. Further, the Respondent was aware that this was a long-term health condition which would not improve without treatment, and was also for this reason aware that the Claimant was disabled. This was further supported by the OH investigations undertaken between December 2022 and April 2023 such that the Respondent remained aware at all times subsequently that the Claimant was disabled.[69]The Respondent dismissed the Claimant. The dismissal was unfavourable treatment.[70]The Claimant’s sickness absence from 5 September 2022 to 16 October 2023 arose in consequence of her disability.[71]The Respondent dismissed the Claimant because of the sickness absence.[72]The Respondent’s stated legitimate aim in dismissing the Claimant was “effective management of sickness absence management and service management, due to the Claimant’s prolonged absence from the workplace which had an adverse impact on the Respondent’s service.” This was capable of being a legitimate aim. 14 of 27[73]However, the treatment was neither an appropriate nor a reasonably necessary way to achieve this aim. This is because the Respondent’s service was not adversely impacted by the Claimant’s prolonged absence, because the Respondent hired bank staff to cover her work, and did not stop doing so for 11 months after they dismissed her. The bank staff provision had started at the commencement of maternity leave in March 2021, and there was no evidence that at any stage this use of bank staff had any impact on the Respondent’s service. If there had been such evidence we would have expected to have seen it.[74]Something less discriminatory could have been done instead of dismissing the Claimant: the Claimant was on unpaid sick leave at the time of her dismissal. The Respondent could have kept the Claimant on unpaid sick leave to await further information on her prognosis or an improvement in her condition. Doing so would have allowed the Respondent to achieve its aims to the same extent as dismissing her did, because her role was being filled by a bank worker.[75]The needs of the Claimant and Respondent should be balanced by finding that the Respondent should have continued to keep the Claimant on unpaid sick leave with her role being completed by bank staff. Any reasonable employer would have taken such an approach.[76]As such, the Claimant’s claim that she was discriminated against because of something arising from her disability is well-founded and succeeds. Reasonable adjustments[77]The Respondent did not provide a high stool, an adjustable desk for back pain, or an office near the toilet.[78]The failure to provide a high stool meant that the Claimant could not perform histology samples because without a high stool this needed to be done standing up due to the height of the desk. The failure to provide an adjustable desk meant that the Claimant suffered back pain. The failure to provide an office near the toilet meant that the Claimant suffered the effects of incontinence. Each of these failures individually and also collectively placed the Claimant at a substantial disadvantage compared to someone without her disability in that she suffered the effects of the failures (that is, inability to carry out the work, suffering pain, and the effects of incontinence) where others would not.[79]The Line Manager was informed of the needs for reasonable adjustments, and the reason for the needs. The Respondent therefore knew that the Claimant was likely to be placed at the disadvantage by the non-provision of the reasonable adjustments.[80]The Respondent could have purchased the high stool and adjustable desk and relocated the Claimant to another office near the toilet in order to avoid the disadvantage.[81]The Respondent was made aware by the Claimant of how these adjustments could avoid the disadvantage. In particular she informed the Respondent of how 15 of 27 they could be achieved. Notably, she identified an alternative meeting room that could be used as an office. The costs and administrative inconvenience of providing these adjustments would not have been significant. The Respondent has significant resources available to it to make the identified adjustments. As a result, it would have been reasonable for the Respondent to take these steps.[82]Within 2 weeks of being made aware of the need for the high stool and adjustable desk it would have been reasonable for them to have been provided by the Respondent. Also within 2 weeks of being made aware of the need for reasonable adjustments it would have been reasonable for the Respondent to relocate the Claimant to another room with adjusted office furniture in place so that the Claimant could at least have carried out the administrative revenue capture part of her job (which she had done while shielding), with other adjustments to the room being made subsequently to allow her to carry out the clinical part of her job.[83]The Respondent failed to ever put in place any adjustments for the Claimant.[84]As a result, the Claimant’s claim in relation to a failure to make reasonable adjustments is well-founded and succeeds.[85]The principal reason for dismissal was ill health capability.[86]The Respondent did not take meeting notes of the first phone meeting between the Claimant and the Line Manager, but this was because no meeting in fact took place.[87]The Respondent did not provide to the Claimant copies of the minutes of the Step 2 and Step 3 meetings.[88]The Respondent gave some warning to the Claimant of the potential outcome of the Step 3 meeting but, in the way that it couched the invitation to the meeting and the conduct of the meeting, it played down the warning it had given so that the warning was outweighed by reassurance given to the Claimant in such a way that she was not in fact warned that a potential outcome of the meeting was dismissal.[89]In assessing whether a fair procedure was adopted we do not substitute ourselves for the Respondent. We do not base our decision on the procedure that we would have adopted, but rather make an assessment of whether the procedure was in fact fair taking into account the whole of the procedure and the size and administrative resources of the Respondent. We recognise that a single failure may not be sufficient to render a procedure unfair, and even multiple failures may not make a procedure unfair: we consider the entirety of the procedure in the round.[90]Not taking meeting notes of the Step 1 meeting was not unfair, because no meeting in fact took place. 16 of 27[91]Not providing minutes of the Step 2 and Step 3 meetings to the Claimant would not in and of itself render the procedure unfair, if the procedure was otherwise fair.[92]However, when the procedure is viewed in the round, including the lack of followup after the Step 1 and Step 2 meetings, the lack of provision of minutes, the failure to confirm what subsequent actions and timescales would be after the Step 1 and Step 2 meetings (in violation of paragraph 18.8 of the Policy), the lack of any notice that dismissal was a possible outcome until the Step 3 meeting invitation was sent, and the outweighing of any warning of dismissal by reassurances of protection in the Step 3 meeting, the failure to provide warnings of dismissal rendered the procedure unfair. This is because the Claimant did not know and could not have been expected to know that dismissal could follow the Step 3 meeting and therefore she did not know that all evidence and argument supporting her continued employment needed to be put forward at the Step 3 meeting. Without that knowledge on the Claimant’s part, the Claimant was deprived of an opportunity to save her job.[93]We finally turn to whether the Respondent acted reasonably in all the circumstances in treating ill health capability as a sufficient reason to dismiss the Claimant.[94]With regard to the Line Manager’s belief – genuine or otherwise – in whether the Claimant was no longer capable of performing her duties, the Tribunal is troubled by the lack of real consideration that she gave to this question. The Line Manager never critically appraised the situation to determine whether the Claimant was in fact incapable, but rather took a superficial view of the matter, seeing that the Claimant was at the time of the decision (when no reasonable adjustments had been put in place) not performing her duties. We are willing to accept that in light of this failure to actually give consideration to the details of the matter, the Line Manager did have a genuine belief in the Claimant’s incapacity. However, that is not to say that such a genuine belief was reasonably held, a point we turn to next.[95]The Respondent did not adequately consult the Claimant before deciding to dismiss. We reach that conclusion on the basis of the failure to place the Claimant on notice of the risk of dismissal at the Step 3 Meeting, the reassurances given to her, the failure to consult her outside of meetings about what further steps could be taken to return her to work, and the fact that the Respondent did not make clear that redeployment or adjustments may be a way of avoiding dismissal.[96]The Respondent did not carry out a reasonable investigation. They did not find out the up-to-date medical position, including about prognosis about returning to work. The OH report was 6 months out of date at the date of dismissal. The Respondent did not ask the Claimant for up-to-date information from medical professionals at the Step 3 Meeting. This was not cured by the appeal process, in which the Respondent did not wait for the Claimant to provide a fit note which gave a “back to work” date despite her having(1) set January as the time when she would return to work, and(2) made clear that such a fit note is what she was waiting for. 17 of 27[97]The Respondent could reasonably have been expected to wait longer. The Claimant was off sick unpaid. She was not a burden on the Respondent. There was no “catalyst” for her dismissal. There was long-term cover in place which could and did continue. The Respondent was aware that the Claimant was awaiting medical treatment that could alleviate her symptoms. The Respondent was also aware that they could have put in place reasonable adjustments to facilitate the Claimant’s return to work within a reasonable period. There was no reason that a decision to dismiss had to be taken when it was taken. That itself does not make a decision unreasonable. However, assessing all the circumstances in the round, no reasonable employer would have taken the decision to dismiss rather than to wait until the Claimant’s prognosis became clearer. By the end of January 2024, when the Claimant had been assessed again and would have had a clearer prognosis either because a medical aid was provided or a surgery was in prospect, the Respondent may have been in a position to reasonably say that it could wait no longer. However, it knew that a prognosis would become clearer on such a timescale, and it chose not to wait for its own reasons, rather than because a decision needed to be made. No reasonable employer would have taken such an approach because there was no downside to the continued employment without pay of the Claimant to await her possible return in January 2024.[98]Taking all that in the round, dismissal was not within the range of reasonable responses. No reasonable employer would have dismissed rather than waiting until January 2024 for the position to become clearer.[99]The Claimant was therefore both substantively and procedurally unfairly dismissed and the claim for unfair dismissal is well-founded. Redundancy pay[100]The Claimant was not redundant. The reason for her (unfair) dismissal was illhealth capability. As a result, the claim for redundancy pay is not well-founded and is dismissed. Conclusions on remedy Basis of remedy calculations[101]We begin by determining the Claimant’s gross and net pay. We calculate this based on 15 hours’ work per week, because this is what the Claimant was working throughout the entire period from her return to work to her dismissal. It is also what she would have continued to work if she continued to be employed. Further, it is the number of hours that she would work if she had new employment. On that basis:(1) The Claimant’s gross weekly pay was £225.21.(2) The Claimant’s net weekly pay was £215.08.[102]The Claimant did not cause or contribute to her own dismissal. The Claimant would not have been dismissed if a fair procedure had been used. 18 of 27[103]The Respondent invited us to conclude that the Claimant had not taken reasonable steps to mitigate her loss. However, we concluded that she had taken such steps as were reasonable. We concluded that it would take another 26 weeks from the date of our oral judgment to find new employment, and such employment would be comparable to the employment from which she was dismissed. We reached these conclusions for the following reasons.[104]It was understandable that the Claimant did not immediately seek new work when she was dismissed: she wanted to be re-employed by the Respondent, and she was off sick until the end of January 2024 because of the non-provision of her reasonable adjustments. Further, the Claimant required a period of reflection and recovery after the loss of a job that she had held for over 17 years: she could not be expected to attempt to find new employment immediately. Further, the Claimant was disabled, and it had been over a year since she had worked. As time went on it became longer and longer since she had worked. This would become harder and harder to explain to a prospective employer. Further, the Claimant initially took steps to find work close to her home in fields in which she had experience. She later widened out her search to other fields. She sought new work by word of mouth, going into shops to ask for jobs, and to a small extent online. This was a reasonable approach. Further, there is a limit to the amount that the Claimant can work and the work that she can do because of her disability. This makes it harder for her to find work. Further, the Claimant’s psychiatric health was made worse by her condition and by her treatment by the Respondent, and this again made it harder for her to look for and obtain new employment.[105]We are more hopeful for the Claimant’s future employment prospects. The Claimant will no longer have this case hanging over her. She will be able to dedicate time to looking for work. She will have an improvement in her psychiatric health as a result of the vindication she has had in this case: we have publicly held that she in the right. Nonetheless, it will remain difficult for her to find employment. Given the time since she has worked, her disability, the fact that she has brought her last employer to an employment tribunal, and her lack of employment in any role other than the one from which she was dismissed, it will take her some more time to find employment. It should take another 26 weeks to find new employment comparable to her previous employment.[106]In order to prevent double recovery, we have made no Compensatory Award for unfair dismissal. Instead, the Claimant’s compensation falls to be considered in light of our findings in relation to discrimination.[107]The levels at which we have set the awards in this case take account of what would ordinarily be the need to gross up parts of the award which are subject to tax. As a result, some of the figures are higher than the figures requested by the Claimant because the Claimant did not account for taxation. We have indicated below which awards are attributable to dismissal and which are attributable to something else so that tax liabilities can be determined. Remedy for unfair dismissal[108]The Claimant is entitled to a Basic Award for unfair dismissal. 19 of 27[109]At the date of her dismissal she was 38 years old. She had completed 17 full years of service with the Respondent. As a result she is entitled to 16.5 weeks’ gross pay. That is wholly attributable to the unfair dismissal of the Claimant. 16.5 x £225.21 = £3,715.97. Remedy for discrimination[110]The Claimant invited us to make a recommendation as part of the remedy for discrimination. She was keen to ensure that no one else had to go through what she experienced. The Respondent resisted the making of a recommendation. They said that the incident was a one-off, that there was no risk of further discrimination taking place, and that the individual responsible for the treatment of the Claimant had left its employment.[111]We concluded that a recommendation would not be an appropriate remedy. Although the circumstances of the case lead us to conclude that there was insufficient oversight of the decision-makers in this case, we are persuaded by the Respondent’s submissions that this issue is not likely to recur. We are reinforced in this view by the attention that has been paid by the Respondent’s HR department to these proceedings, and the fact that there now exists a public judgment relating to the Respondent’s failures. In the circumstances the making of a recommendation would be unnecessary.[112]We turn then to the Claimant’s losses for which she must be compensated.[113]While the Claimant remained employed she spent 10 weeks on sick leave at 75% pay. The fact that she was not in work during this period, and therefore on full pay, was wholly attributable to the Respondent’s failure to make reasonable adjustments. If the Respondent had made reasonable adjustments then the Claimant would have been able to work. That means that she lost 25% of her net pay of £215.08 per week each of those weeks. 10 x £215.08 x 0.25 = £537.70.[114]While the Claimant remained employed she spent a further 13 weeks on sick leave at 50% pay. This again was wholly attributable to the Respondent’s failure to make reasonable adjustments. That means that she lost 50% of her net pay of £215.08 per week each of those weeks. 13 x £215.08 x 0.5 = £1,398.02.[115]While the Claimant remained employed she spent a further 6 weeks on sick leave unpaid. This again was wholly attributable to the Respondent’s failure to make reasonable adjustments. That means that she lost 100% of her net pay of £215.08 per week each of those weeks. 6 x £215.08 x 1 = £1,290.48.[116]From the dismissal to the date of our judgment was 70.5714 weeks. The Claimant has not received any further earnings in that period. That is wholly attributable to the discriminatory (and unfair) dismissal of the Claimant. 70.5714 x £215.08 = £15,178.50. 20 of 27[117]The Claimant also lost out on 4.5% employer’s pension contributions for the period between her dismissal and our judgment. That is wholly attributable to the discriminatory (and unfair) dismissal of the Claimant. 70.5714 x £215.08 x 0.045 = £683.13.[118]We concluded that the Claimant will find new employment in 26 weeks. Until then she continues to suffer a complete loss of earnings. That is wholly attributable to the discriminatory (and unfair) dismissal of the Claimant. 26 x £215.08 = £5,592.08[119]The Claimant will also lose out on 4.5% employer’s pension contributions for the period between our judgment and finding new employment. That is wholly attributable to the discriminatory (and unfair) dismissal of the Claimant. 26 x £215.08 x 0.045 = £251.68.[120]The Claimant has lost her right to long notice and statutory protection. That is particularly important to a person in the Claimant’s position who had over 17 years’ continuous employment with one employer, and who is disabled. That is wholly attributable to the discriminatory (and unfair) dismissal of the Claimant. We judge that adequate compensation for this is £1,250.[121]The Claimant suffered injury to feelings as a result of the Respondent’s actions. This injury to feelings is attributable to both the failure to make reasonable adjustments and the discriminatory dismissal. It is impossible to separate out the injuries to feelings from each of these two causes. This case falls towards the bottom end of the middle Vento band. We judge that adequate compensation for injury to feelings is £15,000.[122]The Claimant suffered psychiatric harm including depression, anxiety, and stress, as a result of a combination of her traumatic labour and the symptoms she experienced subsequently. However, the effect of the Respondent’s failure to provide reasonable adjustments and decision to dismiss the Claimant was to worsen her existing symptoms. The Respondent is not responsible for the Claimant having psychiatric symptoms, but solely for making those symptoms worse. We therefore consider the compensation due for personal injury for the worsening of the existing conditions. This personal injury is attributable to both the failure to make reasonable adjustments and the discriminatory dismissal.[123]The impact of the Respondent’s actions was to significantly worsen the Claimant’s psychiatric issues. Considering the Judicial College Guidelines, if the Respondent had caused all of the psychiatric issues then this case would have fallen into “Cases of work-related stress resulting in a permanent or long-standing disability preventing a return to comparable employment would appear to come within this category”. However, the Claimant was not caused all that harm by the Respondent: all the Respondent did was make the Claimant’s condition worse. In our judgment the Respondent exacerbated the existing harm to an extent that 21 of 27 can be adequately compensated by an award for personal injury of £10,000. Employment Judge Knight Dated: 19 March 2025 22 of 27 ANNEX 1: LIST OF ISSUES Discrimination arising from disability (Equality Act 2010 section 15)[1]Did the respondent treat the claimant unfavourably by dismissing the claimant?[2]Did the following things arise in consequence of the claimant’s disability: the claimant’s sickness absence between 12 September 2022 and 16 October 2023?[3]Did the respondent dismiss the claimant because of that sickness absence?[4]Was the treatment a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim? The respondent says that its aims were “effective management of sickness absence management and service management, due to the Claimant’s prolonged absence from the workplace which had an adverse impact on the Respondent’s service.”[5]The Tribunal will decide in particular:(1) was the treatment an appropriate and reasonably necessary way to achieve those aims;(2) could something less discriminatory have been done instead;(3) how should the needs of the claimant and the respondent be balanced?[6]Did the respondent know or could it reasonably have been expected to know that the claimant had the disability (pelvic organ prolapse)? From what date? Reasonable adjustments (Equality Act 2010, sections 20 and 21)[7]Did the respondent know, or could it reasonably have been expected to know that the claimant had the disability (pelvic organ prolapse)? From what date?[8]Did the lack of an auxiliary aid, namely the respondent not providing:(1) a high chair to work from in the lab to avoid having to stand,(2) an office near the toilet due to incontinence 23 of 27(3) an adjustable desk for back pain put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage compared to someone without the claimant’s disability, in that the claimant:(4) could not perform histology samples in the lab without a high chair because this otherwise needs to be done standing up because the desk is so high(5) Suffered the effects of incontinence, and(6) Suffered back pain.[9]Did the respondent know, or could it reasonably have been expected to know that the claimant was likely to be placed at the disadvantage?[10]What steps could have been taken to avoid the disadvantage? The claimant suggests the respondent could have:(1) purchased the high chair and adjustable desk, and(2) relocated the claimant to another office near the toilet.[11]Was it reasonable for the respondent to have to take those steps and when? Did the respondent fail to take those steps?[13]What was the reason or principal reason for dismissal? The respondent says the reason was ill health capability. The claimant says it was a (hidden) redundancy reason ie disputes the real reason for dismissal.[14]Did the respondent fail to follow a fair dismissal procedure by:(1) Not taking meeting notes at the first phone meeting with the claimant’s line manager(2) Not giving the claimant a copy of the minutes of the 2nd and 3rd meetings(3) Not warning the claimant that dismissal was a potential outcome. 24 of 27[15]Did the respondent act reasonably in all the circumstances in treating that as a sufficient reason to dismiss the claimant? The Tribunal will usually decide, in particular, whether:(1) The respondent genuinely believed the claimant was no longer capable of performing their duties;(2) The respondent adequately consulted the claimant;(3) The respondent carried out a reasonable investigation, including finding out about the up-to-date medical position;(4) The respondent could reasonably be expected to wait longer before dismissing the claimant;(5) Dismissal was within the range of reasonable responses.[16]If redundancy was the reason or principal reason for dismissal, did the respondent follow a fair redundancy procedure including warning and consultation with the claimant? Redundancy pay[17]Was the claimant entitled to redundancy pay (either statutory or enhanced) and, if so, how much? Remedy for unfair dismissal[18]Does the claimant wish to be reinstated to their previous employment? The claimant says she is not at this stage seeking reinstatement but keeps the option open.[19]If there is a compensatory award, how much should it be? The Tribunal will decide:(1) What financial losses has the dismissal caused the claimant?(2) Has the claimant taken reasonable steps to replace their lost earnings, for example by looking for another job? 25 of 27(3) If not, for what period of loss should the claimant be compensated?(4) Is there a chance that the claimant would have been fairly dismissed anyway if a fair procedure had been followed, or for some other reason?(5) If so, should the claimant’s compensation be reduced? By how much?(6) If the claimant was unfairly dismissed, did she cause or contribute to dismissal by blameworthy conduct?(7) If so, would it be just and equitable to reduce the claimant’s compensatory award? By what proportion?(8) Does the statutory cap of fifty-two weeks’ pay or £105,707 apply?(9) What basic award is payable to the claimant, if any?(10) Would it be just and equitable to reduce the basic award because of any conduct of the claimant before the dismissal? If so, to what extent? Remedy for discrimination[20]Should the Tribunal make a recommendation that the respondent take steps such as management training on understanding disability?[21]What financial losses has the discrimination caused the claimant?[22]Has the claimant taken reasonable steps to replace lost earnings, for example by looking for another job?[23]If not, for what period of loss should the claimant be compensated?[24]What injury to feelings has the discrimination caused the claimant and how much compensation should be awarded for that?[25]Has the discrimination caused the claimant personal injury (anxiety and depression leading to worsened prolapse symptoms) and how much compensation should be awarded for that?[26]Is there a chance that the claimant’s employment would have ended in any 26 of 27 event? Should their compensation be reduced as a result?[27]The Claimant does not claim any failure to deal with a grievance (relevant to the ACAS Code of Practice) because she did not raise one. 27 of 27