Mr M Henson v Treasure Transport Services Ltd: 2600349/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2600349/2025

Between

Mr M HensonClaimant

Treasure Transport Services LimitedRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Ost

In person for claimant

Date 29 September 2025

JUDGMENT

After consideration of the evidence provided and submissions made by each party at the Preliminary Hearing, the judgment of the Employment Tribunal is as follows:

[1]The entirety of the claimant’s claim is struck out under rule 38(1)(a) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 because the claimant has no reasonable prospect of success in persuading the Tribunal that his claim was submitted in time so as to give the Tribunal jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim. The claim is dismissed.

[2]In addition, any stand-alone claim by the claimant against the respondent in respect of a personal injury which is contained within his claim form is struck out under rule 38(1)(a) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 because it has no reasonable prospect of success because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear a personal injury claim.

[3]The respondent’s application that the entirety of the claimant’s claim should be struck out under rule 38(1)(a) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 because it has no reasonable prospect of success on the basis that it has already been brought and settled as a claim in Lincoln County Court with claim number 125DC789 is refused.

REASONS

[4]The claimant, Mr Henson, was employed by the respondent as a Washbay Operative. His employment started on 2 November 2017 and ended on 23 October 2023.

[5]The respondent, Treasure Transport Services Limited, is a specialist logistics company operating out of two sites in Lincolnshire and Leicestershire.

[6]The claimant says that he slipped on ice at work which caused him injuries whilst working in the evening of 10 February 2021 (the “Injury at Work”). The claimant was signed off as unfit to work and he did not return to active duty prior to termination but he remained employed for more than two and a half years.

[7]The Respondent wrote to the claimant on 23 October 2023 to terminate his employment with payment in lieu of five weeks’ notice pay.

[8]The claimant commenced litigation against the respondent in Lincoln County Court on 8 February 2024 in relation to the Injury at Work with claim number 125DC789 (“PI Claim 125DC789”). PI Claim 125DC789 was settled further to a part 36 offer which was accepted by the claimant’s legal representatives on or around 2 May 2025.

[9]The claimant commenced ACAS early conciliation on 12 March 2025 and the period of early conciliation ended on the same day. ACAS issued a certificate with number R142513/25/93 to confirm the claimant’s compliance with the early conciliation requirement.

[10]The claimant submitted a claim form on 7 April 2025. It is relevant for the purposes of the applications to address in detail the information provided by the claimant within his claim form. (Page references in this document are references to the hearing bundle.)

[11]In section 8.1 of his claim form the claimant ticked boxes to indicate the type of claim he was bringing (page 9). The claimant ticked boxes to indicate he was ‘unfairly dismissed’, and, that he was making ‘a whistleblowing claim including dismissal or any other unfair treatment after whistleblowing‘. The claimant also ticked a box to indicate that he was ‘making another type of claim which the Employment Tribunal can deal with’.

[12]The claim form invited the claimant to provide information about the nature of that third other type of claim within a narrative box. The claimant inserted the following information: Lying on the RIDOR [sic] report I’ve got deep depression caused by the above. I am a church person and don’t tell lies”

[13]Section 8.2 of the claim form invited the claimant to set out ‘the background and details of your claim’ in a narrative box provided. It also invited the provision of dates when events happened. The claimant provided an account of how he suffered the Injury at Work (page 11).

[14]Section 9.2 of the claim form invited the claimant to identify the compensation or remedy he is seeking within a narrative box. The claimant inserted “Financial compensation” (page 10). He also inserted some further information in that box stating: “Upon leaving the place of work after the accident I never returned to site contrary to the RIDDOR report Treasure have CCTV in operation and have facial recognition clocking in sisten [sic], my clock no is 1090”.

[15]Section 14 of the claim form invited the claimant to provide any additional information within a narrative box (page 15). The claimant inserted “See 8.1 9.2”

[16]The respondent submitted its response form and grounds of resistance on 5 June 2025. The respondent denied and contested all the claimant’s complaints (pages 26 to 35). The respondent also raised various jurisdictional issues with the claimant’s claim in paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 of its grounds of resistance and indicated that a strike out application was being made in paragraph 8 (pages 33 to 34).

[17]On 6 June 2025 the respondent made applications that the claimant’s claims should be struck out in the entirety as disclosing no reasonable prospects of success and//or as vexatious pursuant to rule 38(1)(a). In the alternative, the respondent requested that the tribunal make a deposit order in the sum of £1,000. The respondent asserted three bases on which the grounds were met (pages 36 to 37).

[18]The respondent provided a copy of the application to the claimant under a covering letter (pages 38 to 39) and the claimant signed to confirm receipt of this correspondence on 7 June 2025 (page 40).

[19]The respondent’s application asserted three bases for strike out and/or a deposit order which were described as follows: “1. The Employment Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the claim/s as they are time-barred. The Claimant was dismissed on 23 October 2023. The claim was lodged on 7 April 2025. (The Tribunal will refer to this as “Asserted Basis 1: time bar”.) 2. The Employment Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the Claimant’s claim because it is a standalone personal injury claim. (The Tribunal will refer to this as “Asserted Basis 2: standalone PI claim”.) 3. The Claimant has already brought the claim in Lincoln County Court under claim Number 125DC789”. (The Tribunal will refer to this as “Asserted Basis 3: repeated claim”.)

[20]On 13 June 2025 Employment Judge Heap ordered a preliminary hearing take place to determine the respondent’s applications for strike out and, in the alternative, deposit order on the three specified bases.

[21]Employment Judge Heap also made four case management orders for the preparation of the preliminary hearing which were issued to the parties (page 41 to 43). Those four orders are recorded in the bottom half of page 42.

[22]In summary, order 1 required the claimant:22.1 to confirm if he is bringing an unfair dismissal claim;

22.2 to provide the grounds upon which he says that any dismissal was unfair;

22.3 to confirm whether he is advancing complaints about whistleblowing and; if so,

22.4 to set out the protected disclosure he relies upon within any whistleblowing complaint,

22.5 to set out detriment(s) he complains about within any whistleblowing complaint, and

22.6 to explain why he says the reason or principal reason for his dismissal was because of any protected disclosures within any whistleblowing complaint.

[23]In summary, order 4 required the claimant: 23.1 to provide a witness statement dealing with the question of why the claim form was not presented in time and why it was not reasonably practicable for him to do so.

The Hearing

[24]The preliminary hearing took place in public in accordance with rule 52(1)(c) and rule 54(2) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024.

[25]Mr Henson represented himself. Ms Haddon of Counsel represented the respondent.

[26]The Tribunal explored whether any of the participants required any reasonable adjustments to enable each to fully participate throughout the hearing. The claimant confirmed that he takes medication to assist with mental health issues, but that medication just calmed him down; he said that he didn’t need any particular adjustments at the hearing. The claimant said that he still experienced back pain and discomfort and sometimes he needs to stretch. The Tribunal invited the claimant to stand, move and stretch as and when he needed to do so. The Tribunal also invited the claimant to notify the Tribunal if he needed a break at any point or he was struggling to represent himself for any reason. (The claimant did stretch at various points but did not indicate that he needed a break or that he was struggling at any point either of his own initiative or when explicitly asked if that was the case by the Tribunal.)

[27]The Tribunal was provided with a bundle of 147 pages.

[28]The claimant provided a witness statement comprising 15 paragraphs (pages 47 to 48).

[29]The Tribunal sought clarity on whether and to what extent the claimant had complied with the orders of Employment Judge Heap.

[30]Ms Haddon said the claimant had not complied with the Orders 1 or 4.

[31]In summary, the claimant said that he had tried to comply with the orders of Employment Judge Heap but he “didn’t understand”, he thought he “went off track”, it was probably his “misunderstanding” and he “had not done anything like this before”. Understanding the claimant’s complaints

[32]The Tribunal carefully examined the pleadings in order to try to identify the complaints which the claimant appeared to be bringing.

[33]In the absence of a clear explanation within the claimant’s claim form and/or his witness statement to confirm or explain the complaint(s) he was bringing and the issues within such complaint(s), the Tribunal sought to explore and understand the claimant’s claims before addressing the applications of strike out and/or deposit orders.

[34]The claimant had ticked the unfair dismissal box in his claim form, so the Tribunal asked the claimant to explain his complaint for unfair dismissal.

[35]The claimant said the decision to terminate his employment was “not fair”. When asked why, the Claimant said that the respondent shouldn’t have dismissed him in October 2023 because it wouldn’t have cost the respondent to “keep me on the books”.

[36]The claimant also described being unhappy with his treatment by the respondent during his employment. He described being unhappy with how the respondent paid him for bank holidays, and, being unhappy because he didn’t receive a Christmas card and £50 bonus in 2021 and 2022. However, the claimant confirmed that he had not resigned in response to that alleged treatment; he had not resigned at all.

[37]The Tribunal noted that the claimant did say in paragraph 10 of his witness statement, “I wasn’t repaid the same loyalty to them when I needed their help as I had shown them in my 9 years of working for them” (page 48). Whilst it is not unambiguous, this does correlate with the claimant’s oral explanation at the hearing that he is alleging that the respondent ‘should have kept him on their books’ rather than terminating his employment in October 2023.

[38]The claimant had also ticked the whistleblowing box in his claim form, so the Tribunal asked the claimant to explain the protected disclosures and the relationship to his dismissal in October 2023 which he was relying upon for his whistleblowing claim.

[39]The claimant said that:39.1 he had raised issues about his receipt of payment for bank holidays (although the claimant also said that he did not know that him raising this issue had influenced the decision to terminate his employment and he did not provide any explanation or evidence as to how it could have influenced the decision);

39.2 he had complained about the completion of the RIDDOR report and the accident book in February 2021; and

39.3 he was working as a lone worker, but he was not supposed to be working alone;

39.4 “I think they wanted me out of the way”.

[40]The only ‘detrimental consequence’ to any protected disclosures which the claimant identified was the termination of his employment.

[41]In relation to the third type of claim, the claimant was focused upon the respondent’s handling of both the RIDDOR report and the accident book in relation to the Injury at Work and he clearly retained a strong sense of grievance over the errors and inaccuracies which he alleged had been included. The claimant had repeatedly stated in both his claim form (page 9) and at paragraphs 13 and 14 of his witness statement (page 48) that the respondent’s handling of both the RIDDOR report and the accident book had hurt his feelings, caused him to feel like Treasures have let him down, made him feel anxious and depressed, led to problems with anxiety and depression, and caused deep depression.

[42]Having taken time to seek to understand the Claimant’s claims, the Tribunal explained the different ‘prospects of success’ tests that apply to applications for strike out under rule 38(1)(a) (‘no reasonable prospects of success’), and, for a deposit order under rule 40 (‘little reasonable prospect of success) in readiness for the parties to provide their submissions on the applications.

[43]The claimant’s statement was taken as read. Ms Haddon chose not to cross examine the claimant. The Submissions

[44]On behalf of the respondent, Ms Haddon confirmed that the respondent’s applications were those in their application at page 36 of the bundle. However, Ms Haddon confirmed that the respondent had abandoned the ground that the claims were ‘vexatious’, and it was making the applications based only on the grounds relating to ‘prospects of success’.

[45]Ms Haddon submitted that the claimant’s entire claim was time barred. The claimant’s claim form states that the last date of employment was 23 October 2023, but the claim was only presented on 7 April 2025.

[46]Ms Haddon submitted that the complaint contained within the claim form is a standalone personal injury claim. Whilst within section 8 of his claim form the claimant has ticked boxes suggesting he was bringing claims for unfair dismissal and for whistleblowing, he had also ticked the third box to indicate another type of claim. Ms Haddon submitted that what is described by the claimant in narrative appears to be a personal injury claim only and the Employment Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to determine a standalone personal injury claim.

[47]Ms Haddon further submitted that even if the Employment Tribunal did have jurisdiction to hear the claim, it appeared to be described in the claim form in the case which had been resolved in Lincoln County Court. Ms Haddon referred to the documents relating to the claim number 125DC789 in the bundle (pages 107 to 111) and in particular the confirmation from the claimant’s representatives of the claimant’s acceptance of part 36 offer (page 136).

[48]Ms Haddon submitted that the claimant had not complied with Employment Judge Heaps’s Order 1. She submitted that he had not confirmed in writing whether he was bringing an unfair dismissal claim or a whistleblowing claim. She submitted that his witness statement (at page 47-48) did not provide the basic answers required by Employment Judge Heap’s orders. She submitted that the claimant did not set out the protected grounds he was relying upon, he did not set out the detriment and he did not explain why the dismissal was ‘because of’ any disclosures. Ms Haddon submitted that there was no basis provided to support any complaint of automatic unfair dismissal on the grounds of whistleblowing. She submitted that the claimant’s witness statement was empty of all of that. She submitted that the witness statement focused entirely on the claimant’s concerns as set out in the 3rd box in section 8.1 (page 9) regarding psychiatric injury.

[49]Ms Haddon referred to the Tribunal’s efforts to understand the claimant’s complaints orally at the hearing and she submitted that, to the extent the claimant had been permitting to elaborate today, the claimant still hadn’t provided a coherent set of answers; he had referred to ongoing issues of dissatisfaction from his employment regarding the method of payments for bank holidays and the lack of a Christmas card and a £50 gift card. She submitted that what the claimant said today about the impact upon dismissal mainly consisted of speculation. Ms Haddon submitted that there is no clear case outlined. She said that the claimant still hasn’t articulated any case that the Respondent acted anything other than fairly.

[50]The Tribunal asked Ms Haddon to clarify whether or not the respondent was now seeking at the hearing to expand the grounds for strike out to include the ground in rule 38(1)(c) on the basis that the claimant has failed to comply with Employment Judge Heap’s orders. Ms Haddon confirmed that she was not applying for a strike out on that basis but was providing it as context to suggest the claimant’s failure to provide details of his claim to date has been compounded.

[51]The Tribunal provided a short break for the claimant to stretch and move to ensure he was comfortable, and also to gather his thoughts and make notes about what he wanted to say about the tests to strike out under rule 38, and, to a deposit order under rule 40, and what he wanted in response to Ms Haddon’s submissions on behalf of the respondent.

[52]After the break, the claimant provided his submissions in response to the respondent’s applications for strike out and/or a deposit order. The claimant submitted that he should not have to pay a deposit order and his claims should not be struck out. He said that the SHEQ manager, Lexcie Richards, had not completed the RIDDOR report or the accident report properly and he described some of the alleged inaccuracies. He also referred to pictures in the bundle which he said showed a pipe where he slipped (page 18) and which showed acid in a storage container that was not caged (page 19). The claimant said that if he had knocked the pipe when he slipped, then he could have been covered in acid. The claimant said that he was a lone worker on 10 February 2021 because the respondent was seeking to save money.

[53]The claimant said that he had been paid for his injuries caused by his Injury at Work. The claimant also agreed with Ms Haddon that the PI claim 125DC789 had been settled.

[54]The claimant said that he just wanted “it all put to bed”.

[55]The claimant said that he accepted that his claim was not submitted in time. He said that he had instructed Ringrose law to bring PI claim 125DC789 in August 2021 which was during the covid pandemic. He said that he has spent time since then travelling over two thousand miles, going all round the country, for medical appointments. He said that his Injury at Work and the termination had taken “a big toll on his mental health” and he “felt like he had been tortured”. The claimant said he didn’t know he could make a claim to the Employment Tribunal. He thought that Ringrose law would deal with his employment claim, but they said they couldn’t pursue it because it wasn’t to do with the accident.

[56]The Tribunal asked when the claimant had found out about the employment law claim and spoken to Ringrose law before contacting ACAS. The claimant said that he spoke to Ringrose about this in 2025 and then he contacted ACAS.

[57]The claimant said that the inaccuracies in the RIDDOR report and the accident book had taken a big effect on his mental health. He felt like he was “thrown under the bus by the respondent for no reason”.

[58]The claimant said that it was unreasonable that a health and safety person had lied on the RIDDOR report and accident book. He said he had googled it once and when a person lies on a RIDDOR report they can get a prison sentence so it would be unfair to strike out his claim.

[59]The claimant said that at the end of the day he had done nothing wrong, but he feels guilty. In response, the Tribunal explained that the issue under consideration is not about whether he has done anything wrong but about the prospects of success for the complaints that he has indicated in his claim form and witness statement. The Tribunal explained that it is not in anyone’s interests, including a claimant’s interests, for very weak claims to continue and as a result to take up time, resources and effort.

[60]Mr Henson said that he wanted Lexcie Richards and Les Gibney to give evidence on what happened and what was put in the RIDDOR report and in the accident book. The Claimant’s ability to pay a deposit order

[61]The Tribunal made enquiries about the claimant’s financial resources. The claimant gave the following information.

[62]The claimant is not working and indicated that he is dependent on benefits. The claimant stated that he currently received income of £129 per week in sick pay, a £412 PIP payment per month, and, a pension payment of £80 per month.

[63]The claimant said that he lives with his dad. He stated that he had outgoings of £50 per week paid as board and lodgings to his dad, £50 per month for a Sky contract, road tax of £14 per month, and he spent groceries of £15 per week.

[64]The claimant stated that he had savings of £16,000 in an instant access bank account and £24,000 in an ISA.

The Law

[65]Section 111(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides the time limit for presenting an unfair dismissal claim (whether ordinary or automatic) as follows: (2) an employment tribunal shall not consider a complaint under this section unless it is presented to the tribunal—(a) before the end of the period of three months beginning with the effective date of termination, or

(b) within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three months.

[66]Section 48(3) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides the time limit for presenting a whistleblowing detriment claim as follows: An employment tribunal shall not consider a complaint under this section unless it is presented—(a) before the end of the period of three months beginning with the date of the act or failure to act to which the complaint relates or, where that act or failure is part of a series of similar acts or failures, the last of them, or

[67]Rule 38 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 provides the grounds for strike out, insofar as relevant, as follows: 38.—(1) The Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party, strike out all or part of a claim, response or reply on any of the following grounds— (a) that it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success; (b) that the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by or on behalf of the claimant or the respondent (as the case may be) has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious; (c) for non-compliance with any of these Rules or with an order of the Tribunal; (d) that it has not been actively pursued; (e) that the Tribunal considers that it is no longer possible to have a fair hearing in respect of the claim or response (or the part to be struck out).

(2) A claim, response or reply may not be struck out unless the party in question has been given a reasonable opportunity to make representations, either in writing or, if requested by the party, at a hearing.”

[68]In Balls v Downham Market High School and College

2011 IRLR 217

the Employment Appeal Tribunal said that the no reasonable prospects test is not whether the claim is likely to fail; nor is it a matter of asking whether it is possible that the claim will fail. It is not a test that can be satisfied by considering what is put forward by the respondent either in the ET3 or in submissions and deciding whether their written or oral assertions regarding disputed matters are likely to be established as facts. It is a high test. It can be unfair to strike out if there are crucial facts in dispute and there has been no opportunity to test the evidence.

[69]An order for strike out is a draconian sanction and not one that should be applied lightly. In Mbuisa v Cygnet Healthcare Ltd EAT 0119/18 Tribunals were cautioned by the Employment Appeal Tribunal about exercising their power to strike out badly pleaded claims brought by litigants in person who are not familiar with articulating complex arguments in written form on the ground that they have no reasonable prospect of success. An order for strike out should be made only in exceptional cases. The proper course of action would be to record how the case was being put, ensure that the original pleading was formally amended so as to pin that case down, and make a deposit order if appropriate.

[70]It will generally not be appropriate to strike out a claim where the central facts necessary to prove the case are in dispute. It is not the function of a tribunal in such an application to conduct a mini trial. The proper approach is to take the Claimant’s case at its highest as it appears from their claim form/ET1 unless there are exceptional circumstances (North Glamorgan NHS Trust v Ezsias

[2007] IRLR 603

[71]In Anyanwu and anor v South Bank Student Union and anor

2001 ICR 391

, HL, their lordships said that discrimination claims should not be struck out except in the most obvious cases as they are generally fact sensitive. In Ezsias v North Glamorgan NHS Trust

2007 ICR 1126

, CA, the Court of Appeal held that the same or a similar approach should generally inform protected disclosure (‘whistleblowing’) cases, which have much in common with discrimination cases, in that they involve an investigation into why an employer took a particular step. Similarly, in Tayside Public Transport Co Ltd (t/a Travel Dundee) v Reilly

2012 IRLR 755

, Ct Sess (Inner House) (which was subsequently cited with approval in Mechkarov v Citibank NA

[2016] ICR 1211

) the Court of Session authoritatively summarised the correct approach to strike-out applications in unfair dismissal cases. It noted that almost all unfair dismissal claims are fact-sensitive and that, where the central facts are in dispute, a claim should be struck out only in the most exceptional circumstances.

[72]In Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Health Board v Ferguson

[2013] ICR 1108

the Employment Appeal Tribunal, commented that whilst in some cases strike out may save time, expense and anxiety, in cases that are fact sensitive, the circumstances in which a claim is likely to be struck out are rare.

[73]In Cox v Adecco Group UK & Ireland and ors

2021 ICR 1307

the Employment Appeal Tribunal gave guidance to tribunals dealing with strikeout applications against litigants in person. It held that when considering strike out of claims brought against litigants in person, the claimant’s case should be taken at its highest and the Tribunal must consider, in reasonable detail, what the claims and issues are. A Tribunal should not strike out a claim where it does not know what the claim is. There should, therefore, be a reasonable attempt at identifying the claim and the issues before considering strike out. The Employment Appeal Tribunal also said that, if the claim would have reasonable prospects of success had it been properly pleaded, consideration should be given to the possibility of an amendment, subject to the usual tests that apply to amendments.

[74]In considering whether a claim has no reasonable prospect of success, the Tribunal must consider whether there is a “more than fanciful” prospect of the claim succeeding (A v B and another [2011] ICR D9).

[75]The Employment Appeal Tribunal held that the striking out process requires a two-stage test in HM Prison Service v Dolby

[2003] IRLR 694

, and in Hasan v Tesco Stores Ltd

UKEAT/0098/16

. The first stage involves a finding that one of the specified grounds for striking out has been established; and, if it has, the second stage requires the tribunal to decide as a matter of discretion whether to strike out the claim. In Hasan, Lady Wise stated that the second stage is important as it is a fundamental cross check to avoid the ending prematurely of a claim that may yet have merit. (Dolby was decided under a previous version of the Employment Tribunal Rules, but the relevant part of the wording of the rule was the same, in that it provided that the Tribunal ‘may’ strike the claim out.)

[76]Applications for a deposit order are governed by Rule 40 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, the relevant part of which provides, insofar as relevant, as follows: 40.—(1) Where at a preliminary hearing the Tribunal considers that any specific allegation or argument in a claim, response or reply has little reasonable prospect of success, it may make an order requiring a party (“the depositor”) to pay a deposit not exceeding £1,000 as a condition of continuing to advance that allegation or argument (“a deposit order”)

(2) The Tribunal must make reasonable enquiries into the depositor’s ability to pay the deposit and have regard to any such information when deciding the amount of the deposit.

(3) The Tribunal’s reasons for making the deposit order shall be provided with the order and the depositor must be notified about the potential consequences of the order.”

[77]The purpose of a deposit order is to weed out claims which are unlikely to succeed but do not meet the strike out criteria, and to give a clear warning that costs may be payable if a claim succeeds (Hemdan v Ishmail and anor

2017 ICR 486

[78]In Tree v South East Coastal Ambulance NHS Foundation Trust EAT 0043/17 Her Honour Judge Eady QC commented that in a case that has deficiencies in the pleadings it is important that employment tribunals do not use deposit orders as a substitute for more appropriate case management orders aimed at clarifying the facts and issues or for ensuring compliance with case management directions (such as ordering further particulars, requiring amendments or using unless orders).

[79]As for the approach the Tribunal should take, in Wright v Nipponkoa Insurance [2014]

UKEAT/0113/14

and Van Rensburg v Royal Borough of Kingston-Upon Thames and others [2007]

UKEAT/0095/07

it was said, a Tribunal is not restricted to a consideration of purely legal issues; it is entitled to have regard to the likelihood of the party being able to establish the facts essential to their case and, in doing so, to reach a provisional view as to the credibility of the assertions being put forward. That said there is a balance to be struck as to how far such an analysis can go.

[80]It was also made clear in Hemdan that a mini trial of the facts is to be avoided. If there is a core factual conflict it should properly be resolved at a full merit hearing where evidence is heard and tested.

[81]In a case where a Tribunal concludes that a claim or allegation has little reasonable prospect of success, it does not mean that a deposit order must be made. The Tribunal retains a discretion in the matter and the power to make such a deposit order must be exercised in accordance with the overriding objective and with having regard to all of the circumstances of the particular case. This power must be exercised in accordance with reason, relevance, principle and justice, including the overriding objective (Williams v Real Care Agency Ltd 2012 ICR D27, EAT).

[82]In considering whether to strike out or make order a deposit, the Tribunal must bear in mind the overriding objective, in Rule 3 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 which provides: “The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable Employment Tribunals to deal with cases fairly and justly. Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes, so far as practicable—(a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing;

(b) dealing with cases in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues;

(d) avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues; and

(e) saving expense.”

Findings of Fact

[83]Very little of the factual content of the issues was in dipsute. The Tribunal recorded or found the following facts for the purpose of this hearing.

[84]The claimant and the respondent agreed that the claimant’s last day of employment was 23 October 2023.

[85]The 3 month primary time limits for bringing a claim for unfair dismissal under section 111(2)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, and, a claim for whistleblowing detriment that took place up to the last day of employment under section 48(3)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 both expired on 22 January 2024 as a matter of calculation.

[86]The claimant and the respondent agreed that the claimant had brought a claim for the personal injuries he experienced as a result of his Injury at Work in claim number 125DC789 before Lincoln County Court. Claim number 125DC789 commenced on 8 February 2024. The Tribunal accepts the claimant’s uncontested evidence that he instructed Ringrose law on this litigation.

[87]The particulars of claim for claim number 125DC789 (pages 107 - 111) provided in evidence address the alleged circumstances in which the Injury at Work occurred, the respondents alleged liability regarding that Injury at Work, and the physical and psychological injuries which were alleged to have been caused. The particulars of claim do not identify any claim based upon the respondent’s completion of a RIDDOR report or an accident book. The particulars of claim do not refer to a dispute over a RIDDOR report or an accident book.

[88]The claimant and the respondent agreed they had settled all of the claims within claim number 125DC789. The Tribunal found that settlement occurred on or around 2 May 2025 as indicted by the email of that date from the claimant’s representative to the respondent’s representative (page 136).

[89]The claimant commenced and completed the ACAS early conciliation process on 12 March 2025 which is evidenced by the certificate.

[90]The claimant presented his claim to the Employment Tribunal on 7 April 2025.

[91]The claimant’s information regarding his financial means indicated that he had disposable income of approximately £729 per month and savings. Analysis & Conclusions

[92]The claimant is a litigant in person. His claim form indicates in section 8.1 that the claimant is bringing three different types of complaint:92.1 an unfair dismissal claim,

92.2 a whistle blowing claim,

92.3 another type of poorly defined claim for which he provided some basic narrative details as set out above in paragraph 12 (which the Tribunal will refer to as the “Third Claim”)

[93]The Tribunal concluded that the claimant had tried to comply with the orders of Employment Judge Heap to provide details of his complaints, but his attempts were similarly unclear and deficient.

[94]The Tribunal noted that there were obvious deficiencies in the claimant’s pleading of his case and it lacked the details which the respondent needs to properly defend the complaints. This could be addressed by case management.

[95]The claimant is a litigant in person. The Tribunal noted the guidance in Mbuisa (above) to be cautious about exercising their power to strike out badly pleaded claims brought by litigants in person who are not familiar with articulating complex arguments in written form on the ground that they have no reasonable prospect of success. The Tribunal noted the similar guidance in Tree (above) in respect of deposit orders. The Tribunal concluded that the substantial deficiencies and gaps that still remain in the claimant’s pleadings would be addressed by suitable case management orders aimed at clarifying the facts and issues.

[96]The Tribunal followed the guidance in Cox (above) by carefully examining the claimant’s pleadings and the claimant’s witness statement with clarifications from him to identify the claims before addressing the applications for strike out and deposit orders. Having done so, the Tribunal was satisfied that the claimant is not seeking to bring a personal injury claim only. This is because the claimant actively ticked boxes to indicate that he was bringing a claim because he was unfairly dismissed, and also, a whistleblowing claim. This was corroborated and slightly elaborated by the claimant’s oral explanation at hearing. As a result, the Tribunal rejects the respondent’s submission that the claimant’s claim is only a personal injury claim.

[97]The Tribunal noted that the Third Claim does appear to be a standalone personal injury claim based on an analysis on the pleadings in the claim form and the explanation given orally at the hearing.

[98]The Tribunal addresses the specific bases asserted by the respondent in turn Asserted Basis 1: timebar

[99]In relation to the time limits for bringing claims, the Tribunal noted the long delay of more than 14 months after the expiry of the primary time limit of three months before the claimant actually submitted his claim to the Employment Tribunal.

[100]The Tribunal noted that the claimant had access to professional legal representatives (Ringrose Law) for the purposes of bringing PI Claim 125DC789 during that 14 month period, and, that he appears to have been capable of obtaining advice and giving instructions for the purpose of pursuing and then settling that personal injury claim.

[101]However, the Tribunal also noted that the claimant asserts that his ability to submit a claim to the Employment Tribunal was restricted by his poor mental health. He described himself within his claim form as suffering from “deep depression” and “anxiety and depression”. There are references to him being prescribed medication for depression within the bundle (eg page 96). During the hearing, the claimant described himself as “broken” during this period.

[102]The bundle contains:102.1 A psychological report by Dr Steve Halford dated 21 January 2024 (page 86 to 103) which, amongst many other elements, states at para 6.5 (pages 96 – 97) that the claimant reports that he “suffers from anxiety to the extent of panic”, “struggles to cope emotionally” and “he does not want to leave the home”, and, at para 8.2.3 (p101) Dr Halford states that it is likely at the point of assessment that the claimant met the criteria for DSM-V TR F43.23 Adjustment Disorder with low mood and anxiety; and also

102.2 a report from Lincolnshire Partnership NHS Foundation Trust dated 19 June 2024 which, amongst other elements, states that the claimant had been assessed by Lincolnshire Talking Therapies as presenting “symptoms of depression” and “Generalised Anxiety Disorder” (page 112).

[103]The Tribunal notes that the claimant gave evidence that he contacted ACAS after asking Ringrose Law about his ability to bring an employment law claim. The claimant was able to contact ACAS to commence the early conciliation process on 12 March 2025 and he concluded it on the same day. However, the claimant did not submit his claim form until 7 April 2025, nearly 4 weeks later.

[104]In accordance with the guidance in Ezsias (above), the Tribunal did not conduct a mini-trial but undertook a summary assessment of the claimant’s presentation of his claim against the time limits specified in sections 48(3) and 111(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. In accordance with the guidance in Cox (above), the Tribunal took the claimant’s case at its highest.

[105]The Tribunal noted that the primary 3 month time primary period in which to bring the claimant’s claims expired on 22 January 2024. The Tribunal notes that, even allowing for the mental health issues which were evidenced, the claimant was able to bring, conduct and ultimately settle a personal injury claim in Lincoln County Cout during the same broad time period. The Tribunal notes that the claimant gave evidence that he became aware of the possibility of bringing an employment law claim in 2025 and he raised this with his representatives on the personal injury, Ringrose Law, whom he says advised that they were not able to assist him but pointed him towards ACAS. The claimant contacted ACAS and commenced early conciliation on 12 March 2025.

[106]The Tribunal notes that the claimant’s evidence indicates that by 12 March 2025 at the latest:106.1 the claimant was aware of and was contemplating an employment law claim,

106.2 the claimant was able to interact with legal professionals,

106.3 the claimant was able to contact ACAS and comply with early conciliation process,

106.4 The claimant was approximately 14 months beyond the primary time limit.

[107]However, the claimant did not submit his claim form for just under 4 more weeks on 7 April 2025. The claimant did not provide any reasons or evidence for that approximate 4 week period of inactivity after completing early conciliation before submitting his claim form.

[108]Whilst it would not be impossible for the claimant to persuade an Employment Tribunal that his claim had been brought in time, in the Tribunal’s view, the claimant prospect of doing so was highly unlikely, or to put it another way, no more than “fanciful”.

[109]The Tribunal is satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect that the claimant will persuade an Employment Tribunal that both(a) it was not reasonably practicable for him to submit his claim form within the three month primary time limit which expired on 22 January 2024, and,

(b) that, by submitting his claim on 7 April 2025 he had submitted his claim within such further period that was reasonable in the circumstances. Accordingly, the Tribunal is satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of success that the claim will be determined to be in time in accordance with the extension provisions of sections 48(3)(b) and/or 111(2)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. On that analysis, the grounds to strike out the entirety of the claimant’s claim under rule 38(1)(a) are established.

[110]The Tribunal considered whether it should exercise its discretion to strike out claimant’s claims, in accordance with the two-stage test described in Hasan (above). The Tribunal determined that it was fair and just to strike out the claimant’s claim because the respondent should not have to incur the costs, time and effort in preparing for and then defending at hearing a complaint which is hopeless. Neither is it in the claimant’s interests to do so. As the Employment Appeal Tribunal observed in Cox (above) ‘no-one gains by truly hopeless cases being pursued to a hearing’. The Tribunal believes that striking out claims for which it does not have jurisdiction because they are substantially out of time is dealing with the case fairly and justly in the circumstances, it will save expense, and it will deal with this case in a way which is proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues in the case. It will also allow other litigants with valid claims to assess the Employment Tribunal’s resources more quickly. The Tribunal considered the exercise of discretion to be proportionate. The claim should be dismissed as a result of that strike out.

[111]Whilst the above decision disposes of the case entirely, the Tribunal will still provide its decision and explain reasoning on the remaining applications which would have be pertinent if the Tribunal had not concluded that the claims should be struck out due to the claimant not submitting his claim in time.

[112]When considering the factors listed above, the Tribunal would have determined that the grounds on which the Tribunal may make a deposit order under rule 40 are established because the claimant does not have more than little reasonable prospect of success in persuading an Employment Tribunal that(a) it was not reasonably practicable for him to submit his claim form within the three month primary time limit which expired on 22 January 2024, and,

(b) by submitting his claim on 7 April 2025 the claimant had submitted his claim within such further period that was reasonable in the circumstances.

[113]After the grounds for making a deposit order were established, the Tribunal again considered whether it should exercise its discretion to make a deposit order in accordance with the two-stage test in Hemdan (above). The Tribunal formed the view that the claimant should be discouraged from continuing with his claim when it has little reasonable prospect of success. Additionally, in accordance with the purpose described in Hemdan (above), the claimant should be formally warned by means of the deposit order that he is at risk of being ordered to pay towards the respondent’s costs if he continues with his claim but fails because his complaints are held to have been submitted out of time. The Tribunal believed that making the deposit order would have dealt with the case fairly and justly; in particular it would have saved expense, and, it would have dealt with this case in a way which was proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues in the case.

[114]In accordance with rule 40(2) the Tribunal had regard to such information when deciding the amount of the deposit order. The Tribunal considers that the amount of £400 (being just over half of the claimant’s disposal income for a month) would have clearly indicated to the claimant that his remaining complaints appear to be very weak. The Tribunal considers that the requirement to pay the amount of £400 within 21 days would have given the claimant good reason and opportunity to consider whether or not he should continue with his claim, without affecting ‘a strike out by the back door’ or making it difficult for the claimant to access justice. Asserted Basis 2: standalone PI claim

[115]The claimant did not put forward any basis on which the Employment Tribunal can hear a stand-alone personal injury claim. The Tribunal believes that the Employment Tribunal does not have a jurisdiction to determine a stand-alone personal injury claim. The Tribunal determined that any stand-alone personal injury claim within the claimant’s claim form would have no reasonable prospect of success. On that analysis the grounds to strike out any stand-alone personal injury claim under rule 38(1)(a) are established.

[116]For the reasons described in paragraph 96 above, the Tribunal does not accept the respondent’s characterisation that the claimant’s claim is solely a stand-alone personal injury claim. The different claims/complaints brought by the claimant in his claim form are those listed in paragraph 92.1 to 92.3 above.

[117]The Tribunal noted that when asked to state the nature of the Third Claim in the narrative box at 8.2, the claimant inserted the following information: Lying on the RIDOR [sic] report I’ve got deep depression caused by the above.

[118]The Third Claim referred to in paragraph 92.3 above did appear to be a stand-alone personal injury claim because it seeks compensation or damages for injuries or harm alleged to have been caused to the claimant by the respondent’s alleged actions (i.e. inappropriately completing the RIDDOR report and/or the accident book). The Tribunal concluded that the Third Claim was a stand-alone personal injury claim which had no reasonable prospect of success. On that analysis the grounds to strike out the Third Claim under rule 38(1)(a) are established.

[119]The Tribunal considered whether it should exercise its discretion to strike out the Third Claim, in accordance with the two-stage test described in Hasan (above). The Tribunal determined that it would have been fair and just to strike out(a) the Third Claim and

(b) any other stand-alone personal injury claim within the claimant’s claim because the respondent should not have to incur the costs, time and effort in preparing for and then defending at hearing a hopeless complaint. Neither would it be in the claimant’s interests to do so. The Tribunal believes that striking out personal injury claims for which it does not have jurisdiction to hear or determine would be dealing with the case fairly and justly in the circumstances, it would have saved expense, and it would have dealt with this case in a way which is proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues in the case.

[120]The Third Claim would also be struck out on this additional basis. Asserted Basis 3: repeated claim

[121]As described above, there were three different complaints within the claimant’s claim. The unfair dismissal complaint and whistleblowing complaints are plainly not contained within the particulars of claim for PI Claim 125DC789 (pages 107 to 111). The Third Claim does appear to share factual elements with PI Claim 125DC789 and therefore it required closer analysis to determine whether the third claim is a repetition of the same cause of action.

[122]As stated above, the Tribunal noted that when asked to state the nature of the Third Claim in the narrative box at 8.2, the claimant inserted the following information: Lying on the RIDOR [sic] report I’ve got deep depression caused by the above.

[123]The Tribunal also noted that in the box for narrative at section 14 of the claim form, the claimant indicated that the additional information regarding his claim was in the narrative boxes at sections 8.2 and 9.1. The narrative box in section 8.2 provides the background to the claim being the Injury at Work. The box is completely filled. The claimant then appears to have used the narrative box 9.1 for additional space and this box concludes by identifying a dispute over the accuracy of the RIDDOR report stating: “Upon leaving the place of work after the accident I never returned to site contrary to the RIDDOR report Treasure have CCTV in operation and have facial recognition clocking in sisten [sic], my clock no is 1090”.

[124]After careful scrutiny, the pleadings indicate that the Third Claim before the Employment Tribunal is based upon the claimant’s allegation that the respondent’s completion of the RIDDOR report and the accident book were inaccurate and the claimant’s assertion that the alleged inaccuracies have caused psychological injuries. Rather than being a repetition of the PI Claim 125DC789, the references to the Injury at Work in box 8.2 appear to be providing the context to the respondent’s completion of the RIDDOR report and the accident book. The details of the Injury at Work appear to explain(a) why the respondent had to fill in an accident book and make a RIDDOR report, and,

(b) the claimant’s position on why the respondent’s completion was inaccurate.

[125]The Tribunal noted that the claimant did reference his belief that he was a lone worker and his concerns with both the RIDDOR report and the accident book in paragraph 14 of his witness statement and its impact on his mental health at paragraphs 13 and 15 of his witness statement (all page 48).

[126]In contrast, the claimant’s claim within PI Claim 125DC789 appears to have been limited to the liability for the Injury at Work itself when the claimant slipped on ice. The particulars of claim for PI Claim 125DC789 (pages 107 to 111) does not refer to the respondent’s completion of an entry in the accident book and/or the RIDDOR report, nor did the particulars allege that any injuries were caused by the completion of the accident book and the RIDDOR report.

[127]The Tribunal does not consider that the Third Claim is a repetition of a cause of action which has already been pursued in PI Claim 125DC789 before Lincoln County Court. On that analysis, the grounds to strike out either whole claim (or the undefined third claim) under rule 38(1)(a) on this basis were not established and the application must be refused.

[128]However, the Third Claim is already struck out for the reasons described above.

[129]The claim as a whole is dismissed. Approved by: