Miss K Alder v Pet Friends Ltd (In Vol Liquidation) and Govets Ltd: 2407240/2024
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 2407240/2024
Between
Miss K AlderClaimantPet Friends Ltd (In Vol Liquidation) and Govets LtdRespondent
Before
Employment Judge AndersonIn person for claimantDate 17 March 2026
JUDGMENT
[1]The Claimant was employed by the First Respondent.[2]All claims against the Second Respondent are dismissed.[3]The Second Respondent conducted the proceedings unreasonably within the meaning of Rule 74(2)(a) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024. The Second Respondent is ordered to pay a Preparation Time Order to the Claimant of £180.00.[4]In respect of the First Respondent, the claims of direct disability discrimination and harassment related to disability are not well founded and are dismissed.[5]In respect of the First Respondent, the claim of breach of contract (notice pay) is well founded. The Respondent is ordered to pay £2307.68. This sum is calculated on a gross basis.[6]In respect of the First Respondent, the claim of unlawful deduction from wages is well founded. The First Respondent unlawfully deducted sums from the Claimant’s wages. The First Respondent is ordered to pay the Claimant the sum of £862.30. This sum is calculated on a gross basis.[7]In respect of the First Respondent, an award is made under s.38 Employment Act 2002. The First Respondent is ordered to pay the Claimant the sum of £2307.68[8]In respect of the First Respondent, the claims of discrimination arising in consequence of disability, a failure to make reasonable adjustments and victimisation are well founded. The First Respondent discriminated against the Claimant. The First Respondent is ordered to pay damages to the Claimant in respect of:a. Damages for past loss of earnings: £1932.28b. Injury to feelings: £25,000.00c. Interest: £2959.45[9]The total sum ordered to be paid by the First Respondent to the Claimant is £35,369.39[10]The total sum ordered to be paid by the Second Respondent to the Claimant is £180.00
REASONS
[1]The Claimant, Ms K Alder a Veterinary Nurse brings Employment Tribunal proceedings against the First Respondent Pet Friends Limited, a company which is in voluntary liquidation and the Second Respondent, Govets Limited. Procedural Matters General[2]It is necessary to record a number of procedural points.[3]The hearing took place by way of CVP over a period of one full day.[4]The Claimant was represented by her Mother Ms Bennett. The Claimant also occasionally spoke on her own behalf. Mr Firmin a litigation consultant with Croner represented the Second Respondent. The First Respondent is in creditors voluntary liquidation and has not submitted an ET 3 in this matter or taken part in the proceedings. The liquidator is aware of the proceedings. The Second Respondent[5]Prior to the start of the hearing, I took the opportunity to read the Tribunal file. The Second Respondent had submitted an ET 3 in these proceedings but had not otherwise participated until the 18th February 2026. On the 18th February 2026, Croner had gone on record for the Second Respondent. Prior to that, Ms Barr was down as the named contact/representative within the Second Respondent. No explanation has been advanced as to how or why Croner came to be put on record at that point. On the 25th February 2026, the day before the hearing, the Second Respondent had served on the Claimant a bundle of documents and a witness statement from Ms Barr, who had been Practice Manager of the First Respondent and now worked for the Second[6]The Claimant is an individual with a range of impairments, including neurodiversity. She had complied with all orders of the Tribunal and had sought to engage with the Tribunal and the Second Respondent throughout. Both verbally and in writing, she made clear the extent to which the late actions of the Second Respondent had caused her additional distress.[7]The Second Respondent was in breach of multiple orders of the Tribunal. In these circumstances, it would be incumbent on any Respondent, but particularly a represented Respondent to make an application to the Tribunal to rely upon late documents and witness evidence together with a full and frank explanation of what has happened. No application was made with the late service of the bundle and the documents. At the outset of the hearing today, Mr Firmin appeared to be proceeding on the basis that now a bundle had been served and a witness statement provided, that the hearing would now progress as normal.[8]I was clear with Mr Firmin that I required an application to be made if the Respondent wished to rely on witness evidence and the bundle. The Claimant had complied with the case management orders of the Tribunal.[9]The problems were as follows:a. The Second Respondent did not attend the Preliminary Hearing on the 10th June 2025.b. The Second Respondent had not replied to the case management order requiring it to provide information regarding its participation in the litigation by 24th June 2025.c. It provided disclosure yesterday, albeit in limited detail, whereas disclosure was ordered on the 5th August 2025.d. It had served a witness statement yesterday and not by the deadline of 1st October 2025.e. The Second Respondent had not participated in this litigation. A strike out warning (of the ET 3) had been made by Employment Judge Holmes at one point, but this was then never progressed further by the Employment Tribunal.[10]Mr Firmin submitted that effectively the Second Respondent considered that it had put its ET 3 in and that this was sufficient. There was little detail. I asked him whether he was offering Ms Barr to give evidence on the point. He was not. He then changed his mind and did call her. The explanation she advanced was that she was not there for a lot of this period as she was working elsewhere as a consultant. She also said that any post that mentioned the First Respondent was sent on to the administrators.[11]The explanations being advanced were difficult to follow and not really consistent. A party has responsibility in litigation to reply to correspondence and to progress its case. Ms Barr was the contact on record. This did not change until Croner went on record. Yet, Ms Barr was also telling the Tribunal that there was a period in this litigation after January 2025 when she did not work for the Second Respondent. I asked Ms Barr who was responsible person for the running of the Second Respondent and was told it was Ms Sam Pony.[12]The Second Respondent was aware of these proceedings. It had submitted an ET 3, albeit a brief one. It received continual correspondence from the Claimant and the Tribunal. It received Orders from the Tribunal. Correspondence to the administrator for the First Respondent was sent separately to correspondence to the Second Respondent.[13]The application was opposed by the Claimant. The alternatives to allowing the application were a) postponing the hearing. This would have resulted in a listing in over a years time and well into 2027. The Claimant was not seeking this. b) preventing the Second Respondent from relying on this evidence. I consider that this would be legally permissible given the egregious series of breaches that occurred. However, the evidence was brief and I considered that I could ameliorate any prejudice as it arose, for example giving the claimant any extra time that she needed.[14]I permitted the Second Respondent to rely on these documents and the witness statement. With regard to the documents, they were brief and if anything my concern was that there had not been sufficient disclosure. The witness statement was also brief. I made clear that I would consider any additional unfairness as it arose during the proceedings. Approach to the Parties[15]Because of the Claimant’s identified impairments, I permitted Ms Bennett to remain on screen whilst the Claimant gave her evidence under affirmation. I did this rather than require her to leave the room on the basis that I had a large screen available to me in the Tribunal room and I would be able to observe whether or not there was any interference with evidence. I explained the position and gave the appropriate warnings. The benefit of Ms Bennett was that she could assist with locating documents, which the Claimant found to be a struggle in addition to her reassuring presence for the Claimant, who was plainly finding these proceedings to be difficult.[16]I also provided a significant degree of latitude to Mr Firmin. He said that he had been provided with this case by his Director the afternoon prior to the hearing. On at least three occasions, I allowed short breaks to be taken to enable him to take additional time. In addition, he indicated that he was concluding his cross-examination and I suggested that he may wish to reflect as quite a lot had not been covered. He did ask further questions, including further questions following the lunch break. Absence of Individuals[17]Separately, I record that I have heard no evidence from either Ms Sam Pony or Mr Luke Kinighton. The evidence of Ms Barr when asked ‘do you know where [name] is?’ in relation to each of them she said ‘no’. Neither Ms Barr or the representative of the Respondent were able to answer where they were or why they had not provided witness evidence to the Tribunal. Given that one or both of them would have been in a position to provide much needed evidence as to the events with the First Respondent and the events with the setting up of the Second Respondent in addition to the evidence regarding the failure to engage with the litigation, this is a concern. Ms Barr’s evidence on a number of relevant points was that she did not know the answer. At the same time, I record that because of this state of affairs, neither individual has had the matters contained within this Judgment put to them. I have taken this into account when making my findings of fact below.
The Issues
[18]The issues were set out at a Private Preliminary Hearing in June 2025.[19]In relation to the claim of harassment, the Claimant was ordered to particularise the specific whats app messages that she relied upon by harassment and also the sums claimed in her wages claim. By letter dated 29th June 2025, she did so in accordance with the order, sending copies to the Tribunal, to the liquidator for the First Respondent and to the Second Respondent. The list of issues below reflects those additional particulars.[20]The list of issues is set out as an Annex to this Judgment.
Findings of Fact
[21]I make the following findings of fact on the balance of probabilities.[22]Both the Claimant and Ms Barr gave evidence by way of affirmation. The Claimant struggled in her evidence and clearly found the process of giving evidence difficult. Her core point was that ‘go vets’ were on the documents.[23]Ms Barr had provided a short witness statement. On occasion, it was difficult to get Ms Barr to answer the question posed. Some matters were not within her knowledge. At other times, her evidence was overly partisan which again made it more difficult to establish a chronology. Reference was made to her ‘representing’ the Second Respondent whereas the role of the witness is to give evidence truthfully and answer relevant questions. My findings of fact should be seen in this context and the difficulty in obtaining relevant information.[24]The Claimant commenced employment in May 2024 as a Veterinary Nurse.[25]The Claimant was given a document which was a letter of appointment but also refers to ‘terms and conditions’. It is recorded as being sent by Ms Barr. It has Ms Barr’s name on it. It has the Claimant’s signature on it and her handwritten date of 25th May 2024. No other document purports to be the Claimant’s terms and conditions of employment.[26]In evidence, Ms Barr said that she was told to send documents like this and did not take responsibility for its contents. Furthermore, her evidence was that as Practice Manager, she did not check the document for accuracy or whether it was correct or not.[27]The document is on ‘go vets’ headed paper. It has an address at the bottom and refers to ‘Govets’ and provides an address. It also provides a go vets email address. The document states “Further to your recent interview, I am delighted to offer you the position of Veterinary Nurse with Govets’ The capitalisation is variable as is whether or not it is one word or two words.[28]There is no mention of Pet Friends Limited or any other entity in this document.[29]The Claimant’s evidence is that there was little by way of initial procedure within her employment. There was no Handbook and a limited induction. She was not enrolled in the pension scheme.[30]The Claimant would work shifts of around 10.5 hours to 11 hours at a time. She says that she had limited breaks and that she often worked without lunch breaks.[31]In her evidence, the Claimant describes working conditions from her perspective. It is clear as could be that the Claimant was not happy working at Go Vets (whatever the legal entity). She describes feeling as if she was not given the best possible chance of success and being at a disadvantage.[32]I find based on the Claimant’s evidence that she was likely to need to work within a supportive environment. i.e. one in which there were open discussions as to her needs and feelings. Having heard from the Claimant and Ms Barr, this was not such a work environment. The phrase has been used that the Claimant was told words to the effect that ‘this is a throw in the deep end practice’. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the approach taken, the indicators are that the Claimant was unlikely to fit within this culture. The Claimant has a right not to be discriminated against, what I am describing here goes beyond that. What I am describing is the more amorphous sense of ‘culture’[33]In June, the Claimant was continuing to have migraines. Her employer was aware of her autism.[34]The Claimant continued to have sporadic periods of sickness. The specific dates have not been made available to me. Eventually, the Claimant went off sick.[35]In her witness statement, the Claimant describes a number of events which could be described as alienating from her perspective. These are not claims before the Tribunal. Where the Claimant has claimed harassment, I deal with the whats app messages below. It is reasonable to record that there appears to have been difficulties and unhappiness throughout this short period of employment.[36]The Claimant raised a grievance on the 11th August 2024. It was addressed to Ms Barr. In it, the Claimant references her disabilities and the fact that the Respondent is aware of them. In it she makes a number of allegations of disability discrimination, some of which form part of these ET proceedings.[37]On the 19th August 2024, the Claimant was sent a letter with ‘go vets’ on it. There was no address or reference to a company. It was from Juan Cercadillo who was the Clinical Director. It references the Claimant’s probationary period of three months and states this “We have a number of concerns with your performance in your role and would like to discuss these with you. Consequently, you are required to attend a probationary review meeting on Monday 2nd September 2024 at 13.00 to discuss these matters.”[38]The letter goes on to reference the possible termination of the Claimant’s employment.[39]The Claimant did not attend any further meeting. The Claimant requested that she be allowed to attend any meeting with her mother. I accept her evidence that the First Respondent was aware that this was because of her disabilities and was aware that she required additional support. I accept the Claimant’s evidence that having her mother present would be a calming presence on her, allow her to understand information better and enable her to more effectively participate in the meeting. The Claimant tells me that this request was not granted.[40]That meeting was rescheduled via letter dated 19th September 2024, again from Mr Cercadillio.[41]The Claimant was dismissed by a letter dated 25th August 2024 but I find that this is incorrect and should be dated 25th September 2024. It was common ground that this date was wrong. The meeting was taking place in September and was not due to take place in August.[42]The dismissal letter references “...we must terminate your employment with GoVets Manchester immediately.” Again, the heading on the paper is the Govets logo. There is no named company on the letter and the email address is a Go vets email address.[43]The Claimant’s evidence was that she was given her payslips following her dismissal along with her P45. These payslips and P45 referenced Pet Friends Limited. I accept the Claimant’s evidence on this. There is evidence of her requesting these paylips, she did so because she wanted her payslips.[44]Even with these payslips, the position regarding pay is far from clear. The Claimant’s bank statements show that her pay came from a company called ‘Exo Investments Limited’. Ms Sam Pony is the Director of this company. Ms Barr’s evidence was that this was not on her bank account and that her bank account showed Pet Friends Limited.[45]On the face of it, the Second Respondent would appear to be a phoenix company arising from the First Respondent. It is the same activity – veterinary services. It is the same location. The phrase ‘Go Vets’ is used by both the First Respondent as a brand and by the Second Respondent. Ms Sam Pony is a Director of the First Respondent and a person with significant overall control of the Second Respondent. The Director of the Second Respondent Mr Luke Knighton is a former Director of the First Respondent, though it is important that I record that he was not a Director of the First Respondent during the period the Claimant was said to be an employee of the First Respondent, his directorship had ended prior to that. I also record that there is evidence of his being on the Go Vets Whatsapp group in August 2024 and writing as if he were in a leadership role.[46]The Claimant’s evidence, unchallenged on this point was that there were multiple companies based on her research involving a combination of or one of Sam Pony or Mr Luke Knighton. At least twelve were identified and a list was provided in the Claimant’s bundle of documents. These include the First and Second Respondent and also Exo Investments Limited, which is the company that appears on the Claimant’s bank statements.[47]I do not have any information or evidence placed before me as to the basis on which the First Respondent went into creditors voluntary liquidation.[48]No party has put clear or cogent evidence before me as to when the activities of the First Respondent ceased and the activities of the Second Respondent started. Given that this would be central to a core point of dispute, this is surprising. The evidence of Ms Barr was vague on this point. When pressed, Ms Barr referred to her employment moving to the Second Respondent and the First Respondent ending at the end of December, albeit this was a point (around a month) post entering into liquidation and five months after the creation of the Second Respondent.
The Law
[49]It is understood that discrimination is rarely overt. It can be subtle and fact sensitive. Evidence of discrimination may come from a range of sources but often depends on inferences being drawn from facts found. Recognising the difficulty that exists in proving discrimination, s.136 of the Equality Act provides for a specific application of the burden of proof.[50]Section 136 Equality Act 2010 provides:(1) This section applies to any proceedings relating to a contravention of this Act.(2) If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred. But subsection (2) does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the provision.[51]Section 136 provides for a two stage process for determining whether the burden shifts to the employer. It is not obligatory for Tribunals to resort to the burden of proof and in appropriate cases, the Tribunal can ask ‘the reason why’ the treatment occurred. Where there is room for doubt as to the facts necessary to establish discrimination, the burden of proof provision is of particular assistance. In contrast, where the Tribunal is in a position to make positive findings on the evidence, there is little to be gained by returning to the burden of proof: Hewage v Grampian Health Board [2012] ICR 1054.[52]Where the burden of proof provisions are applied, the longstanding authority is that of Madarassy v Nomura International PLC [2007] ICR 867 following on from Igen v Wong [2005] ICR 931. Mere difference in treatment is not ‘without more’ sufficient to reverse the burden of proof. However, the ‘more’ is not required in and of itself to be something substantial.[53]The mere existence of unreasonable behaviour does not in and of itself lead to an inference of discrimination. At the same time, the fact that conduct is unreasonable does not mean that it cannot be discriminatory. c.f. Bahl v The Law Society & Others [2004] IRLR 799[54]Direct Discrimination is provided for in s.13 Equality Act 2010 which states: A person(a) (A) discriminates against another(b) (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others.[55]The need for an actual or hypothetical comparator is set out at section 23 of the Equality Act 2010. There must be ‘no material difference’ with the comparator.[56]When considering a hypothetical comparator, it is possible to identify and use evidential comparators who do not fit within section 23 but nonetheless provide potential evidence as to how a hypothetical comparator would have been treated. However, in the present case no such evidential comparator has been advanced.[57]Section 26 Equality Act 2010 provides (1) A person (A) harasses another (B) if— (a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and (b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of— (i) violating B's dignity, or (ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B.[58]Section 26 further provides: (4) In deciding whether conduct has the effect referred to in subsection (1)(b), each of the following must be taken into account—(a) the perception of B;(b) the other circumstances of the case;(c) whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect.[59]A key element is that the unwanted conduct must be ‘related to’ the Claimant’s disability. (c.f. Peninsula Business Service Ltd v Baker (2017) UKEAT/0241/16/RN.[60]In Richmond Pharmacology v Dhaliwal [2009] IRLR 336 Underhill J when considering the nature of harassment noted: “We accept that not every racially slanted adverse comment or conduct may constitute the violation of a person’s dignity. Dignity is not necessarily violated by things said or done which are trivial or transitory, particularly if it should have been clear that any offence was unintended.” (para 22)[61]It is not suggested that a proposition of law exists that intent is irrelevant. Rather, the statutory language must be applied carefully.[62]Underhill J continued: “While it is very important that employers, and tribunals, are sensitive to the hurt that can be caused by racially offensive comments or conduct (or indeed comments or conduct on other grounds covered by the cognate legislation to which we have referred), it is also important not to encourage a culture of hypersensitivity or the imposition of legal liability in respect of every unfortunate phrase.” (Para 22)[63]Further context was provided by the Court of Appeal in Grant v HM Land Registry [2011] IRLR 748 in which the following passage from Dhaliwal was submitted by the Equality and Human Rights Commission (intervening) to be in error as conflating purpose and effect: “One question that may be material is whether it should reasonably have been apparent whether the conduct was, or was not, intended to cause offence (or, more precisely, to produce the proscribed consequences): the same remark may have a very different weight if it was evidently innocently intended than if it was evidently intended to hurt.”[64]The Court of Appeal rejected this: “I do not agree. When assessing the effect of a remark, the context in which it is given is always highly material. Everyday experience tells us that a humorous remark between friends may have a very different effect than exactly the same words spoken vindictively by a hostile speaker. It is not importing intent into the concept of effect to say that intent will generally be relevant to assessing effect. It will also be relevant to deciding whether the response of the alleged victim is reasonable.” (para 13 per Elias LJ)[65]A single isolated incident can be an act of harassment and that there is no obligation for there to be more than one act for it to amount to harassment. Again, context is essential and the wording of the statute must be applied.[66]Section 27 of the Equality Act 2010 provides:(1) A person (A) victimises another person (B) if A subjects B to a detriment because— (a) B does a protected act, or (b) A believes that B has done, or may do, a protected act.(2) Each of the following is a protected act— (a) bringing proceedings under this Act; (b) giving evidence or information in connection with proceedings under this Act; (c) doing any other thing for the purposes of or in connection with this Act; (d) making an allegation (whether or not express) that A or another person has contravened this Act.(3) Giving false evidence or information, or making a false allegation, is not a protected act if the evidence or information is given, or the allegation is made, in bad faith.[67]The duty to make reasonable adjustments is provided for within sections 20 & 21 of the Equality Act 2010. For reasons of brevity, I do not repeat them in full. However, I do summarise the position as follows:a. There must be a provision criterion or practice. (PCP)b. That PCP must place the Claimant at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with persons who are not disabledc. The Respondent must have failed to take such steps as were reasonable to avoid that disadvantage.[68]It is a requirement that the employer is aware or could reasonably be expected to be aware that the Claimant was placed at a substantial disadvantage in order for the duty to make reasonable adjustments to be triggered.[69]This is not a physical feature or auxiliary aid case.[70]Moving on from the Equality Act, this is a case in which some provisions of company law are relevant. The Companies Act 2006 is the source of a number of the core legal obligations that are placed on companies as a matter of company law. Section 82 of that Act permits the Secretary of State to make regulations placing obligations on companies as to how the information regarding that company is presented. Those regulations are the Company, Limited Liability Partnership and Business (Names and Trading Disclosures) Regulations 2015/17[71]Section 82(2) provides that the Regulations must in every case require disclosure of the name of the company and also make provision as to the manner in which any specified information is to be displayed, stated or provided.[72]Section 83 and Section 84 provide for civil and criminal sanctions for breaches. These matters are outside the jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunal.[73]Section 1 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 places the obligation on an employer to provide a worker with a written statement of particulars of employment. Section 1(3)(a) requires that the statement shall contain the names of the employer. Conclusions The Identity of the Employer
Conclusions
[74]Identifying the correct employer has not been straightforward. I consider that I have been provided with limited assistance by the Second Respondent in circumstances whereby it would be in their interest to persuade me that the correct employer is the First Respondent.[75]The ET 3 of the Second Respondent states “never been employed by GoVets Limited. No records of P45, wage slip or contract with company.”[76]In the previous case management hearing I recorded that the Claimant told me that Ms Barr who completed those grounds of resistance was the person who interviewed her for her role. I recorded that this was not a ‘complete unknown’ case. Amongst other matters, I recorded this: “In so far as the ET three of the second respondent seeks to leave an impression that the claimant is completely unknown to the company, on the basis of what the claimant has told me but also the documents she has provided this would be a difficult position to maintain. Therefore, if the claimant is not a complete unknown then it is reasonable to expect the second respondent to plead in full a basis as to why it is not the correct employer. None of the above is making a finding as to whom the correct employer is. All I am doing is making an observation that on the face of it this is not a ‘complete unknown' situation but rather a situation requiring a fact sensitive determination of whom the correct employer is. The lack of detail in the ET 3 together with the second respondents non attendance before me today is problematic.”[77]At no time has permission been sought by the Second Respondent to amend its Grounds of Resistance.[78]In Godfrey Morgan Solicitors Limited v Marzan & Godfrey Morgan Solicitors Limited t/a GMS Limited, Langstaff P was critical of a Respondent for providing sparse information in a pleading where there was a lack of clarity over the correct employer. It is right to say that the EAT expressly referenced the fact of the employer being a solicitor and the professional duties attached to that was a factor in the strength of the criticism. Nonetheless, I consider that Respondent’s generally should be expected to plead their case in a way that does not lead to ambiguity or worse, potentially misleads through omission.[79]Moving on from the paucity of information in the ET 3, the documentary evidence that I have is also concerning.[80]The document identified as the Claimant’s terms and conditions is in breach of s.1 Employment Rights Act 1996. It refers to ‘Go Vets’ as the employer. It does not say ‘limited’. It does not identify a legal entity. No other document correctly identifies the employer. It is a basic legal obligation in s.1 ERA 1996 to correctly identify the employer. It is an obligation that applies to all employers. It has a clear policy basis. An employee should know who their contract of employment is with.[81]Furthermore, the company is not identified in correspondence or letterheads. Simply ‘Go Vets’ is referred to. On the face of it, there is a breach of the obligations in s.82 of the Companies Act 2006.[82]I consider it is all too easy to euphemistically refer to these matters as ‘technical breaches’. Rather, these are matters of substance. In part, these problems, which should not have occurred have led to the need for this contested hearing.[83]The Second Respondent submits that ‘Go Vets’ is simply a trading name of the First Respondent. That could be true, but it wouldn’t alter the legal obligations to correctly identify the company in the relevant documents. Indeed, if you are using a trading name to the public then that is all the more reason for the correct legal entity to be readily identifiable.[84]There is a lack of detail in the ET 3 provided by the Second Respondent. Even though there is a very late bundle, there is a lack of disclosure by the Second Respondent in support of a clear chronology that would support its position. I have given consideration as to the extent to which I can draw evidential inferences from this.[85]What I do know is that the Claimant’s employment commenced in May 2024 and the Second Respondent did not exist as a legal entity until July 2024. This is important, but it is not conclusive as to the outcome of this question. It is not conclusive because the Claimant’s employment did not end until the 25th September, just under two months after the creation of the Second[86]It is also known that the First Respondent went into administration in November 2024. It is not a clear fact as to when the First Respondent ceased trading.[87]There is scant evidence as to what the Second Respondent did once it was formed in July 2024. There is no evidence at all as to why the Second Respondent was formed in July 2024.[88]I consider that this gives rise to the following factual scenarios:a. Somone other than the two named Respondents are the correct employer for the purposes of these proceedingsb. The First Respondent or another employer employed the Claimant initially but her employment transferred to the Second Respondent.c. The First Respondent was the correct employer throughout.[89]Ultimately, I have concluded that the correct employer is the First Respondent. Taking into account all of the above, the reasoning is as follows:a. It is a clear fact that the Claimant’s employment commenced in May 2024 and that the Second Respondent only came into existence in July 2024.b. I do not have any positive evidence that the Claimant’s employment transferred whilst she was employed.c. I consider that it is appropriate for me to draw evidential inferences from the difficulty that there has been in getting information from the Second Respondent generally, the difficulty with the partisan nature of Ms Barr’s evidence and the fact that there are multiple companies and the situation is opaque. In addition, the fact that ‘Go Vets’ is referenced as the employer and is identified on letterheads is also relevant. Given the repeated references to Go Vets, the use of a letterhead without providing company information and the reference in the offer letter and the dismissal letter to Go Vets, it is more likely than not that a decision has been taken to not put the correct company name on documents, irrespective of the legal obligations. The frequency with which this happens, combined with the basic nature of the obligation and the fact that it is not onerous or detrimental to a company to identify itself are all relevant points and indicate that a decision has been taken to keep the situation opaque.d. However, on balance, I do not take those broad inferences and reach a conclusion that a transfer occurred during the course of the Claimant’s employment in the absence of any positive evidence in support of the proposition. In the absence of positive evidence of a transfer, the inferences are not sufficient to make a finding that there was a transfer. On the balance of probabilities, the Claimant was employed by the First[90]I recognise that the claimant may find this outcome to be perplexing. This is understandable. The opaque practices of the First and Second Respondent and those who are responsible for those companies have resulted in a situation that causes confusion. Approach to the Claim Against the First Respondent[91]In light of the finding that the First Respondent is the employer, the claims that remain are against the First Respondent.[92]Whilst the claimant did seek to name individual respondents in or around August 2025 this was significantly after the period in which the claim had started and resulted in a refusal from the Tribunal.[93]The First Respondent is in creditors voluntary liquidation. No Grounds of Resistance have been submitted. In addition, on file there is correspondence from the Tribunal at the direction of an Employment Judge asking the liquidator whether or not they intend to participate in the proceedings in any way. I have not been able to locate a reply and I proceed on the basis that they have chosen not to participate as is the norm in such situations.[94]Notwithstanding the fact that no defence has been advanced, the Claimant still bears the burden of proving her case as she otherwise would.[95]I also recognise that given that the First Respondent is in creditors voluntary liquidation, it is likely that the Claimant will recover little, if any of any sums awarded. However, she has brought claims to the Employment Tribunal and she is entitled to have them adjudicated upon. Disability[96]The Claimant bears the burden of proof of proving that she is a disabled person for the purposes of s.6 Equality Act 2010.[97]The Claimant has provided detailed witness evidence in support of this. On the basis that it is on the face of it credible, detailed and uncontradicted I accept this evidence as accurate on the balance of probabilities. I therefore deal with the question of s.6 disability more briefly than I otherwise would in a contested case.[98]The impairments relied upon are ADHD and autism spectrum disorder together with other co-occurring impairments. The Claimant describes having cooccurring anxiety, depression and PTSD amongst other matters.[99]I find that the Claimant has a mental impairment. I find that impairment is a combination of the stated diagnoses and consider their cumulative effect.[100]I accept the Claimant’s evidence that her ADHD and autism are lifelong conditions. I also accept her evidence that she has had mental health impairments for decades.[101]The Claimant describes completing her degree in four years rather than three. She describes a range of matters which I generalise as being evidence of it impacting on her cognitive processing of information and other activities such as sleeping.[102]The Claimant also describes taking a range of medication, though I am less clear on what the exact periods of the medication were. The Claimant does describe during the course of her employment being on ADHD medication. I accept her evidence that without this medication she has great difficulty in functioning generally. Without medication, I accept the Claimant’s evidence that her symptoms would be worse day to day.[103]I find that there is a mental impairment. I find that it has a long term and substantial adverse effect on the Claimant’s ability to carry out day to day activities. I therefore find that the Claimant is a disabled person for the purposes of s.6 Equality Act 2010. The Claims Direct Discrimination
The Claims
[104]The detriment is said to be the dismissal of the Claimant. The Claimant relies upon a hypothetical comparator.[105]Direct discrimination requires the detriment to be ‘because of’ the protected characteristic.[106]There is a distinction between ‘because of’ and ‘something arising in consequence of’.[107]The First Respondent was at all material times aware of the Claimant’s mental health problems. These did not cause a dismissal prior to her grievance. Rather, the Clamant was dismissed following ostensible concerns about her performance and absence.[108]There is no positive evidence before me that the dismissal was motivated by the fact that the Claimant is disabled. Rather, the evidence that I do have points towards the consequences of the Claimant’s disability being related to the dismissal.[109]The evidence that I do have is the evidence the Claimant has given in her witness statement, the WhatsApp messages in which her absence from work is being raised by her, her grievance letter and the letter dismissing her from employment.[110]A non disabled person who had the Claimant’s level of absence and same ostensible difficulties at work would have been dismissed at the same time the Claimant was.[111]I consider these facts to be more applicable to a claim under s.15 Equality Act 2010, which I consider below. It would be an unjustifiable leap to find that this dismissal was direct discrimination.[112]I therefore dismiss the claim for direct disability discrimination on the basis that the Claimant has not proven that her dismissal was ‘because of her disability’. Harassment[113]I have given myself a detailed self-direction on the law above as it relates to harassment within the meaning of s.26 Equality Act 2010.[114]In relation to the Whats app message on the 28th June 2024 the Claimant considers that this text message was sent in general terms to the Go Vets WhatsApp group and that this relates to an error that she made albeit she is not identified.[115]The Claimant has not proven that this text message was unwanted conduct related to her disability. On the face of it, this is a message from an employer providing a general admonishment regarding a practice that should not happen. The fact that it may have been the Claimant’s error does not relate it to her disability. The fact that the Claimant then takes it a step further and links the reason she made the error to the effect of her disability does not in my view make it related to disability. Rather, what the Claimant is saying is that the error was a consequence of her disability. I accept that on some wider factual scenarios, that could be sufficient to relate to disability and establish harassment but on the facts before me, this is ostensibly a general admonishment and not related to disability. The threshold for the other elements of s.26 are not met. This claim is therefore dismissed.[116]In relation to the 2nd August 2024, the Claimant asks that I find that this message was put on WhatsApp as a way of having a dig at her whilst she was off sick. I accept that the Claimant subjectively views this as unwanted and that it possibly relates to her disability. However, I do not find that it had the purpose or effect of the proscribed language in s.26 Equality Act 2010. In so doing, I consider the context factors in s.26(4) including the perception of the Claimant, the other circumstances and whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect. I find that an employer is entitled to encourage and praise employees in a WhatsApp group chat. The Claimant is not directly referenced. The fact that the Claimant pleads that she perceived it as a ‘dig’ is also indicative of it not being sufficient to meet the language of s.26. This claim is therefore dismissed.[117]Regarding the messages from Ms Barr on the 19th August 2024, the Claimant did not directly challenge Ms Barr on these points in crossexamination. In any event, whilst I consider that a more empathetic tone could possibly be said to be advisable, this text correspondence is simply an employer asking an employee for the a fit note. The Claimant in her pleading does agree that she told Ms Barr that she would send her fit note in on the Friday and that this did not happen. The Claimant attributes not doing it to a deterioration in her mental health and considered that given Ms Barr knew that the Claimant was not fit for work this would be sufficient. In the circumstances and employer is still permitted to seek a relevant fit note. Therefore, whilst this may be unwanted conduct related to the Claimant’s disability, I do not find that it had the purpose or effect as set out in s.26 Equality Act 2010 taking into account he necessary context as required by s.26(4). This claim is therefore dismissed.[118]I therefore dismiss the claims of harassment. Discrimination Arising from Disability[119]The Claimant has proven that she is a disabled person and has proven that the First Respondent was aware of her disability.[120]The fact that she was dismissed is also proven. A dismissal is plainly unfavourable treatment.[121]In evidence, it was established that Ms Barr was a joint decision maker in respect of the dismissal of the Claimant. However, her evidence on the dismissal of the Claimant was limited. No corroborative evidence was available, nor was it possible for there to be a pleaded position by the First Respondent which could be relied upon.[122]I find that the dismissal was because of something arising in consequence of the Claimant’s disability. The First Respondent had an adverse view of the Claimant’s performance. Their perception of her performance was linked to her absence from work which was disability related and also how she performed her role, which the Claimant relates to her mental impairments and the need for training and support from her employer.[123]The burden of proof is on the Respondent to plead, advance and prove any justification defence. In this case, no justification defence having been pleaded or any evidence advanced, it follows that the claim for discrimination arising in consequence of disability succeeds. The Claimant is entitled to a declaration to that effect and damages. Failure to Make Reasonable Adjustments[124]The Claimant’s evidence was unchallenged.[125]I find that the Claimant has proven the two PCP’s relied upon. It is selfevident that the Claimant was required to perform her duties at work and that the requirement to perform duties applied to other staff. I also find that there was a policy in place as is commonplace that the Claimant could only be accompanied by a work colleague or TU representative, this reflects the statutory position as per the Employment Relations Act 1999. Because of the statutory and also commonplace occurrence of this, I consider that this is a viable PCP.[126]I accept that the Claimant is someone who may require breaks as a result of her mental impairments in a way a non disabled person would not. I also accept that she will have greater difficulty than a non disabled person in dealing with grievances and formal meetings.[127]The First Respondent knew of these substantial disadvantages. The Claimant was open with Ms Barr from the start of her employment as to her mental health impairments. I accept the Claimant’s evidence in this regard, corroborated by her grievance letter which refers back to her interview.[128]Given that the Claimant has established the fact of the PCP and the fact of her disadvantage and the Respondents knowledge of it, I accept that allowing her to take a break every four hours is a reasonable adjustment. I understand that this would be a point of contention in many cases, but in the present case the Claimant’s case is uncontradicted.[129]It would have been a reasonable adjustment for the First Respondent to allow the Claimant to go to formal meetings accompanied by her mother. I recognise that this goes beyond the provisions of the Employment Relations Act 1999, but the reasonable adjustments regime is capable of going beyond statutory minimum standards. I also consider taking into account my experience that this is becoming a more commonplace adjustment in the workplace. It is reasonable because it was unlikely to cause the Respondent additional problems and those conducting the meeting may well have benefited from the Claimant attending, her mother attending and assisting the Claimant through the process. This claim is well founded and succeeds.[130]In light of my conclusions on s.15 Equality Act 2010 and victimisation, I do not consider it necessary to find that there was a specific reasonable adjustment in the form of not dismissing the Claimant. The dismissal was already unlawful for those two purposes. The claim regarding the dismissal was broadly framed and given my lack of findings over the alleged misconduct due to lack of evidence I am not able to find that there was a duty to make reasonable adjustments in relation to the allegations against the Claimant. Victimisation[131]The Claimant relies upon requests made for breaks in June and July 2024 related to her disability as her first protected act. This evidence has not been contradicted, though the particulars are somewhat vague. However, for the reasons that are evident below, I consider the second protected act to be the relevant one for the purposes of the detriment claim.[132]The second protected act relied upon is the grievance raised by the Claimant on the 11th August 2024. I find that the grievance letter was a protected act, it references the Claimant’s disability and it references a range of matters including a failure to provide reasonable adjustments and harassment.[133]The Claimant was then dismissed the following month. Dismissal is a detriment. Therefore, the issue is causation and whether the dismissal was because of the Claimant’s protected act.[134]I take into account the timing of the dismissal. It is after the grievance raised by the Claimant. There is a degree of proximity. However, the invite to a meeting is on the 19th August 2024, within a relatively short period of the grievance.[135]The grievance is detailed. It makes a number of points that the First Respondent needs to consider. It is unlikely to have been welcomed by the Respondent. In addition, the proximity of the invite to a potential dismissal meeting is proximate to that grievance.[136]I consider these bare facts to be sufficient to meet the first limb of the burden of proof provisions within s.136 Equality Act 2010. These are facts from which the Tribunal could conclude in the absence of other facts that this was victimisation. The ‘something more’ is the nature of the grievance and the timing of the invite.[137]The First Respondent bears the burden of proof under s.136(3) to show that it did not victimise the Claimant. It has not done so.[138]First of all, there is no pleaded position in the absence of an ET 3. Secondly, the evidence of Ms Barr was light on detail as to what it is alleged that the Claimant has done wrong and there was no corroborative or supportive evidence. The mere existence of the probationary period is not in isolation sufficient to show that was the reason for the invite.[139]The claim of victimisation is well founded. The First Respondent victimised the Claimant by dismissing her. Notice Pay[140]The Claimant was dismissed without notice. This is corroborated by the dismissal letter which refers to ‘with immediate effect’.[141]The Claimant had a statutory entitlement of one weeks notice. However, the contract of employment which the Claimant signed provides for four weeks notice.[142]The claim of wrongful dismissal is therefore well founded and the Claimant is entitled to four weeks pay. Wages[143]The Claimant claims that two deductions were made from her salary for £432.60, on the 31st July 2024 and the other on 31st August 2024.[144]I have very little to go on. However, the two payslips do demonstrate that two deductions were made. The word used by those deductions is ‘sickness’. At the same time, the Claimant is paid basic pay in July and in August some basic pay and some SSP totaling £931.15.[145]I consider these matters to be deductions and that the Claimant has proven that fact. It is not clear the basis on which the Claimant has been paid less than her normal pay. These are matters that I would expect an employer to advance in response to a claim for unlawful deductions and in the absence of that, I find that the Claimant has established that these two sums totaling £865.20 were unlawfully deducted from her pay by the First Respondent. Preparation Time Order – Second Respondent[146]Rule 73(2) of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024 provides for preparation time orders, otherwise known as a ‘PTO’. Preparation time is time spent whilst not represented by a legal representative. It does not include time spent during the course of a Tribunal hearing.[147]Rule 74(1) permits a preparation time order to be made on the Tribunals own initiative.[148]Rule 74(2) provides that “The Tribunal must consider making a…. preparation time order where it considers that- (a) a party (or that party’s representative) has acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in either the bringing of the proceedings, or part of it, or the way that the proceedings, or part of it, have been conducted,”[149]It is to be noted that ‘must’ is mandatory language. However, I am also clear that the ‘must’ only relates to the duty to consider a PTO. Whether the threshold is met has to be seen in the context of the fact that cost/PTO orders are not the norm. The Employment Tribunal is in the vast majority of cases a no costs jurisdiction. There is a public interest in costs/PTO’s not being awarded so as to deter litigants from participating in the Tribunal process.[150]In light of the Second Respondent’s application to rely on a witness statement and documents served yesterday, I considered it appropriate to raise with the Respondent the possibility of a Preparation Time Order.[151]This was an appropriate course of action to take. The Second Respondent knew it was attending today in circumstances where it was in breach of multiple Tribunal orders, even if it did not initially intend to make an application. It was a point that was capable of being dealt with within the hearing. The fact of the breaches was an established fact by virtue of a) its factual accuracy and b) the Respondent’s ultimately successful application. The point was put to the Second Respondent and it had a reasonable opportunity to respond, particularly taking into account the undisputable breaches and the modest sums. The scale of the opportunity to respond has to be seen in the context of the modest nature of the potential liability and the fact that the breaches were established.. It was also proportionate to deal with it in the hearing given the modest potential sums and it would not be within the overriding objective to increase cost to require the parties to deal with such modest potential sums at a separate hearing.[152]I consider the threshold for a PTO to have been met. The conduct of the Second Respondent has been unreasonable in the following respects:a. It did not attend the Preliminary Hearing in June 2025.b. It was in breach of orders of the Tribunal requiring it to provide information, to disclose documents and to provide witness statements.c. I find that the above breaches were intentional. The basis for this finding is the fact that the Respondent is a limited company with a Director. It is a Vet company, seeking to provide regulated professional services, it is not a company that is unaware of the basic operation of society. That limited company submitted an ET 3 to this claim. It was therefore aware of this claim. Since that point it has not engaged with the Tribunal proceedings at all. A finding that the breaches were intentional is not a necessary prerequisite of a finding of unreasonable conduct. On these facts however, it is an appropriate finding to make.[153]There is an additional point regarding the opaque nature of the ET 3 and the lack of information provided in it. The reader is left with the impression or inference that there is no link at all between the First and Second Respondents. This is potentially unreasonable conduct as well. However, I consider this point to be distinct from the breaches of Tribunal orders point as the extent to which a pleading is unreasonable is a more nuanced point that may have required consideration of additional principles. I did not consider it in accordance with the overriding objective to make a PTO determination on this point at this hearing.[154]Having decided that the threshold for a PTO has been met, I retain a discretion as to whether or not to make a PTO order. In these circumstances, I exercise my discretion in favour of making a PTO. There is little, if any good reason to justify exercising my discretion the other way and the repeated nature of the Second Respondent’s conduct is in favour of making a PTO award.[155]The fact that the Second Respondent has successfully defended that it is not the employer does not take things further on these facts. I consider my Judgment above to have been far from inevitable. It is something that I have had to consider carefully. It was reasonable for the Claimant to name them as a Respondent and for the Second Respondent to be involved in these proceedings. In any event, the issue here is the Second Respondent’s conduct of the litigation.[156]I direct myself that a preparation time order is not punitive. It is compensatory. There must be a link between the unreasonable conduct and the time spent. I direct myself in accordance with Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council v Yerrakalva [2012] IRLR 78[157]I further direct myself that a preparation time order, unlike a costs order must not relate to time spent in the Tribunal hearing. It must relate to additional preparation time only.[158]The Claimant estimated the additional time spent as a result of the breaches of the orders by the second Respondent at around 13 hours.[159]I summarily assessed this to be around 4 hours. I consider that the Claimant’s estimate whilst somewhat speculative could reflect the fact that she has spent a long time on this case. However, I had to consider what was sustainable on the basis of summary assessment. The basis for the assessment takes into account:a. The Claimant is an individual who has regularly corresponded with the Tribunal and the Second Respondent. This includes correspondence referencing the lack of participation of the Second Respondent. Both pre and post the Preliminary Hearing, the Claimant sent more correspondence than she otherwise would have had to.b. That as an unrepresented party with a number of mental impairments, the Claimant is less likely to deal with correspondence as efficiently as a paid legal representative would.c. In the circumstances of the length of time covered by the litigation and the extent of correspondence, 4 hours could well be an under estimate. It is categorically, not an over estimate. I resolve any uncertainty in favour of the paying party.d. A summary assessment of costs is by its very nature summary and ‘rough and ready’ rather than going into the level of detail required by detailed assessment.[160]The Second Respondent did not ask me to take into account the means of the Second Respondent. In any event, I note that it is a trading limited company employing a number of staff. The sum reflected in 4 hours of a capped PTO rate is modest. Nothing suggests that it is not payable or would otherwise cause hardship.[161]The PTO rate after 1st April 2025 is £45 per hour. I therefore award on the basis of £45 x 4 hours = £180. The Second Respondent is ordered to pay this sum.
Remedy
[162]It is for the Claimant to prove her losses on the balance of probabilities.[163]I have limited evidence regarding remedy. I have a Schedule of Loss completed by an unrepresented Claimant. When I asked the Claimant about the accuracy of the Schedule of Loss, she did equivocate, indicating that her lack of knowledge means that she did not think it was necessarily correct.[164]In these circumstances, I have sought to do the best that I can, bearing in mind the burden of proof is on the Claimant to prove her losses.[165]The Claimant’s gross weekly pay was £576.92 per week. Her net weekly pay was £483.07 per week.[166]In terms of notice pay, I award four weeks pay as per the Claimant’s contractual entitlement. I award this on a gross basis. The Claimant must account to the revenue in respect of any sums received.[167]In terms of the period of loss, I direct myself that the Respondent bears the burden of proof to prove that the Claimant has failed to mitigate any losses. No evidence has been put forward in this regard. However, we do know that the First Respondent went in to voluntary liquidation on the 21st November 2024.[168]I have taken into account the notice pay already awarded to the Claimant. The Claimant’s losses then run from the 23rd October 2024. Four weeks of further losses is slightly rough and ready, but the exact chronology as to what happened with the First Respondent is far from clear.[169]I recognise that I am awarding damages. Therefore, I am seeking to put the Claimant in the position that she would have been had the discrimination not occurred. I have considered whether in awarding damages, the period of loss should go past the period of insolvency on the basis that the Claimant’s employment would have transferred to the Second Respondent.[170]I have not done so. The Claimant’s period of employment with the First Respondent was not a happy one. I have heard limited evidence, but the evidence that I do have is that this was a short period of employment and in that short period the Claimant was not happy at work prior to the acts of discrimination in respect of which she has succeeded. On the balance of probabilities, this was not a relationship that was likely to be sustained for the long term.[171]I consider it to be too speculative to say that on the balance of probabilities, I am able to find that this Claimant’s employment would have transferred to the Second Respondent had the discrimination not occurred. I would effectively be making a finding on a factual scenario in respect of which no positive evidence has been advanced and inferring based on the fact that this appears to be a phoenix company that employment would have continued in circumstances where the relationship between the parties appears to be strained.[172]The period in which the First Respondent goes into voluntary liquidation is a convenient point at which to cut off losses. It is an event that is identifiable and provable. It is an event which could have led to the Claimant’s employment ending.[173]I award the Claimant four weeks pay. £483.07 x 4 is £1932.28[174]The Claimant seeks a Vento award in excess of £60,000. I direct myself in accordance with the Presidential Guidance (7th addendum applies to the present case) as to the relevant bands. I must focus on the effect of the discrimination on the Claimant not on the conduct of the Respondent.[175]The entirety of the Claimant’s evidence was unchallenged. The Claimant experienced significant distress as a result of her dismissal.[176]The effect of the Respondent’s general treatment of the Claimant is not recoverable as damages. It is clear that the Claimant’s relationship with the Respondent was not a happy one. The issue of breaks has been found to have been unlawful discrimination, but the majority of the discrimination occurs after the Claimant goes off sick with disability related absence.[177]I consider this to be a middle band case. There has been a number of successful claims and therefore multiple acts of discrimination, albeit over a short period. The impact on the Claimant has been significant. The Claimant’s successful victimisation claim means that the ostensible reasoning for her dismissal was not true and this has an inevitable impact on her.[178]The Claimant refers to a worsening of her disabilities, including suicidal ideation. I accept this evidence.[179]I consider an award of £25,000 to be appropriate. This is a significant sum and reflects the seriousness of the effect of the discrimination on the Claimant.[180]It is not an upper band case. I do not have the evidence in support of such a significant award before me. This was a relatively short period of employment and thus the discrimination took place over a short period rather than a sustained period and whilst it has affected the Claimant significantly, the effect is not at the threshold of the upper band. I am not able to find that this is a loss of career case. The Claimant asserts that before me, but I do not have anything more to make such a significant finding on the balance of probabilities. I am not prepared to find that the Claimant is unable to work in the future, that evidence is not before me.[181]No specific claim for personal injury was made and I do not make any separate award. Where the Claimant has referred to exacerbation, I have taken into account her assertions in this respect as part of the injury to feelings award.[182]The First Respondent has been found to be liable for claims listed in Schedule 5 to the Employment Act 2002. Furthermore, at the relevant time, it was in breach of its obligation under s.1 Employment Rights Act 1996 to provide the Claimant with a compliant statement of terms and conditions. I consider it appropriate to make an award under s.38 Employment Act 2002. The First Respondent failed in its basic legal obligation to provide the Claimant with a statement of terms and conditions that correctly identified the employer. The consequences of that for the Claimant have been seen in this litigation. In these circumstances, an award of 4 weeks is appropriate. It is a significant breach of the most basic of obligations.[183]I therefore calculate as follows, the sums claimed against the First i. Notice Pay 4 x 576.92 = £2307.68 ii. Unlawful deduction from wages £862.30 iii. An award under s.38 Employment Act 2002. 4 x £576.92 = £2307.68[184]In respect of the Claimant’s Equality Act claims, I award the following damages in respect of the First Respondent:a. Damages for past loss of earnings of £1932.28b. Injury to Feelings £25,000.00c. Interest at 8% totaling £2959.45 made up of: i. On past loss: 260 days = £110.11 ii. On injury to feelings: 520 days = £2849.34[185]The Second Respondent has been ordered to pay a Preparation Time Order of £180.00.[186]It is my sincere hope that the Claimant can now move on from these events. She was clear before me that she just wanted this over with and I can fully understand why. Whilst the liquidation of the First Respondent means that she will have real difficulty in enforcing this award, given what she describes as the effect of this case on her, I hope that she now finds closure and is able to get the assistance that she needs to move on. Annex Complaints and Issues Identity of Employer
Remedy
[1]In respect of each of the claims below, who is the correct Respondent? Wrongful dismissal / Notice pay What was the claimant’s notice period?[3]Was the claimant paid for that notice period? Disability[4]Did the claimant have a disability as defined in section 6 of the Equality Act 2010 at the time of the events the claim is about May 2024 to September 2024? The Tribunal will decide:(1) Did she have a physical or mental impairment: Autism & ADHD?(2) Did it have a substantial adverse effect on her ability to carry out day-today activities?(3) If not, did the claimant have medical treatment, including medication, or take other measures to treat or correct the impairment?(4) If so, would the impairment have had a substantial adverse effect on his/her ability to carry out day-to-day activities without the treatment or other measures?(5) Were the effects of the impairment long-term? The Tribunal will decide: (a) did they last at least 12 months, or were they likely to last at least 12 months? (b) if not, were they likely to recur? Harassment related to Disability (Equality Act 2010 section 26)[5]Did the respondent do the following alleged things: (1) Whats App messages sent:a.28th June 2024 a WhatsApp message stating “again no pet or client details when monitoring meaning we can not now locate this to a patients account, please start filling this out.”b.2nd August 2024 – Luke Knighton sending a message to the Go Vets Whats App group “just want to shout out a big thank you to our head man and @ Luciano Cppola. Some tough times recently, being understaffed and without nurses etc, you two have absolutely smashed it.”c.19th August 2024 - Amy Barr texting the Claimant “Kirsty, at present we have you down as AWOL from the business due to not receiving any fit note or correspondence from yourself regarding not attending work today.” followed by “Kirsty you informed me you would send in a fit note on Friday. I haven’t heard anything from yourself thereafter and had no fit note therefore as your employer we are unaware of what is happening.” If so, was that unwanted conduct? Was it related to disability?[8]Did the conduct have the purpose of violating the claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the claimant?[9]If not, did it have that effect? The Tribunal will take into account the claimant’s perception, the other circumstances of the case and whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect. Direct disability discrimination (Equality Act 2010 section 13)[10]What are the facts in relation to the following allegations: (1) The dismissal of the Claimant.[11]If so, has the claimant proven facts from which the Tribunal could conclude that in any of those respects the claimant was treated less favourably than someone in the same material circumstances without a disability was or would have been treated? The claimant relies on a hypothetical comparison.[12]If so, has the claimant also proven facts from which the Tribunal could conclude that the less favourable treatment was because of disability?[13]If so, has the respondent shown that there was no less favourable treatment because of disability? Discrimination arising from disability (Equality Act 2010 section 15)[14]Did the respondent know, or could it reasonably have been expected to know, that the claimant had the disability? From what date?[15]If so, did the respondent treat the claimant unfavourably in any of the following alleged respects: (1) The dismissal of the Claimant[16]Did the following things arise in consequence of the claimant’s disability: (1) The Respondents perception of the Claimant’s performance at work?[17]Has the claimant proven facts from which the Tribunal could conclude that the unfavourable treatment was because of any of those things?[18]If so, can the respondent show that there was no unfavourable treatment because of something arising in consequence of disability?[19]If not, was the treatment a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim? The respondent says that its aims were: (1) No legitimate aims have been pleaded.[20]The Tribunal will decide in particular:(1) was the treatment an appropriate and reasonably necessary way to achieve those aims;(2) could something less discriminatory have been done instead;(3) how should the needs of the claimant and the respondent be balanced? Reasonable Adjustments (Equality Act 2010 sections 20 & 21)[21]Did the respondent know, or could it reasonably have been expected to know, that the claimant had the disability? From what date?[22]A “PCP” is a provision, criterion or practice. Did the respondent have the following PCPs:(1) Requiring the Claimant to perform her duties(2) Not allowing the Claimant to bring a third party to grievance or disciplinary meetings[23]Did the PCPs put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage compared to someone without the claimant’s disability, in that23.1 the Claimant requires breaks in order to avoid becoming overwhelmed.23.2 The Claimant had greater difficulty in dealing with formal situations and articulating her point of view or responding to information[24]Did the respondent know, or could it reasonably have been expected to know, that the claimant was likely to be placed at the disadvantage?[25]Did the respondent fail in its duty to take such steps as it would have been reasonable to have taken to avoid the disadvantage? The claimant says that the following adjustments to the PCP would have been reasonable:(1) Allowing the Claimant to take a short break roughly every four hours or so(2) Allowing the Claimant to bring a third party such as her mother to a grievance or disciplinary hearing(3) Not dismissing the Claimant.[26]By what date should the respondent reasonably have taken those steps? Victimisation (Equality Act 2010 section 27)[27]Did the claimant do a protected act as follows:(1) In June and July 2024 make repeated requests for adjustments and breaks.(2) Raise a grievance on the 12th August 2024?[28]Did the respondent do the following things: (1) Dismiss the Claimant.[29]By doing so, did it subject the claimant to detriment?[30]If so, has the claimant proven facts from which the Tribunal could conclude that it was because the claimant did a protected act or because the respondent believed the claimant had done, or might do, a protected act?[31]If so, has the respondent shown that there was no contravention of section 27? Remedy for discrimination or victimisation[32]Should the Tribunal make a recommendation that the respondent take steps to reduce any adverse effect on the claimant? What should it recommend?[33]What financial losses has the discrimination caused the claimant?[34]Has the claimant taken reasonable steps to replace lost earnings, for example by looking for another job?[35]If not, for what period of loss should the claimant be compensated?[36]What injury to feelings has the discrimination caused the claimant and how much compensation should be awarded for that?[37]Has the discrimination caused the claimant personal injury and how much compensation should be awarded for that?[38]Is there a chance that the claimant’s employment would have ended in any event? Should their compensation be reduced as a result?[39]Did the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures apply?[40]Did the respondent or the claimant unreasonably fail to comply with it?[41]If so, is it just and equitable to increase or decrease any award payable to the claimant? By what proportion, up to 25%?[43]Should interest be awarded? How much? Unauthorised deductions[44]Were the wages paid to the claimant less than the wages s/he should have been paid? The Claimant says £432.60 was deducted on the 31st July 2024 and £432.60 was deducted on the 31st August 2024.[45]Was any deduction required or authorised by statute?[46]Was any deduction required or authorised by a written term of the contract?[47]Did the claimant have a copy of the contract or written notice of the contract term before the deduction was made?[48]Did the claimant agree in writing to the deduction before it was made? How much is the claimant owed?