Dr T Pararountas v Channel 4 Television Corporation: 2405093/2025 and 2405646/2025
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 2405093/2025, 2405646/2025
Between
Dr T PararountasClaimantChannel 4 Television CorporationRespondent
Before
Employment Judge Phil AllenIn person for claimantMr S Healy (instructed by counsel) for respondentDate 23 October 2025
JUDGMENT
[1]It does not appear that it is likely that in determining the complaint the Tribunal will find that the principal reason for the dismissal will be because the claimant made one or more protected disclosures. The application for interim relief is refused.
REASONS
Procedure
[1]This was an application for interim relief.[2]The claimant represented himself at the hearing. Mr Healy, counsel, represented the respondent.[3]The hearing was conducted by CVP remote video technology from Manchester Employment Tribunal. The parties and their representatives attended remotely by video.[4]Each party provided a bundle of documents. The claimant provided some additional documents. During the hearing the claimant provided one further document. At the start of the hearing, I asked the parties to identify the documents which they needed me to read and, after they had done so, I adjourned the hearing to read those documents.[5]A witness statement was provided by the respondent prepared by Wayne Charran, head of technology data architecture and strategy. In accordance with rule 94, I did not hear oral evidence.[6]The claimant had provided a document which set out his interim relief application. The respondent’s counsel provided a submission document.[7]At the start of the hearing, I suggested to the parties that the claimant’s two claims against the respondent (6030493/25 and 6035484/25) should be joined, and the interim relief application be heard in the joined claims. The parties agreed. I ordered that the claims be joined and heard together (albeit that the latter claim has yet to be served on the respondent).[8]Each of the parties was given the opportunity to make submissions. I heard what the claimant wished to say. I then heard from the respondent’s representative. The claimant asked for an adjournment and to be allowed to respond. We took an adjournment and I allowed him to do so.[9]I adjourned to consider my decision. After doing so, I provided the parties with my decision and the reasons for it. The claimant requested written reasons and therefore this document provides the Judgment and the reasons for it.
Facts
[10]Due to the nature of an interim relief hearing, I have provided only a short and brief summary of the key facts.[11]The claimant was employed by the respondent as enterprise data governance and architecture lead from 12 May 2025. His employment was subject to a probationary period.[12]In his second claim form, the claimant said that he made protected disclosures to senior management on 18 July 2025 and to Grace Boswood in a meeting on 25 July 2025.[13]I was provided with emails sent from the claimant on 18 July 2025 to Martin Baker (111) and Grace Boswood (135). I will not reproduce the emails or endeavour to summarise them myself, but the claimant’s own executive summary in the former said that an external vendor (Ascent) had presented a comprehensive data governance transformation to Channel 4 stakeholders – far exceeding “thin slice forecasting” scope – without his authorisation as data governance manager and while claiming authorisation from absent executives. In his situation summary in the latter email the claimant said that an external vendor presented unauthorised work that fundamentally undermined the respondent’s governance structure and regulatory compliance obligations. It was said that this occurred without proper oversight and with claimed authorisations that could not be verified.[14]The respondent’s case was that there was no meeting between the claimant and Ms Boswood on 25 July 2025, and it therefore disputed that a protected disclosure had been made on the second occasion when it was alleged a disclosure had been made.[15]Whilst the claimant did not expressly confirm this, it may be that the claimant was relying on what he said to Ms Boswood in a meeting which I believed to have been on 21 July, for which the claimant had a computer-generated note (C2). That was a lengthy note, and the claimant did not highlight a particular passage in it, but the respondent drew my attention to what the claimant said near the start where he said that he was quite worried that the organisation is not compliant right now and he went on to highlight the very significant fines which could be levied for noncompliance.[16]The claimant’s line manager was Wayne Charran. It was said in Mr Charran’s statement that he was on holiday from 18 July to 1 August 2025, but on 18 July, after he had been contacted by others who had received emails that day, his gut instinct was that the claimant’s employment at the respondent was no longer tenable. The claimant highlighted the proximity of that apparent decision to the disclosure he had made. Mr Charran explained his instinct with reference not to the content of the disclosure made but rather to: the fact that the claimant had shown that he was not capable of uniting people across the business on data governance projects (which was said to be a key aspect of his role); his work style was disruptive and not conducive to a collaborative working environment; and the claimant had not understood what he was meant to be delivering in his role.[17]From 23 July the claimant worked remotely. From 29 July onwards he was absent on ill health grounds. The claimant contends he was absent due to a disability, which I understand to be work related stress. His wife was also pregnant and as somebody who was older, she was identified as having a high-risk pregnancy. The claimant asserts that meant that his wife had a disability.[18]On 29 July the claimant undertook his own 360-degree feedback with colleagues. That feedback was positive. The claimant placed significant reliance on that feedback as undermining the reasons given for dismissal. Mr Charran was not one of the responders. I found that feedback to be of little importance for the decision which I needed to reach.[19]The claimant raised a grievance, which was determined. He appealed against the outcome and that was determined. It was said in Mr Charran’s statement that the probation period was extended so that the grievance and appeal could be addressed and, on one occasion, to accommodate the availability of the claimant’s trade union representative.[20]Mr Charran decided to terminate the claimant’s employment on 22 September at a meeting which the claimant did not attend because he was signed off on ill health grounds. A letter (202) explained the reasons for termination as poor communication style, gatekeeping and siloed thinking, inability to effectively fulfil the role and failure to demonstrate expected behaviours, and lack of proactive engagement.[21]The claimant appealed against his dismissal. The appeal was not upheld. I was provided with a lengthy letter which set out the reason for the appeal decision dated 22 October 2025.
