Mr K Aniagolu v World Class Security Ltd: 2406912/2024
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 2406912/2024
Between
Mr K AniagoluClaimantWorld Class Security LtdRespondent
Before
Employment Judge L CowenIn person for claimantDate 15 December 2025
JUDGMENT
(1) The claimant was not an employee or a worker for the purposes of section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.(2) The claimant’s claim for unlawful deduction of wages therefore fails and is dismissed.
REASONS
[1]This hearing took place through CVP on 7 August 2025 and 19 September 2025.[2]Evidence was given by the claimant, and by Mr W Raza and Mr A Khawaja on behalf of the respondent. The claimant had not produced a witness statement. I permitted the claimant’s bundle of documents to stand as his evidence in chief. During the hearing reference was also made to documents contained in an agreed bundle.[3]The respondent had produced witness statements from several individuals which provided general evidence of their experience with the respondent, evidence which I considered to be irrelevant to the issues which I had to determine in this claim. I therefore had no regard to the witness statements beyond the witness statements of Mr Raza and Mr Khawaja.[4]Judgment was reserved at the conclusion of the hearing on 19 September 2025. This document sets out my judgment and the written reasons for my judgment.
The issues
[5]The claimant claims for unlawful deduction from wages in respect of wages not paid for work undertaken by the claimant between 10 July 2024 to 1 August 2024.[6]It is accepted that the claim was brought in time.[7]The respondent opposes the claim on the ground that the claimant is not an employee and not a worker. A List of Issues had been agreed at a Case Management Hearing that took place on 11 April 2025. Preliminary Issues Application to postpone[8]On 7 August 2025 the respondent made an application to postpone the final hearing under Rule 32 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 (“the 2024 Rules”). The application was based on the unavailability of Mr S Shah, who the respondent described as a key witness.[9]The respondent had previously made an application to postpone the Final Hearing which was refused on 6 August 2025.[10]The claimant opposed the application, submitting that the case should go ahead today.[11]I refused the application to postpone today’s hearing. I had regard to the overriding objective contained in Rule 3 of the 2024 Rules, namely the requirement to deal with cases fairly and justly. I had regard to the time that had been available to the respondent to seek to arrange matters such that Mr Shah could attend today.[12]I also had regard to the witness statements served by the respondent, and considered that relevant matters could be addressed by Mr Raza, who was in attendance and able to give evidence to the tribunal. I considered the prejudicial effect of delay on all parties.[13]In my assessment, it would not be appropriate to adjourn today’s hearing to another date given the evidence that could be presented by both parties, and the prejudicial impact of delay. Application to strike-out[14]The respondent made an application to strike out the claimant’s claim under Rule 38 of the 2024 Rules. The respondent submitted that the evidence demonstrated that the claimant was a self-employed subcontractor and that his claim for unlawful deduction of wages had no realistic prospect of success.[15]The respondent further submitted that the manner in which the claim had bene conducted and the claimant’s non-compliance with orders made by the tribunal provided an alternative basis to strike out the claimant’s claim.[16]The claimant opposed the application to strike out his claim. He submitted that he was not self-employed and that he was an employee of the respondent.[17]I refused the respondent’s application to strike out the claim. In my assessment there was a clear factual dispute between the parties regarding the claimant’s employment status, and I would need to hear evidence to resolve this dispute. In my assessment, it could not be said that the documents established that the claimant’s claim had little prospect of success.[18]I also did not consider the claimant’s conduct of the claim to be inappropriate, and although he had not complied with the tribunal’s directions to provide a witness statement, I did not consider this to be due to a wilful failure to comply on his part, having regard to the fact that he was representing himself as a litigant in person.[19]Having dealt with these two preliminary issues, I now set out the findings of fact I reached after hearing the evidence in the case. The Findings of Fact Relevant to the Issues[20]I note at the outset that the evidence before the tribunal raised a wide range of matters, several of which I considered irrelevant to the issues which I had to determine, namely what was the claimant’s employment status and had he suffered an unlawful deduction from wages.[21]I have reached findings of fact in relation to the matters which I determined were necessary to determine the claimant’s claim. I set out my findings of fact in relation to these matters below.[22]The parties were in agreement that the claimant began work for the respondent on 10 July 2024. He worked as a door supervisor. There was no written contract between the parties.[23]The parties agreed that the claimant had incurred wages of £1690.00. The parties agreed that the claimant had worked the shifts he claimed, and from the text messages produced by the claimant, it is clear that he attended work on time and put care into his work, which was often undertaken in challenging conditions.