Ms T Brangman v Jewel Home Support Ltd: 2411177/2021

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2411177/2021

Between

Ms T BrangmanClaimant

Jewel Home Support LtdRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Slater

Not represented for claimant

Mr A Timol (instructed by solicitor) for respondent

Date 10 October 2022

JUDGMENT

The claim is dismissed, pursuant to rule 47 of the Employment Tribunals (Rules of Procedure) 2013, because of the failure of the claimant to attend the hearing.

REASONS

[1]This was a public preliminary hearing listed to consider the following issues:(1) In relation to complaints brought under Equality Act 2010, whether the claimant can show that it would be just and equitable for the Tribunal to allow a longer period for the claim to be brought, that period extending to the date of presentation of the claim on 21 September 2021;

(2) In relation to complaints brought under the Employment Rights Act 1996 and/or the Working Time Regulations 1998, whether the claimant can show that it was not reasonably practicable for her complaint to have been presented within time, and if so whether it was presented within such further period that the Tribunal considers reasonable.

(3) The respondent’s application for costs if there was sufficient time.

[2]The parties were notified of the date of the hearing and the issues to be dealt with by a letter from the Tribunal dated 17 August 2022.

[3]At this hearing, I made an order amending the name of the respondent from “Jewel Home Support (Preston)” to “Jewel Home Support Ltd”. Background to this preliminary hearing.

[4]The claimant presented her claim on 21 September 2021. She ticked the boxes on the claim form to say she was claiming race discrimination, sex discrimination, holiday pay, arrears of pay and “other payments”. She also ticked the box to say she was making another type of claim which the Employment Tribunal can deal with, which she described as “indirect and direct discrimination.”

[5]Early conciliation with ACAS took place in the period 20-21 September 2021.

[6]By a letter from the Tribunal dated 7 October 2021, the claimant was ordered to provide a full account of facts alleged to be unlawful conduct, identifying the type of claim, by 4 November 2021. The claimant, in response to this order, sent on 23 October 2021 to the Tribunal, but not the respondent, a “Schedule of Less Favourable Treatment”. This set out in a table a chronological list of matters about which the claimant complained. The last date given was 15 December 2020. The claimant did not, in relation to each complaint, identify what type of complaint it was. At the end of the schedule, she wrote that her claims were as follows: “indirect and direct discrimination – race and sex discrimination; breach to contract; victimisation; harassment; retaliation; equal pay; modern slavery; breach to human rights; breach to General Data Protection Regulation 2018”.

[7]The claimant’s Schedule of Less Favourable Treatment was sent by the Tribunal to the respondent on 11 November 2021.

[8]The respondent was not required to present a response to the claim until 28 days from receipt of the further information from the claimant. By a letter dated 8 December 2021, the parties were informed that Regional Employment Judge Franey had extended time for a response, which now expired 14 days after the date of that letter i.e. 23 December 2021. The respondent presented its response on 17 December 2021.

[9]By a letter dated 20 November 2021, the claimant made the first of a number of applications for judgment in default.

[10]By a letter from the Tribunal dated 17 February 2022, the claimant was informed that the response form was filed within time extended by the Tribunal’s letter of 8 December 2021 and was accepted. The claim was contested and judgment under rule 21 was not appropriate. The parties were also informed in that letter that it appeared from the Schedule of Less Favourable Treatment that the course of treatment about which the claimant complained appeared to end at the end of 2020, or arguably early in 2021, when the claimant alleged her grievance was not properly addressed. On REJ Franey’s directions, the parties were informed that there would be a public preliminary hearing to decide the following issues: “In relation to complaints brought under the Equality Act 2010, whether the claimant can show that it would be just and equitable for the Tribunal to allow a longer period for the claim to be brought, that period extending to the date of presentation of the claim on 21 September 2021; “In relation to complaints brought under the Employment Rights Act 1996 and/or the Working Time Regulations 1998, whether the claimant can show that it was not reasonably practicable for her complaint to have been presented within time, and if so whether it was presented within a further period that the Tribunal considers reasonable.”

[11]The claimant was ordered to provide to the Tribunal and the respondent within 21 days of the date of this letter, a witness statement addressing the question of time limits, providing an explanation for the passage of time between December 2020 and September 2021, accompanied by copies of all documents on which the claimant relies to explain why the claim was not lodged any earlier during that period.

[12]In a letter dated 28 February 2022, the claimant asserted that her application to the Tribunal was made in time as she was still employed by the respondent.

[13]The parties were sent a notice of hearing on 6 April 2022 listing a preliminary hearing for 9 May 2022. The hearing was listed to take place in person. The notice of hearing stated that the hearing would determine: “The question of when employment ceased, when the matters complained of occurred, time limits, and whether the employment tribunal has jurisdiction to consider the claim.”

[14]A separate letter of the same date included reference to the order for the claimant to provide a witness statement in relation to the time issues, and noted that the claimant had yet to comply and must do so within the following 14 days.

[15]On 15 April 2022, the claimant sent the Tribunal a further copy of a witness statement which she had previously sent to the Tribunal. This statement does not address the claimant’s reasons for not presenting the claim in time.

[16]The claimant requested, by email of 5 May 2022, that the hearing on 9 May should take place by video link. The request was refused by REJ Franey. The claimant made further applications by email on the morning of 9 May 2022 to convert the hearing to a hybrid hearing, where she would attend remotely by video link. The respondent attended the hearing in person on 9 May 2022. The claimant did not attend. Employment Judge Ross refused the claimant’s application to convert the hearing to a hybrid hearing, for reasons which the judge has given in writing. The judge directed that the preliminary hearing in relation to time limits would take place in person on 8 August 2022.

[17]The respondent subsequently successfully applied to postpone the hearing listed for 8 August 2022 due to the departure of the person who had been dealing with the case at the respondent’s representative’s firm. The preliminary hearing was re-listed for today, 10 October 2022. The parties were notified of the date of the hearing and the issues to be dealt with by a letter from the Tribunal dated 17 August 2022. These issues were those I have set out in the introduction to these reasons.

[18]The claimant, in a number of letters, made applications for what she described as a default judgment. Employment Judge Ross noted in her written reasons for her decisions made on 9 May 2022 that the claimant, in one of her emails applying for the hearing on 9 May 2022 to be a hybrid hearing, had included the statement: “…the case is appropriate for a default hearing based on evidence at a point of law in accordance with rule 21”. Employment Judge Ross noted, in paragraph 9 of her reasons, that the claimant had been informed by the Employment Tribunal on numerous occasions that her application for a default judgment was unsuccessful and her application for a reconsideration of the refusal to issue a default judgment was also unsuccessful. The judge also recorded that the claimant had been advised by 25 April 2022 that further applications for a default judgment were misconceived and would not be entertained again.

[19]Following this judgment, the claimant wrote again, on a number of occasions, repeating her request for a default judgment and was informed by the Tribunal that her requests were refused for the reasons first set out in the Tribunal’s letter of 17 February 2022. By a letter from the Tribunal dated 26 September 2022, the claimant was informed that REJ Franey directed that the repeated applications for a default judgment were unreasonable, the point had been addressed in February 2022 and the Tribunal would not respond to any further applications on this point. The claimant’s non-attendance at this hearing

[20]The claimant sent an email to the Tribunal and the respondent on Friday 7 October 2022 at 17.29. She wrote: “I am responding to the respondents email today. There is no hearing listed for the 10th of October 2022 as there is no requirement for a hearing. Also, the claimant was not informed of change of representative as Martin Broomhead was representing but has left the firm. “The case is appropriate for Default Judgement due to the fact that the respondent did not respond or contest the claims which is a breach to the Tribunal Rules of Procedure. “Therefore, Default Judgement applies and no further consideration shall be permitted for a response from the respondent. I object to any application from the respondent. “The claimant has complied with all rules and has directed all errors and concerns by the representative and Tribunal to the Judge for correction in which the Tribunal have failed to correct for a fair and lawful Tribunal without hearing. “Please refer to a Judge as the claimant is applicable for remedy in compliance with the Tribunal Rules of Procedure, Employment Law and Human Right's.” The claimant did not attend the hearing.

Law

[22]Since the claimant clearly had notice of the hearing and had, in effect, given reasons for not attending the hearing in her email of 7 October 2022, I decided it was not appropriate to contact the claimant before proceeding with the hearing.

Law

[23]Rule 47 of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2013 provides: “If a party fails to attend or to be represented at the hearing, the Tribunal may dismiss the claim or proceed with the hearing in the absence of that party. Before doing so, it shall consider any information which is available to it, after any enquiries that may be practicable, about the reasons for the party’s absence.” Conclusions

[24]The claimant has been informed on many occasions prior to this hearing of the reasons why a judgment under rule 21 (which she refers to as a default judgment) will not be made. The relevant circumstances have not changed. The claimant could not reasonably expect that a rule 21 judgment would be issued so this hearing would not take place. The claimant has given no reason why she would not be able to attend and has not asked the Tribunal to consider any written representations in her absence. The claimant has given no good reason for not attending the hearing.

[25]The witness statement the claimant sent to the Tribunal does not deal with the time limit issue which this hearing was to address. Had the claimant attended, I would have clarified her complaints and then, if it was confirmed that her complaints were presented out of time, given her an opportunity to explain why she did not present her claims in time.

[26]This is the second time the claimant has failed to attend a hearing, the first being the hearing on 9 May 2022. On both occasions, the respondent has attended.

Conclusions

[27]I do not consider it would be in the interests of justice to postpone this hearing a further time, when the claimant knew about the hearing and has given no good reason for not attending.

[28]In these circumstances, I consider it appropriate to dismiss the claim because of the claimant’s failure to attend the hearing. Costs

[29]The respondent had, in correspondence prior to this hearing, made an application for costs in respect of the claimant’s failure to attend the May 2022 hearing. The application did not set out the basis for that application in any further detail or provide details of costs sought. The parties were informed in correspondence before this hearing that the costs application would be dealt with at this hearing, if there was time to do so.

[30]Since the respondent had not made their application in detail in writing before the hearing and since the claimant was not able to respond to any oral application because she had not attended, I did not consider it appropriate to deal with the costs application at this hearing. I informed the respondent that, if they wished to pursue a costs application, this should be made in writing within 14 days of the written judgment being sent to the parties. I have shortened the 28 day time limit set out in rule 77 of the 2013 Rules of Procedure.

[1]This is a decision made on the basis of a written application and written representations. Neither party requested a hearing to deal with the costs application and I considered that the application could properly be dealt with on the papers.

[2]The costs application followed a decision made on 10 October 2022 to dismiss the claim because of the claimant’s failure to attend the hearing on that day. The Tribunal’s judgment and reasons were sent to the parties on 13 October 2022.

[3]The application was made by letter dated 28 October 2022, copied to the claimant. The claimant responded briefly on 1 November 2022.

[4]The Tribunal wrote to the parties on 8 November 2022 giving the claimant a further opportunity to respond to the costs application and to provide information about her financial means, if she wished the judge to take these into account when deciding on whether to award costs and, if so, how much to award. The Tribunal gave both parties an opportunity to express a view on whether the costs application should be dealt with on the basis of the written application and response or whether there should be a costs hearing.

[5]The claimant wrote again on 9 November 2022 and the respondent wrote on 22 November 2022.

[6]The respondent requested that the matter be dealt with on the papers, without a hearing. The claimant did not express a view as to whether there should be a hearing on costs. The application

[7]The respondent made an application for costs in writing on 28 October 2022. The application was made on the grounds that: 7.1. The claimant had acted unreasonably in the way in which the proceedings had been conducted. 7.2. The claimant had no reasonable prospect of success. 7.3. The claimant acted unreasonably and/or in breach of the Tribunal’s case management orders in the complete lack of cooperation in the preparation for the hearings. 7.4. The claimant failed to attend two in-person hearings. 7.5. The claimant had repeatedly misled the Tribunal and the respondent with regards to information provided and in complying with the case management orders. 7.6. The claimant’s conduct had been unreasonable and vexatious throughout proceedings.

[8]The respondent did not, in its written application, explain why it said these grounds were established, although it made comments on the claimant’s letter of 17 October 2022. The comments on this letter included: that it made another baseless request for default judgment; and that the claimant claimed she had requested to attend the hearing on 10 October by CVP, contradicting her email of 7 October in which she stated “there is no hearing listed for the 10th of October 2022 as there is no requirement for a hearing”. The respondent also asserted that it had incurred substantial costs in defending the claim, attending two hearings which the claimant failed to attend and dealing with a disproportionately large volume of correspondence and applications from the claimant.

[9]The respondent sought a costs order that the claimant make a payment in respect of: all legal costs incurred in defending the claim; the costs of preparing for and attendance at the Tribunal; and costs of dealing with “the barrage of communication (as evidenced in the Bundle prepared for the Preliminary Hearing)”.

[10]The respondent provided a statement of costs for work done on the case, totalling £8,283.01 excluding VAT.

[11]The respondent’s letter of 22 November 2022 included a statement that the respondent had incurred significant costs in defending a claim which at best had no reasonable prospects of success and at worst, has been a waste of resources for both parties as well as the Tribunal. The respondent wrote that they had faced a barrage of unfounded claims and applications to seek judgment in default and the claimant had shown a complete disregard for the Tribunal process. The respondent set out the grounds for their application as being: 11.1. The claimant had acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in the bringing of these proceedings; 11.2. The way that the proceedings had been conducted; 11.3. The claim or response [sic] had no reasonable prospect of success; 11.4. The claimant had been in breach of orders, e.g. to provide information and witness evidence; 11.5. The claimant had failed to attend two hearings and sought to rely on contradictory explanations by way of justification.

[12]No further explanation of why these grounds were established was set out in the letter.

[13]The respondent requested the Tribunal deal with the costs application on the basis of the written application and response. The claimant’s response to the application

[14]In her email dated 1 November 2022, the claimant wrote: “I would like to confirm that the Judge has already stated that the costs application will not be granted in the correspondence sent on the 13th of October 2022. “The claimant also has objected to any cost applications for the reasons stated when Martin Broomhead suggested a cost order prior as the case is lawfully and fairly appropriate for a Default Judgement with no response and contest from the respondent. Therefore, the cost application is not applicable by law.”

[15]The claimant’s letter sent 9 November 2022 (but dated 9 October 2022) repeated, in large part, points made on previous occasions as to why the claimant considered a “default judgment” should have been issued. She asserted that she should have been allowed to attend the hearings by CVP. The claimant asserted that she had complied with all requests and orders. She wrote: “Any time limits are out of the question as the Claimant has provide the reason by law of the claims being within time which does not have to be provided within a witness statement. All documentation was provided prior to questioning any time limits to delay the case.”

[16]The claimant provided no information about her financial means.

[17]The claimant gave no information as to why, if this was the case, she was unable to attend the hearings in person, as distinct from asserting that she should have been allowed to attend by CVP. The background to the application

[18]The claimant’s claim was dismissed at the hearing on 10 October 2022, pursuant to rule 47 of the Employment Tribunals (Rules of Procedure) 2013, because of the claimant’s failure to attend the hearing.

[19]I gave written reasons for my decision. These should be read with this decision, to understand the history of these proceedings. I rely on matters set out in those reasons and will refer to these in my conclusions.

[20]The time limits jurisdictional issues which were to have been considered at that hearing were not considered, due to the claimant’s failure to attend the hearing.

[21]The merits of the claimant’s complaints have not been considered at any hearing. Law

[22]Rule 76(1) of the Employment Tribunals (Rules of Procedure) 2013 provides: “A Tribunal may make a costs order or a preparation time order, and shall consider whether to do so, where it considers that –(a) a party (or that party’s representative) has acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in either the bringing of the proceedings (or part) or the way that the proceedings have been conducted; or

(b) any claim or response has no reasonable prospect of success; or

[23]To make a costs order, at least one of these grounds must apply. If it does, the Tribunal has the power to make an order, but also has a discretion as to whether to make an order and, if so, for how much.

[24]In accordance with rule 75(1)(a), a costs order is an order to make a payment to a party in respect of costs that the receiving party has incurred while legally represented or while represented by a lay representative.

[25]“Costs” are defined in rule 74(1) as “fees, charges, disbursement or expenses incurred by or on behalf of the receiving party (including expenses that witnesses incur for the purpose of, or in connection with, attendance at a Tribunal hearing).

[26]Rule 84 provides that, in deciding whether to make a costs order and, if so, in what amount, the Tribunal may have regard to the paying party’s ability to pay.

Conclusions

[27]The application for costs is made on both the grounds set out in rule 76(1) (a) and (b). Whether I have power to award costs

[28]I will consider first whether either of these grounds apply, which would give me the power to award costs.

[29]I consider first whether any award could or should be made relying on 76(1)(b) i.e. whether the claim had no reasonable prospect of success. The merits of the claimant’s claims have not been considered at any hearing. The complaints, as they can be understood from the claim form and further information provided by the claimant, are far from clear. The time limit issues were not considered at the hearings on 9 May 2022 or 10 October 2022 due to the non-attendance of the claimant, although I note that the claimant failed to address time limit issues in the witness statement she wanted to rely on at the preliminary hearing.

[30]I consider that I should exercise caution in concluding that the claims had no reasonable prospects of success where the claims are not clear and the claimant has not provided any explanation as to why the claim was not presented earlier. The respondent has not set out in its application for costs why the respondent says the Tribunal should conclude that the claim had no reasonable prospect of success.

[31]I consider that I cannot safely conclude, in these circumstances, that the claim had no reasonable prospect of success (although this statement should not be taken as being any conclusion that the claim did have a reasonable prospect of success). Since I cannot be satisfied that I have the power, under rule 76(1)(b) to make an award for costs, I do not make any order relying on this ground in the rules.

[32]I turn next to whether I have the power, under rule 76(1)(a) to make an order for costs i.e. that the claimant acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in either the bringing of the proceedings (or part) or the way that the proceedings (or part) have been conducted.

[33]For the same reasons as I decided I would not make an order for costs on the basis of the claim having no reasonable prospect of success, I do not make an order on the basis that the claimant acted in any of the listed ways in the bringing of the proceedings. This is distinct from the way the proceedings have been conducted, which I now examine.

[34]The respondent has not explained in detail in its application how it considers this ground is made out. However, it is clear the respondent relies on the claimant’s failure to attend the hearings on 9 May and 10 October 2022 and the claimant’s continued correspondence seeking a “default judgment”. The respondent also refers to the claimant misleading the Tribunal. I will consider whether the specific matters the respondent has referred to give me power to make an order for costs. If there is any other conduct by the claimant which might fall within the description in rule 76(1)(a), I do not consider it incumbent on me to try to identify it for myself, without the respondent having identified it in relation to specific acts or failures to act, and do not consider it would be fair for me to base a decision on conduct without a specific allegation about that conduct having been put to the claimant for comment in the respondent’s application.

[35]The history leading up to the claimant’s non-attendance at the hearing on 10 October 2022, including the claimant’s non-attendance at the hearing on 9 May 2022, have been set out in detail in the reasons for my decision to dismiss the claim. Employment Judge Ross also sets out in some detail, in the order sent to the parties on 27 May 2022, the circumstances surrounding the claimant’s nonattendance at the hearing on 9 May 2022. I note that Employment Judge Ross records that it was tempting, in the circumstances, to strike out the claimant’s claim on that occasion, but gives reasons as to why she did not. The reasons do not include any finding that it was reasonable for the claimant not to attend the hearing in person. The judge noted a lack of clarity as to why the claimant was unable to attend.

[36]I conclude, based on the events described in the reasons from each hearing, that the claimant acted unreasonably in not attending the hearings on 9 May and 10 October 2022. The claimant has still given no explanation as to why, if this was the case, she could not attend. Her email of 7 October 2022, quoted at paragraph 20 of the reasons for my decision to dismiss the claim, asserted that there was “no hearing…as there is no requirement for a hearing”, going on to repeat again her assertion that a default judgment should be issued. It did not explain why she could not attend the hearing on 10 October 2022. The claimant has never provided a proper explanation as to why she could not attend the hearing on 9 May 2022. The respondent incurred unnecessary costs in preparing for and attending the two hearings. I conclude that I have power, based on this unreasonable conduct of proceedings, to make an award of costs.

[37]As noted in paragraph 18 of the reasons for my judgment, the claimant made a number of applications for what she described as a default judgment, and continued to do so despite being informed on many occasions by the Tribunal that this application was unsuccessful. At paragraph 19 I record that the claimant had been informed by letter dated 26 September 2022 that Regional Employment Judge Franey considered her repeated applications for a default judgment were unreasonable, the point had been addressed in February 2022 and the Tribunal would not respond to any further applications on this point.

[38]Despite the various occasions on which the claimant has been told that no default judgment will be made, the claimant has persisted with requests, including in the letter of 7 October 2022 saying why she would not attend the hearing on 10 October 2022 and in her response to the application for costs sent on 9 November 2022. I conclude that the claimant has acted unreasonably in the conduct of these proceedings by persisting in these applications. I conclude that I have power, based on this unreasonable conduct of proceedings, to make an award of costs.

[39]The respondent refers to the claimant misleading the Tribunal and the respondent with regards to information provided and in complying with the case management orders. The respondent does not identify specifically what it relies on in this respect, other than the claimant claiming in her letter dated 17 October 2022 that she had requested to attend the hearing on 10 October 2022 by CVP, contradicting her email dated 7 October 2022 in which she states: “There is no hearing listed for the 10th October 2022 as there is no requirement for a hearing.” The claimant asserted in her letter dated 17 October 2022 that she had requested by email on 23 September 2022 to attend the hearing by CVP. As noted in the reasons for my judgment refusing the application for reconsideration, sent to the parties on 8 November 2022, the Tribunal has no record of a request dated 23 September 2022 to attend the hearing on 10 October 2022 by CVP. I agree with the respondent that there appears to be a contradiction between having made a request to attend by CVP and the letter of 7 October 2022. It may be possible that the claimant sent, or thought she had sent, an email on 23 September 2022, although there is no record of this being received. I do not conclude that, in this respect, the claimant acted unreasonably in the conduct of proceedings so do not base any award of costs on the claimant misleading the Tribunal and respondent. Whether I should exercise my discretion to order costs and, if so, the amount to be paid

[40]I have concluded there was unreasonable conduct of proceedings by the claimant in not attending the hearings on 9 May and 10 October 2022 and in persisting in correspondence about a default judgment. I, therefore, have the power to award costs and must consider whether to exercise my discretion to do so. If I do order costs to be paid, I must consider the appropriate amount to be paid.

[41]The claimant was given an opportunity to provide information about her financial means but has not done so. I have no reason, therefore, relating to financial means not to make an award.

[42]I conclude it would be appropriate to make an award of costs. The claimant has engaged in unreasonable conduct of proceedings on a number of occasions and, as a result, the respondent’s costs have been greater than they would have been, had the claimant conducted proceedings in a reasonable manner.

[43]The respondent prepared for, and attended, two hearings where the claimant unreasonably failed to attend. Had the claimant acted reasonably, there would only have been the need for one of the two hearings, which the claimant and the respondent would have attended. I consider it appropriate to award costs representing the expense of the respondent preparing for, and attending, the second hearing. This was the attendance of Mr Timol. The schedule of costs shows his attendance at hearings as 7 hours, with separately listed time of 2 hours for travel and waiting. The hearing on 10 October 2022 was 45 minutes long. It appears that the time shown as attendance at hearing for Mr Timol cannot all relate to the hearing on 10 October. The respondent was represented at the hearing on 9 May by Mr Broomhead. It may be that some of the time of waiting at the Tribunal is included in the attendance at hearings, rather than this all being included in “travel and waiting”. There would also have been time spent in preparing for the hearing on 10 October. One hour is noted in the schedule of costs for Mr Timol preparing for the preliminary hearing. I exercise my discretion to order the claimant to pay costs equivalent to 4 hours of Mr Timol’s time i.e. 4 x £251 = £1004, in respect of the claimant’s unreasonable conduct in not attending the hearings.

[44]The respondent was put to additional expense by reason of the claimant’s unreasonable conduct in making repeated applications to the Tribunal for a default judgment. The respondent’s representative needed to read this correspondence, to see if there was anything they needed to respond to, and sometimes write to the Tribunal with comments. I cannot tell from the schedule of costs how much time was spent on this, but consider it appropriate to order the claimant to pay the equivalent of two hours’ work for this matter i.e. 2 x £251 = £502.

[45]I order the claimant, in total, to pay the respondent a contribution to costs of £1506.

[46]I assume the respondent is registered for VAT so it would not be appropriate to award an additional sum representing VAT on the legal costs.

Introduction

Conclusions

[1]The claimant’s application dated 28 December 2022 for reconsideration of the judgment sent to the parties on 15 December 2022 is refused.

[2]If the claimant is making an application to reconsider the judgment sent to the parties on 8 November 2022 refusing a reconsideration of the judgment sent to the parties on 13 October 2022, this is also refused.

Conclusions

[1]The claimant wrote to the Tribunal on 28 December 2022: “I would like to object to the cost orders and request a full review of the case as there have been breaches from the beginning of the case; particularly not granting the Default Judgement in 2021, as stated numerous times with the reason given on the Default Judgement being lawful and fair in accordance with the Rule of Tribunal. “The case has full prospect of success and the valid points by law that the claimant has raised has not been taken into consideration including the claimants most recent correspondence. Interim the Judges have breached the laws and have not abided by impartiality on numerous occasions. “A case should not be dismissed when it already has been clearly stated and evident that the Judge has been Discriminatory in not allowing the Claimant to attend via CVP; lawfully and fairly to put parties at equal etc. There aren't any complexity to the case where a decision can not be made based on evidence provided. Please refer to a Judge”.

[2]I take this as being an application to reconsider my judgment sent to the parties on 15 December 2022, ordering the claimant to pay to the respondent a contribution to costs of £1506.

[3]It is unclear whether the application is also an application to reconsider my decision sent to the parties on 8 November 2022 refusing the application to reconsider my judgment dismissing the claim, sent to the parties on 13 October 2022. Because of the lack of clarity, I will also deal with this application, in case it is being made. My decision on the applications The application to reconsider my costs decision

[4]The claimant, in her application, asserts points relating to the merits of her substantive claim and that she should have been allowed to attend a hearing by video (CVP). The merits of her claim were not relevant to my decision on costs. My judgment dismissing the claim set out the history of the case, including the refusal that the claimant be allowed to attend the hearing on 9 May 2022 by video link. My judgment refusing the application for reconsideration included my view that the claimant cannot reasonably have formed the view (if this is what she was asserting) that she was not required to attend the hearing on 10 October 2022 in person. Although I noted in my decision on costs that there appeared to be a contradiction between the claimant’s assertion that she had requested to attend the hearing on 10 October 2022 by CVP and her letter of 7 October 2022, I did not base my decision on costs on the claimant misleading the Tribunal and the respondent in this respect.

[5]The claimant gives no reasons in her application which could lead me to conclude that there was any reasonable prospect of my decision on costs being varied or revoked. For these reasons, I dismiss the application. The application to reconsider my decision refusing the application to reconsider the judgment dismissing the claim (if this is made)

[6]I dismissed the claimant’s claim in a judgment sent to the parties on 13 October 2022 and refused an application for reconsideration of that judgment by a judgment

[7]This application is made outside the time limit of 14 days from the date the judgment was sent to the parties. The claimant has given no reasons as to why I should extend time to consider this application. I do not consider it would be in the interests of justice to do so and I refuse to extend time. The application is refused on this basis.

[8]Had the application been made in time, or had I extended time, I would have refused the application on the basis that there was no reasonable prospect of the decision to dismiss the claim being varied or revoked, for the reasons given in the judgment sent to the parties on 8 November 2022.