The Law
[22]This is an interim relief application. The key law is section 129 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. The test is whether it is likely that that the claimant’s claim will succeed. The claim brought is automatic unfair dismissal. The key question is: was the principal reason for the claimant’s dismissal because he made a protected disclosure? That is section 103A of the Employment Rights Act 1996.[23]When considering whether the claim is likely to succeed, I must consider all elements of the claim. I must take account of all the things which must be established at the final hearing. That includes: whether a disclosure was made as alleged; was there a disclosure of information; did it meet the legal requirements to be a protected disclosure; did the claimant believe that the disclosure was in the public interest; was that belief reasonable; and (perhaps most importantly) was any protected disclosure the principal reason for the claimant’s dismissal?[24]I must carry out an expeditious summary assessment. That is done on the material available. I must do the best I can. The evidence is untested. The final hearing will look at evidence far more closely. I do not make findings of fact. I must decide the likelihood of success. That is based on a broad assessment of the material available.[25]The test is - likely to succeed. Case law has said that is whether the claimant has a pretty good chance of success at the final hearing. It requires something nearer to certainty than mere probability. The test is tougher than that which will be applied by the Tribunal at the final hearing.[26]Both parties referred to case law. I have considered it and will not repeat it all. I was referred to London City Airport Ltd v Chacko [2013] IRLR 610, Qasimi v Robinson UKEAT/0283/17, Taplin v C Shippam Ltd [1978] ICR 1068, Dandpat v University of Bath UKEAT/0408/09, Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz [2011] IRLR 562, Cavendish Munro Professional Risks Management Ltd v Geldud [2010] ICR 325, Kilraine v London Borough of Wandsworth [2018] ICR 1850 and Chase v Northern Housing Consortium Ltd EA-2023-001442. However, I would emphasise what was said in the extracts from the Judgments in Taplin and Dandpat which were quoted in his submissions by the respondent’s counsel at paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of his submission document.[27]Erroneously, the claimant asserted that section 129(8) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides that if I make an Interim Relief order and the claimant then does not ultimately succeed in his claim, the respondent can recover what it has paid from the claimant. The provision does not say that. One of the reasons for the relatively high bar for an interim relief application being granted, is precisely because the decision places a respondent in a position where it is required to incur cost which is irrecoverable, irrespective of what the Tribunal who hears the final hearing decides. Conclusions – applying the Law to the Facts[28]I have not found that the claimant is likely to succeed in his claim. He may do. It needs a final hearing to decide. I have made a decision based on an expeditious summary of the material before me. I have decided that the claimant is not likely to succeed. By that I mean that he does not have a pretty good chance of success. He might do so.[29]It is entirely possible that the claimant made a protected disclosure on 18 July. I can see why there are arguments that he did not. The Tribunal at the final hearing will need to determine those issues.[30]The claimant has certainly not shown me that it is likely that he made a protected disclosure on 25 July, where the respondent disputes any such disclosure was made.[31]If the claimant intended to assert that he made a protected disclosure to Ms Boswood in the meeting on 21 July, he may have done so, however it is far from clear to me that he disclosed information or that the information disclosed met the legal requirements. Making an allegation is not enough.[32]The most significant reason for my decision to refuse the claimant’s interim relief application, was the issue of whether the principal reason for the dismissal of the claimant was that he made a protected disclosure (and I would emphasise the word principal, which is what is required). The claimant clearly has a strong belief that it was. The respondent will assert that it was not, and (presumably) Mr Charran will give evidence that it was not. A Tribunal will need to consider all the evidence and reach a decision when the case has been heard. I was certainly not in a position to say at the hearing, based upon what I heard, that the claimant had proved that he has a pretty good chance of succeeding.[33]I noted the reasons for dismissal explained by the respondent’s counsel and put forward in Mr Charran’s letter and statement. The claimant is right that the timing of the decision assists his case. There will also be some question about the influence that any protected disclosure may have had on the matters upon which Mr Charran relies. However, the principal reason for the dismissal will need to be determined at the final hearing. I was not in a position to say that the claimant is likely to succeed as he asserted.[34]A relevant factor was that the decision made was to terminate the claimant’s employment at the end of an extended probationary period. I agreed with the claimant’s submission that the right to claim that a dismissal has been automatically unfair due to a protected disclosure is a day one right. However, that overlooked the slightly more nuanced point, that a dismissal based upon a shorter process and a less thorough examination of the reasons, is consistent with the end of a probationary period (which in practice is what the respondent’s policy said). The probationary period also provided an explanation for a decision being made during the claimant’s ill-health absence. It will be a matter for the final hearing to decide the outcome in the claims which the claimant wishes to bring, but those factors assisted the respondent’s argument at the hearing.[35]The respondent also highlighted the important difference between a dismissal where the principal reason was the protected disclosure, and a dismissal where the reason was the manner in which issues were raised or the language used (or, potentially, to whom it was sent). The respondent also highlighted the role to which the claimant had been appointed and the need for him to take others on a data governance journey. That distinction and the respondent’s precise reasons will be an important matter to be fully addressed on all the evidence at the final hearing. In my view it lessened the strength of the claimant’s argument that he was likely to succeed in his claim.[36]As I explained, by its nature, an interim relief Judgment is a brief one based upon limited scrutiny of evidence which has not been tested. The Tribunal who conducts the final hearing will undertake a far more detailed consideration of the evidence. My decision does not mean that the claimant will not succeed in his claim, but applying the test required of me, he did not succeed in his interim relief application.