Mr P Ah-Thion v Cloud Imperium Games Ltd: 2406047/2022

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2406047/2022

Between

Mr P Ah-ThionClaimant

Cloud Imperium Games LimitedRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Horne

In person for claimant

Ms Rumble (instructed by counsel) for respondent

Date 20 June 2024

JUDGMENT

At all relevant times (and in particular the time from 13 October 2021 to 8 July 2022) the claimant had a disability within the meaning of section 6 of the Equality Act 2010. JUDGMENT The judgment of the Tribunal is that:

[1]The claimant’s claim for a failure to make reasonable adjustments pursuant to sections 20-21 Equality Act 2010 is well-founded and succeeds.

[2]The claimant's claim pursuant to section 15 Equality Act 2010 is well-founded and succeeds.

REASONS

[1]The claimant was employed by the respondent as a Senior Programmer from 12 February 2018. The claimant has Autistic Spectrum Disorder (“ASD”). The claimant informed the respondent of his condition at the start of his employment.

[2]The claimant is a disabled person within the meaning of section 6 Equality Act 2010 by reason of the impairment of ASD.

[3]The claimant worked from the respondent’s office in Wilmslow, Cheshire, from the start of his employment until the Covid pandemic required the respondent’s employees to work from home.

[4]The claimant had a lengthy commute from his home in Birkenhead to the respondent’s office in Wilmslow. During 2021 the respondent began to require its staff to return to the office.

[5]The respondent is described as a “start up company”. It is a video game developer and publisher. At the relevant time it employed over 400 employees.

[6]During 2021 the respondent took the decision to move from its premises in Wilmslow to new premises in Manchester. It embarked on a consultation process seeking to amend the place of work for its employees in their contract of employment.

[7]We entirely accept, and indeed are bound by, the factual findings of Employment Judge Horne at a preliminary hearing that the claimant found working in the office face to face substantially more difficult than people without autism because of the need for face-to-face conversations, to be in a public place and to commute by car where the journey was of unpredictable length.

[8]We rely on the claimant's evidence to find that prior to the Covid-19 pandemic he did not realise how much better for his condition working from home would be compared to working in the office.

[9]Unsurprisingly, the claimant requested to work from home permanently. The claimant's request was swiftly refused by his direct line manager, Mr Colson, within a couple of days.

[10]The claimant's request to work from home on a permanent basis as a reasonable adjustment because of his disability of autism became intertwined with the respondent’s individual consultation process for the members of staff in relation to the transfer to Manchester office.

[11]The claimant attended a number of meetings, but the position did not change and the claimant received a final refusal on 26 April 2022.

[12]The claimant had explained to the respondent that if they were unwilling to permit him to work from home on a permanent basis his disability of autism meant he could not travel and work in the Manchester office. The respondent therefore made the claimant redundant by a letter of July 2022.

[13]The claimant brought a claim to this Tribunal. Procedural History

[14]The respondent disputed that the impairment of Autistic Spectrum Disorder meant the claimant was a disabled person within the meaning of section 6 Equality Act 2010. At a preliminary hearing before Employment Judge Horne, he determined that the claimant was a disabled person.

[15]The claimant brought a claim under section 15 Equality Act 2010 and a claim for failure to make reasonable adjustments pursuant to sections 20-21 Equality Act 2010.

[16]The legal issues identified by Employment Judge Horne were as follows:(1) Did the claimant reasonably understand that his dismissal was unfavourable treatment?

(2) Did the claimant’s unwillingness to work in the Manchester office arise in consequence of his disability?

(3) Was dismissing the claimant a means of achieving one or both of the respondent’s aims? The aims were: (i) ensuring acceptable performance of a senior gameplay programmer; and (ii) ensuring acceptable performance of the senior gameplay programmer’s team as a whole. The claimant agreed that these were legitimate aims.

(4) Was the dismissal proportionate?

[17]By the time of the hearing the respondent was no longer disputing issues (1) and (2). Accordingly, the issues for the Tribunal in relation to the section 15 claim were issues (3) and (4).

[18]For the reasonable adjustments claim, the PCP was agreed to be requiring a senior gameplay programmer to do a substantial amount of their work from the respondent’s office. The disputed issues at the time of the preliminary hearing were as follows:(1) Did the PCP put the claimant at the alleged disadvantage of his autism making it substantially more difficult for him than for a person without autism to work in an office environment, have face to face conversations, be in a public place and commute by car where the journey was of unpredictable length?

(2) Was it more than minor or trivial?

(3) Can the respondent prove that it did not know the claimant was likely to be placed at a substantial disadvantage by the PCP?

(4) Can the respondent prove that it could not reasonably have been expected to know of the likely disadvantage?

(5) Was it reasonable for the respondent to have to allow the claimant to work from home on a permanent basis? (The words “on a permanent basis” were agreed with the parties at the final hearing, to clarify the issue).

(6) When must the failure or failures to take that step be treated as having been done?

(7) Was that date on or before 9 April 2022?

(8) If not, is it just and equitable to extend the time for that failure?

[19]By the submission stage of the hearing the respondent wisely accepted that the only issues which remained in dispute were issues (5) to (8).

Facts

[20]We heard from the claimant. For the respondent we heard from Mr Johnson, the claimant’s former line manager; Ms Cunningham from HR and from Mr Curtis who determined the appeal. We did not hear from Mr Colson, the claimant's line manager who made the initial decision to refuse his application to work from home permanently. We were informed he no longer works for the respondent.

[21]We found the following facts.

[22]The claimant began working for the respondent on 12 February 2018, not so long after he was formally diagnoses with Autistic Spectrum Disorder (“ASD”). It is not disputed that the claimant informed his employer of the diagnosis and provided them with a letter confirming it when he started work with them.

[23]We entirely accept the claimant's evidence set out in detail in his statement about how difficult he found working in an office face to face and travelling to that office in Wilmslow from his home in Birkenhead.

[24]There is no dispute that the claimant notified his employer of the stress of his commute when asking about the waiting list for parking spaces. In his letter at page 112 the claimant made them aware that the issue was related to ASD. To their credit, the respondent provided a parking space for the claimant.

[25]We find that when working for line manager Mr Johnson there were some concerns about the claimant's performance. There are a number of documents such as appraisals and performance reviews in the bundle, although unfortunately some of them appear to be incorrectly dated.

[26]It is particularly unfortunate that although the performance documents were fully completed when the claimant was managed by Mr Johnson containing both the claimant’s and Mr Johnson’s entries, the relevant documents when the claimant was line managed by Mr Colson only have the claimant's entries. We find the claimant to be a conscientious and reliable witness. We accept his evidence that to the best of his recollection Mr Colson did complete his part of the forms. Mr Colson did not give evidence and the respondent’s other witnesses had no explanation as to why his entries were missing.

[27]We find that soon after the claimant started working for the respondent in 2018, whilst working from the office, the claimant himself identified difficulties with team working which he recorded as being possibly related to ASD (see page 206). Mr Johnson noted some problems with the claimant's performance prior to the pandemic when the claimant was working from the office. In a review for 2019/2020 which is dated 14 February 2020 at page 213 Mr Johnson lists the claimant's performance as being below that which would be expected of someone at his level.

[28]We find that Mr Johnson was the claimant's line manager until November 2020 when David Colson became the line manager (relying on Mr Johnson’s statement).

[29]In March 2020 the Covid pandemic affected the UK and the respondent in common with other employers required all staff to work from home in accordance with the Government’s direction.

[30]We rely on the claimant's evidence to find that it was only when he was working from home on a permanent basis that he realised how much better it was in relation to his ASD. He set up a designated workplace with the appropriate PCs and monitors, he was less anxious because he did not have to engage in a stressful, uncertain and lengthy commute and did not have to engage with colleagues in person and take part in face-to-face socialising. The claimant did not have to use “masking” which people with ASD do in face-to-face situations and which the claimant found exhausting. He also found video conferencing and communicating via text much easier forms of communication.

[31]The respondent has suggested that once the claimant was working from home his performance deteriorated. We are not satisfied that there is clear evidence to show that is the case. There is evidence to show Mr Johnson had concerns about the claimant’s performance before he worked from home. There is no specific written evidence about performance from Mr Colson in the performance reviews or assessments because they are blank. There was no witness statement from Mr Colson. The only evidence the Tribunal has found are in relation to what appears to be fairly routine email enquiries from Mr Colson to the claimant about his work.

[32]We have no reason to doubt the claimant's evidence that he found Mr Colson to be an unsympathetic manager as set out in his statement at paragraphs 16-20.

[33]We find the contemporaneous evidence appears to suggest there was no specific issue with the claimant's performance in relation to working from home as opposed to his performance generally. At page 147 Mr Johnson said, “It does seem like working from home has been beneficial for you”, and he went on to reference the claimant’s autism.

[34]At page 182 Mr Curtis recorded in 2022, “David acknowledges there have been improvements in your performance in the last year”. We were not persuaded by Mr Curtis’ evidence to the Tribunal that when he said this in a letter to the claimant he was reflecting back what the claimant had said to him rather than what Mr David Colson had said. The wording of the letter makes that improbable.

[35]We find that from 2021 the respondent had been inviting staff to return to the office. We find the respondent never specifically asked the claimant to return to work in the office. We also find the respondent had never placed the claimant in any formal performance improvement process or invited him to attend any formal meetings specifically to discuss concerns about this performance.

[36]We find that at some point in the late spring/early summer of 2021 the respondent alerted its staff to the proposed move to Manchester and started collective consultation. It also offered individual consultation.

[37]We find on 11 October 2021 the claimant made a specific request to Robert Johnson who was no longer his line manager to work from home on a permanent basis. We find the claimant contacted Mr Johnson because he found him to be a supportive manager. We find Mr Johnson’s reply was positive, “We will see what we can do”, although he made it clear that the final decision was not his. He also referenced the autism training he had attended (page 147). We find that within two days Mr Colson had contacted the claimant to refuse the request. We find that no reason was given although Mr Colson told the claimant the company was taking a much tougher stance on working from home after the announcement of the new office move. We entirely accept the claimant’s evidence that he was stunned and distressed by that news. We rely on the claimant’s evidence to find that returning to office based work was likely to be extremely stressful for him, especially as the new office was even further away from his home.

[38]We find the claimant requested an individual consultation meeting (page 148).

[39]We find there was a meeting on 5 November 2021 on Teams with the claimant, Ms Cunningham from HR and a manager, Mr Welch (we did not hear from Mr Welch). The claimant made it clear that the reason for his request was his autism and the difficulties it caused him. The claimant did not receive an outcome.

[40]The claimant chased the matter on 13 January 2022 and another meeting was arranged with the same individuals which took place on 14 January 2022. The claimant was then informed that they had discussed the matter with Mr Colson and the claimant was invited to another meeting on 4 February 2022 with Ms Cunningham, Mr Welch and Mr Colson. The claimant was informed the meeting was to discuss and give an outcome to this proposal.

[41]We accept the claimant's evidence that for the first time the claimant's performance was raised as an issue in relation to him working from home.

[42]The claimant's request was rejected by a letter dated 10 February 2022 relying primarily on the claimant's performance and the need for him to be in the office. The claimant appealed (pages 171-173) and a further meeting was held on 25 March 2022. The outcome letter was dated 26 April 2022. It again relied on the claimant's performance and the need for him to be based in the office to supervise more junior staff.

[43]The claimant received a letter dated 3 May 2022 in relation to the move to the Manchester office and then a letter terminating his employment by reason of redundancy dated 28 June 2022 (page 189). Failure to make reasonable adjustments (sections 20-21 Equality Act 2010)

[44]The relevant law is sections 20-21 Equality Act 2010. We had regard to the well-known case of Royal Bank of Scotland v Ashton

[2011] ICR 632

EAT which reminds us that when looking at the reasonableness of an adjustment we should focus on the practical effect of it.

The Issues

[45]By the time of the submissions stage the respondent had agreed the PCP of requiring a senior gameplay programmer to do a substantial amount of work from the respondent’s office put the claimant, a person with autism, at a substantial disadvantage and that the substantial disadvantage was the claimant's difficulty with working in an office environment face-to-face, being in public and commuting by car when the journey was often an unpredictable length. The respondent conceded that either it knew the claimant was likely to be placed at a substantial disadvantage or it reasonably could have been expected to know the likely substantial disadvantage.

[46]Therefore the only issue for us to decide was whether it was reasonable for the respondent to allow the claimant to work from home on a permanent basis.

[47]When reaching our decision we reminded ourselves of the guidance in the Equality and Human Rights Commission (“EHRC”) Code of Practice on Employment:(1) The extent to which taking the step would prevent the effect in relation to which the duty was imposed i.e. the effectiveness of the step;

(2) The extent to which it was practicable for the employer to take the step;

(3) The financial and other costs which would be incurred by the employer and the extent to which taking it would disrupt any of its activities;

(4) The extent of the employer’s financial and other resources and the availability to the employer of financial or other assistance in taking the step;

(5) The nature of the employer’s activities and the size of its undertaking.

[48]We turned to the first point. We find the effectiveness of the step, naming working from home permanently, was considerable. The distress and anxiety caused to the claimant by travelling to work was removed. Likewise, the stress and anxiety caused by having to interact with other people in public and face-to-face was removed.

[49]In reaching this finding we rely on the claimant's testimony that when working in the office he was often so exhausted and distressed that sometimes he needed to go into the toilet cubicles and lock himself in so he could feel calm. When working from home he no longer felt anxious each morning and each evening in anticipation of the daily commute. He found he was sleeping better and felt happier during the working day. He found the use of video conferences for meetings and socialising beneficial. In particular he found only one person being able to talk at a time on video meetings very helpful and reduced his anxiety. He also found supervising junior members of the team much easier when he did not have to work face-to-face. We rely on his evidence of working successfully with colleague Tom on screensharing.

[50]We turn to the next point – the practicability of the step. It was extremely practicable for the claimant to work from home from the claimant’s perspective in the sense that he had been doing it since March 2020 and had never returned to the office.

[51]The respondent sought to persuade us that working from home was not practicable for two reasons. Firstly, that it caused a dip in the claimant's performance. We find the evidence does not suggest that working from home was the reason for the claimant's performance. We find there were concerns about his performance raised by Mr Johnson and also by the claimant himself when he was still working in the office. There was concern about an element of his work “jiras” when working from home. There was also evidence which suggests his performance was improving.

[52]The Tribunal finds that the respondent’s concern about the claimant's performance seemed rather retrospective in the sense that whilst the claimant was employed the respondent never formally investigated those concerns. The Tribunal finds that if the respondent had a serious concern about the claimant's performance they failed to give any evidence to suggest why they could not monitor it successfully remotely whilst he was working from home. Normal performance measures, such as performance targets and regular review meetings, could have been dealt with online.

[53]We turn to the next point from the guidance – the financial cost. We find there was no financial cost to the employer to the claimant working from home on a permanent basis.

[54]We turn to the next point – the nature of the employer’s activity and size of its undertaking. The Tribunal finds that this was a tech business which, if any business could , would be able to support working from home permanently. The respondent is a video game developer and publisher. So far as the size of the undertaking is concerned, although it has been described as a “start-up” at the relevant time it had over 400 employees so it was not a small business.

[55]Stepping back and considering the guidance as a whole, we are satisfied that working from home on a permanent basis was a reasonable adjustment. Time Limits

[56]We remind ourselves of the issues set out by Employment Judge Horne in relation to the reasonable adjustments claim:(1) When must the failure (or failures) to take that step be treated as having been done?

(2) Was that date on or after 9 April 2022?

(3) If not, is it just and equitable to extend the time limit for that failure? (Page 81)

[57]The Tribunal reminds itself of the law in relation to time limits and omissions in relation to reasonable adjustments. The relevant law is section 123(4) Equality Act 2010. It is complex.

[58]The leading case is Kingston upon Hull Council v Matuszowicz

[2009] ICR 117

CA. The Tribunal must first ask itself was there a specific decision not to alleviate the disadvantage? This must be a conscious refusal to allow a reasonable adjustment. We find the answer to that question is no. The respondent does not seem to have engaged with the claimant's information that he was a disabled person by reason of his autism. The claimant's request to work from home was caught up in an individual consultation process available to all staff in relation to a move to a new office.

[59]We find at the earlier stages, from October 2021 onwards, there was a lack of care and consideration in relation to understanding that the claimant was requesting a reasonable adjustment under the Equality Act 2010.

[60]The respondent seemed to think that the claimant was simply requesting a lifestyle choice so he did not have a difficult commute. We are satisfied there was no conscious decision at that stage to refuse him a reasonable adjustment.

[61]We must then go on to ask when, if the employer had been acting reasonably, it would have made the adjustment. We find that this was by the time they sent the appeal outcome letter on 26 April 2022. By that time any reasonable employer, knowing that this was the last stage of the process which would result effectively in the claimant's redundancy if the adjustment was refused, would have sought Occupational Health advice about the disability issue and about the reasonable adjustment sought by the claimant and would have communicated it to the claimant. We therefore find time starts to run from 26 April 2022. Therefore, the claimant's claim was presented within the time limit.

[62]There is therefore no need for us to go on and consider the issue of discretion to extend the time limit.

[63]For these reasons the claimant's claim for a failure to make reasonable adjustments succeeds and was presented within the time limit. Section 15 Equality Act Claim

[64]The relevant law is at section 15 Equality Act 2010. The Tribunal had regard to Pnaiser v NHS England and Another

[2016] IRLR 170

EAT. The Tribunal also had regard to the EHRC Code of Practice on Employment.

[65]By the time we reached the submissions stage the only issue at stake was the employer’s defence. The Tribunal reminded itself of the burden of proof, namely that it is for the respondent to show that the dismissal of the claimant by reason of redundancy was a proportionate means of achieving its legitimate aims. Its legitimate aims were;(1) ensuring the acceptable performance of a senior gameplay programmer; and

(2) ensuring the acceptable performance of the senior gameplay programmer’s team as a whole.

[66]We reminded ourselves of the well-known case of Gray v University of Portsmouth [2021] 6 WL UK 80 – that we must carry out the necessary critical evaluation when considering the employer’s defence and properly weigh the employer’s needs against the discriminatory effect of the dismissal. We also reminded ourselves of the EHRC Employment Code and its guide on objective justification. We particularly reminded ourselves of paragraph 4.31, that the treatment will not be proportionate if less discriminatory measures could have been taken to achieve the same objective.

[67]We also reminded ourselves of Griffiths v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

[2017] ICR 160

CA. This case reminds us that if there is a claim for dismissal related to disability and a potentially reasonable adjustment which might have allowed the claimant to remain in employment which has not been made, the dismissal will not be justified.

[68]We turn to consider the respondent’s first aim, which was to ensure the acceptable performance of a senior gameplay programmer.

[69]The respondent argued this could only be achieved by the claimant returning to work in the office. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the evidence shows this. The respondent had permitted the claimant to work from home from March 2020 until his employment was terminated in June 2022. During the period March 2020 to June 2022 the respondent had never placed the claimant in a formal performance improvement plan. Neither had they ever formally invited the claimant to return to work in the office. If the claimant had truly been failing in his performance to the extent that the respondent was suggesting that a return to work was essential to monitor his performance, we find he would have not been permitted to continue to work from home for long.

[70]We have also taken into account that the evidence suggests that there were problems with the claimant's performance prior to the pandemic which were unrelated to working from home because they occurred when he was working in the office.

[71]We also rely on the contemporaneous evidence of Mr Colson and Mr Johnson that the claimant's employment had improved slightly whilst working from home.

[72]The Tribunal finds that if there were real concerns about the claimant's performance, he could have been given clear targets and regular meetings to asses him which could have been done remotely, as could a formal performance management plan. As the claimant himself suggested in evidence, if there were concerns about whether or not he was actually working he could have been tracked.

[73]We have to balance the discriminatory effect of the termination of the claimant’s employment on the claimant with the respondent’s aim of ensuring the acceptable performance of a senior gameplay programmer.

[74]The Tribunal finds the respondent cannot satisfy us that terminating the claimant's employment was proportionate. We rely on the fact we have found that working from home was a reasonable adjustment which would have alleviated the substantial disadvantage to the claimant. There is no evidence that working from home would have failed to achieve the respondent’s legitimate aim of ensuring the acceptable performance of a senior gameplay programmer.

[75]The respondent sought to suggest that they had made other reasonable adjustments for the claimant. The respondent referred to offering the claimant a subsidy on public transport. We find this did not assist the claimant because his autism meant travelling on public transport, being in public, having contact with other people face-to-face and the uncertainty of the very poor public transport service between Birkenhead and Wilmslow or Manchester meant that it was not an option for him.

[76]The respondent relied on an adjustment of flexible start and finish times, allowing the claimant to leave early or late outside the core hours. We rely on the claimant's evidence that this still meant the journey time was very uncertain and the only way to avoid heavy traffic was to come in early and leave late, which meant very long days which was clearly unsuitable for the claimant, and it was therefore not a reasonable adjustment.

[77]We turn to the second aim of the respondent, which was ensuring an acceptable performance of the senior gameplay programmer’s team as a whole. This was a legitimate aim.

[78]The respondent stated that in his role as a supervisor and supporter of juniors in the team only the claimant's presence in the office would be sufficient.

[79]We find there was a failure of the respondent to understand the nature of the claimant’s autism. It was a condition of his autism that he struggled with his duties to act as a coach, reviewer and mentor to the junior members of the team. The evidence shows that the claimant was struggling to do this when he worked in the office. We rely on the claimant's evidence that he worked better with team members when he was working remotely, sharing screens and communicating via message.

[80]For a neurotypical employee ( a person without ASD) it might be the case that returning to work in the office meant they were better able to carry out their role as a mentor, supervisor and supporter of the juniors in the team. However, this is to ignore the claimant's autism, which meant that face-to-face communication was particularly difficult for him. Working from home was an adjustment which enabled the claimant to discharge this part of his duty to the best of his ability as a senior gameplay programmer and was therefore a less discriminatory measure because working from home enabled the respondent’s legitimate aim to be discharged and meant the claimant would not have to be dismissed.

[81]In conclusion the Tribunal is not satisfied when conducting the balancing exercise that the respondent has shown that dismissal was a proportionate means of achieving their legitimate aims.

[82]When reaching this conclusion, we have noted that although Mr Colson and Mr Johnson attended specific training on autism, Mr Colson does not appear to have put the training into practice when considering the claimant’s request to work from home permanently because of his autism. Mr Curtis honestly admitted that he had not attended any autism training, and Ms Cunningham candidly admitted that the claimant was not treated as a disabled person when they considered his request to work from home permanently.

[83]Accordingly, we find that the respondent has treated the claimant unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of his disability. They have been unable to show that dismissal was a proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aim and accordingly the claimant's claim succeeds.

The Issues

[1]An award for loss of earnings of 4.5 months x £3,121.18 = £14,045.31.

[2]Interest at the judgment rate of 8% from the midpoint ( Full period 26 April 2022 to 19 June 2024 ) of £3.07 daily x 392 days = £1,203.44. Loss of statutory rights of £500.

[4]Injury to feelings inclusive of interest of £12,000.

[5]The total payable by the respondent to the claimant within 21 days of the date of this Judgment is £27,748.75.

The Issues

[1]There is no dispute that the claimant is not entitled to a basic award because he received a redundancy payment from the respondent. The claimant agreed that his loss of earnings started when his payment in lieu of notice (“PILON”) expired and accordingly he is entitled to 4.5 months at an agreed rate (net) of £3,121.18 monthly = £14,045.31.

[2]We find that the claimant is entitled to £500 for loss of statutory rights to reflect the fact that in his new employment he will have to work two years before he is eligible for a redundancy payment or entitled to bring a claim for “ordinary” unfair dismissal pursuant to section 95 and section 98 Employment Rights Act 1996.

[3]We are obliged to calculate interest and although it was not raised by the parties, we must not ignore it. Interest is awarded in accordance with Employment Tribunals (Interest on Awards in Discrimination Cases) 1996. Regulation 6(1)(b) reminds us that when calculating interest (which is not injury to feelings), the interest shall be for the period beginning on the midpoint date and ending on the date of calculation. We find that we must calculate the date of discrimination, which was 26 April 2022 (as we have found was the date for the failure to make reasonable adjustments) and the calculation date which is 19 June 2024. The midpoint between those two dates is a point 392 days apart. Accordingly, interest on £14,045.31 at 8% is £1,123.62 annually. The daily rate is therefore that sum divided by 365 = £3.07. Midpoint to the Tribunal hearing is 392 days x £3.07 = £1,203.44.

[4]The Tribunal turned to an award for injury to feelings. The respondent contended for £10,000 just on the cusp between the first and mid band of Vento. The claimant contested for an award at the midpoint of the mid band. The band relevant to that period of time was £990 to £9,900 in the lower band, and £9,900 to £29,600 in the mid band. The Tribunal reminded itself of the long-established guidelines in Prison Service v Johnson

[1997] ICR 275

EAT. We were mindful that the award for injury to feelings was designed to compensate the injured party fully but not to punish the guilty party, that an award should not be inflated by feelings of indignation at the guilty party’s conduct, and that awards should not be so low as to diminish respect for the policy of the discrimination legislation. On the other hand, awards should not be so excessive that they might be regarded as untaxed riches. Awards should be broadly similar to the range of awards in personal injury cases. Tribunals should bear in mind the value in everyday life of the sum they are contemplating, and Tribunals should bear in mind the need for public respect for the level of awards made.

[5]The Tribunal took into account that this was a discrimination case involving two discrete acts, namely the failure to make reasonable adjustments and the consequent dismissal of the claimant. The time period involved was relatively short. The failure to make reasonable adjustments we have found was effective from 26 April 2022 and the claimant had fortunately found a new job by December 2022. In his new job the claimant was able to work remotely and secured a higher rate of pay.

[6]However, balanced against that we entirely accept what the claimant told us – that this was an extremely stressful time for him. He stretched his redundancy payment out over the period he was not working. He told us as a person with ASD, dealing with uncertainty is very difficult. We entirely accept his evidence that after his employment was terminated he was extremely emotionally exhausted, unable to do very much for the first couple of weeks, and that he suffered feelings of hurt, anxiety and depression. On the other hand, the Tribunal has taken into account that the claimant did not attend his GP and seek any formal assistance in relation to his poor mental health.

[7]Taking all of these factors into account the Tribunal considers that an award at the lower end of the mid band is appropriate and has made an award of £12,000 which is inclusive of interest.