Employment Judge DunlopIn person for claimantDate 5 December 2025
JUDGMENT
[1]The claimant’s complaint of wrongful dismissal is not well-founded.[2]The claim is dismissed. Approved by JUDGMENT having been given orally on 5 December 2025 (a written Judgment is awaiting promulgation by the Tribunal administration), and written reasons having been requested on 15 December 2025 in accordance with Rule 60(4) of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2024, the following reasons are provided:
REASONS
[1]These are the written reasons for the Tribunal’s judgment sent to the parties on 5 December 2025. Mr Parhair’s sole remaining complaint was one of wrongful dismissal.[2]Mr Parhair was summarily dismissed on 2 November 2023. It is common ground that his contractual notice period was four weeks and that the equivalent gross notice pay would have been £2,461.54. It is also common ground that no notice pay was paid. The respondent’s position was that Mr Parhair was not entitled to notice as he was summarily dismissed for gross misconduct. I had to determine whether the respondent was entitled to summarily dismiss Mr Parhair.
The Hearing
[3]The hearing took place as an in-person hearing at Manchester Employment Tribunal. I was provided with a bundle of documents comprising around 120 pages, which I read in full. The bundle was prepared by the respondent and, after some discussion, Mr Parhair confirmed all relevant documents were before the Tribunal.[4]I heard evidence from Mr Parhair, who had prepared a written witness statement and was cross-examined by Mr Katz.[5]On behalf of the respondent, I heard evidence from Mr Warren O’Donovan, who had been Mr Parhair’s Team Leader at the relevant time, and had been involved in making the decision to dismiss. Mr O’Donovan had also produced a witness statement and was cross-examined by Mr Parhair.
The Issues
[6]The only issue for determination was whether the claimant’s conduct amounted to a repudiatory breach of contract entitling the respondent to dismiss without notice. If it was not, it was agreed that Mr Parhair would be entitled to four weeks’ notice pay in the sum of £2,461.54 gross.
Findings of Fact
[7]The allegations of gross misconduct fall into two categories. In a wrongful dismissal claim (and in contrast to an unfair dismissal claim) I am required to make primary findings of fact about whether the claimant committed the misconduct as alleged.[8]Mr Parhair commenced work for the respondent on 19 January 2023 as an Employment Law Consultant. The role involved taking calls from clients and taking appropriate actions within the respondent’s case management system. If Mr Parhair gave advice, he had to select a particular “advice given” icon within the interface and then summarise the advice given so that it would be stored on the system. Not all incoming calls would require advice to be given, the action might be simply to log information provided by the client, to ask the client for something, or to raise an action for another team to deal with.[9]In this role, Mr Parhair and his colleagues were subject to KPIs and performance against those KPIs was monitored by the respondent. One of the KPIs related to how many times a Consultant “gave advice” during each day, which was identified using the recording process I have described.[10]As to the first category of misconduct, the respondent says that Mr Parhair made entries into its electronic case handling system that were fraudulent or dishonest. Mr Parhair accepts that he made entries that were incorrect. His case about why they were incorrect was somewhat confused at times. He said that he may have made mistakes, and referred to the fact that he was struggling with mental health; that he was working in a pressured environment and that he had not been adequately trained. He also seemed to suggest at other points that the the incorrect entries may have been made by other people, or generated by system errors, rather than being his own mistakes.[11]The background to these incorrect entries was a general background of poor performance by Mr Parhair. He had commenced work in January 2023. His probation had been extended in July 2023, after the initial six month period. It was further extended in October 2023. Both probationary reviews identified problems with the clarity of advice given to clients, and with hitting KPIs.[12]The fact that the respondent extended Mr Parhair’s probation period demonstrated that it was willing to work with employees who did not immediately reach the standards expected in the role. Mr O’Donovan, who was Mr Parhair’s line manager through most of his employment, gave clear evidence about the training and support that Mr Parhair received, which I accept.[13]In late October 2023, an issue was identified which went beyond the poor performance concerns already noted. Mr O’Donovan and Lucy Cobb (who was a new in-coming manager due to replace Mr Donovan as Mr Parhair’s line manager), noticed that the system showed that Mr Parhair had a number of outstanding tasks, which then suddenly disappeared when he was due to leave the office that day. Looking at the records on the electronic case management system, they realised that the Mr Parhair had moved tasks to the following day without contacting the client.[14]The respondent operates service-level agreements (SLAs) with its clients which stipulate minimum service levels such as the time the client can wait for a call-back, or for a substantive response to a query. It appeared to Mr Donovan and Ms Cobb that Mr Parhair was taking actions which would put the respondent in breach of these SLAs.[15]This prompted Mr O’Donovan to review Mr Parhair’s records more generally. He found several instances where Mr Parhair had recorded on the system that he had ‘given advice’ to clients but had not in fact done so. These instances were evidenced in print-outs before the Tribunal. Mr O’Donovan was able to confidently talk through the print-outs explaining what they showed in each case. I found his explanations clear and compelling.[16]In some instances, instead of giving advice, Mr Parhair had done another action, for example asking the client for a document or instigating a handover to a different team. Those things were part of his role, but they did not amount to “giving advice” actions and should not have been recorded as such. In other instances, there was simply a ‘dot’ typed into the space to show what advice would be given.[17]As I have said, giving advice to clients was one of Mr Parhair’s KPIs. Recording that he had given advice when, in actual fact, he had not, would inflate his KPI figures. Separately, the respondent’s system would indicate that clients were receiving a service when they had not received that service. I fully accept that that is a serious matter, I understand why Mr O’Donovan and Ms Cobb were concerned. This was not something that could wait until the next probationary review (which was the approach that Mr Parhair suggested should have been taken).[18]However, in considering whether this can properly be regarded as gross misconduct, amounting to a repudiatory breach of the contract and justifying summary dismissal, I consider that I must decide whether these actions were deliberate or accidental. Mr Parhair says that he was accidentally making incorrect recordings on the system and that that ought properly to be viewed as a capability issue and not a gross misconduct issue, and he would therefore be entitled to his notice pay. I agree with that analysis, but only if Mr Parhair is correct that this conduct was accidental. That is a question I will return to.[19]A meeting was held on 2 November 2023 by Mr O’Donovan and Ms Cobb, to put the allegations to Mr Parhair. Mr Parhair could not provide an explanation for the entries which satisfied his managers. It is agreed that Mr Parhair left the meeting and refused to engage with further attempts to question him about the incorrect entries. Mr O’Donavan says that Mr Parhair stormed off, shouting, and saying “I am not doing this” before taking his belongings and leaving. Mr O’Donovan was clear that Mr Parhair did not swear, but Mr O’Donovan regarded his actions was unprofessional and abrupt. Mr Parhair’s account is that he began to feel severely unwell, that he stood to leave and informed his managers he was too ill to continue. He says that both the managers shouted at him and were aggressive and intimidating.[20]The failure of this meeting is a demonstration of why it is often wise to make sure that employees facing serious allegations are given an indication of what a meeting will be about before they attend, even if they have insufficient service to benefit from statutory protection. I accept that Mr Parhair did shout, and did say “I am not doing this” and that this was reflective of his distressed mental state at the time. I make no findings as to the actions of the managers because I am not required to do so. Legal principles, analysis and conclusions[21]Absent repudiatory breach, an employer who dismisses an employee must pay contractual notice. The question is not whether conduct is labelled gross misconduct, but whether it demonstrates a deliberate intention to disregard the essential requirements of the contract. This is a claim requiring primary findings of fact. The burden rests on the respondent once dismissal and non‑payment are established: Hovis Ltd v Louton UKEAT 1023/20.[22]Two allegations of misconduct are relied on by the respondent, firstly Mr Parhair’s actions in wrongly recording that advice had been given to clients on several occasions when it had not been. Secondly, his actions in “storming out” of the meeting on the 2 November.[23]Dealing with the first matter; as I have alluded to above, the key question is whether Mr Parhair acted deliberately (and therefore dishonestly) in making the recordings that his did. The burden of proof is on the respondent to show that there was such dishonesty. They are asserting that there was, in order to make good their defence in relation to his claim. Mr Parhiar need only show that he was dismissed (which he was), and that he was not paid for his contractual notice period (which he wasn’t).[24]Mr O’Donovan’s evidence was careful and considered. He explained the training that Mr Parhair had undertaken and the reasons why the “advice given” log was known to be important by everyone in the business. He explained that it would be impossible for anyone else, other than Mr Parhair, to have made the notification that advice had been given and for the ‘dot’ to have appeared in the dialogue box for reasons other than that Mr Parhair had put it there. Mr O’Donovan’s explanations today are consistent with his actions as a manager – when there was a capability issue, this was logged and addressed in line with the probation review system. The issue that came to light in November were qualitatively different from the background performance concerns.[25]Set against Mr O’Donovan’s evidence, I have Mr Parhiar’s evidence. I don’t draw any adverse inferences from Mr Parhair’s failure to explain himself in the meeting on 2 November – which I will come to as a separate issue below. I accept that he was faced with serious allegations without warning and that he was suffering from mental health difficulties. What is more difficult for me to understand is Mr Parhair’s failure to address the allegation of dishonestly fully and convincingly in his witness statement for these proceedings – which he had plenty of time to prepare – and in his oral evidence today. When asked for an explanation, he repeatedly tried to deflect the question. Such explanations as were eventually given were vague and confusing and, at times, contradictory.[26]Weighing up all the evidence I have heard, I am satisfied that the respondent has shown that the entries referred to were made dishonestly, and that by doing so Mr Parhair did commit gross misconduct, entitling the respondent to dismiss him without notice.[27]For completeness, I return to the fact that the respondent also relied on Mr Parhair’s conduct in the 2 November meeting as being a separate instance of gross misconduct, also justifying dismissal.[28]On the basis of the facts I have found I would conclude that Mr Parhair’s actions on 2 November did not amount to gross misconduct. His reaction was unprofessional and disruptive, but not abusive. It has to be seen in the context of a “surprise” meeting (as he put it) where very serious allegations were being put to him. It demonstrates that he was under emotional stress but does not, of itself, show any intention to repudiate the contract.[29]Of course, that finding does not change the fact that I have found that the incorrect entries amounted to gross misconduct in themselves. I am also satisfied that they were the primary reason for the summary dismissal, and that Mr Parhair would have been summarily dismissed following the meeting on 2 November even if he had acted professionally throughout that meeting. In those circumstances, the claim must fail. Approved by:
Introduction
[1]The claimant commenced work for the respondent in January 2023. He was summarily dismissed in November 2023. On 8 December 2023 he presented a claim to the Tribunal raising complaints of wrongful dismissal (i.e. a claim for notice pay) and discrimination of grounds of disability.[2]There was an initial preliminary hearing for case management and then a public preliminary hearing held on 23 May 2025 to determine whether the claimant was a disabled person within the meaning of s.6 Equality Act 2010. Employment Judge Eeley found that he was not. The only claim which proceeded to trial, therefore, was the wrongful dismissal claim.[3]In an oral judgment given on 5 December 2025 I determined that Mr Parhiar had committed gross misconduct, and that the respondent was entitled to summarily dismiss him. Written reasons for that decision were requested and sent to the parties on 24 February 2026.[4]On 15 December 2024, the respondent applied for its costs, the application being supported by a schedule of costs totalling £12,928.44 (inclusive of VAT).[5]This was a CVP hearing listed to determine the costs application.
The Hearing
[6]The hearing was conducted in two phases. Firstly, I heard from the parties as to whether a costs order was appropriate in principle. Mr Mahmood wished to cross examine Mr Parhiar on some of the documents in the bundle in respect of that decision, and I allowed him to do so for a limited time period. Having heard from both parties, I informed them that I had determined that a costs order was appropriate in principle, and that I would then hear about Mr Parhiar’s financial means in order to determine the appropriate amount of the order. (I emphasised that it was still possible, at that point, that my final decision would be to make no order at all.)[7]The bundle prepared by the respondent contained correspondence indicating that the respondent had (properly) informed Mr Parhiar in advance of the hearing that his means may be taken into account in the Tribunal’s decision as regards to costs, and had invited him to submit any evidence that he wished to as to his means for inclusion in the bundle. Mr Parhiar had submitted very limited information about benefits he had received. He had declined to submit his bank statements, and had told the respondent that he would only do so if ordered to by the Tribunal.[8]At the outset of the hearing, I explained that the Tribunal had a discretion to take into the claimant’s financial means, and that if Mr Parhiar wished to argue that a costs order would be difficult for him to pay, or would cause him financial hardship, the onus was on him to provide evidence supporting that assertion. We had a 25 minute break whilst I considered the ‘in principle’ determination, and I invited Mr Parhiar to produce further documents during that adjournment, which he did, as discussed further below.[9]Following the adjournment I announced my determination that a costs order was appropriate in principle, and heard evidence (including cross examination) from Mr Parhiar on his means, I then heard submissions again from both sides as to the question of quantum of the order, before giving a short oral Judgment.[10]Mr Parhiar attempted to re-argue the case following my Judgment, which he was evidently very unhappy with. I informed the parties that I would provide a full written Judgment to enable Mr Parhiar to consider his position and to take any subsequent steps he considered to be necessary. Relevant Legal Principles[11]Rule 74 Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024 sets out a threestage process to be adopted when the Tribunal is considering a costs application. I must first consider whether the claimant’s conduct falls within the descriptions contained in the rule 74(2) i.e. the gateways. If so, the Tribunal’s costs jurisdiction is engaged, but this does not necessarily mean that an order will be made. I have a discretion, and I must decide whether it is appropriate to exercise that discretion. Finally, if it is appropriate, I must decide the amount of any award in accordance with Rule 76. Rule 82 provides the discretion to take into account the financial means of the paying party, as referred to above.[12]The respondent’s application is pursued under two of the available ‘costs gateways’ set out in Specifically:(a) a party (or that party’s representative) has acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in either the bringing of the proceedings, or part of it, or the way that the proceedings, or part of it, have been conducted.(b) any claim, response or reply had no reasonable prospect of success.[13]I remind myself that costs are the exception in this jurisdiction and that there is a high threshold in establishing unreasonable behaviour: Gee v Shell UK Ltd [2003] IRLR 82 and Salinas v Bear Stearns International Holdings Inc [2005] ICR 1117.[14]I also remind myself of Yerrakalva v Barnsley Metropolitan Council [2012] ICR 240 which establishes that costs awarded need not be directly attributable to the impugned conduct, but that I must take into account the nature, gravity and effect of the unreasonable conduct, and ensure that I am looking at the whole picture. Submissions, discussion and conclusions Gateway – unreasonable conduct[15]This assertion relied on the claimant’s conduct, evidenced in inter-partes correspondence, of failing to comply with case management orders to prepare the case for final hearing. It is worth noting that it is a very rare for a case to come before this Tribunal for final hearing in circumstances where both parties have fully complied with all the case management orders in a timely way. The costs jurisdiction is not intended to be invoked in ‘run of the mill’ cases where there have been delays or other minor difficulties in getting a case ready for hearing, particularly where the party at fault is a litigant in person. However, I agree with the respondent that Mr Parhiar’s default goes beyond that sort of difficulty.[16]In autumn 2024 the respondent made an Unless Order application, pointing out that it still did not know the case it had to meet and that medical evidence had not been provided after long delays. These matters were ultimately resolved and case management orders for the final hearing were set out by Employment Judge Eeley. Again, however, the claimant failed to comply in a wholesale way, leading to the respondent sending a great deal of ‘chasing’ correspondence and ultimately completing disclosure and preparing the final hearing bundle on a unilateral basis. During correspondence in relation to witness statements, the claimant send a brief email on 10 October 2025 merely stating “I have nothing to exchange”. The respondent therefore also sent its statement on a unilateral basis.[17]On 17 November 2025 the respondent sent a details costs warning letter to Mr Parhiar asserting both that the claim appeared to be without merit and that, by failing to comply with case management orders, Mr Parhiar appeared to be failing to actively pursue it.[18]In response, Mr Parhiar sent a detailed one-page letter setting out a without prejudice save as to costs offer of £1,750.00 (as against the full value of the notice pay claim of just under £2,500.00). It was apparent from that letter that the main points relied on by Mr Parhiar were allegations of procedural unfairness.[19]In a further letter dated 25 November 2025, the respondent rejected this offer and made its own ‘drop hands’ offer again, on a without prejudice save as to costs basis. This offer pointed out, correctly, that the procedural allegations would not be relevant to the Tribunal’s determination of the wrongful dismissal claim. This point was expanded upon in a further letter of 26 November, setting out excerpts from the ACAS website and from the Practical Law publication in support of the respondent’s proposition. Mr Parhiar’s terse response was “See you in the tribunal”. Following this exchange, however, he did provide a witness statement.[20]Mr Parhiar acknowledged today that he did not comply with case management orders and blamed his mental health conditions. He asserted repeatedly that he had provided evidence of these. However, all that has been provided is proof that he has been prescribed a wide range of medications, some of which are used in cases of depression and/or anxiety. There has never been any medical evidence to state that Mr Parhiar was unable to comply with the case management orders, either generally, or within a particular time scale. He never asked for any extensions or gave indications that he was seeking to comply with the orders but struggling to do so (at least in the period between the second preliminary hearing and the final hearing). He has taken no responsibility for advancing his claim.[21]In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the gateway condition at 74(2)(a) is met, and I there “must” consider making a costs order. Gateway – no reasonable prospect of success[22]As explained in my written reasons for the Judgment dismissing the claim, the issue before the Tribunal was narrow – had Mr Parhiar acted in a way such as to entitle the respondent to summarily dismiss him? The issues of procedural fairness which Mr Parhiar tried to raise were entirely irrelevant (as the respondent had tried to inform him from at least 25/26 November).[23]I agreed with Mr Parhiar that the question of whether his actions amounted to gross misconduct depended on whether he had acted honestly or dishonestly in making the recordings that he did on the respondent’s case management system. Although Mr Parhiar argued that his claim was not weak, as the Tribunal had refused to strike it out at an earlier stage, my Judgment is that, from the Tribunal’s perspective, there was a need to hear evidence in order for a determination to be made regarding the dishonesty question.[24]However, Mr Parhiar has known all along what his position is about dishonesty, and the evidence that he would be able to give. I refer to paragraph 25 of my earlier written reasons. Specifically, Mr Parhiar chose to give no explanation for his conduct in his witness statement and, in oral evidence, attempted to deflect the question before giving answers which were vague, confusing and contradictory.[25]I am satisfied that Mr Parhiar must have known from the outset that he had no real answer to the allegation of misconduct. That is why his arguments in the without prejudice letters focused on the procedural points, which were irrelevant. Although acting in person, Mr Parhiar is not an unsophisticated litigant. He works in the field of employment relations advice. Even if (which I doubt) he was unable to work out for himself that this was a hopeless claim, he definitely ought to have been able to work that out when he received the respondent’s detailed without prejudice letters.[26]In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the second ‘gateway’ relied on the respondent (Rule 74 (2)(b)) is also made out. Again, that means that I “must” consider whether to award costs. Discretion[27]I next ask myself whether, in principle, it is appropriate to award costs in respect of the unreasonable conduct I have identified.[28]My conclusion in this case is that it would be, subject to an assessment of the claimant’s means.[29]The claimant’s unreasonable conduct and pursuit of an unmeritorious claim is not an isolated matter, it has infected the whole course of this case, at least from the second preliminary hearing. The respondent has borne not only the usual costs associated with defending a claim, but the additional costs of having to chase the claimant and make applications to the Tribunal due to his default. The claimant has shown no insight into his actions, repeatedly arguing today that the respondent should have chosen to pay him off rather than spending larger sums on legal representation. Whilst the Employment Tribunals encourage settlement, there can be absolutely no criticism of an employer who chooses to pursue a defence and proves entirely justified in doing so. Amount of Award[30]Having been invited to produce further documents during the adjournment, Mr Parhiar produced two documents. The first was a witness statement (which had not been requested, but was admitted with the respondent’s agreement) entitled ‘Financial Circumstances Statement’. This set out that Mr Parhiar’s only source of income is £340 job seeker’s allowance per month. It then set out his expenses including a mortgage payment, utilities, council tax, groceries, motoring costs, insurance and child maintenance. According to the statement, Mr Parhiar’s outgoings amounted to approximately £2,000 per month, and therefore exceeded his income by more than £1,500 per month. He also referred to having outstanding credit card debt of around £600.[31]The second document produced by Mr Parhiar was a bank statement for the month of February. It was very difficult to align the story told by the witness statement with that which appeared to be told by the bank statement:31.1 The bank statement showed an opening balance of £4,790, which was surprising given the huge gap between his income and out-goings that Mr Parhiar had portrayed.31.2 On 2 February there was a £1,000 transfer to another account, also in Mr Parhiar’s name. Mr Parhiar said that he used the second account for groceries etc. No statement was produced from that second account.31.3£520 was paid in on 10 February as a Post Office deposit. Mr Parhiar said this was a loan from his brother.31.4£1,368.06 was paid in on 26 February from Anchor Hanover Group. When questioned, Mr Parhiar said that this was income from temporary work. His witness statement had made no mention of temporary work. He said this was because it had now finished.31.5 There was no evidence of money from benefits moving into the account, nor of money for a mortgage payment, child maintenance nor many of the other outgoings claimed by Mr Parhiar moving out of it.31.6 The balance of the account at the end of the month was £4,750.14 – almost identical to the opening balance.[32]I recognise that Mr Parhiar may not have been able to put his hands on all of his financial documentation within the timescale of a 25-minute adjournment. However, I nonetheless find that he has been disingenuous in the way he has chosen to present evidence about his financial means to the Tribunal. The witness statement he provided was not a full and frank account of his means, as it did not account for the significant sums accrued in his Lloyds Bank Account. I do not consider that I can place any weight on Mr Parhiar’s evidence about his income and outgoings at all, given the discrepancies between the witness statement and the very limited documentary evidence he has produced.[33]Does that then mean that the respondent should be entitled to receive the full £12,928.44 claimed in the schedule? In my judgment, the answer to that question is ‘no’ for reasons I will outline.[34]Firstly, a significant proportion of the costs claimed in the schedule relate directly to the second preliminary hearing in front of EJ Eeley. That hearing dealt with Mr Parhiar’s disability discrimination claim. I have not found, and would have no basis on which to find, that Mr Parhiar’s disability discrimination claim was without reasonable prospects of success (of course, I recognise it was unsuccessful as a result of EJ Eeley’s determination that he was not disabled, but that does not mean that the case had no reasonable prospects from the outset). Equally, whilst the respondent has alluded to concerns with the claimant’s conduct of the case prior to that hearing it has not presented the detailed evidence of noncompliance that has been presented in relation to the period after that hearing. In those circumstances, I do not consider that it would be just to make a costs order in respect of the costs of the initial phases of the litigation, up to and including that hearing.[35]The only costs claimed in respect of the later phase of the litigation is 28.78 hours of solicitor time preparing for the final hearing. This amounts to £5,468.20, or £6,561.84 inclusive of VAT. I understand the reason why no costs are claimed for representation or attendance at the final hearing is because the respondent is part of the Peninsula Group, and the representation was brought back in-house and undertaken by Peninsula staff.[36]I would be prepared to award the full amount of £6,561.84, subject to giving consideration to the claimant’s means, on the basis that the amount claimed is inevitably significantly less than the ‘true’ cost to the respondent of mounting a full defence of the claim at a final hearing, notwithstanding that that task was ultimately brought back in house.[37]I am aware, however, that £6,561.84 is a lot of money for almost anyone. Even if Mr Parhiar has not been honest with me as to the extent of his impecuniosity, I consider it unlikely that it is a sum that he could come up with without significant hardship, given his employment history and the wage he was earning with the respondent. On that basis, I have determined that the appropriate amount to award is £3,500.00. I recognise that that is still a very significant amount for most workers today, however, it is also within the level of the funds that Mr Parhiar appears to have available to him on the basis of the credit balance of the bank account he has disclosed. Further, it is around six weeks’ net earnings at his earnings rate whilst he was working with the respondent, and it is to be hoped that he can obtain further employment at a similar level, enabling him to meet this obligation. Approved by: