C Dickinson and Others v RLH Associates Ltd and Others: 2500547/2025 and Others

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 2500547/2025
(1) C Dickinson (2) E Cousins (3) D Reynolds FirstClaimantRLH Associates Ltd and OthersRespondent
Employment Judge ChildeIn person for claimantDate 28 January 2026

JUDGMENT

[1]The second respondent shall pay compensation to:a. The first claimant of £10,743.57 made up as follows: i. A redundancy payment of £4,314.00. ii. £1,892.07 in respect of holidays accrued but not taken. iii. £1,655.38 for notice pay. iv. £1,770.71, in relation to pension contributions. v. A compensatory award of £1,111.41.b. The second claimant of £14,194.83 made up as follows: i. A redundancy payment of £5,033.00. ii. £727.14 in respect of holidays accrued but not taken. iii. £2,661.73 for notice pay. iv. A compensatory award of £1,017.99. v. £1,754.94, in relation to pension contributions. vi. £3,000, in relation to wages that were unlawfully deducted from the second claimant’s pay.c. The third claimant of £13,879.37 made up as follows: i. A redundancy payment of £4,188.45. ii. £2,650.01 for notice pay. iii. A compensatory award of £7,040.91 made up of: 1. £15.00 travel expenses. 2. £102.00 childcare costs. 3. £2,393.40 loss of wages between dismissal and the third claimant starting work in her new role. 4. £4,530.51 difference in earnings between the third claimant’s old role and her new role between February 2025 and January 2026.[2]The figures in 1.a, 1.b, 1.c.i, 1.c.ii, 1.c.iii.1 and 1.c.iii.2 were agreed by the second respondent and the first, second and third claimant respectively.[3]The figures at 1.c.iii.3 and 1.c.iii.4 were not agreed by the parties and I awarded these sums for the reasons I gave at the time. Approved by: Employment Judge Childe 28 January 2026 Note Reasons for the judgment were given orally at the hearing. Written reasons will not be provided unless a party asked for them at the hearing or a party makes a written request within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision.[1]Under section 163 Employment Rights Act 1996 it is determined that the claimants are entitled to a redundancy payment from the second respondent.[2]The first and second claimants’ complaint in respect of holiday pay is well-founded. The second respondent made an unauthorised deduction from the first and second claimants’ wages by failing to pay the claimants for holidays accrued but not taken on the date the claimants’ employment ended.[3]The claimants’ complaint of breach of contract in relation to notice pay contributions against the second respondent is well-founded.[4]The first and second claimants’ complaint of breach of contract in relation to the second respondent failing to pay employer pension contributions to the first and second claimants is well-founded.[5]The first and second claimants’ complaint of breach of contract in relation to sums deducted from wages, ostensibly as employee pension contributions but then not paid into their respective pensions, against the second respondent, is wellfounded.[6]The first and second claimants’ complaint of unauthorised deductions from wages, in that sums were deducted from wages, ostensibly as employee pension contributions but then not paid into their respective pension, against the second respondent, is well-founded.[7]The second respondent made an unauthorised deduction from the first claimant's wages by failing to pay her wages due in her December 2024 salary.[8]The second respondent breached the first claimant's contract of employment by failing to pay her wages due in her December 2024 salary.[9]The claimants’ complaint of unfair dismissal against the second respondent is wellfounded. The claimants were unfairly dismissed.[10]The claimants’ claims against the third respondent are not well founded and are dismissed. Approved by: Employment Judge Childe 10 December 2025 Note Reasons for the judgment were given orally at the hearing. Written reasons will not be provided unless a party asked for them at the hearing or a party makes a written request within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision.[1]I have undertaken preliminary consideration of the second and third respondents’ application for reconsideration of the judgment upholding claims against the second respondent. That application is contained in an email dated 24 December 2025. The Law[2]An application for reconsideration is an exception to the general principle that (subject to appeal on a point of law) a decision of an Employment Tribunal is final. The test is whether it is necessary in the interests of justice to reconsider the judgment (rule 68).[3]Rule 70(2) of the 2024 Rules of Procedure empowers me to refuse the application based on preliminary consideration if there is no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked.[4]The importance of finality was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Ministry of Justice v Burton and anor [2016] EWCA Civ 714 in July 2016 where Elias LJ said that: “the discretion to act in the interests of justice is not open-ended; it should be exercised in a principled way, and the earlier case law cannot be ignored. In particular, the courts have emphasised the importance of finality (Flint v Eastern Electricity Board [1975] ICR 395) which militates against the discretion being exercised too readily; and in Lindsay v Ironsides Ray and Vials [1994] ICR 384 Mummery J held that the failure of a party's representative to draw attention to a particular argument will not generally justify granting a review.”[5]Similarly in Liddington v 2Gether NHS Foundation Trust EAT/0002/16 the EAT chaired by Simler P said in paragraph 34 that: “a request for reconsideration is not an opportunity for a party to seek to re- litigate matters that have already been litigated, or to reargue matters in a different way or by adopting points previously omitted. There is an underlying public policy principle in all judicial proceedings that there should be finality in litigation, and reconsideration applications are a limited exception to that rule. They are not a means by which to have a second bite at the cherry, nor are they intended to provide parties with the opportunity of a rehearing at which the same evidence and the same arguments can be rehearsed but with different emphasis or additional evidence that was previously available being tendered.”[6]In common with all powers under the 2024 Rules, preliminary consideration under rule 70(2) must be conducted in accordance with the overriding objective which appears in rule 3, namely to deal with cases fairly and justly. This includes dealing with cases in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues, and avoiding delay. Achieving finality in litigation is part of a fair and just adjudication. The Application[7]The majority of the points raised by the second and third respondents are attempts to re-open issues of fact on which the Tribunal heard evidence from both sides and made a determination. In that sense they represent a “second bite at the cherry” which undermines the principle of finality. Such attempts have a reasonable prospect of resulting in the decision being varied or revoked only if the Tribunal has missed something important, or if there is new evidence available which could not reasonably have been put forward at the hearing. A Tribunal will not reconsider a finding of fact just because the second or third respondent wishes it had gone in their favour.[8]That broad principle disposes of almost all the points made by the second and third respondents. However, there are some points made which should be addressed specifically.[9]I have considered carefully the points raised by the second and third respondents about the alleged appearance of bias by me in conducting the Tribunal proceedings.[10]Under rule 41 the Tribunal must conduct any hearing in the manner it considers fair, having regard to the overriding objective (referred to in paragraph 6 above).[11]The third respondent makes the point that I asked the third respondent questions about whether he could remember orally promising the second claimant a payment of £3,000. The third respondent suggests that by asking these questions I placed him in an unfair position whilst giving his evidence.[12]I have reflected carefully on the third respondent’s point, and don't agree that by asking the third respondent questions relevant to an issue in dispute, this placed him in an unfair position whilst giving his evidence. It was fair to give the third respondent an opportunity to clarify his evidence on this point, to enable me to determine whether the second claimant was orally promised a payment of £3,000. I was in the best position, having clarified the third respondent’s oral evidence on this point, to determine this factual dispute.[13]The third respondent complains that he was questioned consecutively by all three claimants whilst he gave evidence in the hearing, which the third respondent says gave an appearance of imbalance. I've carefully considered the third respondents point about the appearance of imbalance, and I don’t agree with him for the following reasons:a. The second and third respondents were professionally represented by counsel at the final hearing. The claimants by contrast were litigants in person. If there was an imbalance of power, it was in favour of the second and third respondents.b. The claimants asked relevant and appropriate questions of the third respondent in cross examination. This is standard procedure in a Tribunal hearing. I don’t agree that they were repetitive or inappropriately adversarial as suggested by the third respondent.c. The Tribunal’s note of the hearing records that the second and third respondents’ counsel raised one specific objection to a question asked by the claimants at 1521 on the afternoon of the first day of the hearing. I dismissed this objection as I decided the line questioning was relevant and appropriate and could continue.d. If the second and third respondents’ professional representative considered other questions asked by the claimants were inappropriate, this could have been raised at the time and dealt with but was not.[14]The Tribunal has noticed that the written judgment dated 10 December 2025 (“the Judgment”) did not deal with whether the claims against the first respondent were well founded.[15]The claims against the first respondent, as set out in paragraphs 1 to 9 of the Judgment, are well founded. The second respondent is liable for those claims, as set out in paragraphs 1 to 9 of the Judgment.[16]The remedy hearing remains listed, and the parties must comply with the Case Management Orders issued, to ensure they are prepared for that hearing. Approved by: