Ms N Ridley-Laing and Miss L Mason v The Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police: 2403444/2022 and others

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2403444/2022, 2403446/2022, 2403103/2023

Between

Ms N Ridley-Laing and Miss L MasonClaimant

The Chief Constable of Greater Manchester PoliceRespondent

Before

Employment Judge M Butler

Date 9 February 2026

JUDGMENT

It is the unanimous judgment of this tribunal that:

[1]Ms Ridley Laing’s complaints of direct disability discrimination, harassment related to disability, a failure by the respondent to make reasonable adjustments, discrimination arising from disability and victimisation all fail and are dismissed.

[2]Miss Mason’s complaints of direct disability discrimination, harassment related to disability, a failure by the respondent to make reasonable adjustments, discrimination arising from disability and victimisation all fail and are dismissed.

[3]Miss Mason’s claim of unfair (constructive) dismissal also fails and is dismissed.

[4]For the avoidance of doubt, all claims brought by the claimants, across the above the case numbers, have failed and been dismissed. Approved by:

[2]For the avoidance of doubt, all claims brought by the claimant, have failed and been dismissed. Oral judgment in this case was handed down at the hearing on 28 November 2025. The respondent requested written reasons by email dated 20 January 2026. These are those written reasons.

REASONS

[1]This claim was heard alongside another claim, which was brought by Ms Mason. The request for written reasons only applied to the judgment insofar as it determined the claims brought by Ms Ridley-Laing. These written reasons are therefore limited to the decision taken on the allegations brought by Ms Ridley-Laing. There are occasions where Miss Mason is referred to in this judgment. However, this is limited to those occasions where Ms Ridley-Laing and Miss Mason’s claims overlapped to the extent that they could not be disentangled.

[2]Mr Adjei raised with the Tribunal that there was an issue that he wanted the Tribunal to be aware of from the outset. And that was that there were allegations present in this case that had already been brought as part of a previous case by Ms Ridley-Laing. And further, there are other allegations that could and should and should have been brought in that previous claim as well. He was not inviting the Tribunal to determine these as a preliminary issue, as he submitted the Tribunal’s time would be best used reading into the case and determining the allegations as they stand.

[3]The Tribunal was assisted in this case by two bundles of documents. The first (this is the primary bundle, and all page references in this judgment are to pages in this bundle) ran to 4091 pages. There was a second bundle, this was produced by the claimant, that ran to 357 pages.

[4]The Tribunal heard evidence from the claimant. She did not call any additional witnesses. Miss Mason gave evidence in her claim. Although this judgment is limited to the allegations brought by Ms Ridely-Laing, there is reference to evidence of Miss Mason where it had a direct impact on findings of fact with regards Ms Ridley-Laing’s allegations.

[5]The respondent called the following witnesses:a. Mr R Jackson. He had responsibility for what was to become the Corporate Development Branch.

b. Ms C Nutall. She had involvement in the roll out of the Windows-10 project.

c. Ms C Chadwick. A member of the HR time.

d. Ms C Stepleton. She was a member of the Operations Training Unit in the People and Development Branch.

e. Ms R Harrison. She took over line management responsibility of the claimant in the DEI time.

f. Ms L Haider. She was involved in the claimant’s Access to Work.

g. Ms E Myers. She worked as a Recruitment Co-ordinator.

h. Ms C Ryle. She acted as Welfare support for the claimant. and;

[6]The following witnesses gave evidence in this case but were not relevant to Ms Ridley-Laing’s claim: Mr Hargreaves, Mr Parkin, Mr Chunara and Ms Godwin. Their evidence was not considered when determining the allegations brought by Ms Ridley-Laing.

[7]The Tribunal was aware of the claimant’s need for certain adjustments in this case, and that she was a self-representing litigant in person. And the process has been adjusted throughout to ensure that the claimant was able to participate effectively. This benefitted the Tribunal in that it was able to hear all the necessary evidence in this case. The Tribunal ensured that there were sufficient and adequate breaks throughout, assisted the claimant with putting her case where necessary. The claimant allowed the claimant time to prepare cross-examination where that was necessary and possible. The Tribunal had early finishes to most sitting days. The parties were given a day between the completion of evidence and closing submissions. This was to allow the claimant adequate preparation time.

[8]The Tribunal throughout these proceedings made allowances for the claimant, and this was because the claimant was self-representing and had various impairments. However, there are clear deficiencies in the claimant’s witness statement, and this is with respect fundamental matters that go to central issues in this case. The tribunal does not consider that being selfrepresented nor the claimant’s impairments explain why certain important issues are not covered in her witness statement. This includes the following (although not limited to):a. Ms Ridley-Laing has not included any evidence on the impact on her normal day-to-day activities for those impairments not conceded as being a disability by the respondent. Ms Ridley-Laing explained to the tribunal that she did not know that this was necessary. And this was despite her understanding that there were still impairments in dispute as to whether they were a disability or not.

b. The claimant did not engage with the matter of a Provision, Criterion or Practices causing a substantial disadvantage, or the respondent’s knowledge of those disadvantages for the purpose of the reasonable adjustment complaint.

[9]The Tribunal does want to note the following, as representatives are not always given the credit they deserve. The Tribunal wants to note that Mr Adjei was entirely fair in his approach and is a credit to the Bar. Mr Adjei allowed expansions on evidence to be given rather than trying to limit it to the question he asked, and this included where allegations were not covered in witness statements and where the allegation took a direction that did not mirror the claim being brought. And he raised with the tribunal topics not covered by the claimant’s cross examination of respondent witnesses to ensure that she had presented her case fully. Practitioners do not get told often enough when they do a good job, but this tribunal is appreciative of Mr Adjei’s approach.

[10]The tribunal notes that the claimant did not make any applications of any sort (such as to postpone proceedings or for permission to include additional witness evidence). The tribunal reminded the claimant that during these proceedings (on several occasions, primarily when an issue concerning a significant gap in the witness evidence arose) the initial burden of proof in respect the claims rested on her. And that her witness statement was a document that should have included all the evidence that she wanted to give on those matters in dispute. The tribunal has tried to alleviate any evidential gap in the witness statements through consideration of the documents in the bundle where that was possible. However, the tribunal has not considered every bundle in the document with a view to filling these gaps. As that would have been an unreasonable task, given the tribunal had two bundles in front of it, running to a cumulative total of circa 4448 pages. Rather, it has adopted an approach of considering documents that it thought may have some relevance to issues not adequately covered in witness evidence, where they were either easily identifiable on the index to the bundle or found using the document search function. This supplemented any documents the tribunal had already been taken to and read during these proceedings. This approach was adopted with the overriding objective in mind.

LIST OF ISSUES

[11]The following allegations were brought by Ms Ridley-Laing in this case (these are copied across from pp.459-467 of Bundle A: 1. Reasonable Adjustments (Equality Act 2010 sections 20 & 21) Adjustments relating to Think Victim" training1.1 A"PCP" is a provision, criterion or practice. Did the respondent have the 1.1.1 In 2021, officers and staff were required to undertake a mandatory training course called Think Victim". The course was delivered in one online format which included the following features:

• It required participants to watch on a screen for several hours;

• It could not be paused

• It could not be saved

• It had to be completed in one sitting

• There were no gaps or pauses in delivery to allow information to be processed

• There were no transcript or course materials provided for reference

1.2 Did the PCPs put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage compared to someone without the claimant's disability? Although the claimant was, ultimately, able to complete the course by 02 June 2021, her position is that the format of the course meant that she did so only with great difficulty, causing an exacerbation of her pain and fatigue. Further, she was unable to retain the information conveyed during the course meaning that she has been deprived of the practical benefits that the training was intended to provide.

1.3 Did the respondent know, or could it reasonably have been expected to know, that the claimant was likely to be placed at the disadvantage?

1.4 Did the respondent fail in its duty to take such steps as it would have1.4.1 Provide the course in an alternative format

1.4.2 Provision of simple supportive information such as transcripts

1.4.3 Adapt the course to enable saving, pausing and multiple sittings. 1 .4.4 Provide link to download course materials after event. Adjustments relating to "Think Victim2 and "Equality Act Protected Characteristics" Training

1.5 APCP is a provision, criterion or practice. Did the respondent have the1.5.1 Towards the end of October 2021, officers and staff were required to undertake a mandatory training course called "Think Victim 2. (The course had been offered on a role related basis for staff since the course was released on 17 August 2021). The course was delivered in an in- person format at the respondent's Sedgley Park training facility.

1.5.2 From 15 September 2021, officers and staff were required to undertake a mandatory training course called Equality Act and Protected Characteristics". The course was delivered in an in-person format at the respondent's Sedgley Park training facility.

1.6 Did the PCPs put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage compared was unable to attend an in-person course at Sedgley Park due to the fact that she was clinically extremely vulnerable and to attend would place her at risk of contracting covid and, separately, due to her need to access toilet facilities urgently and without warning. The claimant has therefore not completed either of these mandatory training. She does not allege that there has been any further disadvantage (including sanction) beyond the fact that she has been unable to access training which the respondent evidently considers to be important for its staff.

1.7 Did the respondent know or could it reasonably have been expected to know that the claimant was likely to be placed at the disadvantage?

1.8 Did the respondent fail in its duty to take such steps as it would have1.8.1 Provide alternative means of accessing the training e.g. online package or remote access;

1.8.2 Alternatively, provide access to course materials to enable C to gain benefit from those on a self-taught basis. Adjustments relating to 8 December 2021 meeting

1.9 A PCP" is a provision, criterion or practice. Did the respondent have the following PCP: 1.9.1 That an important meeting, related to equalities, which the claimant was due to participate in on 8 December 2021, was to take place in person

1.10 Did the PCP put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage compared was unable to attend an in-person meeting due to the fact that she was clinically extremely vulnerable and to attend would place her at risk of contracting covid and, separately, due to her need to access toilet facilities urgently and without warning.

1.11 Did the respondent know, or could it reasonably have been expected to know, that the claimant was likely to be placed at the disadvantage?

1.12 Did the respondent fail in its duty to take such steps as it would have 1.12.1 Provide a link to enable the claimant to attend the meeting remotely. The claimant's position is that this adjustment was agreed in advance of the meeting in principle, but that Elaine Clarke-Williams failed to put it into place. The claimant eventually managed to access the meeting but missed some of it and this caused her distress. Adjustments relating to new laptop roll-out

1.13 APCP" is a provision, criterion or practice. Did the respondent have the 1.13.1 The claimant was instructed to attend Bolton Arena on 12 January 2022 as part of the respondent's roll-out of new Windows 10 laptops to its officers and staff. The alleged PCP is that, in order to be issued with a laptop, individuals had to attend a collection event. This took place at the Bolton arena, in a conference room booked by the respondent for this purpose. Attendees were required to participate in a 60-minute information session about the laptop and participate in a set up process. The respondent delayed issuing laptops to those who could not attend, informing them that they would receive their laptops later, as part of a "mop up" process starting at some point in March 2022.

1.14 Did the PCP put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage compared was unable to attend an in-person collection event of this nature due to the fact that she was clinically extremely vulnerable and to attend would place her at risk of contracting covid and, separately, due to her need to access toilet facilities urgently and without warning. The claimant has therefore not been issued with a Windows 10 laptop. She contends that this puts her at a particular disadvantage as having the laptop would enable the respondent to put in place other adjustments recommended by Access to Work (see below). Further, the claimant contends that this PCP put her (and other disabled officers/staff) at a disadvantage as not having a Windows 10 laptop interfered with the claimants ability to carry out their role in full by removing access to emails, internal calendars, meetings, scheduling and other internal communication channels and in some cases 'outed' them as having a disability to colleagues within the organisation.

1.15 Did the respondent know or could it reasonably have been expected to know that the claimant was likely to be placed at the disadvantage?

1.16 Did the respondent fail in its duty to take such steps as ii would have 1.16.1 Making bespoke arrangements to provide disabled employees, including the claimant, with a laptop outside of the standard 'roll-out' process, in a time frame which ensured they received laptops no later than colleagues. Adjustments relating to auxiliary aids

1.17 Did the lack of an auxiliary aid, put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage compared to someone without the claimant's disability? The claimant says that she was disadvantaged by the absence of the following auxiliary aids. In each case, the disadvantage relied on is that she was unable to fulfil her duties without being in pain and experiencing brain fog, cognitive fatigue and physical fatigue. These aids would have supported her physical and/or mental functioning so as to reduce the impact of her work, protecting her health and enabling her to perform her role more effectively.1.17.1 'Microbreak' software which would prompt the claimant to take breaks. This was recommended by Access to Work in November 2019 and remains outstanding. C's case is that it should have been provided by no later than 12 March 2020.

1.17.2 Wireless headphones. Also recommended by Access to Work in November 2019. A pair were provided but these were not compatible with C's equipment. The respondent should have provided a pair which were compatible, or alternatively, provided C with a suitable laptop to interface with the wireless headphones. C's case is that she should have been provided with effective access to wireless headphones by no later than 12 March 2020.

1.17.3 A personal laptop with assistive software. This was recommended by Access to Work in August 2021 and remains outstanding. C's case is that it should have been provided by no later than 14 December 2021.

1.17.4 A sit/stand desk for use at home. This was recommended by Access to Work in August 2021 and remains outstanding. C's case is that it should have been provided by no later than 14 December 2021.

1.17.5 A support chair for use at home. This was recommended by Access to Work in August 2021 and remains outstanding. C's case is that it should have been provided by no later than 14 December 2021.

1.17.6 A footstool for use at home. This was recommended by Access to Work in August 2021 and remains outstanding. C's case is that it should have been provided by no later than 14 December 2021.

1.17.7 A back support for use at home. This was recommended by Access to Work in August 2021 and remains outstanding. C's case is that it should have been provided by no later than 14 December 2021.

1.17.8 An 'arm' to hold the computer monitor provided by the respondent for use at home. This was recommended by Access to Work in August 2021 and remains outstanding. C's case is that it should have been provided by no later than 14 December 2021.

1.17.9 Annotating and notetaking conversion hardware and software ReMarkable 2 Pad and Digital Pen. This was recommended by Access to Work in August 2021 and remains outstanding. C's case is that it should have been provided by no later than 14 December 2021.

1.18 By what date should the respondent reasonably have taken those steps? (Reference should be made to the information given above as to the claimant's case on timings). 2. Harassment related to disability (Equality Act 2010 section 26)

2.1 Did the respondent do the following alleged things:2.1.1 In a meeting on 31 August 2021 Elaine Clarke-Williams told C that everyone would have to return to the office and, in the future, "no one would be working from home".

2.1.2 Elaine Clarke-Williams failing to send C the link to enable her to remotely attend the 8 December 2021 meeting regarding Equality and Human Rights policy/guidance.

2.1.3 Rachel Harrison in a meeting on 18 January 2022 with C and Lisa Mason accusing C of "using disability as a blocker" in relation to Windows 10 roleout and stating "I'm trying to help you girls because you've not been able to pick up your laptops because of your disabilities."

2.1.4 Rachel Harrison deliberately setting meetings or requesting contact outside C's working hours 18 January 2022.

2.1.5 Kelly Chilton telephoning C on 6 January 2022 to ask if there was a genuine reason why she could not attend the Windows 10 roll-out event, despite C having given her reasons in writing.

2.1.6 On 19 January 2022, C being removed from her role in the Diversity, Equality and Inclusion ("DEI") team and placed back in the P&D Branch with no role, work or team position against her wishes and contrary to the outcome of her Fairness at Work procedure and various assessments/recommendations.

2.2 If so, was that unwanted conduct?

2.3 Was it related to disability?

2.4 Did the conduct have the purpose of violating the claimant's dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the claimant?

2.5 If not, did it have that effect? The Tribunal will take into account the claimant's perception, the other circumstances of the case and whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect. 3. Direct disability discrimination (Equality Act 2010 section 13)

3.1 What are the facts in relation to the following allegations:3.1.1 In 2019, C sought assistance in finding an alternative role, and was instead being placed on the redeployment register (which she didn't want). This remains an on-going issue arising from the respondent's application of their redeployment procedure that forms part of their Attendance Management Policy.

3.1.2 On 8 December 2021, Elaine Clark-Williams failed to provide C with remote access to an important meeting about Equality and Human Rights guidance/policy which C had been asked to participate in.

3.1.3 On 19 January 2022, C being removed from her role in the Diversity, Equality and Inclusion ("DEl") team and placed back in the P&D Branch with no role, work or team position against her wishes and contrary to the outcome of a previous Fairness at Work procedure and various assessment/recommendations.

3.2 Did C reasonably see the treatment as a detriment?

3.3 If so, has C proven facts from which the Tribunal could conclude that in any of those respects the claimant was treated less favourably than someone in the same material circumstances without a disability was or would have been treated? The claimant relies on a hypothetical comparison.

3.4 If so, has the claimant also proven facts from which the Tribunal could conclude that the less favourable treatment was because of disability?

3.5 If so, has the respondent shown that there was no less favourable treatment because of disability? 4. Discrimination arising from disability (Equality Act 2010 section 15)

4.1 Did the respondent know or could it reasonably have been expected to know that the claimant had the disability? From what date?

4.2 If so, did the respondent treat the claimant unfavourably in any of the following alleged respects:4.2.1 In 2019, C sought assistance in finding an alternative role, and was instead being placed on the redeployment register (which she didn't want). This remains an on-going issue arising from the respondent's application of their redeployment policy.

4.2.2 During summer 2019, the claimant refused multiple roles on redeployment register due to needs to for reasonable adjustments. Whilst the claimant says she was refused up to 40 roles in total, she relies on the following roles for the purposes of her claim, as they were best-suited to her strengths, experience and circumstances:4.2.2.1 Blended learning officer. Applied for 12 June 2019, rejected on 16 July 2019 on the grounds of need for reasonable adjustments.

4.2.2.2 Workforce Planning HR Performance Officer. Applied 1 August 2019, rejected on 09 August 2019 on the grounds of need for reasonable adjustments.

4.2.2.3 Administration Manager. Applied for on 21 August 2019. rejected on 13 Sept 2019 on the grounds of need for reasonable adjustments.

4.2.2.4 Assessment, Verification and Accreditation officer. Applied for on 27 August 2019, rejected on 03 Sept 2019 as outside of redeployment policy criteria. NB C's case is that she was given this role in February 2022 when not on redeployment register. In each case, the parties agree that the date of the discriminatory act would be the date of rejection for the role (rather than application). The application dates are included to assist the respondent in identifying material related to those roles (including rejection dates if the claimant is unable to provide these).

4.2.3 On 8 December 2021, Elaine Clark-Williams failed to provide C with remote access to an important meeting about Equality and Human Rights guidance/policy which C had been asked to participate in.

4.2.4 On 19 January 2022, C being removed from her role in the Diversity, Equality and Inclusion (DEI") team and placed back in the P&D" Branch with no role, work or team position against her wishes and contrary to the outcome of a previous Fairness at Work procedure and various assessment/recommendations.

4.3 Did the following things arise in consequence of the claimant's disability:4.3.1 The fact that the claimant was on the redeployment register during summer 2019 and would have required part-time working in any redeployed role (NB the claimant's needs at this time were less severe than outlined below, those needs developed later).

4.3.2 The claimant's need to take rest breaks during work;

4.3.3 The claimant's need to work from home;

4.3.4 The claimant's need to work reduced hours;

4.3.5 The claimant's need to access toilet facilities urgently and without warning;

4.3.6 The claimant having difficulties in processing and retaining information

4.4 Has the claimant proven facts from which the Tribunal could conclude that the unfavourable treatment was because of any of those things?

4.5 If so, can the respondent show that there was no unfavourable treatment because of something arising in consequence of disability?

4.6 If not, was the treatment a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim? The respondent says that its aims were: 4.6.1 R will have the opportunity to confirm any justification defence after the claims have been clarified.

4.7 The Tribunal will decide in particular: 4.7 .1 was the treatment an appropriate and reasonably necessary way to achieve those aims; 4.7.2 could something less discriminatory have been done instead; 4. 7.3 how should the needs of the claimant and the respondent be balanced? 5. Victimisation (Equality Act 2010 section 27)

5.1 Did the claimant do a protected act as follows: 5.1.1 The Claimant's emails dated 15 July 2021 and 21 July 2021 regarding Access to Work to Timothy Rice; and The Claimant's emails to Marie O'Loughlin dated 22 July 2021, 20 September 2021 and 14 October 2021

5.2 Did the respondent do the following things:5.2.1 Leah Haider's stating in an email 23 September 2021 that C had previously not allowed access to her home to facilitate provision of equipment when that was untrue. (The delivery had failed because R provided a desk which was too big to fit through the claimant's door and had not asked for measurements.)

5.2.2 Carolyn Stapleton on 4 October 2021 asking C's line manager to ensure that the issue above was 'dealt with' even although she knew that the issue on the previous occasion did not lie with C.

5.3 By doing so, did it subject the claimant to detriment?

5.4 If so, has the claimant proven facts from which the Tribunal could conclude that it was because the claimant did a protected act?

5.5 If so, has the respondent shown that there was no contravention of section 27? 6. JURISDICTION

6.1 The Claimant's contacted ACAS on 11 April 2022 ('Day A') and was issued with an ACAS Early Conciliation certificate on 11 April 2022 (Day B') Any allegations or claims relating to matters which occurred prior to 12 January 2022 are out of time, s.123(1) EqA.

6.2 Do any or all of those acts/omissions form part of a course of conduct by the Respondent extending over a period of time such as to render them in time s.123(3) EqA?

6.3 If not, then is it just and equitable to extend time in respect of those allegations s.123(1)(b) EqA 2010? 7. DISABILITY

7.1 The Claimant relies on the following conditions for the purposes of her disability discrimination claims:7.1.1 Crohn's disease;

7.1.2 Lupus;

7.1.3 Depression;

7.1.4 Anxiety;

7.1.5 PTSD; and

7.1.6 ADHD.

7.2 At the material time, was the Claimant disabled within the meaning of s.6 EqA.

[12]The Tribunal is aware that a List of Issues is simply a case management tool, and it does not replace the claims that form part of the pleadings. With this in mind, the Tribunal checked carefully and was satisfied that the allegations contained in the list of issues properly presented the allegations brought by Ms Ridley-Laing. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK Jurisdiction: cause of action estoppel/abuse of process/the Rule in Henderson v Henderson

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

[13]Cause of action estoppel applies in the Employment Tribunal (Watt (formerly Carter) v Ahsan

[2007] UKHL 51

[2008] IRLR 243

) and acts to prevent re-litigation of a claim that has already been decided between the parties (Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v Zodiac Seats UK Ltd (formerly Contour Aerospace Ltd)

[2014] AC 160

, SC at para.17, per Lord Sumption).

[14]The doctrine also applies where a claimant raises in subsequent proceedings claims that had formed part of a claim that they had previously withdrawn and which was dismissed upon withdrawal (Patel v Governing Body of Lister Community School

UKEAT/0289/16/JOJ

at paras.38 & 40 per Simler P (as she then was)).

[15]Whilst the Rule in Henderson v Henderson deems it to be an abuse of process to seek to raise in subsequent litigation points which could and should have been raised before. Important consideration of the effect of this rule was by Lord Bingham in Johnson v Gore-Wood & Co

[2002] 2 AC 1

. He explained that the principle in Henderson v Henderson was “both a rule of public policy and an application of the law of res judicata”. And explained that: ““Henderson v Henderson abuse of process, as now understood, although separate and distinct from cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel, has much in common with them. The underlying public interest is the same: that there should be finality in litigation and that a party should not be twice vexed in the same matter. This public interest is reinforced by the current emphasis on efficiency and economy in the conduct of litigation, in the interests of the parties and the public as a whole. The bringing of a claim or the raising of a defence in later proceedings may, without more, amount to abuse if the court is satisfied (the onus being on the party alleging abuse) that the claim or defence should have been raised in the earlier proceedings if it was to be raised at all. I would not accept that it is necessary, before abuse may be found, to identify any additional element such as a collateral attack on a previous decision or some dishonesty, but where those elements are present the later proceedings will be much more obviously abusive, and there will rarely be a finding of abuse unless the later proceeding involves what the court regards as unjust harassment of a party. It is, however, wrong to hold that because a matter could have been raised in earlier proceedings it should have been, so as to render the raising of it in later proceedings necessarily abusive. That is to adopt too dogmatic an approach to what should in my opinion be a broad, merits-based judgment which takes account of the public and private interests involved and also takes account of all the facts of the case, focusing attention on the crucial question whether, in all the circumstances, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the court by seeking to raise before it the issue which could have been raised before.” Jurisdiction: Time limits

[16]Section 123(1)(a) of the Equality Act 2010 provides that: “…proceedings on a complaint within section 120 may not be brought after the end of— (a) the period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates,

[17]However, this must be read alongside s.123(1)(b) of the Equality Act 2010, which allows the tribunal to extend time for presentation of a claim of discrimination when it is just and equitable to do so. In deciding how to exercise my discretion where an extension of time is at issue, the factors that I need to consider are, as far as they are relevant in any particular case, those set out in s.33 of the Limitation Act, as confirmed in the case of British Coal Board v Keeble

[1997] IRLR 336

. Those factors are: the balance of prejudice to each party in the case taking into consideration all the factual circumstances including the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the extent to which the cogency of the evidence will suffer as a result of extending time and the steps taken by the Claimant to take proper advice once he knew of the cause of action.

[18]Where a claim is out of time, the burden rests with the claimant to provide evidence the tribunal that it is just and equitable to extend time. Importantly, extending of time is the exception rather than the rule. Specifically, Auld LJ Robertson v. Bexley Community Centre t/a Leisure Link

[2003] IRLR 434

stated: “It is also of importance to note that the time limits are exercised strictly in employment and industrial cases. When tribunals consider their discretion to consider a claim out of time on just and equitable grounds there is no presumption that they should do so unless they can justify failure to exercise the discretion. Quite the reverse. A tribunal cannot hear a complaint unless the applicant convinces it that it is just and equitable to extend time. So, the exercise of discretion is the exception rather than the rule.”

[19]A useful summary of the principles governing the exercise of the ‘just and equitable’ discretion was set out by Mrs Justice Elisabeth Laing (as she then was) in Miller and ors v Ministry of Justice and ors and another case EAT 0003/15:a. the discretion to extend time is a wide one

b. time limits are to be observed strictly in employment tribunals. There is no presumption that time will be extended unless it cannot be justified. The reverse is true: the exercise of discretion is the exception rather than the rule

c. if a tribunal directs itself correctly in law, the EAT can only interfere if the decision is, in the technical sense, ‘perverse’, i.e. no reasonable tribunal properly directing itself in law could have reached it, or the tribunal failed to take into account relevant factors, or took into account irrelevant factors, or made a decision which was not based on the evidence

d. what factors are relevant to the exercise of the discretion, and how they should be balanced, are a matter for the tribunal. The prejudice that a respondent will suffer from facing a claim which would otherwise be time-barred is customarily relevant in such cases

e. the tribunal may find the checklist of factors in S.33 of the Limitation Act 1980 helpful (see ‘Relevant factors’ below) but this is not a requirement and a tribunal will only err in law if it omits something significant.

f. requires the court to consider the prejudice which each party would suffer as a result of the decision reached, and to have regard to all the circumstances of the case, in particular: the length of, and reasons for, the delay; the extent to which the cogency of the evidence is likely to be affected by the delay; the extent to which the party sued has co-operated with any requests for information; the promptness with which the claimant acted once he or she knew of the facts giving rise to the cause of action; and the steps taken by the claimant to obtain appropriate advice once he or she knew of the possibility of taking action. Disability

[20]The legal test for disability is set out at s.6 of the Equality Act 2010. This states: (1) A person (P) has a disability if— (a) P has a physical or mental impairment, and (b) the impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on P's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. … Knowledge of Disability

[21]In respect of knowledge of disability, the Tribunal considered the principle in Gallop v Newport City Council

[2014] IRLR 211

CA, and in particular that at para 36, Rimer LJ expressed that actual or constructive knowledge of disability requires actual or constructive knowledge of each element of the statutory test. “I come to the central question, namely whether the ET misdirected itself in law in arriving at its conclusion that Newport had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of Mr Gallop's disability. As to that, Ms Monaghan and Ms Grennan were agreed as to the law, namely that(i) before an employer can be answerable for disability discrimination against an employee, the employer must have actual or constructive knowledge that the employee was a disabled person; and

(ii) that for that purpose the required knowledge, whether actual or constructive, is of the facts constituting the employee's disability as identified in s.1(1) of the DDA. Those facts can be regarded as having three elements to them, namely (a) a physical or mental impairment, which has (b) a substantial and long-term adverse effect on (c) his ability to carry out normal day-to-day duties; and whether those elements are satisfied in any case depends also on the clarification as to their sense provided by Schedule 1.”

[22]This was further elaborated on by Choudhury P in Gallacher v Abellio Scotrail Ltd

UKEATS/0027/19

: “53. The submission is that all of this detail, as to the Claimant's symptoms, the medication she was on and the various measures that would be taken to facilitate her return to work, including the referral to occupational health, was sufficient to give rise to constructive knowledge. That was so even though the Claimant was not aware herself that she was disabled at the time. The Tribunal's error had, according to Mr Grant-Hutchison, a knock-on effect on the Tribunal's conclusion as to whether there was discrimination because of something arising in consequence of disability. In particular, he submits that had there been an occupational health referral, it might have led to the conclusion reached some time later by the Claimant's GP that her condition affected her interactions with colleagues. … 55. I agree with Mr Crammond that even if there were something in the constructive knowledge ground, the point would be academic for the reasons he gives. But in any event, it is my judgment that the constructive knowledge ground cannot succeed. I say that for the following reasons:a. The Tribunal reached a clear conclusion of fact that while some information was provided by the Claimant to Ms Taggart as to her conditions, there was none of the detail required as to substantial disadvantage, the effects on her day-to-day activities or the longevity of those effects so as to satisfy the requirements of Section 6 of the 2010 Act : see [216] and [217].

b. The Tribunal also noted that the Claimant was herself inclined to under-report her symptoms at the time and did not consider herself to be under any disadvantage in light of the arrangements that had been put in place: see [219].

c. The Tribunal was entitled, in the circumstances, to conclude that the OH referral would have been unlikely to change the state of knowledge so as to give rise to constructive knowledge being present on the part of the Respondent. For these reasons, Ground 2 of the appeal also fails and is dismissed (emphases added).” Burden of proof under the Equality Act 2010

[23]We reminded ourselves of the burden of proof in discrimination cases, with reference to section 136 of the Equality Act 2010:(1) This section applies to any proceedings relating to a contravention of this Act.

(2) If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred.

[24]Lord Justice Mummery (with which Laws and Maurice Kay LJJ agreed) in Madarassy v Nomura International plc

[2007] ICR 867

, at paragraphs 56- 58, provided a summary of the principles that apply when considering the burden of proof in Equality Act Claims:"56. The court in Igen v Wong… expressly rejected the argument that it was sufficient for the complainant simply to prove facts from which the Tribunal could conclude that the respondent "could have" committed an unlawful act of discrimination. The bare facts of a difference in status and a difference in treatment only indicate a possibility of discrimination. They are not, without more, sufficient material from which a Tribunal "could conclude" that, on the balance of probabilities, the respondent had committed an unlawful act of discrimination.

57. "Could… conclude" in section 63A (2) must mean that "a reasonable Tribunal could properly conclude" from all the evidence before it. This would include evidence adduced by the complainant in support of the allegations of sex discrimination, such as evidence of a difference in status, a difference in treatment and the reason for the differential treatment. It would also include evidence adduced by the respondent contesting the complaint. Subject only to the statutory "absence of an adequate explanation" at this stage (which I shall discuss later), the Tribunal would need to consider all the evidence relevant to the discrimination complaint; for example, evidence as to whether the act complained of occurred at all; evidence as to the actual comparators relied on by the complainant to prove less favourable treatment; evidence as to whether the comparisons being made by the complainant were of like with like as required by section 5(3) of the 1975 Act; and available evidence of the reasons for the differential treatment.

58. The absence of an adequate explanation for differential treatment of the complainant is not, however, relevant to whether there is a prima facie case of discrimination by the respondent. The absence of an adequate explanation only becomes relevant if a prima facie case is proved by the complainant. The consideration of the Tribunal then moves to the second stage. The burden is on the respondent to prove that he has not committed an act of unlawful discrimination. He may prove this by an adequate non-discriminatory explanation of the treatment of the complainant. If he does not, the Tribunal must uphold the discrimination claim."

[25]Mummery LJ also explained further how evidence adduced by the employer might be relevant, noting that it could even relate to the reason for any less favourable treatment (paras. 71-72):"71. Section 63A (2) does not expressly or impliedly prevent the Tribunal at the first stage from hearing, accepting or drawing inferences from evidence adduced by the respondent disputing and rebutting the complainant's evidence of discrimination. The respondent may adduce evidence at the first stage to show that the acts which are alleged to be discriminatory never happened; or that, if they did, they were not less favourable treatment of the complainant; or that the comparators chosen by the complainant or the situations with which comparisons are made are not truly like the complainant or the situation of the complainant; or that, even if there has been less favourable treatment of the complainant, it was not on the ground of her sex or pregnancy.

72. Such evidence from the respondent could, if accepted by the Tribunal, be relevant as showing that, contrary to the complainant's allegations of discrimination, there is nothing in the evidence from which the Tribunal could properly infer a prima facie case of discrimination on the proscribed ground…."

[26]Lord Justice Mummery also pointed out that it will often be appropriate for the Tribunal to go straight to the second stage. An example is where the employer is asserting that whether the burden at the first stage has been discharged or not, he has a non-discriminatory explanation for the alleged discrimination. A claimant is not prejudiced by that approach since it is effectively assumed in his favour that the burden at the first stage has been discharged.

[27]The Tribunal was reminded of two important matters (amongst others) by the then House of Lords in Nagarajan v London Regional Transport

[1999] IRLR 572

:a. If the burden shifts, the Tribunal should then focus on the employer’s conscious or subconscious reason for treating the worker as they did, and

b. The protected characteristic needs to “significant[ly] influence” the less favourable treatment so as to be causally relevant.

[28]To summarise, the claimant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, facts from which a Tribunal could conclude, in the absence of an adequate explanation that the respondent had discriminated against him. If the claimant succeeds in doing this, then the onus will be on the respondent to prove that it did not commit the act. This is known as the shifting burden of proof. Once the claimant has established a prima facie case (which will require the Tribunal to hear evidence from the claimant and the respondent, to see what proper inferences may be drawn), the burden of proof shifts to the respondent to disprove the allegations. This will require consideration of the subjective reasons that caused the employer to act as he did. The respondent will have to show a non-discriminatory reason for the difference in treatment. A failure in the duty to make reasonable adjustments

[29]The relevant statutory provisions, in respect of a failure to make reasonable adjustments complaint are as follows: 20. Duty to make adjustments(1) Where this Act imposes a duty to make reasonable adjustments on a person, this section, sections 21 and 22 and the applicable Schedule apply; and for those purposes, a person on whom the duty is imposed is referred to as A.

(2) The duty comprises the following three requirements.

