Miss M Wright v SFE Chetwode Ltd and K Winter: 2601525/2024 and Others
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 2601525/2024, 2601526/2024
Between
Miss M WrightClaimantSFE Chetwode Ltd and K WinterRespondent
Before
Employment Judge AhmedIn person for claimantMr Jacques Algazy KC for respondentDate 19 December 2024
JUDGMENT
The decision of the Tribunal is that the Claimant’s application for interim relief is refused. JUDGMENT UPON hearing from the claimant in person and Counsel for the respondent AND for the reasons set out below IT IS THE TRIBUNAL’S JUDGMENT THAT[1]For the avoidance of doubt, all claims are consolidated because they are founded on the same facts and against the same parties;[2]The claimant’s claim that she was automatically unfairly dismissed for making a protected disclosure (Employment Rights Act 1996 section 103A) is struck out;[3]The claimant’s claim that she was automatically unfairly dismissed for exercising her right to be accompanied to a disciplinary hearing (Employment Relations Act 1999 section 12(3)) is struck out;[4]The claimant’s claim that the respondents subjected her to a detriment on grounds related to union membership or activities (Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 section 146) is dismissed on withdrawal[5]The claimant’s claim labelled “trust and confidence” is struck out;[6]The claimant’s application to amend her claim to bring a claim of automatic unfair dismissal on the grounds related union membership or activities Page 1 of 26 (Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 section 152) is dismissed;[7]The claimant’s claim that the respondents subjected her to one or more detriments because she made a protected disclosure of 31 May 2024 was one that she reasonably believed tended to show the deliberate concealment of an endangerment of health and safety (Employment Rights Act 1996 section 43B(1)(f) and section 47B) is struck out;[8]All of the claimant’s claims that the respondents subjected her to one or more detriments because she made a protected disclosure on 12 June 2024 (Employment Rights Act 1996 section 43B(1)(d), (f) and section 47B) are struck out.[9]The only remaining claims are that the respondents subjected her to one or more detriments because of the protected disclosure on 31 May 2024 as far as that fell with section 43B(1)(d) (endangerment of health and safety).[10]In respect of that claim, the claimant must pay a deposit, details of which are in the separate deposit order sent to the parties with this order;[11]The claimant must pay to the respondent the sum of £1,000 as a contribution towards their costs of the hearing for interim relief on 29 August 2024;[12]There will be a further case management hearing, details of which follow separately.
REASONS
[1]The claimant has presented 3 claims: 1.1. 2601525/2024 and 2601526/2024 are identical. They advance claims of “A. Whistleblowing detriment under s47B ERA 1996; and B. Automatic unfair dismissal under s103A ERA 1996.” 1.2. 2601808/2024 adds the following claims: “C. Automatic unfair dismissal under s10 Employment Relations Act 1999 and s146 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1992. D. Breach of trust and confidence.”[2]She seeks to amend the third claim to substitute Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULCRA) section 152 in place of section 146.[3]None of them trigger different issues about time limits or jurisdiction. This means it is pragmatic to treat them all as one claim in my view for the purposes of this judgment.[4]The respondents seek to strike out the claims on the grounds that they have no reasonable prospect of success and they are vexatious. The claimant opposes that. The respondents also seek an order the claimant pay costs Page 2 of 26 for an interim relief hearing. The claimant also seeks permission to amend her claim, which the respondents oppose.
The hearing
[5]The hearing proceeded as follows: 5.1. The claimant represented herself. 5.2. Mr J Algazy KC, instructed by Browne Jacobson represented the respondent. 5.3. The case was listed for one day. 5.4. I heard oral evidence from Ms Wright on her financial circumstances only. I did not hear oral evidence about the claims themselves. 5.5. At the hearing I clarified the claims with Ms Wright. 5.6. There was an agreed bundle of pages 344 pages. I have taken into account the bundle and the contents of the Tribunal’s file. The latter did not contain any relevant document not already in the bundle. There was an electronic bundle version which unfortunately was not helpful because it was not bookmarked and had not been subject to optical character recognition, in breach of the President’s guidance. Thankfully, the respondents provided a printed bundle as well. 5.7. The respondents relied on the applications as written submissions. The claimant relied on written submissions. I have taken them into account. 5.8. I asked the claimant questions during her submissions to allow her the chance to set out her position on key matters that I have to consider. 5.9. I have taken into account the claimant’s oral evidence, her clarification of claims, both parties’ written and oral submissions and the relevant parts of the bundle. 5.10. I decided to reserve my decision because of the multiple issues. 5.11. During the hearings, we took appropriate breaks, particularly when Ms Wright became distressed. No reasonable adjustments were requested. There was nothing about the hearing that alerted me to the need for any, either. 5.12. No party has complained this was an unfair hearing. I am satisfied the hearing was fair.[6]I add only this observation as an aside. I am left with a strong feeling Ms Wright is pursuing a claim she does not understand and cannot personally justify when asked. While it is clear she feels genuinely aggrieved, I am left with the impression that she does not understand if or how that grievance is legally justified. Page 3 of 26[7]Her particulars of claim are well set out and quite clear. Her written submissions and witness statements are verbose and less focused but appear on issue. Her oral arguments were not particularly on issue and vague. It transpired that she received help from a charity to bring and write the claim and used ChatGPT (a large language artificial intelligence (AI) web-based device) to write her statement and submissions, into which she added her own details. I am not going to be drawn into a discussion about the use of AI. I also appreciate that writing something for a Tribunal is different to speaking in front of it, especially if one is a litigant-in-person against experienced legal representatives. However, even allowing for all of that, the contrast and demeanour left me with that feeling.[8]This is not relevant to the decision I must make. I remark on it for Ms Wright’s benefit – if she continues with this claim, she must take steps to ensure she personally understands what her case is. Ms Wright’s claims before the Tribunal as clarified at the hearing[9]Before I get into the law, it is important to set the claims before the Tribunal as clarified by Ms Wright to the Tribunal at the hearing.[10]Those claims are as follows. 10.1. Being subjected to various detriments because she made a protected disclosure. Those detriments are set out in her particulars of claim at paragraph 38. 10.2. Being automatically unfairly dismissed for making a protected disclosure. 10.3. Being automatically unfairly dismissed for exercising the right to be accompanied at a disciplinary hearing relying on the Employment Relations Act 1999 section 10. 10.4. and also seeking to bring it under TULCRA section 146 (which only covers automatic unfair dismissals).[11]Because section 146 does not cover dismissals, after discussion she clarified that she sought to amend her claim to rely instead on section 152. I treat that as under section 145 as withdrawn accordingly because she does not pursue it. There was no formal written application however the respondents were content to deal with it because it is a “literal relabelling” in that if allowed, one crosses out “145”, and writes “152”. No other material changes are required to the documents.[12]At the hearing, I explained to Ms Wright a point that the respondents had made, but which she did not appreciate. The respondents pointed out that for the dismissals to be automatically unfair, the sole reason for dismissal or if more than one the principal reason for dismissal must be the prohibited conduct, e.g. if the dismissal was for whistleblowing, then the sole reason for dismissal or at least the principal reason must be whistleblowing.[13]Ms Wright advances 2 grounds for which the dismissal was unfair. I explained if the principal reason was e.g. whistleblowing, then the sole or principal reason could not be her requesting to be accompanied to the Page 4 of 26 disciplinary hearing (for the purposes of this discussion I include claims under section 10 and section 152 as being the same).[14]After giving that explanation I asked her to confirm which reason was the main one she says the respondents dismissed her for. She told me that her case was that both reasons were equal reasons for her dismissal – that is that no one reason was the sole or principal reason. I clarified this but she maintained her position – both are equal reasons for dismissal.[15]We also discussed the claim labelled “trust and confidence.” Trust and confidence is not itself a cause of action. However she confirmed she was not seeking to pursue the claim as one of breach of contract. As there is no such claim, I strike out that of “trust and confidence” because there is no benefit to allowing a non-justiciable claim to proceed. The Issues before me at today’s hearing[16]The issues before the Tribunal at this hearing are as follows: 16.1. Amendment issue: Should I permit the claimant to amend her claim to substitute a claim under the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULCRA) section 152 (Dismissal of employee on grounds related to union membership or activities) for the claim under section 145. 16.2. Strike out issue: 16.2.1. Should I strike out some or all of the claims because they have no reasonable prospect of success? 16.2.2. Should I strike out some or all of the claims because they are vexatious? 16.3. Deposit issue: Should I order the claimant to pay a deposit as a condition of pursuing some or all of her claims because they have little reasonable prospect of success? 16.4. Costs issue: Should I order the claimant to pay some or all of the costs of the interim relief hearing?[17]In my view I should deal with the amendment issue, strike out issue and deposit issue first and the costs issue separately. Legal principles I have to apply on strike out, deposit orders and applications to amend[18]The respondents have properly drawn to my attention a number of relevant cases that guide me how to approach these issues. For brevity and simplicity, I summarise them and refer to what I consider the key cases below Amendment[19]I have referred to the following cases on the principles of whether to allow or refuse an amendment to a claim: 19.1. Vaughan v Modality Partnership [2021] ICR 535 EAT; Page 5 of 26 19.2. Chaudhry v Cerberus Security and Monitoring Services Limited [2022] EAT 172 EAT. These cases draw on earlier authorities in turn. Vaughan in particular reviews the previously decided cases (including the key case of Selkent Bus Company v Moore [1996] ECR 836 EAT) and brings them together to set out the principles.[20]I understand from them the following, relevant principles emerge: 20.1. The task before me is to identify the proposed amendments and then balance the paramount consideration of the hardship and injustice of allowing the amendment against that of refusing it, recognising that refusal is always going to cause some perceived prejudice. 20.2. The focus is not so much on the formal classification of causes of action, but the extent to which the new pleading is likely to involve substantially different areas of enquiry from the old: The greater the difference between the factual and legal issues raised by the new claim and by the old, the less likely it is that it will be permitted. 20.3. The following may well be relevant: 20.3.1. the nature of the amendment, 20.3.2. the applicability of time limits and the timing, 20.3.3. manner of the application, and 20.3.4. if the proposed amended claim has no reasonable prospects of success. 20.4. I must not refuse amendments simply as punishment. I am entitled to expect that party to explain how it is we have ended up in the situation that the amendment is being sought.[21]I remind myself the overriding objective in rule 2 also informs how I should exercise case management powers to allow an amendment. Strike out[22]Tribunal Rule 37 provides as far as relevant: “37. (1) At any stage of the proceedings, either on its own initiative or on the application of a party, a Tribunal may strike out all or part of a claim or response on any of the following grounds - “(a) that it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospects of success; “(b) that the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by or on behalf of the claimant or the respondents (as the case may be) has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious; .... “…” Page 6 of 26 No reasonable prospects of success[23]The cases provide the following guidance on the exercise of this power. As far as one is considering a reasonable prospect of success: 23.1. No reasonable prospect of success is a high test. It is not enough to conclude that claim is likely to fail. It is not enough to ask whether it is possible that the claim will fail. It is not a test that can be satisfied by considering what is put forward by the respondents either in the ET3 or in submissions and deciding whether their written or oral assertions regarding disputed matters are likely to be established as facts: Balls v Downham Market High School and College [2011] IRLR 217 EAT. 23.2. As said in Cox v Adecco Group and others UKEAT/0339/19/AT, 23.2.1. strike out is not prohibited in discrimination or whistleblowing cases; but especial care must be taken in such cases as it is very rarely appropriate (see also Anyanwu v South Bank University aor [2001] ICR 391 UKHL) 23.2.2. If the question of whether a claim has reasonable prospect of success turns on factual issues that are disputed, it is highly unlikely that strike out will be appropriate; 23.2.3. The Claimant’s case must ordinarily be taken at its highest; 23.2.4. It is necessary to consider, in reasonable detail, what the claims and issues are. Put bluntly, you cannot decide whether a claim has reasonable prospects of success if you do not know what it is; 23.2.5. This does not necessarily require the agreement of a formal list of issues, although that may assist greatly, but does require a fair assessment of the claims and issues on the basis of the pleadings and any other documents in which the claimant seeks to set out the claim; 23.2.6. In the case of a litigant in person, the claim should not be ascertained only by requiring the claimant to explain it while under the stresses of a hearing; reasonable care must be taken to read the pleadings (including additional information) and any key documents in which the claimant sets out the case. When pushed by a judge to explain the claim, a litigant in person may become like a rabbit in the headlights and fail to explain the case they have set out in writing; Page 7 of 26 23.2.7. Respondents, particularly if legally represented, in accordance with their duties to assist the tribunal to comply with the overriding objective and not to take procedural advantage of litigants in person, should assist the tribunal to identify the documents in which the claim is set out, even if it may not be explicitly pleaded in a manner that that would be expected of a lawyer; 23.3. If a case has no reasonable prospect of success it ought to be struck out: ABN Amro Management Services Ltd & Anor v Hogben UKEAT/0266/09; Malik v Birmingham City Council UKEAT/0027/19 23.4. Reasonable prospects of success means “realistic” not “merely fanciful prospects of success”: Ezsias v North Glamorgan NHS Trust [2007] ICR 1126 EAT. 23.5. Matters of fact can be taken into account where there is a possibility of a provisional view of credibility, for example the claimant’s factual allegations have an absence of reality or are totally inconsistent with contemporaneous documents: see Jansen van Rensburg v Kingston upon Thames RLBC UKEAT/0096/07/MAA. Vexatious[24]Bingham CJ described “vexatious” proceedings as follows in Attorney General v Barker [2000] 1 FLR 759, QBD (DC): “[They have] little or no basis in law (or at least no discernible basis); that whatever the intention of the proceeding may be, its effect is to subject the defendant to inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to any gain likely to accrue to the claimant; and that it involves an abuse of the process of the court, meaning by that a use of the court process for a purpose or in a way which is significantly different from the ordinary and proper use of the court process.”[25]This meaning applies to the use of the word in the Tribunal Rules: see Bennett v Southwark London Borough Council [2002] ICR 881 CA.[26]I interpret “out of all proportion” to set a high standard. Being disproportionate is not enough. It has to go beyond that. This is supported by Lord Bingham’s words “and that it involves an abuse of process….” The disproportionality must be so significant it is of the character of an abuse of process. If it were not so then lots of modest claims or badly pleaded claim (particularly common in the Tribunals) may well fall foul of the definition and be struck out accordingly. I consider it a self-evident fact that this is not the law. Deposit orders[27]Tribunal Rule 39 provides: “Deposit Orders Page 8 of 26 39. - (1) Where at a preliminary hearing (under rule 53) the Tribunal considers that any specific allegation or argument in a claim or response has little reasonable prospect of success, it may make an order requiring a party (“the paying party”) to pay a deposit not exceeding £1,000 as a condition of continuing to advance that allegation or argument.”[28]As the law makes clear in Jansen van Rensberg it is not as rigorous test as for striking out a claim for no reasonable prospects of success and so the Tribunal has more leeway. Any deposit should be affordable based on an assessment of the claimant’s actual financial situation: Carryl v Governing Body of Manford Primary School [2023] EAT 167 EAT. Legislation and case law relevant to Ms Wright’s claim[29]I need also to refer to the relevant legislation and legal tests. Whistleblowing[30]There is no dispute that any protected disclosure was made to a relevant person. I can therefore skip over that.[31]The Employment Rights Act 1996 section 43A-43B provides “43A Meaning of “protected disclosure “In this Act a “protected disclosure” means a qualifying disclosure (as defined by section 43B) which is made by a worker in accordance with any of sections 43C to 43H. “43B Disclosures qualifying for protection “(1) In this Part a “qualifying disclosure” means any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, [is made in the public interest and] tends to show one or more of the following— “… “(d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered, “… “(f) that information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding paragraphs has been, or is likely to be deliberately concealed. “… “(5) In this Part “the relevant failure”, in relation to a qualifying disclosure, means the matter falling within paragraphs (a) to (f) of subsection (1).][32]The requirement for a reasonable belief is a low threshold: Korashi v Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board [2012] IRLR 4 EAT.[33]The Employment Rights Act 1996 section 47B entitles an employee to bring a claim if their employer subjects them to a detriment because the employee has made a protected disclosure. Section 48(2) puts the emphasis on the employer to show the ground on which any act or failure Page 9 of 26 to act was done. However if the respondents fails in this task, it does not follow the claimant succeeds: Ibekwe v Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust UKEAT/0072/14 EAT. There must be a link to show the protected disclosure was the real or core reason: Aspinall v MSI Mech forge Ltd UKEAT/0891/01 EAT. “Detriment” has been identified as existing if a reasonable worker would or might see the act as a detriment, viewed from that worker’s position: Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] ICR 337 HL (a discrimination case but defining the same word in the context of the Equality Act 2010. There is no reason to believe it should be different in whistleblowing cases).[34]Section 103A provides: “An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes of this Part as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employee made a protected disclosure.” [emphasis added].[35]The claimant has the burden of showing the reason for the dismissal in a s.103A automatic unfair dismissal and that the reason was because she made a protected disclosure, because she was not employed for 2 years immediately before dismissal: Kuzel v Roche Products Ltd [2007] IRLR 309 (EAT). Right to be accompanied[36]The Employment Relations Act 1999 sections 10 provides as far as relevant: “10 Right to be accompanied “(1) This section applies where a worker— “(a) is required or invited by his employer to attend a disciplinary or grievance hearing, and “(b) reasonably requests to be accompanied at the hearing. “(2A) Where this section applies, the employer must permit the worker to be accompanied at the hearing by one companion who— “(a) is chosen by the worker; and “(b) is within subsection (3) [which provides in summary for the right to trade union representation.] “…”[37]Section 12 provides (as far as relevant) 12 Detriment and dismissal “… “(3) A worker who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes of Part X of the Employment Rights Act 1996 as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that he— Page 10 of 26 “(a) exercised or sought to exercise the right under section 10(2A), (2B) or (4), or “(b) accompanied or sought to accompany another worker (whether of the same employer or not) pursuant to a request under that section. “… “(5) Sections 128 to 132 of that Act (interim relief) shall apply in relation to dismissal for the reason specified in subsection (3)(a) or (b) above as they apply in relation to dismissal for a reason specified in section 128(1)(b) of that Act….” [emphasis added][38]Section 13 provides “(4) For the purposes of section 10 a disciplinary hearing is a hearing which could result in— “(a) the administration of a formal warning to a worker by his employer, “(b) the taking of some other action in respect of a worker by his employer, or “(c) the confirmation of a warning issued or some other action taken.”[39]The respondents referred me to Talon v Engineering v Smith [2018] IRLR 1104 EAT. It points out that the right to be accompanied is separate from ordinary unfair dismissal. I am not convinced however this takes me any further forward in my deliberations. Trade union activities[40]It is common ground that TULCRA section 145 applies only to detriments. Ms Wright’s claim relied only on automatic unfair dismissal, however. Section 152 provides: “152 Dismissal [of employee] on grounds related to union membership or activities “(1) For purposes of [Part X of the Employment Rights Act 1996] (unfair dismissal) the dismissal of an employee shall be regarded as unfair if the reason for it (or, if more than one, the principal reason) was that the employee— “… “(ba) had made use, or proposed to make use, of trade union services at an appropriate time, “… “(2) In subsection (1) “an appropriate time” means— “(a) a time outside the employee's working hours, or “(b) a time within his working hours at which, in accordance with arrangements agreed with or consent given by his employer, it is permissible for him to take part in the activities of a trade union [or (as the case may be) make use of trade union services]; Page 11 of 26 and for this purpose “working hours,” in relation to an employee, means any time when, in accordance with his contract of employment, he is required to be at work. “(2A) In this section— “(a) “trade union services” means services made available to the employee by an independent trade union by virtue of his membership of the union, and “(b) references to an employee's “making use” of trade union services include his consenting to the raising of a matter on his behalf by an independent trade union of which he is a member. “…” Background and facts
Introduction
[41]There are many disputed facts. I have set out below why, generally, I cannot rule as the respondents invite me to do and hold that Ms Wright has no reasonable prospect of success in establishing the facts. I deal with this in paragraph 44 below onwards. In short the disputes call out for a trial. Generally the documents, claims and responses do not show her factual allegations to be fanciful or that they have an “absence of reality” (to quote the description of the parallel test for summary judgment under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 by Lord Hobhouse in Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No.3) [2003] 2 AC 1 UKHL). In short as far as the facts are relevant and in dispute, they call out for a final hearing to decide where the truth lies on the basis of the evidence presented. Brief summary of the case (as far as relevant)[42]The relevant facts (with the above caveats as appropriate) in my view are as follows. 42.1. The first respondent (SFE) employed the claimant (Ms Wright) as a secretary from 12 June 2023 to 17 July 2024. The second respondent (Ms Winter) is employed as a director of SFE. 42.2. There are numerous allegations that Ms Wright was rude to members of staff. Ms Wright denies this. Some of these involves interactions between someone called Megan and Ms Wright, though there are other complaints too. Some of these are documented and before me. 42.3. In February 2024, Ms Wright raised a grievance about a Raquel Lesta. The details or correctness I cannot determine and for present purposes do not matter in my view. All that matters is that it was dismissed on 9 February 2024. 42.4. SFE provides food onsite to staff. The alleged circumstances of the protected disclosure are as follows. On 31 May 2024 Ms Wright requested a jacket potato with cheese. The catering team delivered the jacket potato to Ms Wright with a pot of cheese. Ms Page 12 of 26 Wright says she found mould in 2 pots of cheese. SFE’s staff investigated and the respondents deny the cheese was mouldy, they say it was pepper. Whether it was mouldy or a mistake I cannot determine from the photos, even less determine whether it is fanciful she held a reasonable belief it was mouldy. 42.5. Ms Wright avers she made the following protected disclosures following this. 42.5.1. On 31 May 2024 she told DW (the restaurant manager) “there was mould in the cheese” 42.5.2. On 12 June 2024 she told Liz Bowler (her line manager) that Ms Winter expected her to put the cheese in the bin and be discreet. She avers both amount to information tending to show breaches of health and safety laws and “a wide range of legislation” include the “The Food Safety & Hygiene (England) Regulations 2013 which specifically relates to the microbiological safety of food.” 42.6. At about this time other staff raised concerns to Ms Winter about Ms Wright. These came to a head in a meeting on 5 June 2024 between Ms Wright and Ms Winter that resulted in no further action. 42.7. The claimant complained on 10 June 2024 about Ms Winter’s conduct in that meeting. The details and veracity do not matter. 42.8. On 11 July 2024 Ms Wright complained about Ms Lesta’s conduct again. Again the details and veracity do not matter. 42.9. On 15 July 2024, SFE invited the claimant to a “disciplinary hearing” (to use their own words in the response). The claimant’s trade union representative could not attend so it was postponed to 22 July 2024. 42.10. On 26 July 2024, the respondents say the claimant was rude and unproductive. It does not matter if this is true or not for these purposes. What is agreed is that she was dismissed that day with immediate effect. It is agreed that she was not offered the opportunity to have trade union representation at this hearing. The alleged detriments[43]Ms Wright avers she suffered the following detriments (taken from paragraph 38 of her claims). 43.1. Her treatment by Ms Winter in reaction to her protected disclosure on 31 May 2024, where she dismissed and belittled her concerns and comments made. 43.2. Likewise on 05 June 2024 in reaction to her concerns and comments made, where she dismissed and belittled her concerns and comments made. Page 13 of 26 43.3. Her treatment by her line manager on 11 June 2024, where she dismissed her concerns and comments made in relation to being reprimanded by Ms Winter. 43.4. Her treatment by my Line Manager, Liz Bowler on 18 June 2024, where she dismissed her concerns about the Second Respondents reprimanding me on false allegations. 43.5. Allegations of gross misconduct received via email on 15 July 2024, which she believes to be unjustified and fabricated. 43.6. Failure to allow her the opportunity to defend any allegations against her and raise various issues about the integrity of the investigation. 43.7. The dismissal (which can only be a detriment against the second respondent: Timis & Anor v Osipov [2018] EWCA Civ 2321). 43.8. The manner (as opposed to the fact of) her dismissal on 16th July 2024 43.9. The failure to follow an appeal procedure in line with the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures. She adds that detriments 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are pursued against Ms Winter personally. Consideration of the applications for strike out and to amend General[44]There is a common theme across the applications for strike out, to amend and for the deposit orders. While the respondents put it more subtly it amounts to no more than it is so certain they will win on the facts, the claimant has no reasonable prospect of success. They rely on the statements of two of their witnesses and a number of their documents. I have borne in mind the case law above about striking out for no reasonable prospect of success where there is a factual dispute. I have scrutinised the statement of all parties and the documents before me. I am not close to being persuaded that these show that the claimant has no reasonable prospect of success on the merits. I am left with the impression that the respondents’ submissions on this point amount to no more than the respondents say they are telling the truth on various matters so Ms Wright cannot win. That may be correct but there is nothing in the documents or statements that persuades me that the Tribunal can safely come to this conclusion without hearing oral evidence. There is in my view no compelling document that so undermines Ms Wright’s case it has no reasonable prospect of succeeding.[45]In my view the nearest to which one gets is the photos of the cheese. However they are not clear. In any case the argument is that what Ms Wright said was mould was in fact pepper. I cannot safely summarily decide this from a photo or untested oral evidence or the other documents. I cannot safely make the next logical step to say there is no reasonable prospect Page 14 of 26 that the claimant will establish therefore that she did not reasonably believe it was mouldy.[46]It all calls out for a trial. These are all the types of factual disputes that the authorities weigh against a strike out (see above). The respondents may be confident they will win. However I cannot be satisfied from what I have seen that the factual disputes are so biased in favour of one party that the chance the other party has of succeeding on them is fanciful or lacks reasonable prospects. Therefore any part of the application for strike out the claim on the factual disputes alone does succeed. I will therefore consider the applications taking Ms Wright’s claim at its highest, as clarified today by her.[47]This should be read as applying across the applications, even though for brevity I set it out here once only. Vexatiousness[48]The respondents have not persuaded me the claims are vexatious. I believe I can explain why briefly.[49]I cannot conclude the claims have little or no basis in law. Rather it seems to me it is quite clear what the claims are meant to be. I consider only wilful blindness would prevent a party from being able to discern Ms Wright’s claims as set out in her Particulars of Claim.[50]I appreciate there is a legal error in the third claim. That became apparent in discussion. Ms Wright thus has sought permission to amend. That is a typical part of the usual case management process. No reasonable person would say it is indicative of an abuse of process.[51]The nearest the respondents get in my view to a legitimate claim of vexatiousness is about the third claim being presented rather than being simply presented though as an application to amend. They emphasise it is otherwise the same particulars of claim but with a new cause of action added. They submitted it should have been an application to amend. There was no argument that it was an abuse under principles in e.g. Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 (which explored the intersection between the rules on abuse of process and the general rule one must present all of one’s claims in one go).[52]I conclude this is not an abuse. An application may have been preferable, perhaps. However in my view one must go back to the rules. The overriding objective makes clear that the Tribunal must be flexible in a way compatible with a proper consideration of the issues. Form over substance may be another way to express it. Neither the rules nor substantive law forbid expressly the approach that Ms Wright took. I accept in principle it could be abusive (for example it might be abusive if a claimant used it as a way to completely rewrite their claim and allege facts inconsistent with their existing claim). This in my view falls far from being abusive. It is doing no more than adding in a couple of legal bases for the claim without real alteration to the factual allegations. It is not the sort of act that ought to Page 15 of 26 result in a claimant being forbidden to pursue her claims. To strike out on this basis would in my view be contrary to the overriding objective.[53]This ground of the application is dismissed. No reasonable prospects of success[54]For the claimant to succeed she must succeed in relation to each element of the claim she has presented. If she fails on one of them, then the claims themselves fail. Therefore she must have a reasonable prospect of success on each part of the claim. It follows I must consider the claims at each stage individually.[55]There is, rightly, no suggestion the alleged disclosures were not made to an appropriate person. On 31 May 2024, the claimant telling the restaurant manager that “There is mould in the cheese” -- Information[56]The respondents argues that the statement “there was mould in the cheese” cannot be seen as information. The test is whether it conveys facts: Kilraine v Wandsworth LBC [2018] ICR 1850 CA. To my mind it reads as a statement of fact or information. I struggle to envisage how a person could convey more informatically there was mould on the cheese if those words are not enough. It may not have been true in the end, but I am not aware of a case which says that if the information is incorrect then the claim must fail. The statute does not support that proposition. In my view the respondents appear to be seeking to introduce a test of accuracy. At this stage, the question I must answer is whether the respondents have persuaded me the claimant has no real prospect of successfully showing this is information. It has not. -- Reasonable belief it tends to show endangerment of health and safety[57]The respondents argue Ms Wright cannot reasonably believed that (assuming her statement were information) it tended to show health and safety has been, is being or is likely to be endangered. They cite in particular that Ms Wright relied on the Food Safety & Hygiene (England) Regulations 2013 and her allegation that it specifically related to the microbiological safety of food. They point out (correctly) these regulations do not in fact relate to microbiological safety.[58]I cannot accept this. 58.1. I begin by observing the 2013 regulations were a part of the expressed belief. Ms Wright also said she had “concern that had the potential to harm a wide range of individuals by causing a foodborne illness.” It is possible to read them such that they are severable. Even if she did not reasonably believe the 2013 regulations provided for microbiological safety, there is still the question of whether her belief of harm to individuals was reasonable. I consider it is properly and credibly arguable to be more than fanciful that if the claimant believed that mouldy Page 16 of 26 cheese presented a risk of harm to individuals, that belief was reasonable. It is hardly a controversial view that mould on food is generally a risk of harm and may cause food-borne illness and should therefore not be served. 58.2. As noted above, it is a low threshold that a claimant must meet to show a reasonable belief. I consider the respondent’s criticisms impose a threshold that is too high. For this hearing, the respondents must show there is no reasonable prospect Ms Wright will meet the low threshold even about beliefs. They have not shown that. 58.3. I am more sympathetic to the argument about the legislation. Ms Wright in her claim is clear she believed at the time it was a breach of those specific regulations. They do not provide what she says, which tends to support the respondent’s case she could not have had a reasonable belief. However 58.3.1. she is not advancing her claim as disclosure of a breach of a legal obligation – only as a health and safety endangerment. I am not persuaded that the respondents have shown no reasonable prospects in relation to her reasonable belief about the regulations so that it undermines her reliance on health and safety. 58.3.2. In any event even if her belief in what the regulations provided were not reasonable, there is still her belief about foodborne illnesses.[59]The respondents therefore have not persuaded me the claimant has no reasonable prospect of success on this issue. -- Reasonable belief it tends to show concealment of a health and safety issue[60]The respondents suggest the claimant cannot succeed on this issue. They rely on the respondents’ evidence on the point. I agree with the respondents’ conclusions. I do not agree with their reasons.[61]The claim provides no explanation in what is otherwise a detailed and through claim that provides any basis for why she believed this particular disclosure tended to show endangerment of health and safety was likely to be concealed. Moreover the words themselves do not suggest any concealment. Ms Wright has no reasonable prospect of success on this issue. I strike out therefore that part of the claim that suggests Ms Wright reasonably believed the alleged information disclosed on 31 May 2024 fell with section 43B(1)(f). -- Summary[62]I strike out any claim that relies on the allegation that the disclosure of 31 May 2024 falling within section 43B(1)(f). Page 17 of 26 On 12 June 2024 Ms Wright telling her line manager that Ms Winter expected Ms Wright to put the cheese in the bin and be discreet -- Information[63]For like reasons in relation to the first disclosure, it is not fanciful to suggest this is a statement of information because it appears to be factual. Therefore for essentially the same reasons the respondents have not persuaded me the claimant has no real prospect of successfully showing this is information. -- Reasonable belief it tends to show endangerment of health and safety[64]The claim provides no explanation in what is otherwise a detailed and through claim that provides any basis for why she believed this particular disclosure tended to show endangerment of health and safety itself. The words do not suggest endangerment of health and safety. It is not obvious why being reporting one has been asked to dispose of food tends to show health and safety is endangered. Rather the request to dispose of what Ms Wright says is mouldy food suggests the opposite. Ms Wright has no reasonable prospect of success on this issue. I strike out therefore that part of the claim that suggests Ms Wright reasonably believed the alleged information disclosed on 31 May 2024 fell with section 43B(1)(d). -- Reasonable belief it tends to show deliberate concealment of a health and safety issue[65]The only matter the respondents raised that gave me pause for concern on this is issues is that she had already told the restaurant manager the cheese was mouldy on her own case, and again it must on the claimant’s case be that Ms Winter knew about this. The matter had been brought into the open on 31 May 2024 on Ms Wright’s own case. Therefore it is said that she cannot reasonably believed the information showed a deliberate concealment of health and safety endangerment.[66]This requires analysis of Ms Wright’s case taken at is highest. She had told the restaurant manager the cheese was mouldy. Ms Winter knew she had told the restaurant manager it was mouldy. Ms Winter had asked Ms Wright to do no more than discretely put the cheese in the bin according to the disclosure. Ultimately even on the claimant’s case she is merely being asked to dispose of what she believes is mouldy cheese. I think it fanciful for her to suggest that when she relayed this information to her line manager she reasonably believed that the information tended to show that there was a deliberate concealment. This is because the issue was out in the open already. In addition she does not allege that Ms Winter said not to tell anyone. This is a situation where I am persuaded her factual allegations are fanciful. Therefore I also strike out the allegation that the disclosure of 12 June 2024 fell within section 43(1)(f) -- Summary[67]It follows that any claim that relies on 12 June 2024 disclosure is struck out. Page 18 of 26 Automatic unfair dismissal for making a protected disclosure[68]I strike out this claim because it cannot succeed in law taking the claimant’s case at its highest.[69]The difficulty for the claimant is that for her to succeed the reason for dismissal must be the protected disclosures. If there is more than one reason, then the protected disclosures must be the principal reason. This is shown in the highlighted parts of s.103A quoted above. It is different from, for example, constructive unfair dismissal where the fundamental breach of contract need only be a reason for resignation.[70]As I noted above, Ms Wright advances her case that the reason for dismissal was both the protected disclosures and wanting to be accompanied by a trade union official equally. Therefore on her own case it cannot be the reason or the principal reason for her dismissal. It is perhaps curious that the law should provide that where there are two reasons for dismissal, each of which on its own might make the dismissal automatically unfair, it ceases to be unfair if they are both equal reasons for dismissal. However it is plain that the statutes provide that consequence by their reference to the reason or principal reason.[71]It follows I must strike out this claim because it has no reasonable prospect of success. Automatic unfair dismissal for exercising the right to be accompanied[72]For the same reason (that Ms Wright says this was an equal reason for dismissal whereas the statute requires it be the reason or at least principal one), I strike out this claim too.[73]I add only this observation. If I had to consider the issue of whether a meeting at she was dismissed was one to which she had the right to be accompanied, I would have found that the argument was open to Ms Wright. It is clear from both the claim and response that it was apparent that Ms Wright wanted to be accompanied by a trade union representative. That is why the first disciplinary hearing was moved. Therefore, looking to the definition of a hearing in section 10 it seems to me that a hearing at which one is summarily dismissed squarely falls within “(b) the taking of some other action in respect of a worker by his employer”. Therefore I would have found against the respondents on this particular issue. However it does not arise.[74]For avoidance of doubt I would also have found against the respondents if it depended on the facts because that would require a mini-trial to establish. Subjecting the claimant to a detriment for making a protected disclosure[75]The respondents did not make submissions on the detriments themselves and their prospects of success.[76]I have already ruled on the protected disclosures. Only one survives: that of 31 May 2024 as far as it relates to health and safety. Page 19 of 26[77]In my view it is a purely factual issue that requires the Tribunal to hear evidence and to determine if the respondents can show the reason for the treatment is not the protected disclosure. The papers I have seen and statements I have seen do not set out any basis on which I could conclude that the claimant has no reasonable prospect of succeeding on the facts of the case. Therefore I refuse to strike out the detriment claims. Application to amend to add a claim under s.152 TULCRA[78]Like the other claims for automatic unfair dismissal, the reason or if more than one principal reason, must be the making use of trade union services. As I noted with the other claims, the claimant’s case is that both the protected disclosures and the wanting to be accompanied equally contributed to the dismissal. Therefore the claim cannot succeed for that reason alone.[79]There is a further problem that such a claim would have. It can succeed only if the worker makes use of the trade union services outside of working hours or at “a time within his working hours at which, in accordance with arrangements agreed with or consent given by his employer, it is permissible for him to take part in the activities of a trade union [or (as the case may be) make use of trade union services]”. Ms Wright does not suggest she wanted to make use of services outside working hours. She also does not suggest her employer had an agreed arrangement with her to use trade union services or it had given its consent for her to do so. Therefore this further element is missing from the proposed claim.[80]In my view these are fatal to the application. The proposed claim cannot succeed. It has therefore no reasonable prospects of success. It does not further the overriding objective to put the respondents to the expense of dealing with a claim that is doomed to fail.[81]Balancing the hardship and injustice of allowing the amendment against that of refusing it, I must refuse it. It is of no benefit to run a claim that must fail. Deposit order[82]Only the detriment claims continue and so I consider the deposit order in respect of them.[83]While I accept the burden is on the respondent, the authorities make clear that a claimant does not succeed simply because a respondents fails. There needs to be something that shows these detriments (if proven so to be) happened because of the protected disclosure. Even though I have read the pleaded case carefully and the statements from Ms Wright I cannot see anything that explains what the causal link is or, more simply, that explains why a Tribunal would conclude that the respondent’s perpetrated any detriments on the claimant because of the protected disclosure. Additionally I note that the respondent’s evidence does contain some notes from other employees that suggest there were issues between Ms Wright and others, which tallies with the respondents’ case. What I have therefore is a bare assertion the respondents’ subjected her to detriments because she made Page 20 of 26 a protected disclosure, and some evidence that suggests that in fact it was because of other reasons and not the protected disclosure. This leads me to conclude the claimant has little reasonable prospects of successfully showing each detriment was because of the protected disclosure. I consider it is appropriate to exercise my powers to order the claimant to pay a deposit.[84]The respondents criticise the claimant’s evidence on means. They suggest she was evasive and not forthcoming. I agree some of it was vague. I do not detect any evidence or anything in her demeanour to suggest evasiveness or to conclude that she was not telling me the truth. I therefore accept her evidence as broadly accurate.[85]Based on her oral evidence, her means are as follows: 85.1. Ms Wright is unemployed. She has no income but is looking to claim contribution-based job seeker’s allowance/universal credit. 85.2. She has £200 in her current account and £1,000 in her savings. She has used the latter to fund her lifestyle since she lost her employment with SFE. 85.3. She owns a house on a shared-ownership basis. The rent and mortgage total about £700. 85.4. Her outgoings are about £1,000. 85.5. She cannot sell her home because of a building issue. She has provided no documents to support that and no evidence to facilitate the calculation of equity. However I had the advantage of observing her demeanour when answering these questions and had no reason to doubt her veracity on this. 85.6. There are no other assets. 85.7. The debts she has are £60 to a store card, £440 to a credit card and £200 for a parking charge. 85.8. She is not expecting any windfalls. 85.9. She has had a brief period of employment since leaving SFE, and it has helped to maintain her savings. 85.10. There is no reason to believe she cannot or will not be successful in securing new employment, albeit SFE’s refusal to provide a reference is not helping (they said it was their policy never to provide references).[86]I note that there are 8 allegations against SFE and 6 against Ms Winter. I do not believe her financial circumstances mean that she should not pay a deposit when I am satisfied that they have little reasonable prospect of success.[87]In my opinion the approach I should take is as follows. Each allegation should attract a deposit of £10. In relation to some it would mean that Ms Wright would be paying £10 to pursue against SFE and a further £10 to Page 21 of 26 pursue against Ms Winter. If she paid the total that would require a payment of £140. In my opinion this is proportionate, affordable, simple to understand, enough to cause the claimant to think carefully and to mark the Tribunal’s view these claims have little reasonable prospect of success and does not act as either a block to access to justice or to a strike out by alternative means.[88]Ms Wright should not read anything into the amount of the deposit. It reflects purely her means. If she is unsuccessful on some or all of these allegations, then there will be an assumption she acted unreasonably pursuing those allegations on which she was unsuccessful and could therefore mean she faces an application for costs and the requirement to pay a costs order.[89]I set out the deposit and its terms, with information on how to pay in a separate order. Costs of the interim relief hearing[90]The respondents apply for the costs of the interim relief hearing on 29 August 2024 before Employment Judge Ahmed. There are no written reasons. Their schedule of costs shows they claim £20,217. At the hearing they capped the claim at 50% of that: £10,108.50.[91]The respondents rely on Rule 76(1)(a) (claimant was vexatious, abusive or otherwise unreasonable) and 76(1)(b) (had no reasonable prospect of success). Legal principles on costs[92]Rule 76(1) as far as relevant provides: “(1) A Tribunal may make a costs order or a preparation time order, and shall consider whether to do so, where it considers that— “(a) a party (or that party's representative) has acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in either the bringing of the proceedings (or part) or the way that the proceedings (or part) have been conducted; or “(b) any claim or response had no reasonable prospect of success;[93]Rule 78 provides I can determine the amount of any costs without a detailed assessment if it does not exceed £20,000.[94]Rule 84 permits me to take into account the ability of the payee to pay.[95]As for the meaning of the words used, 95.1. “Vexatious” has the same meaning as when considering a strike out: see 24 above. 95.2. Unreasonable means what it says: Dyer v Secretary of State for Employment EAT 183/73. It can include pursuing an unmeritorious claim and I can have regard to what the paying party knew or ought to have known: Keskar v Governors of All Saints CofE school [1991] ICR 493 EAT. Page 22 of 26 95.3. Where costs are sought both through the Rule 76(1)(a) and the Rule 76(1)(b) route, and the conduct said to be unreasonable under (a) is the bringing, or continuation, of claims which had no reasonable prospect of success, the questions are: did the application, in fact, have no reasonable prospect of success? If so, did the claimant in fact know or appreciate that? If not, ought they, reasonably, to have known or appreciated that?: see Radia v Jeffries International Limited UKEAT/0007/18/JOJ EAT[96]The following principles are also relevant. 96.1. The focus is on how things looked at the time of the application: Radia 96.2. Costs should be seen as an exception not the rule: Gee v Shell UK Ltd [2003] IRLR 82 CA. 96.3. The Tribunal must ask: Has the threshold has been met to make a costs order? If so, should it exercise our discretion to make a costs order: Robinson v Hall Gregory Recruitment [2014] IRLR 761. 96.4. The amount to award arises only for consideration if it has decided to exercise its discretion: Hayder v Pennine Acute NHS Trust UKEAT/0141/17. 96.5. In Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council v Yerrakalva [2012] IRLR 78, the Court of Appeal said: “The vital point in exercising the discretion to order costs is to look at the whole picture of what happened in the case and to ask whether there has been unreasonable conduct by the claimant in bringing and conducting the case and, in doing so, to identify the conduct, what was unreasonable about it and what effects if had.” 96.6. Those representing themselves cannot be judged by the same standard as those who are represented: AQ Ltd v Holden [2012] IRLR 648. 96.7. Even if he has an inability to pay, it does limit costs to those that can be afforded (particularly where circumstances may improve): Arrowsmith v. Nottingham Trent University [2012] ICR 159. So it follows that a realistic prospect of a future ability to pay may justify an award significantly higher than current affordability: Vaughan v London Borough of Lewisham [2013] IRLR 713. 96.8. A generous benefit of doubt may be afforded to the receiving party in relation to what might be afforded over a reasonable period of time: Vaughan v London Borough of Lewisham [2013] IRLR 713. Page 23 of 26 Has the respondent shown that rules 76(1)(a) or (b) are satisfied?[97]I do not consider the application for interim relief was vexatious or abusive. Though I was not the judge on that occasion, I have seen nothing to suggest that her conduct in bringing or pursuing the application is of the kind that falls within these words. I have already found that there is a reasonable prospect of success in establishing one protected disclosure. I appreciate the claimant did not reflect on the fact that if her case is that two automatically unfair reasons are equally the reason for her dismissal, then her claim must fail. If she had then she would not have sought interim relief because it would be doomed to fail. However this is a subtle point that may well be lost on a litigant in person, no matter how experienced she may be with the employment tribunal (something on which the respondents rely but which I have seen nothing compelling to persuade me she is more sophisticated that one might reasonably expect from a litigant in person). I reject this as a basis for making an order for costs.[98]I turn then to consider the question of unreasonable conduct and/or whether the application had a reasonable prospect of success. The respondents rely substantially on the written submissions made for that hearing.[99]In that hearing they quite properly highlight the high standard that a claimant must reach to succeed on a claim for interim relief: something nearer certainty or a significantly higher degree of likelihood than 51%: Taplin v Shippam Limited [1978] IRLR 450 EAT and Ministry of Justice v Sarfaz UKEAT/0578/10 EAT. The respondents also refer to the documentation that supports their case that there were wider problems between Ms Wright and other employees of SFE. I have alluded to it earlier. In an echo of what I said earlier, like with the detriments, the claim discloses no basis to show a causal link between the protected disclosures and her dismissal beyond a bare assertion.[100]I ask myself the questions set out in Radia. 100.1. Did the application, in fact, have no reasonable prospect of success? In my opinion it did not when one reflects on the fact that there is a high degree of likelihood that must be satisfied. Her claim was no more than a bare assertion of a link. Documents show it is more nuanced and introduce doubts that mean it falls short of the high standard required. It also lacked any prospect of success because the claimant relied on two automatically unfair reasons and legally that cannot succeed. 100.2. If so, did the claimant in fact know or appreciate that? I am satisfied the claimant did not appreciate that advancing two automatically unfair reasons for dismissal means it has no reasonable prospect of success because the substantive claims could not succeed. Page 24 of 26 I have no evidence either way about whether the claimant appreciated her application would not meet the high standard. The impression I had is that she never applied her mind to it. 100.3. If not, ought they, reasonably, to have known or appreciated that? For reasons given earlier I do not think Ms Wright ought to have known that relying on two automatically unfair reasons for her dismissal as being equally to blame is unreasonable. It is a subtle point that I do not consider would be obvious to a litigant in person reading the statutes. I do however think Ms Wright ought to have known her application for interim relief had no prospect of successfully showing the high standard of likelihood needed to succeed. She ought to have been aware she had provided no factual basis for concluding there was a link between the protected disclosure and her dismissal. She would have known that the respondents were raising other issues and of difficulties in the workplace and that SFE and Ms Winter did not purport to dismiss her for making a protected disclosure. If she had reflected on that she may well have concluded she had a claim but would have concluded it would not be one that reached the high standard to attract interim relief. Had she reasonably reflected on the respondents’ evidence and submissions in reply, she would have come to the same conclusion. I make allowances for the fact she is representing herself. However these are not complex points and require to think only about the facts that she knew.[101]Therefore I have the jurisdiction to make a costs order. Should I make such an order?[102]I have concluded that I should make such an order. Ms Wright’s unreasonable conduct and application that had no reasonable prospects of success put the respondents to legal expenses that would not otherwise have been incurred if she had simply presented a claim. There is no reason to protect her from the consequences of that decision. I can see no good reason not to exercise the discretion. How much should it be?[103]I have looked at the schedule of costs. The schedule shows that all elements arose from the application for interim relief. Therefore on the face of it, all costs were caused by the unreasonable conduct and/or application that had no reasonable prospects of success.[104]However I consider the amount claimed is excessive. I am not persuaded for example that the application warranted leading Counsel. Nor am I persuaded that the hours worked are reasonably incurred. My very rough calculations shows that over 21 hours was spent preparing for the interim relief hearing. As the Court of Appeal said in Wraith v Sheffield Forgemasters Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 132 CA a party is not free to instruct Page 25 of 26 without consequence. They can instruct who they like at the rates they like, if there is no good reason for having to use that firm or Counsel, the costs are reduced accordingly. Taking a broad-brush approach the effect of the unreasonable conduct was £5,000. The excess arises not from the unreasonable conduct but from the desire to carry out extra work using a more expensive firm and use more senior Counsel than the application warranted. Means[105]I set out the claimant’s means at paragraph 85 above. They are limited. However there is no reason not to think that Ms Wright will not have the ability to make a payment in the reasonably future. She is looking for work and qualified for many roles. However she has so far had limited success. I bear in mind that she has to pay a deposit, but also that payment of the costs order is not a condition of continuing the claim, and she can be afforded time to pay.[106]I consider therefore that she should be ordered to pay £1,000. Further case management[107]I direct there be a further hearing for case management. Details will follow separately.