Mr N Rosario v Hellermann Tyton UK Ltd: 2410146/2019

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2410146/2019

Between

Mr N RosarioClaimant

Hellermann Tyton UK LtdRespondent

Before

Employment Judge A M Buchanan

Members

Ms Jackson and Ms Owen

In person for claimant

Date 12 April 2023

JUDGMENT

It is the unanimous Judgment of the Tribunal that:

[1]The complaint of automatic unfair constructive dismissal by reason of protected disclosure advanced pursuant to section 103A of the Employment Rights Act 1996 fails and is dismissed.

[2]The complaint of victimisation advanced pursuant to sections 27 and 39 of the Equality Act 2010 fails and is dismissed.

REASONS

1.1 The claimant instituted these proceedings on 13 July 2019 relying on an early conciliation certificate on which Day A was shown as 7 May 2019 and Day B was shown as 7 June 2019. Complaints were indicated of unfair dismissal, race discrimination, victimisation and for other payments. A claim against a second respondent Vivienne Ryan of Springboard HR was not accepted as the claimant had not entered into early conciliation with her. No application to review that decision was made by the claimant. RESERVED JUDGMENT Case Number: 2410146/2019

1.2 The respondent filed a timely response in which all liability to the claimant was denied.

1.3 It is necessary to set out in some detail the subsequent history of these proceedings in terms of the complaints being advanced and the issues arising in those complaints. The many other matters which have arisen during the time this case has taken to come on for final hearing are not recorded as they have no relevance to the complaints now before us.

1.4 A private preliminary hearing (“PH”) took place on 29 October 2019 (pages 21-27) before Employment Judge Ryan. The resulting orders set out that the claimant had sought to expand his claim in a variety of ways including seeking to join 13 further respondents and had also referred to United States legislation, had cited several criminal offences including bribery, fraud and theft, the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and other allegations such as data breaches. The Employment Judge explained in writing why the claimant could not pursue such matters and then set out at paragraphs 13-17 the issues in the complaints which were to be pursued. There were two complaints. First, a complaint of automatic unfair express dismissal by reason of public interest disclosure pursuant to section 103A of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“the 1996 Act”) and secondly, a complaint of victimisation pursuant to section 27 of the Equality Act 2010 (“the 2010 Act”). It was recorded that the claimant’s case on victimisation was that a grievance raised by him alleging race and sex discrimination amounted to a protected act and that he had been dismissed because of that protected act. The claimant’s case on having made a protected disclosure is recorded as resting on the same grievance. The respondent accepted the grievance was a protected act but denied having dismissed the claimant at all, let alone because of the protected act. On dismissal the claimant’s case was recorded as being that he had been dismissed by the respondent when it had purported to accept his resignation when he had not in fact resigned. The respondent’s case was that the claimant had resigned his employment. It was noted that any act or omission occurring before 8 February 2019 was potentially out of time. Case management orders were made, and a hearing for three days listed to begin on 18-20 February 2020. Those orders included an order for further information in relation to a putative direct race discrimination complaint.

1.5 In the course of correspondence between the parties pursuant to the abovementioned orders, the claimant indicated that he did wish to pursue his unfair dismissal claim on the additional basis of a constructive dismissal (page 47). The claimant also indicated a wish to amend his claim to include a complaint of direct race discrimination as regards the difference in pay between himself and two male colleagues. In the event, that last application did not proceed.

1.6 The matter came before Employment Judge Leach and non-legal members on 18- 20 February 2020. It is recorded that it became immediately apparent that a number of case management issues needed to be dealt with particularly in relation to identifying the complaints being brought and the issues to be decided on. A full day was taken in discussion with the parties to identify the complaints and the issues and at the end of that day a list of issues was sent to the parties. On 19 February 2020 it was clear that neither party considered that note to be satisfactory and further time was spent on that second day drafting and finalising the terms of the schedule of issues. Paragraph eight of the resulting case management orders states: “We also have seen for ourselves RESERVED JUDGMENT Case Number: 2410146/2019 over the past day and a half a shifting of the claimant’s case which is unsatisfactory. This is now at an end as the claimant has agreed to the terms of the schedule attached”. Comprehensive case management orders were issued, and a final hearing listed before Employment Judge Leach and non-legal members was set for 18 - 22 May 2020 inclusive. The orders provided for the claimant to have leave to provide an update to his witness statement or a newly drafted statement having regard to the issues which by then had been agreed. This explains why we had two witness statements from the claimant before us.

1.7 In the course of that hearing two important matters were clarified. First, Employment Judge Leach decided to allow the claimant to proceed in claiming constructive dismissal or actual dismissal in the alternative both in relation to the alleged protected disclosure and in relation to the alleged protected act. The basis of that decision was that the factual matrix around the termination of the claimant’s employment was not straight forward because: “The claimant indicated his resignation or intention to resign and he was in the process of resigning but during the course of resigning he feels that he was dismissed by a notice being brought forward”.

1.8 Secondly, Employment Judge Leach decided the schedule of issues should record an allegation that there was a second protected act relied on for the victimisation claim on a date between 4 and 15 October 2018 (wrongly referred to as September in the claim form) when the claimant raised an informal grievance with Scott Mayne. This matter had emerged during the morning of the second day of the case management hearing.

1.9 A further case management hearing took place on 18 May 2020 by telephone as the scheduled final hearing could not proceed because of the pandemic. A further public preliminary hearing was set for 6 November 2020 to consider whether the empanelled Tribunal should stand down, whether the claim should be struck out, whether the response should be struck out and whether the list of issues should be amended. A further final hearing was set for 19-23 April 2021.

1.10 On 6 November 2020 an application that Employment Judge Leach should recuse himself was considered and refused. Further discussion took place to clarify the claimant’s case. The claimant told Employment Judge Leach that his claim was one of constructive dismissal and that he had never brought a claim of actual dismissal and could not understand the reference to actual dismissal in the February 2020 list of issues. It was explained to the claimant that there was reference in the list of issues to both actual and constructive dismissal because of the relatively complicated circumstances at or shortly before the termination of his employment and that both possibilities were included in the list from the best of intentions. The claimant was asked to consider whether he wished to rely solely on constructive dismissal and he was afforded time to do so. Case management orders were made.

1.11 The orders included detailed orders at paragraph 25 in relation to the preparation of the trial bundle. Those orders were not complied with by either party. At the outset of the hearing before us the claimant came with no bundle at all and the bundle brought by the respondent and placed before us was incomplete. We took time to resolve that matter and set out below the steps we had to take to resolve it. RESERVED JUDGMENT Case Number: 2410146/2019

1.12 On 19 April 2021 the matter came before Employment Judge Phil Allen for case management. Further proceedings were stayed as appeals were outstanding at the Employment Appeal Tribunal. The claimant did not pursue an application he had made on 15 April 2021 to amend his claim to include a complaint of age discrimination. After discussion it was noted that the following amendment to the list of issues had been specifically agreed with the claimant: “the claim for unfair dismissal is for constructive unfair dismissal only and not actual dismissal. It includes a claim for automatic constructive unfair dismissal”. A further application by the claimant to add other respondents was refused. It was determined that the scheduled final hearing should deal with liability only. Further case management orders in relation to documents were made including providing for the claimant to prepare a separate bundle of any additional documents on which he wished to rely and obtained by him from the Information Commissioner in response to a subject access request.

1.13 By the end of September 2022 outstanding appeals had been dealt with. On 10 October 2022 Regional Employment Judge Franey lifted the stay on these proceedings and listed the final hearing which came before this Tribunal in January 2023. The Hearing

2.1 At the outset of the hearing the claimant advised that he had hoped to have representation for the hearing but in the event would be representing himself. The claimant appeared with no papers at all in terms of the witness statements or the bundle as these were still held by his erstwhile advisers. There was no application to adjourn the final hearing. We made arrangements for our clerk to copy the witness statements and the bundle and hand them to the claimant.

2.2 The claimant explained at the outset that he may appear from time to time angry and frustrated but that was not what he felt inside. We had noted from previous Orders that the claimant had stated that his concentration was affected when he was dealing with important issues and that he was prone to become agitated. The Tribunal accepted that the claimant suffered at least from anxiety and that adjustments should be made to the procedure being followed at the hearing to take account of the claimant’s condition. We did not determine whether the claimant was disabled for the purposes of section 6 of the 2010 Act as it was not relevant for us to do so. We proceeded as if the claimant suffered with an impairment which made him anxious and which affected his concentration and adjusted our procedure in order to minimise the stress on the claimant and so enable the hearing to proceed without difficulty. We had regard to the provisions of the Equal Treatment Bench Book.

2.3 A full explanation was given to the claimant at the outset on the first day of the procedure which would be followed, about the reading of witness statements, about the purpose and form of cross examination, about the right to make final submissions and about the legal issues which appeared to arise in the complaints being advanced. It was clear that the claimant was not well prepared for the final hearing and various adjustments were made, within the obligation to conduct a hearing fair to both parties, to enable the claimant to prepare properly for the hearing and in particular for cross examination of the respondent’s witnesses. RESERVED JUDGMENT Case Number: 2410146/2019

2.4 It became clear at the outset of the hearing that the bundle produced for the hearing by the respondent was not complete in that additional documents, which had been handed up and added to the trial bundle at the outset of the hearing in February 2020, had not been included in the bundle placed before us. The missing pages were identified (pages 223-376) and were added to the bundle. The claimant came to the hearing without a bundle and so a full bundle was copied and provided to the claimant at the outset of the hearing as referred to at 2.1 above.

2.5 The claimant wished to add some further documents to the bundle and handed up 46 further pages. We had those pages copied and added to the bundles used by ourselves and the parties. In the event those additional documents were not referred to. During the hearing it was noted that the respondent’s grievance procedure was not in the trial bundle. A copy was obtained and added to the bundle at pages 378-382. There was no objection from either party to this document being added.

2.6 It became apparent when discussing a timetable for the hearing that one of the respondent’s witnesses Vivienne Ryan (“VR”) proposed to attend by video from her home in France. The Employment Judge enquired whether the respondent had followed the Presidential Guidance on Taking Oral Evidence by Video or Telephone from Persons Located Abroad dated April 2022. That guidance had not been followed. Enquiries were made of the Administration, and we were informed that consent from the French Government for witnesses to give evidence from France before the Tribunal had not been given. We considered how to proceed. We considered whether we should allow evidence from VR at all or whether we should read her witness statement and give less weight to it than might have been the case had she appeared in person. Enquiries were also made as to whether VR could fly from France to Manchester in order to give evidence but that proved impossible within the time available. The views of the parties were sought.

2.7 The claimant was clear that he wished to ask some, but not many, questions of VR. Equally the respondent wished to advance her as a witness and rely on her evidence. Given the time available it was suggested and agreed by both parties that the claimant should prepare written questions for this witness which would be sent by the respondent to the witness for her to reply to in writing. The claimant was given until the opening of the third day of the hearing to prepare these questions. On the third day of the hearing, the claimant appeared with a list of some 77 questions. The Tribunal spent time going through that list to ensure the questions were relevant and not duplicated. That process resulted in a list of questions being sent by the respondent to VR who duly responded in writing on 12 January 2023 and the parties were told they were able to review her replies and to comment on them in their submissions. It was made plain to the respondent that the weight which would be given by the Tribunal to the evidence of VR would not be as great as it would have been had she been present in person. Both parties agreed this course of action as being in the interests of justice and in accordance with the overriding objective to make the best use of Tribunal time and to save time and expense. There was no objection to this course of action from either party.

2.8 The concept of final submissions was explained to the claimant, and he was given the opportunity to make his submissions orally. In the event both the respondent and the claimant filed written submissions and supplemented those by brief oral RESERVED JUDGMENT Case Number: 2410146/2019 submissions. Due to some difficulty with the IT systems on the final afternoon of the hearing with the parties, neither party was able to send their written submission to the Tribunal by the time submissions were due. The Tribunal listened to oral submissions. Written submissions were sent through on 16 January 2023 and the Tribunal considered them fully during its deliberations and read them in conjunction with its notes of the oral submissions. The procedure adopted in this regard was one agreed by both parties.

2.9 Regular breaks were offered and taken as the hearing progressed in particular at times when the claimant became emotional. The hearing was taken at a measured pace and the times when the claimant needed a break were in fact few and generally coincided with the times when the Tribunal was taking a break in any event.

2.10 A detailed timetable was agreed at the outset with the parties and time was built in for the claimant to complete his preparation for cross examination of the witnesses for the respondent particularly giving him an opportunity to do so overnight. After a full discussion on the first day, which took us to lunchtime, we adjourned until the second day in order to allow us to read into the case and to give the claimant time to prepare. The claimant had not prepared fully for the hearing when it began on the first day for the reasons we allude to at 2.1 above.

2.11 A running order for the respondent's witnesses was agreed at the outset on the first day. A subsequent application from the respondent to vary that running order was refused in order not to confuse or unsettle the claimant given that he was acting in person.

2.12 As a result of the adjustments made to the procedure, the five days allotted for this hearing were taken up by evidence and submissions until late in the afternoon of the fifth day. The Tribunal therefore reserved its judgement and met in chambers on 3 March 2023 to deliberate. Accordingly, this judgement is issued with full reasons in writing to comply with the provisions of rule 62(2) of Schedule I to the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013. There has been a slight delay in our being able to issue this final Judgment. Any consequent inconvenience to the parties is much regretted.

2.13 On several occasions it became clear that the claimant had not used the time allowed him to properly prepare. On the morning of 10 January 2023, the claimant sent to the Tribunal an e-mail running to 21 numbered paragraphs which amounted to an application to have the respondent’s response struck out and asserting the respondent had no defence particularly to the allegations of discrimination. The Tribunal refused to deal with an application to strike out on the second day of the final hearing and pressed on. Such applications had been made previously and rejected and there was simply no basis to consider them afresh. A further attempt was made to do so on the final morning but not permitted.

2.14 On several occasions during the hearing the claimant made it plain that he considered the adjustments being made for his condition to be very fair and that the hearing was being conducted fairly. Neither party raised any complaint at any time about the conduct of the hearing. RESERVED JUDGMENT Case Number: 2410146/2019

The claim

[3]The claimant advances the following complaints to the Tribunal:-3.1 A complaint of automatic unfair constructive dismissal by reason of having made a protected disclosure relying on the provisions of Part IVA of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“the 1996 Act”), section 103A of the 1996 Act and section 95(1)(c) of the 1996 Act.

3.2 A complaint of victimisation relying on the provisions of sections 27 and 39 of the Equality Act 2010 (“the 2010 Act”).

[4]The Issues The issues in the two complaints were clarified and set out in the February 2020 Orders of Employment Judge Leach and were amended as set out by Employment Judge Phil Allen in the Orders of April 2021. The issues were therefore defined as follows:

The claim

[1]Has the claimant made one or more protected disclosures as defined?

[2]Were any such disclosures in the reasonable belief of the claimant made in the public interest and did any such disclosures in the reasonable belief of the claimant tend to show one or more of the circumstances set out in section 43B(1)(a)-(f) of the 1996 Act?

[3]Were any such disclosures made to his employer pursuant to the provisions of section 43(c)(1)(a) and/or 43(C)2?

[4]Were any such disclosures the principal reason for the claimant’s constructive dismissal?

[5]Was there a protected act carried out by the claimant as defined in section 27 of the 2010 Act between 4 and 15 October 2018? For the avoidance of doubt the respondent accepts that there was a protected act on 8 February 2019.

[6]Was the claimant subjected to a detriment by being constructively dismissed by the respondent on the grounds that he had carried out a protected act as identified above? In addressing the above issues, the Tribunal has had regard to the full contents of the schedule set out to the February 2020 Orders. In particular Section C which defines the protected acts alleged and Section D which defines the protected disclosure alleged. The above-mentioned issues are succinctly set out. There are various legal questions to be considered in relation to each issue and we consider each question in our conclusions which follow. 5. Witnesses In the course of the hearing, the Tribunal heard from the following witnesses: Claimant

Findings of Fact

[7]Having considered all the evidence both oral and documentary placed before us and in particular the way the oral evidence was given, we make the following findings of fact on the balance of probabilities: Background.7.1 The claimant was born on 22 October 1964. He has lived in Britain all his life. English is his first language. When asked to describe his ethnic origin he does so as “Black British”.

7.2 On 21 October 2017 the claimant was placed with the respondent as an agency worker working in a section known as “Heads One Way” in the Packing Department of the respondent’s factory in Manchester. The agency which had placed the claimant with the respondent was called “Proman” and he was employed by that agency. The claimant remained an agency worker employed by Proman until he became employed by the respondent on a fixed term contract effective from 5 November 2018. The claimant’s employment ended during the currency of that contract.

7.3 The respondent company has some 350 employees. It manufactures cable ties for the automotive industries. The Production Department in Manchester works on a 24- hour pattern with 2 days shift and 2 night shifts. In addition to the production and packing departments, there is a warehouse function, tool room, maintenance and the usual administrative functions. At the material time, the head of HR at the Manchester site was CC who lead a team of two employees including Paul Nicholson (“PN”). The respondent company has other sites in the United Kingdom at Cannock and Plymouth. The UK Head of HR was JB who worked in Manchester but in a different building to CC and her team. The respondent company is part of a global company Aptiv and one feature of that structure is that employees of the respondent company have the right to use a facility known as “Driveline” to report issues of concern about the respondent company including whistleblowing concerns. If an employee used that facility, it would RESERVED JUDGMENT Case Number: 2410146/2019 be reported to JB as UK Head of HR and she would decide how best to deal with the issue. That is what happened in this case.

7.4 In addition to his normal work in the packing department, which was always as an agency worker, the claimant would be invited from time to time as from December 2017 to work “downstairs” in the production department. It was the claimant’s evidence that, if and when invited, he generally agreed to do that work and when he worked downstairs he did so on a series of Temporary Worker Machine Moulding Operative Contracts which lasted for 6 weeks each and would apply at any time in that period during which he covered work in the production department. We did not see any such contract.

7.5 The claimant subsequently wrote an email (“the Grievance Email”) dated 8 February 2019 to SM entitled “Do hear me now”. This was treated as a grievance and the claimant expanded on this grievance in a lengthy document (“the Grievance Statement”) (pages 97 -182) given to VR who was to investigate the Grievance. We deal with this matter in more detail below but allude to it now in order to put the matters complained of in the Grievance Email and the Grievance Statement in context. Applications for posts July 2018 onwards

7.6 In late July or early August 2018 the respondent advertised three moulding operator roles in the production department The claimant contacted PN of Human Resources (“HR”) to apply for those roles. There was on offer one permanent day position on Team A managed by JC and two permanent positions on Team C managed by Andy Gibney (“AG”). On 10 August 2018 before leaving for a period of annual leave the claimant was told by PN that the shortlisting process was ongoing.

7.7 On 25 August 2018 the claimant together with his friend and colleague Peter went to speak to PN to enquire about the claimant’s application. PN told the claimant that the three positions had been turned into internal transfers. By this we find that PN meant the three posts had been given to employees transferring from elsewhere. We did not hear from PN. We accept the claimant’s evidence to the effect that three female employees Mona, Maria and Natalia had been appointed to JC’s team to join their colleague supervisor Paula Araujo. PN mentioned to the claimant that a temporary night shift vacancy was coming up on Team D and the claimant’s application would be carried over to that vacancy if he wished. The claimant agreed.

7.8 In the Grievance Statement, the claimant alleged that this action by the respondent was an act of sex and race discrimination against him and evinced an attitude that he was not welcome to join the permanent employee workforce. The claimant questioned that if the three females had been internally transferred, what had happened to the two vacancies on the AG team. The claimant asserted that at least one of the females transferred was not eligible to internally transfer as she had not completed her probationary period as an employee.

7.9 On 11 September 2018 the claimant received an email from Dernica Garner of HR telling him that his application had been unsuccessful. The claimant was unsure whether this related to the July application or the application which was then ongoing.

Findings of Fact

[1]The events of the last 7 months should be the focus namely from July 2018 to February 2019.

[2]HR and managers did all in their power to stop him getting a permanent contract.

[3]The rate of pay when he worked downstairs in Production Department.

[4]The events around his application for one of the three vacancies in August 2018 and allegations of sex/race discrimination.

[5]Files having been changed by HR to cover up illegal processes and being given details of allegedly fictitious applicants for jobs by SM together with fictitious scores of RESERVED JUDGMENT Case Number: 2410146/2019 other candidates in an attempt to convince the claimant that appointment processes were fair and non-discriminatory.

[6]An email received dated 11 September 2018 about an upcoming interview demonstrated predetermination and was to prevent him attending an interview for a night shift vacancy. The interview of himself and “Steve” for the temporary position was for a fictitious vacancy. Steve (white British) was eventually given a permanent position. This demonstrated race discrimination.

[7]The fact that the claimant only had one day to prepare for the interview on 18 September 2018.

[8]Institutional racism being present at the respondent. Disproportionate disciplinary action being taken against “black employees” particularly by DA.

[9]No candidate appointed in September 2018 as a moulding operator left within one month of appointment as SM had stated to the claimant.

[10]The arrangements for the English test taken by the claimant in September 2018.

[11]Inferior contracts being changed to permanent contracts once preferred Caucasian candidates were in position.

[12]The claimant being forced to accept the fixed term contract offer before he knew the outcome of the interview in October 2018.

[13]Being cheated out of a permanent position so that other Caucasian employees could be offered a job on Wayne’s shift and could convert temporary contracts to permanent contracts and there being a conspiracy by three shift managers, HR and SM to achieve that outcome.

[14]Being given inadequate training during his probationary period for the fixed term contract role.

[15]Not being offered the position given to Jack.

[16]There being an illegitimate investigation into disciplinary allegations against the claimant in February 2019.

[17]Being told not to communicate with his manager JC after the investigatory meeting in February 2019. 7.48 At page 179 the claimant wrote: “ I am a victim of repeated systematic discrimination which is at an unacceptable level beyond that of which any reasonable employer should practice. I am currently on annual leave and following this investigation I don't realistically see myself returning to HT Manchester unless all named offenders are made accountable for their actions and the bias discriminative epidemic is removed. This would cause a huge amount of disruption to the business which I presume it would be easier for all concerned if I were to go. I suspect that what I have uncovered is just the tip of the iceberg and we have only touched HT Manchester discriminatory surface. In order to protect myself and/or if I am to continue working at HT this condition will help to protect me from some of the hostility. I expect a permanent senior managerial position to be created specifically for me. If this position puts me in charge of HR or minority recruitment or gives me the ability to oversee HR, reporting directly to the company director I will make changes to improve the recruitment process in the interests of the business. Failing this I will accept a senior managerial position in NPD or sale account management would be ideal. I see no reason why these conditions cannot be met simply because I have witnessed many employees in senior managerial position with no concept of what their duties and responsibilities are. I expect the position to commence ASAP and or settlement for loss of permanent contract earning, esteem, stress pain and suffering etc”.

[1]The application from the claimant for reconsideration is comprised in four email messages namely 22 April 2023 timed at 17:02, 23 April 2023 timed at 22:15, 24 April 2023 timed at 08:35 and 25 April 2023 timed at 22:03 (“the Application”).

[2]I have considered all four messages in detail. There is considerable repetition. I apprehend that the message of 25 April 2023 is the message which contains the main application for reconsideration. It comprises 159 numbered paragraphs. However, I have considered the contents of all the messages in detail.

[3]I have considered the relevant rules of procedure namely Rules 70-73 of Schedule I to the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013 (“the 2013 Rules”).

[4]I note that the one ground for reconsideration is now that it is necessary in the interests of justice so to do.

[5]In Outasight VB Ltd v Brown 2015 ICR D11, EAT, Her Honour Judge Eady QC (as she then was) accepted that the wording ‘necessary in the interests of justice’ in Rule 70 allows employment tribunals a broad discretion to determine whether reconsideration of a judgment is appropriate in the circumstances. However, this discretion must be exercised judicially: ‘which means having regard not only to the interests of the party seeking the review or reconsideration, but also to the interests of the other party to the litigation and to the public interest requirement that there should, so far as possible, be finality of litigation’.

[6]The Application is long and discursive. I conclude that the Application is in reality an attempt to re-hear the case which was dealt with over 5 days in January 2023 11.6C Judgment – Reconsideration refused – claimant - rule 72 Case number: 2410146/2019 with later deliberations by the Tribunal. That is no basis on which to reconsider the Judgment.

[7]The claimant complaints that the Tribunal restricted his case particularly in relation to the date of the alleged protected disclosure. The Tribunal followed the clarification of the claimant’s case which was produced after a detailed and lengthy (3 day) case management hearing on 18, 19 and 20 February 2020.

[8]The claimant raises issues in relation to the trading name of the organisation for which the representative of the respondent works. That was not and is not a relevant matter. In any event, the Judgment contains no error in that regard.

[9]I note that finality in litigation is an important factor when considering the interests of justice. I note that it is unusual for a litigant to be given a ‘second bite at the cherry’ and the jurisdiction to reconsider should be exercised by the Tribunal with caution. I note that Rule 71 of the 2013 Rules requires a party seeking reconsideration to indicate why they do so and therefore an application should necessarily also include an indication of which decisions within a judgment a party is inviting the Tribunal to reconsider.

[10]The Application does not make clear why an application for reconsideration is advanced save for a clear dissatisfaction with the outcome. The Application makes no reference to new evidence having become available or any other matter which might indicate that the interests of justice require a reconsideration of the Judgment.

[11]In those circumstances, the Application fails and is dismissed.