Mr N Grice v Grice Collins Long Ltd and Mr A Stanhope: 2602082/2024 and 2600320/2025
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 2602082/2024, 2600320/2025
Between
Mr N GriceClaimantGrice Collins Long Ltd and Mr A StanhopeRespondent
Before
Employment Judge B ChapmanMr Austin (instructed by Counsel) for claimantMr Caiden (instructed by Counsel) for respondentDate 24 July 2026
JUDGMENT
[1]The Claimant’s complaints of automatic unfair dismissal and protected disclosure detriment are withdrawn as at 12 June 2026, and are therefore dismissed.[2]The Claimant’s complaint of unfair dismissal is not well-founded. He was fairly dismissed.[3]The Claimant’s complaint of wrongful dismissal is not well-founded.[4]The Respondent’s claim for breach of contract concerning the return of the company car and company laptop is well-founded. Damages shall be assessed at a remedy hearing if not agreed. Case Numbers: 2602082/2024; 2600320/2025 Approved by:
REASONS
[1]The Claimant, Neil Grice, initially brought the following claims:a. Unfair dismissal against the First Respondent, Grice Collins Long Limited;b. Automatic unfair dismissal against the First Respondent;c. Protected disclosure detriment against the First Respondent and the Second Respondent, Mr Alex Stanhope, who was a Director of the First Respondent;d. Wrongful dismissal, in that there was a breach of contract concerning notice pay, against the First Respondent.[2]The claims in respect of automatic unfair dismissal and protected disclosure detriment were withdrawn on 12 June 2026 following the oral evidence, such that there were no longer any claims against the Second Respondent personally. These reasons shall hereafter simply refer to the First Respondent as the Respondent.[3]The remaining claims by the Claimant were therefore:a. Unfair dismissal; andb. Wrongful dismissal.[4]The Claimant did not seek reinstatement or re-engagement.[5]The Respondent also brought an employer’s claim for breach of contract concerning the return of a company car and laptop.[6]The matter was case managed by EJ Welch on 10 April 2025 and a list of issues was produced at that hearing (124-134).
The Hearing
[7]The hearing took place in person and lasted 5 days.[8]The hearing commenced on a Monday. The Friday prior, the Tribunal refused an application by the Claimant for witness orders, and deferred consideration of applications by the Respondent to postpone the hearing and for specific disclosure until the first day of the hearing, with reading time to follow in the afternoon as appropriate.[9]On the first morning of the hearing, I had a discussion with Counsel about how realistic the time estimate was. It was agreed that it would be tight to complete the evidence and submissions, and that it was unlikely I would be able to give my decision that week. It was acknowledged that there was also likely to be a delay in providing my decision as I do not sit full time. I explained to the parties that the second day of the hearing could be used for judicial mediation. In the event, the parties preferred to proceed with the hearing and did not wish to engage in judicial mediation. The application for specific disclosure was not pursued. The Tribunal sat for longer each day to ensure all of the evidence could be heard and to avoid going part-heard. I am grateful to all participants for accommodating this.[10]Ahead of the hearing, I had the benefit of a bundle running to 1633 electronic pages. Bundle references in these Reasons shall take the following format: (electronic page number) [paragraph number as applicable].[11]I also had the benefit of witness statements from the following witnesses:a. Eve Donaldson, Finance Director of the Respondent;b. Alex Stanhope, Director of the Respondent;c. Gareth Jones, Director of the Respondent;d. The Claimant;e. Andrew Long, Director of the Respondent;f. Tony Carruthers, friend of the Claimant and a Senior HR Professional.[12]The first day of the hearing was used to deal with the above housekeeping and reading time. I heard evidence across the remainder of the days from the above witnesses in the same order. There was some question over whether Mr Carruthers would be able to attend to give evidence in person, but he ultimately did and I am grateful to him for his attendance. I received written closing submissions documents from Counsel, which were supported by oral submissions given on the last day of the hearing. Law: Unfair Dismissal[13]An employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed by his employer (s. 94 Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”)).[14]It is for the employer to show the reason (or principal reason if more than one) for the dismissal, and that it is either a reason falling within a legislative list of potentially fair reasons, or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the employee held (ss. 98(1-2) ERA). The list of potentially fair reasons includes where the reason relates to the conduct of an employee (s. 98(2)(b) ERA). The reason for the dismissal is the ‘set of facts known to the employer, or beliefs held by him, which causes him to dismiss the employee’ (Abernethy v Mott, Hay and Anderson [1974] ICR 323, CA).[15]The determination of whether the dismissal was fair or unfair, having regard to the reason given by the employer (s. 98(4) ERA):a. Depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer's undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, andb. Shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case.[16]The Tribunal should consider the following (Burchell v BHS [1980] ICR 303):a. Did the Respondent genuinely believe the Claimant was guilty of misconduct?b. If so, was that belief based upon reasonable grounds?c. Did the Respondent carry out a reasonable investigation in the matter?[17]That test may have more limited relevance where there is no real conflict on the facts, for example where there are admissions. This lessened relevance is particularly so in respect of the need to investigate further (Boys and Girls Welfare Society v Macdonald [1997] ICR 693 EAT; Scottish and Southern Energy plc v Innes EATS 0043/10).[18]The Tribunal should consider whether the decision to dismiss was within the band of reasonable responses. Insodoing, the Tribunal should not substitute its own view on what the appropriate sanction should be (British Leyland (UK) Ltd v Swift [1981] IRLR 91). The band of reasonable responses test applies also to the procedure by which the decision is reached (J Sainsbury plc v Hitt [2003] ICR 111, CA). Bias[19]The classic test for apparent bias is from Porter v Magill [2002] AC 357 HL: ‘would the fair minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, conclude that there was a real possibility that a tribunal was biased?’[20]The Claimant relied upon Watson v University of Strathclyde [2011] IRLR 458 EAT, in which the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) explained that ‘an employer setting up a grievance appeal panel is [not] routinely required to consider specifically whether or not there is “apparent bias” in the panel, expressly applying the Porter v Magill test in doing so, but what is, in our view, clear, is that any reasonable employer [is required] to have regard to the need to afford an employee a fair hearing of [their] grievance throughout, including at the appeal stage. In this case [emphasis added] any reasonable employer would then have had regard to the Claimant’s perception, had regard to the facts relied on by her as justifying her in holding that perception and if they had done so, we consider that they, just like Lord Hope’s fair minded and informed observer, could only have concluded that it would not be fair to her to include Dr West in the appeal panel’.[21]Each case will turn upon its own facts. In that case, the claimant had filed a grievance against an individual. The claimant’s grievance was rejected. She objected to Dr West being on the appeal panel as he was a powerful figure in the university, had been a member of the committee appointing the individual that the grievance concerned, and had also previously spoken publicly in their support following a conviction.[22]In the later case of Adeshina v St George’s University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2015] IRLR 707 at [17], the EAT confirmed:a. The strict rules regarding apparent bias applicable to judicial processes are not applicable to internal disciplinary proceedings;b. Actual bias giving rise to a breach of natural justice could be fundamental to the question of fairness;c. Whether there is an appearance of bias may be a relevant factor and is something that will go into the mix to consider as part of fairness as a whole, as will the question whether the employer did in fact carry out the job before it fairly and properly.[23]The IDS Handbook: Unfair Dismissal: Chapter 7.52 explains, and I accept, that “although absence of bias is important, it has also been recognised that the requirement that there should be no possibility of bias cannot be applied in absolute terms in the employment field. It may be unreasonable — particularly in smaller organisations — to expect the different stages of investigation and adjudication to be conducted by different individuals, or to expect those individuals to be unaffected by daily contact with each other. As the EAT has said: ‘In the end the only thing that matters is whether the disciplinary tribunal acted fairly and justly’ — Haddow and ors v Inner London Education Authority 1979 ICR 202, EAT. Similarly, the fact that a disciplinary decision is taken by the employee’s line manager — who will frequently have pre-formed views about the qualifications and competencies of the employee — will not necessarily render the dismissal unfair, particularly where the employer’s normal disciplinary procedure provides for the line manager to undertake the decision-making role — Norland Managed Services Ltd v Hastick EAT 0005/12.”[24]The Claimant relied in particular upon Prospect v Hajee (2017) EAT 0313/16 to make the proposition that any finding by the Tribunal that a dismissing officer lacked complete impartiality will not undermined by a conclusion that he or she held a genuine belief in the Claimant’s misconduct and had a reasonable ground for that belief. This is a reference to paragraph [68] which, having read it, does not appear to be making a broad statement of principle but was explaining the findings of the first instance Employment Tribunal in that case were not internally inconsistent.[25]The Claimant also drew to my attention a recording of the first instance Tribunal’s reasoning: “We regard this flaw as so fundamental that it could not be corrected at appeal even if Mr Clancy himself had been completely impartial. It is so fundamental to the fairness of the dismissal to have an impartial dismissal officer and to be denied that is effectively being denied the opportunity for the 2 stage process required both by the respondent’s own procedure and the ACAS Code of Practice. This must make the dismissal procedurally unfair. In any event, Mr Clancy was not completely impartial as he had extensive prior knowledge of the claimant (and in his evidence was critical of his past performance), having previously not allowed his appeal against the final written warning. These indicate that even if Mr Clancy was making every effort to be impartial again it must be very likely that he could not have come to the appeal with a completely open mind.”[26]The Respondent was right to point out that the EAT in that case was critical of the reasoning in the first part of the paragraph concerning the 2 stage process, which it found was wrong as a matter of principle [61 of Hajee]. The second part of the paragraph was a finding in respect of the dismissing officer in that case which, on its face and in isolation, might lead a reader to conclude that a lack of complete impartiality will render a dismissal unfair. The case, however, requires a little further reading to discern the correct approach where procedural failings are identified.[27]The EAT in Hajee at [61] explained that even defects sufficiently serious to render a decision to dismiss to be unfair, such as where the dismissing officer is not impartial, can be cured by a full and fair appeal. At [62], it went on to explain: “What is required is a careful assessment of the seriousness of the misconduct relied on as the reason for dismissal, the impact of the procedural failings on the process, and consideration of the overall fairness of the appeal process said to have cured the particular defect or defects in order to decide whether looked at overall, the employer has acted reasonably in dismissing the employee. As the Court of Appeal held in Taylor v OCS Group Ltd, particularly in a borderline misconduct case, serious procedural failings at the disciplinary stage might have such an impact on fairness that the Employment Tribunal will have to examine the thoroughness and fairness of the appeal stage particularly carefully to decide whether the overall process is fair notwithstanding those failings.” In that case, the Employment Tribunal found that a lack of complete impartiality meant the appeal did not cure the earlier flaws in the procedure as explained at [63]. Law: Wrongful Dismissal[28]Article 3 of the Employment Tribunals Extension of Jurisdiction (England and Wales) Order 1994 gives the Tribunal the jurisdiction to consider wrongful dismissal claims.[29]The Tribunal has to consider whether, on the balance of probabilities, the Respondent has proved that the Claimant has committed a repudiatory breach of the contract which would entitle it to summarily dismiss the Claimant. Law: Employer Contract Claims[30]Article 4 of the Employment Tribunals Extension of Jurisdiction (England and Wales) Order 1994 gives the Tribunal the jurisdiction to consider counter claims by employers for breach of contact.
Findings
[31]The Claimant founded the Respondent on or around 01 January 2007. He was employed as Managing Director.[32]The Respondent, a firm of chartered surveyors and accountants, is owned by a holding company, GCL Holdco Limited. In May 2024. In early 2024, the majority shareholding was sold through a loan note mechanism to Mr Stanhope, Mrs Donaldson and Mr Jones who collectively formed the Management Team. Mr Stanhope took the lead on HR matters.[33]The effect was that the Management Team between them held 80% of the shares. The Claimant held 10% and Mr Long, a Non-executive Director, held 10% (210). It was not in dispute that, if a party to the Shareholders’ Agreement were to become a Departing Employee (defined as an employee who ceases to be a Director and/or employee of the Company or the Subsidiary other than by reason of death (187)), then it could increase the shares of the other shareholders. That would bring with it financial advantages. Receipt of Complaints[34]On 01 November 2024 Mr Stanhope received a complaint about the Claimant from an employee, William Polglass (226). Mr Polglass complained that the Claimant had in a meeting: sworn at him several times, been aggressive, and threatened that unless Mr Polglass did as the Claimant said then the Claimant would lose it (before walking out). He complained that he had had similar experiences in previous meetings.[35]On 05 November 2024, there was a call between the claimant and another employee, Ben Barclay, that both were aggrieved about. That same day, the Claimant wrote an email to Mr Stanhope and Mrs Donaldson. He requested that Mr Barclay be issued immediately with a formal warning concerning his conduct and intimating that he was shortly going to be sending an email to Mr Barclay (232). The draft of that email explained that he considered Mr Barclay’s actions to be rude and insolent, that he had been arrogant, constricted the work activities Mr Barclay could involve himself in, and explained he expected a full apology in writing within 24 hours. The actual email he sent to Mr Barclay was less confrontational, did not contain inflammatory language, and did not ask for that apology (235).[36]On 06 November 2024:a. At 10:10, Mr Stanhope received a formal complaint from another employee, Mr Barclay, about the Claimant. Mr Barclay took issue with the way the Claimant had spoken to him. He described a work dispute between them. In amongst this, he alleged that the Claimant had berated him for not calling back soon enough, shouted down the phone at him, told him a fee proposal he had made was utterly rubbish, and asked him why something he did not know had ‘not crossed [his] tiny mind’ [emphasis in the original] (240-241).b. At 12:19, Mr Stanhope relayed to the Claimant that he had subsequently asked Mr Barclay if he would be apologising, and he said he would not. He explained the next step for the Claimant would be to raise a formal grievance (237).c. At 12:41, Mr Barclay followed up with a further email raising a further complaint about the way he was spoken to by the Claimant on another occasion, where he described being shouted at, an attempt to bully him into work he did not consider he was able to help with, and described an ‘overly aggressive and dictatorial manner’ (239).[37]On 07 November 2024, Mr Stanhope sent to the Claimant the policy for raising a grievance and explained the first step would be to set out the complaint in writing and provide any relevant documents (243). It does not appear that the Claimant ever did this.[38]The Respondent was dealing with formal complaints from Mr Polglass and Mr Barclay only. It was not dealing with complaints from the Claimant because he did not formally raise them (despite being told how to do so).[39]The Claimant accepted in his evidence that, at that stage, Mr Stanhope was doing as he should have been doing in his HR capacity (albeit he asserted this was lip service as (to paraphrase) he asserted Mr Stanhope was playing a long game). He nevertheless also alleged each of these complaints were pursued under the advice of Mr Stanhope and Mr Jones respectively. I do not accept that on the evidence I have seen and heard. In respect of Mr Barclay, I have seen the email from Mr Stanhope explaining to him what the next steps were if he wanted to take it further (228-229). He was not actively advised to raise one. In respect of Mr Polglass, Mr Jones explained in evidence he had received a call from him, and he had said he should speak to Mr Stanhope if he wanted to document it and log it as a complaint. I do not consider that to be active advice to pursue a complaint. Commencing the Investigation[40]On 07 November 2024, Mr Stanhope brought the complaints from Mr Polglass and Mr Barclay to the attention of Mr Long, copying Mrs Donaldson and Mr Jones in. He raised, ‘as a side note’, the Claimant’s intention to bring a formal complaint against Mr Barclay (260-261). The Claimant in his evidence suggested something should be inferred from this reference to a ‘side note’ and for dealing with Mr Barclay’s complaint first. That is not a fair criticism. As above, the Claimant had not yet raised a formal complaint and indeed did not do so.[41]What followed was a dispute between the Management Team and Mr Long: Mr Long wanted the matter dealing with informally to ‘nip matters in the bud’ (260), whereas the Management Team sought to progress with an investigation. This difference of opinion ran throughout the process that followed, and ultimately escalated.[42]At that stage, the Management Team raised between them:a. Concerns around a long-standing and documented pattern of behaviour resulting in the previous loss of a number of employees in 2023;b. The fact an informal resolution resulting in apologies had already been explored;c. The way Mr Polglass had presented following the incident with him;d. The quick succession of complaints from 2 different employees; ande. The need to follow company procedures (257-259).[43]The Claimant asserted this is evidence that a view had been formed by the Management Team from the outset, who were effectively working as a collective group and wanted him out. I do not accept that assertion. The Directors inevitably needed to discuss an appropriate way forwards given the complaints had been made about a fellow Director. I note at this stage that Mrs Donaldson thought the height of any sanction may have been a formal warning (258). I also take the point made by the Respondent that Mr Jones’ suggestion in his email that the outcome might cause the Claimant to reflect and change his behaviour would run counter to a suggestion that Mr Jones wanted rid of the Claimant (257). These matters would steer away from the Claimant’s suggestion that they wanted him out.[44]The height of the Claimant’s concern here is the commentary about longstanding patterns of behaviour, and how this might indicate the Management Team had already taken a view. The Claimant did accept in his investigation meeting that those who gave exit interviews in 2023 had been critical about him in particular (682-683). I find it was a valid consideration, alongside the other considerations, in deciding whether the formal procedures should be invoked and matters be investigated further. It did not mean matters had been predetermined. The fact of the investigation would militate against that.[45]I will return to the decision to keep the process in house in due course. For now, criticism is levelled at the Management Team for deciding early who would undertake which roles in the process: Mrs Donaldson would undertake the investigation, Mr Stanhope would chair any disciplinary hearing, and Mr Jones would chair any appeal. I do not view the concept of identifying chairs for potential hearings as a predetermination of the outcome. It is sensible contingency planning. Undertaking the Investigation[46]On 14 November 2024, ahead of his investigation meeting on 19 November 2024, Mrs Donaldson informed the Claimant of the allegations to be discussed. At this stage, they were only the two complaints by Mr Polglass and Mr Barclay (306). In the Claimant’s response the next morning, he queried who would be taking notes and commented that it would be inappropriate if this was not a Director (306). The Respondent was in fact exploring whether Charlie HR could take notes at the meeting, but Charlie HR would not match the fee that the Respondent was seeking (311-312).[47]On 15 November 2024 at 18:23, Mr Stanhope informed the Claimant that the company had not decided to suspend him, but this was on the basis that he ‘ensured that he did not seek to interfere with the company’s ongoing investigation in any way. In particular, he should not discuss the complaints that have been made about him with the complainants or anybody else within the company, especially those individuals who may be asked to provide evidence as part of the investigation’, and that ‘any attempt to interfere with the investigation is likely to be considered an act of misconduct’ (305).[48]Mr Polglass in his investigation meeting on 14 November 2024 complained that the matter was not a ‘one-time thing’, but that it was recurring and asserted he would not accept ‘constant abuse’. He complained of swear words being used towards him aggressively, and in particular that the Claimant had either said Mr Polglass was a fuck up or that he had fucked up, and that the language was used on a phone call with a client and contractor. Ideally, he did not want the Claimant working at the company, complaining about the way the Claimant treated Mr Polglass and others (emphasis added) (625-627).[49]Mr Barclay had similar sentiments in his investigation meeting on 18 November 2024 (628-631). The Claimant sought to challenge the fact that Mr Barclay was making allegations tantamount to bullying. I do not find that credible.[50]Mr Grice had explained at the outset of his evidence that he would not disagree with the ACAS definition of bullying: ‘Unwanted behaviour from one person to another that is either a) offensive, intimidating, malicious or insulting, or b) abuse or misuse of power that undermines, humiliates or causes physical or emotional harm to someone’. He acknowledged that behaviour can still be bullying even if the individual does not realise or intend that.[51]Mr Barclay had explicitly asserted that the Claimant had attempted to bully him into doing a piece of work. When summarising, he had added the word ‘belligerent’ to the words he had used previously to describe the Claimant. He went on to assert that he knew the Claimant would never apologise, would likely raise an insubordination complaint against him, that the Claimant was ‘losing his shit’, and was fabricating errors to make the Claimant look bigger and Mr Barclay smaller ‘like an angry child’. He was describing bullying behaviour. I find the Claimant was challenging this label because he knew it would be damaging to his case if he accepted what was being suggested.[52]Mrs Donaldson then decided to approach 2 further longer serving members of staff, Kate Roberts and Tom Hitchin, to consider whether there was a pattern of behaviour. I do not find that this was an unreasonable step in light of what was being alleged. That could have provided evidence either way: to suggest there was not such a pattern of behaviour, or that there was. Longer serving colleagues were in a better position to assist with this, particularly those who had been around at the time of the 2023 exits by other colleagues. A suggestion was made in the Claimant’s evidence that these individuals were friends of Mrs Donaldson and Mr Stanhope respectively. I take the point made by the Respondent that these matters were not put in cross examination to Mrs Donaldson and Mr Stanhope respectively. These are bald assertions that are not sufficient to undermine the decision to interview them where there are reasonable grounds for doing so. Friendships develop between work colleagues. That does not mean work colleagues cannot remain professional with one another despite these friendships.[53]In the event, the Claimant put together a document analysing which witnesses made reference to other witnesses (962). It is clear from that document that there was a snowballing effect, in that when Mr Hitchin and Ms Roberts were spoken to, they named a number of other witnesses, who then themselves made references to each other. Allegations were made of similar types of behaviour by the Claimant, and he accepted in evidence several witnesses were indicating a pattern of behaviour. He accepted Mrs Donaldson had a duty to investigate when the witnesses provided further allegations against him. That then undermines his assertion that there was a witch hunt.[54]The Claimant started to take a point in his evidence that Conor Hurman, who was mentioned by other witnesses, had been contacted and had said more positive things about the Claimant. When it was raised with him that this assertion was not made in his witness statement, he pivoted to suggest this was in some way related to his point about there being no need to approach Ms Roberts and Mr Hitchin in the first place. I am unable to take this further.[55]In a similar vein, the Claimant is critical that his wife, Mrs Grice, was not approached in the investigation. During his investigation meeting, Mr Grice did explain his wife was prepared to write a statement about what had happened in respect of the conversation with Mr Barclay (655). Mrs Donaldson did not recall this when she gave evidence. That is an avenue that could have been explored by Mrs Donaldson (though I note the Claimant himself does not appear to have obtained such a statement despite seemingly receiving advice from both a solicitor and his friend who works in HR). In light of the Claimant’s admissions that I will come on to, however, I do not view this omission as something that undermined the fairness of the investigation. Suspension and Breaches[56]On 15 November 2024, following the meetings with Ms Roberts, Mr Hitchin and Mr Polglass, Mr Stanhope circulated the Summaries to the Management Team and Mr Long, and explained that those from Ms Roberts and Mr Hitchins were confidential as there was no permission to divulge anything from them (339).[57]On 18 November 2024, Mr Stanhope notified Mr Long that the company had been advised to suspend the Claimant due to the more serious nature, and number, of allegations now raised and that the Management Team all agreed with that (338). That was a course of action Mr Long disagreed with, and he sought to question Mr Stanhope’s motivation and authority to suspend (337). He subsequently forwarded that chain, along with the confidential meeting summaries referred to above, to his on advisor. He copied the Claimant in (336-337).[58]The Claimant was notified of the suspension the same day. The letter explained that the Claimant must not carry out any of his normal duties, attend the workplace unless authorised by Mrs Donaldson’s authorisation, or communicate with employees, workers, contractors, clients, customers or suppliers without prior authorisation. There was an exception in respect of his wife, who worked for the company, in that the restriction applied only insofar as it prevented communication linked to the investigation (378). A board meeting then took place on 21 November 2024 in which the Management Team voted to suspend the Claimant and Mr Long voted not to (411-433). A further suspension letter was issued the same day repeating the same warning (434-435). The Claimant in evidence confirmed he understood the letters. Mr Stanhope in evidence confirmed the Claimant had received the board minutes, video and recording of the meeting.[59]The Claimant asserted there was no clear rationale for moving to suspend as nothing had changed materially, and in evidence criticised the jump straight to suspension rather than alternative arrangements such as working from home and not going to the office. Mrs Donaldson explained in her evidence that initial interviews had taken place by that point indicating that the issues went beyond Mr Polglass and Mr Barclay, and that they had taken advice. As per Sattar v Citibank [2019] EWCA Civ 2000 at [51], “it will often be necessary for an employee to be suspended as soon as investigations have unearthed serious matters which will be, or are likely to be, the subject of disciplinary action, even though the full investigation into those matters has not been completed… [a concern may be] that the employee might interfere in some way with the evidence if he remains at work”. The matter was developing and becoming more serious. Suspension was a reasonable decision to make, as was borne out by subsequent events.[60]On 22 November 2024, Mr Polglass emailed Mr Jones and Mrs Donaldson to assert he had been called into the little office by the Claimant (466). I do not have the full email, but in what I do have Mr Polglass has described a discussion about the allegations, with the Claimant commenting that he understood Mr Polglass was ‘terrified of being in a room with him’, invited him to go work from home or do whatever he needs to do to be safe and comfortable, and also asserted that Mr Jones was aware of the conversation (466). The Claimant in evidence suggested they had bumped into each other. On either account, the Claimant had attended the office and spoken to a complainant about the allegations in breach of the terms of his suspension.[61]It was also not in dispute that the Claimant had attempted to continue to work, including by joining a call that Mr Barclay was on with a client, or that he had contacted the Respondent’s IT supplier threatening to take legal action against them if they did not reinstate his email account (447).[62]I also had emails before me in which the Claimant was refusing to abide by the suspension (513, 762).[63]The Claimant’s case in evidence was that he accepted he had breached the suspension requirements, but that he had good reasons for it.[64]He initially pointed to confusion because he was also receiving instruction from Mr Long to continue working. I do not accept that the Claimant genuinely thought he could ignore the instructions within the suspension letter. The assertion undermined his credibility. Even if Mr Long did instruct this, it is hard to accept that the Claimant would think he could take the instruction of one member of the board over the resolution of the entire board. In any event, it also conflicted with Mr Long’s evidence who asserted that he did not tell the Claimant not to comply.[65]I preferred the Claimant’s later evidence that he continued to work as he did not agree with the decision of the company to suspend him. He described it as a ‘massive overreaction. He told me that he thought the company required him to continue working if it was going to survive. This was something he was particularly emphatic about and a theme repeated a number of times, including an illustrative example of being in the Royal Navy and the incumbency to refuse orders of a Captain if they were wrong. In his own words, he viewed his actions as honourable and was aware of the potential consequences of refusing to follow those instructions.[66]On 25 November 2024, the Claimant was informed by Mrs Donaldson that further allegations had come to light and would be discussed with the Claimant at his investigation meeting, including those of bullying, creating a toxic work environment, and breaching the terms of his suspension (552).[67]The Claimant submitted that it was unfair to include the allegation that he had breached the terms of his suspension because it was not investigated. This matter was evolving as the investigation and disciplinary process progressed. As per Sattar v Citibank [2019] EWCA Civ 2000 at [51], the point is that the Claimant should have a full and fair opportunity to engage with the new charges and that opportunity can be during the investigation or at the disciplinary hearing itself. The allegations were put to Mr Grice, he was given an opportunity to respond, and he admitted them.[68]On 29 November 2024, the Claimant was sent the full set of Investigation Meeting notes and complaints as at that time (598).[69]The Claimant’s Investigation Meeting took place on 02 December 2024. He accepted in evidence he had the full list of allegations and all of the notes in advance of this meeting. In the course of this meeting, the Claimant made the following admissions:a. Accepted he had raised his voice with Mr Polglass (652);b. Accepted he made the ‘tiny mind’ comment to Mr Barclay and raising his voice (661);c. Admitted pushing Connor Hurman (which I take to mean verbally), and that he ‘did tear him a strip’ about repeated lateness ‘in front of everybody’ so that others in the office would hear him and ‘know it’s not acceptable to be late’ (672-673).d. Accepted being harder with Katherine than he should have been, describing himself as passionate, and in hindsight he had probably been a bit over the top, bordering on aggressive, and pushy at times (692-692).e. In respect of Shakir, he was guilty of some of the allegations about being aggressive and angry and shouty, and had been too forceful on occasions (705-707).f. He had been shouting with his wife in the office, and using the F word (681).g. Those employees who left and undertook exit interviews in 2023 had been critical about him in particular (682-683).h. That he could have pulled people up when they had not performed ‘smarter, politer’ (684-685).i. Following his suspension, he had come across Will in the office and asked for a quiet word in an effort to try to sort matters out (653-654).[70]On 03 December 2024, The Claimant was provided with the transcript from the meeting (719).[71]On 05 December 2024, the Claimant asserted his intention to start work again the next morning (762), prompting Mrs Donaldson to twice reconfirm he remained suspended (764, 771).[72]The Investigation Report is dated 09 December 2024 (803-804)/ On its face, it runs to two pages, however it attached the interview notes and documents considered as part of the investigation. It recommended that the matter should progress to a disciplinary hearing to consider allegations of gross misconduct. Criticism was made of the length of the summary document. The summary is short, but there is force in the point made by the Respondent in cross examination of Mr Carruthers that it was not Mrs Donaldson’s role to decide the outcome and rather she should simply present the evidence. I do not find that it has undermined the fairness of the process.[73]The invite to the Disciplinary Hearing on 16 December 2024 was dated 11 December 2024. It contained the same allegations as those received ahead of the Investigation Meeting. It attached the Investigation Report and attachments, explained the potential for dismissal without notice or pay in lieu if found guilty of gross misconduct, explained his right to be accompanied and reminded him of his suspension (827-828).[74]The Claimant attempted to attend with his solicitor. The Hearing was adjourned (834-836). It was reconvened on 18 December 2024 when the Claimant joined with his friend Mr Carruthers. Disciplinary Hearing[75]The transcript of the hearing vividly demonstrates how difficult that hearing was. I accept the Respondent’s submission that the Claimant’s behaviour can reasonably be read as rude, obstructive, and bullying towards Mr Stanhope. Examples include:a. His assertion to Mr Stanhope that when he listened back to the recording, it was going to be embarrassing (854);b. Accusing him of failing to prepare for the hearing in any way, shape or form (855-856);c. Having spent the first half hour of the hearing raising issues with the procedure, when Mr Stanhope attempted to move matters forwards, asserting that the process and the way the meeting was being run was a joke (861);d. Reiterating that he had made it clear that he did not think Mr Stanhope would perform the task to the required standard when some confusion arose about a reference to a document, and going on to assert he has ‘fallen at the first hurdle’ (864-866).e. Commenting on Mr Stanhope’s appearance, and how it looked like he was going out to clean the car (867).f. At the 1 hour 46 minute mark when Mr Stanhope was attempting to move the hearing along, interrupting him and querying whether Mr Stanhope had somewhere else to be (884);g. The comment that the HR representative was ‘taking Mr Stanhope out of a hole’ when she attempted to move a matter on (893).[76]The Claimant continued to justify his behaviour in evidence. He described the hearing as a car crash and how he was being ‘utterly restrained’. That is not consistent with the examples raised above.[77]The hearing did not ultimately proceed in the way Mr Stanhope had intended, but rather there was a break following which the allegations were put one at a time and the Claimant responded. The Claimant could have no complaint that he did not have an opportunity to have his say.[78]I also note here that the Claimant made further admissions and relevant comments at the hearing:a. In respect of the allegations concerning Mr Polglass, he sought to justify his conduct by explaining Mr Polglass had been underperforming for an extensive period, and so there was a ‘huge amount of back context which more than justifies the fact that I then took it upon myself, to give will addressing down’ (872).b. He continued to assert Mr Barclay’s work was utterly rubbish appears to accept telling Mr Barclay that on the call (879) [1.31.24] – (880) [1.34.15]. Outcome and Appeal[79]The Claimant was summarily dismissed on 19 December 2024 (901). The allegations were broadly upheld, save that some of the particulars of bullying allegations were not upheld.[80]The Claimant produced a Notice of Appeal of 09 January 2025.[81]The appeal hearing took place on 25 February 2025 and was chaired by Mr Jones (990). The Claimant accepted he had received the notes of the Disciplinary Hearing in advance.[82]There were technical difficulties at the outset of this appeal held by video, and the Claimant could not see other participants. The Claimant made assertions that Mr Jones had been in the office that morning then left, before going on to comment that if Mr Jones was not going to look him in the eye around a table then he needed to look him in the eye on a meeting. This was despite the Claimant being told the hearing would be remote. When asked about this in evidence, the Claimant explained that he wanted a face-to-face meeting. I am led to the conclusion that, again, the Claimant had ignored instructions and gone into the office with a view to trying to force a face-to-face hearing.[83]The Claimant continued with similar behaviour to that displayed at the Disciplinary Hearing, Examples include:a. Spending the fist 20 minutes of the hearing attempting to get Mr Jones to answer his criticisms instead.b. Calling Mr Jones a coward for not facing him in a room (993);c. A terse exchange at [20.49-22.99] when the Claimant sought to question whether Mr Jones should be chairing the appeal and whether he benefitted financially from the Claimant’s dismissal. Mr Jones declined to engage and explained he would make a note of it, prompting the Claimant to call it an ‘absolute fucking disgrace’ and telling Mr Jones to move on to his next question that Mr Jones will refuse to answer (999-1000).d. Telling him to ‘grow a pair’ and ‘stick his neck above the parapet’ when he was unable to give a specific date by which he would be able to provide the outcome, and cutting across him as Mr Jones continues to attempt to explain why it will take some time (1012).[84]In evidence, the Claimant again sought to justify his behaviour as ‘slightly restrained bearing in mind what he and his family were being put through’. He continued to describe Mr Jones as ‘scuttling off through the back door’ instead of meeting him when he tried to force that face-to-face meeting.[85]The Claimant was given the opportunity to expand on his grounds of appeal which were each raised in turn, including the assertions of bias.[86]The outcome of the appeal is dated 11 March 2025. Save for the finding he had told Mr Polglass he was a ‘fuck up’, the findings and outcome form the disciplinary hearing were upheld (1024-1027). The Appellant’s other points of appeal, including that of bias, were dismissed. In respect of the bias allegations, Mr Jones rejected that it was improper for the Board to appoint Mr Stanhope, found that the decisions were appropriate in light of the allegations and evidence, and that Mr Stanhope could not have been tainted by the Claimant’s allegations around breaches of the Company Act because he did not know those allegations had been made. Laptop and Vehicle[87]I have addressed this at the end of these Reasons. Proceedings[88]The Claim Form was presented on 25 December 2024 along with an application for interim relief. The application was subsequently refused on 20 January 2025. Early conciliation was undertaken between 26 and 27 December 2024 for both Respondents (as they then were) and a second claim was presented on 27 December 2024. Unfair Dismissal Reason for Dismissal[89]The Claimant accepted in closing submissions that, given admissions that some of the material conduct occurred, there is a potentially fair reason on the basis of conduct. That is consistent with the material before me which confirms the entire disciplinary process was focussed upon allegations of misconduct. The process started with 2 individuals complaining of misconduct, and extended to further complaints of misconduct and breaches of the terms of the suspension as the investigation continued. I find that the principal reason for the dismissal was conduct, which is a potentially fair reason. Genuine Belief and Fairness of the Process[90]The question at the core of the Claimant’s case is: did the Respondent genuinely believe the Claimant was guilty of misconduct based upon reasonable grounds, or did the Management Team trump up minor issues and build them into something more significant to force the Claimant out for their own gain?[91]I have borne in mind the potential to gain financially from the Claimant’s departure, which is ultimately the crux of the Claimant’s position.[92]The Claimant argues that the Respondent should have gone external with the investigation and disciplinary process, and that it should not have been divided between the Management Team because of concerns about apparent bias. He asserts that the decision to keep it in house was in furtherance eof this underlying motivation o remove him.[93]I have to have regard to the size and administrative resources of the Respondent’s undertaking. This was a relatively small firm of chartered surveyors and accountants. There was no dedicated HR officer, but a Director who took the lead on HR (without himself having a background in HR) and support from an external HR agency. I accept Mrs Donaldson’s evidence that cash flow was tight. She explained that there was a loss in year end March 2024, and the first loan note payment was due in December 2024. Christmas bonuses were not paid that year. As above, the Respondent attempted to negotiate down the fee that Charlie HR wanted to charge to take notes by a significant amount (310-311). That supports the contention that full support would have been financially unrealistic. There was not the financial capacity to go external.[94]Given the Claimant’s position in the company, the reasonable approach was to have the matter investigated by another Director. Indeed I note in an email from the Claimant dated 18 November 2024 ahead of his Investigation Meeting, he was strong in his view that it should only be another Director taking notes (319). Mr Long was clear in evidence that he never wanted to be the disciplinary chair which was consistent with Mr Stanhope’s evidence that Mr Long did not want to be involved in a formal capacity, and given his longstanding personal relationship with the Claimant of some 20 years it would have been inappropriate in any event. I then ask myself, what was the alternative? There were 3 directors available to undertake 3 potential roles.[95]That would not absolve the Respondent if the process was not fair and just because it was tainted by impartiality. I am not, however, satisfied that the Claimant has made out his case.[96]I have already addressed above that I am not satisfied that the initial decision to investigated was motivated by malintent.[97]During the course of that investigation, further concerns came to light. The Claimant has admitted much of the conduct alleged against him. The Claimant also accepted in cross examination that the type of conduct alleged was consistent over a number of witnesses. As I will come onto, the conduct was serious.[98]I have read the emails and board minutes from the various meetings between Mr Long and the Senior Leadership Team. There was a particular focus in evidence with Mr Stanhope on the Board Meeting of 10 December 2024 at which the decision about progressing to a Disciplinary Hearing was discussed. Mr Stanhope was carrying the proxy vote for Mr Jones. Mr Long at the outset asked Mrs Donaldson if she considered she was independent and unconflicted in making her recommendation to progress (809). Whilst Mr Long purported to make no comment on this, it was clearly a challenge to her independence and set the tone for the rest of the meeting in which Mr Long continued to challenge the independence of the Management Team. It is this discussion which led to Mr Stanhope explaining that he did not think the process needed to go external due to cost, the desire to avoid airing dirty laundry to 3rd parties, and because it could be dealt with in house. The Board Meeting unfortunately descended thereafter, with Mr Stanhope (and, I suspect, Mrs Donaldson) viewing Mr Long as being obstructive in his questions, and in turn Mr Long then viewing Mr Stanhope as being obstructive in not answering his questions around cost and what a disciplinary hearing would look like. I am satisfied that this was not Mr Stanhope deliberately obfuscating matters to cover some ulterior motive, but a result of the deteriorating relationship between Mr Long and the Management Team.[99]Mr Long asserted that he sensed some form of hidden agenda amongst the Management Team, and described matters as a witch hunt. I find that in making these assertions, Mr Long was in fact attempting to protect his friend:a. Mrs Donaldson made a note in an email dated 19 November 2024 of a conversation she had with Mr Long on the evening of 18 November 2024. She did so expressly because she wanted to record events whilst they were fresh in her mind. She recorded him as saying ‘bullying is not gross misconduct’. Mr Long could not recall using those exact words. That is not a criticism of Mr Long as I acknowledge that was one phone call undertaken 1.5 years prior in and amongst many communications taking place over a long period of time. I do find it likely he did use those words given Mrs Donaldson had recorded them somewhat contemporaneously. I am supported in this by his comments in evidence when asked to reflect. He asserted he had not seen any clear evidence of bullying. He accepted he had seen the investigation notes. I find his assertion lacks credibility for the reasons I have outlined above. His assertions to me in evidence were based upon how he felt rather than anything with evidential substance.b. I was not impressed with his explanation as to why confidential information had been shared with the Claimant: i. His assertion that he was not accountable to Mr Stanhope suggested to me that it was about power struggles rather than what was the appropriate thing to do. He was accountable to the Respondent. ii. I cannot see how he thought it was appropriate to copy the Claimant into an email to his own corporate lawyer (337). He explained in evidence he had raised the email to see whether the other Directors had the authority to embark upon their process, and the Claimant had been copied in because he was interested in what the Claimant had to say in response. That was not relevant to the question he was raising with his lawyer. I find that he copied him in as a way of bringing the contents of those documents to the Claimant’s attention.[100]Throughout, the Claimant has taken particular issue with Mr Stanhope as the individual who took the decision to dismiss. The Claimant’s particulars in the List of Issues focussed upon him (133) [12.5]. I have addressed most of this in my findings above. To address the residual complaints:a. It is the Claimant’s case that Mr Stanhope wanted to be Managing Director from the day that he joined. I note he is not currently Managing Director, though I acknowledge he could be ‘holding off’ given he knows of such assertions by the Claimant. For the reasons I have outlined above and below, however, I am satisfied the investigation and ultimate decisions were a result of properly responding to complaints raised and the outcome of the ensuing investigation.b. The Claimant asserted that Mr Stanhope would receive a salary increase. That would require written approval of the Noteholders whilst the Notes were outstanding (612) [6.1.16]. It seems eminently unlikely the Claimant and Mr Long would agree, and so I do not find it likely this was a motivation.[101]I am not satisfied the decision to proceed with the formal procedure, the way it was conducted or the ultimate decision to dismiss was tainted by financial motivation. The respondent genuinely believed the Claimant was guilty of misconduct, and this was reasonable. I am satisfied they were led by the evidence rather than any pre-determination or pre-existing view of the Claimant. The Respondent received complaints from 2 separate employees about similar behaviour. Further investigation suggested there was a pattern of such behaviour. The Claimant admitted to conduct, continued to attempt to justify it, and continued to refuse to abide by the terms of his suspension. The way in which he conducted himself during the hearings undoubtedly contributed to the breakdown of trust between him and the Respondent. As I will come on to, the dismissal was in the range of reasonable responses.[102]I have otherwise addressed the fairness of the process throughout my findings above. For the avoidance of doubt, I am satisfied there was a fair process. Dismissal within Range of Reasonable Responses[103]The Employee Guide included a list of acts as examples of gross misconduct which may render an employee liable to instant dismissal. The list included bullying of colleagues or clients, and serious insubordination (1095).[104]The Claimant’s Service Agreement signed by him on 03 May 2024 confirms:a. That the Claimant must (amongst other things) (170-171): i. Perform his duties in a professional and competent manner in willing co-operation with colleagues and at all times conform to the reasonable directions and instructions by the Company; ii. Conduct his personal and professional life in a way which does not risk adversely affecting the Company’s standing and business reputation; and iii. Be polite and courteous in his behaviour.b. That the Company is entitled to terminate his employment in writing without notice or pay in lieu of notice if at any time he is guilty of any type of gross misconduct or a serious breach of the Service Agreement (176).[105]It is not my role to substitute my own decision for that of the company. It is to decide whether dismissal was within the range of reasonable responses. I find it was:a. The types of conduct for which the Claimant was dismissed are clearly set out in the Employee Guide and Service Agreement, and he had fair warning that such conduct can amount to summary dismissal.b. The Respondent is justified in questioning the authenticity of the remorse expressed during the investigation process (706) in light of the Claimant’s continued efforts to justify the behaviour and the way in which he conducted himself during the disciplinary and appeal hearings, which notably was not repeated at those stages.c. He repeatedly failed to follow reasonable management instructions. Wrongful Dismissal[106]It follows from the findings above that there was no wrongful dismissal and no entitlement to notice pay. The repeated refusals to follow reasonable management instructions alone amount to repudiatory breaches. Counterclaim - Law[107]The Claimant’s signed Service Agreement confirms that the Claimant must upon demand or the termination of his employment by any reason return to the company immediately a list of company items inclusive of computers and cars (178).[108]The Claimant accepted that the items were not returned immediately.[109]In respect of the laptop, his Defence asserted he had not returned it because his private data had not been removed from it and the Respondent’s refusal to allow him to access his private data was a breach of contract. The Claimant now accepts there is a breach of contract, and I find that there was. It was not returned immediately as per the Service Agreement.[110]The car was supplied by Octopus EV. The Claimant’s case has changed a number of times in respect of this:a. In his Defence, he asserted it was reasonable not to return the car pending the outcome of his appeal and it was ultimately returned on 30 January 2025 (103-104) [5-7].b. In his Witness Statement at paragraph [135], he asserted that it was not returned as the Respondent would not assure him that any outstanding charges for dents, scrapes or excessive mileage were not his responsibility. I note in the same paragraph he also asserted it was not possible to organise the return of the car himself because ‘the contract was with GCL… it was their contract not mine’.c. At the hearing, his Counsel asserted there was no contract between the Claimant and the Respondent, but instead the contract was between himself and Octopus. That conflicts with the quote above.[111]The vehicle was part of a salary sacrifice scheme (1147-1162). The information pack that describes the scheme confirms the vehicle is leased to the company through a master contract hire agreement (1151). That agreement confirms that the Respondent is responsible to Octopus EV for return of the vehicle, excess mileage and any damage beyond fair wear and tear (amongst other things) (1480-1481) [9].[112]The Claimant did sign an Agreement which his Counsel pointed to in cross examination of Mr Stanhope. It confirms the Claimant was signing up for a salary sacrifice scheme (1498-1502). The opening paragraph reads as follows: “Here is your final Electric Dreams Car Scheme quote. Below is the breakdown of your vehicle plan by going electric through our (your employer’s) salary sacrifice scheme. This scheme is provided by us and facilitated by Octopus Electric Vehicles.” Whilst it is clearly a template produced by Octopus EV, it defines ‘our’ as the Claimant’s employer (i.e. the Respondent). It then confirms the scheme is provided by ‘us’ (i.e. the Respondent) and facilitated by Octopus EV. The Driver Declaration at (1501) in the second to bottom checkbox reads: “I confirm that I have selected the car using my own skill and judgement and acknowledge that neither you nor Octopus Electric Vehicles [emphasis added] make representations as to the quality, condition or fitness for any particular purpose of the car.” The document is signed by the Claimant and Mrs Donaldson on behalf of the Respondent. It does not appear that the Claimant was contracting directly with Octopus EV, but was rather contracting with the Claimant.[113]The Claimant has breached his contract with the Respondent by failing to return the car immediately.[114]Damages will need to be dealt with at a remedy hearing if not agreed. Approved by: