Mrs C A R Palmer v General Medical Council Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service: 2404411/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2404411/2025

Between

Mrs C A R PalmerClaimant

General Medical Council Medical Practitioners Tribunal ServiceRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Phil Allen

In person for claimant

Date 22 May 2026

JUDGMENT

[1]The claim was not entered within the applicable time limit in section 23 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and/or Regulation 30 of the Working Time Regulations 1998. It was reasonably practicable to do so. The claim is therefore dismissed.

REASONS

[1]The claimant was a fitness to practise panel member for the respondents. Following the case of Somerville v NMC which established that the claimant in that case was a worker as a panel member for the NMC, the claimant and others brought a claim for holiday pay. The claims against the respondents have been joined and will be heard together.

[2]Specific to the claimant’s claim was whether she had brought the claim within the time required, whether it had been reasonably practicable for her claim to have been entered in time, and/or whether it was entered within such further period as was reasonable. That issue was listed to be determined separately at a preliminary hearing. This Judgment was delivered at that hearing and this document contains the full written reasons for that Judgment. Claims and Issues

[3]This hearing had been listed at a preliminary hearing (case management) conducted in all of the joined claims on 2 December 2025. The issues to be determined were set out in paragraphs 27 and 28 of that case management order. At the time this hearing was first arranged, there had been three claimants for whom the same issues needed to be determined. By the time of this hearing, the claimant was the only person for whom the issues needed to be determined.

[4]The relevant legislation on time limits was identified as section 23 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and regulation 30 of the Working Time Regulations 1998. The questions to be decided were: 4.1. Whether the claim was presented within the relevant time limit. 4.2. If not, whether it was reasonably practicable for the claim to have been presented in time. 4.3. If not, was the claim presented within such further time as was reasonable.

[5]The same case management order also addressed the appropriate respondent. It was decided at that hearing that both respondents would be respondents to each claim. At some point in the joined claims, the correct respondent will need to be addressed. For the purposes of this hearing nothing arose from which of the respondents was the correct respondent, and the two respondents are referred to collectively throughout.

Procedure

[6]The claimant represented herself at the hearing. Mr Siddall KC represented the respondents.

[7]The hearing was conducted by CVP remote video technology with the parties attending remotely.

[8]I was provided with a bundle of documents, a skeleton argument prepared by each of the parties, and a bundle of authorities. The claimant’s witness statement was included in the bundle. I read what I was asked to in the two skeleton arguments including the claimant’s witness statement. I did some of that reading before the hearing started and the remainder when the hearing was adjourned shortly after it had started. Where a number is referred to in brackets in this Judgment that is a reference to the page number in the bundle.

[9]I heard evidence from the claimant, who was cross examined by the respondents’ representative.

[10]After the evidence was heard, each of the parties was given the opportunity to make submissions. The claimant asked that the respondents’ counsel made his submissions first. He did not object to doing so and so I heard his oral submissions first followed by those of the claimant.

[11]I adjourned the hearing before returning and informing the parties of my decision and my summary reasons for my decision.

[12]The claimant requested written reasons. I clarified with her whether she was seeking written summary reasons or whether she would in any event be asking for full written reasons. As she indicated that she was seeking written reasons with appeal in mind, I decided that I would provide the parties with full written reasons (there being no benefit to anyone in providing written summary reasons first, if full written reasons were going to be requested in any event).

Facts

[13]From 2011 until 2024 the claimant was a lay panellist appointed to sit on Fitness to Practise and other disciplinary and regulatory hearings. She also sat as a lay chair. She was initially appointed by the first respondent, but some while after she was initially appointed, the second respondent was established and panellists were called tribunal members and exercised the same functions.

[14]The claimant’s first term of office ran from November 2011 and the first work she did was 14 November 2011. Ordinarily panellists serve two terms of four years, but the claimant’s appointment was extended. The end of the term is called demitting. The claimant’s appointment ended after it was extended so that a case upon which she had sat could be concluded.

[15]In her evidence, the claimant emphasised that her experience of the respondents was positive and Judge Pearl (who was the first Chair of the MPTS) was very supportive. The claimant emphasised her commitment to the respondents and wish to maintain their reputation.

[16]The Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) performs functions in relation to nurses and midwives broadly similar to those of the respondents in relation to doctors. In 2018, Robin Somerville, a chair of NMC disciplinary panels, was found to be a worker by an Employment Tribunal. In 2022 that decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal.

[17]In March 2022 the claimant and others were sent an email by Tamarind Ashcroft of the MPTS (12). It said: “We have noted the decision by the Court of Appeal in the case of NMC v Somerville, which relates to the worker status of associates contracted by the NMC. We are currently considering the judgment and any implications this may have for us. This may take some time so that we can ensure proper consideration is given”

[18]On 20 October 2022 a further email was sent to the claimant and others with reference to the Court of Appeal judgment. It confirmed that permission to appeal to the Supreme Court in that case had been refused and went on to say: “Developments in case law around worker status have continued throughout this time and it is important that we carefully consider the situation and ensure we understand the wider implications around the Court of Appeal’s decision in NMC v Somerville so we can also understand how this may affect future arrangements for appointing tribunal members. I am sure that there will be a number of questions around this judgment but at this time I would appreciate your continued patience and I will endeavour to provide a more comprehensive update about what the judgment means for you in due course. I am also aware that some of you, at annual training, expressed queries regarding the general fee and I can also confirm that we are considering this matter as well. Thank you for your continuing support for the MPTS and if you have any interim queries please let me know.

[19]A further email was sent on 12 June 2023 which told the recipients that Ms Ashcroft would write again with further information later in the year. I will not reproduce all that was said. On 3 May 2024 an email was sent which, amongst other things, said the following: “We … are reviewing this carefully alongside continuing to work on arrangements for how we can implement the necessary requirements. It is important that we implement things correctly so appreciate your ongoing patience. We will let you know at the earliest opportunity what specific arrangements will be made for each of you”

[20]On 22 July 2024 the claimant undertook her last day of work for the respondents.

[21]The date of the last payment to the claimant was 4 August 2024.

[22]The last date under the standard time limit for the claimant to enter a claim at the Tribunal arising from her work or payment for the work (or, at least, to enter into ACAS Early Conciliation) was 3 November 2024.

[23]A further email was sent by the respondents on 12 November 2024 which said it provided an update, albeit it provided very little information save for saying “We hope to be able to be in a position to make interim payments for backdated liability in 2025”.

[24]Ultimately, the respondents’ decision was that with effect from 1 January 2025 they would recognise worker status for the role. For those in a qualifying worker role on 1 January 2025, the respondents would offer holiday back pay for the two-year period from 1 January 2023.

[25]On 26 April 2025 the claimant was informed in a conversation with a third party that there was a belief that the respondents were hoping that people would run out of time to make a claim.

[26]On 1 May 2025 the claimant submitted a claim to the Employment Tribunal. The claim form did not include an ACAS Early Conciliation number as ACAS Early Conciliation had not been undertaken. The claimant incorrectly ticked the box to say that early conciliation was not required in her case. The text on the claim form next to the box ticked by the claimant says “Nearly everyone should have this number before they fill in a claim form. You can find it on your Acas certificate. For help and advice, call ACAS on [number] or visit [website address].

[27]The claimant’s claim to the Employment Tribunal was rejected on 12 June 2025. The claimant found out that it had been rejected on 16 June 2025.

[28]The claimant undertook a period of ACAS Early Conciliation from 17 June to 29 July 2025 (those were the dates recorded on the ACAS early conciliation certificate (43)). The claimant’s actual contact with an ACAS conciliator in practice only occurred in late July 2025.

[29]It was agreed that on 27 June 2025 the claimant was unequivocally informed by the respondents in a letter that she would not receive any payments as the respondent was applying the 1 January 2025 cut off (33).

[30]On 12 August 2025 the claimant entered her claim at the Employment Tribunal. That claim was accepted.

[31]The claimant attached to her skeleton argument a schedule of other claimants who had brought comparable claims against the respondents. None of those claimants had entered claims at the Tribunal within the primary time limit for the claimant. The first such claim was entered on 23 November 2024. Five other people entered a claim before the claimant had first done so (in the claim that was rejected). Ten others had entered their claims before the claimant did so (in the claim which was accepted).

[32]This Judgment does not seek to address every point about which I heard or about which the parties disagreed. It only includes the points which I considered relevant to the issues which I needed to consider in order to reach my decision. If I have not mentioned a particular point, it does not mean that I have overlooked it, but rather I have either not considered it relevant to the issues I needed to determine or I have not considered it necessary to refer to in these reasons.

The Law

[33]The starting point is the wording of section 23 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. Section 23 provides: (2) Subject to subsection (4) an employment tribunal shall not consider a complaint under this section unless it is presented to the Tribunal before the end of the period of three months beginning with – (a) In the case of a complaint relating to a deduction by the employer, the date of payment of the wages from which the deduction was made … (3) Where a complaint is brought under this section in respect of – (a) a series of deductions of payments … the references in subsection (2) to the deduction or payment are to the last deduction or payment in the series … (4) Where the Employment Tribunal is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for a complaint under this section to be presented before the end of the relevant period of three months, the tribunal may consider the complaint if it was presented within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable.

[34]The three-month period is, of course, extended by any period of ACAS Early Conciliation.

[35]The wording which applies to the time limit for bringing a complaint in relation to a failure to pay holiday pay under regulation 30 of the Working Time Regulations 1998 is different, but what applies is materially the same. I will not also produce the wording in the regulation in this Judgment.

[36]Whether it was not reasonably practicable for the claim to be entered in time, is a question of fact for me to decide. I must apply the words of the statute (and the regulations), that is whether it was not reasonably practicable.

[37]Dedman v British Building and Engineering Appliances Ltd

[1973] IRLR 379

said: “In my opinion the words ‘not practicable’ should be given a liberal interpretation in favour of the man. My reason is because a strict construction would give rise to much injustice which Parliament cannot have intended.” “Summing up, I would suggest that in every case the Tribunal should inquire into the circumstances and ask themselves whether the man or his advisers were at fault in allowing the [time limit] to pass by without presenting the complaint. If he was not at fault, nor his advisers - so that he had just cause or excuse for not presenting his complaint within the [time limit] - then it was 'not practicable' for him to present it within that time. The Court has then a discretion to allow it to be presented out of time, if it thinks it right to do so…”

[38]The claimant referred in her skeleton argument to Marks & Spencer plc v Williams-Ryan [2005] EWAC Civ 470 when emphasising the need to give the provision a liberal interpretation in favour of the claimant. She highlighted that reasonably practicable means more than merely what is reasonably capable of being done, referring to Schulz v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd

[1999] IRLR 119

and Palmer v Southend-on-Sea

[1984] IRLR 119

. She said I must investigate what was the substantial cause of the worker’s failure to comply with the statutory time limit.

[39]The claimant submitted that the employer’s representations to the claimant are relevant, for which she referred me to the Marks & Spencer plc case and said it was a case where the employee was left with an impression by the employer, rather than a case of explicit misrepresentation. She said that the fact that the claimant was seeking to avoid litigation by pursuing an alternative remedy was relevant and a factor in her favour (relying upon Schulz).

[40]The claimant submitted that fact that the claimant made a mistake was not fatal to reasonableness, relying upon Adams v BT

[2017] ICR 382

and Cohen v Mahmood

[2023] EAT 144

. She said the nature of the original mistake was relevant to the assessment, but it was not determinative.

[41]On the question of such further period as was reasonable, the claimant highlighted the words of the test and said they were not whether the claim was submitted as soon as it was reasonably practicable after the time limit.

[42]The respondents in their skeleton argument emphasised the words of the legal test, said that the claimant must show it was not reasonably practicable to have entered the claim in time (relying upon Porter v Bainbridge

[1978] IRLR 271

), and relied upon Cullinane v Balfour Beatty [2011]

UKEAT/537/10

in saying that whether it was entered within such further period as was reasonable was a matter of fact for me to decide. Their counsel highlighted that reasonable practicability was akin to reasonable feasibility (Palmer). He said that the discovery of new facts may in limited circumstances render it not reasonably practicable to present the claim in time (Cambridge NHS Trust v Crouchman

[2009] ICR 1306

). He also submitted that pursuit of an internal procedure is unlikely to render it not reasonably practicable to present a claim within time unless allied to a reasonable lack of knowledge as to the time limit (John Lewis v Charman

[2011] ALL ER (D) 23

). In his skeleton, the respondents’ counsel cited passages from Palmer and Cullinane which I do not need to reproduce in this Judgment. Conclusions – applying the Law to the Facts

[43]The first question I needed to determine was whether it had not been reasonably practicable for the claimant to have entered her claim in time.

[44]The claimant correctly emphasised that I should give that test a liberal interpretation in favour of the employee. That comes from the case of Dedman.

[45]Reasonably practicable means more than physically capable, however it is not just a reasonableness test. Whether it was reasonably feasible to have entered the claim in time is another way of explaining the test.

[46]I accepted the claimant’s submission that the employer’s representations to the claimant were relevant to my decision.

[47]I also accepted that the fact that a claimant made a mistake, was not fatal. That was based upon the case of Adams v BT (a Judgment I considered, having been referred to it).

[48]The burden is on the claimant (at least for this part of the test).

[49]I found that there was no impediment to the claimant issuing her claim within time.

[50]The legal position is that the claimant has always been a worker. The Somerville decision, which made that clearer to those like the claimant who were following that litigation, was determined long before the primary time limit expired

[51]I did not accept the claimant’s position or suggestion that the respondents’ misrepresented the position to her. I considered what was said in the documents from which I have quoted but could see no such misrepresentation.

[52]The claimant placed great weight on the respondents’ request for patience. There are questions about why the respondents did not address matters more quickly. However, nothing in what was said in the emails I was shown (and from which I have quoted) led me to decide that it was not reasonably practicable for the claimant to have entered her claim in time.

[53]In her submissions, the claimant explained her positive view of the respondents and the trust she placed in them. That was positive and laudable. That was a factor to be considered.

[54]Both the Employment Rights Act 1996 and the Working Time Regulations 1998 include a relatively strict time limit and a relatively strict test when an extension of time is sought. I did not find that the trust or patience the claimant had shown meant it had not been reasonably practicable to have entered the claim in time.

[55]Had the test been one of whether the claim was entered within such further period as was just and equitable, the conclusion and decision which I reached would in all likelihood have been very different. That was not the test which I needed to apply.

[56]I found that it was reasonably practicable for the claimant to have entered her claim in time by the 3 November 2024.

[57]It was not necessary for me to go on and decide whether the claim was entered within such further period as was reasonable, where I had decided that it was reasonably practicable for the claim to have been entered in time. However, if I had, I would not have found that the claim entered only on the 12 August 2025 was entered within such further period as was reasonable.

[58]Having reached the decision I did on whether it was reasonably practicable to have entered the claim in time, I did not need to address many of the more complex and potentially difficult arguments and submissions I heard. Nonetheless, as I heard evidence and argument, I did consider it appropriate to outline what I would have decided when considering the question of whether it was entered within such further period as was reasonable, had I needed to have done so.

[59]The claimant is clearly a highly capable person, well able to have identified the rules which apply to entering an Employment Tribunal claim and what is required before claiming in the Employment Tribunal. The respondents’ counsel quite correctly highlighted what is said next to box 2.3 of the claim form. The mistake made by the claimant when she first entered her claim at the Tribunal and the failure to undertake ACAS Early Conciliation as she should have done before entering the claim, would have been a significant factor which would have made it more difficult for the claimant to argue that her claim was entered in such further period as was reasonable.

[60]I would not have found that waiting for ACAS Early Conciliation to conclude during the period which ACAS Early Conciliation was undertaken, and not in some way short circuiting the process and the consultation, would have meant that for the period between the 17 June and 29 July 2025 that the claim was not entered in such further period as was reasonable (for that period).

[61]I also would not have found the gap between the ACAS Early Conciliation certificate on the 29 July and the claim being validly entered on the 12 August, meant that the claim was not entered within such further period as was reasonable (for that period).

[62]For the period from the date when the claim was due on 3 November 2024 until the claim was entered 12 August 2025 (but setting aside from the consideration for the reasons I have given the period after 17 June 2025), I would not have found that was the claimant entering the claim in such further period as was reasonable (had I needed to have done so).

[63]However, those specific considerations of the reasonableness of when the claim was entered, were irrelevant to the primary decision I needed to reach, where I concluded that it was reasonably practicable for the claimant to have entered her claim in the primary time limit (which meant that no issue of whether any further period was reasonable applied).

[64]As a result of the fact that the claim was not entered within the time required, the Employment Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider the claim, and it is dismissed Employment Judge Phil Allen 22 May 2026