(3) The first requirement is a requirement, where a provision, criterion or practice of A's puts a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled, to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to avoid the disadvantage. ... 21. Failure to comply with duty (1) A failure to comply with the first, second or third requirement is a failure to comply with a duty to make reasonable adjustments. (2) A discriminates against a disabled person if A fails to comply with that duty in relation to that person. The Tribunal reminded itself that when considering a claim for a failure in the duty to make reasonable adjustments that there is need to establish knowledge (actual or constructive) of the substantial disadvantage alleged on the part of the respondent. Harassment related to disability

[30]Section 26 of the Equality Act 2010 provides that: “(1) A person(a) (A) harasses another

(b) (B) if— (a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and (b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of— (i) violating B's dignity, or (ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B. (4) In deciding whether conduct has the effect referred to in subsection (1)(b), each of the following must be taken into account— (a) the perception of B; (b) the other circumstances of the case;

[31]The test is a mix of subjective and objective parts.

[32]The proper approach to harassment claims is set out in Richmond Pharmacology v Dhaliwal

[2009] IRLR 336

:a. Was there unwanted conduct?

b. Did it have the purpose or effect of violating C’s dignity or creating an adverse environment for her? and

c. Was it on or related to the prohibited ground?

[33]In Land Registry v Grant (2011 IRLR 748) Elias LJ said: “Where harassment results from the effect of the conduct, that effect must actually be achieved. However, the question whether conduct has had that adverse effect is an objective one – it must reasonably be considered to have that effect – although the victim's perception of the effect is a relevant factor for the tribunal to consider. In that regard, when assessing the effect of a remark, the context in which it is given is always highly material. Moreover, tribunals must not cheapen the significance of the words “intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment”. They are an important control to prevent trivial acts causing minor upsets being caught by the concept of harassment.” Discrimination arising from disability

[34]Protection against discrimination arising from disability is contained at section 15 of the Equality Act 2010: (1) A person (A) discriminates against a disabled person (B) if— (a) A treats B unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of B's disability, and (b) A cannot show that the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

[35]In respect of discrimination arising from disability, the Tribunal reminded itself of the guidance given by Simler P (as she then was) at paragraph 31 in Pnaiser v NHS England

[2016] IRLR 170

: “the proper approach can be summarised as follows:(a) A Tribunal must first identify whether there was unfavourable treatment and by whom: in other words, it must ask whether A treated B unfavourably in the respects relied on by B. No question of comparison arises.

(b) The Tribunal must determine what caused the impugned treatment, or what was the reason for it. The focus at this stage is on the reason in the mind of A. An examination of the conscious or unconscious thought processes of A is likely to be required, just as it is in a direct discrimination case. Again, just as there may be more than one reason or cause for impugned treatment in a direct discrimination context, so too, there may be more than one reason in a section 15 case. The ‘something’ that causes the unfavourable treatment need not be the main or sole reason, but must have at least a significant (or more than trivial) influence on the unfavourable treatment, and so amount to an effective reason for or cause of it.

(c) Motives are irrelevant. The focus of this part of the enquiry is on the reason or cause of the impugned treatment and A’s motive in acting as he or she did is simply irrelevant: see Nagarajan v London Regional Transport

[1999] IRLR 572

. A discriminatory motive is emphatically not (and never has been) a core consideration before any prima facie case of discrimination arises, contrary to Miss Jeram’s submission (for example at paragraph 17 of her Skeleton).

(d) The Tribunal must determine whether the reason/cause (or, if more than one), a reason or cause, is “something arising in consequence of B’s disability”. That expression ‘arising in consequence of’ could describe a range of causal links. Having regard to the legislative history of section 15 of the Act (described comprehensively by Elisabeth Laing J in Hall), the statutory purpose which appears from the wording of section 15, namely to provide protection in cases where the consequence or effects of a disability lead to unfavourable treatment, and the availability of a justification defence, the causal link between the something that causes unfavourable treatment and the disability may include more than one link. In other words, more than one relevant consequence of the disability may require consideration, and it will be a question of fact assessed robustly in each case whether something can properly be said to arise in consequence of disability.

(e) For example, in Land Registry v Houghton

UKEAT/0149/14

a bonus payment was refused by A because B had a warning. The warning was given for absence by a different manager. The absence arose from disability. The Tribunal and HHJ Clark in the EAT had no difficulty in concluding that the statutory test was met. However, the more links in the chain there are between the disability and the reason for the impugned treatment, the harder it is likely to be to establish the requisite connection as a matter of fact.

(f) This stage of the causation test involves an objective question and does not depend on the thought processes of the alleged discriminator.

(g) Miss Jeram argued that “a subjective approach infects the whole of section 15” by virtue of the requirement of knowledge in section 15(2) so that there must be, as she put it, ‘discriminatory motivation’ and the alleged discriminator must know that the ‘something’ that causes the treatment arises in consequence of disability. She relied on paragraphs 26 to 34 of Weerasinghe as supporting this approach, but in my judgment those paragraphs read properly do not support her submission, and indeed paragraph 34 highlights the difference between the two stages - the ‘because of’ stage involving A’s explanation for the treatment (and conscious or unconscious reasons for it) and the ‘something arising in consequence’ stage involving consideration of whether (as a matter of fact rather than belief) the ‘something’ was a consequence of the disability.

(h) Moreover, the statutory language of section 15(2) makes clear (as Miss Jeram accepts) that the knowledge required is of the disability only, and does not extend to a requirement of knowledge that the ‘something’ leading to the unfavourable treatment is a consequence of the disability. Had this been required the statute would have said so. Moreover, the effect of section 15 would be substantially restricted on Miss Jeram’s construction, and there would be little or no difference between a direct disability discrimination claim under section 13 and a discrimination arising from disability claim under section 15.

(i) As Langstaff P held in Weerasinghe, it does not matter precisely in which order these questions are addressed. Depending on the facts, a Tribunal might ask why A treated the claimant in the unfavourable way alleged in order to answer the question whether it was because of “something arising in consequence of the claimant’s disability”. Alternatively, it might ask whether the disability has a particular consequence for a claimant that leads to ‘something’ that caused the unfavourable treatment. Direct discrimination

[36]Protection against direct discrimination is provided at s.13 of the Equality Act 2010: A person(a) (A) discriminates against another

(b) (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others.

[37]Lord Nicholls in Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary

[2003] IRLR 285

gave guidance as to the approach an employment Tribunal should consider when determining a direct discrimination complaint: “7. …In deciding a discrimination claim one of the matters employment Tribunals have to consider is whether the statutory definition of discrimination has been satisfied. When the claim is based on direct discrimination or victimisation, in practice Tribunals in their decisions normally consider, first, whether the claimant received less favourable treatment than the appropriate comparator (the 'less favourable treatment' issue) and then, secondly, whether the less favourable treatment was on the relevant proscribed ground (the 'reason why' issue). Tribunals proceed to consider the reason why issue only if the less favourable treatment issue is resolved in favour of the claimant. Thus the less favourable treatment issue is treated as a threshold which the claimant must cross before the Tribunal is called upon to decide why the claimant was afforded the treatment of which she is complaining. 8. No doubt there are cases where it is convenient and helpful to adopt this two-step approach to what is essentially a single question: did the claimant, on the proscribed ground, receive less favourable treatment than others? But, especially where the identity of the relevant comparator is a matter of dispute, this sequential analysis may give rise to needless problems. Sometimes the less favourable treatment issue cannot be resolved without, at the same time, deciding the reason why issue. The two issues are intertwined. … 11. …employment Tribunals may sometimes be able to avoid arid and confusing disputes about the identification of the appropriate comparator by concentrating primarily on why the claimant was treated as she was. Was it on the proscribed ground which is the foundation of the application? That will call for an examination of all the facts of the case. Or was it for some other reason? If the latter, the application fails. If the former, there will be usually be no difficulty in deciding whether the treatment, afforded to the claimant on the proscribed ground, was less favourable than was or would have been afforded to others.”

[38]This is further explained by Mr Justice Underhill P (as he then was), in Amnesty International v Ahmed

[2009] IRLR 884

: “32. The basic question in a direct discrimination case is what is or are the "ground" or "grounds" for the treatment complained of.[3] That is the language of the definitions of direct discrimination in the main discrimination statutes and the various more recent employment equality regulations. It is also the terminology used in the underlying Directives: see, e.g., art. 2.2 (a) of Directive EU/2000/43 ("the Race Directive"). There is however no difference between that formulation and asking what was the "reason" that the act complained of was done, which is the language used in the victimisation provisions (e.g. s. 2 (1) of the 1976 Act): see per Lord Nicholls in Nagarajan at p. 512 D-E (also, to the same effect, Lord Steyn at p. 521 C-D).[4]33. In some cases the ground, or the reason, for the treatment complained of is inherent in the act itself. If an owner of premises puts up a sign saying "no blacks admitted", race is, necessarily, the ground on which (or the reason why) a black person is excluded. James v Eastleigh is a case of this kind. There is a superficial complication, in that the rule which was claimed to be unlawful – namely that pensioners were entitled to free entry to the Council's swimming-pools – was not explicitly discriminatory. But it nevertheless necessarily discriminated against men because men and women had different pensionable ages: the rule could entirely accurately have been stated as "free entry for women at 60 and men at 65". The Council was therefore applying a criterion which was of its nature discriminatory: it was, as Lord Goff put it (at p. 772 C-D), "gender based".[5] In cases of this kind what was going on inside the head of the putative discriminator – whether described as his intention, his motive, his reason or his purpose – will be irrelevant. The "ground" of his action being inherent in the act itself, no further inquiry is needed. It follows that, as the majority in James v Eastleigh decided, a respondent who has treated a claimant less favourably on the grounds of his or her sex or race cannot escape liability because he had a benign motive.

34. But that is not the only kind of case. In other cases – of which Nagarajan is an example - the act complained of is not in itself discriminatory but is rendered so by a discriminatory motivation, i.e. by the "mental processes" (whether conscious or unconscious) which led the putative discriminator to do the act. Establishing what those processes were is not always an easy inquiry, but Tribunals are trusted to be able to draw appropriate inferences from the conduct of the putative discriminator and the surrounding circumstances (with the assistance where necessary of the burden of proof provisions). Even in such a case, however, it is important to bear in mind that the subject of the inquiry is the ground of, or reason for, the putative discriminator's action, not his motive: just as much as in the kind of case considered in James v Eastleigh, a benign motive is irrelevant. This is the point being made in the second paragraph of the passage which we have quoted from the speech of Lord Nicholls in Nagarajan (see para. 29 above). The distinctions involved may seem subtle, but they are real, as the example given by Lord Nicholls at the end of that paragraph makes clear. … 37. …although (as Lord Goff points out) the test may be applied equally to both the "criterion" and the "mental processes" type of case, its real value is in the latter: if the discriminator would not have done the act complained of but for the claimant's sex (or race), it does not matter whether you describe the mental process involved as his intention, his motive, his reason, his purpose or anything else – all that matter is that the proscribed factor operated on his mind. This is therefore a useful gloss on the statutory test; but it was propounded in order to make a particular point, and we do not believe that Lord Goff intended for a moment that it should be used as an all-purpose substitute for the statutory language. Indeed if it were, there would plainly be cases in which it was misleading. The fact that a claimant's sex or race is a part of the circumstances in which the treatment complained of occurred, or of the sequence of events leading up to it, does not necessarily mean that it formed part of the ground, or reason, for that treatment.

[39]It may be that a protected characteristic is in the background of a casem but it is not the reason for the alleged treatment. For example, in Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Keohane

[2014] ICR 1073

, MR Justice Langstaff explained: “22. Pregnancy, sex, race, disability, age and the other characteristics identified as protected in the Equality Act are an inherent part of the identity of a person. They are thus always liable to be present when any decision is made or act is done in respect of that person. Often, and perhaps almost inevitably, those characteristics will shape the context and the circumstances within which that decision or act is taken or done. The purpose of the Equality Act put generally is to proscribe criteria or behaviour which are responsive not to the context generally, but specifically to the characteristic concerned. Thus, in Martin v Lancehawk

[2004] All ER (D) 400

an employee was dismissed because her affair with the manager had broken down. If he had not been male, and she female, the relationship, and consequently its breakdown, would not have occurred. But the fact that they were of different gender did not cause the breakdown; it was merely part of the background circumstances. A difference in sex was not the real, or “activating” cause of the dismissal. It was upon cause in that sense that a Tribunal had to focus - see Seide v Gillette Industries

[1980] IRLR 427

(per Slynn J for the Appeal Tribunal): context was insufficient. A more recent example is that of Onu v Akwiwu

[2013] IRLR 523

in which migrant worker status was regarded as a background circumstance rather than an activating cause of the employers’ ill-treatment of their domestic worker, who had that status. The distinction between the underlying circumstances, or the context within which a decision or act is taken or done is thus well understood.” CLOSING SUBMISSIONS

[40]The Tribunal benefitted from written and oral closing submissions made by Ms Ridley-Laing and on behalf of the respondent. These are not repeated here. However, they have been considered and taken into account when reaching this decision. COMPARATOR FOR THE DIRECT RACE/DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION

CLAIMS

[41]No actual comparators were recorded in the List of Issues, and none are apparent in the claim form.

[42]Rather, when considering the claimant’s direct discrimination complaints (save for allegation 3.1.1, which was dismissed on Res Judicata grounds), the Tribunal adopted a hypothetical comparator. The hypothetical comparator was not the same for all of the allegations. The following hypothetical comparators were adopted:a. Allegations 3.1.2, the hypothetical comparator was a person without the same disabilities as Ms Ridley-Laing, was somebody who Ms Clarke-Williams wanted present at the meeting of 08 Decmeber 2021 and somebody who had been given permission to attend remotely.

b. For allegation 3.1.3, the hypothetical comparator was a member of the DEI Team on temporary secondment and who, in a meeting, engaged in what can be perceived as an angry disagreement with their line manager. FINDINGS OF FACT We make the following findings of fact based on the balance of probability from the evidence we have read, seen, and heard. Where there is reference to certain aspects of the evidence that have assisted us in making our findings of fact this is not indicative that no other evidence has been considered. Our findings were based on all of the evidence and these are merely indicators of some of the evidence considered in order to try to assist the parties understand why we made the findings that we did. We do not make findings in relation to all matters in dispute but only on matters that we consider relevant to deciding on the issues currently before us. The Tribunal has separated out the findings as follows: the general section contains the majority of the findings of fact. This primarily set out the findings in chronological order. However, the Tribunal has included separate findings on some specific matters. However, the findings of fact should be considered as a whole. General conclusions on extension of time on a just and equitable basis

FINDINGS OF FACT

[43]The Tribunal did not find that any of the allegations succeeded (save for allegations 1.17.3-1.17.9). And if it did, there are specific allegations that were brought outside of the primary time limit (this is noted in the relevant sections, below).

[44]If the Tribunal did need to determine whether to extend time on a just and equitable basis (aside from allegations 1.17.3-1.17.9, which is dealt with under that heading), then it would have concluded that it would not. In short, Ms Ridley-Laing did not adduce any evidence to support or put forward any acceptable reason to support that it would have been just and equitable to extend time.

[45]Rather, the Tribunal would have concluded that time should not have been extended in this claim. Important considerations included that Ms RidleyLaing had already brought previous proceedings, and so was aware of the process and must have known about time limits. There was nothing that impaired or prevented her from bringing proceedings sooner. Ms RidleyLaing was a member of a Trade Union and had access to advice if that was needed.

[46]The Tribunal does not consider it to be proportionate to take this any further in this judgment. (i) Was the claimant disabled by reason of the mental impairments of Anxiety, depression, PTSD and/or ADHD?

[47]The respondent conceded that Ms Ridley-Laing was disabled at the material times by reason of Crohn’s disease and Lupus. However, it disputed that the claimant was disabled by reason of depression, anxiety, PTSD and/or ADHD. Whether these specific impairments were a disability was therefore in dispute between the parties. And this was a clear dispute when considering the respondent’s amended Grounds of Resistance (pp.443- 444).

[48]Despite these impairments being in dispute as to whether they satisfied the test for disability under the Equality Act 2010, Ms Ridley-Laing did not include any satisfactory evidence in her witness statement (or elsewhere in the bundle) that explained the impacts that such impairments had on her normal day-to-day activities. Ms Ridely-Laing did specify documents that she relied on when she re-examined herself and in her closing submissions.

[49]Despite the above, the tribunal undertook an assessment of the evidence it did have in the bundle and the claimant’s witness statement to assess whether there was any such evidence to support that these disputed impairments had a substantial adverse affect on the claimant’s day to day activities. This included, but not limited to:a. Ms Ridley-Laing’s disability timeline (pp.309-311)

b. Ms Ridley-Laing’s medical records (pp.756-785)

c. The document from Dr Hui (pp.792-793)

d. The written notes at pp.801-803

e. The medical records at pp.805-817

f. The occupational health reports (08 February 2019, pp.872-874, 11 April 2019, pp.884-887, 04 July 2019, pp.928-930

g. Dr Hui’s email of 15 February 2019 (p.876) and 18 April 2022 (p.888)

h. Disability Declaration of 07 March 2019 (p.877)

i. The Consultant letter of 29 May 2019 (pp.906-907)

j. The stress risk assessment of 30 May 2019 (pp.910-914)

k. Rheumatology Department document of 10 July 2019 (pp.931-932)

l. The Disability Needs Assessment of 19 May 2021 (pp.1465-1479)

m. The stress risk assessment of 20 May 2021 (pp.1480-1484)

n. The Access to Work Report of 22 July 2021 (pp.1522-1541)

[50]Based on the evidence before this Tribunal, it concludes that none of the evidence supports that any of the disputed impairments were having a substantial adverse effect on the claimant’s normal day-to-day activities, such to be a disability pursuant to s.6 of the Equality Act 2010.

[51]Based on the evidence before it, the tribunal found that Ms Ridley-Laing to was not disabled by reason of depression, anxiety, PTSD and/or ADHD. These specific impairments are found not to be a disability for the purposes of this claim. (ii) Adjustments relating to ‘Think Victim’ training (p.459, paras 1.1-1.4)

[52]The respondent conceded that it applied the PCP’s as pleaded.

[53]On 25 May 2021, Ms Ridley-Laing emailed Mr Ashcroft with her observations on the Think Victim Package (p.1488-1489). This was following trying to complete the training. Ms Ridley-Laing does not identify in this email that having to complete the training in the current format was causing her difficulty as it was exacerbating her pain and fatigue which was linked to her disability. Nor that for reasons connected to her disability she was not able to retain the information conveyed during the course. Rather she provides feedback in the general sense (such as it isn’t likely to aid long term retention, if you have a disability you may need to pause for various reasons such as to alleviate pain, fatigue… a pause button and transcripts would be helpful and improve the offering). That is the height of Ms RidleyLaing’s evidence on impacts. And this Tribunal considers this to be insufficient.

[54]In short, the claimant has adduced no evidence that supports that this specific course put her at the disadvantages that she relies on. And so, the tribunal concludes that it did not exacerbate pain and fatigue, nor was she not able to retain the information conveyed. Further, even if it had, the tribunal finds that the respondent did not have knowledge that the way this course was presented put Ms Ridely-Laing to these disadvantages that others without her disabilities would not have been put at.

[55]Ms Ridley-Laing completed the Think Victim training by 02 June 2021 (p.1491).

Conclusion

[56]The initial burned of proof rests on Ms Ridley-Laing to satisfy the tribunal with evidence that the PCP put her at the disadvantage as alleged. And Ms Ridely-Laing has failed in this respect. And therefore, this allegation must fail. Furthermore, Ms Ridely-Laing must adduce evidence that supports that the respondent had knowledge of such disadvantage. And again, she has not satisfied this burden. At its height, the claimant’s evidence is the email of 25 May 2021. And this simply does not reach the level of satisfying that she was either put at the substantial disadvantage as alleged, or that the respondent had knowledge of the alleged substantial disadvantages.

[57]The allegation therefore fails and is dismissed.

[58]Even if the tribunal is wrong on that, the latest date that Ms Ridely-Laing could have been subject to the disadvantage as alleged is 02 June 2021. This has been brought out of time. She has not satisfied the tribunal with any good reason or evidence to support that time should be extended on a just and equitable basis. And the tribunal does not consider that this would have formed part of a continuing act with any allegation that was brought in time. As such, even had Ms Ridley-Laing satisfied the tribunal with such evidence, it would have failed for being brought out of time in any event. (iii) Adjustments relating to ‘Think Victim 2’ and ‘Equality Act Protected Characteristics’ training (p.460, paras 1.5-1.8) Findings (Think Victim 2)

[59]On 17 August 2021, Ms Stapleton emailed to Division Leaders on 17 August 2021 information on a course entitled ‘Think Victim 2’ (p.1555).

[60]In this email, Ms Stapleton explained that the course was mandatory for police officers. And explained that attendance for police staff would be role specific. She continued to explain that she thought that it would be appropriate for the majority of staff that attended the initial Think Victim course and those involved in the design and delivery of training. Responsibility for adding or removing participants was left with each Division Lead.

[61]Ms O’Loughlin forwarded the email to the claimant on 31 August 2021 (p.1555). She wrote: ‘Please let me know your thoughts on attending the below course, in line with your training roles?’

[62]Ms Ridley-Laing replied to Ms O’Loughlin on 01 September 2021 at 08.14 (p.1554). In short, Ms Ridley-Laing explained that it didn’t make sense for her to do the course.

[63]Ms O’Loughlin replied to Ms Ridley-Laing on 01 September 2021 at 10.20 (p.1554). She explained that she would update P&D that in her current role there was no necessity for her to attend the course.

[64]Ms Ridley-Laing in closing submissions referred to the emails on p.2840. These emails had not been referred to in the claimant’s witness statement, nor referred to under cross-examination and was not put to any of the respondent’s witnesses. Particularly, this matter should have been put to Mr Hargreaves. Despite this, and appreciating that Ms Ridley-Laing was unrepresented and may not have understand these needs, the Tribunal has considered these emails in reaching this decision. And it does not consider them to have had any material impact on the decision. The Tribunal makes the following findings following having considered these emails: o. On 22 December 2021, Ms Chilton emailed various individuals, including the claimants. She explained that Think Victim 2 training was mandatory, and they were required to book themselves on to the course urgently (p.2840). p. Ms Iqbal emailed Mr Hargreaves on 22 December 2021 to explain that Ms Clayton already had this in hand. And that the rest of those that needed to attend were already booked on to the course. And this email was forwarded on from Mr Hargreaves to Ms Clayton and Ms Chilton on 29 December 2021 (p.2840).

[65]Ms Ridley-Laing did not attend the course. She was not required to attend the course. There was no consequence for her not attending the course. Conclusion (Think Victim 2)

[66]This claim must fail as Ms Ridley-Laing was ultimately not required to attend the Think Victim 2 training. Ms Iqbal’s email clearly indicates that those that were required to attend the course had either completed the course or were booked on to the course. And this did not include Ms Ridely-Laing, who had not completed the course nor booked on to the course. No such PCP was applied to Ms Ridley-Laing.

[67]Even if the tribunal is wrong on that, the latest date that Ms Ridley-Laing could have been subject to the disadvantage as alleged is 01 September 2021 (see Ms O’Loughlin’s email of that same date, p.1554). This has been brought out of time. She has not satisfied the tribunal with any good reason or evidence to support that time should be extended on a just and equitable basis. And the tribunal does not consider that this would have formed part of a continuing act with any allegation that was brought in time. As such, even had Ms Ridley-Laing satisfied the tribunal with such evidence, it would have failed for being brought out of time in any event.

[68]This claim fails and is dismissed. Findings (Equality Act training)

[69]A general email was sent out by the Business Development Team on 15 September 2021 (p.1580). This explained that Professionalising Policing had some spaces available on an Equality Act training course and asked for those who were interested to email a specific email address. This email was sent to all staff in the People and Development Branch. It was not a mandatory course for either of the claimants.

[70]Ms Ridley-Laing shared her screen with Ms Mason to bring the email to her attention.

[71]Ms Ridely-Laing emailed the Training team on 15 September 2021 at 09.13 to ask whether there was remote access to the course, as she would like to book onto it but would be unable to attend the course in person, due to disability (p.1580).

[72]Ms Chilton replied to Ms Ridley-Laing on 15 September 2021 at 21.30 (p.1581) to explain that there will be online courses being delivered in the near future. And that Ms Ridley-Laing would be made aware when this happens so she can secure a place then. Conclusions (Equality Act Training)

[73]This was not a mandatory course for officers and staff. The PCP as alleged has not been established on Ms Ridley-Laing’s own evidence. And further, even if it had been, it was not applied to Ms Ridely-Laing. The claim must therefore fail.

[74]Again, this is an allegation brought out of time, The latest date that any disadvantage could have been applied to the claimant (if the Tribunal had concluded that that was the case) was 17 September 2021, the date the course was due to take place. And again, the Tribunal would have concluded that Ms Ridley-Laing had not satisfied the tribunal with any good reason or evidence to support that time should be extended on a just and equitable basis. And the tribunal does not consider that this would have formed part of a continuing act with any allegation that was brought in time. As such, even had Ms Ridley-Laing satisfied the tribunal with such evidence, it would have failed for being brought out of time in any event. (iv) Adjustments relating to 08 December 2021 meeting (pp.460-461, paras 1.9- 1.12)

[75]Ms Ridley-Laing under cross-examination explained that the meeting in question was being held in person; however, that an exception had been made for both herself and Miss Mason to attend remotely. This is consistent with the evidence of Miss Mason. The tribunal therefore makes a finding that there was no requirement that all attendees at this meeting were to attend in person. And even if there was such a PCP, it was not applied to either claimant. Conclusions (08 December 2021 meeting)

[76]On Ms Ridley-Laing’s own evidence, there was no PCP as alleged. And further, any PCP (if the respondent did have one) was not applied to her. There was an exception made for Ms Ridley-Laing to attend the meeting remotely.

[77]Again, this is an allegation brought out of time, The latest date that any disadvantage could have been applied to the claimant (if the Tribunal had concluded that that was the case) was 08 December 2021, the date of the meeting. And again, the Tribunal would have concluded that Ms RidleyLaing had not satisfied the tribunal with any good reason or evidence to support that time should be extended on a just and equitable basis. And the tribunal does not consider that this would have formed part of a continuing act with any allegation that was brought in time. As such, even had Ms Ridley-Laing satisfied the tribunal with such evidence, it would have failed for being brought out of time in any event. (v) Adjustments relating to new laptop rollout (p.461, paras 1.13-1.16)

[78]Ms Ridley-Laing accepted/did not dispute the following propositions, and therefore the tribunal adopts each as findings of fact:a. Ms Harrison was upgraded to a Windows 10 laptop in February 2022.

b. There were still people getting their upgraded laptops at collection events in February 2022, and this was simply down to the order they were put down to attend such an event.

c. The programme ran from January to June 2022.

d. There were individuals that were given 121 deployments.

e. There were 6 individuals who got their upgraded laptop through a home visit.

f. The collection events satisfied the Covid guidance at the time, with respect to social distancing, wearing of masks, cleaning of services etc.

g. If a person was on leave on 12 January 2022, then they would be offered an alternative appointment.

[79]On 14 December 2021, at 08.08, Ms Ridley-Laing was initially invited to attend a collection event on 12 January 2022 to pick up a Windows 10 Laptop (see p.1599).

[80]Ms Ridley-Laing queried with Ms Wooller by email on 14 December 2021 (pp.1599-1600) whether there was an alternative way of her obtaining her laptop. This was because Ms Ridley-Laing was in a clinically extremely vulnerable group that had been shielding. According to Ms Ridley-Laing this meant she could not sit in a classroom environment for the hour required and that GMP required a risk assessment before she could attend a GMP site.

[81]Around 22 December 2022, Ms Wooller discussed this matter with others, including Ms Chilton (pp.1601-1603).

[82]On 23 December 2021, Ms Wooller asked Christoper Angle a series of questions, including whether there was a plan for those who could not attend the hour session as this would put them at risk, and around those who could not pick up a laptop due to annual leave (p.1604). Ms Wooller forwarded Christopher Angle’s message to Ms Ridley-Laing on 23 December 2021 (p.1604-1605). This informed Ms Wooller that the specific reasons for not being able to attend were required. And that the team would confirm the process to supply the IT requirement in those circumstances (p.1605).

[83]On 24 December 2021, Ms Ridley-Laing emailed the Windows 10 Agilsys Team (p.1608). She gave little detail, other than she was unable to sit in a classroom for an hour or more for multiple reasons.

[84]Ms Stapleton informed Ms Ridley-Laing on 30 December 2021 that appointment changes needed to go through the SPOC (p.1610).

[85]On 06 January 2022, Ms Ridley-Laing spoke to Kelly Chilton. This was the first conversation the claimant had spoken to Ms Chilton. And she had never criticised the claimant about her disabilities. During this conversation, Ms Chilton was supportive of the claimant. And she asked about MS RidleyLaing’s capabilities of picking up her laptop.

[86]On 17 February 2022, Ms Nutall emailed Ms Ridley-Laing (p.1713). This was to arrange a 121 deployment of the Windows 10 laptop. This was to arrange a 121 pickup on 12 March 2022. Conclusion (laptop rollout)

[87]There was no PCP applied by the respondent of staff having to attend the Bolton arena on 12 January 2022 as part of the roll-out of Windows 10 laptops, in order to be issued with a laptop. And even if there was, this was not applied to Ms Ridley-Laing. And that is the conclusion reached based on Ms Ridley-Laing’s own evidence. The respondent adopted mass-roll out events for efficiency purposes. And this was applied to most staff members, save for those that could not attend for some reason. And this included for those with impairments that precluded them for attending such an event. For those who could not attend the mass roll out events, there were bespoke arrangements made. For Ms Ridley-Laing this was in the form of 121 deployment. This inevitably was at a later date.

[88]On the basis that there was no PCP applied by the respondent as alleged, and certainly no such PCP applied to Ms Ridley-Laing, this claim fails and is dismissed. (vi) Adjustments relating to auxiliary aids (p.462, paras 1.17-1.18)

[89]The Tribunal has dismissed allegations1.17.1 and

1.17.2 under the rule of Henderson v Henderson. The claimant previously presented a claim before the Employment Tribunal on 22 September 2020. These specific allegations relate to auxiliary aids that were recommended in November 2019, and which the claimant says should have been provided to her by 12 March 2020. These two specific allegations could have and should have been brought as part of that earlier claim. There was no good reason presented why they were not and why they should be brought as part of these proceedings. As such they are dismissed under the rule in Henderson v Henderson. No more is said on these specific allegations in this judgment.

[90]Ms Ridley-Laing had a second Access to Work Assessment on 27 July 2021. This was to reflect her current working environment at home and as Ms Ridley-Laing had made Ms O’Loughlin aware that she was struggling due to a lack of suitable equipment (p.1513).

[91]The report was completed on 27 July 2021 (pp.1522-1541). And the grant letter was completed and sent to both Ms Ridley-Laing and the respondent on 02 August 2021 (p.1545).

[92]By 12 January 2023, the following equipment had not been provided (see step 3 grievance outcome, pp.2058-2059):a. A personal laptop with assistive software

b. A suitable height adjustable desk

c. A support chair

d. A footstool for use at home

e. A back support

f. An computer monitor ‘arm’

g. Annotating and notetaking software.

[93]The respondent appears to concede that these auxiliary aids have not been provided. The Tribunal makes this finding.

[94]Given the type of aids this is concerned with, given the size of the organization, given the need to use preferred suppliers, given that these were funded by the DWP, the tribunal considers that it would have been reasonable for this equipment to be provided to Ms Ridley-Laing within 3 months of the grant award. However, as the respondent is not disputing the date of 14 December 2021 as being the date at which there has been a failure in the duty, the tribunal adopts the 14 December 2021 as being the date on which the respondent was in breach of this duty.

[95]The Tribunal considered whether to extend time on a just and equitable basis. And it makes the following findings: there was nothing that stopped the claimant from bringing her claims sooner. There was no impediment affecting the claimant such that she had difficulty in bringing her claim sooner. The claimant had access to Union advice. And she was aware that she could get general support from her union at the time of these allegations and she was aware that she could fill out a form to seek legal advice, if she chose to. The claimant did not take any of these steps. The claimant has not given any good reason why these claims were not pursued sooner or why it would be just and equitable to extend time to allow the claims to proceed. And in these circumstance, alongside the impact that passage of time had had on Ms Haider’s memory of these events, the Tribunal has decided that it was not just and equitable to extend time for these allegations.

[96]This has been a failure by the respondent to provide the auxiliary aids. However, although this claim succeeds in that respect, it has been brought out of time, and the claims fail as the Tribunal has decided that time is not being extended on a just and equitable basis. These claims are dismissed.

[97]The tribunal has been very careful with this allegation, to ensure that it has considered the date of the breach of the duty appropriately. As it is acutely aware that a respondent will benefit from adopting a finding of a breach at an earlier date where time limits are an issue. The respondent relies on the date as recorded in the list of issues as being the claim brought by Ms Ridley-Laing. However, this is not part of the pleaded case and therefore Ms Ridley-Laing is not bound by this date. So the tribunal has undertaken the necessary objective analysis. It has taken into account the views of Ms Ridley-Laing as recorded in the list of issues. And although it concluded that the respondent had failed in its duty form an earlier date, it has adopted the later date of 14 December 2021 to benefit the claimant. Either way, the allegation has been brought out of time, and Ms Ridley-Laing has failed to satisfy the tribunal with adequate reason as to why time should be extended. So, although the tribunal agrees that there has been a failure in the duty to provide auxiliary aids for Ms Ridley-Laing, the claims fail as they have been brought out of time and time is not being extended to give the Tribunal jurisdiction over them. (vii) Harassment related to disability: In a meeting on 31 August 2021 Elaine Clarke-Williams told C that everyone would have to return to the office and, in the future, "no one would be working from home" (p.463, para 2.1.1)

[98]Around this time, the UK Government was introducing further relaxation of the Covid restrictions. Particularly, on 27 August 2021, the UK government announced Plan A of its roadmap out of Covid. This was to commence on 14 September 2021, and included that, subject to the NHS not being under unsustainable pressure, ‘It is no longer necessary for Government to instruct people to work from home. Employers can start to plan a return to workplaces.’

[99]The tribunal makes a finding, on the balance of probability, Ms ClarkeWilliams did constantly raise comments about agile working or that staff, including Ms Ridley-Laing, would have to come into the office (supporting this finding are the emails between Ms Ridley-Laing and Ms O’Loughlin on 01 September 2021 (p.1554) concerning a meeting with Elaine, and para 72 of Ms Ridley-Laing’s witness statement).

[100]The claimant when she raised a grievance on 09 February 2022 did not include any complaint about Ms Clarke-Willaims comments on 31 August 2021, despite this being a grievance where the claimant raised a wide-ranging series of matters. And the claimant did not raise a specific complaint about Ms Clarke-Williams targeting her with such comments. The Tribunal was not taken to any such document.

[101]The Tribunal concludes that it is more likely than not that Ms ClarkeWilliams raised in a meeting with the claimants and Ms O’Loughlin that everyone would have to return to the office and words to the effect that no one would be working from home. This was raised in the general sense, given the announcement of the UK government only a matter of days before. This is consistent with Ms O’Loughlin’s email to Ms Ridley-Laing on 01 September 2021 (p.1554).

[102]Ms Clarke- Williams did not have any authority over the claimant to say whether she could or could not work from home. And Ms Ridley-Laing knew this. Ms O’Loughlin had no issue with what was stated by Ms ClarkeWilliams in that meeting, and this was a person that the claimant has have identified as being supportive of her in the workplace.

[103]Ms O’Loughlin, in her email of 01 September 2021 (p.1554) explains that she would seek clarity on staff returning to the workplace. Conclusion (31 August 2021 meeting)

[104]The Tribunal has concluded that, on balance, Ms Clarke-Williams more likely made general comments about returning to the workplace, around 4 days after the Government announcements around Plan A of the roadmap, which including returning to the workplace. It would be unreasonable for Ms Ridley-Laing to perceive this as having the purpose or effect of creating a harassing environment. And this is particularly so, where she knows that Ms Clarke-Williams had no authority over her in terms of any such arrangements. In those circumstances, the Tribunal concludes that this is not harassment and is dismissed.

[105]Further, this is an allegation brought out of time. The date concerned was 31 August 2021. And again, the Tribunal would have concluded that Ms Ridley-Laing had not satisfied the tribunal with any good reason or evidence to support that time should be extended on a just and equitable basis. And the tribunal does not consider that this would have formed part of a continuing act with any allegation that was brought in time. As such, even had Ms Ridley-Laing satisfied the tribunal that this was harassment related to disability, it would have failed for being brought out of time in any event.

[106]This allegation therefore fails and is dismissed. (viii) Harassment related to disability: Elaine Clarke-Williams failing to send C the link to enable her to remotely attend the 8 December 2021 meeting regarding Equality and Human Rights policy/guidance (p.463, para 2.1.2); Direct Disability Discrimination: On 8 December 2021, Elaine Clark-Williams failed to provide C with remote access to an important meeting about Equality and Human Rights guidance/policy which C had been asked to participate in (p.464, para 3.1.2), and; Discrimination arising from disability (unfavourable treatment): On 8 December 2021, Elaine Clark-Williams failed to provide C with remote access to an important meeting about Equality and Human Rights guidance/policy which C had been asked to participate in. (p.465, para 4.2.3).

[107]Ms Elaine Clarke-Williams was not part of the DEI team around this date but was working alongside both Ms Ridley-Laing and Miss Mason around 08 December 2021.

[108]Ms Clarke-Williams specifically wanted both claimants to attend a meeting on 08 December 2021. This was because she wanted the claimants’ help. Ms Ridley-Laing and Miss Mason were both told that they were able to join this meeting remotely. There was no requirement that they both attend in person. This is the evidence of both Ms Ridley-Laing and Miss Mason.

[109]On the morning of 08 December 2021, neither of the claimants had received the link to join the meeting.

[110]Ms Horgan was Personal Assistant to Mr Jackson at the time of this allegation.

[111]At 10.07am on 08 December 2021, Miss Mason emailed Ms ClarkeWilliams and copied in Mr Jackson, Ms Horgan and Ms Ridley-Laing explaining that there did not appear to be an online joining option (p.2818).

[112]The claimants were sent a link to join the meeting. The tribunal does not consider it necessary to determine who sent the link, as it is not material to the conclusions the Tribunal has reached.

[113]The claimants joined at around 10.10am. The tribunal accepts Miss Mason’s oral evidence that the two claimants probably missed about 10 minutes of the meeting. Neither claimant was criticized for having attended the meeting later than its start time. Conclusion (08 December 2021 meeting)

[114]This allegation is difficult to follow. Ms Ridley-Laing was given permission to attend the meeting on 08 December 2021 remotely. Ms Clarke-Williams specifically wanted Ms Ridley-Laing, alongside Miss Mason, at the meeting for her support and help. Ms Ridley-Laing and Miss Mason, when they realized they did not have the link on the morning of the meeting, requested a link. And this was provided to them within about 10 minutes of the meeting starting. No issues were raised about their late attendance.

[115]In the circumstances above, the tribunal does not consider this to be any form of unwanted conduct or detrimental treatment. This appears to have been a simple error on behalf of whoever was tasked with sending the meeting link out to the claimant.

[116]Furthermore, the claimant was not subjected to unwanted conduct related to her disabilities that could reasonably be viewed as having the purpose or effect of creating a harassing environment. The claimant’s attendance was wanted by Ms Clarke-Williams, there was a simple error, which was corrected when it became known. Ms Ridley-Laing’s allegation of harassment for this event fails and is dismissed.

[117]And based on the above, the Tribunal concluded that no such treatment was because of Ms Ridley-Laing’s disabilities or anything arising from her disabilities. There is nothing to support that either her disability or something arising from disability was the reason was behind the failure to provide a link. And therefore, even if the claimant was subjected to a detriment, her claims of direct discrimination would have failed due to a lack of causal link to one of her disabilities, and her discrimination arising from disability would have failed due to a lack of causal link to something arising from her disabilities.

[118]Further, these allegations are brought out of time. The date concerned was 08 December 2021. And again, the Tribunal would have concluded that Ms Ridley-Laing had not satisfied the tribunal with any good reason or evidence to support that time should be extended on a just and equitable basis. And the tribunal does not consider that this would have formed part of a continuing act with any allegation that was brought in time. As such, even had Ms Ridley-Laing satisfied the tribunal that this was harassment related to disability, it would have failed for being brought out of time in any event. For the avoidance of any doubt, this allegation would have formed part of the allegation concerning Ms Clarke-Williams on 31 August 2021. But it would not have been linked to any of the later allegations, which Ms Clarke-Williams was not involved in. (ix) Harassment related to disability: Rachel Harrison in a meeting on 18 January 2022 with C and Lisa Mason accusing C of "using disability as a blocker" in relation to Windows 10 role out and stating "I'm trying to help you girls because you've not been able to pick up your laptops because of your disabilities." (p.463, para 2.1.3)

[119]The tribunal finds that Ms Harrison did not use the phrase “using disability as a blocker”. The reason the tribunal makes this finding are for the following reasons: the claimants do not raise this in their email sent on 18 January 2022 (p.1667), In Miss Mason’s grievance statement she records that Ms Harrison stated that ‘you’re trying to [put] up blockers’ and that from this she was implying that Nadia was using her disability as a blocker. And Ms Ridley-Laing when this was put to her said that Mason probably more accurate. In these circumstances, the tribunal preferred the evidence of Ms Harrison, which was consistent with Miss Mason’s recollection, that this specific comment was not made.

[120]The tribunal has concluded that words to the effect that “I'm trying to help you girls because you've not been able to pick up your laptops because of your disabilities” was likely used by Ms Harrison in this meeting. Ms Ridley Laing and Miss Mason have given clear evidence on this. It is raised in Ms Ridley-Laing’s grievance statement (starts at p.1628, but see p.1665) and in Miss Mason’s grievance statement (see p.2726). Ms Harrison’s statement is quiet on this comment. And the tribunal has seen evidence of Ms Harrison trying to find ways to speed up the laptop rollout for the two claimants, which her understanding at this stage was that neither had been able to collect for reasons connected to their disabilities. Conclusion (18 January 2022 comments)

[121]This allegation, insofar as it relates to the comment “using disability as a blocker” fails and is dismissed, consequent to the finding of fact above.

[122]Turning to the comment “I'm trying to help you girls because you've not been able to pick up your laptops because of your disabilities”. The Tribunal is not satisfied that this comment, although made, in the circumstances reaches the level of being harassment. The reality is that for reasons connected to Ms Ridley-Laing’s disability she was not able to attend the roll-out date of 12 January 2022. And at this time, Ms Harrison mistakenly thought that the same applied to Miss Mason. And Ms Harrison was trying to help the claimants in finding alternative means of being set up with a new laptop, which was accepted by Ridley-Laing under Cross examination.

[123]Although the claimant’s disability was part of the context in which Ms Harrison made this comment, the Tribunal does not consider that it was unwanted conduct related to disability. The comment was a factual statement and related to the efforts that Ms Harrison was making to try to help the claimant to pick up a laptop, which at that stage she had been unable to collect.

[124]And even if the Tribunal is wrong on that, the Tribunal concludes that it would not be reasonable for the claimant to view such conduct as creating a harassing environment, as per s.26 of the Equality Act 2010. This was part of a conversation where Ms Harrison was trying to assist the claimant in obtaining her laptop, as to date she had not been able to collect it for reasons connected to her disabilities. Explaining this to Ms Ridely-Laing neither violates her dignity, not creates an intimidating, hostile or degrading environment. In those circumstances, the allegation fails and is dismissed. (x) Harassment related to disability: Rachel Harrison deliberately setting meetings or requesting contact outside C's working hours 18 January 2022. (p.463, para 2.1.4)

[125]Ms Ridley-Laing, when working in the DEI team worked agile hours. This meant that there could be variations to her working hours each day (for example, see p.1374).

[126]Ms Harrison did not know of Ms Ridly-Laing’s working pattern/hours. And that is consistent in Ms Harrison and Ms Ridley-Laing’s evidence.

[127]Ms Harrison would have moved any meetings if they caused Ms Ridley-Laing any issues. This was Ms Harrison’s clear evidence that went unchallenged by Ms Ridley-Laing. And this is something recorded in Ms Harrison’s email to Mr Jackson on 18 January 2022 (p.2871 and para 27 of Ms Harrison’s witness statement).

[128]Ms Harrison did arrange meetings that landed outside of the claimant’s working hours on 18 January 2022. But she would have changed them. Conclusion (meetings outside of working hours)

[129]This falls well short of being unwanted conduct related to disability that had either the purpose or effect of creating a harassing environment. First, it was not related to disability. It was a simple error by Ms Harrison due to her not knowing Ms Ridley-Laing’s working pattern. And secondly, it would be unreasonable for Miss Ridley-Laing to view this as creating a harassing environment given that Ms Harrison was not aware of Ms RidleyLaing’s working pattern, and would be happy to rearrange any such meeting if it was raised with her.

[130]In the circumstances, this allegation of harassment fails and is dismissed. (xi) Harassment related to disability: Kelly Chilton telephoning C on 6 January 2022 to ask if there was a genuine reason why she could not attend the Windows 10 roll-out event, despite C having given her reasons in writing. (p.463, para 2.1.5)

[131]Ms Chilton was not aware of the specific reasons why Ms RidleyLaing could not attend to pick up her laptop on 06 January 2022. Ms RidleyLaing’s evidence at its height presumed that she knew, but the tribunal was not satisfied that there was evidence that she did know.

[132]Ms Chilton was clearly tasked with finding out the specific reasons for Ms Ridley-Laing not being able to attend the Windows 10 roll-out event in line with Chirstopher Angel’s email (p.1605).

[133]During the conversation on 06 January 2022, Ms Chilton was being supportive and there was some laughing between Ms Chilton and Ms Ridley-Laing. That is the claimant’s own evidence.

[134]Ms Chilton, more likely than not, asked about capabilities of picking up the laptop. This was the purpose of the phone call. Ms Ridley-Laing explained the various reasons, and Ms Chilton understood the reasons and told her to leave it with her and that she would work out a solution. Ms Chilton told Ms Ridley-Laing to keep her number and call her if there were any problems (see p.1656, Ms Ridley-Laing’s timeline, as part of 09 February 2022 Grievance). Conclusion (06 January 2022 phone call)

[135]The Tribunal concludes that this was not unwanted conduct related to disability. Ms Ridley-Laing may want to frame it this way for the purposes of this claim. However, this is simply the respondent seeking to understand the reasons behind why Ms Ridley-Laing was unable to attend the Window’s 10 roll-out event, in circumstances where it did not have sufficient information to understand her reason. This is neither unwanted conduct, nor is it related to disability. The claimant’s disability may well have been the information that came back from her when asked, but that does not mean that this treatment was targeted at Ms Ridley-Laing for reasons related to her disability.

[136]This would be unreasonable for a person to perceive this as unwanted conduct related to disability that had the purpose or effect of creating a harassing environment. The conversation between Ms RidleyLaing and Ms Chilton was supportive and was a means of identifying what specific reasons were preventing Ms Ridley-Laing form attending the rollout event and to find a reasonable solution. This falls well short of being harassment related to disability.

