Mrs K Lester v The Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police: 2413003/2023
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 2413003/2023
Between
Mrs Kathryn LesterClaimantThe Chief Constable of Greater Manchester PoliceRespondent
Before
Employment Judge LeachIn person for claimantMr G Madgwick (instructed by solicitor) for respondentMiss C Widdet (instructed by Counsel) for respondentDate 29 January 2026
JUDGMENT
[1]All complaints of harassment (section 27 Equality Act 2010) made by the claimant were presented outside of the time limits set by section 123(a) and 140B Equality Act 2010. However it is just and equitable to extend time, under section 123(b) Equality Act 2010, to allow those complaints to be brought.[2]The respondent’s application to strike out some of the complaints of harassment is refused.
REASONS
[1]The final hearing in this matter took place before me on 27-29 January 2026. An oral judgment was given dismissing Mrs Lester’s claims.[2]Subsequently, by email dated 25 February 2026, the respondent made a costs application. Mrs Lester provided a written response, objecting to that application, by email dated 27 February 2026.[3]I consider it is appropriate to determine the application on the papers in order to save further expense to the parties, and to use the Tribunal’s resources in a proportionate way in accordance with the overriding objective. Neither party requested a hearing in their correspondence.[4]At the outset of the final hearing, Mrs Lester was pursuing five allegations of harassment against the respondent. Allegations 2.1.1, 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 Case No: 2413003/2023 2 related to comments allegedly made by DI Cottam. Each alleged comment was something would could, at least arguably, have related to Mrs Lester’s sex. I found in each case that either the comment was not made as alleged, or that it did not amount to harassment.[5]Allegations 2.1.4 and 2.1.5 were qualitatively different. They arose out of the decisions of senior officers not to support that claimant’s application for promotion and to place her on a development plan. Mrs Lester’s evidence appeared to be that both of these matters were retaliatory actions because she had complained about a colleague, DI Threader. At the end of her evidence I asked her to explain to me the basis on which she was asserting that these actions (which were clearly unwanted conduct) related to her sex. Mrs Lester confirmed her evidence that they were retaliatory actions, and that there were not related to her sex. I explained to Mrs Lester that the allegations were before the Tribunal as allegations of harassment related to the protected characteristic of sex, and that if that key part of the test was not met on her own view of the case, she ought to consider overnight whether to proceed with those allegations. The following morning Mrs Lester confirmed that those allegations were withdrawn.[6]The remaining allegations, as I have said, were dismissed in my Judgment given at the conclusion of the hearing.[7]The costs application is somewhat difficult to follow in terms of how it references the list of issues. But I understand the respondent’s position to be that Mrs Lester ought never to have pursued allegations 2.1.4 and 2.1.5 as harassment complaints, or ought to have withdrawn them much earlier, given her evidence at trial. The respondent says her conduct in pursuing them to the point of withdrawal midway through the hearing was unreasonable. It seeks costs in the sum of £4,375.00 representing, it is said, half of the counsel’s fee preparing for the hearing. This is on the basis that if the allegations had been withdrawn at an earlier stage one of the respondent witnesses would not have been needed, the bundle would have been smaller and the hearing time shorter.[8]Rule 74 Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024 sets out a three-stage process to be adopted when the Tribunal is considering a costs application. I must first consider whether Mrs Lester’s conduct falls within the descriptions contained in the rule 74(2) i.e. the gateways. If so, the Tribunal’s costs jurisdiction is engaged, but this does not necessarily mean that an order will be made. I have a discretion, and I must decide whether it is appropriate to exercise that discretion. Finally, if it is appropriate, I must decide the amount of any award in accordance with Rule 76. Rule 82 provides the discretion to take into account the financial means of the paying party, as referred to above.[9]The respondent’s application is pursued under Rule 74(2)(a): Case No: 2413003/2023 3 (a) a party (or that party’s representative) has acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in either the bringing of the proceedings, or part of it, or the way that the proceedings, or part of it, have been conducted.[10]I remind myself that costs are the exception in this jurisdiction and that there is a high threshold in establishing unreasonable behaviour: Gee v Shell UK Ltd [2003] IRLR 82 and Salinas v Bear Stearns International Holdings Inc [2005] ICR 1117.[11]Whilst I have some sympathy with the respondent’s position, I am not prepared to make a finding that Miss Lester has acted unreasonably in the sense required by Rule 74(2).[12]Equality law is complicated. Mrs Lester has come to the Tribunal, as many self-represented litigants do, in the expectation that the Tribunal will be able to conduct a general review of the matters she has complained about and determine that her employer has wronged her. She feels very strongly (and genuinely in my view) that that is the case. Unfortunately for Mrs Lester, the Tribunal has a limited jurisdiction to determine claims which have been set out by the legislature and in respect of which this Tribunal has been given jurisdiction.[13]At preliminary hearings Judges often taken a fairly active role in attempting to help claimants to attach an appropriate ‘legal label’ to the facts that they wish to complain about. Sometimes the Judge gets that wrong. Sometimes there is no appropriate legal label, and the claimant and the Judge alight on something which is adjacent to the matters complained about, but which, ultimately, will not hold up under the scrutiny of a trial. I can only speculate as to how a list of issues was arrived at in this case which did not properly reflect the view that Mrs Lester took of her own case. But it is clear from Mrs Lester’s written response to this application that her understanding was that the Judge at the preliminary hearing had considered all matters in the list if issues to be arguable. Whilst reviewing the merits is not necessarily and exercise which is conducted in a private preliminary hearing, it is not unreasonable for Mrs Lester to have formed the view that she did.[14]I am satisfied that Mrs Lester brought her claim in good faith. The respondent itself accepts that three of the five allegations required to be determined at a final hearing. There is no criticism of how Mrs Lester conducted her case in terms of preparing for the hearing, complying with case management orders and so forth. When my questions drew out the fundamental difficulty with her case in respect of allegations 2.1.4 and 2.1.5 she did not try to shift her position or prevaricate, she simply withdrew. The only criticism that can be levelled at Mrs Lester is that she did not, herself, perceive the difficulty sooner.[15]What is suddenly revealed in the crucible of the final hearing is not necessarily something that will be readily apparent in the fog of preparing for that hearing. That is particularly so for litigants in person, and in Equality Act cases where, as I have said, the law is recognised to be complicated. In all of those circumstances I cannot say that Mrs Lester acted unreasonably, and I am not persuaded that her being a police officer and Case No: 2413003/2023 4 therefore having some familiarity with legal processes makes any difference to that conclusion.[16]For those reasons I have refused the application.[17]Had I considered that Mrs Lester had acted unreasonably, I would have sought further information from her as to her financial means before making any Judgment in favour of the respondent. For that reason, I make no further comment as to the level of award that might have been appropriate had I reached a different conclusion. Approved by: