[1]The Claimant is disabled within the meaning of Section 6 and Schedule 1 of the Equality Act 2010 (the 2010 act) in respect of the physical impairment of hearing loss.[2]The Claimant is not disabled within the meaning of Section 6 and Schedule 1 of the 2010 act in respect of the mental impairment of depression and anxiety.[3]The Claimant was not an employee of the Respondent within the meaning of Section 230(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (the 1996 act).[4]The Claimant was however a worker as defined in Section 230(3) of the 1996 act.[5]The Claimant is entitled to the protection of the 2010 act because pursuant to Section 83(2)(a) she was employed under a contract personally to do work.
REASONS
[1]Mrs Cammack represented herself, gave evidence on her own behalf and called two witnesses Mr S Castle and Mr R Weston. Mr Price of Counsel represented the Respondents and he called Mr Johnson the Respondent’s Managing Director. There was an agreed bundle of documents and references are to page numbers in that bundle. Page 1 of 7
Introduction
[2]This preliminary public hearing was held pursuant to a telephone case management discussion before Employment Judge Clark which resulted in orders being sent to the parties on 28 February 2019. Employment Judge Clark summarised in paragraphs 1 and 2 his understanding of the various claims being put forward by Mrs Cammack. He noted that they required further particularisation and this is a matter which I was not able to deal with at this hearing because of a lack of time. Orders are made subsequently.[3]Employment Judge Clark directed that the following issues would be determined:-3.1 To determine whether the Claimant was disabled at the material time and;3.2 to determine the Claimant’s employment status. Disability[4]The relevant statute law is Section 6 of the 2010 act:- “Section 6 Disability (1) A person (P) has a disability if:- (a) P has a physical or mental impairment, and (b) the impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on P's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities.”[5]Mrs Cammack relies upon two disabilities, the first being a physical impairment namely deafness. The Respondent’s conceded having regard to a audiometric report of 13 March 2019 showing that Mrs Cammack had profound hearing loss in the right ear and a severe loss in the left ear, she was disabled in that regard. The second disability upon which Mrs Cammack relies upon is the mental impairment of depression and anxiety. Mrs Cammack provided a lengthy statement which in summary suggested that she had suffered from depression and anxiety for most of her life. That following the sudden death of her first husband on 14 July 2010 she had suffered a lengthy depressive reaction to her husband’s death from which she took some considerable time to recover. Messrs Weston and Castle both supported Mrs Cammack’s contention that she suffered a lengthy reaction to her husband’s death in 2010 and took some time to return to a normal life.[6]I also had the benefit of Mrs Cammack’s medical records and a letter from her GP which is at page 334 of the agreed bundle. Turning to the records it can be seen that on 19 July 2010 Mrs Cammack telephoned her general practice and the diagnosis was bereavement. She then met with her GP on 29 July 2010. Mrs Cammack says that she was prescribed antidepressants at that point which turned her into a zombie. However no such record is set out in the patient record. Page 2 of 7[7]The next relevant record is of 4 June 2013 in which it is recorded that Mrs Cammack has “ongoing palpitation. Says wake up in the morning and feel as if her heart stopped and then start again beating very fast. Lost her husband at the age of 53 with heart attack. Her mother had stroke”. Thereafter there is no relevant entry during Mrs Cammack’s service with the Respondents.[8]Turning now to her GP’s report prepared for the purposes of this hearing. That is at page 334 and is dated 12 November 2018.[9]The matters relevant to the issue read as follows: “Mrs Cammack has asked me to provide a medical report regarding her and particularly regarding her mental state. Mrs Cammack never had any problems with depression in her life until the death of her first husband in July 2010, he died suddenly from a heart attack. She had a bereavement reaction but eventually started to find her feet again. She eventually remarried. Unfortunately her second husband developed carcinoma of the colon and had surgery resulting in a colostomy and unfortunately has pulmonary secondary’s. She is obviously trying to support her husband through this illness but finding herself under considerable pressure. Mrs Cammack has become increasingly depressed over recent months and on 29 October we commenced her on an antidepressant Citalopram, 10 mg daily, she complained that she felt under pressure at work and she was sexually harassed in her employment. I saw her again today when we increased the dose of her Citalopram to 20 mg.”[10]The period that is relevant for the purposes of the consideration of whether Mrs Cammack was disabled through the mental impairment of depression and anxiety is from the commencement of her working for the Respondents on 7 December 2015 to her resignation with an effective date of termination of 25 May 2018. During that period Mrs Cammack was running her own function/catering business, though I accept on a very small scale. She was also carrying out driving duties for the Respondent. I accept that these are work related and not necessarily normal day to day activities, though driving clearly is a normal day to day activity. I have had regard to Schedule 1, paragraph 2 and in particular subparagraph 2 which reads: “If an impairment ceases to have a substantial adverse effect on a person’s ability to carry out normal day to day activities it is to be treated as continuing to have that effect if that effect is likely to recur.”[11]However I am not satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to establish that the bereavement reaction diagnosed by Mrs Cammack’s GP in 2010 was one that satisfies that definition.[12]The only medical evidence supporting Mrs Cammack’s contention thereafter comes post the ending of her relationship with the Respondents. In conclusion therefore I am not satisfied that in respect of the impairment of depression and anxiety Mrs Cammack was disabled within the meaning of the 2010 Act. Page 3 of 7[13]In respect of Mrs Cammack’s undoubted disability of hearing loss I note that there appears to be no real reliance in Mrs Cammack’s claim form or extensive statement produced for the purpose of this hearing. However that is a matter that will have to be dealt with by way of particularisation. Status – Statute Law[14]Section 230 of the Employment Rights Act, subsections 1, 2 and 3:- “(1) In this Act “employee” means an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) a contract of employment. (2) In this Act “contract of employment” means a contract of service or apprenticeship, whether express or implied, and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing. (3) In this Act “worker” (except in the phrases “shop worker” and “betting worker”) means an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under):-(a) a contract of employment, or(b) any other contract, whether express or implied and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing, whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual; and any reference to a worker’s contract shall be construed accordingly.” Case Law[15]There is a plethora of case law concerning the status of employee/worker. As I indicated to the parties my approach would be to begin with the oft cited case of Readymix Concrete (Southeast Limited) against Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 1 All England Reports 433 in which Mr Justice McKenna stated that: “A contract of service exists if these 3 conditions are fulfilled:- a) The servant agrees that, in consideration of a wage or other remuneration he will provide his own work and skill in the performance of some service for his master; b) He agrees expressly or impliedly that in the performance of that service he will be subject to the other’s control in a sufficient degree to make that other master (now read employer/employee) and; c) The other provisions of the contract are consistent with it being a contract of service. Page 4 of 7[16]That passage was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Autoclenz Limited against Belcher and Others [2011] ICR 1157. The following background facts are relevant:-16.1 Mrs Cammack met with Mr Johnson. The Respondents is a small family run business providing refrigerated van services to local food production companies. At the relevant period there were 16 or so drivers; the great majority of which were employees within the meaning of Section 230 and treated as such.16.2 From about 2013 Mrs Cammack set up a business called Carolan Functions. It was not a limited company and Mrs Cammack was the only person who had an interest in it. The business had its own premises and a liveried company van.16.3 The extent of Carolan Functions business is far from clear. Mrs Cammack’s evidence on the point was both confused and confusing. I accept however that it did very little business and such business as it seems to have done was between 2014 and 2017. The accounts show that it was loss making.16.4 The accounts of Carolan also appear to show that the income received by Mrs Cammack in regard to her driving for the Respondents appeared as income in those accounts.16.5 At page 339 is a list of the payments made to Carolan Functions by the Respondents between the dates of 18 December 2015 and 7 August 2018. It is clear from this record that Mrs Cammack worked on a regular basis and over that period was paid some £27,157.32. The weekly and monthly averages are consistent over the period.16.6 Mrs Cammack throughout her service used the Respondent’s vehicles.16.7 The payments to Mrs Cammack were not subjected to the deduction of tax or national insurance.16.8 Mrs Cammack was not paid sickness pay nor holiday pay.16.9 Mrs Cammack had no financial interest in the Respondents and was not paid any form of bonus or profit share.[17]With those matters in mind I turn now to the RMC elements. There would appear to be 3 elements that are essential, the first being control.[18]Notwithstanding Mr Price’s submissions to the contrary it is absolutely clear that Mrs Cammack was under the control of Mr Johnson. It was he or the transport manager who directed when and where and by what route Mrs Cammack should work. The Respondent’s vans had trackers and Mr Johnson kept a close eye on the routes being taken by all drivers. If Mr Johnson was not happy with a route being taken he would contact Mrs Cammack (and any other driver) and re-route them if necessary. Page 5 of 7[19]The next matter is one of personal performance. There was no written contract between the parties. It was an oral contract about which there is a significant conflict of evidence to which I shall return. However on the matter of personal service the parties are agreed that that was not discussed. In cross examination Mr Johnson said that the matter ie of personal service had not crossed his mind. In my view it is clear that both parties assumed at the time of the formation of the oral contract that Mrs Cammack would carry out all driving duties personally.[20]The next matter is that of mutuality of obligation which in my view is fundamental to any contract of employment.[21]On this point Mr Price submits that Mrs Cammack was able to reject work and that she specifically rejected work on a Sunday. However we have the record at page 339 and although there are differences between weeks it seems to me that there is a reasonably consistent provision of work in exchange for pay and that the Respondents when they had work did offer it to Mrs Cammack.[22]Thus far then Mrs Cammack satisfies the RMC test but the third issue arising from RMC is whether the other provisions of the oral contract between the parties are consistent with it being a contract of employment.[23]Mr Price correctly submits that it is evident from Mrs Cammack’s tax returns that:-23.1 She knew she was being declared as self-employed to HMRC.23.2 Ostensibly declared only her income from the Respondents in the tax year 2016-17 despite evidence of other income ie from the performance functions.23.3 Claim the costs of running her other business against the income received from the Respondent.23.4 She requested payments to be made in the name of Carolan Functions and supplied the Respondent with business invoices.[24]I referred above to a conflict of evidence as to what was said about status. Mr Johnson’s evidence was that Mrs Cammack wished to be treated as self-employed, that the request to do so came from her. He went on to say that the great majority of his drivers were employees, employed on zero hour contracts and there would have been no difficulty in treating Mrs Cammack in that way.[25]On the other hand Mrs Cammack alleges that she expressed the wish to be employed and that the provision of invoices in the name of Carolan Functions was no more than a submission of a time sheet.[26]I prefer the evidence of Mr Johnson. Mrs Cammack was not a straightforward witness on the point. She claimed that she did not understand self-employed status, that she did not understand Carolan Functions accounts. I think she was being disingenuous. In my view she understood full well the advantages of being self-employed and being able to off-set the costs of Carolan Functions against the income she received from the Respondents. Page 6 of 7[27]This arrangement as part of the oral contract is, in my view, clearly not a sham as was the case in Autoclenz[28]On balance therefore I find that Mrs Cammack was not an employee of the Respondents and it follows that she cannot bring a claim for unfair dismissal.[29]However on the same facts and reasoning Mrs Cammack was a “worker” within the meaning of sub section 3 of Section 230 of the 1996 act. Equality Act Status[30]The relevant provision is Section 83(2)(a):- “(2) “Employment” means— (a) employment under a contract of employment, a contract of apprenticeship or a contract personally to do work.”[31]As to case law Mr Price correctly draws my attention to the leading authority of Givraj against Hashwani [2011] UK SC 40 in which Lord Clark said: “The essential questions in each case are whether, on the one had the person concerned performed services for and under the direction of another person in return for which she receives remuneration, or on the other hand she is an independent provider of services who is not in a relationship of subordination with the person who receives the services. Put another way, was this contract in essence in the field of dependent work relationships or was it a contract between two independent business undertakings.”[32]I am firmly of the view that it is the former. This was a dependent work relationship. By way of illustration of the latter, had Mrs Cammack been discriminated against whilst providing catering or function services to the Respondents in the capacity of Carolan Function then the latter would have been the case. The facts here point conclusively to a relationship where Mrs Cammock was subordinate to the Respondents in the person of Mr Johnson.[33]For that reason therefore Mrs Cammack is entitled to the protection of the Equality Act.
Introduction
[1]For the avoidance of doubt Mrs Cammack’s claim of constructive unfair dismissal is dismissed because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear it.[2]The complaint of suffering detriments pursuant to Section 47B of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (the 1996 act) fails and is dismissed.[3]The complaint of direct sex and/or marriage discrimination pursuant to Section 13 of the Equality Act 2010 (the 2010 act) fails and is dismissed.[4]The claim of harassment pursuant to Section 26 of the 2010 act fails and is dismissed.[5]The claim of a failure to make reasonable adjustments pursuant to Section 20 and 21 of the 2010 act also fails and is dismissed.[6]Normally an Employment Judge who has determined an issue in a case Page 2 of 10 would not sit on the final hearing. At the beginning of the hearing I invited Mrs Cammack with her companion to read my earlier judgment sent to the parties on 7 September 2019 and in particular I drew her attention to paragraph 26 of that judgment which reads as follows:- “I prefer the evidence of Mr Johnson. Mrs Cammack was not a straightforward witness on the point. She claimed that she did not understand self-employed status, that she did not understand Carolan Functions accounts. I think she was being disingenuous. In my view she understood full well the advantages of being self-employed and being able to off-set the costs of Carolan Functions against the income she received from the Respondents.” The Tribunal gave Mrs Cammack time both to read the judgment and to consider whether she wished to make an application for Employment Judge Blackwell to recuse himself.[7]After consideration Mrs Cammack stated that she had no objection to Employment Judge Blackwell continuing to hear the claims. ISSUES AND THE LAW8.1 Background findings of fact relevant to all issues8.1.1 Mrs Cammack began providing her services to the Respondent as a Courier/Delivery Driver on 18 November 2015 and ceased providing her services on 31 May 2018.8.1.2 The Respondent (QL) is a small family run business started by the Managing Director Paul Johnson in July 2012 and whose clients are local food production companies. The majority of the work is collecting raw materials and packaging required at short notice from anywhere within mainland UK and delivering the finished product produced too late for normal distribution means to distribution depots anywhere within mainland UK. At the time of the response there were 19 employees and two selfemployed contractors.8.1.3 From January 2016, Mrs Cammack was the regular driver on Sundays only of a laboratory van leased from QL by Bakkavor, a large food production organisation.8.1.4 During the week Mrs Cammack drove other of QL’s vans on a variety of work. There is a good deal of conflict or evidence about what she did which we will return to in the context of her individual claims.8.2 Issue 1 DETRIMENT FOR MAKING A PROTECTED DISCLOSURE – SECTION 47B 1996 ACT:-8.2.1 Did the Claimant make a protected disclosure as defined by Section 43A of the 1996 act?8.2.2 In respect of each of the disclosures relied on in her Scott Schedule did the Claimant make a “disclosure of information” for the purposes of Section 43B(i)? Page 3 of 108.2.3 Did the Claimant have a reasonable belief that each disclosure was made in the public interest?8.2.4 Did the Claimant have a reasonable belief that each disclosure tended to show that one of the sub categories under Section 43B(i) applied?8.2.5 Was the disclosure made in good faith?8.2.6 Was the Claimant subjected to any detriment by any act or any deliberate failure to act by the Respondent on the ground that the Claimant had made a protected disclosure?8.3 The Claimant relies on the following as amounting to detriments:-8.3.1 Conduct by Mr Johnson and in particular unpleasant, nasty, spiteful language, that he ranted and raved.8.3.2 That less work was allocated to her as a consequence.8.4 Conclusions on issue 18.4.1 In relation to the agreed list of issues, the Respondent concedes that Mrs Cammack made a number of protected disclosures as defined. They also concede that there was a disclosure of information and that Mrs Cammack had a reasonable belief that her disclosures were made in the public interest. They also concede that the disclosures which were all related to the condition of the vehicles that she drove were related to breaches of the Construction and Use Regulations and/or that the health and safety of any individual has been, is being, or is likely to be endangered. They also concede that the disclosure was made in good faith.8.4.2 The question for us therefore to determine is whether or not Mrs Cammack suffered either of the detriments that she pleads occurred, namely that on many of the occasions that she made the disclosures Mr Johnson ranted and raved at her and/or she was given less work as a consequence of making the disclosure.8.4.3 Most of the disclosures made by Mrs Cammack concerned the laboratory van (known as Skippy) which was leased by Bakkavor from QL. Its purpose was to convey samples of food from Bakkavor’s various production units to their central laboratory for testing for food hygiene purposes. The van was driven from Tuesday to Saturday by Mr Lucy, an employee of Bakkavor. Mr Teal regularly drove the van on a Saturday and he was an employee of QL. Mrs Cammack regularly drove the van on a Sunday from September 2016 until she had an altercation with the security guard at the laboratory in April 2018.8.4.4 Bakkavor did their own risk assessments of the laboratory van and it seems to us highly unlikely that they would have permitted an unroadworthy vehicle to be used in connection with their business. There Page 4 of 10 is ample evidence that defects once reported were dealt with, though not always successfully.8.4.5 In relation to the alleged detriment of being ranted and raved at, clearly such would be a detriment if we accepted that Mr Johnson had regularly ranted and raved at Mrs Cammack. Mrs Cammack’s evidence is supported in that regard by that of Mr Lucy, the driver employed by Bakkavor. Unsurprisingly since his statement was written by Mrs Cammack, he also uses the same phraseology as Mrs Cammack. Mr Weston notes that Mr Lucy is a friend of Mrs Cammack’s. Mr Weston who was also an employee of QL and was called by Mrs Cammack to give evidence does not support that evidence. He says that Mr Johnson was not rude to him, even when he reported defects.8.4.6 Mr Johnson’s evidence is that whenever defects were reported he dealt with the matter politely and calmly. We have to say at this point that we did not find Mrs Cammack to be a reliable witness. Her evidence was prone to exaggeration and in our view in parts was pure fantasy as we will set out in relation to other issues. Mr Johnson also said that he rarely came into contact with Mr Lucy and it seems highly unlikely that Mr Johnson would have ranted and raved at an employee of Bakkavor who provided QL with valuable business.8.4.7 We therefore find on balance that Mr Johnson did not rant and rave at Mrs Cammack.8.4.8 The second matter complained of is that whenever Mrs Cammack made protected disclosures she suffered the detriment of receiving less work. In cross examination, Mrs Cammack was taken to a number of specific dates when she had made protected disclosures and was then taken to the record of hours worked, which begins at page 303. Mrs Cammack was unable to identify any correlation between the making of the protected disclosures on specific dates and a consequent diminution of work being offered. Therefore, that part of her claim must fail because she cannot show that any alleged diminution in work was “done on the ground that the worker has made a protected disclosure”.9.1 Issue 2 DIRECT SEX/MARRIAGE DISCRIMINATION (SECTION 13 OF THE EQUALITY ACT 2010):-9.1.1 Did the Respondent treat the Claimant less favourably than it treated or would treat an actual or hypothetical comparator who was not of the Claimant’s sex/or was not married? The acts relied on are set out in her Scott Schedule.9.1.2 Does the Claimant rely on an actual or hypothetical comparator? If an actual comparator who?9.1.3 If less favourable treatment occurred are there facts from which the Tribunal could fairly and properly conclude in the absence of any explanation from the Respondent that the acts complained of were because of sex/marriage status? Page 5 of 109.1.4 Can the Respondent show a none discriminatory reason for the acts of potential discrimination identified?9.2 Conclusions on issue 29.2.1 Complaints of less favourable treatment are set out at page 63 in Mrs Cammack’s Scott Schedule supplied as part of the further and better particulars. The first act complained of is the allegation that Mr Johnson when he saw Mrs Cammack lifting the bonnet of a van told her that no woman lifts the bonnet of a van. Mrs Cammack maintains that thereafter she never lifted the bonnet of a van.9.2.2 Nothing illustrates more clearly why we found Mrs Cammack to be an unreliable witness than this allegation.9.2.3 Mrs Cammack’s account was that the van in question, a Ford Transit, would not start due to a flat battery. So, in preparation she raised the bonnet so that it could be started from another battery. At that point Mr Johnson is alleged to have made the remark complained of. When Mr Johnson was cross examined on this point he first denied that such an event had ever occurred and reminded Mrs Cammack that the battery in a Ford Transit sits beneath the driver’s seat and not in the engine compartment. Mrs Cammack’s cross examination ceased abruptly. We therefore find that the remark was never made.9.2.4 The next allegation is that Mr Johnson told Mrs Cammack in relation to the distribution of work that married women such as herself would always come second because they could rely upon income derived from their husband. Again, if true that would be a clear act of less favourable treatment on the ground of the protected characteristic of marriage. Mr Johnson’s evidence was that he never made such a remark and that he had no idea whether Mrs Cammack’s husband was in work or not. We accept Mr Johnson’s evidence and we do not believe that the remark was made.9.2.5 The next matter is an allegation that Mrs Cammack was forced to wear the black company uniform of male fit whereas her male colleagues could wear what they wished. The evidence in this regard is that Mrs Cammack at her request was issued with a number of items of company uniform on 4 September 2017, see page 302A.9.2.6 It is common ground that Mrs Cammack never wore the uniform. Mrs Cammack alleges that on 31 May 2018 Mr Johnson required her to wear the uniform. Mr Johnson’s evidence is that the company uniform was unisex. Examples of the product supplied as company uniform are at pages 291-293 and are all labelled as “unisex”. We accept that the uniform was unisex.9.2.7 We also accept Mr Johnson’s evidence, uncontested by Mrs Cammack, that the uniform was regularly worn by two of the female office staff and by Ms Whitworth, a female driver. Page 6 of 109.2.8 It was Mr Johnson’s evidence which again we accept that there was no compulsion to wear the uniform and nobody was ever disciplined for failing to do so. It was merely recommended.9.2.9 As to the events of 31 May, Mrs Cammack alleges that she was told she must wear the uniform. Mr Johnson’s evidence is that he merely asked, given that she had asked for the uniform and that it had been issued as long ago as September 2017, why she did not wear it. Again, we prefer the evidence of Mr Johnson. In our view therefore, there was no less favourable treatment.9.2.10 The final matter complained of is that Mrs Cammack was offered less work than 3 other comparators. The named comparators are Steve Sharman, Matt Pointon and Graham Wakefield. At pages 303-306 we see the relevant records of Mrs Cammack, the 3 male comparators and 6 other drivers including Mr Weston who we note makes similar complaints that he was given less work, though he is male.9.2.11 It is clear from these records that Mrs Cammack did work less hours than the 3 male comparators. So too did Mr Weston. It does not seem to us on its own to reverse the burden of proof as set out in Section 136 of the 2010 act. In any event QL advanced a number of factors which would explain why Mrs Cammack worked less hours than the 3 comparators. The first was that Mrs Cammack ran a small business of her own organising events. That meant that she was generally unavailable on Saturdays. Mrs Cammack denied that that was the case and that she was always available on Saturdays.9.2.12 The second matter relied upon by QL is that she declined to undertake local jobs. The consequence of that was that if other work became available during the undertaking of a local job, then more hours would then be worked. Mrs Cammack again denied that she refused local runs. However, both Mr Johnson and Mr Blanchard gave evidence that she did and we prefer that evidence.9.2.13 Mr Blanchard also gave evidence that if work was short he gave preference to the employed drivers rather than Mrs Cammack and the other driver of the same status. Again, we accept that evidence. In fact, the evidence points to the fact that there were material differences between the circumstances relating to Mrs Cammack and to her 3 male comparators. We particularly note that Mr Weston, a male, makes the same complaint. It seems to us that this particular complaint is simply motivated by a feeling of grievance that other employees were doing more hours and therefore earning more money. We therefore find that this allegation of less favourable treatment fails because there are material differences as outlined above between Mrs Cammack and the 3 male comparators.10.1 Issue 3 HARASSMENT ON THE GROUNDS OF SEX (SECTION 26, 2010 ACT):-10.1.1 Did the Respondent harass or engage in unwanted conduct related to the Claimant’s sex? The Claimant relies on the acts of alleged harassment set out in her Scott Schedule. Page 7 of 1010.1.2 If any act complained of is found to have been unwanted, did it have the purpose or effect of violating the Claimant’s dignity or of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the Claimant?10.1.3 Was it reasonable having regard to the Claimant’s perception and the Court of Appeal’s guidance in Grant v HM Land Registry, for the conduct complained of by the Claimant as violating her dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile etc environment, as the case may be, to have had the effect complained of?10.2 Conclusions on issue 310.2.1 It seems to us from the document produced by Mrs Cammack at pages 231-239 and in particular at page 238 Mrs Cammack would have us believe:-10.2.2 In relation to the layby incident, Mr Johnson’s evidence, confirmed by Mr Sharman, is that that the purpose of Mr Johnson’s calls was simply to find out whether the transfer had taken place and the estimated time of arrival at the customer’s premises because he, Mr Johnson, was being asked by the customer to confirm that ETA. Mr Sharman described Mrs Cammack’s account both of the alleged relationship and the layby incident as pure fantasy. We agree. We simply do not believe Mrs Cammack’s Page 8 of 10 account which as with almost all of her complaints is unsupported by any other evidence whether oral or documentary.10.2.3 The other two complaints of sexual harassment are that Mr Johnson asked Mrs Cammack as to whether she was happily married and that “you really ought to be nice to me” implying that Mrs Cammack would receive more work if she was nice to Mr Johnson. Again, these are matters denied by Mr Johnson and again we simply do not believe Mrs Cammack’s evidence.10.2.4 Therefore, her claims brought under Section 26 have no basis in fact and must fail.(a) That Mr Johnson was attracted to her and flirted with her on a regular basis.(b) That as a consequence Mrs Johnson, who worked in QL’s office, was jealous of Mrs Cammack and;(c) that Mr Johnson was jealous of Mr Sharman because he perceived that Mr Sharman was attracted to Mrs Cammack.(d) In that context we will deal first with the examples of harassment at paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Scott Schedule at page 64. The first alleges that Mr Johnson hounded and badgered Mrs Cammack as to what Mr Johnson perceived to be a relationship with Mr Sharman. Closely connected with that is the fourth allegation that Mr Johnson threatened Mr Sharman and Mrs Cammack over the telephone at a point where there was a handover of goods between the two drivers as a consequence of a change of plans and an urgent need of a client.(e) As to the badgering and hounding complaint Mrs Cammack draws particular attention to an occasion where she alleges that she drove Mr Johnson to a nearby garage to collect a van which had been repaired. She alleges that he asked her at least 25 times in that short return journey about her relationship with Mr Sharman. Mr Johnson denies that there was ever such a conversation and points out that he would not have gone to the garage if the garage had not told him that the van was ready for collection. There therefore would have been no return journey.11.1 Issue 4 FAILURE TO MAKE REASONABLE ADJUSTMENTS, SECTION 20 AND 21 OF THE 2010 ACT:-11.1.1 Did the Respondent apply a provision, criterion and/or practice which put C at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled? The Claimant relies upon a practice of the Respondent ringing her whilst she was driving. She says that the substantial disadvantage was that she could not hear the call because of her disability. She says that reasonable adjustments would have either to have given her written instructions or to have sent messages by text.11.1.2 Did the Respondent take such steps as were reasonable to avoid the disadvantage?11.1.3 Did the Respondent not know or could not reasonably have been expected to know that the Claimant had a disability or was likely to be placed at the disadvantage complained of?11.2 Conclusions on issue 411.2.1 Mrs Cammack complains that there was a practice of communicating changes in itinerary by telephone whilst she was driving. Although Mr Blanchard gave evidence that he had on occasions texted Mrs Cammack at her request with such changes, on the evidence of Mr Johnson and Mrs Cammack we find that there was a practice of communicating changes by telephone.11.2.2 Mrs Cammack further alleges that she was put at a substantial disadvantage compared to drivers whose hearing was not impaired because she would have to pull over in order to ring the person instructing her of the change. In relation to reasonable adjustments, she says that changes should have been communicated by text or by written instructions. As to the latter, that plainly could not occur where there was a change of itinerary after the delivery route had begun because such change could only be given by way of a telephone call or by text.11.2.3 In relation to a text, Mrs Cammack said that if she received a text, she would need to pull over in order both to read the text, reply to it and, if necessary, to reset her satellite navigation. In other words, she would have pulled over whether the change was communicated by text or phone. Page 9 of 1011.2.4 On those facts therefore, we cannot see that texting a change of itinerary would have assisted because precisely the same process would have followed with a communication by telephone. In our view, therefore, Mrs Cammack was not put at a substantial disadvantage, nor would any of the reasonable adjustments she suggests have assisted. This claim must therefore fail.