Ms T Doil v Proman Managed Services Ltd and Toyota Motor Manufacturing UK Ltd: 2600366/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2600366/2025

Between

Ms T DoilClaimant

Proman Managed Services Limited (1) Toyota Motor Manufacturing UK Limited (2)Respondent

Before

Employment Judge Brewer

In person for claimant

Date 9 December 2025

JUDGMENT

At the relevant times the claimant was not disabled by reason of cervical spondylosis

REASONS

[1]This case came before me to determine whether the claimant met the definition of disability as set out below.

[2]I had an indexed and paginated bundle of documents and skeleton arguments from the respondents. The claimant gave oral evidence and was cross-examined by the respondents’ representatives. I also asked a few questions. At the end of the evidence the parties made submissions all of which I have taken into account. 1 of 8 Issues

[3]The sole issue is whether the claimant met the definition of ‘disabled’ within the meaning of s.6 Equality Act 2010, at the relevant time, by reason of Cervical spondylitis. Law

[4]I set out below a brief description of the relevant law.

[5]In Goodwin v Patent Office

[1999] IRLR 4

, the EAT gave detailed guidance as to the approach which ought to be taken in determining the issue of disability. A purposive approach to the legislation should be taken. A tribunal ought to remember that, just because a person can undertake day-to-day activities with difficulty, that does not mean that there was not a substantial impairment. The focus ought to be on what the claimant cannot do or could only do with difficulty and the effect of medication ought to be ignored for the purposes of the assessment.

[6]The EAT said that the words used to define disability in S.1(1) DDA (now S.6(1) EqA) require a tribunal to look at the evidence by reference to four different questions (or ‘conditions’, as the EAT termed them): 6.1. did the claimant have a mental and/or physical impairment? (the ‘impairment condition’) 6.2. did the impairment affect the claimant’s ability to carry out normal day-today activities? (the ‘adverse effect condition’) 6.3. was the adverse condition substantial? (the ‘substantial condition’), and 6.4. was the adverse condition long term? (the ‘long-term condition’)?

[7]These four questions should be posed sequentially and not together (Wigginton v Cowie and ors t/a Baxter International (A Partnership) EAT 0322/09).

[8]The approach in Goodwin was approved in J v DLA Piper UK LLP

[2010] ICR 1052

(paragraph 40). It was said at paragraph 38 of that judgment: “There are indeed sometimes cases where identifying the nature of the impairment from which a Claimant may be suffering involves difficult medical questions; and we agree that in many or most such cases it will be easier – and is entirely legitimate – for the tribunal to park that issue and to ask first whether the Claimant's ability to carry out normal day-today activities has been adversely affected – one might indeed say “impaired” – on a long-term basis. If it finds that it has been, it will in many or most cases follow as a matter of common-sense inference that the Claimant is suffering from a condition which has produced that adverse effect — in other words, an “impairment”. If that inference can be drawn, it will be unnecessary for the tribunal to try to resolve difficult medical issues of the kind to which we have referred.” 2 of 8

[9]To amount to a disability the impairment must have a ‘substantial adverse effect’ on the person’s ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities — S.6(1)(b) EqA. If an impairment ceases to have a substantial adverse effect on a person’s ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities but that effect is likely to recur, it is to be treated as continuing to have that effect — para 2(2), Sch 1.

[10]In Goodwin (above) the EAT said that of the four component parts to the definition of a disability in S.1 DDA (now S.6 EqA), judging whether the effects of a condition are substantial is the most difficult. The EAT went on to set out its explanation of the requirement as follows: ‘What the Act is concerned with is an impairment on the person’s ability to carry out activities. The fact that a person can carry out such activities does not mean that his ability to carry them out has not been impaired. Thus, for example, a person may be able to cook, but only with the greatest difficulty. In order to constitute an adverse effect, it is not the doing of the acts which is the focus of attention but rather the ability to do (or not do) the acts. Experience shows that disabled persons often adjust their lives and circumstances to enable them to cope for themselves. Thus a person whose capacity to communicate through normal speech was obviously impaired might well choose, more or less voluntarily, to live on their own. If one asked such a person whether they managed to carry on their daily lives without undue problems, the answer might well be “yes”, yet their ability to lead a “normal” life had obviously been impaired. Such a person would be unable to communicate through speech and the ability to communicate through speech is obviously a capacity which is needed for carrying out normal day-to-day activities, whether at work or at home. If asked whether they could use the telephone, or ask for directions or which bus to take, the answer would be “no”. Those might be regarded as day-to-day activities contemplated by the legislation, and that person’s ability to carry them out would clearly be regarded as adversely affected.’

[11]This approach reflects the advice in Appendix 1 to the EHRC Employment Code that account should be taken not only of evidence that a person is performing a particular activity less well but also of evidence that ‘a person avoids doing things which, for example, cause pain, fatigue or substantial social embarrassment; or because of a loss of energy and motivation’ — para 9.

[12]There must be a causal link between the impairment and the substantial adverse effect, but it need not be a direct link.

[13]In determining whether an adverse effect is substantial, the tribunal must compare the claimant’s ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities with the ability he or she would have if not impaired. It is important to stress this because the Guidance and the EHRC Employment Code both appear to imply that the comparison should be with what is considered to be a ‘normal’ range of ability in the population at large. Appendix 1 to the EHRC Employment Code states: ‘The requirement that an effect must be substantial reflects the general understanding of disability as a 3 of 8 limitation going beyond the normal differences in ability which might exist among people’ — para 8.

[14]Appendix 1 to the EHRC Employment Code states that ‘normal day-to-day activities’ are activities that are carried out by most men or women on a fairly regular and frequent basis. The Code says: ‘The term is not intended to include activities which are normal only for a particular person or group of people, such as playing a musical instrument, or participating in a sport to a professional standard, or performing a skilled or specialised task at work. However, someone who is affected in such a specialised way but is also affected in normal dayto-day activities would be covered by this part of the definition’ paras 14 and 15.

[15]The Guidance thus emphasises that the term ‘normal day-to-day activities’ is not intended to include activities that are normal only for a particular person or a small group of people. Account should be taken of how far the activity is carried out by people on a daily or frequent basis. In this context, ‘normal’ should be given its ordinary, everyday meaning (see para D4).

[16]The EAT in Paterson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis

2007 ICR 1522

, EAT, concluded that ‘normal day-to-day activities’ must be interpreted as including activities relevant to professional life.

[17]Under para 2(1) of Schedule 1 to the EqA, the effect of an impairment is long term if it: 17.1. has lasted for at least 12 months, 17.2. is likely to last for at least 12 months, or 17.3. is likely to last for the rest of the life of the person affected.

[18]Paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 1 to the EqA provides that if an impairment ceases to have a substantial adverse effect on a person’s ability to carry out normal day-today activities, it is treated as continuing to have that effect if the effect is ‘likely to recur’. In this regard, likely means ‘could well happen’ (see Boyle v SCA Packaging Ltd (Equality and Human Rights Commission intervening)

2009 ICR 1056

[19]Paragraph 5(1) of Schedule 1 to the EqA provides that an impairment is to be treated as having a substantial adverse effect on the ability of the person concerned to carry out normal day-to-day activities if measures are being taken to treat or correct it and, but for that, it would be likely to have that effect. In this regard, likely means ‘could well happen’.

[20]A person who has a progressive condition as a result of which he or she has an impairment that has (or had) some effect on the ability to carry out normal day-to4 of 8 day activities, but not a substantial effect, will be taken to have an impairment that has a substantial adverse effect if the condition is likely to result in such an impairment — paragraph 8(1) and (2) of Schedule 1 EqA.

[21]Paragraph 8 of Schedule 1 EqA 8 will only apply where ‘the condition is likely to result’ in the person having an impairment which has a substantial adverse effect. In Mowat-Brown v University of Surrey

2002 IRLR 235

, the EAT emphasised this point, stating that: the question to be asked is whether, on the balance of probabilities, the claimant has established that the condition in his case is likely to have a substantial adverse effect. It is not enough simply to establish that he has a progressive condition and that it has or has had an effect on his ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities… In some cases it may be possible to produce medical evidence of his likely prognosis. In other cases it may be possible to discharge the onus of proof by statistical evidence

[22]In accordance with the Equality Act 2010 Guidance (see above), in assessing the likelihood of an effect lasting for 12 months, Section C4 provides that account should be taken of the circumstances at the time the alleged discrimination took place. Anything which occurs after that time will not be relevant in assessing this likelihood.

[23]Further guidance is given at Section C5 with respect to recurring or fluctuating effects: if an impairment has had a substantial adverse effect on a person’s ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities but that effect ceases, the substantial effect is treated as continuing if it is likely to recur. (In deciding whether a person has had a disability in the past, the question is whether a substantial adverse effect has in fact recurred.

Findings of fact

[24]I make the following findings of fact (references are to pages in the bundle).

[25]The relevant time for this claim is the period from 17 July 2023 until the termination of her employment on 17 January 2025.

[26]On 23 August 2017 the claimant had a GP appointment following an MRI scan which showed “at C6-7 a large right paracentral/intraforaminal disc extrusion narrows the right C7 neural exit foramen and appears to cause root compression”. No other spinal problems were noted but there is a referral to a spinal surgeon [585].

[27]On 24 August 2017 the claimant’s GP notes confirm the diagnosis as Cervical spondylosis with radiculopathy [586]. There is a referral to a spinal orthopaedic triage service.

[28]The claimant attended a spinal clinic review at the University Hospital of Derby and Burton NHS FT on 29 August 2018. 5 of 8

[29]The report from that visit [110] confirms, following a further MRI scan on 21 May 2018, that although the claimant had some pain in both arms, her “disc protrusion has nearly completely shrunk down and is not compressing any of her nerves in her cervical spine” [110]

[30]I understand that to mean that any pain the claimant experienced was not because of the nerve compression noted in 2017. The claimant told the doctor that she could manage her symptoms. At the time she was taking regular painkillers. A review was scheduled for 6 months later. It seems that the review never took place, or if it did, the notes have not been disclosed.

[31]Save for a sick note and an unrelated letter from Trent OTS, that is the sum of the claimant’s relevant documentary evidence about her alleged disability.

[32]The claimant stopped taking painkillers in 2020.

[33]Under cross-examination today the claimant agreed that the “problem” had resolved by around May 2018.

[34]The claimant last saw her GP in relation to the Cervical spondylitis in 2019 or 2020.

[35]In her medical questionnaire, completed by the claimant for R2, she stated that she had been diagnosed with Cervical spondylitis, confirms that she stopped taking painkillers in 2020 and “no episodes of nerve pain since. 100% better with neck and arm”.

[36]Until today the claimant has never suggested these notes were incorrect. Today she said they were not correct. I prefer the evidence of the contemporaneous documents.

[37]The claimant has had no time off for pain related to the Cervical spondylitis. Discussion and conclusions

[38]I turn now to my conclusions on the issue.

[39]In her disability impact statement, the claimant says that she sometimes has “chronic pain, loss of grip, numbness, and reduced mobility”. She goes on to say that she experiences “nerve compression, flare ups, and radiating pain into my arms, which limits my ability to carry shopping, write, dress myself, or even lift a cup”.

[40]Apart from making the obvious point that, clinically “chronic” means long lasting or persistent, so that one cannot ‘sometimes’ have chronic pain, the facts as set out in the claimant’s contemporaneous documents do not support what she reports in her statement.

[41]The claimant has had a diagnosis from 2018 confirming that there was no longer any nerve compression, which makes it surprising that if there had been a change since 2018 such that she was again experiencing pain to the extent she says, she 6 of 8 did not visit her GP again for confirmation and a potential re-referral for surgery or other treatment.

[42]Added to that is the salient fact that despite now reporting regular flare ups, and the impact she says this has had on her day-to-day activities, she has had literally no time off work as a result.

[43]The clamant has had two jobs with R2; car valeting and car inspection, both physical jobs to a greater or lesser degree. She reports no problems doing the work.

[44]Leaving aside for the moment what the claimant says is her management of the condition, I consider that either the condition has not degenerated, or if it has, not to the degree which causes the problems or effects which the claimant now states she suffers. In short, I do not find the claimant a credible witness of fact on this point.

[45]The claimant says that she manages her condition but not using medication. She instead relies on massage, oil, heat and various natural supplements.

[46]There is no evidence that these are having any effect on the Cervical spondylitis. I accept that the claimant says it does, and that she knows her own body, but I require evidence beyond what the claimant believes. It is perfectly conceivable that the claimant is experiencing pain, but there is simply no evidence presented to me that if she is, that pain arises from Cervical spondylitis, a condition which had ceased causing nerve compression problems in 2018.

[47]In other words, when the claimant asserts, as she does at [106], that she is managing her “condition”, the fact is that there is a complete absence of any evidence that the condition, the Cervical spondylitis, is the cause of any pain she does have. I would have hoped to see more up to date medical evidence if the claimant was to contend that a condition which was not causing a problem in 2018 is now causing the problems she states, even leaving aside the lack of any real evidence to support the problems she now says she has.

[48]I have considered whether, if the claimant could have been disabled in 2017, and assuming her normal day to day activities were substantially adversely affected at that time, and given the lack of evidence of an ongoing adverse effect, the adverse effect is likely to recur.

[49]The claimant presented no evidence about this because in essence her case seems to be that her condition is ongoing (not that she still has Cervical spondylitis as that is not in dispute – it is the effect that is in dispute), and although she manages her condition, there are flare ups during which she cannot undertake day to day activities such as shopping. But I stress that, absent what the claimant says, there is either no corroborative evidence of that or there is evidence that runs counter to what the claimant says, in particular; no sickness absence for Cervical spondylitis or anything related to it, no requirement for further GP/hospital visits, no painkillers for 4 or 5 years, what the claimant said in the medical questionnaire completed by the claimant for R2 and no evidence (statistical or otherwise) that the ‘natural’ remedies the claimant says she relies on, are efficacious for pain caused by Cervical spondylitis. 7 of 8

[50]Turning then to the ‘Goodwin’ questions, I would answer them as follows: 50.1. the claimant did have a physical impairment – Cervical spondylitis, 50.2. there is no reliable evidence that the impairment affected or affects the claimant’s ability to carry out normal day-today activities, 50.3. there is no reliable evidence that if there was an adverse condition it was substantial, and 50.4. the evidence is that while the Cervical spondylitis is long term, if there was, in 2017, a substantial adverse effect on the claimant’s ability to carry out normal day to day activities, that ceased before May 2018 and there is no evidence that it has recurred or is likely to recur. 50.5. For those reasons I find that at the relevant times the claimant was not disabled by reason of Cervical spondylitis.