Mr Alim v Royal and Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd: 2406202/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2406202/2023

Between

Mr AlimClaimant

Royal and Sun Alliance Insurance LtdRespondent

Before

Employment Judge KM Ross

Date 2 February 2026

JUDGMENT

[1]The claimant’s claims of direct discrimination pursuant to Section 13 Equality Act 2010 and claims for harassment pursuant to Section 26 Equality Act 2010 are struck out pursuant to Rule 38(1)(b) and 38(1)(e) Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2024.

[2]The claimant’s claim for notice pay is struck out pursuant to Rule 38(1)(b) and 38(1)(e) Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2024

REASONS

[1]The claimant is a litigant in person. He brought claims for discrimination on the grounds of race and religion or belief and a claim for notice pay. He was employed by the respondent Royal and Sun Alliance Insurance Limited between July 2022 and May 2023, when he resigned. His claims are for direct discrimination pursuant to Section 13 Equality Act 2010 and for harassment pursuant to Section 26 Equality Act 2010. He did not have sufficient service to bring a claim for “ordinary” unfair dismissal pursuant to Section 95 and 98 Employment Rights Act 1996.

[2]There have been five previous preliminary hearings. These were on 31 August 2023 before Judge Shergill, 23 November 2023 before Judge Tobin and on 9 July 2024 before Judge Leach. Judge Leach was unable to complete the hearing within the time allocation, so the hearing was part heard and there was another hearing before him on 1 October 2024. There was a preliminary hearing before Regional Employment Judge Franey on 15 August 2025.

[3]The claimant has supplied written further particulars of his claim on 22 September 2023, 21 December 2023, 14 March 2024 and 2 October 2024. He also sent further particulars to the respondent in late 2025. A final hearing has been listed twice and twice postponed. A detailed procedural background was set out by Regional Employment Judge Franey in his Case Management Order following the preliminary hearing on 15 August 2025 and I repeat it here. Background and Procedural History

[4]The claimant, a litigant in person, brought a claim for race discrimination.4.1 The claim form was presented on 30 May 2023 and when it was sent to the respondent it was listed for a case management hearing on 31 August 2023 and a three-day final hearing on 9-11July 2024.

4.2 The response form received on 19 July 2023 resisted all the claims.

4.3 There was a case management hearing before Employment Judge Shergill on 31 August 2023. The claimant was ordered to provide Further Particulars of his claims as the factual matters pursued under each legal type of claim were not clear. A further hearing was listed for 23 November 2023.

4.4 The claimant provided Further Particulars on 22 September 2023. He sought to introduce a wholly new complaint of disability discrimination. In its amended Grounds of Resistance, the respondent pointed out that permission to amend would be needed.

4.5 At a public preliminary hearing before Employment Judge Tobin on 23 November 2023 the unfair dismissal complaint was withdrawn because the claimant had not been employed for two years at the date his employment ended. The claims were discussed and the claimant again was required to provide some more Further Particulars. Directions were given leading to service of witness statements in June 2024 prior to the final hearing the following month.

4.6 The claimant provided Further Particulars on 21 December 2023. He raised a number of matters over which an employment tribunal has no jurisdiction, such as allegations of conspiracy and slander.

4.7 He had a third attempt at providing Further Particulars on 14 March 2024. This document set out 54 different complaints and provided some clear details for each one. It was clear that the scope of the claim would not enable the case to be heard in three days so the final hearing in July was postponed by Employment Judge Allen and the matter listed for a case management hearing on 9 July 2024.

4.8 At that case management hearing Employment Judge Leach sought to clarify the list of complaints and issues based on the Further Particulars, but time ran out and the hearing was adjourned to 1 October 2024. The final hearing was, however, relisted for seven days between 13-21 October 2025. Employment Judge Leach identified that six of the 54 factual complaints were new matters for which permission to amend would be required.

4.9 At the resumed case management hearing before Employment Judge Leach on 1 October 2024 the claimant decided not to pursue his application to amend, and those six matters were dropped. The resulting List of Issues was still long and complicated. Directions were given for agreement of the hearing bundle and exchange of witness statements in May 2025.

4.10 Amended Grounds of Resistance were filed on 20 December 2024.

4.11 On 28 February 2025 the claimant made an application under the Civil Procedure Rules, which do not apply in employment tribunals. He alleged there had been tampering of evidence by the respondent (primarily redactions) and threats and abuses of power. He included details of without prejudice discussions between the parties which sought to resolve the case. The respondent replied to that application on 14 March 2025. It explained why there had been redactions in some of the material disclosed (due to previous subject access requests) and raised concerns about how the claimant had been pursuing the claim and the reliance on without prejudice discussions.

4.12 On 19 March the claimant said he would renew his application. He did so on 17 April 2025. He provided a table of what he said was the missing material. He asked the Tribunal to order that Pinsent Masons be prevented from representing the respondent, that there be a bar on any further without prejudice contact, that the Tribunal report Pinsent Masons to the Crown Prosecution Service and the Solicitors Regulation Authority, and that the defence be struck out.

4.13 Employment Judge Butler considered this application and directed that a response be sent by a Tribunal letter of 8 May 2025. In that letter he explained that he had considered the application of 17 April 2025 and the respondent’s response to it, and that the application to strike-out the Response was refused. Reasons were given in the second paragraph of that letter. Further directions for case preparation were made, and a dispute resolution hearing which had been listed for later that month was cancelled. It was later relisted for 15 August 2025.

4.14 On 16 June 2025 the claimant sent an e-mail asking for permission to use the documents disclosed to him by the respondent in this case for other purposes. The e-mail itself does not appear on the Tribunal file, but he sent a further copy with a chasing e-mail of 18 July. Neither email was copied to the respondent. He said that he wanted to use those documents for the purpose of civil proceedings for defamation, and to make complaints to the Solicitors Regulation Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority, and the police regarding alleged misconduct by the respondent and/or their representatives.

4.15 On 1 July 2025 the claimant e-mailed the Tribunal to say that he was pausing his involvement in the proceedings for health reasons, providing a copy of a sick note. In response the respondent said that he had been conducting matters unreasonably, such as refusing to agree the hearing bundle, and that witness statements had not yet been exchanged. Having considered that correspondence I converted the dispute resolution hearing which had been listed for 15 August 2025 into a case management hearing.

4.16 On 18 July 2025 the claimant e-mailed to say he would not attend the case management hearing or the final hearing in October 2025. The respondent made clear in reply that it objected to any postponement of the final hearing and that there was no medical evidence to support what the claimant said about the medical position. On 30 July 2025 Employment Judge Batten directed that the case management hearing would continue and the claimant would have to provide medical evidence if he was unable to attend.

4.17 On 6 August the claimant provided a copy of a medical report from his General Practitioner Dr Goggins. It was accompanied by a fit note from a different doctor for the period from 1 August to 1 November 2025 on account of ADHD, depression and anxiety. The report from Dr Goggins did not specifically address whether he was fit for either hearing, and an updated report was provided on 12 August 2025 to which I will refer below.

4.18 The respondent made an application on 8 August 2025 to strike out the claim on the basis of unreasonable and vexatious conduct by the claimant which was making a fair trial impossible. There were many components to that application, including the claimant sending e-mails to hundreds of people who had no connection with the claim, refusing to agree the hearing bundle unless the respondent admitted liability, and refusing to communicate with the respondent’s solicitor. It was also said that he had sent threatening letters to employees and witnesses and had commenced County Court proceedings against at least one of them.

4.19 The respondent followed this up with an e-mail on 13 August which attached documents in support of the application and asked that this hearing be converted to a public preliminary hearing so that the application to strike out the claim could be considered. The respondent also made clear that it objected to any postponement of the final hearing, even though it was maintaining in the strike-out application that a fair hearing was not possible. Events from 15 August 2025 to this hearing.

[5]At a preliminary hearing on 15 August 2025 Regional Employment Judge Franey granted the claimant’s application to postpone the final hearing which was listed for 13 to 21 October 2025. He recorded that the claimant made his application to postpone the final hearing, primarily on health grounds, although he referred in passing to an intention to apply yet another time to amend his claim.

[6]His note of the hearing makes it clear he relied on the medical evidence supplied by the claimant from Dr Goggins date 1 August 2025.

[7]He refused the claimant’s application to use documents obtained in this case for other purposes.

[8]He made case management orders.

[9]These included case management order 5: All communications from the claimant to the respondent about this case must be conducted only through the respondent’s chosen representative, currently Ms Paton. The claimant must not contact other lawyers in Pinsent Masons LLP or staff of the respondent itself about the case save in relation to contact with witnesses that he wants to call to give evidence for him”. P171

[10]He also ordered at case management order 6: If the claimant continues to refuse to accept emails from Ms Paton the respondent will need to make sure that all communications with him are conducted by post.p.171

[11]Regional Employment Judge Franey also listed this hearing. The purpose of this hearing was to determine.(a) Whether the claim should be struck out under Rule 38(1)(b) and (e) on the basis set out in the respondent’s application dated 8 August 2025, and/or

(b) Whether the case should be struck out because: (i) A fair trial is no longer possible given the passage of time before a seven day final hearing can be accommodated in 2027 and/or (ii) Because the continuation of the Tribunal proceedings is a factor preventing the claimant becoming well enough to attend a final hearing and

(c) If the case is not struck out the appropriate case management orders for case preparation to be resumed and the matter to be relisted for a final hearing. P170-1.

[12]Regional Employment Judge Franey also made a case management order that : If the claimant wishes to make any written response to the respondent’s strike-out application, or if he wishes to put forward additional medical evidence, he must ensure that it is received by the respondent and the Tribunal by 4:00pm on Friday 5 January 2026. No such information was received by the Tribunal and the claimant confirmed at the outset of this hearing none was sent. Procedural issues at this hearing and the claimant’s application to postpone.

[13]The claimant did not join this hearing which was conducted remotely by CVP at the listed start time 10.00 am. The clerk contacted him and he was able to join by 10.30 am. At the outset of the hearing I checked whether the medical evidence which had been produced by the claimant at the last hearing from Dr Goggins dated 1 August 2025 (see below) was still relied upon by the claimant. The claimant said that Dr Goggins report was still an accurate description of his situation. However, he said he was well enough to continue today.

[14]Secondly, I checked whether both parties had all the documents which I had. These were an index to an updated strike out bundle of documents, an updated strike out bundle, the strike out application (updated) and the skeleton argument of counsel for the respondent.

[15]The claimant said he did not have any of the documents. I asked the claimant if, since the last hearing he had unblocked the respondent’s representative Ms Paton so that he could receive email communication from her. He said he had not. For the respondent, counsel said they had made repeated attempts to send the documentation to the claimant via Royal Mail and at least one of the documents had been received, because they had a receipt, but they did not know which one.

[16]The claimant continued to deny that he had received any of the documents.

[17]We had a number of adjournments during the morning, and I arranged for all the documentation to be emailed from the Employment Tribunal by the clerk to the claimant. This took some time because the bundle of documents for the strike out application was hearing was 225 pages. It was too large to attach into one email attachment. However, the clerk divided it into sections and sent it, together with the index, the updated strike out application and the skeleton argument from the respondent’s counsel. The claimant confirmed he had received all these documents from the Tribunal.

[18]The claimant said he wanted to make a postponement application on the basis that it was not fair to proceed because he needed at least two days to consider the information. The respondent objected to the postponement.

[19]I refused the claimant’s postponement application. I was satisfied the documents within the bundle were not new documents to the claimant. I was satisfied they were all documents which he had seen before in the course of these proceedings. I was also satisfied that he was well aware of the application to strike out because it had been made in its initial format in August 2025. Although the claimant said he was entirely unaware of the strike out application the case management note of Regional Employment Judge Franey makes it clear it was discussed at the case management hearing in August 2025.

[20]I had regard to the interests of justice, and I was concerned of the very significant delay there would be if I postponed this hearing. I checked and the next available date for a one-day preliminary hearing was September 2026, a delay of almost nine months.

[21]I was satisfied there was a more proportionate way to deal with any prejudice to the claimant and that was to allow him time to consider the information. We therefore adjourned until 1.30 pm which gave the claimant almost two hours to consider the documentation. In the event when we resumed, the claimant was able to speak for almost an hour in a detailed and articulate manner on his objection to the respondent’s strike out application.

[22]I was mindful that the claimant has informed the Tribunal that he suffers from General Anxiety Disorder (GAD) and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and offered him regular breaks.

[23]This hearing concluded later in the afternoon so there was insufficient time for me to consider the submissions and give an oral decision to the partirs. I therefore informed the parties I would reserve my decision and write to them with a reserved Judgment. I was able to consider this case on 22 January 2026, in chambers, and reach a decision. The respondent’s application to strike out the claim.

[24]The application to strike out the claim sets out in detail the basis of the application.

[25]Counsel grouped the claimant’s conduct into the following headings:(a) Refused to engage with the respondent’s legal representatives, blocked all emails from them and flouted repeated requests from the Employment Tribunal to cooperate with the respondent.

(b) Refused to cooperate regarding agreeing a trial bundle and made repeated disproportionate disclosure requests for documents going far beyond the scope of the litigation.

(c) Successfully applied for postponement of the final hearing on the basis that he was too unwell to participate in litigation, whilst simultaneously pursing multiple County Court claims, an EAT appeal and sending correspondencde to multiple Employment Tribunals and news outlets.

(d) Sent harassing correspondence to the respondent’s witnesses.

(e) Made repeated and extensive unfounded allegations of bad faith and professional misconduct against people at R and its solicitors

(f) Inflated the alleged value of his claim from £126,000 in his first schedule of loss to over £36 million in his updated schedule of loss

[26]The claimant objected to the application on the following basis. Firstly he said it was wrong that the application should be heard at all because he had made an application to strike out the response earlier in the year and was appealing it to the Employment Appeal Tribunal and this application should not be heard until the Employment Appeal Tribunal had determined his application.

[27]Secondly, he disputed he had refused to engage with the respondent’s legal representatives and disputed he had refused to cooperate agreeing a trial bundle or that he had made disproportionate requests for documents. He said that it was the respondent who had refused to comply with case management orders. He made a number of allegations that the respondent had unlawfully redacted documents that the additional preliminary hearings were all because of the respondent and said Ms Paton, the solicitor with dayto-day conduct of the case had lied. So far as the witness intimidation was concerned he disputed the allegation, denied he had sent the burnt letters, said he had not known who the witnesses in the case were and that he had never suggested that he was medically unfit to engage in all litigation.

The Law

[28]I reminded myself of the overriding objective Rule 3 Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024. Overriding Objective 3 (1)

[29]The overriding objective of these rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly, dealing with a case fairly and justly includes as far as practicable:(a) Ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing.

(b) Dealing with cases in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues;

(d) Avoiding delay so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues;

(e) Saving expense.

[30]The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective when it:(a) Exercises any power under these rules; or

(b) Interprets any rule or practice direction.

[31]The parties and their representatives must:-(a) Assist the Tribunal to further the overriding objective; and

(b) Cooperate generally with each other and with the Tribunal.

[32]I remind myself that the parties are not merely requested to assist the Employment Tribunal in furthering the overriding objective, they are required to do so.

[33]Rule 38(1) of the ET Rules 2024 provides: “The Tribunal may on its own initiative or on the application of a party, strike out all or part of a claim, response, or reply on any of the following grounds: (b) That the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by or on behalf of the claimant tor the respondent (as the case may be) has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious. (e) That the Tribunal considers it is no longer possible to have a fair hearing in respect of the claim, response or reply (or the part to be struck out).

[34]I reminded myself that the Higher Courts, the EAT and the Court of Appeal have repeatedly emphasised that there is a high threshold to striking out a claim. It is an exceptional sanction to be exercised sparingly.

[35]In the words of Sedley LJ in Blockbuster Entertainment Limited -v- James

2006 IRLR 630

the power of strike out “is a draconic power, not to be readily exercised. It comes into being as if in the judgment of the Tribunal had happened here, a party has been conducting its side of the proceedings unreasonably. The two cardinal conditions for its exercise are either that the unreasonable conduct has taken the form of deliberate and persistent disregard of required procedural steps or that it has made a fair trial impossible. If these conditions are fulfilled it becomes necessary to consider whether, even so striking out is a proportionate response”. I reminded myself of the guidance in Abegaze -v- Shrewsbury College of Arts and Technology

2009 EWCA civ 96

also in Bolch -v- Chipman

2004 IRLR 140

considering what is now Rule 38(1)(b): it is well established that before a claim can be struck out it is necessary to establish that the conduct complained of was scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious conduct in the proceedings, that the result of that conduct was that there could not be a fair trial and that the imposition of the strikeout sanction was proportionate. If some lesser sanction is appropriate and consistent with a fair trial, then strike out should not be employed.

[36]I turned to consider the first question, has there been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious conduct of the proceedings?

[37]I find that there has been unreasonable conduct of the proceedings by the claimant.

[38]Counsel grouped the grounds into five headings. I deal with them in turn. (a) Refused to engage with the respondent’s legal representatives, blocked all emails and flouted repeated requests from the Employment Tribunal to cooperate with the respondent.

[39]The claimant agreed that he had blocked the respondent’s chosen representative Ms Paton, solicitor from his email account so that he could not receive emails from her.

[40]On 5 August 2025 he sent an email to Mr K Norgrove, the Chief Executive Officer of Royal and Sun Alliance with the subject heading “Pinsent Masons blocked you are assigned point of contact”. In this email the claimant wrote “Ken I have blocked Pinsent Masons LLP from corresponding with me. I will be communicating with you exclusively and only when essential, page 141”. On 6 August 2025 the claimant sent an email to the Tribunal copying Mr Norgrove rather than the respondent’s legal representative Ms Paton. In this email the claimant wrote “additionally I will no longer be corresponding with Pinsent Masons LLP or its partners given a various accusations of me and conduct”.

[41]At the hearing on 15 August 2025 Regional Employment Judge Franey made it clear to the claimant and gave an order that “All communications from the claimant to the respondent about this case must be conducted only through the respondent’s chosen representative currently Ms Paton. The claimant must not contact other lawyers in Pinsent Masons LLP or staff of the respondent itself about the case, save in relation to contact with witnesses that he wants to call to give evidence for him”. He made this order as the claimant had previously emailed all 60 partners in Pinsent Masons, had been contacting the respondent direct rather than their legal representative and had blind copied a document to more than 400 recipients. See paragraph 5.2 Regional Judge Franey’s note of case management hearing.

[42]The claimant breached this order of Regional Employment Judge Franey. He copied emails dated 22 and 31 August 2025 which he sent regarding his claim to each of the following Employment Tribunals: London Central, London South, Midlands West, Midlands East, Leeds, Wales and Watford. At page 200 and 201 on 12 August 2025 he copied in Mr Norgrove again, stating “I will be unblocking Pinsent Mason’s LLP prior to sending correspondence but will be immediately blocking them as soon as the correspondence has been sent. I won’t receive any of their emails”, page 165.

[43]On 25 September 2025 the claimant submitted an appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal regarding the refusal of application to strike out the response and he copied this correspondence to Mr Norgrove in breach of Regional Employment Judge Franey’s order, page 210 to 222. On 24 October 2025 the claimant sent an email to Mr Norgrove with a settlement offer of £36 million pounds. He stated “whilst I am open to negotiating, any offer that is significantly below a proportionate and credible assessment of the claim will be regarded as offensive and may result in me ceasing all settlement discussions and proceeding immediately to further litigation, page 223.

[44]The claimant also blind copied that email to eight individuals of Pinsent Mason LLP from across the UK who are not involved in his claim in breach of Regional Employment Judge Franey’s order, page 225.

[45]On the same date the claimant also sent a handwritten letter to Mr Norgrove seeking a settlement of 36 million pounds from the respondent in breach of Regional Employment Judge Franey’s order, page 224.

[46]It is appreciated that the claimant is a litigant in person. It is noted that he suffers from GAD and ADHD. However, this does not explain why he has continued to block Ms Paton. There are cases where a litigant in person does not have access to the internet and an appropriate device and in these circumstances, it is perfectly proper that correspondence should be conducted only by post. That is not the case here. The claimant has an internet connection and is clearly able to communicate via email and does so extensively. He has simply chosen not to communicate with Ms Paton. There is no credible explanation as to why not. The claimant makes wild allegations that Ms Paton has engaged in harassment against him but as Regional Employment Judge Franey identified in his case management hearing the claimant has never identified any evidence which suggests that is the case. The respondent’s written application to strike out the claim sets out a history of the claimant copying in extensive other individuals instead of Ms Paton.

[47]Although he is a litigant in person, the claimant is an educated man who told me has studied at university. Once he had attended the hearing before Regional Employment Judge Franey, he could have been in no doubt that the correct person to communicate with in this matter was Ms Paton, the respondent’s chosen representative only. He ignored the order.

[48]I remind myself of the overriding objective. The overriding objective and the requirement to cooperate applies to both parties. I find that continuing to block Ms Paton so that he does not receive email communication from her and continuing to write to and copy in members of the respondent’s staff including the CEO and other persons employed at Pinsent Masons LLP is unreasonable conduct. (b) Refused to cooperate regarding agreeing a trial bundle and made repeated disproportionate disclosure requests for documents going far beyond the scope of the litigation

[49]The second area relied upon by counsel is refusal to cooperate regarding agreeing a trial bundle and making repeated disproportionate disclosure requests for documents going far beyond the scope of the litigation.

[50]The Tribunal appreciates that the claimant is a litigant in person. It is not disputed that there is already a bundle of documents of 1,600 pages. The respondent wrote to the claimant on 5 June 2025 stating they would put all documents in the bundle that the claimant wanted, with the exception of without prejudice documentation. On 20 June 2025 the claimant requested a further extensive number of documents- he made over 70 individual requests for further disclosure and amendments to the draft hearing bundle. The request for further disclosure, many of which were raised for the first time were clearly excessive and included documents irrelevant to his claims or which do not exist according to the respondent, such as:(i) Full log in histories for himself and his six comparators across all the respondent’s systems including, but not limited to phones, live chat and shared point; and

(ii) Status histories (e.g. teams, presents logs showing away/busy in a meeting) for himself and his six comparators, page 71 to 80.

[51]Prior to that, by email dated 5 June 2025, the claimant suggests to the respondent’s representative that he would only agree to the hearing bundle of documents if the respondent was prepared to withdraw its defence and all supporting documents and admit full liability in respect of his claims.

[52]Despite the Tribunal explaining to the claimant, a litigant in person, that it is not appropriate to include or refer to without prejudice correspondence the claimant continues to seek its inclusion in the bundle.

[53]I am satisfied that this is unreasonable conduct.

[54](c) Successfully applied for postponement of the final hearing on the basis that he was too unwell to participate in litigation, whilst simultaneously pursing multiple County Court claims, an EAT appeal and sending correspondence to multiple Employment Tribunals and news outlets

[55]I turn to the third heading.

[56]I had regard to the medical evidence, a letter from GP Dr Goggins. There are two versions of that letter. They were produced for the postponement application in August. The first version is at page 162 to 163. The second version is at 166 to 167. Both versions are dated 1 August 2025. The difference between the two versions is that the second version includes an additional paragraph which says: “regarding the question when Abdul may be well enough to attend and engage in proceedings this is difficult to determine and is, in part, contingent on the Tribunal’s own conduct. Abdul believes that the Tribunal is unfairly permitting his former employer and representatives to behave in a manner he describes as unfairly prejudicial. This is having a significant impact on his mental health and must be taken into account when asking if he can attend and participate with any hearings or orders. Ideally, I would like for things to be resolved for him for his mental health, but I am happy to reassess his condition after his sick note expires in November if he so wishes. I hope this letter provides useful context regarding the mental health difficulties Abdul is experiencing and the contributing factors linked to his former workplace. I respectfully request that his account of his condition is accepted in good faith and that further demands for specially worded notes from a medical practitioner are avoided where possible”.

[57]Regional Employment Judge Franey relied on this letter in postponing the hearing that was listed for October 2025. He relied on the evidence which stated “This sequence of events has had a significant psychological impact on Abdul. He experiences ongoing symptoms including nightmares, flashbacks and persistent anxiety, which are consistent with features of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). He has also been formally diagnosed by a psychiatrist with Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD). In addition, he received a diagnosis of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) last year, which may compound the stress he experiences in high-pressure or unsupportive environments. Abdul continues to be adversely affected by the ongoing legal process, which causes him to relive distressing experiences and contributes to a persistent state of emotional distress and hypervigilance. Tribunal request. Abdul currently feels unfit to attend or participate in the preliminary hearing scheduled for 15 August 2025 and/or the full hearing scheduled between 13-21 October 2025. He is suffering from a chronic condition, which, to my understanding, has already been disclosed to the Tribunal. “

[58]Regional Employment Judge Franey asked the claimant whether he had been putting his energies into County Court litigation or whether he had issued County Court proceedings against at least one of the respondent’s witnesses. The claimant replied “no comment”. Regional Judge Franey recorded that that was an evasive reply. The question simply required a straight answer, see page 176.

[59]It has now become clear that the claimant did not give a straight answer to Regional Employment Judge Franey, and he had commenced proceedings against Ms Leonie Soul on 1 August 2025, page 122 and against Mr Ashley McGhee also on 1 August 2025, page 118. He lodged claims against two other witnesses Mrs McAllister and Dermot Hillon on 29 August 2025.

[60]The Tribunal considers it is unreasonable conduct to obtain a postponement of a final hearing listed for October 2025 because the claimant was too unwell to prepare and participate in that litigation and yet the claimant was well enough to issuing legal proceedings arising out of the same area of factual matrix against individuals who are witnesses in the Tribunal case during the same time period. (d)Sent harassing correspondence to the respondent’s witnesses.

[61]The Tribunal finds that this is the most disturbing allegation. On 6 September 2025 one of the respondent’s witnesses Ashley McGhee was sent a partially burnt letter. Included in the envelope was a Default Judgment which had been obtained by the claimant against one of the other witnesses for the respondent, Ms Leonie Soul. Ms Soul’s name had been redacted from the judgement, potentially in an attempt to mislead Mr McGhee that the default judgment had been made against him, page 203 to 209. It is very difficult to understand why such a letter was sent to Mr McGhee. The claimant denied sending it. Counsel for the respondent explained that in accordance with court procedure only Ms Soul and the claimant received a copy of that default judgment. (The respondent later received a copy because they were instructed to act for Ms Soul).

[62]Another burnt letter was sent to the respondent’s solicitor, page 182. The claimant denied sending this letter. Counsel for the respondent pointed out that the logo of Pinsent Mason, the solicitor for the respondent can be seen at the top of the letter and that only the claimant and the respondent’s solicitor had a copy of the letter. It is therefore likely that the burnt letter did come from the claimant, but he has said denied he sent it.

[63]This was not a hearing where sworn evidence was taken and in the face of the claimant’s blanket denial that he sent either letter, although I find what happened extremely concerning, I do not make a finding that the behaviour was committed by the claimant, so I do not find it was unreasonable conduct. (If the letters had been sent by the claimant, it would certainly amount to unreasonable conduct.) (e) Made repeated and extensive unfounded allegations of bad faith and professional misconduct against people at R and its solicitors

[64]I turn to the next area, made repeated and extensive unfounded allegations of bad faith and professional misconduct against people at the respondent and its solicitors.

[65]The lens through which the claimant sees communication is illustrated by an exchange he had with Mr Wortley of the respondent. On 5 August 2025 Mr Paul Wortley, Head of Legal at Royal and Sun Alliance wrote a polite letter to the claimant reminding him not to contact Mr Norgrove the Chief Executive of the respondent and to correspond with the respondent’s legal representative. This followed numerous occasions of the claimant contacting the respondent direct when he knew they were professionally represented by a solicitor at Pinsent Mason. The email at page 144 identifies Mr Wortley as Head of Legal at RSA. The claimant wrote back the same day to Mr Wortley copying in Mr Ken Norgrove. There was no greeting or introduction. The claimant’s email stated “I don’t know who you are Paul. Don’t approach me so casually and without a formal polite introduction. Speak to me like this again and you will be getting blocked”, page 144.

[66]When the claimant was making his submissions, he said “I think Mr Wortley is inappropriate. He uses imposing language. He comes across as threatening. It is dishonest by counsel to say my response was inappropriate. I am well within my rights to be offended by that.

[67]I quote the letter from Mr Wortley in full: “Dear Mr Alim I understand you have addressed an email message to RSA’s UK CEO today. No one at RSA will be communicating with you directly regarding your ongoing Employment Tribunal proceedings. You are aware that RSA is represented in the proceedings by Pinsent Masons LLP and you should correspond only with them. You should not expect to receive a response to any further communications which you send to the company directly.” .

[68]It concludes with the greeting “ Regards” and then gives Mr Wortley’s name, job title and contact information.

[69]It is very difficult to understand how the claimant considers a reasonable email of that nature is inappropriate or threatening and it is entirely unacceptable for the claimant to suggest it was dishonest of counsel in these proceedings to say that the claimant’s response was inappropriate.

[70]The claimant repeatedly stated during his submissions, as he had in correspondence, numerous allegations against the respondent’s solicitor. He said in submissions that Ms Paton conducted herself in a criminal manner, there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that she has done so. I rely on the way the claimant has communicated with the respondent as unreasonable conduct. The respondent is expected to have broad shoulders when dealing with a litigant in person and to be aware that the claimant has Generalised Anxiety Disorder and Attention Hyper Activity Disorder. However, the claimant is an intelligent educated man. There has been to medical evidence to suggest the medical conditions he has could cause him to communicate in this way. Neither has the claimant produced any evidence of his allegations against Ms Paton. I find his conduct is unreasonable. (f) Inflated the alleged value of his claim from £126,000 in his first schedule of loss to over £36 million in his updated schedule of loss

[71]It is very difficult to understand why the claimant has produced a schedule of loss of 36 million pounds. He agrees that when he worked for Royal Sun Alliance he was on a salary of approximately £25,000. However I am satisfied that on its own, this conduct does not amount to unreasonable conduct.

[72]I step back at this stage. I find the claimant has committed unreasonable conduct in blocking Ms Paton and refusing to receive emails from her, in ignoring the order of REJ Franey to communicate with Ms Paton and continuing to send correspondence to the respondent’s employees at Royal and Sun Alliance, other solicitors at Pinsent Mason and other unconnected parties including other Tribunals and in in conducting other litigation relating to the same matters when he had relied on medical evidence to say he was too unwell to engage in this litigation. This amounts to a pattern of unreasonable conduct.

[73]I turn to consider the next legal principle when considering whether to strike out the claim which is whether a fair trial is still possible. I have reminded myself that it was stated in Blockbuster Entertainment -v- James

2006 IRLR 630

that the Courts and Tribunals of this country are: open to the difficult as well as the compliant so long as they do not conduct their case unreasonably.

[74]I also remind myself that the first object of any system of justice is to get triable cases tried. The Tribunal has made every effort in this case to get this claim ready to be tried. There have been five preliminary hearings. The Judges have engaged with the claims and tried to understand the claims and prepare a list of issues. On reading the case management order of Employment Judge Leach who conducted the hearings in July and October of 2024 it is clear he made painstaking efforts to understand the claimant’s claims and suggest a draft list of issues. However at this stage now there is no final bundle, witness statements have not been exchanged and there is not a final list of issues because the claimant has indicated he wishes to further amend his claim.

[75]The reasons why I consider, with a heavy heart that a fair trial is not possible are several. Firstly, the way the claimant is conducting the litigation. He will not cooperate with the respondent’s chosen representative by communicating via email. Although he said to me at the end of this hearing that he would unblock Ms Paton I am very doubtful whether he will cooperate with her. The reason for this is that the claimant has said the reason why he “stepped back” and paused the litigation was because he considered that Ms Paton was “harassing” him. The claimant repeatedly during the course of this hearing made further allegations against Ms Paton including that she was acting in a “criminal” manner. I therefore think it is very unlikely that the claimant will communicate with Ms Paton to enable this case to be prepared for hearing.

[76]I remind myself this is not a case where the claimant has a reason why he cannot communicate by email. He is simply choosing not to do so. It is very difficult to understand why that is. His failure to communicate via email causes problems. These were illustrated today when the respondent has sent documentation via the post and the claimant says he has not received it.

[77]The second reason why I consider a fair trial is not possible is that despite the claimant saying in his submissions today that he has complied with every Employment Tribunal order, he has not done so. He has ignored the clear order of Regional Employment Judge Franey to communicate only with Ms Paton and not to copy in or correspond with others at Pinsent Mason and not to correspond with individuals at the respondent itself. This indicates he is unwilling to cooperate with the Tribunal.

[78]The next reason why I think a fair trial is not possible in this case is the medical evidence. The claimant was contradictory. At the outset of this hearing he said that the medical evidence provided by his GP remains accurate and summarises the position. That evidence says that “regarding the question of when Abdul may be well enough to attend and engage in proceedings it is difficult to determine and is in part contingent on the Tribunal’s own conduct. Abdul believes the Tribunal is unfairly permitting his former employer and representatives to behave in a manner he describes as unfairly prejudicial. It is having a significant impact on his mental health and must be taken into account when asking if he can attend and participate with any hearings or orders.”

[79]On the basis of that evidence and noting that at the hearing today the claimant continues to complain about how he perceives the Tribunal is dealing unfairly with matters and how he perceives the respondent’s representative is dealing with his case in an unfairly prejudicial manner, it is difficult to understand when the claimant would ever be well enough to attend a hearing. In short, the Tribunal is dealing with this case in accordance with the overriding objective, but the claimant perceives that to be prejudicial. The same is true of the way he perceives the respondent’s representative is conducting the case. Neither REJ Franey nor I can see any conduct which justifies the allegations the claimant is making against the respondent’s representative. But as long as the claimant holds those beliefs, according to his own medical evidence, he will remain unwell and the position changing is “contingent on the Tribunal’s own conduct”. Given the Tribunal is acting in accordance with the over riding objective, it seems stalemate is reached and there is no indication of when if ever the claimant will be well enough to prepare for and attend a final hearing.

[80]Despite his medical evidence the claimant said he would be well enough to attend a final hearing. I have reminded myself of the guidance in Arrow Nominees Inc -v- Blackledge

2000 BCLC 167

that a fair trial is a trial which is conducted without undue expenditure of time and money and with a proper regard to the demands of other litigants upon the finite resources of the court.

[81]I remind myself of the guidance in Smith -v- Tesco Stores

2023 EAT 11

where it was stated “regrettably those who are confused by or disagree with proper case management decisions that are fair to both parties sometimes jump to the conclusion that the Employment Judge is biased and that the Employment Tribunal and its staff are adversaries to be challenged and attacked. If such a mistaken view results in a withdrawal from the required cooperation with the Employment Tribunal and the other party necessary to advance the overriding objective it puts a fair trial at risk. Whilst the Employment Tribunal remains open to the “difficult” there can be circumstances in which a party becomes so antagonistic to the process that proper case management becomes impossible which can mean that a fair trial is no longer a realistic possibility. “

[82]There have been extensive efforts to manage this case. Despite the order of Regional Employment Judge Franey the claimant has continued to copy other parties into correspondence. He has therefore ignored his case management order.

[83]Despite the efforts of previous judges there is no final list of issues because the claimant stated in an email to the Tribunal dated 25 June 2005, page 91 that he was working on an amendment to his claim. This was despite the claimant having raised his claim in 2022 and having sought to amend his claim before. The claimant said he did not expect to submit any amendment application in 2025 and that “it may be ready in 2026”, page 157.

[84]Finally, there is the issue of the witnesses. The claimant has started four separate claims in in the County Court against four of the respondent’s witnesses. At this hearing the claimant said that he did not know who the respondent’s witnesses were and said this was the first time he had been made aware of who they were. I find that this is not accurate. The case management order of Employment Judge Leach on 9 July 2024 specifically states at paragraph 5 “however one of the respondent’s witnesses (Margaret McAllister) will attend remotely by CVP to provide her evidence. The witness has childcare issues. The claimant raised no objection to the request.” The Tribunal file shows that in an email on 27 June 2024 in advance of that preliminary hearing where the agenda identified Leonie Soul and Ashley McGhee as witnesses.

[85]Bringing claims personally against witnesses in this case also in the county court is likely to be intimidatory and is a factor when considering whether a fair trial remains possible.

[86]I remind myself of the guidance in Emuemukoro -v- Croma Vigiliant (Scotland) Limited

2022 ICR 327

where it was not accepted that the power to strike out can only be triggered where a fair trial is rendered impossible in an absolute sense. It was stated “that approach would not take into account all of the factors that are relevant to a fair trial which the Court of Appeal in Arrow Nominees 2000 TBC LC167 set out. These include the undue expenditure of time and money, the demands of other litigants and the finite resources of the Court. These are factors which are consistent with taking into account the overriding objective. “

[87]If this case is not struck out it will require a further case management hearing(s) to determine the claimant’s application to amend and to deal with issues relating to disclosure of documents because the parties have not agreed the bundle. The earliest date a further case management or other preliminary hearing can take place is September 2026.

[88]If the claimant pursues the application to amend it is likely it will be heard at a preliminary hearing in September 2026.

[89]Whether any amendment is granted or not, it is highly likely a further case management hearing would be required to deal with an extensive disclosure application on another date given the excessive disclosure currently being sought by the claimant. It is likely that would be in early 2027.

[90]The Tribunal is currently listing 7-day final hearings well into 2027. A final hearing listed at a preliminary hearing in 2027 is likely to be in 2028.

[91]Alternatively, even if the claimant decides not to pursue an amendment application at least one further preliminary hearing will still to be required to deal with disclosure and possibly another if the claimant continues to insist on including without prejudice correspondence in the bundle to determine whether or not the without prejudice documents can be included.

[92]Therefore the earliest any final hearing is likely to take place is late 2027.

[93]The claimant’s allegations are for direct discrimination and harassment. Many of them are very general allegations about what he says was said about him by the respondent’s witnesses. If the hearing is in 2027 or 2028 that is almost five years from the date these things are alleged to have happened. Memories of the witnesses are likely to fade.

[94]Finally there is the claimant’s medical evidence The medical evidence suggests that, given the claimant’s perception, there may never be a time when the claimant is well enough to attend the final hearing.

[95]In summary I consider a fair trial is no longer possible. The factors are cumulative as described above but the primary reason is the claimant’s refusal to communicate properly with the respondent’s chosen representative, ignoring the order of Regional Employment Judge Franey not to contact others in Pinsent Mason and not to contact staff in the respondent’s organisation and his own medical evidence which suggests he may never be well enough to attend a final hearing.

[96]I turn now to the very last issue which is whether strike out is proportionate. I must consider whether if this is an exceptional case. I say that it is. Like the Tesco case after conspicuously careful thoughtful and fair case management the claimant has demonstrated that he is not prepared to cooperate with the respondent’s chosen representative and the Employment Tribunal to achieve a fair trial. I am very well aware that the first object of any system of justice is to get a triable case tried. I have considered very carefully whether there is any alternative which might get this case back on track. Sadly, I do not think there is. This is not a case where an Unless Order can be made for one simple action to take place and then the case can be listed for hearing. The claimant made it clear in his submissions his perception is that “Ms Mills (the previous representative of the respondent who has now left the employment of the respondent’s solicitors) and Ms Paton (of the respondent solicitors) “have a responsibility to understand my claim. It is on them. They should understand my claim better. It is entirely their fault that we have had five preliminary hearings.” He continued to say the solicitors had infringed his rights and withheld documents.

[97]Finally, I have considered whether the fact the claimant has an application before the EAT arising out of the refusal of Judge Butler to strike out the response is a reason to postpone this hearing and not strike out this claim. I am not satisfied that it is. It would have caused further delay. The claimant has already indicated that he will appeal this decision if it goes against him. If he does so, he is entitled to request that the appeals are heard together, and there is therefore no prejudice to him in this application proceeding as the appeals, if they both proceed, could be heard together.

[98]For these reasons the claim is struck out.

[99]Following the hearing and before I considered the claim in chambers, I received a further letter from the respondent’s solicitor objecting to new conduct of the claimant and the claimant’s reply objecting to their letter. I did not have regard to those letters as they were received after the hearing and so it was inappropriate to consider them. Approved by