[24]I have considered the circumstances in which the claimant began to undertake shifts with the respondent. Mr Raza’s evidence was that from the outset of his working relationship with the respondent, the claimant held himself out as a self-employed subcontractor. Mr Raza stated that the claimant had mentioned that he worked as a door supervisor at another venue and that he would only work accept shifts with the respondent to the extent that his other commitments allowed.[25]The respondent relied on a document referred to as a declaration that the claimant had signed prior to commencing work. This document is headed “payment form & disclaimer”. It contains a section one which is headed “status details” which gives various options to be indicated.[26]The box under the heading “PAYE Employee” is marked “yes”. There is a section two to this document headed “disclaimer” which, amongst other things, states “I confirm that I am responsible for payment of my own taxes, national insurance and returns as a self-employed individual”. This section is signed by the claimant, with the date of the signature being 16th July 2024.[27]There was some dispute between the parties regarding whether the document I have described was the original version of the document signed by the claimant. I consider the document to be somewhat contradictory in the labels applied by the parties to their working relationship. There is reference to being an employee (from the box marked “yes” in section one) and also reference to being a self-employed individual (the declaration signed in section 2).[28]In any event, having regard to the decision in Uber BV and others (Appellants) v Aslam and others (Respondents) [2021] UKSC 5 (“Uber”), I have reminded myself that the labels the parties apply to their working relationship is not the final determinant of their working relationship; I must consider the nature of the relationship as shown by what happened between the parties. I therefore do not consider the document headed “payment form and disclaimer” as determining the working relationship between the parties.[29]Looking to the arrangements for the work undertaken, in relation to the provision of tools and equipment, Mr Raza’s evidence was that the claimant supplied and paid for items needed for his work. He stated that the respondent required the claimant to wear a uniform, and that the claimant purchased his own uniform. When questioned, the claimant confirmed that he had purchased clothes to wear at work. I have also had regard to text messages in the agreed bundle in which the claimant says he bought trousers, a blazer and shoes for work, at significant personal expense.[30]I have also considered how work was offered to and accepted by the claimant. Mr Raza’s evidence was that the claimant accepted only a limited number of shifts with the respondent and turned down other shifts as he chose. The messages produced by the claimant show that he was allocated shifts by text message, which set out the dates and times when he was expected to work. He was to engage with the client receiving his security services if there was any major incident at the site of work. His work was not directly supervised by the respondent but he had to report to a chat group every hour during his shift.[31]In his evidence, the claimant stated that he did not refuse any work allocated by the respondent, but he did say in advance if he would not be available. He stated that he did not refuse to work on any day that the respondent appointed him. When asked whether there would be any punishment or negative consequences if he did not attend shifts he was offered, he stated that he did not miss any shifts that he was scheduled to do.[32]The respondent referred to a message where the claimant refers to having “an emergency” and states that he will not be able to work, as well as a message where the claimant refers to leaving “AMBA” and attending a training programme in London.[33]These messages were isolated from their context, and it was not clear to whom they had been sent. The claimant referred to them as being sent by him to a different person with whom he had worked. I have placed no reliance upon these messages as their meaning was far from clear. However, the claimant did accept in his evidence that he had been told that before taking a day off he had to give notice. When asked whether in general there was an expectation that he could take a day off work, he said that he had been told before taking a day off work he would need to give a week or two weeks’ notice.[34]The claimant explained that in his first week of work he worked for two days, then was unavailable for a week, and then the next week he started full time hours, then he did four days. He said that the respondent was “perfectly alright” if he was not available as long as he gave them notice. I have therefore concluded that there was flexibility in the arrangements for the acceptance of shifts, and that the claimant was, subject to giving notice regarding his availability, free to take or refuse shifts as he wanted.[35]In his witness statement, Mr Raza stated that on at least three occasions, the claimant subcontracted his allocated shifts to other individuals of his choosing. The claimant did not accept this, and explained that he had never not attended a shift he had been booked for, and that he had introduced people he knew who were looking for work to the respondent, but had not supplied others to do his work.[36]In his oral evidence, Mr Raza explained that he was not asserting that the claimant actually subcontracted his shifts to others, but that others had been introduced to the respondent by the claimant, who would do shifts for the respondent on behalf of the claimant.[37]In his evidence, Mr Khawaja said that he recollected other individuals attending shifts for the claimant. However, his evidence of this was somewhat vague, and whilst it is understandable that Mr Khawaja may not recollect key details of interactions he had with people some time ago, I do not consider that his evidence can establish others actually performed shifts for the claimant.[38]There was also no independent evidence before the tribunal of individuals working for the respondent as part of a separate business operated by the claimant. I do not accept that the claimant was engaging others to work in this way for the respondent.[39]It was also asserted that the claimant had others working for him in security in another geographical area. Mr Khawaja gave evidence that the claimant had spoken to him about this work. The claimant denied having a security business himself and working in another area. I have determined that there is insufficient evidence before me to prove that the claimant operated a security business in another area. I considered Mr Khawaja to be somewhat vague in his recollections of conversations with the claimant. This is understandable, but these recollections do not provide sufficient clarity of the matters the respondent alleges.[40]Mr Raza was asked about the arrangements for shifts being allocated by the respondent. Mr Raza explained that the respondent had a pool of subcontractors. He stated that work was offered to the subcontractors, and they could take it, or send people who met certain requirements, and as long as the people sent met those criteria they would be accepted for work. The criteria that had to be met related to ensuring compliance with the legal requirements of the security industry.[41]Mr Raza explained that in a “worst case scenario”, if someone persistently did not accept work, they would not be offered further shifts, but the arrangement was flexible, and people could cover others’ shifts if they met the legal requirements for the industry. I accepted Mr Raza’s account of the arrangements for the offering and allocation of work.[42]Although there was no written document before the tribunal confirming this arrangement, I considered this arrangement to be consistent with the claimant’s account of the flexibility in the work offered, and the expectation of his availability. I accept that the claimant’s view was that he was introducing people he knew who were looking for work rather than providing people to cover his shifts. I also accept Mr Raza’s evidence that shifts could be covered by those meeting the legal requirements for the industry.[43]Mr Raza’s evidence was that the claimant invoiced the company for his services. Mr Raza stated that he made it clear to the claimant that he would be responsible for his own taxes and National Insurance contributions. The claimant was very clear in his assertion that he could not be self-employed as he did not have a unique taxpayer reference number.[44]The claimant also referred to his post-graduate student visa status as a reason he could not be self-employed. I accept that the claimant was sincere and genuine in his account of these matters. The documents show that he provided his national insurance number to the respondent, and that he has not provided a unique taxpayer reference number.[45]Mr Raza asserted that the claimant advertised himself online as a freelancer, and suggested that this was consistent with the work he did for the respondent being in the capacity of a self-employed contractor who was taking on work around other professional commitments.[46]There was evidence before me of graphic design work undertaken by the claimant. The claimant explained that this was work he had undertaken prior to coming to the UK. I accept the claimant’s account of these matters, and did not consider it to be indicative of the claimant’s employment status in this case.
The law
[47]The claimant’s claim is a claim for unlawful deduction from wages. Section 13 (1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”) provides: “(1) An employer shall not make a deduction from wages of a worker employed by him unless— (a) the deduction is required or authorised to be made by virtue of a statutory provision or a relevant provision of the worker's contract, or (b) the worker has previously signified in writing his agreement or consent to the making of the deduction.[48]The term “worker” is defined in section 230 (3) of the ERA as: “an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) -(a) a contract of employment, or(b) any other contract, whether express or implied and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing, whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual; and any reference to a worker's contract shall be construed accordingly”.[49]The term “wages” is defined in section 27(1) of the ERA as ‘any sums payable to the worker in connection with his employment’.[50]The definition of a “contract of employment” is found in section 230 (2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 as “a contract of service whether express or implied, and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing”.[51]In Ready Mixed Concrete Ltd. v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497, McKenna J defined a contract of service in the following terms: “A contract of service exists if these three conditions are fulfilled.(i) The servant agrees that, in consideration of a wage or other remuneration, he will provide his own work and skill in the performance of some service for his master.(ii) He agrees, expressly or impliedly, that in the performance of that service he will be subject to the other's control in a sufficient degree to make that other master.(iii) The other provisions of the contract are consistent with its being a contract of service ….”[52]In the case of Pimlico Plumbers Ltd v Smith [2017] EWCA Civ 51, Lord Wilson JSC referred to the significance of the obligation of personal performance when considering whether someone is a worker within s 230 (3), stating: “The sole test is of course the obligation of personal performance; any other so called sole test would be an inappropriate usurpation of the sole test. But there are cases, of which the present case is one, in which it is helpful to assess the significance of Mr Smith's right to substitute another Pimlico operative by reference to whether the dominant feature of the contract remained personal performance on his part.” (at [32])[53]In Uber Lord Leggatt provided the following guidance in relation to determining whether an individual is a “worker” within the meaning of section 230 (3): “In determining whether an individual is a "worker", there can, as Baroness Hale said in the Bates van Winkelhof case at para 39, "be no substitute for applying the words of the statute to the facts of the individual case." At the same time, in applying the statutory language, it is necessary both to view the facts realistically and to keep in mind the purpose of the legislation. As noted earlier, the vulnerabilities of workers which create the need for statutory protection are subordination to and dependence upon another person in relation to the work done. As also discussed, a touchstone of such subordination and dependence is (as has long been recognised in employment law) the degree of control exercised by the putative employer over the work or services performed by the individual concerned. The greater the extent of such control, the stronger the case for classifying the individual as a "worker" who is employed under a "worker's contract” (at [87]) The parties’ submissions[54]The tribunal heard closing oral arguments by both parties, and had received written closing submissions from both parties. These are not repeated here but have been considered and taken into account in reaching this decision. Was the claimant an employee?[55]I have considered section 230 (2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 to consider this issue. There is no written contract of employment in this case. There was a verbal agreement between the parties through which the respondent offered work to the claimant, and agreed to pay him if he performed that work.[56]I have had regard to paragraph [76] of Lord Leggatt’s judgment in Uber regarding the distinction drawn in employment law between three categories of people: “those employed under a contract of employment; those self-employed people who are in business on their own account and undertake work for their clients or customers; and an intermediate class of workers who are self-employed but who provide their services as part of a profession or business undertaking carried on by someone else”.[57]I have kept in mind that the labels people apply to their working relationship are not determinative of their employment status.[58]I have had regard to the definition of a contract of service in Ready Mixed Concrete Ltd. v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497. In my assessment, in this case, the working relationship between the parties could not be characterised as involving a contract of service as I do not conclude that there is the necessary obligation of personal service in this case.[59]I have concluded that the claimant was free to accept or refuse work as he wanted to. I have concluded that the respondent would continue to offer him work if he did not accept shifts. I have concluded that others could undertake work in place of the claimant, subject to certain limited conditions being satisfied.[60]I have also considered the circumstances in which the work was performed, and consider that the respondent did not exercise control over when the work was performed and how it was performed for the working relationship to be characterised as a contract of service.[61]The claimant provided his own uniform, subject to certain broad items of clothing being required, and no tools or equipment was provided by the respondent. The claimant was not supervised in his work. The respondent was not the person the claimant was to contact in the event of issues at the site of work.[62]I therefore consider that the element of control necessary for a contract of service was not present in this case. Was the claimant a worker?[63]To answer this question, I have considered s.230 (3) of the ERA 1996. I have had regard to paragraph [87] of the judgment in Uber in which the Court emphasised that the determination of whether someone is a worker entails consideration of the facts of a particular case and to keep in mind the purpose of the legislation.[64]For an individual to be a worker under s. 230 (3) (b) of the ERA 1996 there must be a contract, whether express or implied, and, if express, whether written or oral. I have concluded that in this case there was a verbal agreement between the parties through which the respondent offered work to the claimant, and agreed to pay him if he performed that work.[65]To be a worker, there is also the requirement that the individual undertakes to do or perform the work personally. In this case, I have had regard to the flexibility in working arrangements, and I accept the respondent’s evidence that if work was not accepted, shifts would continue to be offered. I accept the respondent’s evidence that subject to certain limited requirements, the claimant could send someone else to perform the work that he had undertaken to do.[66]I do not therefore conclude that there was an undertaking that the claimant would do the work personally. For this reason, I do not consider the claimant to be a worker within the meaning of section 230 (3) (b) of the ERA 1996.[67]My judgment is therefore that the claimant is not able to bring a claim for unlawful deduction of wages as he is not an employee or a worker within the meaning of section 230 of the ERA 1996, and his claim is dismissed.