Mr T S Chaudhry v Hopwood Hall College: 2403480/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2403480/2024

Between

Mr T S ChaudhryClaimant

Hopwood Hall CollegeRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Cookson

Date 15 May 2026

JUDGMENT

ON COSTS The claimant is ordered to pay to the respondent the total sum of £17,103.10 in respect of the respondent’s costs.

REASONS

[1]It was necessary to adjourn a 5-day final hearing in this case on the first day because the Claimant was in Pakistan and had not sought the necessary diplomatic permission to give evidence from there by video. The Tribunal had only become aware for the first time that the Claimant was in Pakistan on 2 March 2026. He had had a serious accident last year and reported that he was unable to travel for medical reasons.

[2]At the start of the hearing, I had explained that the Claimant could not give evidence remotely and he had applied for an adjournment. The Respondent objected. The claimant told me that he had been advised that he could not travel back to the UK for health reasons although I had limited medical evidence before me.

[3]It was suggested that I could determine the case on the basis of unsworn evidence. The Respondent had instructed counsel and was fully prepared for the hearing to start. I accepted that granting an adjournment caused prejudice to the Respondent and its witnesses but considered that the prejudice to the Claimant of having his case determined on the basis of unsworn evidence was greater, because the Claimant would not have the opportunity to respond in cross examination to the challenges to his evidence raised by the Respondent witnesses and I would be faced with sworn evidence from Respondent witnesses with their cross-examination evidence on the Claimant’s case. Inevitably that would significantly impact on the weight I could give to the Claimant’s evidence to such an extent I considered that it was likely to present a possibly insurmountable evidential hurdle for the Claimant to overcome. I accepted that these were exceptional circumstances and for that reason the hearing was postponed and relisted.

[4]The Respondent made a cost application for its wasted costs. I would have had to consider making such an award in any event given the lateness of the postponement under Rule 74(c). It was agreed that I would determine that application in chambers after receiving written submissions. The Law Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024 72. Definitions In this Part— “paying party” means a party liable to pay costs; “preparation time” means time spent by the receiving party (including by any of the receiving party’s employees or advisers) in working on the case, except for time spent at any final hearing; “receiving party” means a party entitled to be paid costs. 73. Costs orders and preparation time orders(1) A costs order is an order that the paying party make a payment to— (a) the receiving party in respect of the costs that the receiving party has incurred while represented by a legal representative or a lay representative, or (b) another party or witness in respect of expenses incurred, or to be incurred, for the purpose of, or in connection with, an individual’s attendance as a witness at a hearing. 74. When a costs order or a preparation time order may or must be made (1) ….

(2) The Tribunal must consider making a costs order or a preparation time order where it considers that— (a) a party (or that party’s representative) has acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in either the bringing of the proceedings, or part of it, or the way that the proceedings, or part of it, have been conducted,…. (c) a hearing has been postponed or adjourned on the application of a party made less than 7 days before the date on which that hearing begins. 75. Procedure (1) A party may apply for a costs order or a preparation time order at any stage up to 28 days after the date on which the judgment finally determining the proceedings in respect of that party was sent to the parties. (2) The Tribunal must not make a costs order or a preparation time order against a party unless that party has had a reasonable opportunity to make representations (in writing or at a hearing, as the Tribunal may order). 76. The amount of a costs order (1) A costs order may order the paying party to pay— (a) the receiving party a specified amount, not exceeding £20,000, in respect of the costs of the receiving party; (b) the receiving party the whole or a specified part of the costs of the receiving party, with the amount to be paid being determined— i. in England and Wales, by way of detailed assessment carried out either by a county court in accordance with the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, or by the Tribunal applying the same principles; ii. in Scotland, by way of taxation carried out either by the auditor of court in accordance with the Act of Sederunt (Taxation of Judicial Expenses Rules) 2019, or by the Tribunal applying the same principles; (c) another party or a witness, as appropriate, a specified amount in respect of necessary and reasonably incurred expenses for the purpose of, or in connection with, an individual’s attendance as a witness at a hearing; (d) an amount agreed between the paying party and the receiving party in respect of the receiving party’s costs. (2) ……

(3) A costs order under sub-paragraphs (b) to (d) of paragraph (1) may exceed £20,000. 82. Ability to pay In deciding whether to make a costs order, preparation time order, or wasted costs order, and if so the amount of any such order, the Tribunal may have regard to the paying party’s (or, where a wasted costs order is made, the representative’s) ability to pay. Submissions

The Law

[5]The Respondent applied for an Order for costs against the Claimant in accordance with rule 74(2)(a) and rule 74(2)(c) of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024 for the sum of £17,103.10, supported by a detailed breakdown of those costs. This included a £11,400 brief fee and costs of conference for counsel and £267.60 counsel expenses, and £5,435 in respect of solicitor costs, primarily in respect of time spent by an associate with some work and supervision by a principal associate and a modest amount of time for partner supervision.

[6]The Respondent argued that the Claimant had been warned in the case management summary and orders in January 2025 that he would need diplomatic permission to give evidence from outside the UK. The Claimant had told the Respondent he had to attend to hospital in Pakistan in October 2025 but had also confirmed receipt of a hard copy of the bundle to an address in the UK and had notified a change to his UK address later in the year. They had no reason to think he had not returned to the UK. In early February he had indicated that he might request a video link to give evidence, but not that he was still in Pakistan. The only hint of this seems to have been in the Claimant’s witness statement.

[7]On 2 March 2026, one week before the final hearing was due to start, the Claimant emailed the Employment Tribunal requesting to attend the final hearing by video link. He referred to the accident in Pakistan but not that he remained there nor that he intended to give evidence from there. This did however prompt the Respondent to query the position with the Claimant. It was only on 6 March 2026 (one working day before the final hearing), that the Claimant explicitly confirmed he intended to give evidence from Pakistan.

[8]I ordered the Claimant to produce any further medical evidence he relied upon in support of his contention that he was unable to travel back to the UK for this hearing due to medical advice and that he did not unreasonably delay informing the Respondent and Tribunal.

[9]The Claimant has provided evidence in the way for letters from a Dr Ammad Ahmed which confirm the Claimant’s injuries after the accident. A letter of 1 December 2025 confirms a recommendation of bed rest for 2to 3 months and avoiding long-distance travel, but there is no medical evidence to support the contention made at the hearing that the Claimant had medical advice not to travel back to the UK given shortly before the hearing.

[10]The Respondent argued that the Claimant had behaved unreasonably in failing to notify the Respondent and the Tribunal that he would be unable to travel back to the UK and seeking an earlier adjournment and in failing to seek permission to give evidence form Pakistan.

[11]I am reminded that at the hearing on 9 March 2026, the Claimant had been unable to clearly articulate when he first became aware that he might not be able to attend the hearing, or why he had failed to notify the Tribunal of that at possibility at the earliest opportunity. The Claimant referred to various factors, including his accident and injuries sustained, anxiety and depression and separation from his family.

[12]In his submissions the Claimant referred to the impact that the accident has had on his mental health, in part through separation from his family in the UK. He also referred to being under considerable strain due to the ill health of his mother in Pakistan. He said “I did not properly follow the instructions as per CMO order 9th January 2025, however; my medical conditions including stress and financial loss element were the main reason. I have been living in the UK since July 2000, I had no idea how to obtain the permission to give evidence from Pakistan, I was also under the impression I should be able to travel back to the UK before the 9th of March 2026.”

[13]In terms of the Claimant’s ability pay any costs he has informed me that he has had no paid employment since October 2025. He has an accountancy business in the UK but that has not been fully operational due to his injuries and stay in the Pakistan and as a result of which he has lost clients. The business is operating at a loss.

[14]The financial evidence he submitted shows that in the period from January 2026 to 1 May 2026 the Claimant’s accountancy business (TS Consultants Ltd) had a net profit of £2,582.49 before administrative expenses and advertising costs but had incurred a net loss of £7,777.07 once those were factored in. The accounts are somewhat vague though. There are sundry expenses of £3,300 which have not been explained, and more than £2,800 of expenses have been incurred due to costs of “light, heat and power” and cleaning, which seems somewhat high for premises which are not being used. 15. . The Claimant provided copy bank statement for the the current business account of TS Consultants Ltd, but he has not provided evidence of his personal income and outgoings, savings or other assets in accordance with my orders for what would be required if I were to take means into account. That is significant because the Claimant has told me that he would be unable to pay the Respondent’s wasted costs but has chosen to present with me with no actual evidence of that. The evidence of the financial position of his business tells me nothing about his personal means.

Conclusions

[16]I accept the Respondent‘s submissions that the Claimant’s conduct was unreasonable. The Claimant has submitted that he did not know how to obtain diplomatic permission to give evidence from Pakistan but the case management orders from January told him what the rules were and directed him to where he could obtain the relevant information. The fact that the Claimant told me he was unaware that he could not give evidence from Pakistan tells me that he had not read the information in the case management orders. The Tribunal had set out the position to him. If he paid proper attention to the case management orders, he would have been aware of the position, and this situation could have been avoided.

[17]Likewise, I am not satisfied that the Claimant has offered a reasonable explanation for not alerting the Tribunal and the Respondent to the fact he was unable to travel back to the UK at an earlier time. I agree with the Respondent that he could easily have done that. If he had explained the situation in a timely way after receiving the medical advice in December, I have no doubt that an adjournment would have been granted. To be clear I am sure that what has happened has taken its toll on the Claimant and that he have had good reasons not to want to travel in time for the hearing, but he had acted unreasonably when he failed to consider for investigate the implications of that for the final hearing in the Tribunal case he has chosen to bring. He was aware that the Respondent had legal representation. He must have known it was incurring cost in preparing for the final hearing. I have no evidence that anything in particular had changed. I conclude it must have been very clear to the Claimant for some time that he was not going to travel, perhaps underlined by the fact he seems to have taken no steps to book a plane ticket.

[18]I must consider making a costs order where an application to postpone is granted but it has been made less than 7 days before a hearing. There will be cases where the circumstances are such a cost order would not be appropriate where the need for postponement arises very close to hearing. However I conclude that this is not one of those cases because the lateness of the application simply arises from the failure of the Claimant to act sooner, not from the fact, for example, that his medical situation had taken an unexpected turn for the worse or he had received unexpected firm medical advice not to travel just before he planned to do so. I also accept the Respondent’s submissions that the Claimant conduct was unreasonable in this regard

[19]Unlike other jurisdictions, costs are the exception in the employment tribunal, but the Rues are clear they can be ordered. In the absence of a deposit order, Rule 74(1) imposes a three-stage test in considering costs: first, the tribunal must ask itself whether a party’s conduct falls within rule 74(1)(a) or 74(1)(c) — in other words, is its costs jurisdiction engaged? If so, secondly, it must go on to ask itself whether it is appropriate to exercise its discretion in favour of awarding costs against that party; and the third stage is the determination of the amount of any award.

[20]In terms of the first stage, I concluded that not only had the costs threshold been met in terms of the timing of the postpone application, the threshold for costs for unreasonable conduct had also been met. The Claimant is a litigant in person but that does not mean he is immune from orders for costs. I recognise that I cannot judge a litigant in person by the standards of a professional representative. Justice requires that tribunals do not apply professional standards to lay people, and I recognise that lay people are likely to lack the knowledge of law and practice brought to bear by a professional legal adviser. However, here the Claimant had been provided with the necessary information about giving evidence from abroad and expressly warned that he should assume this would not be possible. Disregarding that was unreasonable. 21. . I then had to consider whether I should exercise my discretion to make a costs order. . As the Court of Appeal reiterated in Yerrakalva v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council and anor

2012 ICR 420

, CA, costs in the employment tribunal are still the exception rather than the rule. In that case the Court of Appeal noted that the tribunal’s power to order costs is more sparingly exercised and is more circumscribed than that of the ordinary courts, where the general rule is that costs follow the event. I had to decide whether to use that power to award costs in the circumstances here.

[22]I conclude that I should make an order. The Respondent here is a further education college which is publicly funded. Despite the criticism the Claimant seems to make of the Respondent’s solicitor for not realising sooner that he was in Pakistan I see no basis for criticising the conduct of the lawyer in this case. The fault for the late adjournment applies in this case lies with the Claimant alone. Although some of the preparation work already done by the Respondent will not be wasted – it was work necessary for a final hearing whenever that occurred, I accept that much work done in the last weeks before hearing will have been wasted because unfortunately due to the pressure of cases in the Tribunal, it has not been possible to relist this hearing until June 2027. Inevitably that means at least some of the preparation will have to be redone and that wasted work is the fault of the Claimant not the Respondent.

[23]When it came to the amount of costs to be awarded, I was prepared to take into account the Claimant’s means but for whatever reason he has chosen not to present me with any information about his personal means including savings. That is of course his right but, in the circumstances, I find no reason to reduce the amount of the costs on that basis.

[24]I note that the Claimant has not taken issue with any of the amounts claimed in costs by the Respondent. I am not required to undertake a detailed assessment of costs, but I see nothing unreasonable in the schedule of costs. Accordingly, I award the full amount claimed in the sum of £17,103.10. Approved by