[137]Further, this is another allegation brought outside of the primary time limit. The allegation concerning 06 January 2022. Ms Chilton had no involvement in any other allegations, and the Tribunal would not have linked it to any other allegation for the purpose of a course of conduct. As with other allegations, Ms Ridley-Laing has not brought sufficient evidence to persuade the Tribunal that time would have been extended on a just and equitable basis. Therefore, even had Ms Ridley-Laing established that this was harassment related to disability, the claim would have been dismissed as it was brought out of time, and the Tribunal would not have extended time to have jurisdiction over it. (xii) Harassment related to disability: On 19 January 2022, C being removed from her role in the Diversity, Equality and Inclusion ("DEI") team and placed back in the P&D Branch with no role, work or team position against her wishes and contrary to the outcome of her Fairness at Work procedure and various assessments/recommendations. (p.463, para 2.1.6); Direct Disability Discrimination: On 19 January 2022, C being removed from her role in the Diversity, Equality and Inclusion ("DEl") team and placed back in the P&D Branch with no role, work or team position against her wishes and contrary to the outcome of a previous Fairness at Work procedure and various assessment/recommendations. (p.464, para 3.1.3) and Discrimination arising from disability (unfavourable treatment): On 19 January 2022, C being removed from her role in the Diversity, Equality and Inclusion (DEI") team and placed back in the P&D" Branch with no role, work or team position against her wishes and contrary to the outcome of a previous Fairness at Work procedure and various assessment/recommendations. (p.465, para 4.2.4).

[138]Ms Ridley-Lang was absent from work due to sickness from 19 November 2019 until August 2020.

[139]In a meeting with Ms Stapleton in May 2020, Ms Ridley-Lang explained that she did not know of anything that could be put in place to support her return to the workplace. Ms Ridley-Lang accepted under crossexamination that this conversation had taken place.

[140]Due to Covid, during Ms Ridley-Laing’s absence, a decision was made to suspend training, and PDU staff were repurposed to do other things.

[141]In September 2020, Ms O’Loughlin required support on the DEI portfolio. Ms Ridley-Laing was seconded, voluntarily, to the DEI team. The role was temporary.

[142]Ms Ridley-Laing did not reach any agreement with HR and her union rep that there must be a period of consultation before this agreement was brought to an end. In short, there is simply no evidence of this to support that any such agreement was in place. Ms Ridly-Laing has produced nothing. Chose not to call her union rep. And does not raise this as an issue at the point the secondment was ended. This all led the tribunal to reach this conclusion on the balance of probabilities.

[143]This role remained a temporary seconded role up until the point that Ms Ridley-Lang was returned to the P&D branch. Ms Ridley-Laing suggested in her evidence that there were discussions that her role with the DEI team was to be made permanent and that was her understanding. And that this was communicated by Ms O’Loughlin around October 2021. However, the tribunal has seen no evidence that supports that such was the case. The documentary evidence supports the fact that there was uncertainty with the role and this was because it was a temporary role. For example, in the claimant’s grievance of 09 February 2022 (starts at p.1631) there is reference to concerns about still being in limbo with regards our roles (see p.1640) and no reference in the document about being informed or intimated that the role was to be made permanent. And the emails between senior persons, for example the email from Ms Ashworth to Mr Parkin and others on 18 November 2021 (see pp.2359-2360), also supports that the roles were unestablished roles.

[144]On 18 January 2022, Ms Harrison had a remote meeting with Ms Ridley-Laing and Miss Mason. This meeting started at 13.00 and lasted for about half an hour.

[145]During this meeting there was a disagreement between Ms Harrison, and Ms Ridley-Laing and Miss Mason. This led to Ms Harrison bringing the meeting to an end.

[146]This meeting was not recorded.

[147]At 14.06, on 18 January 2022, some 36 minutes after the meeting had ended, Ms Harrison sent an email to Mr Jackson raising complaints about how both Ms Ridley-Laing and Miss Mason had conducted themselves in the meeting (see pp.2871-2872).

[148]Within Ms Harrison’s email of 18 January to Mr Jackson, she raises the following:a. Neither had been able to pick up their laptops due to clinical vulnerability, which has impacted on their work.

b. Ms Harrison had escalated the matter with a view to coming up with a solution.

c. A solution was explained to the claimants, but Ms Ridley-Laig reacted negatively.

d. Ms Ridley-Laing did not accept the explanation given to her as to why she could not set it up herself at home.

e. That she was aggressively talked over by both claimants.

f. That Ms Ridley-Laing and Ms Mason got angry.

g. Ms Ridely-Laing was adversary in the manner that she spoke to her, and accused Ms Harrison of speaking over her.

h. Miss Mason accused Ms Harrison of being arsey.

i. She is not sure where to go from here.

j. She found it really challenging speaking to Ms Ridley-Laing as she constantly goes off on tangents, seems to struggle to listen and often provides a “no” response.

[149]Mr Jackson had no reason to dispute Ms Harrison’s record of the hearing.

[150]Mr Jackson made the decision on 18 January 2022 that both Ms Ridley-Laing and Miss Mason would be returned to their substantive posts. Mr Jacksons reasons for doing so were concerns around the claimant’s behaviour toward Ms Harrison in the meeting of 18 January 2022, that his view was that little meaningful work had been produced by the team and the roles had not been established but remained temporary. These were the reasons that clearly were in Mr Jackson’s mind at the time of making this decision. This is clear in the email sent by Mr Jackson to Ms Harrison, copying in Ms Chadwick, on 18 January 2022, at 15.32 (p.2871). And, this was the evidence that Mr Jackson presented at the hearing. Mr Jackson took the view that in the circumstances both Ms Ridley-Laing and Miss Mason should be removed from the DEI role. Ms Ridley-Laing does not dispute that this decision was made by Mr Jackson.

[151]The tribunal rejects Ms Ridley-Laing’s submission that the claimant’s working from home had any influence on this decision. Although this is mentioned in passing, in the email on p.2871, the claimant accepted that Mr Jackson had known about her working from home arrangement throughout their secondment, had never raised anything negative about it before and this was not mentioned in Ms Harrison’s email that triggered Mr Jackson’s decision. And this context led the Tribunal to the finding that it made. Further, none of the other matters recorded as something arising in consequence of Ms Ridley-Laing’s disabilities had any influence on this decision. And the tribunal concludes this as they were not mentioned at all by Mr Jackson in his email to Ms Harrison and there is no evidence provided that would support that they did have any influence.

[152]There is no evidence that there were any assessments or recommendations that stated that Ms Ridley-Laing should not be removed from the DEI team. And this is because there were no such assessments or recommendations that stated this.

[153]On 19 January 2022, Ms Chilton emailed Ms Clayton, copying in Mr Parkin, Ms Ashworth, Ms Chadwick and Mr Hargreaves, to put in writing that at an earlier conversation between them, Ms Clayton had been asked to make contact with the claimants and relay specific information. The email contained the information to be relayed to the claimants (pp.1872-1873).

[154]The following information was relayed to Ms Ridley-Laing by Ms Clayton:a. that her work on the DEI programme had come to an end and she will now be returning to her established post in Uniform Training.

b. In the immediacy at this time she will remain working from home and work

c. is going on in the background to finalise the detail regarding who her line manager will be and what workstream she will be picking up.

d. We will be in touch with her to provide this update and in the meantime Ms Clayton will be her line manager contact until the handover has been completed.

[155]Ms Clayton emailed Ms Turner on 20 January 2022 to confirm that she had relayed the information as required to the claimants (p.2386).

[156]Ms Ryle was tasked with reviewing where Ms Ridley-Laing would sit and what she did workwise going forward (p.3805). She made enquiries on this around 24 January 2022.

[157]Ms Ridley-Laing went on sick leave on 01 March 2022. Conclusions (Removal from the DEI team)

[158]The decision on 18 January 2022 was made by Mr Jackson and was not because of any of the matters that Ms Ridely-Laing relies on as ‘something arising’. Nor was it because of her disability nor is it harassment related to disability.

[159]The decision made by Mr Jackson is clearly for three reasons: he was concerned with the claimant’s behavior toward Ms Harrison in the meeting of 18 January 2022, that in his view little meaningful work had been produced by the team and the roles had not been established and were temporary. The treatment complained about was not because of Ms RidleyLaing’s disability, was not because of something arising from Ms RidleyLaing’s disability nor was it disability-related. These allegations must therefore fail.

[160]Furthermore, the claimant failed to establish that there were any procedures or assessments/recommendations which were being breached through the claimant being moved back out of the DEI team. (xiii) Direct Disability Discrimination: In 2019, C sought assistance in finding an alternative role and was instead being placed on the redeployment register (which she didn't want). This remains an on-going issue arising from the respondent's application of their redeployment procedure that forms part of their Attendance Management Policy (p.464, para 3.1.1); Discrimination arising from disability (unfavourable treatment): In 2019, C sought assistance in finding an alternative role and was instead being placed on the redeployment register (which she didn't want). This remains an on-going issue arising from the respondent's application of their redeployment policy (p.465, para4.2.1 ), and; Discrimination arising from disability (unfavourable treatment): During summer 2019, the claimant refused multiple roles on redeployment register due to needs to for reasonable adjustments. Whilst the claimant says she was refused up to 40 roles in total, she relies on the 4 specific roles for the purposes of her claim, as they were best suited to her strengths, experience and circumstances (p.465, para

4.2.2 ).

[161]The claimant does not complain about being put on the redeployment register, rather it was how the respondent runs the process that she was complaining about. This was the claimant’s own evidence.

[162]The claimant, before presenting this claim, presented a claim to the Employment Tribunal on 22 September 2020 (p.4007). This previous claim included allegations of disability discrimination. These particulars of claim (pp.4019-4024) cover the claimant’s allegations that relate to the redeployment process and the four specific roles she applied for and was rejected from in July to September 2019 that now form her allegations 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. Ms Ridley-Laing accepted this under cross examination.

[163]The claimant withdrew her claims under the 22 September 2020 claim, and a judgment dismissing the claim on withdrawal was issued on 26 March 2021 (p.4025).

Conclusions

[164]These allegations have already been brought, as part of the claim brought on 22 September 2020. The claimant has tried to bring these allegations again in these proceedings. These allegations fall under Cause of Action Estoppel and are dismissed accordingly. (xiv) Discrimination arising from disability. Did the following arise in consequence of the claimant’s disability (see pp.465-466, para 4.3):a. The fact that the claimant was on the redeployment register during summer 2019 and would have required part-time working in any redeployed role (NB the claimant's needs at this time were less severe than outlined below, those needs developed later).

b. The claimant's need to take rest breaks during work;

c. The claimant's need to work from home;

d. The claimant's need to work reduced hours;

e. The claimant's need to access toilet facilities urgently and without warning;

f. The claimant having difficulties in processing and retaining information

[165]The Tribunal considers that (a) must have arising in consequence of the claimant’s Crohn’s disease. The Tribunal reaches this conclusion based on the document at p.792, particularly the third paragraph.

[166]The respondent conceded that (c) and (d) arose in consequence of the claimant’s disabilities. And therefore this is not taken any further in this decision.

[167]The claimant has not adduced sufficient evidence to establish that (b), (e) or (f) arose in consequence of her disabilities. The Tribunal therefore concludes that they do not, for the purposes of this claim. (xv) Victimisation: did the claimant do protected acts in emails dated 15 July 2021 and 21 July 2021 regarding Access to Work to Timothy Rice; and The Claimant's emails to Marie O'Loughlin dated 22 July 2021, 20 September 2021 and 14 October 2021 (p.466, para 5.1); Victimisation (detriment): Leah Haider's stating in an email 23 September 2021 that C had previously not allowed access to her home to facilitate provision of equipment when that was untrue. (The delivery had failed because R provided a desk which was too big to fit through the claimant's door and had not asked for measurements.) (p.466, para5.2.1 ), and; Victimisation (detriment): Carolyn Stapleton on 4 October 2021 asking C's line manager to ensure that the issue above was 'dealt with' even although she knew that the issue on the previous occasion did not lie with C. (p.466, para

5.2.2 )

[168]The complaints of victimisation were withdrawn. These complaints are dismissed on withdrawal.

CONCLUSIONS

[169]For the reasons outlined above, Ms Ridley Laing’s claims in their entirety fail and are dismissed. Approved by: