Mr J Bonnsain v Barclays Bank UK plc: 2412198/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2412198/2023

Between

Mr J BonnsainClaimant

Barclays Bank UK plcRespondent

Before

Employment Judge McDonald

Representing himself for claimant

Mr L Harris (instructed by counsel) for respondent

Date 13 March 2026

JUDGMENT

[1]The claimant’s complaints of unfavourable treatment because of something arising in consequence of disability at 7.2.1, 7.2.2 of the List of Issues are dismissed on withdrawal.

[2]The complaint at 7.2.3 of the List of Issues is dismissed on withdrawal insofar as it relates to failing to adjust time on numerical or timed verbal reasoning tests as part of appointment or promotion but not insofar as it relates to mandatory training.

[3]The claimant’s complaints of failure to make reasonable adjustments in relation to the PCPs at 8.1.1, 8.1.3 and 8.1.4 of the List of Issues are dismissed on withdrawal.

[4]The claimant’s complaint of failure to make reasonable adjustments in relation to the PCP at 8.1.5 of the List of Issues is dismissed on withdrawal insofar as it relates to failing to adjust time on numerical or timed verbal reasoning tests as part of appointment or promotion but not insofar as it relates to mandatory training. Case Number: 2412198/2023

[5]The complaint of a failure to make reasonable adjustments by failing to provide an auxiliary aid (8.6 on the List of Issues) is dismissed on withdrawal.

[6]All the claimant’s other complaints fail and are dismissed. Approved by: JUDGMENT was approved by the Tribunal on 13 March 2026 and sent to the parties on 27 April 2026. Oral summary reasons having been given at the hearing and written reasons having been requested in accordance with Rule 60 of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure, the following summary written reasons are provided: WRITTEN SUMMARY REASONS Introduction

[1]These are summary reasons for our judgment. We gave oral reasons for our judgment and the parties have requested those summary reasons in writing within the required time limit. The Employment Judge apologises that his absence from the Tribunal has led to a delay in providing these written reasons.

[2]Rule 60 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 require that these reasons provide a brief explanation of why the Tribunal has reached its decision in respect of each issue. That means we will not set out all our findings of fact the relevant law and everything that happened at the hearing. Instead, we will set out those findings of fact relevant to determining the issues and our reasons for determining the issues in the way that we did. The reasons are not a verbatim transcript of those given orally. We have in some places amended the wording to correct typos or grammar, remove duplication and to make the reasons read more clearly. The substantive content of the reasons is the same as that in the oral reasons. We have added headings to make the reasons easier to follow.

[3]The issues in the case are set out in the final list of issues agreed at the preliminary hearing on 16 December 2025. In these reasons we will refer to the numbering in that list of issues.

[4]It is important to stress that it is those specific issues identified in the list of issues which we are deciding. It is not our function to decide whether the allegations made against the claimant in the disciplinary process are substantiated, our role is to decide whether the conduct of those named by the claimant in his allegations amount to discrimination, victimisation or other breaches of the Equality Act 2010 or to breaches of the whistleblowing provisions in the Employment Rights Act 1996.

[5]We deal with the issues in a different order to that set out in the list of issues. There are 3 reasons for that. First, we deal with the issue of time limits at the end of our reasons. To decide those time limit issues we have first to decide whether any of the discrimination and whistleblowing complaints succeed and whether they amount to continuing acts. Without doing that we cannot decide whether and when the relevant time limit begins to run. It makes sense therefore to address time limits after we have set out our reasons in relation to the substantive complaints. Second, it seems to us to make sense to deal with the claimant’s allegations of direct race and religion discrimination in Section 6 of the list of issues first. Those allegations relate to how Newton Mills (“Mr Mills”) and Lauren Holt (“Ms Holt”) carried out the investigation into the claimant and the contents of the investigation report prepared by Mr Mills. As well as forming the basis of the direct discrimination complaints in Section 6 of the list of issues and the allegation of race and/or religion related harassment in 5.1.6 of the List of Issues the claimant relied on what he says are flaws in the investigation and report as evidence relevant to passing of the burden of proof. In essence, his case was that the discrimination in that initial investigation tainted and corrupted the steps that followed. Third, it seems to us clearer if we deal with the allegations as much as possible in chronological order, even if that involves jumping from one part of the list of issues on occasion.

[6]We start then with our findings of fact about the investigation and the investigation report. As these are summary reasons, we will not set out our findings of fact in relation to all the evidence we heard. The claimant’s selection for investigation

[7]In short, the investigation into the claimant emerged from a project by the respondent investigating possible inappropriate access to customer accounts by its staff through the FullServe System. None of the claimant’s complaints in the case are about the process by which the long list of employees to potentially be investigated were identified. That was, as he acknowledged, data driven. At phase two of the FullServe project a filter was applied which resulted in twenty-six cases being identified for desk top review by the Central Security Office (“CSO”). Those cases included the claimant’s. Those twentysix cases were then the subject of a desk top review by CSO which allocated the cases into four categories, the claimant was placed in the category prioritised for further investigation. The claimant does not dispute that he did access a number of customer accounts via the FullServe system. There were no recorded consents for him to do so on the system.

[8]There is no complaint as part of this case that the claimant’s selection as a priority for further investigation was in itself a discriminatory act. However, it was part of the claimant’s case that the results of the desktop review pointed to the methodology or its application by Mr Mills and/or Ms Holt being discriminatory. That is potentially relevant to whether the burden of proof passes.

[9]When it comes to that the claimant’s submission was that of the 5 members of staff identified for further investigation (4 as a result of the phase two desktop review and 1 as a result of phase one) 3 had the surname Hussain. That included the claimant, whose surname that was at the time. The claimant said that pointed to there being an element of race or religion discrimination in the process.

[10]The methodology involved in the desktop review was explained in Mr Mills’s report at page 2435 in the bundle. We find that methodology relied on objective criteria. We also accept Mr Harris’s submission that Hussain is a relatively common name. We find the use of the objective criteria and the small numbers involved means the appearance of the same name 3 times in the group prioritised for investigation does not provide sufficient basis for finding that the review (and by extension Mr Mills or Ms Holt’s conduct in carrying it out) was tainted by discrimination on racial or religious grounds.

[11]The claimant also suggested that the outcome of the disciplinary process in relation to the 5 staff identified for further investigation pointed to race or religious discrimination. The 2 members of staff whose surname was not Hussain received a letter of education and a final written warning respectively. In contrast, the claimant submitted, Nasar Hussain was dismissed and Fatima Hussain resigned under investigation. We do not accept that submission helps the claimant in establishing that the actions of Ms Holt and Mr Mills were tainted by discrimination. The first reason for that is that it was not Mr Mills or Ms Holt who decided on the disciplinary outcomes. Once the investigations were completed, they were handed over to the Disciplinary, Capability and Grievance process (“DCG”). The disciplinary outcomes decided on cannot therefore assist in assessing the conduct of Mr Mills and Ms Holt. Second, we do not know what the disciplinary outcome would have been in Fatima Hussain’s case because she resigned under investigation. We also do not know what the disciplinary outcome would have been or will be in the claimant’s case. That leaves only 3 cases in which the disciplinary outcomes are known. We find that is too small a number to give rise to a reliable finding that the outcomes were tainted by race or religion discrimination. The meeting on 18 January 2023

[12]Moving on then to our findings about the investigation meetings themselves. The first of those was on 18 January 2023. There were no specific complaints in the list of issues about Mr Mills and Ms Holt’s conduct at that meeting. However, in evidence the claimant made some specific allegations about what happened at that meeting. We record our findings about that meeting because they are relevant to our findings about the later conduct of Mr Mills and Ms Holt which are the basis for complaints in the list of issues.

[13]First of all, we accept the claimant found that meeting very distressing. On the face of it the notes of that meeting taken by Ms Holt at pages 288 to 296 suggest that Mr Mills took care to establish the claimant was fully able to participate in the meeting. The notes record the claimant explaining about his Dyslexia and saying that he had hit his head a week earlier. They record Mr Mills checking whether the claimant wanted to pause the meeting so he could seek medical advice and the claimant saying he did not. They also record Mr Mills checking whether the claimant wanted a companion to attend with him and the claimant saying he did not. When the claimant became distressed and stated that he needed time to pull himself together the notes record Mr Mills saying that they could reschedule if the claimant could not carry on with the meeting. When the notes record the claimant becoming tearful and referring to the emotional turmoil he had recently undergone and expressing thoughts of self-harm the notes record Mr Mills asking the claimant to fetch his husband. Mr Mills is then recorded in the notes as explaining to the claimant’s husband that he wanted to ensure the claimant had support for his wellbeing. He asks for the claimant’s husband’s contact details so the respondent can contact him if they cannot make contact with the claimant.

[14]The claimant during his evidence at the Tribunal suggested the notes were incomplete and presented a distorted picture of what had actually happened at the meeting. Specifically, he said that at the start of the meeting he told Mr Mills that he thought he might be concussed and that Mr Mills said something like “you sound or look lucid to me”. The claimant said that he showed Mr Mills the head injury he had recently sustained. He also said that rather than being supportive when he became tearful after the break, Mr Mills had said that they had to continue with the interview because it was already booked in.

[15]Mr Mills and Ms Holt’s evidence was that the notes were an accurate record of what happened at that meeting. We do prefer their evidence. We found both to be credible witnesses and their evidence reliable. We also found their versions of events more consistent with the documentation in the bundle than the claimant’s. We found the first and only mention of concussion by the claimant in the documentation was at the disciplinary hearing on 18 April 2024 at page 1084. Concussion is not referred to for example in the occupational health report on 30 January 2023 which is at page 1270. That report was obtained in the wake of the initial fact-finding meeting on 18 January. We have taken into account the picture of the claimant’s head injury which was admitted in evidence during this Tribunal hearing without objection from the respondent. Without wanting in any way to minimise the injury the claimant suffered, the photograph shows a wound which is in the claimant’s hairline. As at the date of the picture, which was taken a week before the meeting, we find the wound is not immediately evident except in close up. It seems to us reasonable to assume that it would have further healed to some degree in the week to the meeting so that it would not have been obvious to Mr Mills and Ms Holt on screen during the Teams meeting on18 January. We do not find the injury was so obviously serious from a visual point of view as to cause Mr Mills not to accept the claimant’s confirmation that he was able to continue at face value.

[16]We also find the description of Mr Mills’s behaviour during the meeting given by the claimant to be wholly inconsistent with the claimant’s actions immediately after the meeting. The day after the meeting Mr Yorston at page 342 reported that the claimant wanted to continue with the meeting. It was Mr Mills we find who raised concerns about continuing with the process given the claimant’s state of mind. It was also Mr Mills who suggested (at page 350) that there needed to be engagement with occupational health before the fact find continued.

[17]We therefore prefer the account of the meeting on 18 January 2023 given by Mr Mills and Ms Holt, and we find the notes of that meeting are reliable. They capture Mr Mills being very mindful of his duty of care towards the claimant. Although we accept that the meeting caused the claimant genuine distress we do not find anything to criticise in the way Mr Mills or Ms Holt conducted that meeting. They recognised the claimant’s distress and acted accordingly. We do not accept that Mr Mills said that the meeting had been booked and so that they had to carry on when the claimant became distressed. The alleged acts of race and religion discrimination at 6.2

[18]The 18 January 2023 meeting provides the background to the complaints of discrimination in the list of issues.

[19]Turning first to the direct race or religion discrimination complaints at Section 6 of that list. The alleged acts of discrimination are set out at 6.2.1-6.2.4. For each, the issues we need to decide are whether the alleged treatment occurred and whether the claimant was treated less favourably than a comparator in the same material circumstances but of a different race or perceived religion would have been treated. Although the claimant had originally indicated he was relying on the actual comparators set out at 6.4.1 to 6.4.3. he confirmed during the hearing he was relying only on a hypothetical comparator. It is clear from the unchallenged evidence relating to the named comparators in Karen Johnson’s witness statement that they were not in the same material circumstances as the claimant.

[20]The first allegation of direct discrimination is that at 6.2.1. The respondent accepted that factually the treatment did occur in the sense that Mr Mills accepted in evidence he did read the notes on the case management system relating to the previous investigation in 2018. The key question in relation to this allegation is therefore whether there was less favourable treatment of the claimant because of his race or religion. In deciding this issue, we apply the burden of proof provisions in Section 136 of the Equality Act 2010. That means the burden is initially on the claimant to show facts from which we could conclude that the alleged breach of the Equality Act 2010 had taken place. During the hearing the claimant said that his “instinct” was that the conduct he experienced was because of his race or religion. That is clearly not sufficient to pass the burden. The claimant must prove facts from which we could conclude that the direct discrimination has occurred.

[21]As this is a summary judgment we will not set out the law in full. However, a key principle is that when it comes to what is required to pass the burden at the first stage, there must be “something more” than a difference in the relevant protected characteristic of the claimant and the hypothetical comparator and the difference in treatment. That said, the “something more” required at the first stage need not be a great deal. What the case law also makes clear (e.g. in Glasgow City Council -v- Zafar

[1998] ICR 120

) is that a finding that an employer has behaved unreasonably or treated an employee badly will not be sufficient in itself to cause the burden of proof to shift.

[22]Turning to this specific allegation we find that the relevant hypothetical comparator was a member of staff identified as being within the twenty-six cases for desktop review who did not share the claimant’s race or perceived religion. We find that Mr Mills would have checked the case notes of the previous investigations into such a hypothetical comparator. The existence of a previous investigation was one of the criteria applied in the desktop review. There is indeed evidence that Mr Mills did do so in relation to employees called Fisque page 2436, and then Goppolan at page 2436. The claimant did not produce any explicit evidence to support a finding that Mr Mills looked at the case record of the 2018 investigation in his case because of his race or religion. We have considered whether there are other facts which could lead to the burden of proof passing. We have already explained why we do not find that the claimant’s selection and the composition of the group of 5 prioritised for investigation is sufficient to pass the burden of proof.

[23]In terms of other facts which could lead to the burden passing, the claimant refererred to Mr Mills clearly knowing his ethnicity and making enquiries about whether he had accessed accounts while abroad in Pakistan. We find that he did so because Mr Yorston had told him and Ms Holt that the claimant had been in Pakistan for a period around that time. In the context of the investigation which was being carried out into access to customer accounts which started from the claimant having made undisputed multiple accesses to customer accounts we find it was a reasonable investigative step for Mr Mills to take and not something which points to discrimination. If we are wrong and the burden did pass, we find that the explanation given for Mr Mills viewing the CMS record of the previous investigation is an adequate nondiscriminatory one. Previous investigation was, as we have said, one of the relevant triage criteria. It made sense in assessing the claimant’s conduct to view the record of that previous investigation to decide its relevance, for example, whether it had resulted in a finding of “no case to answer”. In this case it had, and Mr Mills recorded that in his report on the desktop review process in December 2022. What we find in relation to this allegation therefore is that although the treatment alleged did occur there was no less favourable treatment because of race or perceived religion.

[24]For the sake of completeness, we accept Mr Mills’s evidence that the alleged remark by an individual working in the CSO office recorded in 6.2.1 was not recorded on the CMS system. The claimant’s own case was the remark relating to money laundering for Islamic terrorists was made verbally. As such we find that Mr Mills was not aware of the alleged comment and so it could not have influenced his actions in any way.

[25]Allegation 6.2.2 relates to Mr Mills and Ms Holt’s conduct at the fact finding meetings on May 9th and May 10th. The allegation is about their hostile body language in response to the claimant’s referencing his culture and heritage.

[26]We accept (and it was not disputed) that there were such references, they are recorded in the notes taken by Ms Holt. When it comes to this allegation we have to make a finding of fact about whether there was the hostile body language alleged. That means assessing the relative credibility of the witnesses. As we have said, we found Mr Mills and Ms Holt to be credible witnesses and their evidence reliable. Their clear evidence was that they displayed no hostile body language. We found the claimant’s evidence less reliable. In cross examining the witnesses during this hearing, the claimant said that it was “his perception” that they displayed hostile body language. We accept there may be something in Mr Harris’s suggestion that given the meetings were on Teams and Ms Holt was taking notes and so looking down occasionally at her keyboard the claimant may have misinterpreted that as her rolling her eyes. Our fundamental and central finding about this allegation however is that neither Mr Mills nor Ms Holt displayed any hostile body language as alleged.

[27]We also base that finding on the fact that their evidence is more consistent with the documentation in the bundle. We have already said that we found the notes taken by Ms Holt of the meeting of 18 January to be reliable as a record of events. We find the same for the record of the meetings on 9 and 10 May 2023. The claimant himself confirmed the accuracy of the notes in his emails to Mr Mills on 17 May 2018, (page 418) and when he made additional points in his emails (pages 414 and 416). Although he made additional points in those emails, he did not suggest that the note of what happened at the meeting was inaccurate. We accept, of course, that those notes would not record body language however the interactions recorded in the notes seem to us wholly inconsistent with the allegation. That relates in particular to the positive comments made by the claimant at the end of the meeting (page 412).

[28]The claimant did not raise the hostile body language allegation until his grievance on 18 July 2023. That is over two months after the meetings. During the Tribunal hearing the claimant suggested that he acquiesced with Mr Mills’s version of events and did not challenge at the time what was done at the meeting because Mr Mills was his “abuser”. We do not accept that explanation. The claimant emailed Barclays Whistleblowing Team on 26 June 2023. He was clearly at that point able to raise concerns about matters affecting him. It seems to us that if he had genuine concerns about Mr Mills and Ms Holt’s conduct during the meeting in May he would at least have raised it when he contacted the Whistleblowing Team but he did not do so.

[29]We find as a fact that Mr Mills and Ms Holt did not display hostile body language at the meetings. The less favourable treatment did not happen so this complaint fails.

[30]Allegation 6.2.3 is that Mr Mills made false allegations both in the investigation meetings and in his written investigation report. Specifically, the claimant says that Mr Mills misquoted the conflict of interest policy because the duty to declare his outside interest did not apply to the claimant. We remind ourselves that what we are assessing is Mr Mills’s conduct based on the evidence he had and his role in carrying out the investigation.

[31]It was not disputed that the claimant owned and let a number of properties. We find it is accurate to describe it as “property letting business”. In evidence the claimant suggested this wasn’t a “business” but we find on any ordinary use of the term it was. This was not a one-off buy to let property situation such as the one described by Mr Harris-Redfern in his evidence. The claimant had at times 7 properties which were reported to be bringing in an income of £10,000 per month. He had set up a limited company to hold the Freeholds. The claimant did not dispute that he had printed off tenancy agreements from the respondent’s computer systems during work hours. The evidence showed that Ms Holt had received confirmation in January 2023 that there was no declaration of an outside interest recorded in relation to the claimant. The evidence also showed that the claimant had accessed customer accounts relating to his tenants.

[32]The claimant’s interpretation of the rules was that he was not required to declare because of his role within the respondent and his position as a nondirector. He also said that he had disclosed his property portfolio and discussed it with senior colleagues from around 2011 onwards. We accept Mr Mills’s evidence that his genuine interpretation of the relevant policies was that the claimant’s role as a Mortgage Advisor (including in relation to buy to let properties) meant that the claimant’s property portfolio raised a potential conflict of interest. It is important to remember Mr Mills’s role in the process at this point. It was not to decide whether there was a conflict of interest or a breach of policy on declaring outside business interests. It was rather to decide whether there was a case to answer on that front. We accept that his genuine conclusion was that there was. That means we find that he did not make a “false” allegation alleged at 6.2.3 so this complaint fails. Harassment complaint 5.1.6

[33]It is convenient at this point to also deal with the harassment allegation at 5.1.6. This is also about false allegations made by Mr Mills but is wider encompassing allegations of the claimant accessing customer accounts without consent. It was not disputed that the claimant accessed customer accounts. It was also not disputed that there was no written consent recorded on the respondent’s systems. That was, we find, a matter which was legitimately the subject of an investigation. That was particularly so in relation to the claimant’s brother, where there was email evidence that he and Mr Bonnsain were (at least for some of the relevant period) not on good terms. That raised legitimate concerns about why the claimant was accessing his brother’s account.

[34]We find these were not “false” allegations as alleged. We have considered whether there was any other evidence which could cause us to conclude that Mr Mills had made false allegations. The claimant referred to specific flaws in the written investigation report as supporting such a finding. He said that the report failed to provide a balanced view of the investigation. It omitted his explanations about the outside business issue and about the verbal consents given to him by family members allowing him to access their accounts.

[35]The claimant also said (and it was accepted by the respondent) that the report inaccurately said that Barclays had been unsuccessful in contacting his brother by phone about whether he had given consent to the claimant to access his account. It is accepted that the report is inaccurate in that respect because by the time the report was submitted on 18 July 2023, Mrs Pennington or the Advocacy Team had succeeded in contacting the claimant’s brother. They spoke to him on 22 June, the transcript being at page 2580. We find on the evidence that Mrs Pennington had reported to her line manager that she had contacted the claimant’s brother but there was no evidence to support a finding that she had reported it to Mr Mills. The evidence set out in Ms Holt’s email to Mr Sharma when he queried this as part of the disciplinary investigation provides, we find, an explanation as to why Mr Mills was not aware that the claimant’s brother had in fact been contacted. The position we find is that Mr Mills was not aware that there had been a successful call to the claimant’s brother before Mr Mills left Barclays on 3 July. At the point when he was drafting his report, he was unaware of that successful call.

[36]From a common-sense point of view, it also seems to us that the allegation that Mr Mills had somehow attempted to hide the fact that there had been a successful call with the claimant’s brother makes little sense. Mr Mills was an experienced investigator and must have known that the call would have been recorded. It would inevitably have come to light that there had been such a call. On balance therefore we do accept that this was a genuine error on Mr Mills’s part rather than any kind of false allegation.

[37]The claimant also suggested that Mr Mills failed in his report to include the claimant’s version of events, for example that he had declared his property interest to his manager in 2011 or that verbal consent had been given for access to accounts. We do accept that that is not specifically recorded in the body of the report. Mr Mills accepted he could have done that but we accept the respondent’s submission that the report itself does make clear at page 448 that the report had to be read in conjunction with its appendices. Specifically, it says that it was crucial that the contemporaneous notes of the meetings were read and that the claimant had made addendum notes to the interviews. The attention of the reader was being drawn to those specific appendices. We do not find that there was any attempt to hide the comments which the claimant had made in his follow up emails after the meetings on May 9th and 10th.

[38]On the facts therefore, our finding is that Mr Mills did not make any of the broader “false allegations” alleged in the harassment complaint at 5.1.6. That complaint fails because the alleged unwanted conduct did not take place.

[39]For the avoidance of doubt there was no evidence to support a finding that any flaws in the investigation or in the investigation report were because of or in relation to the harassment complaint related to the claimant’s race or religion. It is clear that the claimant disagreed with the contents and conclusions of the report. His position appeared to be (and still appears to be) that so long as there was no evidence of actual dishonesty or harm to customers that should have been an end to it. We accept that matters are not so clear cut from the respondent’s point of view. It needed (and needs) to ensure that its policies were being followed because those policies are in place to ensure that customers and staff and the bank are protected. It could not simply take somebody’s word that there was no inappropriate access to bank accounts or inappropriate dealings with outside business interests without investigating. Allegation 5.1.3

[40]Moving on chronologically it seems to us that the next allegation to deal with is that at 5.1.3. This relates to the call which Mrs Pennington made to the claimant’s brother on 22 June. The allegation was that the claimant’s brother had been told that “family members can commit fraud against you and referenced the claimant’s name”. In relation to this allegation, we have the benefit of a transcript of that calI it is clear from that that Mrs Pennington did not use the words alleged by the claimant in the allegation. The claimant suggested that that was how the call was reported back to him by his brother. That maybe the case but we find that the allegation as set out in 5.1.3 must fail, because the comment as alleged did not happen.

[41]Again, for the avoidance of doubt we find nothing in that call which amounts to harassment related to race or religion. The claimant’s case was that Mrs Pennington continued to press his brother on the points of consent, access and matters such as pin and passwords and that she had done so because of race or religion. There was no evidence to support such a finding or to pass the burden of proof. We find that Mrs Pennington followed the questions she had been provided with. It seems to us perfectly reasonable that when she was trying to establish whether an account was being accessed improperly, she would not simply just accept an initial response about verbal consent but would instead ask follow up questions. Failing to do so might mean that a vulnerable customer might simply give the answer which they thought the bank wanted to hear rather than providing a more accurate picture of what was happening.

[42]We find this complaint fails because the alleged unwanted conduct did not occur. Allegation 3.1 (D1)

[43]The next allegation chronologically is the decision to proceed to a disciplinary hearing. This was a decision made by Mr Niraj Sharma (“Mr Sharma”). It was alleged to be an act of detriment related to or because of making protected disclosures. The protected disclosures are set out in Section 2 of the list of issues and the alleged detriment and the issues relating to it are set out at issues 3.1. to 3.3. It was not disputed that it was Mr Sharma’s decision to proceed to a disciplinary hearing against the claimant.

[44]For the complaint of whistleblowing detriment to succeed, the claimant first has to establish that he made one or more qualifying disclosures as defined by the Employment Rights Act. As the list of issues makes clear at 2.1.2 to 2.1.7, for there to be a qualifying disclosure there has to be a disclosure of information which the claimant reasonably believes was made in the public interest and which, in his reasonable belief, tended to show (in this case) a failure to comply with a legal obligation or a miscarriage of justice.

[45]The claimant says he made two qualifying disclosures (issue 2.1.1). The first was in writing to the Whistleblowing Team on 26 June 2023 and the second was made verbally at the grievance meeting with Mr Harris-Redfern on 30 August 2023. In both cases the alleged information disclosed was that the investigation report by Mr Mills and Lauren Holt contained deliberate falsehoods.

[46]We find as a fact that that information was not disclosed in the written contact with the whistleblowing team. It could not have been because the claimant did not at that point have the investigation report. He could not therefore be raising any issues about the contents of that report. More fundamentally, when the written communication with the whistleblowing team is read there is no reference to deliberate falsehoods or to the investigation process or report. We find therefore that that disclosure of information in PD1 was not made.

[47]We find the same is true of PD2, there was no evidence of that information being disclosed and again, logically, it could not have been since the claimant did not have the investigation report as at 30 August 2023.

[48]We find that this complaint of whistleblowing detriment fails at the first hurdle. There were no protected disclosures PD1 or PD2 because the alleged information was not in fact disclosed. That means that the detriment because of making a protected disclosure cannot succeed.

[49]In any event, when it comes to issues 3.1 to 3.3 in the list of issues we accept Mr Sharma’s evidence that he did not know about the claimant’s 26th June email to the whistleblowing team and could not have known about any verbal disclosure not recorded in the grievance meeting transcript for 30th August. The complaint of being subjected to a detriment for making protected disclosure fails therefore because there was no protected disclosure but also because even had there been Mr Sharma was not aware of the contact with the whistleblowing team nor anything said verbally to Mr Harris-Redfern on 30 August.

[50]We will deal next with the allegation relating to Mr Harris-Redfern’s conduct of the grievance. This was put as an allegation of victimisation at 9.2.3 in the list of issues. To succeed the claimant will have to show that there was a failure to adequately investigate his grievance and that one or more of the protected acts set out at 9.1 of the list of issues had a material influence on that failure.

[51]We find that protected act 9.1.3 did not happen, it is based on the same facts as the protected disclosure at PD2 and our finding is that that disclosure did not take place in the sense that the information was not disclosed.

[52]That leaves 9.1.1, which is the grievance itself and 9.1.2, which is the written disclosure to the Barclays Whistleblowing Team on 26 June 2023. The respondent accepted that both of these were protected acts for the purposes of Section 27(2) of the Equality Act 2010.

[53]The next question is whether the claimant was subjected to the alleged detriment. Did Mr Harris-Redfern fail to adequately investigate the grievance?

[54]We found Mr Harris-Redfern a credible witness and found his evidence to be reliable. He was willing to accept that different approaches to that he had taken might have been effective. We find, based on the evidence that he did take a thorough and diligent approach to the grievance. He took a significant amount of time to read the relevant documents and took time to listen to the calls made by Mrs Pennington to the claimant’s family. He took advice from ER direct and the evidence shows that he pushed to ensure that the grievance was concluded in a reasonable time. The claimant professed himself reassured by Mr Harris-Redfern’s approach at the grievance meeting and that is (page 982).

[55]The claimant submitted that Mr Harris-Redfern’s grievance investigation was inadequate in that it failed to address the allegation that he had been treated differently because of his race or religion. We don’t accept that is the case. That is addressed in point 1 of the outcome letter (p.983 to 986) which specifically notes the claimant’s concern that he was singled out because of his heritage. Mr Harris-Redfern sets out his findings about this on page 984 as part of the outcome letter. The claimant alleged it was a flaw in the investigation for Mr Harris-Redfern not to have interviewed Mr Mills and Ms Holt specifically in relation to the allegations about their body language during the investigation meetings. We accept the evidence in Mr Harris-Redfern’s witness statement at paragraph 18 that he reached the conclusion, having viewed the investigation documentation including the interview notes that he didn’t require to speak to Mr Mills and Ms Holt in order to decide that issue. We find that that was his genuine decision at the time. We also accept that he had received advice from ER direct about the need to ensure that its investigation did not impinge on what was a live disciplinary investigation and that that did play a part in his decision not to interview them.

[56]We do not accept that the grievance investigation was in any way a sham or that Mr Harris-Redfern shied away from dealing with the point raised by the claimant about being singled out because of his heritage. We have said that is dealt with specifically in the outcome letter. Another investigator might have decided it was necessary to interview Mr Mills and Ms Holt. However, we do not find that his decision not to interview them meant that Mr HarrisRedfern subjected the claimant to a detriment by failing to carry out an adequate investigation. That is not consistent with his diligent approach to the grievance. We find that the alleged detriment/unfavourable treatment in this case did not occur and so the complaint of victimisation at 9.2.3 fails.

[57]In case we are wrong about that we have gone on to consider issues 9.4 and 9.5 in relation to allegation 9.2.3. We remind ourselves that this is a victimisation complaint. The essential question is whether Mr Harris-Redfern would have conducted the grievance investigation differently had it not been for the protected acts. Of the two potentially relevant protected acts we accept Mr Harris-Redfern’s evidence that he was not aware of the claimant’s written communication to the whistleblowing team. It could not therefore be the reason for any detriment. That leaves the grievance itself, Mr HarrisRedfern was clearly aware of that but there was no evidence that the inclusion of allegations of discrimination in that grievance influenced Mr HarrisRedfern’s decision at the time about how to conduct the grievance investigation. That means that even if contrary to our finding the alleged unfavourable treatment at 9.2.3 had taken place we would have found that it was materially influenced by a protected act and the victimisation claim would have therefore failed.

[58]Dealing next with the grievance appeal. This is said to be an act of victimisation at 9.2.4 in the list of issues. The specific allegation is that Mr Cartwright failed to adequately investigate the claimant’s grievance appeal.

[59]We do not understand the claimant to be criticising Mr Cartwright’s general approach. At the grievance appeal meeting at which the claimant clarified his appeal there does not appear to be any complaints about that, with the claimant thanking Mr Cartwright for the time and effort he put in.

[60]We found Mr Cartwright’s evidence reliable and accept that he did diligently investigate the appeal within the parameters as he understood them. We find that those parameters are crucial in assessing the adequacy of his approach. The scope of an appeal is set out in Barclays policy at page 1697 of the bundle. It says that the appeal meeting is intended to provide an opportunity for the employee to explain why they believed the original grievance decision was incorrect or remains unresolved and allow the Appeal Manager to review any new evidence, ask questions and ensure that they fully understand the grounds of the appeal. We accept Mr Cartwright’s evidence that in carrying out the appeal what he was doing was carrying out a review rather than a rehearing. It was therefore not his role to re-hear matters already dealt with at the grievance stage. We find that at the grievance appeal hearing on 26 October 2023 the claimant confirmed which points he had already raised as part of the grievance and which points were new points. We accept Mr Carwright’s evidence that his role was to investigate those new points rather than to re-hear all of the evidence heard at the grievance meeting. Matters already dealt with as part of the grievance would not have been in scope.

[61]Mr Cartwright’s outcome letter identified three points. In summary, they were the monitoring of the claimant’s emails and account, a lack of concern for the claimant’s mental health and wellbeing by Mr Mills and Ms Holt at the 18 January meeting and the concern that ethnic minority groups were being disproportionately targeted for CSO investigations. Those issues are set out in the outcome letter at page 1057 and 1058.

[62]We find that Mr Cartwright did diligently investigate these matters. His investigations included speaking to Ms Holt, having been advised by ER direct (after he asked them) that it was ok to do so. We find his outcome letter to be balanced and evidence based.

[63]When it came to criticism of Mr Cartwright’s approach, the claimant’s primary focus was on the fact that in investigating CSO’s actions Mr Cartwright had not subjected CSO’s actions to sufficiently independent scrutiny. It was accepted that Mr Cartwright had spoken to Emma Kelly of the CSO team to get an impartial view as to how investigations were initiated. This was to address the third point raised by the claimant about the disproportionate targeting of ethnic minority groups. We find that Mr Cartwright was satisfied, based on Ms Kelly’s evidence and his other investigations, that the initial decisions on investigations were based on patterns of behaviour and data driven and not therefore subject to targeting by ethnicity.

[64]Although he did not explicitly address the point in his submissions, we understand the claimant to suggest that Ms Kelly’s evidence could not be impartial as she herself was part of the CSO. When it comes to that, it seems to us the difficulty is that Mr Cartwright wanted to understand how CSO operated and CSO was the obvious source to provide that information. We find that he did take the steps that he could to ensure that Ms Kelly’s information was objective, for example by not disclosing to her the reasons for his investigation.

[65]Based on the evidence we find that Mr Cartwright did not fail to adequately investigate the grievance appeal. The complaint of victimisation at 9.2.4 therefore fails because we find that the alleged detriment/unfavourable treatment did not happen.

[66]For the avoidance of doubt, if we are wrong about that, we again find there was no evidence which would pass the burden of proof to suggest that Mr Cartwright would have acted differently had it not been for the protected acts. We find that in his case the relevant protected act was the grievance itself. We accept Mr Cartwright’s evidence that he was not aware of the written whistleblowing complaint (protected act 9.1.2) and we have found that protected act 9.1.3 did not happen. The only potentially relevant protected act was the grievance itself. There was no evidence that Mr Cartwright was influenced in the way he carried out the appeal by the fact that the claimant had raised allegations of discrimination in that grievance. Indeed, he addressed those issues at point 3 of his outcome having taken the steps which we have already referred to to investigate it. Had we found that the detrimental treatment alleged did happen we would have found that it was not because of a protected act so the allegation of victimisation would fail.

[67]Adopting a chronological approach, the next allegation relates to the delaying of the disciplinary hearing. This is victimisation allegation 9.2.1.

[68]When it comes to this allegation, we find that the delay up to December 2023 was not a detriment or unfavourable treatment. It was something that the claimant wanted. He himself agreed that the grievance and the grievance appeal outcome should be concluded before the disciplinary hearing proceeded. There is no doubt that there was a delay up to that point but we find it was not a detriment or unfavourable treatment.

[69]There is however a further delay until April 2024 which is when the claimant was invited to a disciplinary hearing. The ER Direct records show that Mr Sharma was being prompted to invite the claimant to a disciplinary hearing from the point where the grievance was concluded, that is around mid December 2023. Mr Harris in his submissions suggested the delay was relatively short. We accept the entries on the ER Direct system show that there was a gap from the end of February 2024 until April 2024 when nothing appears to happen. Up to the end of February 2024 ER Direct records that Mr Sharma is taking some action in the sense of liaising about the draft invitation letter initially with ER Direct and then with the legal team. However, we accept that from the claimant’s point of view there was a delay which was unexplained. We were not taken to any evidence that Mr Sharma kept the claimant updated or explained the delay.

[70]When it comes to the delay in holding the disciplinary hearing from mid December 2023 until April 2024, therefore, we accept that there was unfavourable treatment amounting to a detriment.

[71]The question is whether that delay was because of any of the protected acts. In this case we find the relevant protected acts were the grievance 9.1.1 and the claimant presenting his Employment Tribunal claim 9.1.4. We accept Mr Sharma’s evidence he didn’t know about the written whistleblowing disclosure (9.1.2) and we have found that 9.1.3 did not happen. We don’t find that the grievance influenced the unwanted delay from December onwards. It is clear from ER Direct that the grievance having been concluded was not a contributory factor to that further delay.

[72]We accept that Mr Sharma did know about the Employment Tribunal claim 9.1.4). That is clear from ER Direct where there is an entry for 8 January 2024 where Mr Sharma is told about it. The question is whether the delay was because of or materially influenced by that Tribunal claim. We find that it was not. The advice from ER Direct at page 2801 is specifically that “the Tribunal will not prevent the case from progressing”. Mr Sharma uploads the draft invite letter after being notified of the Tribunal claim. We find it is not the Tribunal claim which led to the delay in Mr Sharma progressing matters. In terms of the reason for the delay we accept his evidence that it was that the matter had, as he put it, fallen through the cracks. We accept that is not a good reason for the delay but the issue for us to decide is whether there is an explanation for the delay which is in no way related to the protected act. We find there is. Given the clear indication on ER Direct we find that the Tribunal claim was not the cause of the delay. That means that none of the protected acts had a material influence on the delay in progressing the disciplinary hearing up to April 2024. The complaint of victimisation at 9.2.1 therefore fails. Allegations5.1.1 and

5.1.2

[73]We turn now to those complaints which relate to the claimant being prevented from contacting customers or carrying out his role. That includes being forbidden to speak to customers and blocked in terms of his external email access. Those were said to be complaints of harassment and were at5.1.1 and

5.1.2 of the list of issues.

[74]The specific allegation in 5.1.1 was that Ms Holt had prevented the claimant from carrying out his role as a Customer Mortgage Advisor and said that he was not allowed to discuss the fact that he was under investigation.

[75]We find on the facts that it was not Ms Holt who did these things, the complaint therefore fails at that first step.

[76]Looking at things more broadly, we do accept that during periods in 2023 and 2024 the claimant was prevented from accessing FullServe. Initially, in January 2023, that was as a result of the claimant’s state of mind as perceived at the meeting on 18 January. Again, that was not done by Ms Holt but was done on the advice of Mr Mills. There is no evidence that that was in any way related to the claimant’s race or religion. We find that subsequently the claimant’s access to FullServe was restored but he was instructed not to use it. Again, that instruction was from his management and not from Lauren Holt. The emails in the bundle made it clear that when there was interaction between Ms Holt and the claimant’s line managers about this, the decision about access was one for the business unit and not one for CSO.

[77]When it comes to the claimant being allowed to carry out his role we find on the evidence that he was not able to carry out his role when he returned to work in August 2023 initially because he needed to be re-accredited. That meant that he was not allowed to speak to customers and we find that that was nothing to do with his race or religion. Anybody returning to work and needing to be re-accredited would not be allowed to speak to customers, at least until they had completed the mandatory training and undergone dummy role-playing exercises.

[78]We do accept, however, that in the claimant’s case the prohibition on speaking to customers continued beyond the point where he had completed the dummy role playing exercises. The question is whether that was in any way related to the claimant’s race or religion. The claimant’s case is that there were plenty of other safeguards which could have been put in place to ensure that even if he was carrying out his role and speaking to customers he was posing no threat. He referred to the use of the AWS system to monitor calls and the fact that mortgage applications he might submit would be subject to supervision. Even accepting the claimant is correct about the potential availability of those different approaches, it does not seem to us to be evidence that the decisions taken were race or religion related.

[79]The decisions have to be seen in context. Throughout this period, the claimant was subject to an ongoing (or at least live) disciplinary proceeding where the fundamental allegation was that he had inappropriately accessed customers accounts. In those circumstances it seems to us that it was eminently reasonable for the respondent to put in place restrictions on the claimant’s access to customers. Even if we accept the claimant’s submission that there were other methods available, the case law tells us that the respondent acting in a way which the claimant considered to be unreasonable is not sufficient to pass the burden of proof under the Equality Act 2010. We find that it does not do so in this case. To the extent that restrictions were put in place we find that there were good grounds for doing so and that the reasons for doing so were not related to race or religion.

[80]The specific allegation in 5.1.2 that the claimant’s access to external emails was blocked. We accept that that was done but the evidence was that that was triggered by the claimant self-declaring that he was subject to investigation to the FCA. That led to a decision by the Compliance Team that they would either have to de-register him or confirm his re-registration but ensure that there were restrictions in place to protect the bank. We find that it was that which led to the claimant’s external emails being restricted. Again, there was no evidence to suggest that a member of staff in the claimant’s position of a difference race or religion would have been treated any differently. 81.5.1.1 and

5.1.2 are allegations of race or religion-related harassment. In terms of the elements of harassment in s.27 Of the Equality Act 2010, we accept that the conduct in this case was unwanted conduct. We do not find that there was any harassing purpose. We also do not find that it was reasonable for the claimant to view the conduct as having a harassing effect. We bear in mind that the standard for conduct having a harassing effect is a high one. Section 26 talks about violating dignity, humiliating and degrading treatment. Even if, as we accept, the claimant did perceive this treatment as having a harassing effect we do not find, taking into account all the circumstances, it was reasonable for it to have that effect. The claimant was subject to a live disciplinary investigation and given the nature of that investigation we think it was not reasonable for those restrictions to be viewed as having a harassing effect. More fundamentally, as we have already made clear above, there was nothing in the evidence which suggested that the unwanted conduct was in any way related to the claimant’s race or religion. The harassment complaints at 5.1.1. and 5.1.2 therefore fail. Allegations 5.1.5 and 5.1.5 and 9.2.2

[82]Moving on then to the allegations relating to closure of the claimant’s customer accounts. There is a jurisdictional issue when it comes to this. The case law (in particular the case of Tiplady v City of Bradford Metropolitan District Council

[2019] EWCA Civ 2180

) says that the Tribunal only has jurisdiction if the acts were done in the employment field. Acts done in relation to the claimant in a different capacity, i.e. as a customer of the respondent, would fall outside our jurisdiction. Mr Harris conceded that if we found a link between the claimant’s acts as an employee and the closure of his accounts then that might be sufficient for matters to fall within the employment field. In relation to allegation 5.1.4 we do not find that there was such a link. We note that the original decision to question the claimant about transactions on his account was made in February 2023. At that point the evidence suggests that the team investigating the transactions did not know that the claimant was an employee. That only appears to become apparent when the matter was restarted in December 2023 and Mr Afeeva noticed that the claimant was an employee. To the extent that the allegation at 5.1.4 relates to the initial contact we find that that was not in the employment field and therefore not something over which we have jurisdiction. It fails for that reason.

[83]Allegation 5.1.5 was the notice to close the claimant’s accounts sent to the claimant in May 2024. That is said to be an act of harassment and also an act of victimisation (9.2.2). We find that by May 2024 the respondent was aware that the claimant was an employee. In deciding whether or sending the notice was done “in the employment field” we need to consider more closely the facts of the case.

[84]In terms of how the original decision to investigate the claimant in February 2023 came about, we find that that was data driven. It related to transactions on the claimant’s accounts and we find that that was not influenced by his race or religion, or by any protected act.

[85]The respondent’s version of events was that the contractor who carried out the initial review in 2023 left unexpectedly with no handover. We accept that evidence. There was no evidence to the contrary. We find that that contractor’s work was then distributed between colleagues which led to a delay in matters being progressed. We find that the claimant was relatively low down in the list of cases prioritised for investigation. That meant that the case was not picked up again until December 2023 when Mr Afeeva began to re-investigate it. He decided that there needed to be additional questions asked to those asked of the claimant earlier in 2023 and sent another request for information in March 2024. The claimant’s evidence was that that request for information was never received by him. We accept that evidence. We also accept Mr Harris’s submission that there is no evidence to suggest the letter was not sent.

[86]There was some confusion about the dates of a letter from the claimant, it was dated 3 April 2024 but we find that it was in fact sent on 3 April 2023 in response to the initial request for information by the contractor who then left. We accept, therefore, that the claimant did not respond to the letter sent to him in March 2024. We also accept, however, that the respondent (because of the wrong 2024 date on the claimant’s letter of 3 April) thought that he had responded. It took the view that that letter mistakenly dated 3 April 2024 did not address the points raised in the letter sent to the claimant in March 2024.

[87]In outline what happened next was as a result of the apparent failure to address the queries raised, the matter was referred to the respondent’s case review forum. We find that it was aware of the investigation into the claimant as an employee but decided to keep matters separate.

[88]There is no evidence to suggest that the case review forum knew about the claimant’s Tribunal claim. It does not appear to be recorded in the case summary document which formed the basis for its consideration of the claimant’s case. The decision to close the claimant’s account was made by that case review forum. There is no evidence which explicitly suggests that that decision was in any way influenced by the claimant’s race or religion.

[89]The claimant’s case is that the process relating to the closure of his account was flawed to such an extent that it must raise concerns that there was something nefarious going on. To put it in more legal terms, he suggests the flaws were such that the burden of proof under the Equality Act 2010 passed to the respondent to provide a non-discriminatory explanation of those flaws.

[90]The claimant’s case was that he responded to the initial enquiry in February 2023 but that the respondent said that it had lost that letter, Mr Hornsby’s evidence was that that was indeed the case in the sense that the respondent never received the claimant’s letter. His evidence was that post received was handled by a third party company and that, for whatever reason, that letter from the claimant never reached the respondent.

[91]When it comes to the process that was followed in 2024 we find that there was an issue in the sense that the letter sent to the claimant in February 2024 was a hybrid letter, partly responding to his complaint (about the respondent losing his letter) and partly seeking information relevant to the potential closure of his account. To the extent that the claimant suggests that the hybrid nature of that letter was in itself suggestive that there had been discrimination or victimisation it seems to us there is an explanation. It is that the respondent decided that the way to deal with the claimant’s complaint about his lost letter was for the Customer Relations Team to prepare the letter. We do find that unfortunately that did mean that the letter was not clear, both about the timeline with which a response to the request for information about his account transactions was required and about the consequences if that did not happen. We accept the claimant did not receive that letter but we do not find that the way that letter was put together is indicative of anything which would pass the burden of proof. We accept that there was certainly flaws in the process, that extends to confusion about when the letter which was dated 3 April 2024 was actually received by the respondent and what it was responding to.

[92]We remind ourselves that what the case law says is that a finding that an employer has behaved unreasonably or treated an employee badly will not in itself be sufficient to cause the burden of proof to shift. When it comes to the harassment claim we find that that applies in this case. There was certainly evidence of flaws in the process but none of those indicated, we find, that the flaws were related to the claimant’s race or religion. That means that the allegation of harassment at 5.1.5 fails. It would also mean that even fi we had jurisdiction over allegation 5.1.4 it would fail. There was no evidence to prove facts sufficient to pass the burden of proof that the conduct in 5.1.4 was race or religion related.

[93]When it comes to the victimisation claim the test is a different one which is whether that decision in May 2024 was materially influenced by any of the protected acts. We find it was not. As we have said there was no evidence that the decision makers were aware of the grievance, or of the Employment Tribunal claim brought by the claimant. The claimant suggested that the fact that the investigation into his account was rekindled in December 2023 was suggestive of a link to his Tribunal claim, that is because it was in December 2023 that he issued his claim. However, we are satisfied that the respondent was not notified of that claim by the employment tribunal until 4 January 2024. That means that that happened after the decision to rekindle the investigation into the claimant’s customer accounts in December 2023. Logically, that could not have been the cause of that. Taking all of that into the round what we find is that there was no evidence that the decision to close the claimant’s account in May 2024 was influenced by any of the protected acts. That means that victimisation claim 9.2.2 fails. The disability discrimination complaints

[94]We then move to the disability discrimination complaints. As we have made clear in the judgment the claimant withdrew a number of those complaints. The remaining complaints related to the application of time limits as part of tests applied by the respondent to its staff. The first, relevant to issue 7.2.3 and 8.1.5 is time limits applied to specific tests forming part of the mandatory training. The claimant referred specifically to the income test which he had to pass as part of his mandatory training to gain reaccreditation as a Mortgage Advisor. Our clear finding of fact is that there was no time limit on that test. That was the clear evidence given by Jane Wood at the Tribunal we found her to be a credible witness and her evidence reliable. It was also the unchallenged evidence in the written statement of Taylor Hall. That finding means that the complaint of a failure to make reasonable adjustments at 8.1.5 fails. The PCP of applying a time limit as part of the mandatory training was not applied by the respondent and so the duty to make reasonable adjustments to it could not arise.

[95]The PCP at 8.1.2 that is a PCP relating to limits on the time allowed for completing mandatory training. We accept that there would have to be at some point a limit on how long a Mortgage Advisor could take to complete mandatory training. As Mr Harris submitted, there could not be a situation where an employee could simply keep doing the tests for years while being paid to do so. However, we do not accept that there was a defined cut off point by which time mandatory training had to be completed. Although we heard evidence that there would be a review at 120 or 180 days the evidence did not support a finding that that amounted to a hard and fast rule as alleged in 8.1.2. If the mandatory training had not been completed by that point it might have led to further action by the respondent, but it would not be an absolute bar for the employee concerned continuing to complete the tests. We find therefore that PCP 8.1.2 was not applied and therefore the duty to make reasonable adjustments did not arise in relation to it.

[96]That leaves the allegation of unfavourable treatment as a result of something arising in consequence of disability at 7.2.3. We accept Mr Harris’s submission in relation to this that as pleaded that complaint does not work. As pleaded it is a complaint that the unfavourable treatment was a refusal to adjust time because of the something arising from the claimant’s Dyslexia. It seems to us that in fact the claim being made is that there was a failure to adjust time despite something arising from the claimant’s disability. That is, as Mr Harris submitted, a claim of a failure to make reasonable adjustments and therefore duplicates that we have already dealt with above. We find therefore that complaint 7.2.3 fails because logically it makes no sense.

[97]What that means therefore is all the disability discrimination complaints which were not withdrawn also fail. Time Limits and the ACAS Code uplift

[98]All the claimant’s complaints fail or are withdrawn. That means that we do not need to address the issue of time limits. That issue would only arise if any of the complaints succeeded.

[99]For the sake of completeness, we will deal with the issue of the ACAS code. Had we found that any of the claimant’s complaints succeeded we would have accepted his submission that there was an unreasonable failure by the respondent to comply with that code. That is in relation to the delay in carrying out a disciplinary hearing. As we have already said, we found that that delay was not victimisation or otherwise a breach of the Equality Act. However, we would have found that the delay was unreasonable and had we been awarding compensation would have increased it by way of an uplift under s.207A of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 to reflect that. Approved by Employment Judge McDonald 26 June 2026