Mrs J Rutter v Northumbrian Citizens Advice acting as Citizens Advice Northumberland: 2500934/2026 and 2500877/2026

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2500934/2026, 2500877/2026

Between

Mrs J RutterClaimant

Northumbrian Citizens Advice acting as Citizens Advice NorthumberlandRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Childe

In person for claimant

Mr Brown (instructed by counsel) for respondent

Date 13 May 2026

JUDGMENT

The judgment of the Tribunal is the claimant’s application for interim relief, pursuant to section 129 Employment Rights Act 1996, is not well founded and fails. Approved by: Employment Judge Childe 13 May 2026 Note Summary reasons for the judgment were given orally at the hearing. Written summary reasons will not be provided unless a party asked for them at the hearing or a party makes a written request within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision. 1 of 2 Case Number: 2500934/2026 and 2500877/2026

REASONS

[1]This was an application brought by the claimant for interim relief.

[2]The claimant was dismissed on 23 March 2026.

[3]The claimant attempted to submit her ET1 to the Tribunal on 29 March 2026.

[4]The Tribunal rejected the ET1 on 2 April 2026 in accordance with rule 13 (1) (b) Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 (The “Rules”) because the Tribunal considered it was in a form which could not sensibly be responded to. The Tribunal said “the claim form simply identifies the various types of claim the claimant is making. At box 8.2 the claimant suggests particulars of claim were attached but no such document was in fact attached.”

[5]On 2 April 2026 the claimant applied for a reconsideration of the decision to reject her ET1 form, and attached her particulars of claim which explained what her case is.

[6]On 13 April 2026 the Tribunal reconsidered the decision to reject the claimant’s ET1 form and decided to accept the claimant’s claim for unfair dismissal relying on Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA 1996”) section 103A, only. The Tribunal informed the parties “Because the original decision to reject that part of your claim was correct but the defect which led to its rejection has since been rectified, the claim form in respect of that part of the claim is to be treated as having been received on 2 April 2026 (my emphasis).”

[7]On 13 April 2026, the Tribunal listed an urgent interim relief hearing, with a time estimate of three hours, to determine:a. Whether the claimant’s application for interim relief was validly made within the time limit required by section 128 of the ERA 1996.

b. If so, whether the application succeeds.

c. If so, whether to order that the claimant is reinstated or re-engaged in their employment.

d. If not, whether to order the continuation of the contract until the final determination of the claim.

[8]The parties were told in this letter that if they intended to rely on any documents at the hearing, they must prepare a PDF file of those documents, with page numbers and an index and must send a copy to the other parties and the Tribunal not later than three working days before the hearing.

[9]On 6 May 2026 the claimant requested a short adjournment of the interim relief hearing and an extension of time to complete and file the bundle, as a reasonable adjustment due to her disability.

[10]I granted the claimant’s application, and the case was relisted for an interim relief hearing on 13 May 2026, with a time estimate of a day. In addition to the points at paragraph 7, the Tribunal said it would deal with the claimant’s application to amend her claim, at the hearing.

[11]On 12 May 2026 the claimant made another application to postpone the interim relief hearing and to submit documents late for that hearing. The respondent objected to the claimant’s application for a second adjournment.

[12]On 12 May 2026 Employment Judge Sweeney granted the claimant’s application to submit documents late but refused the claimant’s application to postpone the hearing. The reason for this was that the application was unsupported by any medical evidence and whilst the fact that the claimant is a litigant in person and may be disabled are factors to be considered when deciding to grant an adjournment, they were not reasons in themselves to postpone.

[13]Employment Judge Sweeney also informed the parties on 12 May 2026 that:a. The purpose of the interim relief hearing was to carry out a summary assessment of the application for interim relief.

b. The judge would not read every page submitted by either party and that it was their responsibility to draw to the judge’s attention any key documents in the bundle.

c. The interim relief hearing is not a mini trial; the parties were not expected to prepare full statements or exchange extensive documentation.

d. The hearing requires focused arguments on key points.

[14]At the outset of the interim relief hearing the claimant made a further application for a postponement. I explained to the claimant that a decision had already been made not to postpone the hearing by Employment Judge Sweeney (as set out in paragraph 13 above) and I could only reconsider that decision if new information had come to light, such as further medical evidence, which might justify a change to that decision. The claimant confirmed that no further information had come to light since the application to postpone had been dismissed and I confirmed that the claimant’s application was therefore refused.

[15]The claimant said, on reflection, that she wished to proceed with the interim relief hearing.

[16]I had access to a Tribunal bundle, which had been prepared by the respondent, which ran to 569 pages.

[17]I had access to documents prepared by the claimant, across 14 separate PDF files, which ran to a total of 168 pages and a separate PDF document called ET proofs, which ran to 13 pages.

[18]I did not hear any witness evidence, but I was provided with a witness statement of Abi Conway, chief executive officer of the respondent.

[19]I was provided with a skeleton argument by the respondent. This had been shared with the claimant prior to the hearing.

[20]At the outset of the hearing, the claimant withdrew her application to amend her claim. I was careful to ensure the claimant understood that if the application was withdrawn it couldn’t be pursued again and would be dismissed. The claimant said she understood this and was happy for the claim to be dismissed.

[21]The claimant directed me to read pages 8 to 32, 127, 137, 140, 141 and 170 of her documents prior to hearing her application for interim relief.

[22]I asked the claimant how she wished to make her application for interim relief and the claimant said she would do so orally. The respondent said they would make oral submissions, which supplemented their skeleton argument.

[23]In addition to those documents referred to in paragraph 21, I read the dismissal letter prior to hearing the claimant’s application for interim relief.

[24]I heard the claimant’s application and the respondent’s response and made the decision set out below.

[25]The claimant was able to explain why I should grant interim relief and was able to direct me to documents that she believed were relevant and supported her application for interim relief, during the hearing.

[26]The claimant did ask if she could turn her volume off whilst the respondent made their submissions. I explained to the claimant that the consequence of her doing that would be she would not have the benefit of hearing the respondent’s case, but she could choose to not hear what the respondent had to say should she wish to do so.

[27]At the end of the hearing, once I had delivered my oral judgement, the claimant asked to leave the hearing as she was going to be sick. This request was granted.

[28]A short judgment was sent to the parties on 18 May 2026.

[29]On 29 May 2026 the claimant made an application for written reasons of my decision.

[30]I have decided, despite this request been made more than 14 days after the short judgment was sent to the parties, that it is in the interests of justice that the parties are provided with the full written reasons for the Tribunal’s decision. These are those reasons. Relevant Law The Rules

Relevant Law

[31]The relevant parts of the Rules provide as follows: 13. Rejection: substantive defects(1) Tribunal staff must refer a claim to the Tribunal if they consider that the claim, or part of it, may be— (a) … (b) in a form which cannot sensibly be responded to or is otherwise an abuse of process, (c) - (g) …

(2) The Tribunal must reject a claim, or part of it, if it considers that the claim, or part of it, is of a kind described in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (c) or (d) of paragraph (1).

(3) …

(4) …

(5) If a claim, or part of it, is rejected, the Tribunal must send a copy of the claim form to each claimant together with a notice of rejection giving the Tribunal’s reasons for rejecting the claim, or part of it. The notice must contain information about how a claimant may apply for a reconsideration of the rejection. 14. Reconsideration of rejection of claim (1) A claimant whose claim has been rejected (in whole or in part) under rule 12 (rejection: claim form not used or failure to supply minimum information) or 13 (rejection: substantive defects) may apply for a reconsideration on the basis that either— (a) the decision to reject was wrong, or (b) the notified defect can be rectified. (2) An application under paragraph (1) must be in writing and it must be received by the Tribunal within 14 days of the date that the notice of rejection was sent. It must explain why the decision to reject is wrong or rectify the defect and it must state whether the claimant requests a hearing. (3) If the claimant does not request a hearing, or the Tribunal decides, on considering the application, that the claim is to be accepted in full, the Tribunal must determine the application without a hearing. Otherwise the application must be considered at a hearing attended only by the claimant. (4) If the Tribunal decides that the decision to reject the claim, or part of it, was correct but that the defect has been rectified, the claim must be treated as presented on the date that the application containing the rectification was received by the Tribunal. The law on Automatic Unfair Dismissal due to Whistleblowing and Interim Relief

[32]An employee that presents a complaint that his or her dismissal was unfair and that the reason was that specified in s.103A ERA 1996 may apply for interim relief (s.128(1)(a) ERA 1996).

[33]Section 128(2) ERA 1996 states that the ‘Tribunal shall not entertain an application for interim relief unless it is presented to the Tribunal before the end of the period of seven days immediately following the eﬀective date of termination’.

[34]The relevant parts of s.129 ERA 1996 provide: a. (1) This section applies where, on hearing an employee's application for interim relief, it appears to the Tribunal that it is likely that on determining the complaint to which the application relates the Tribunal will find— (a) that the reason (or if more than one the principal reason) for the dismissal is one of those specified in— i. (i) section … 103A

[35]Section 103A ERA 1996 states: An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes of this Part as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employee made a protected disclosure.

[36]In Panayiotou v Chief Constable of Hampshire Police

[2014] IRLR 500

(EAT) §15 the Tribunal concluded that an employee had not been dismissed contrary to s.103A ERA 1996 in circumstances where he ‘had become a one-man industry for the force, taking up huge amounts of time… He made many very lengthy complaints… There comes a point where the fact of a disclosure is overtaken by the campaign of the discloser to vindicate himself… where he did not agree with the way that the disclosures were handled he complained about that too, as further disclosures… it is clear that unless matters are handled as the claimant wished, then they would have been wrongly handled in his view, and he would not rest until he had altered that course of action’.

[37]In order to amount to a protected disclosure any disclosure must satisfy all the elements of the test in s.43B ERA 1996, which states: 43B Disclosures qualifying for protection(1) In this Part a “qualifying disclosure” means any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show one or more of the following— (a) that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed, (b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject, (c) that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur, (d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered, (e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or (f) that information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately concealed.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), it is immaterial whether the relevant failure occurred, occurs or would occur in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, and whether the law applying to it is that of the United Kingdom or of any other country or territory.

(3) A disclosure of information is not a qualifying disclosure if the person making the disclosure commits an offence by making it.

(4) A disclosure of information in respect of which a claim to legal professional privilege (or, in Scotland, to confidentiality as between client and professional legal adviser) could be maintained in legal proceedings is not a qualifying disclosure if it is made by a person to whom the information had been disclosed in the course of obtaining legal advice.

(5) In this Part “the relevant failure”, in relation to a qualifying disclosure, means the matter falling within paragraphs (a) to (f) of subsection (1).

[38]As a consequence, for a disclosure to qualify there are five conditions:a. there must be a disclosure of information;

b. the worker must believe that the disclosure is made in the public interest;

c. such a belief must be reasonably held;

d. the worker must believe that the disclosure tends to show one or more of the matters listed in s43B(1) ERA 1996 – the ‘wrongdoing’; and

e. such a belief must be reasonably held. Martin v London Borough of Southwark

UKEAT/0239/20/JOJ

(HHJ Tayler).

[39]As to the public interest requirement set out in paragraph 38.b, there are no absolute rules as to what is or is not in the public interest, not least because the issue is of whether the worker making the disclosure reasonably believed it to be in the public interest. The question of public interest is to be answered by a Tribunal on a consideration of all the circumstances of the particular case, by reference to 4 factors as a useful tool:a. the numbers in the group whose interests the disclosure served;

b. the nature of the interests affected and the extent to which they are affected by the wrongdoing disclosed;

c. the nature of the wrongdoing disclosed;

d. the identity of the alleged wrongdoer. Chesterton Global Ltd v Nurmohamed

[2018] ICR 731

, CA (“Chesterton”)

[40]The Tribunal must be cautious before concluding that a disclosure by an employee about a breach of his own contract was made in the public interest ‘because the broad intent behind the amendment of section 43B(1) is that workers making disclosures in the context of private workplace disputes should not attract the enhanced statutory protection aﬀorded to whistleblowers – even, as I have held, where more than one worker is involved’ (Chesterton (CA) at §§34-37).

[41]The number of employees potentially aﬀected is relevant: ‘a disclosure about pay irregularities aﬀecting the entirety of the NHS workforce (over a million employees) would plainly be in the public interest’, as is the nature of the interests aﬀected, the nature of the wrongdoing and the identity of the alleged wrongdoer (Chesterton (CA) at §34). Whether it is likely that reason for dismissal was an automatically unfair one

[42]The Tribunal should ask themselves whether the applicant has established that he has a “pretty good” chance of succeeding in the final application to the Tribunal. “Likely” means more than “probable” and “probable” means “51 per cent or more” (Taplin v. C Shippam Ltd.

[1978] ICR 1068

[43]Further guidance was provided in Ministry of Justice v. Sarfraz

[2011] IRLR 562

at [16]: “likely” does not mean simply “more likely than not” — that is at least 51 per cent — but connotes a significantly higher degree of likelihood.

[44]Where interim relief is sought in relation to a dismissal under s.103A, the claimant must show that it is likely that the Tribunal will find that:(1) They made one or more disclosures to the employer;

(2) The disclosure(s) (and in the case or more than one, each) met the requirements of specificity and precision identified in Kilraine;

(3) They believed that: (a) The disclosure tended to show one or more of the wrongs in s.43B(1); and (b) The disclosure was in the public interest;

(4) Those beliefs were reasonable;

(5) The disclosure was the sole or principal cause of the dismissal (Al Qasimi v. Robinson

EAT/0283/17

at [11]-[15]).

[45]What [determination of the application] requires is an expeditious summary assessment by the first instance employment judge as to how the matter looks to him on the material that he has. The statutory regime thus places emphasis on how the matter appears in the swiftly convened summary hearing at first instance which must of necessity involve a far less detailed scrutiny of the respective cases of each of the parties and their evidence than will be ultimately undertaken at the full hearing of the claim” (London City Airport Ltd. v. Chacko

[2013] IRLR 610

at [23]). Analysis and conclusion Whether the claimant’s application for interim relief was validly made within the time limit required by section 128 of the ERA 1996.

[46]I find that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the claimant’s application for interim relief because the claim was accepted more than seven days after the date the claimant was dismissed.

[47]As I have said at paragraph 33, under section 128 (2) ERA 1996, the Tribunal cannot entertain an application for interim relief unless it is presented to the Tribunal before the end of the period of seven days immediately following the effective date of termination.

[48]The claim was treated as being presented on 2 April 2026, as I have identified in paragraph 6.

[49]As I have said at paragraph 2, the claimant was dismissed on 23 March 2026.

[50]The number of days between 23 March 2026 and 2 April 2026 is ten, which is more than seven.

[51]I have no jurisdiction to extend time. If so, whether the application succeeds.

[52]If I’m wrong on my finding in paragraph 46, I go on to determine whether the claimant’s application for interim relief succeeds on its merits.

[53]I've identified the legal test that I must follow in determining the claimant’s application for interim relief.

[54]The bar the claimant must satisfy is high. I've got to decide whether the claimant has a pretty good chance of succeeding in the various components of her argument in which she must first establish that she made a protected disclosure and then establish that the principal reason for her dismissal was because she raised a protected disclosure. Necessarily i'm looking at this in summary format and I'm assessing it on the material before me.

[55]I find that the claimant does not have a pretty good chance of succeeding in her claim for automatic unfair dismissal due to whistleblowing. This is for two reasons.a. Firstly, because there is considerable doubt that the protected disclosures are made in the public interest and therefore satisfy the test under Chesterton Global that I have identified in paragraphs 39 to 41 All the protected disclosures appear to be about the claimant’s private workplace dispute, which affect her only. In the protected disclosures the claimant refers to: i. Her own absence due to work related stress; panic attacks that she had started having; an arrangement made for her (‘capping her work to 3 full appointments per week’) being revoked; and concerns about her personal performance plan (17 July 2025 disclosure). ii. A ‘formal grievance’ raised by the claimant ‘to protect her employment and wellbeing’. The claimant refers to her desire to return to work; additional scrutiny that the claimant had been receiving; a drop in the quality of the claimant’s work; an adjustment made for the claimant being revoked and unfair treatment of the claimant (15 August 2025 disclosure). iii. The conduct of the process into the claimant’s grievance; the claimant’s view that the process was unfair; her conﬁdentiality had been breached; she had no trust in the integrity of the investigation and she asked for steps to be taken to ‘ensure her grievance is handled independently…’ (2 October 2025 disclosure). iv. The claimant’s grievances about her own workload, health and/or the handling of her grievances (17 November 2025 disclosure).

b. Secondly, because there is considerable doubt that the alleged protected disclosures were the reason for dismissal. There is evidence, which will need to be tested, that the claimant made a significant number of complaints (according to the respondent contained within 335 emails) over a short period of time (according to the respondent between March and July 1996) and could not accept the outcome of those complaints, which led to a break down in the relationship of trust and confidence between the parties, and this was the reason for her dismissal. On the face of it, this does appear to be a similar scenario to that in Panayiotou v Chief Constable of Hampshire Police referred to in paragraph 36.

[56]The application for interim relief therefore fails because the claimant does not have a pretty good chance of succeeding in the various components of her argument that she made a protected disclosure and that the principal reason for her dismissal was because she raised a protected disclosure for the reasons I have set out in paragraph 55. Approved by: