Ms L E Katte v Homerton University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust: 3200014/2019
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 3200014/2019
Between
Ms L E KatteClaimantHomerton University Hospital NHS Foundation TrustRespondent
Before
Employment Judge PrichardDate 13 November 2019
JUDGMENT
[1]This preliminary hearing listed to consider strike out and/or deposit of the claims is hereby adjourned to Wednesday 23 October 2019 at East London Tribunal Service, 2nd Floor, Import Building (formerly Anchorage House), 2 Clove Crescent, London E14 2BE starting at 10.00am. Time estimate 1 day.[2]No future hearings are to be before the present Judge, who recuses himself.[3]Under Rule 76(1)(c) of the Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2013, the claimant is ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the adjournment in the sum of £850.
REASONS
The hearing
[1]The same one-day preliminary hearing with the same agenda to consider striking out or ordering deposits on any of the claimant’s claims will now be heard on Wednesday 23 October 2019 at East London Hearing at 10.00am - time estimate one day.[2]This is an unusual case. The claim form in its original state was hardly comprehensible. Accordingly, orders were made by Judge Burgher in writing for further information of the discrimination claims. There were two orders - one for particulars of the claim itself and of the alleged discrimination, and another concerning the claimant’s disability.[3]The claimant has a rare condition. She has nerve palsy caused by a road traffic accident in April 2015 when she was driving in Ireland with two of her children in the car. Since then she developed neurological symptoms - principally recurrent migraines, and at one stage double vision but a great deal of eye strain and difficulty with her right eye. Not surprisingly, looking at computers for long periods is a strain for her.[4]The claimant complains of sundry other disabilities these have understandably not been accepted by the respondent as amounting to disabilities. By a letter from Hempsons Solicitors on 13 June 2019 the respondent accepts the claimant’s nerve palsy falls within the definition in s 6 of the Equality Act 2010. The palsy affects the intracranial nerves 4, 5, and 6. The concession, which I am sure was rightly made, therefore means the claimant was a disabled person at the time of the events she complains of.[5]The respondent does not accept that the claimant’s hypertension, IBS, right-side weakness, or rare sinusitis meet the Section 6 definition but that should not matter because the claimant’s main problems in this case were to do with her optical impairments, and the resulting headaches. The disability threshold is not a problem here.[6]The problem today is with everything else in the case i.e. the stated claims. I was relieved and thankful to be told that the original claims of maternity, sexual orientation, age, and sex discrimination have all been withdrawn and are no longer pursued. The respondent’s knowledge of the claimant’s palsy is not an issue either. The respondent has throughout been aware of the claimant’s nerve palsy. There has been a history of work place assessments, and adjustments etc. It is a controversial history. The claimant maintains the respondent did not do enough. The respondent says they did everything they could reasonably have done.[7]There is also an extant claim for holiday pay here. I understand that the respondent like majority of employers would not pay for days not worked. If someone returns on a phased return, say 3 days a week, and 2 days are not worked, they would only be paid for 3 days. Sometimes an employer, usually with the employee’s agreement would pay the other two days as accrued holiday, or contractual sick pay, in order to maintain salary at its normal full-time level. That is a common practice. I have mentioned to the parties today the case of O’Hanlon v Commissioners of Revenue & Customs [2007] CA Civ 283. The important principle in that leading case is that it is not a reasonable adjustment to extend sick pay, to create disability leave or to facilitate an employee’s absence from the workplace. That would be entirely contrary to all disability discrimination legislation which aims to facilitate attendance at work, not absence. An extension of that principle, I consider, clearly applies to this practice regarding phased returns, and would probably also apply to attending a large number of medical appointments as the claimant, through no fault of her own, has had to do. However, I know of no authority on that point.[8]The claimant works in a senior non-clinical nursing role as a Band 8A trained nurse / microbiologist. She is employed as the Lead for Safeguarding Adults with the respondent Trust. It is a unique role within the Trust there is only one such lead and the respondent had said that they require that role to be visible at the hospital, which was understandable. Nonetheless she was granted one day per week home working as a reasonable adjustment, because of her disability from the RTA.[9]The matter came for a preliminary case management hearing before Judge Tobin on 15 April and he made an order listing this case today for a preliminary hearing to consider Rule 37(1)(a) strike out / Rule 39 deposit. We later received the claimant’s 52- page Detailed Statement of Grounds, on 29/04/2019, which is clearly drafted by Captain Achunche. The document was extraordinarily hard to read, repetitive, and for the most part incomprehensible. It abounds in inappropriate legal references and is full of hyperbole - a quote to give a feel of it: “R’s managers found C’s constant reference to authorities and use of legal principles and legal terminology that they described their conduct as illegal unlawful, irrational, unfair, egregious and inexplicable errors of law, bias, abuse of power, wrongful and/or unlawful exercise of discretion with specific references to judgments handed down by tribunals and court in this jurisdiction the ECHR, ECJ and CJEU offensive.” I am not sure what any tribunal is supposed to do with that.[10]There is constant and inflammatory reference to fabrications, forgery, abuse, bad faith, and fraud. Indeed, at the beginning of this hearing Captain Achunche asserted that “the respondent is playing fast and loose with the rules from the moment that they put in their ET3 response”. No explanation was given for that sweeping statement, and it appears demonstrably untrue.[11]I am in an invidious position today I cannot help a claimant who is represented. Representing a person before the tribunal is a huge responsibility. The tribunal makes allowances for unrepresented people. We talk to them, we try to understand their cases. We do not do that with people who are represented. A person who is poorly represented, as here, therefore suffers a double disadvantage. They are two-time losers. They have bad representation, and they lose the tribunal’s allowances. There is legal authority for the proposition that the tribunal cannot take it upon itself to sack a party’s chosen representative - Bache v Essex County Council [2000] IRLR, 251, CA.[12]I have asked Captain Achunche to give serious consideration to standing down. I have told him squarely that I consider that this case as it stands now is completely untriable. This is preventing the case from getting started and it is more than possible that the final hearing in March 2020 (5-days) may well have have to be postponed if the case preparation cannot take place. Now, nothing can be done until we have been through this preliminary hearing to consider strike outs and deposits. It is holding progress up[13]I was on the point of striking this out on the basis of that 52-page detailed grounds on the basis of 37(1)(a) that the claim had “no reasonable prospect of success”, but also, and unusually, under 37(1)(e) of the 2013 Rules “that the tribunal considers it is no longer possible to have a fair hearing in respect of the claim…”. Both currently apply.[14]The holiday pay claim is at least comprehensible but because of O’Hanlon it has no reasonable prospect of succeeding.[15]The problem is that the overlay of legalese particularly over the reasonable adjustments, and the super-abundance of irrelevant and ancient authorities which more often than not are not explained (just a stark direction “See”), make this potentially triable case, untriable.[16]I cannot remedy that and do not consider that Captain Achunche will ever be capable of doing so either. He seems to consider that this was his best shot. It has obviously been time-consuming for him, even allowing for copious amounts of obvious “Copy and Paste”.[17]There are irrelevant matters. The claimant sent a letter to the respondent as a reaction to the dismissal of the appeal against her flexible working request from Ms Pelley. By the way it was presented in the email, it seemed to be embedded in a High Court writ. The respondent took the view that this looked deliberate and appeared to be designed to intimidate. Captain Achnunche says it was a complete administrative error on their part. There has been a formal investigation into this but it has not got under way. Nothing can happen. The claimant is not engaging with the process at all. A formal meeting was tried. The claimant did not attend.[18]There was another problem in as much as the claimant has history of covertly recording meetings. She was specifically told not to do so, and yet continued to do so. At some meetings she said she would not guarantee that she was not recording it, so the meeting did not go ahead and was called off.[19]Captain Achunche comes back with a whole load of case authorities on covert recordings in evidence in civil proceedings. That is totally beside the point. What this looks like is disobeying a reasonable request from your management to stop recording meetings. Currently, this whole incident has nothing whatsoever to do with the claim which is before the tribunal.[20]There has been discussion of the legal definition of forgery. The respondent has come close to accusing the claimant of fraudulent doctoring a document for the purpose of causing alarm (the High Court Writ above). Again, this whole incident has nothing whatsoever to do with the claim which is before the tribunal.[21]I am afraid Dr Achunche has a tendency to use the law as an instrument of oppression against the respondent. This is utterly inappropriate in today’s workplace or any other day’s workplace. The tribunal needs to know the facts of a case. We do not need rafts of authorities. Legal authorities come (if at all) all right at the end of the final hearing when the parties are making their submissions. There are often none, and usually a pared down selection of relevant authorities if the case contains unusual contentions, which this case does not. These authorities have no place in a claim form or a Detailed Grounds of claim.[22]The main claim seemed in this case to be for reasonable adjustments, and under Section 15 of the Equality Act 2010. References in this pleading to the DDA 1995 are mistaken and wrong. It was repealed in 2010 when the Equality Act 2010was enacted. Section 5 of the DDA 1995 is a different section from Section 15 of the Equality Act 2010. The former is history, repealed before the claimant even started work for the respondent in 2014. The academic jurisprudential comparison of the sections by Dr Achunche is of no help. It looks like showing off - legal debate for the sake of debate.[23]I gave the claimant and her husband time to discuss the position as I saw it. I stated that if he continued to represent her and continued to rely upon this 52-page Detailed Grounds, it is more likely than not that a judge would strike out the entire proceedings on the grounds I have mentioned above.[24]After consulting, the claimant made the fair request that she wanted a second opinion on this situation and the suitability of husband, Captain Achunche to represent her. As they were not necessarily expecting the views I have expressed today, I have acceded to their request for a postponement to get a second opinion.[25]The case needs to be licked into shape somehow either by the claimant acting in person and the tribunal doing what it often does with unrepresented claimants. Otherwise the claimant may find an alternative representative to try to render these proceedings triable.[26]I will not ask the respondent to put in an amended response to the claim, because the Detailed Grounds are incomprehensible as they stand, teeming with irrelevance, hyperbole, excessive irrelevant or unnecessary legalese and legal authorities.[27]For instance - Nisa v Waverley Education Foundation Ltd UKEAT/0135/18 is a case that involves Section 6 of the Equality Act 2010 and the definition of disability. Section 6 is the only area where the claimant does not have a problem. Captain Achunche this afternoon seriously stated that the claim about a standard working reference was supported by the Nisa case. That submission is complete rubbish. Nisa has nothing to do with references whatsoever. Yet he says this earnestly, and apparently sincerely.[28]That is disappointing considering that he says he has an LLB for which he read at London Metropolitan University.[29]He also stated there is no rule of law requiring brevity. That may be literally true, but prolix baroque pleading such as this is totally against the overriding objective in Rule 2 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2013.[30]There is a complaint about an “over rigid” application by the respondent of the standard work reference. The claimant applied for jobs elsewhere which might have amounted to career progression. One was with Wolverhampton Hospital NHS Trust and another with the Redbridge Clinical Commissioning Group. She asked for references. She received a reference which it is the Trust policy to give. That is a standard work reference i.e. dates of employment and the role which she had, and her banding etc.- just that. There was nothing to do with her absences from work. To say that such a reference is “misleading” is typical of the hyperbole that there has been.[31]This reference is not misleading - it says so little it could hardly be misleading. This is standard policy with the Trust, and not only this Trust, but all London NHS Trusts to give standard work references / factual references unless there are serious concerns or if there was anything, say, involving the NMC or patient safety. There is nothing like that in this case. This is a successful senior nurse seeking progression. This aspect of the claim seems to have absolutely no prospect of success. Even if the respondent was wrong to provide that reference, I cannot discern any nexus between that and the agreed protected characteristic of neural palsy.[32]The claimant needs to give serious thought to these proceedings and to her representation. That is what the adjournment is for. There is a future date now set and that will only be further postponed in truly exceptional circumstances.[33]Because I have stated strong and trenchant views in this judgment I consider it is wise for me to recuse myself from future hearings, certainly if Capt. Achunche continues to represent.[34]On the costs order under Rule 76(1)(c) of the 2013 Rules there is no need for the receiving party to establish unreasonable conduct on behalf of the paying party when there is an adjournment.[35]I have asked Captain Achunche and the claimant if they would have difficulty meeting the costs of counsel’s brief fee today of £850 (no VAT chargeable). Neither of them clearly said they would have a problem. If Captain Achunche is a commercial pilot, and if the claimant is in a job earning nearly £55,000 at Band 8A, I cannot imagine that an award of £850 costs would be unaffordable. That is my determination under Rule 84 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2013.[1]The claimant’s following complaints are struck out as having no reasonable prospects of success:a. harassment related to the claimant’s disability;b. unauthorised deductions from wages; andc. accrued and unpaid holiday pay.[2]The claimant’s following allegations and/or arguments are subject to a deposit order of £500.00 each. Such allegation and/or arguments as sets out in the list of issues contained within the Case Management Orders of Regional Employment Judge Taylor dated 3 October 23019 (and promulgated 19 October 2019):a. Paragraph17.1b. Paragraph17.2c. Paragraph17.3d. Paragraph24.1e. Paragraph24.2 In addition, the 5 time limit arguments identified at paragraphs 7 and 8 of this Judgment and Reasons shall each be subject to a deposit of £500.[1]Regional Employment Judge Taylor, to whom this hearing was reserved, was not available for the hearing and the hearing allocation was reduced to ½-day because of the availability of judicial resources. The claimant arrived late for the hearing (at 10.35am) but we were nevertheless able to complete the hearing by 1.10pm.
The List of Issues
[2]Judge Taylor had spent a considerable amount of time going through the voluminous documents in order to identify the issues of this claim. She had prepared a list of issues on 3 October 2019 (“the Tribunal’s draft LOI”) which was sent to the parties on 19 October 2019. Proceedings had been issued on 4 January 2019 and it had taken over 10 months to identify what the claims were about. I note that the respondent said, in the Response, it was unable to comprehend the claims that had been made. I had initially case managed these proceedings and I told the parties that I had spent some hours the preceding day going through the Tribunal’s file and the Tribunal’s draft LOI and so far as I could see this represented an appropriate breakdown of the legal and factual issues of the claim. Capt Achunche had emailed the Tribunal, from home at 9.03am the morning of the hearing, a document entitled “claimant’s detailed statement of grounds”. I arranged for a copy of the claimant’s late document to be given to the respondent’s representative and because the claimant and her representative were so late the other party and I had enough time to review this document carefully.[3]At the hearing Capt Achunche said the claimant’s detailed statement of grounds gave an abridged and clearer statement of details of complaint and was an alternative list of issues. Mr Nicholls said that he did not understand the claim before the Tribunal’s draft LOI. He said that he appreciated Judge Taylors’ efforts in distilling these proceedings into a list of issues, which he said he accepted. Mr Nicholls objected to the Tribunal accepting Capt Achunche’s late document as clarifying the complaint, he said that this was yet another document from the claimant’s representative that obfuscated an already muddled claim. He said that the document itself was virtually incomprehensible, it did not clarify any of the issues in this case and appeared to raise further claims that had not be raised in the Claim Form.[4]Having read his document before we commenced the hearing, and upon hearing the representatives, I said that Capt Anunche’s document was not helpful because it did not identify the legal and factual issues to be determined in any recognisable form and, furthermore, even as early as the second paragraph, the claimant had raised a claim of reasonable adjustments in respect of office equipment, which had never formed part of her claim hitherto. I determined that I was not going to rely upon this document. If the claimant wants to include further claims against the respondent referred to therein, then she will need to apply to amend the claim or issue further proceedings as appropriate. Capt Achunche signalled he accepted that I was going through the Tribunal’s draft LOI (as a working document) to consider whether to strike out the claims and/or order a deposit as set out in the notice of hearing and paragraph 3 of the Case Management Orders. The claimant’s disability[5]The respondent does not dispute that the claimant is a disabled person (within the meaning of s6 Equality Act 2010) in respect of Bell’s palsy/nervy palsy. I considered the claimant’s other conditions initially by going through the appropriate medical evidence and then discussing this with Capt Achunche. We spent some time discussing the various medical reports and in particular the medical report of Dr Baggaley and a report of Dr Giagonidis recently disclosed. There was a lot of medical evidence that had not been sent to the Tribunal. Upon review of the medical evidence available at the hearing and hearing from the claimant’s representative, I determine that in respect of the conditions identified at 17.1 to 17.3 of the Tribunal’s draft LOI (i.e. hypertension, irritable bowel syndrome and right sided weakness respectively) there was no evidence or information to show that the aforementioned conditions had a substantial adverse effect on the claimant’s ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. The claimant withdrew her claim in respect of rare sinusitis, i.e. the condition identified at issue 17.4.[6]Sufficient information that conditions 17.1 to 17.3 constituted a disability were not provided in the claimant’s 22-page document sent to the Tribunal on 24 May 2019, neither was there sufficient information contained within the claimant’s 22-page detailed statement of grounds which accompanied her Claim Form of 4 January 2019. I have checked all the documents since and I am satisfied that this information has not been available in respect of the various bundles of information sent to the Tribunal. Accordingly, if the claimant wishes to pursue an argument that she was disabled by any of these 3 additional conditions she will need to pay a deposit of £500 per condition: i.e. £500 in respect of condition 17.1; £500 in respect of condition 17.2; and £500 in respect of condition 17.3. The Reasonable adjustments claims[7]In respect of the claimant’s reasonable adjustment claims, the respondent’s representative said that he could not understand this at all. So far as issue 24 was concerned Capt Achunche said that there were various incidents, but he was not able to provide all of the relevant dates. In view of the length of time that proceeding have been underway and as the Tribunal’s draft LOI has been prepared with sufficient time for both the claimant and the respondent to consider this in detail, I expected the claimant (and her representative) to know and to be able to explain what her claim is about. Under these circumstances I was not going to leave this case open ended. The claimant contended that there were 3 tranches of allegations in respect of a failure to arrange a consultation meeting with her to discuss and assess the degree of her disability so issue 24.1 is identified as follows:7.1 After much discussion Capt Achunche said that this allegation related to an email from the claimant to Ms Elaine Connolly (of Human Resources) on 14 April 2018. In the email the claimant asked the respondent to consider all of the claimant’s medical records.7.2 On 2 July 2018 at a meeting to consider flexible working arrangement Ms Clementine Feniola (the claimant’s line manager) failed to arrange a consultation meeting.7.3 Between 15 August 2019 and 23 August 2019, the claimant made various requests by email to Ms Catherine Pelley (Chief Nurse) prior to the flexible working appeal meeting with her.[8]The allegation at issue 24.2 was in respect of a failure to make relevant medical evidence provided by the claimant available to the Occupational Health Practitioner (so that the OHP could make appropriate recommendations). After 3 times in asking Capt Achunche said that this related to matters identified in paragraphs 7.2 and 7.3 before.[9]We discussed the reasonable adjustments claims at length. The respondent contended that it made extensive reasonable adjustments (at issue 25). I could not understand the basis of the claim as it seems that the respondent considered the claimant’s medical condition at various stages and proceeded to make some adjustments. Capt Achunche said that he was not aware of the provision, criterion or practice (“PCP”) identified by Judge Taylor but he did not proffer an alternative PCP for consideration. Under the circumstances, I am not satisfied that there is no prospects of this claim succeeding because that might entail hearing extensive evidence but I am satisfied that this is a fundamentally weak claim both on the basis of the documentary evidence so far submitted and on the basis of our discussion. Under the circumstances I order that the claimant pay a deposit of £500 per argument advanced in respect of her reasonable adjustments claims, i.e. £500 in respect of issue 24.1 and £500 in respect of issue 24.2. Harassment claims[10]Issue 26.1 identified that the claimant alleged that she was subjected to an unwarranted disciplinary investigation for:(a) making a digital recording of 1 or more meeting with her line-manager; and(b) for embedding a letter to the respondent with a High Court injunction document. The respondent contended that (b) was both threatening and unacceptable behaviour. In respect of (a) Capt Achunche said that it was in the interests of justice to make a digital recording at this meeting. Mr Nicholls averred that in July or August 2017 the claimant was specifically told by Lesley Rogers (a manager) not to record any meetings. The claimant then went on to record these meetings in direct contravention of this instruction. This matter was dealt with in the grounds of resistance under paragraph 43 to 51.[11]My concern about recording meeting(s) and the argument in respect of the High Court injunction document is that they both have no relation to an alleged detriment arising from the claimant’s disability. I understand that the claimant had raised concerns about how the respondent’s managers were acting towards her disability, but these 2 allegations are wholly unrelated the fact that the claimant had a disability at this relevant time and the allegations give no indication that the harassment was related to her protected characteristic. Indeed, Capt Achunche said that the determents in respect of issue 26.1 were to do with the claimant’s protected disclosure. Under the circumstances, I strike out this aspect of the claim in its entirety. Unauthorised deductions, accrued holiday pay and/or other payment(s)[12]The claim in respect for failing to pay the claimant’s wages on days that she did not work during the period of her phased return was not pursued as a reasonable adjustment claim. It was advanced as a claim of unlawful deduction of wages, pursuant to s13 Employment Rights Act 1996. Capt Achunche said that the respondent had a contractual and/or a statutory duty to make reasonable adjustment to facilitate the claimant’s return to work and that because of the respondent’s failures to make reasonable adjustments for 4 years the claimant needed a phased return to work. This claim had been discussed with Judge Prichard at the previous Preliminary Hearing. There was a phased return to work in 2015. The claimant claims that she ought to have been paid in full for the period of this phased return to work, i.e. for the time that she did not work during the 4-week phased return.[13]We discussed the case of O’Hanlon v HMRC [2007] EWCA Civ 283 which was a case in respect of reasonable adjustments and sick pay. O’Hanlon established the principle that it is not discrimination for an employer to refuse to extend sick pay for a disabled employee. This is a s13 Employment Rights Act claim in respect of a shortfall of pay; O’Hanlon has no merit in respect of a discrimination claim; however, the claimant missed the (bad) point completely in respect of a non-payment of wages claim. This claim has no prospect of success, it is without any merit and I dismiss it.[14]In any event, the phased return was for 4 weeks culminating in 28 October 2015. This claim was well over 3 years out of time by the time it was issued in the Employment Tribunal. The claimant had been working subsequently and had embarked upon a separate phased return to work in June 2018. The claimant is not claiming in respect of her return to work in June 2018. There is no merit either in the substantive allegation or the excuse for it being outside the appropriate time limit. I determine that it would have been reasonably practicable for this claim to be issued within 3 months (plus conciliation time) of the claimant’s return to work in October 2015 because she was not so incapacitated as has been alleged by Captain Achunche. Stress and depression are not a good enough excuse in this instance because the claimant was able to return to work. I do not accept that the claimant’s will was broken or that she was oppressed or bullied at this time as it was possible for her to return to work some time ago and cope with all the requirements of work and life for some considerable time.[15]In relation to the holiday pay at issue 30, the claimant said that she did not know what period the 9-day claimed related to. Mr Nicholls said the respondent did not know what days the claimant was claiming for in respect of unpaid holiday pay. The appropriate dates appear to be sometime between 2017 and 2018 and the claim is in respect of the claimant using holiday time for her medical treatment. If that was the case, then it should have been easy to ascertain what dates the claimant took as holidays to correspond with entries in her diary (or other place) for the treatment received. We do not have these dates and we are not able to ascertain this information some 10 months after proceedings were issued. So, under the circumstances, I dismiss this claim also.[16]The allegation in respect of issue 32 related to issue 27 so that claim has been dismissed also. Time limits[17]In respect of time limits, the claimant said that there was a prolonged failure by the respondent to make reasonable adjustment. That is not an excuse for failing to issue proceedings within the appropriate time limit. Proceedings were issued on 4 January 2019. The respondent contended that anything before 3 September 2018 (allowing time for the early conciliation period) was prima facie out of time.[18]So, 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 above in respect of issues 24.1 are prima facie out of time and the allegation at 7.2 and 7.3 above are also prima facie out of time in respect of issues 24.2. A deposit order can relate to an argument as well as an allegation. 5 matters are out of time. I order a £500 deposit for each of these out of time arguments and/or allegations. Consideration of the claimant’s means[19]In respect of the deposit, I considered the claimant’s means before coming to the above deposits. Capt Achunche confirmed that the claimant was employed as a band 8A nurse. He said that he was married to the claimant and that they lived together so he requested that I take into account the whole household income. He said that he has a commercial pilot’s licence but that his pilot’s licence had been frozen, and he has not been working in the transport industry. He is currently a freelance journalist. He said he was not on either on a fixed or a particularly high income. He did not elaborate on this. In respect of his freelance journalism he said he has not worked for a while because he had an accident whilst undertaking some undercover reporting. He said that he had to build up his fitness because he needed to be able to run away from danger and that he could be shot at any stage because of his journalistic activities. Capt Achunche did not provide any information or evidence in respect of the household’s outgoings.[20]Capt Achunche drew attention to the guidance sent by the Employment Tribunal in respect of this hearing. This guidance referred to a deposit of up to £500 as a condition to being permitted to continue to take part in the proceedings. This guidance might be out-ofdate although the documents elsewhere and, in particular, the hearing notification said that the deposit could be up to £1,000 for any allegation or argument. In any event I take regard to the totality of the deposits order and because of the total amount of the order and also bearing in mind the out-of-date guidance sent by the Tribunal, I will limit any deposit to £500 for each argument. So therefore, I order a deposit of £500 for each of the 10 arguments and/or allegations identified above (i.e. 3 allegations in respect of additional disabilities, the 2 substantive allegations for failures to make reason adjustments and the 5 arguments in respect of the time limit points). So if the claimant wishes to pursue all of the claims that I have not struck out then the total deposit will be £5,000. I am satisfied that this is a fair and appropriate amount to order within the totality of the case.[21]If the claimant choses to pay a deposit in respect to certain allegations or arguments only then she will need to identify which matters are pursued.[22]Mr Nicholls said that the hearing was listed for 5-days commencing on 4 March 2020. He said he was concerned that the case would not be prepared in time, particularly allowing for the claimant time to pay the deposits. I do not expect the respondent to undertake any preparation until it has heard that the claimant has paid some or all of the deposit ordered so I share his concerns about preparation time available. Accordingly, I vacate this hearing. If the claimant pays the appropriate deposit, then the Tribunal shall issue further Case Management Orders.