Mrs C Parry v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council and Governing Board of Westmorland Primary School: 2402259/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2402259/2023

Between

Mrs C ParryClaimant

Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council and Governing Board of Westmorland Primary SchoolRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Holmes

Date 10 March 2026

JUDGMENT

It is the unanimous judgment of the Tribunal that:

[1]The claimant’s claims of indirect sex discrimination, and part – time worker discrimination, were presented out of time , it would not be just and equitable to extend the time for their presentation, and they are dismissed;

[2]The claimant’s claim of failure to make reasonable adjustments is not well founded, and is dismissed.

[3]The claimant was constructively and unfairly dismissed;

[4]The second respondent was the employer of the claimant , and is liable for that dismissal;

[5]All claims against the first respondent are dismissed;

[6]The parties are to consider remedy in respect of the successful claim, and are to seek either to agree remedy, or to narrow and identify the issues upon remedy that the Tribunal will be required to determine, if necessary.

[7]The parties are to inform the Tribunal by no later than 15 May 2026 as to whether a remedy hearing is required, and, if so, by means of an agreed List of Issues on Remedy, what the issues to be determined upon remedy will be, an estimated length of hearing, dates to avoid, and any consequential case management orders that are sought in relation to any remedy hearing,

REASONS

[1]The claimant notified ACAS of her prospective claim on 3 November 2022 and was issued with a certificate dated 15 December 2022. She presented her claim form on 1 February 2023, in which she claimed: Failure to make adjustments, as defined by sections 20 and 21 of the Equality Act 2010 (“EqA”) and in contravention of section 39(2) of EqA; Discrimination because of maternity, in contravention of section 39(2) of EqA and within the definition in section 18 of EqA; Indirect disability discrimination, within the meaning of section 19 of EqA and in contravention of section 39(2) of EqA; Indirect sex discrimination contrary to those same provisions; and Less favourable treatment of a part-time worker, in contravention of regulation 5 of the Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000 (“PTWR”). and , from 19 May 2023, by way of amendment of her claims, a complaint of unfair constructive dismissal, contrary to section 94 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”), within the meaning of section 95(1)(c) of ERA and alleged to be unfair within the meaning of section 98 of ERA.

[2]There were three preliminary hearings, following which the parties agreed the following List of Issues, setting out the claims made , firstly, as: 1.Indirect sex discrimination :

[1]Did the Respondent adopt the following Provision, Criterion or Practices (PCP) within the meaning of section 19(1) of the Equality Act 2010?(a) Expecting teachers to take responsibility for planning all the lessons in the subjects that were allocated to them; and

(b) Allocating subjects to teachers was such that each teacher was required to spend the same or similar amount of time working on lesson planning.

[2]If so, does the Respondent apply, or would the Respondent apply, the PCP(s) to person who do not share the Claimant’s protected characteristic?

[3]If so, does the application of the PCP, or would the application of the PCP, put those with whom the Claimant shares a protected characteristic (women) at a particular disadvantage in that:(a) Female teachers are more likely than male teachers to work parttime;

(b) There was no pro-rata reduction in planning work for part-time teachers;

(c) There was no compensatory reduction in other work for part-time teachers to make up for doing the same amount of planning work as a full-time teacher; and

(d) A part-time teacher would therefore have more work to do as a proportion of their paid working time than a full-time teacher would have.

[4]If so, was the above PCP applied to the Claimant?

[5]If so, was the Claimant put at the particular disadvantage?

[6]If so, can the Respondent show that the treatment was a proportionate means of achieving the following legitimate aims:(a) The consistency of education of children at a crucial stage in their cognitive development;

(b) The provision and application of a relevant and directed curriculum;

(c) The school's compliance with the local authority's statutory obligation to provide a meaningful education to children within its community; and

(d) Avoiding a disproportionate burden of work on other members of staff engaged in the same work, to ensure fairness and equity and wellbeing among staff. 2.Part time worker regulations:

[7]Are any or all of the following individuals’ comparable full-time workers for the purposes of Regulation 2 of the Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000 ("PTWR"):(a) The Claimant herself in her previous role; and/or

(b) Charlotte Gillis, Robert Britner, Lindsey Cowell, Sarah Thomas, Kathy Williams and Phil Waddington

[8]Was the Claimant given more work to do as a proportion of her paid working hours than the comparable full-time workers?

[9]If so, was she treated less favourably than one or more of the comparable fulltime workers?

[10]If so, was the treatment on the ground that the Claimant was a part-time worker?

[11]If so, was the treatment justified on the following objective grounds:(a) The consistency of education of children at a crucial stage in their cognitive development;

(b) The provision and application of a relevant and directed curriculum;

(c) The school's compliance with the local authority's statutory obligation to provide a meaningful education to children within its community; and

(d) Avoiding a disproportionate burden of work on other members of staff engaged in the same work, to ensure fairness and equity and wellbeing among staff 3.Failure to make reasonable adjustments:

[12]Did the Respondents have one or more of the following Provision(s), Criteria(s) or Practice(s) (PCP) within the meaning of section 20(3) of the Equality Act 2010?(a) Giving teachers responsibility for more than one class and/or

(b) Giving teachers responsibility for classes across different Key Stages.

[13]If so, were the above PCPs applied to the Claimant?

[14]If so, did the application of the above PCP’s put the Claimant at a disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter when compared with persons who were not disabled? The Claimant relies upon the following disadvantage: (a) The additional demands of the split role. In particular, she says, she would have to apply two different teaching curricula and teaching methods simultaneously and to get to know a larger cohort of children and parents. Her mental health disability made it harder for her than for other people to cope with those additional pressures.

[15]If so, was that disadvantage more than trivial or minor?

[16]Can the respondent prove that it did not know, or could not reasonably have been expected to know, that the Claimant was likely to be at the substantial disadvantage?

[17]What if any adjustments could have been put in place to alleviate the substantial disadvantages as set out above? The Claimant relies upon the following adjustments:(a) Giving the claimant responsibility for just one class; and/or

(b) If that could not be managed, ensuring that the claimant’s classes were all within the same Key Stage

[18]Were any of the above adjustments reasonable in the circumstances of the case?

[19]If so, did the Respondent fail to comply with its duty to make reasonable adjustments within the meaning of section 21(1) of the Equality Act 2010? 4.Maternity discrimination:

[20]Did the Respondent subject the Claimant to the following treatment: (a) Requiring her to return to a role with split class and/or Key Stage responsibilities.

[21]If so, was that treatment unfavourable within the meaning of section 18 of the Equality Act 2010?

[22]If so, was the Claimant subjected to the above unfavourable treatment because she was on maternity leave? 5.Constructive unfair dismissal: Breach of express term: [This claim was based upon paragraph 51.9 of the School Teachers’ Pay and Conditions Document, but the claimant withdrew it during the proceedings] Breach of implied term

[23]Did the Respondent do the following things:(a) Give the claimant a disproportionate workload as a part-time worker by requiring her to do the same amount of planning work as the fulltime teachers;

(b) Require the Claimant to return from maternity leave into a role with split responsibility for different classes in different Key Stages;

(d) Fail to have an informal "coffee" meeting with the claimant in advance of her return to work;

(e) Fail to arrange mediation between the claimant and the Senior Leadership Team

(f) Fail to open the school at the weekend in advance of the claimant's return to work so that the claimant could visit and familiarise herself with it;

(g) Fail to contact the Business Manager, Jill Rippon; and

(h) Fail to discuss with the claimant in advance of her return to work what adjustments would be made to her 2021 role.

[24]If so, did the Respondent have reasonable and proper cause for its actions?

[25]Was the conduct calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of trust and confidence?

[26]If so, did the Claimant resign in response to the breach?

[27]If so, did the Claimant affirm the contract before resigning?

[28]If the Claimant was dismissed, can the Respondent show that the sole or principal reason for the Claimant’s dismissal a potentially fair reason pursuant to section 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996?

[29]If so, did the Respondent(s) act reasonably or unreasonably in treating that reason as sufficient constructively to dismiss the Claimant? Additionally (indeed at the outset of the List of Issues) the relevant potential issues as to time limits are set out, as follows: 1. Are any or all of the Claimant’s Discrimination and/or Part-Time Worker Regulation complaints presented out of time for the purposes of section 123(1)(a) of the Equality Act 2010 and/or Regulation 8(2) of the Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000? 2. If so, do the acts complained of amount to a continuous course of conduct extending over a period of time which ended on or after 22 September 2022 within the meaning of section 123(3)(a) of the Equality Act 2010, and/or a series of similar acts or failures which ended on or after 22 September 2022 within the meaning of Regulation 8(2) of the Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000? 3. If any of the Claimant’s Discrimination and/or Part-Time Worker Regulation complaints were presented out of time, would it be just and equitable to extend time to allow for the presentation of these claims under section 123(1)(b) of the Equality Act 2010 and/or Regulation 8(3) of the Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000? As will be noted, no time limit issues arise in relation to the claim of unfair dismissal. A further complication is that there are two respondents, but only one can be liable as the claimant’s employer. The position of both respondents is that the second respondent is the correct respondent. The claimant has not addressed this issue, and the Tribunal finds that, as pleaded in para. 2 of the Grounds of Resistance, pursuant to the 2003 Order therein referred to, the second respondent is the correct respondent. 3. It was agreed that the Tribunal would determine liability only. The claimant gave evidence, and called her husband Andrew Parry as her witness. The respondent called Charlotte Gillis, Elizabeth Garner, Emily Settle, Jennifer Sherstone, Emma Leyland, and Martin Henderson. The hearing was held over 11 days, commencing on 20 January 20205 , for 7 days, and then for a further 4 days from 30 September 2025. There was an agreed Chronology of Events, an Agreed List of Acronyms and Abbreviations, and a Cast List. 4. Written submissions on liability were submitted by both parties on 2 October 2025. Both parties added oral submissions in the hearing. The Tribunal convened in Chambers on 20 and 21 November 2025, and this reserved judgment is now given. The Employment Judge apologises for the delay in promulgation , occasioned partly by the inability to access a full copy the electronic bundle, and other documents, possibly, in part due to the continued erroneous reference , by the respondent it seems, to an incorrect case number in the header of documents (“24022959” when the correct number is 2402259). This was, however, rectified in December 2025, for which the Tribunal thanks Mr Nolan acting for the respondent. 5. Having heard the evidence , considered the documents to which it was referred in the bundle, and the parties’ closing submissions, the Tribunal unanimously finds the following relevant facts.5.1 The claimant began teaching at Westmorland Primary School in September 2017 in a full time capacity and taught a mixed year 3/4 class. The school is a primary school with up to 500 pupils. She considered she had an excellent working relationship with her partner teacher in the adjacent class and that she worked very well with all other teachers and support staff in her Key Stage. Her teaching was judged as good/ outstanding by the Senior Leadership Team.

5.2 The claimant’s first period of maternity leave was 12 months from July 2019 until 2 July 2020. Upon her return to work the claimant reduced her hours to part-time and worked a 0.4FTE contract where she was contracted to work 6.5 hours on a Thursday and 6.5 hours on a Friday.

5.3 The claimant considers that she was subjected to unfavourable treatment from around this time. She was advised by her Union to document events as they occurred. At pages159-166 of the bundle there is a Timeline of Events prepared by the claimant covering the period from 27 May 2020 to 11 February 2021 , in reverse order.

5.4 On the evening of 21 January 2021, the claimant had a telephone conversation with Jennifer Sherstone, her line manager/ the Key Stage Phase Leader for her year group, looking for clarity following a suggested staffing change to the year group. The 1.0 FTE teacher, Charlotte Gillis, in the adjacent class of her assigned year group was due to start maternity leave and the Senior Leadership Team had decided that a TA (teaching assistant) / unqualified teacher would cover her absence. As a result of that decision, the claimant’s workload would increase due to the cover teacher being unqualified. She would be expected to take responsibility for more of the lesson planning for the two classes including one of the core subjects which required planning and resources for five days per week.

5.5 The claimant explained her concerns about this arrangement given her working hours (0.4 FTE) compared with the working hours of the adjacent teacher (1.0 FTE). She also highlighted her declining mental health due to the pressure she was already under during the Covid lockdown where every teacher’s workload was already increased as a result. Jennifer Sherstone listened to her concerns, and sounded understanding saying, ‘Leave it with me.’ (See p. 162 of the bundle.)

5.6 On 25 January 2021 the claimant, along with her colleagues, received an email from Jennifer Sherstone (page 222 of the bundle) outlining the new upcoming planning expectations for the year group for Spring 2 stating she had ‘talked through logistics and expectations of Clare Johnson (the trainee teacher) and the school to support her in her placement’. She continued: Chelsea, you will plan and resource english, including phonics/spelling and history across year 2.Leaving you Clare to plan and resource, RE, D and T, PSHE, Computing and then on Seesaw having the task to upload and assign the check In's, timetable and handwriting. This will be reviewed in the summer term. Obviously with a new addition to the team, communication between everyone will be key. You will all appreciate that there is ultimately less prep time for all in school due to covid and the new ways of working, however the job still needs to be done and as a team I am sure you will all pull together and make it work.

5.7 As a result the claimant was asked to plan:

a. x5 1 hour English lessons (Mon-Fri) for the year group

b. x5 30 min spelling lessons (Mon-Fri) for the year group

c. x1 2 hour history lesson (Thurs) for the year group. The two other teachers in the year group (Clare Johnson 1.0FTE and Elizabeth Garner 0.6FTE) were assigned less planning responsibility despite their working hours being greater than the claimant’s . There was no reference to the concerns the claimant had raised during the telephone conversation four days earlier. She felt as though she had been ignored and her concerns not taken seriously. Jennifer Sherstone ended the email with, ‘I am sure you will all pull together and make it work.’

5.8 On 26 January 2021 the Headteacher Martin Henderson responded to the email with an email (also page 222 of the bundle) , in which he said ‘This sounds like a sensible plan it plays to strengths certainly. How lucky this team are to have three bodies to share the weight of planning rather than the two in other year groups, this will undoubtedly save time and allow staff to focus on the one subject.’ The claimant says that this response from the Headteacher caused significant alarm and confusion, as he expected that they should split the planning equally between the staff despite the difference in their working hours.

5.9 On 27 January 2021, following Union advice, the claimant sent an email in response (pages 223/224 of the bundle) to Jennifer Sherstone and Martin Henderson breaking down what had been asked of each teacher to highlight how unfair the allocation was in respect of the difference in working hours between them. She said: “I have real concerns about this. This means I would have the greatest workload of the three of us next half term and I would be planning and preparing more than the 20% I should be responsible for. I don't think this is a fair split given that I am on a 0.4 contract plus I don't receive the half day allocated non contact time that most other teachers receive. When do you suggest that I would complete this huge workload? Am I going to be given time off timetable to complete this? I'm afraid, as discussed with you on the phone last week, this huge workload would be difficult for me to undertake and cause a huge amount of stress on top of the anxiety and stress I have already been experiencing and have discussed with you several times over recent months. The ·other issue of course is planning and preparing work for my non-working days and the additional stress this may cause given the constant bombardment of work messages I am already receiving on my non-working days via WhatsApp which I have also communicated my concerns about to the team on several occasions. With that in mind, could l ask that from now on, all-Work related matters from briefing etc are communicated with me via email rather than WhatsApp. I personally find this a much more professional and efficient way of working. This is something that would really help with my current mental health and I would really appreciate it. I fully appreciate the situation with Clare and am pleased she is getting the support she deserves to ensure her workload is fair. However I want to ensure that I am also being treated fairly in regards to my contracted hours. The reason I took the difficult decision to be part time in the first place is to ensure a better work life balance yet this suggested workload for next half term isn't too dissimilar to the workload I used to have as a full time teacher. I feel a fairer split would be for me to take responsibility for either: a) the English lessons or b) the spelling lessons as well as the history lesson but to undertake all would be disproportionate to my working days and unfair. All I am asking for is fairness.”

5.10 The claimant followed up this email with a direct WhatsApp message to Jennifer Sherstone (see p. 858 of the bundle.) She said : “I’ve spent the day in tears again at the prospect of this new workload and I just can’t continue like this. My physical symptoms of stress are getting worse each week and I think we both know the direction this is heading in given my current state and that really won't be good for the year group and something I am trying my absolute hardest to avoid but I am at the end of my tether right now.” She did not receive a response

5.11 On 28 February 2021 the claimant was back in school, but she did not receive a response to her email from Martin Henderson or Jennifer Sherstone. She felt isolated and anxious at the thought of returning the next day, (as documented at page. 161 of the bundle.) The following day the claimant was back in the school building and experienced much of the same. At lunchtime Martin Henderson came to her classroom to give a lateral flow test demonstration. On leaving her classroom he called, ‘About that email, I will refer you to OH for the anxiety.’ He said this loudly from the back of the classroom as the children were entering the room after lunch which she found disrespectful and humiliating. There was no reference to her concerns or suggestions regarding the unfair workload allocation. (See p. 161 of the bundle.)

5.12 On 3 February 2021, following the claimant chased up her email with Jennifer Sherstone , who responded the following day saying: “Have a read through the emails from yesterday's seesaw meeting and changes in some ways of working re seesaw and communication with parents and let me know if anything is unclear. As for planning for next term, I know things have adapted slightly in light of workload, which I am sure you are aware of when communicating with the year 2 team. Yesterday there was time for MTP as part of staff meeting tlme. It has been agreed that Clare will now take on board the sessions for Guided reading• including now the 2x spelling sessions and one Oxford Owl reading sessions which would have been on your list. Freeing you up to just plan and prepare the English and Geography after February half term. This addition to the MTP needs to be completed by Monday for all.” (“MTP” means Medium Term Planning) This exchange is at pages 229/230 of the bundle.

5.13 The claimant responded (after some other emails which are not relevant to the claims) by email at 13.22 of 4 February 2021 (page 230 of the bundle) saying: “Also, thank you for looking into the planning situation for me for next half term. As this is the same (or more in some cases) amount of planning that other teachers are doing, does this mean I'll also be given half a day non contact time or paid for 3 hours PPA going forward to ensure everyone is being treated fairly?”

5.14 On the same day, Martin Henderson responded (See p. 230-231 of the bundle) and, after addressing issues relating to the claimant’s pay that she had experienced in terms of her pay since her return from maternity leave, he went on to say this: “I know Jen has made adjustments since the first email for planning requirements and as such I perceive the requirements to be fair in comparison with other part time members across the school. The whole team is working very differently right now and being very flexible because of the pandemic and think most of us will be glad to get back to a more normal schooling routine with all the children back ... removing the need to work from home will be a relief for many. I fully understand the pressures on part time workers and will work with you to help you fully understand how your role can be managed especially around communication, its not been an easy start as the pandemic has got in the way of enabling you to get established. You are lucky to have Liz as your co-teacher as she is meticulous in her approaches. As I informed you last week I hope Wendy has referred you into OH to discuss your anxiety to ensure that we are supporting you appropriately. Rest assured after this report is available to me then we will be able to meet and discuss it. Please make sure that I remain copied into any further emails between your phase leader and others so that I am able to keep up to speed. I have not copied Jen in this instance as there are discussions about pay.”

5.15 The claimant took this as implying that she would not be entitled to the three hour non contact PPA time that all full time teachers received, and that her partner teacher (0.6FTE) also received at the time. She was apparently only entitled to one hour despite now being given the same workload.

5.16 On 5 February 2021 the claimant responded to Martin Henderson’s last email once again outlining her concerns about the unfair and disproportionate workload she was being asked to do (page 241 of the bundle). After referring to the PPA pay issue, the claimant continued thus: “However, the main issue that I have serious concerns about remains unresolved. Because a maternity leave is being covered by a trainee teacher, I am being asked the (sic) plan and prepare an amount of lessons that is disproportionate to the days I work. I am on a 0.4 contract and in receiving one hour of paid PPA, as opposed to three hours non contact time that some other part time teachers get, the amount I'm being asked to do is not in line with them and as a result is unfair. I’ve tried to raise my concerns several times now and feel I'm not being listened to. Someone needs to take this responsibility away from me because it is an unmanageable workload and I'm struggling to cope as it is. I have always worked hard and done above and beyond, like many teachers do, but is completely unacceptable to be asked to do more work than some full time teachers when I only work two days a week. I have offered to plan and prepare all of the English lessons for Spring 2, which is already more than my 20% share of the year group planning, but even this I will struggle to do without the non contact time. I will try my best to get as much done of the MTP for English as I can before the end of today. This is proving extremely difficult however given the delay in communication from you and Jen since I raised these Issues over a week ago and is once again now causing me a great deal of stress. Sorry but I cannot do anymore than that so someone else will have to do the Geography planning going forward”.

5.17 The claimant also thanked Martin Henderson for referring her to occupational health, which had been done by Wendy Hill in early February 2021.

5.18 The claimant struggled, while teaching all day, to complete the English Medium Term Plan before the imminent deadline the following Monday.

5.19 On the evening of Friday 5 February 2021 the claimant’s anxiety worsened considerably and she reached breaking point. She felt she could no longer continue working. She was advised by her Union to speak to her GP and take sick leave until the issues regarding the increased workload had been properly addressed and resolved. Her Union told her that what she was being asked to do was disproportionate to her working hours and as a result made her position untenable.

5.20 On 11 February 2021 , the next day she was due at work she called Martin Henderson to explain that she was too unwell to attend work. He said ‘Presumably you will be off for a while?’ and also spent the majority of the call asking her if she had started to look for/ apply for any other jobs yet (in reference to a previous email she had sent him explaining that she was planning to look for a new job).

5.21 The claimant had an appointment with her GP on 11 February 2021 and was diagnosed with Mixed Anxiety and Depressive Disorder. There does not appear to be any Fit Note in the bundle produced from this consultation . Reference, however, is made to one in an email from Bev Kidd to Jo Candler on 8 March 2021 (pages 246 and 247 of the bundle) seeking advice about the sickness absence procedure. This Fit Note is stated to run out on 23 March 2021.

5.22 The full GP medical records do not go back this far into 2021. The only record of the claimant’s medical condition at this time appears to be as part of a letter from her GP practice to the Specialist Perinatal Community Mental Health Team of 4 October 2022 (which starts at page 467 of the bundle), where (page 469 of the bundle) there is a record dated 11 February 2021with an entry “Mixed anxiety and depressive disorder”. The next one after this is 25 March 2021 for “Antenatal depression”, and the next on 7 April 2021 records the claimant’s pregnancy.

5.23 The claimant , given that her second baby was born on 29 October 2021,had obviously been pregnant since around late January 2021. She did not inform the respondent of this (nor, of course, was she obliged to) for some time.

5.24 On 19 April 2021 the claimant raised a formal Grievance with Keith Thompson, the Chair of Governors (pages 249 to 251 of the bundle). To summarise, it was in two parts , the unfavourable treatment the claimant had experienced since her return to work, and that her mental health concerns were not taken seriously.

5.25 The grievance is quite wide ranging, and in it the claimant rehearses much of the history of her treatment since her return to work in terms of workload , and then in terms of not being listened to. She stated, as was the case, that she would be supported in this grievance, as she had been since early 2021, by her union representative Dawn Taylor.

5.26 On 21 April 2021 the claimant’s first occupational health assessment took place by telephone. She was assessed as having a ‘psychological vulnerability at this time due to severe anxiety and moderately severe depression.’ The report stated that ‘the workplace issues will be a barrier to her recovery and return to work unless they are addressed. These issues would not have a medical solution and needed to be addressed by management’ (see pages 494-495 of the bundle.)

5.27 Despite being , by then, around 11 weeks pregnant, and having consulted her GP on 7 April 2021 (see page 469 of the bundle) and clearly knowing that she was, the claimant made no mention at all of this fact to the occupational health advisor that she spoke to for the purposes of this report.

5.28 On 20 May 2021 a Grievance Hearing took place remotely, chaired by school governor Faye Newton , who was supported by Jo Candler from HR. The claimant attended and was represented by her NEU Union Representative Dawn Taylor. Notes were taken , and then sent out by , Jo Candler, to the claimant . They were received on 24 May 2021 and the claimant considers that they reflect what she had said during the hearing.

5.29 On 24 June 2021 a Stage 1 Sickness Absence Meeting was held at school by Martin Henderson. The claimant was not well enough to attend but was represented by her NEU Union Representative Dawn Taylor. The claimant had indicated that this would be the case prior to the meeting, and had also sent in a written statement to be considered at the meeting (page 807 of the bundle) which says little more than what she said in her email.

5.30 The outcome of that meeting was a letter from Martin Henderson on 24 June 2021 (pages 271 to 273 of the bundle), Reference was made by him to the occupational health report of 21 April 2021, and how an up to date report was now required. Reference was also made to the fact that some of the issues were now the subject of the claimant’s grievance, which made it inappropriate for them to be discussed at that stage, and how a swift determination would be helpful . The claimant was informed of the support that could be made available for her, but the conclusion was that little could be altered in her role at that time that would enable her to return to work. A further occupational health report was therefore commissioned, and the claimant was advised of the sickness absence procedure and its trigger points.

5.31 Faye Newton conducted her investigations into the grievance during May and June 2021. These included interviewing Martin Henderson, Karla George and Jen Sherstone, and reviewing notes, emails and other forms of messages.

5.32 She sent a Grievance Outcome letter dated 2 July 2021 (pages 274-278 of the bundle). In that document Faye Newton set out her findings, in particular: Main findings I found that initially you were asked to plan and resource English, including phonics and spelling, and history for year 2. The reason for this was to make changes to the planning in relation to a maternity leave. You raised a concern that the workload this entailed was disproportionate to your working hours. I saw within the documentation that Jen Sherstone emailed you shortly after you raised your concerns to confirm that she had adapted the planning, removing the guided reading, spelling and an Oxford Owl reading session from your workload. This left you to plan English and then also Geography. I note from the email trail that you thanked Jen for looking into the planning workload. I also noted that you requested half a day non-contact time or 3 hours paid PPA time to complete this. In relation to PPA time I am informed that this Is pro-rata for part-time teachers I found that the 3 hours PPA time you requested is the correct amount for a full-time teacher. However, from my investigation I can see that there has been an error made In relation to the understanding of PPA time. I found that the school believed that paid PPA time was a possible option for part time teachers and in good faith made this agreement with you. However, It Is my view that paid PPA is not in accordance with School Teachers' Pay and Conditions and that the school should provide non-contact time within your normal working hours. In relation to your pay, I note that you did not receive the correct pay for your PPA time. I have seen evidence that this was as a result of an administrative error, which the school tried to rectify when it was made aware of the situation. The second part of your grievance states that you had raised concerns informally on several occasions both verbally and via email, in relation to your mental health. You perceived that you were not listened to or taken seriously. In addition you describe as being treated in a hostile way and the environment being toxic which has had a detrimental impact on your ability to do your job. You have stated that Martin Henderson and Jen Sherstone completely ignored your emails and that Jen ignored your final message to her on 27/01/21 describing your physical symptoms of stress . In my findings It Is clear to me that all parties in this investigation have been upset by events and It was no-one's intention to make you feel the way you do. All those I have spoken to want to work together to resolve the situation. I am aware that referrals to Occupational Health were made for you and counselling was offered to you but I can see that it could have been helpful to you to undertake a stress risk assessment, therefore I am going to make recommendations that SLT take advice in relation to completing these. In addition, there is a reminder to all staff about the mental wellbeing toolkit outlined in the Managing Stress Model Policy for schools. I couldn't find any evidence of a toxic environment nor of bullying behaviours. I am aware that the COVID 19 pandemic posed huge challenges for the school and they worked hard to consider the health and wellbeing of staff. They provided an onsite counsellor and made wellbeing a focus for the school, implementing a wellbeing policy. They also worked hard to stay in touch with staff, parents and pupils when face to face contact was not possible. I can accept that the Intention of the WhatsApp group, that was set up, was to create a sense of community when staff were working from home and to keep communications open. However, I can also accept that you felt pressured when receiving messages during your non-working hours. On this basis I accept that lessons can be learnt from this, and I can assure you that governors will work with SLT in relation to the wellbeing of all staff in School, whether this be formal or informal channels, particularly in relation to any members of staff who are reporting stress. Conclusions In conclusion, my investigation has found that once you raised your concerns in relation to the amount of planning you were being asked to do, the school did its best to make adjustments to the planning. However, I do a appreciate that the short delay in responding to your email, caused you additional stress. And…. With regard to your concerns over you not being listened to or your mental health not being treated seriously I am satisfied that there are policies in place within the School to be followed. I will however be making recommendations in relation to stress risk assessments being completed at the earliest opportunity. It is regretful that you feel you have been let down by the school and that you do not feel that your circumstances were treated with the sensitivity needed. I can assure you that, from my interaction with Senior Leaders, this was not the case and that they would wish to relay this to you. In order to facilitate a return to School I will make a recommendation that mediation could be looked into for yourself and members of SLT.

5.33 She went on to make these recommendations: Recommendations I will be making the following recommendations to the Governing Board and/or the Senior Leadership Team: 1. That any policies within School take into account the pro rata principle of the School Teachers' Pay & Condition Document. 2. That communication, particularly in relation to part time working, is reviewed and suggest that agreement is sought with all parties on the best way forward for both the School and the employee. 3. That a stress risk assessment is completed to support staff as soon as it is Identified that a staff member is experiencing work related stress in line with the Managing Stress Model Policy for Schools. 4. Consideration of mediation between yourself and SLT The claimant considered that this outcome failed to state a definitive outcome of the grievance , causing her much confusion and further stress. She felt that the grievance had not been taken seriously or dealt with fairly. She considered that Faye Newton had not conducted her investigation fairly and was biassed towards the Senior Leaders; she had chosen to take their word over her factual hard evidence, as she saw it.

5.34 On 9 July 2021 the claimant received the Stage 1 Sickness Absence Meeting Outcome letter at page 271 of the bundle. On the same day, her Union Representative Dawn Taylor informed her that a Pastoral Manager at school would be her point of contact and be in touch soon.

5.35 On 16 July 2021 the claimant sent a Grievance Appeal letter to Keith Thompson, Chair of Governors (pages 279-283 of the bundle.) This is a substantial document, running to 4 pages, which contains very specific grounds of appeal. The claimant, for instance, on the first page says this: “First and foremost, I will focus on the Conclusions part of the letter and explain why I feel the grievance has not been handled fairly. I will then reference comments from other sections of the outcome letter that raise concerns and that I feel contribute to the unfair outcome of the investigation. I will write in note form and use bullet points to keep my points as clear as possible for everyone involved as there has clearly been some confusion so far.” She then proceeds to do so, and over the next three pages goes on to make several further points.

5.36 The grievance appeal was acknowledged, and in due course, an appeal hearing was arranged.

5.37 On 23 July 2021 the claimant sent an email to Martin Henderson, copied to Jill Rippon, Jo Chandler, and her trade union rep. an email informing them that she was pregnant. She gave her due date of 3 November 2021 , and said she intended to start her maternity leave from that date, planning to take one year. She attached her MAT B1 form (pages 813 to 815 of the bundle) . Martin Henderson was not previously aware of this (and neither, the Tribunal finds, on a balance of probabilities was any other member of the respondent’s SLT) and he responded shortly afterwards congratulating her.

5.38 The Grievance Appeal Hearing took place on 23 September 2021 via Microsoft Teams. It was held by Teams, with the claimant participating , represented again by Dawn Taylor. The Chair was Kate Andrews, a Governor, with two other Governors, supported by HR from the local authority. Faye Newton presented the management case, assisted by Jo Chandler, of HR.

5.39 No notes of this hearing appear in the bundle, but the outcome was sent to the claimant and her rep. on 30 September 2021 (pages 294 to 296 of the bundle).The outcome was to reject the claimant’s appeal. In the outcome letter, Ms Andrews said this: “Having read the documentation submitted and heard from both parties, after full and careful consideration of all the information provided, the panel came to the decision to dismiss your appeal because we feel that the school has carried out a thorough and comprehensive investigation and has fully responded to all of the points raised by your grievance. In response to your complaint that you were treated unfavourably by the Senior Leadership Team, being given a disproportionate workload for your working hours, we found that this was a shared task and when you raised concerns about how this was shared these were addressed by the school in a timely and appropriate manner. The recommendations of the investigating officer have further responded to the concerns you have raised regarding your workload, including recommending the PPA and any staff communications be Included within your working hours. In response to your complaint about your mental health we understand that referrals were made to occupational health and counselling and the Investigating officer has recommended appropriate additional measures Including an individual stress risk assessment, changes to the schools communications policy, a stress management policy, and mediation between yourself and the senior leadership team prior to you returning to work. We agreed with the investigating officer that It may have been the case that opportunities were missed to make appropriate referrals earlier but the need for this was not necessarily explicit nor had these services been specifically requested by you. We agreed that there are policies in place in the school to be followed. Whilst we do not accept the school failed In its duty of care we do believe the additional recommendations of the investigating officer should ensure there are improved measures going forward.”

5.40 The claimant was represented by Dawn Taylor, who took an active part, and asked Faye Newton questions. In particular, she asked about the way that the workload was allocated and why it was not done on a pro-rata basis. The claimant considered that she struggled to answer the question, and did not know the answer. The claimant also asked questions of Faye Newton. The claimant (and her union rep.) was advised that this concluded the final stage in the grievance procedure.

5.41 On 17 September 2021 the claimant underwent a second occupational health assessment. The report (see pages 496-497 of the bundle) makes reference to the claimant’s 7 month sickness absence, and the previous report of April 2021. She advised that the claimant was not taking any medications, but had undergone several sessions of talking therapy. A psychological assessment had been carried out, and from the scores the claimant was assessed as having moderate anxiety and depression symptoms. On this occasion the claimant did reveal that she was 33 weeks pregnant.

5.42 She expressed the view that she was not optimistic that the claimant will return to work or that her symptoms would fully resolve unless the management issues were addressed and resolved. The outlook, however, was for a full recovery once the claimant felt that her concerns in work had been fully addressed. She confirmed that the claimant would not be considered to have a disability because the condition had not lasted longer than 12 months.

5.43 On 30 September 2021 the claimant’s stage 2 Sickness Absence Meeting took place. The claimant was not well enough to attend but Dawn Taylor attended on her behalf. She provided the claimant with feedback from that meeting (page 816 of the bundle) in which she reported as follows: Just a quick bit of feedback from the meeting today:

• School agreed to refer you to counselling, so can you contact Jill (Business manager) to agree to the referral. If there is a particular day that suits you best, or gender of counsellor preferred, can you state that in the email. You should then expect a phone call from the counselling service.

• Can you return the maternity form at the back of the Maternity Policy to confirm details?

• There was an offer of KIT days, including one to meet up off site e.g. at a coffee shop, which would still be counted and be paid.

• School would welcome you to drop in at anytime

• A stress risk assessment to be completed before a return to work in 2022.

• There will be trigger points for the next stage of sickness absence monitoring set out in the outcome letter, these will be on hold during your mat leave.

5.44 It had been agreed that a stress risk assessment be completed before a return to work in 2022 and an offer of a paid KIT day to meet up informally off site was made. (See p. 291-293 and p. 816 of the bundle.)

5.45 Thereafter, the claimant did not return to work. She should have returned to work in September 2021, as she had indicated that she would not be starting her maternity until November 2021, when her baby was due. The Tribunal cannot see any Fit Notes covering this period, but for one reason or another the claimant did not actually return to work, starting her maternity leave on, if not before, 29 October 2021, when her second child was born.

5.46 Pausing there, the events in respect of which the claimant brings many of her claims had all occurred between January 2021 and July 2021. She had raised a grievance about them in April 2021, which was determined in early July 2021. She appealed that outcome , and that appeal had been heard and determined by 30 September 2021. The claimant was throughout that period advised and represented by a trade union, her representative , Dawn Taylor, being fully aware of the circumstances of her case, and conducting the grievance appeal.

5.47 No action to instigate Tribunal proceedings was taken at that time.

5.48 Nothing then happened in relation to the claimant’s employment for months during her maternity leave in 2021 and 2022 until 23 March 2022 , when she received an email from Jill Rippon, School Business Manager, inviting her to two upcoming INSET days at school. There was no mention of any informal off site meeting.

5.49 Around the time of May 2022 the claimant’s mental health deteriorated and she increased the dosage of her medication. (See p. 426 of the bundle.)

5.50 On 17 June 2022 the claimant received a voicemail left by Toni Drayon from the school office asking her to call the school. She emailed Jill Rippon to enquire about this and she replied saying it was regarding an upcoming INSET day.

5.51 On 6 July 2022 the claimant claims that she emailed Jill Rippon to clarify her return to work date. This document is not in the bundle, but is referred to in the full version of Jill Rippon’s Chronology document , the incomplete version of which is at pages 883 to 884 of the bundle. She did not receive a response. She had received no information on which year group she would be returning to, although she knew arrangements would have been made for September and communicated to staff accordingly several months earlier.

5.52 The claimant was becoming increasingly worried about her upcoming return to work given the lack of contact from school so she chased her previous email by another one on 25 July 2022 (again, not in the bundle, but referred to Jill Rippon’s Chronology) Although Jill Rippon left a message for the claimant , she did not receive it, and did not follow it up at the time.

5.53 On 28 September 2022 the claimant chased the email for a second time, not in the bundle, but again in the Chronology of Jill Rippon, from whom on the same day she received a response (see p. 298 of the bundle) saying this: “I did leave an answerphone message in response to the email you sent on 25th July. You are due to return to school after your maternity leave w/c 31/10/2022. Your working days are Thursday and Friday therefore your first day back in school will be 3rd November. The 31st October is an in-service day if you wish to attend. I have checked with Martin and he is putting you into Reception Class for a day and Year 2 for a day.”

5.54 The claimant replied at 22.18 that day (pages 298 and 299 of the bundle) thanking Jill Rippon, and explained that she had not received any voicemail from her in July. To be clear, there were therefore three emails on 28 September 2022, only two of which are in the bundle, but the first, chasing up details of her return to work , which is not in the bundle , was sent by the claimant to Jill Rippon.

5.55 The claimant considered that it was very unusual for a Class Teacher to be placed in two separate Key Stages – the claimant had not known this happen at this school before with any other teacher returning from a maternity leave in the years that she had worked there.

5.56 She had received a phone call directly from the Deputy Head during her first Maternity Leave to discuss her return. This second return was handled in an entirely different manner that did not include any consultation with her directly. This information, and the lack of opportunity to have a discussion about it, caused a huge amount of stress and anxiety due to the implications of a far more complex role. She saw her role as a Class Teacher and not Cover Teacher.

5.57 Around the time of late September 2022 the claimant’s condition deteriorated further despite the higher dose of medication, and she experienced moments of hopelessness and suicidal thoughts. On 3 October 2022 she reached out to the crisis charity Shout for support (see page 886 of the bundle) , and later that day spoke to her GP about how she was feeling (see the GP notes at pages 424 and 425 of the bundle.)

5.58 On 2 November 2022, the day before the claimant was due to return to work following her maternity leave, she emailed Martin Henderson to notify him that she was too unwell to return (page 300 of the bundle.)

5.59 Neither the recommendations from the Grievance Outcome nor the agreed steps from the Stage 2 Sickness Absence Meeting Outcome - suggested in order to facilitate the claimant’s return to work - had been addressed

5.60 On the day after , 3 November 2022, after seeking legal advice , the claimant emailed Martin Henderson to clarify which year group(s) she would be returning to, who her line manager(s) would be, and what the planning expectation would be (page 301 of the bundle.)

5.61 Martin Henderson replied on 7 November 2022 (also page 301 of the bundle) informing the claimant as follows, repeating the questions she had asked: 1) Which lessons I'll be responsible for teaching and planning in both Year 2 and Reception .... Please contact your phase leaders by email or telephone. Jennifer.sherstone@ and Karla.george@ as requirements for planning will vary in each phase. 2) How my PPA will be managed. PPA is 10% of contracted hours for all staff. 3) Who the current year leaders of each of those year groups are. See answer to question 1 As you are poorly currently and away from work, It is important that you feel well enough before you make contact with phase leaders to find out what you will need to plan etc. Please also remember that the Council offers support through Beacon counselling. If you require a referral please do let me or Jill know.

5.62 Whilst the claimant was surprised to receive such a short blunt response telling her to contact the Phase Leaders directly regarding the planning, and felt that this put her in a difficult position as she needed more reassurance about her new role in order to feel better about it , she was told not to make contact until she was ‘well enough.’

5.63 The claimant , however, simply replied to Martin Henderson’s email by a further email that day (also page 301 of the bundle) saying “Thank you for letting me know”.

5.64 On 3 November 2022 the claimant notified ACAS and began the Early Conciliation process (page 1 of the bundle). The claimant must have chosen the option for ACAS to contact the respondent, as the early conciliation certificate was not issued until 15 December 2022.

5.65 On 14 November 2022 the claimant submitted a further fit note covering her absence up until 14 December 2022 , her condition being described as mixed anxiety and depressive disorder (page 498 of the bundle) .

5.66 On 2 December 2022 the claimant had an Occupational Health appointment, which resulted in the report dated the same day (pages 499 to 500 of the bundle) . The assessment concluded that the claimant displayed severe symptoms of anxiety and depression at that time. The OH therapist stated in the report, ‘Her symptoms are unlikely to resolve in their entirety until workplace issues are resolved’ and she advised ‘that a formal stress risk assessment is carried out with Mrs Parry, in order to address and attempt to resolve any ongoing issues locally.’

5.67 This was the second time the respondent had been advised to carry out a stress risk assessment . The report also stated, ‘Mrs Chelsea Parry’s anxiety is likely to be considered a disability because it a) has lasted longer than 12 months and b)is having a significant impact on her ability to undertake normal daily activities’ (see p. 500 of the bundle.)

5.68 On 5 December 2022 the claimant emailed Jill Rippon to ask if she could ask Martin Henderson if there was any option to be placed in a different year group/ under different line managers in order to facilitate her return to work. She added that she appreciated that this may not be possible , given that the school was already part way through the academic year (page 319 of the bundle.)

5.69 On 6 December 2022 the claimant received a response from Jill Rippon saying that she had asked Martin Henderson about alternative options and she responded with, ‘He said it will be discussed in the meeting on Thursday’ , a reference to the Stage 3 sickness absence meeting to be held on 15 December 2022 (page 322 of the bundle.)

5.70 However, prior to this response, Jill Rippon had asked HR for advice stating, ‘We have no other options to offer her on her return due to her returning part time.’ (See p. 321 of the bundle.) This was, of course, not seen by the claimant at the time.

5.71 On 15 December 2022 a Stage 3 Sickness Absence Meeting was held, by Teams. The claimant was not well enough to attend, so her husband attended on her behalf and she was represented by Dawn Taylor. The notes of this meeting are at pages 306 to 308 of the bundle (erroneously dated 15 November 2022). In this meeting Martin Henderson was supported by Sarah MacDermott of HR.

5.72 In terms of any stress risk assessment , it is unclear whether any such document had been provide to the claimant ahead of the meeting, but Sarah MacDermott said she would provide a copy to the claimant after the meeting.

5.73 There was discussion about the claimant meeting up with Martin Henderson for a coffee off site, mediation, and the completion of the SRA. There was some debate about the order in which these steps should occur, and it was suggested that the SRA would be provided for the claimant to complete following the meeting.

5.74 The Stage 3 sickness Absence Meeting outcome letter dated 16 December 2022 was produced after this meeting (page 324 to 325 of the bundle) . In it Martin Henderson said this: “Your Fit Note states that you are absent due to mixed anxiety and depression, and the Occupational Health report says that the cause of this appears to be work place issues. Dawn explained that you were experiencing ongoing symptoms, and that there were a number of issues tied together. Dawn stated that the issues at work the main reason for this and that these issues needed talking through. In line with your Stage 2 meeting, we agreed that as support a meeting will be arranged at the start of the Spring Term, at your convenience, for us to meet for a coffee and a chat. We discussed the occupational health report, in which it indicated that you were displaying severe symptoms of anxiety and depression, it also stated that you had recently commenced counselling. We noted that the report advices a Stress Risk Assessment be carried out in order to resolve these issues. We discussed completing this, Dawn advised that she would work with you on this and a further meeting would be arranged to look at what support can be provided. We discussed the content of the stage 2 letter and Dawn explained that in line with the outcome of your Grievance the recommendation of mediation between yourself and the senior leadership needs to be arranged. We agreed that Dawn would discuss options with you and this can be discussed in more detail when we meet. We discussed an email that you had sent to Jill requesting that the timetable your return to work be looked at I explained that there are only a limited number of options available to me, however I would like to discuss this with you in more detail. We discussed your PPA and I confirmed that this would be within your working hours. Dawn explained that you do not feel able to set a date to return to work at present. This is supported by the occupational health report, which states you are unfit to return to work at the present time. We discussed options to help alleviate some of your perceived work place issues, which include; completing the stress risk assessment meeting informally for a coffee, mediation, opening the school at weekends to let you familiarise yourself with the building again. Dawn will discuss these in more detail with you. We discussed your ongoing contact with school, and Dawn has since confirmed that you wish for this to continue with Jill, School Business Manager, via Email. Please be assured that we want your return to work to be successful. As you will be aware, absences do cause operational difficulties in terms of the additional pressure placed on colleagues and the cost to the school and it is therefore important to ensure that any support that can be provided to help you to return to work and reduce your sickness absence is offered.”

5.75 The letter went on to set a date for the next Review Meeting for 16 February 2022, to review actions and see if the claimant was able to provide a return to work date within a reasonable timescale. She was also warned that if she remained unable to return to work , or unable to provide a return to work date within a reasonable time scale , a Sickness Absence Hearing would be arranged , which could consider her continued employment by the school.

5.76 On 18 January 2023 the claimant received an email from Jill Rippon asking her to confirm a date and time to meet Martin Henderson for a coffee (page 329 of the bundle) . The claimant found this as a surprise as it was not clear from the outcome letter that it was Martin Henderson she would have to meet for the initial contact. The claimant therefore replied on 19 January 2023 (also page 329 of the bundle) querying this, as it was her understanding that the first meeting would be with Jill Rippon. She was going to check this with Dawn Taylor. Jill Rippon replied to the effect that it was the understanding of Martin Henderson and HR that this initial meeting would be with him (page 328 of the bundle).

5.77 On 23 January 2023 the claimant emailed Dawn Taylor for clarification, in the absence of any feedback notes from her on that occasion, to ask her what was agreed at the Stage 3 meeting regarding her meeting with someone informally from the school. (page 825 of the bundle). The claimant also in that email makes reference to having sought advice as to how to proceed with a personal injury claim, and complains that she has had no response for over two months. On 31 January 2023 Dawn Taylor replied (page 824 of the bundle) but only to ask for further details about the personal injury claim.

5.78 On 1 February 2023 Jill Rippon asked again for a date to meet Martin Henderson for a coffee, and asked the claimant if she would like her to attend as well (page 330 of the bundle). The claimant therefore repeated the question about what was agreed at the meeting on 15 December 2022 in a further email to Dawn Taylor on 2 February 2023 (page 824 of the bundle) , but got no response.

5.79 On 1 February 2023 the claimant presented her claims to the Tribunal, claiming part – time worker discrimination , sex, maternity and disability discrimination.

5.80 On 3 February 2023 the claimant responded further to Jill Rippon (pages 330- 331 of the bundle) saying this, having said that she had read the outcome letter again: Martin mentions in the letter my wish for communication with school to be through yourself. He then clearly states, 'please be assured that we want your return to work to be successful.' As such, it was my understanding that the initial informal meeting would be with yourself to relay the options Martin mentions on his behalf about the 'limited options' regarding my year group placement etc. Given the severity of my condition at present, this would be much more comfortable for me especially since mediation between myself and SLT hasn't yet commenced. It makes most sense in my opinion that mediation, which should have been arranged before the end of my maternity leave, be the first contact after such a long time and given the treatment I have experienced. If this is possible, I could meet with you on a 1 :1 basis next Thursday or Friday so you can pass on any information/options Martin has for me regarding my return. I believe that this would really help the beginning of my return to work 'to be successful.'

5.81 On 8 February 2023 the claimant repeated her question again via email to Dawn Taylor (page 824 of the bundle) and once again she did not receive a response. On the same day she received a response from Jill Rippon (page 333 of the bundle), which said: Sorry I am only just getting back to you about coffee this week. Unfortunately I am unable to make tomorrow or Friday as I am having a small procedure in hospital tomorrow and not sure how I will be Friday. Have you heard from Dawn regarding the meet up? My understanding is that communication with me is via email only and that Martin would have to be included in meetings as Headteacher. Perhaps if you liaise with Dawn as Martin understood that Dawn was going to discuss the various options with you which included meeting informally for a coffee, mediation, etc which will hopefully ensure your return to school is successful. It would be helpful if you could let me know when you have heard back from Dawn. Martin has a stage 3 catch up meeting in the diary for next Thursday.

5.82 On 12 February 2023 the claimant replied to Jill Rippon (pages 333 and 334 of the bundle), saying this: Unfortunately I've still not heard back from Dawn despite chasing it. I will let you know as soon as she gets back to me. However, regardless of her response, I just don't feel that arrangement is appropriate after all the issues, all the time that has passed and my current mental state. I assumed that was why the comment of continuing to liaise with yourself was made which reassured me that I was being eased back in gently and going to be supported in my return to work. The lack of flexibility once again is incredibly disappointing.

5.83 On 15 February 2023 the claimant resigned, by letter of that date, to Martin Henderson (page 334 of the bundle) in these terms: I am writing to confirm my resignation from the post of Teacher at Westmorland Primary School. In accordance with my contract dated 29th June 2017, I am giving the required notice before 28th February so my last day of employment will be 30th April 2023. You should be aware that I am resigning in response to a repudiatory breach of contract that has led to a change in my working hours. I consider this a fundamental breach of contract on your part. This breach came about as result of my maternity leave which amounts to indirect sex discrimination. This breach is one in a long line of instances in which I have been subject to unfavourable treatment over the past two years and this most recent incident is the final straw. In March 2021, I raised a formal grievance regarding part time worker detriment and a breach of duty of care. My grievance was not upheld. Throughout the grievance procedure and since my return from maternity leave, I have been working in protest whilst taking steps to challenge the changes made to my working conditions. You have failed to put into place the recommendations from the grievance outcome along with suggestions from previous Sickness Absence Meetings. Furthermore, there has been a lack of communication and transparency on your part regarding my options going forward and you have remained inflexible and tardy in terms of my return to work arrangements. As a result, I now consider that my position at Westmorland Primary School is untenable and my working conditions intolerable, leaving me with no option but to resign in response to your breach. I therefore consider myself constructively dismissed.

5.84 Martin Henderson reacted to this action from the claimant in an email the day after her received it, on 16 February 2023, in which he said this: “ ….growl. Dawn called this morning for a chat... I reiterated my shock .... Dawn had not had a copy but I gave her a potted summary, she appeared insisting that CP must let go citing highly unusual and usually pretty severe events constructive dismissal which she appeared not to think anything she had heard about were. I spoke honestly about my support for all staff and that one of the emails from C had suggested that the stage 2 should be dealt with in her MAT leave, I asked for her advice but said I had assumed that no union would support that move as maternity is protected. I spoke of the support we give ALL mums and dads on the staff and part time workers. I spoke of having been given no opportunity to address issues as cp would not interact, I spoke of patterns off sick maternity off sick maternity off sick and all processes being suspended. during maternity, made it very clear during the allegation management process that receiving a text from work on a non working day was highlighted and adjusted In the light of the meeting we adapted future contacts. She appeared supportive, was actually enquiring about the staged attendance meeting and that now resignation had happened would it be continuing. I said I would be asking you and that it seemed an additional task that school nor Chelsea would need. Dawn was going to go chat with Chelsea and offer a meeting with me if she felt that she was able or beneficial to her to help her let go. I promised a response that would be only short in the next 24 hours or so.”

5.85 It was never established who this email was to, or who the reply to it was from, but it is likely to have been someone in HR.

5.86 Whilst Jill Rippon’s timeline document suggests that Martin Henderson responded to the claimant’s resignation by letter of 9 March 2023 (page 885 of the bundle), neither the claimant nor Martin Henderson make any reference to this document in their witness statements, and it does not appear to be in the hearing bundle. It presumably does not add anything of significance to either side’s case.

5.87 The claimant did not return to work, but remained off work sick until her employment ended on 30 April 2023. 6. Those , then , are the relevant facts. In terms of any conflicts of evidence, the Tribunal has to observe that where there have been any (and they have been few) the Tribunal has generally preferred the evidence of the respondent’s witnesses. In particular, the Tribunal has noted the lack of candour on the part of the claimant in relation to her second pregnancy in 2021. The evidence shows that the claimant fell pregnant around the end of January 2021. She was clearly aware that she was pregnant by 7 April 2021 , because of the entry on page 469 of the bundle. She made, however, no reference to this highly pertinent fact in the OH consultation on 21 April 2021. She did not inform the respondent until 23 July 2021. She was , not , of course, obliged to do so, but this meant that throughout the period from January 2021 to July 2021 the respondent had no knowledge of her second pregnancy. The Tribunal accepts that there can be many reasons why a woman may choose not to disclose to her employer that she is pregnant until she has to. The claimant , however, was off work sick from February 2021, and one would have thought that the fact she was also pregnant might be a highly relevant fact that she would want her employer to know. It made the issue of what her teaching role would be in the immediate future rather less pressing, as she was due , at some point, to commence a second period of maternity leave, a fact that would be rather germane to the respondent’s planning for the next school year. 7. Coupled with that, however, is the fact, the significance of which the Tribunal had not previously appreciated, that the claimant has only disclosed full GP medical records going back to September 2021. Other than the one reference in a document dated 4 October 2022 where the entry for 7 April 2021 , which reads “pregnant” , there are no references to the claimant’s second pregnancy until after she had informed the respondent of it in July 2021. The Tribunal accordingly has no contemporaneous medical evidence around the time that the claimant was experiencing the issues she complains of, and the commencement of her sickness absence from 11 February 2021. 8. That may not be deliberate, but it is concerning, and has led the Tribunal to the reluctant conclusion that the claimant may be prepared, when she considers that it may not assist her cause to do so, to be less than totally candid. That may, however, not be of crucial importance, because, as will be seen, these claims will not turn upon the credibility of the claimant. Discussion and findings. A.Jurisdiction – time limit issues in relation to the claimant’s discrimination claims. 9. The claimant’s claims of discrimination are: 1.Indirect sex discrimination: This is based upon the respondent adopting the following provision, criterion or practices (PCP) within the meaning of section 19(1) of the Equality Act 2010 by:

(a) Expecting teachers to take responsibility for planning all the lessons in the subjects that were allocated to them; and

(b) Allocating subjects to teachers was such that each teacher was required to spend the same or similar amount of time working on lesson planning. which put those with whom the claimant shares a protected characteristic (women) at a particular disadvantage in that, which was applied to the claimant , and put her at the particular disadvantage. 2.Part – time worker discrimination: This is based upon the claimant being given more work to do as a proportion of her paid working hours than the comparable full-time workers. 3.Failure to make reasonable adjustments: This is based upon the respondents having one or more of the following PCP within the meaning of section 20(3) of the Equality Act 2010 of: Giving teachers responsibility for more than one class and/or Giving teachers responsibility for classes across different Key Stages. which were applied to the claimant , and put her a disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter when compared with persons who were not disabled. 4.Maternity discrimination: This is based upon the respondent subjecting the Claimant to the following treatment: Requiring her to return to a role with split class and/or Key Stage responsibilities. 10. The List of Issues, unfortunately, does not ascribe dates to any of these claims, but does identify 22 September 2022 as being the relevant date by which any of the relevant claims must have arisen to be in time, given the dates the on which the claimant commended ACAS early conciliation, obtained her certificate, and then presented the claim form to the Tribunal. 11. In terms of these claims, therefore, the Tribunal has firstly had to identify the dates upon which they arose, then consider the arguments advanced by the claimant as to whether they , or any of them, are out of time, and then, in the alternative, whether the time limit for their presentation should be extended on the basis that it would be just and equitable to do so. The relevant law. 12. In relation to the claims under the Equality Act 2010, this is to be found in the following provisions of the Equality Act 2010. a)Section 123(1) of the Equality Act 2010 which provides: “.....Proceedings on a complaint .. may not be brought after the end of – (a) the period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or (b) such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable”. And: b)Sections 123 (3) and (4) of the Equality Act 2010 provide: (3) For the purposes of this section— (a) conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period; (b) failure to do something is to be treated as occurring when the person in question decided on it. (4) In the absence or evidence to the contrary, a person (P) is to be taken to decide on failure to do something – (a) when P does an act inconsistent with doing it, or (b) If P does no inconsistent act, on the expiry of the period in which P might reasonably have been expected to do it”. In terms of the Part – time Workers Regulations , the relevant , similarly worded, provisions are set out below/ 13. There are, the Tribunal considers, two claims where time limit issue arise, those for indirect sex discrimination, and under the part – time workers regulations. The dates upon which each of these claims arose. 14. Before considering whether the Tribunal should extend the time for presentation of any out of time claims, it must first determine whether any of them actually were presented out of time. A.The indirect sex discrimination claims. Mr Lassey’s submissions do not identify specifically any date for these claims, but he proceeds on the basis that one of the PCPs (a) was applied to the claimant at the material time, which he identifies as February 2021. Whilst he does not accept that PCP (b) was actually applied to the claimant , if it had been, that too would have been in February 2021. 15. Looking at the claimant’s case, and her evidence, it is clear that she is making these claims in connection with proposals for her working arrangements that were first made in January 2021. There was considerable discussion about them in early 2021, and the claimant raised a grievance about these very issues on 19 April 2021. That was heard on 20 May 2021 The claimant then commenced a period of sickness absence on 24 June 2021. She was provided with the grievance outcome on 2 July 2021, and appealed that on 16 July 2021. That appeal was heard on 23 September 2021, and the outcome provided on 30 September 2021. 16. The claimant remained off work, and did not return because on 30 September 2021 she commenced her next period of maternity leave, not returning , or proposing to return, until 3 November 2022. 17. The Tribunal is accordingly quite satisfied that these claims of indirect sex discrimination arose no later than February 2021, and that the time limit for bringing any claims in relation to these matters began to run from then. As they were not, however, made until 1 February 2023, around 2 years later, they are considerably out of time. Conduct extending over a period of time within s.123(3). 18. The claimant , however, in her submissions argues that the Tribunal should not consider these claims in isolation, but should consider that they are part of conduct extending over a period of time, continuing, in effect up 22 September 2022, bringing them within s.123(3), and making them therefore within time. 19. In support of this (presumably with the benefit of some legal advice or research) she argues that the respondent created a state of affairs that “continued throughout the Claimant’s sickness and maternity leave and bled directly into the discriminatory acts of 2022”. In support of this the claimant argues that the planning issue was never resolved, as the grievance did not achieve such a resolution, and that she considered these issues were unresolved. 20. She argues that the 2022 treatment was “an extension of the 2021 discrimination”, and recites her evidence to the Tribunal that Martin Henderson’s vague response to her about planning requirements “led her to believe that she would be forced back into the same unfair situation”. She goes on to say that the evidence shows a continuous state of affairs where the respondent failed to address the claimant’s legitimate complaints. Mr Lassey, probably because this point had not been raised previously, has not expressly addressed it in his submissions. The law on s.123(3) and (4) of the Equality Act 2010. 21. The Tribunal has considered this argument. The basic distinction is between conduct properly considered as extending over a period on the one hand and a oneoff act which is not such conduct, even though it might have continuing consequences: (see Sougrin v Haringey Health Authority

[1992] IRLR 416

; Hendricks v Metropolitan Police Commissioner

[2003] IRLR 96

). On that basis, a dismissal or demotion (as in Sougrin) is likely to come within the latter category and so not within sub-s (3)(a). Similarly, altering a person's basis of engagement (here, from equity partner to ordinary partner) is likely to be considered a one-off event, albeit with continuing effects, and so not within sub-s (3)(a): Parr v MSR Partners LLP

[2022] IRLR 528

. A further relevant factor commented on in that case is whether the employer was applying a policy to that individual, which is more likely to qualify. In Ahmed v Capital Arches Group Ltd

[2025] EAT 133

(17 September 2025, unreported) Parr was applied to rule out a late claim based on a forced change in contractual duties, whether or not actually constituting a demotion. 22. The Tribunal cannot accept the claimant’s argument. The allocation of teaching duties and PPA time is something that occurs every academic year. It is something that was highly fluid, given the staffing requirements which changed frequently according to the nature of the workforce. Its application , or proposed application, to the claimant cannot be considered to be anything other than a one off act at the time that it occurred. In the context of these claims, therefore, the proposal made in February 2021 (which, it is to be remembered , arose in the unique circumstances of the need to accommodate the student teacher , and the impact of COVID) can only be considered as a one off act. 23. This conclusion is further reinforced by the fact that the claimant makes no claims of any subsequent application of this PCP to her in 2022. The most she says is that she felt or believed that Martin Henderson would do this again, because of his “vague response” to her in an email on 3 November 2022. The Tribunal cannot act upon the subjective feeling or beliefs of the claimant, in order for there to be conduct extending over a period of time, there has to be some conduct, not some fear that there might be. The claimant’s contention, therefore, that the Tribunal can regard the conduct complained of in February 2021 as somehow continuing into 2022, and beyond the crucial date of 22 September 2022 is, with respect, untenable, and these claims are therefore out of time. B. The part time worker regulations claims 24. In terms of the dates for these claims , they are based upon the same facts as the indirect sex discrimination claims discussed above. The dates on which these claims arose is accordingly the same, i.e February 2021. 25. The equivalent provisions of the Regulations in respect of time limits are as follows: Reg.(8) : 2) Subject to paragraph (3), an employment tribunal shall not consider a complaint under this regulation unless it is presented before the end of the period of three months (or, in a case to which regulation 13 applies, six months) beginning with the date of the less favourable treatment or detriment to which the complaint relates or, where an act or failure to act is part of a series of similar acts or failures comprising the less favourable treatment or detriment, the last of them. [2A – early conciliation] (3) A tribunal may consider any such complaint which is out of time if, in all the circumstances of the case, it considers that it is just and equitable to do so. (4) For the purposes of calculating the date of the less favourable treatment or detriment under paragraph (2)— (a) where a term in a contract is less favourable, that treatment shall be treated, subject to paragraph (b), as taking place on each day of the period during which the term is less favourable; (b) where an application relies on regulation 3 or 4 the less favourable treatment shall be treated as occurring on, and only on, in the case of regulation 3, the first day on which the applicant worked under the new or varied contract and, in the case of regulation 4, the day on which the applicant returned; and

(c) a deliberate failure to act contrary to regulation 5 or 7(2) shall be treated as done when it was decided on. (5) In the absence of evidence establishing the contrary, a person shall be taken for the purposes of paragraph (4)(c) to decide not to act— (a) when he does an act inconsistent with doing the failed act; or (b) if he has done no such inconsistent act, when the period expires within which he might reasonably have been expected to have done the failed act if it was to be done. 26. The claimant’s written submissions do not, unfortunately, address the time limit issues in respect of these claims. The respondent’s, however, do. As therein noted, the same considerations apply when determining whether they are part of any series of similar acts or failure, as do to the indirect sex discrimination claims considered above. 27. The Tribunal’s conclusions as to whether these claims were presented out of time are the same as for those claims. These claims too arose in February 2021, and cannot be considered as extending into 2022 for the same reasons that indirect sex discrimination claims cannot. Again, as previously, the question of any extension on just and equitable grounds will be considered in due course. Extension on the just and equitable principle. 28. Having found that these two claims were presented out of time, the Tribunal will now go on to consider whether the claimant should be granted an extension of time for the presentation of either or both of them on the grounds that it would be just and equitable to do so. 29. As submitted by Mr Lassey, the relevant principles to be applied to extensions of time in discrimination claims are set out in cases such as Robertson v Bexley Community Centre t/a Leisure Link

[2003] IRLR 434

, in which Auld LJ commented that there is no presumption that Tribunals should grant extensions of time unless they can justify failure to exercise the discretion. He went on to say: “Quite the reverse, a tribunal cannot hear a complaint unless the applicant convinces it that it is just and equitable to extend time, so the exercise of the discretion is the exception rather than the rule.”

claims.

[30]Further, an extension of time does not require exceptional circumstances, just that an extension of time be just and equitable (see Pathan v South London Islamic Centre EAT 0312/13).

[31]The lead case is , of course, British Coal Corporation v Keeble and ors

[1997] IRLR 336

. The EAT suggested that in determining whether to exercise their discretion to allow the late submission of a discrimination claim, tribunals would be assisted by considering the factors listed in section 33(3) of the Limitation Act 1980. That section deals with the exercise of discretion in the civil courts in personal injury cases and requires the court to consider the prejudice which each party would suffer as a result of the decision reached, and to have regard to all the circumstances of the case, in particular, the length of, and reasons for, the delay the extent to which the cogency of the evidence is likely to be affected by the delay the extent to which the party sued has cooperated with any requests for information the promptness with which the claimant acted once he or she knew of the facts giving rise to the cause of action the steps taken by the claimant to obtain appropriate advice once he or she knew of the possibility of taking action

[32]The factors set out in British Coal Corporation v Keeble and ors were revisited in Adedeji v University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust [2021] ICR D5. The Court of Appeal pointed out that the EAT in that case did no more than suggest that a comparison with section 33 might help ‘illuminate’ the task of the Tribunal by setting out a checklist of potentially relevant factors. It certainly did not say that that list should be used as a framework for any decision. In the Court of Appeal’s view, it is not healthy for the Keeble factors to be taken as the starting point for Tribunals’ approach to ‘just and equitable’ extensions, as they regularly are. Rigid adherence to a checklist can lead to a mechanistic approach to what is meant to be a very broad general discretion, and confusion may occur where a Tribunal refers to a genuinely relevant factor but uses inappropriate language derived from the case of Keeble. The best approach for a Tribunal in considering the exercise of the discretion is to assess all the factors in the particular case that it considers relevant, including in particular the length of, and the reasons for, the delay.

[33]The Tribunal, mindful of this guidance, and that its primary task is to take all the circumstances into account and balance the prejudice to the parties makes the following assessment of these various factors on the facts found above.

[34]The starting point is the length of, and reasons for the delay. The length of the delay is from February 2021 to February 2023, some 21 months , given the initial three month time limit, and is, of course, 7 times that period.

[35]The reasons for it are, the Tribunal considers, unclear. The claimant does not address this delay or the reasons for it all in her witness statement. She seeks to do so in her submissions by reference to her “state of health”. Reliance is placed upon the OH reports, the claimant’s anxiety and depression, and her “impending” child birth.

[36]The Tribunal accepts that these are potentially relevant factors, but they do not, in its view , adequately explain how these factors prevented the claimant from presenting the claims which go back to early 2021 for another 2 years.

[37]Further, the claimant does not address at all the fourth and fifth factors referred to in Keeble . In particular she does not address the highly relevant factor of her union representation throughout this process. Whilst the claimant experienced some issues with communication with her union representative at the end of the period we are considering, there were none in 2021, or 2022, and the Tribunal is left speculating why these claims were not brought at some stage in 2021.

[38]That there was grievance and an appeal is another highly relevant factor. Whilst double – edged , in that this restricts the extent to which the respondent can assert that it was forensically prejudiced by the delay , on the basis that these issues were not investigated nearer the time, it is also relevant that the claimant , and her union representative, knew the position , and all the facts necessary to bring a claim by, at the latest, the time of the grievance appeal outcome in late September 2021 . The claimant’s pregnancy, with respect, should not have been an issue, her union could easily have at least lodged, or advised the claimant to lodge, a Tribunal claim.

[39]Additionally, as Mr Lassey points out, in her evidence the claimant conceded that she had actually decided against bringing a claim about the 2021 matters, as she considered, at around the time of the grievance appeal outcome in or about October 2021, that it would be out of time. She was right, but should have tried to issue then, when the length of the delay would have been much less significant.

[40]A further question that the Tribunal considers relevant, but was not explained by the claimant , is why , given her impending return to work in autumn 2022, and the unresolved issues (as she saw them) of her working arrangements upon return from maternity leave, she did not then seek to bring a Tribunal claim. Again, these claims were left to be added into the claim form that the claimant eventually presented on 1 February 2023.

[41]Whilst observing that the grievance process has reduced the prejudice that the respondent suffers, or the effect upon the cogency of the evidence to some degree, the Tribunal notes Mr Lassey’s point that Elizabeth Garner’s evidence was that she struggled to recall some details of events in 2021, and that some email communications were no longer available. Whilst not a major factor, it does carry some weight.

[42]The Tribunal’s conclusion is that the claimant has not persuaded the Tribunal that it should exercise its discretion in her favour. The length of the delay is serious, and the reasons for it are not clear, or are not good ones. It is reinforced in that view by the fact that the exclusion of these claims (which have direct financial loss impact) will not leave the claimant without any claims at all, as she has other, in time claims which the Tribunal can, and will consider. These claims, however, of indirect sex discrimination and part – time worker discrimination are accordingly dismissed. The claim of failure to make reasonable adjustments.

[43]The Tribunal will now consider the next of the claims set out in the List of Issues, that of failing to make reasonable adjustments. Again, no dates are specified in the List for when these claims arose, and the respondent has not argued that these claims are out of time, which is correct, as they relate to the period when the claimant was due to return to work after maternity cover in 2022, and therefore postdate 22 September 2022.

[44]The issues in these claims are put thus: Did the respondents have the following PCPs : giving teachers responsibility for more than one class and/or giving teachers responsibility for classes across different Key Stages, which were applied to the claimant ? If so, did the application of the above PCP’s put the claimant at a disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter when compared with persons who were not disabled? The claimant relies upon the following disadvantage: The additional demands of the split role. In particular, she says, she would have to apply two different teaching curricula and teaching methods simultaneously and to get to know a larger cohort of children and parents. Her mental health disability made it harder for her than for other people to cope with those additional pressures.

[45]The respondent’s first point is that, as the claimant did not actually return to work, no such PCPs (which it implicitly admits) were ever applied to her. It is accepted that the respondent would have applied them to the claimant (see the email of 28 September 2022 at page 298 of the bundle). This is a simple point, and, if correct, fatal to this claim. This requires the Tribunal to consider what the word “applies” means .

[46]With due respect to Mr Lassey, the word “applies” does not actually feature in the provisions relating to reasonable adjustments. It has, perhaps, fallen into the shorthand often used in connection with these claims, but is not the wording of the statute . It is perhaps helpful , for a moment, to examine the legal architecture of such claims. The foundation is the duty to make reasonable adjustments , which is found in s.20 of the Equality Act 2010. That sets out the circumstances in which the duty to make such adjustments arises. Section 20(3) is the relevant one, in relation to PCPs. It reads: (3) The first requirement is a requirement, where a provision, criterion or practice of A's puts a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled, to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to avoid the disadvantage. The point to note is the use of the word “puts” , which is not followed by the words “or would put” . As observed, the word “applies” is not in this section, unlike s.19 of the Equality Act 2010 , which proscribes indirect discrimination, where it does appear, and is followed by the words “or would apply”. 47, The issue therefore for the Tribunal is not whether any PCP was applied to the claimant , but whether any PCP actually put her at any disadvantage. The Tribunal can see that , on the one hand, until the claimant actually returned to work, the PCP would not put her at any disadvantage. On the other hand, if the claimant were represented , it would doubtless be argued on her behalf that merely to tell the claimant that this teaching requirement would apply to her when she did return to work was sufficient to put her at a disadvantage.

[48]There is, the Tribunal notes, scant authority on this issue, and the Tribunal was not referred to any. What there is, however, is as follows. In general terms, the statutory duty to make reasonable adjustments arises when a disabled person is placed at a substantial disadvantage by the application (in the words of the IDS Handbook at para. 3.23) of a PCP. More specifically, the duty to comply with the reasonable adjustment requirement begins as soon as the employer can take reasonable steps to avoid the relevant disadvantage — Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board v Morgan

2018 ICR 1194

, CA. In that case, the claim concerned a failure to deploy the claimant to another role. The Court rejected the Board’s contention that the date when the duty begins is also the date when time starts to run for the purpose of calculating the time limit for bringing proceedings. In NCH Scotland v McHugh EATS 0010/06 the EAT sought to identify the time at which a disabled claimant was in a position to contend that he or she had been placed at a relevant disadvantage in the context of seeking a phased return to work following a substantial period of absence caused by the disability in question. It ruled that the duty is not ‘triggered’ — to use the EAT’s own word — unless and until the claimant indicated an intention or wish to return to work. HHJ McMullen observed: ‘We agree that a managed programme of rehabilitation depends on all the circumstances of the case, but it does include a return-to-work date. And certainly, if additional management and supervision is to be required, they must be arranged in advance and not in a vacuum. Similarly, if additional costs were to be incurred by (not this case) the purchase of new equipment to counteract the effect of the environment on the disabled person, there would be no need to spend that money in advance of a clear indication that the claimant was returning. In our judgment, applying the trigger approach… it was not reasonable for the respondent to pursue the possibilities which the tribunal noted until there was some sign on the horizon that the claimant would be returning.’ Whilst perhaps not on all fours, the case is authority for the proposal that the duty to make reasonable adjustments can arise when an employee proposes to return to work, not when they actually do.

[49]Finally, the concept of a PCP is not to be approached in too restrictive a manner; as HHJ Eady QC stated in Carrera v United First Partners Research

UKEAT/0266/15

'the protective nature of the legislation meant a liberal, rather than an overly technical approach should be adopted'. In that case the claimant said that he had been 'required' to work late – something he as an analyst had been able to do before a cycling accident, but could not due as a result of his disabilities post-accident. The Employment Tribunal accepted the employer's case that he had been expected to work late, but not forced or coerced into so doing. The EAT held that a 'real world' approach ought to be adopted, and that the claimant was clearly relying on the 'requirement' as a form of 'practice', and that the PCP was accordingly made out.

[50]Taking this guidance into account, whilst taking Mr Lassey’s point, the Tribunal does not agree that the PCPs relied upon did not “put” the claimant to any disadvantage because she did not actually return to work. She had indicated her intention to do so, and the communication of the arrangements for her doing so was, in the Tribunal’s view, sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the PCPs put her at a disadvantage.

[51]That, however, is only the first of the arguments that the respondent relies upon in defence of this claim. The next is that the claimant would not be put at any disadvantage at all, because the role would have been less demanding than that which she had carried out prior to her second maternity leave .

[52]The claimant’s case is that this new role put her at a disadvantage because of the additional demands of the split role. In particular, she says, she would have to apply two different teaching curricula and teaching methods simultaneously and to get to know a larger cohort of children and parents. Her mental health disability made it harder for her than for other people to cope with those additional pressures.

[53]The respondent does not accept this, and its witnesses Martin Henderson, Jennifer Sherstone, Karla George , Elizabeth Garner, Charlotte Gillis and Emily Settle all say, to varying degrees, that they consider this was not the case. They consider that the role which had been identified for the claimant was considerably less demanding than her previous role(s), or any other teaching role that was available under the structure at that time (November 2022). This was the least demanding teaching role that the claimant could have possibly hoped for. In particular, she would not have been required to mark reports, attend parents evenings, write end of year reports, or deal with SEN paperwork; and would have benefitted from the support of two experienced Teaching Assistants (TAs), both of whom worked longer hours than usual.

[54]The claimant does not agree, but, of course, never tried it out to see. Whilst the Tribunal accepts that she may have viewed it that way, the burden is upon her to show the disadvantage to which the PCP put her, which must be viewed objectively, not subjectively. The claimant has failed to establish this, and this claim must fail on that basis.

[55]There is, however, also another argument that the respondent deploys in defence of this claim, and that is under para. 20 of Schedule 8 to the Equality Act 2010, which provides that: “A is not subject to a duty to make reasonable adjustments if A does not know, and could not reasonably be expected to know... (b) that an interested disabled person has a disability and is likely to be placed at the substantial disadvantage referred to in the first, second or third requirement.” where “A” in this context is the respondent. There are two limbs of knowledge, the first actual, and the second constructive (i.e the respondent could reasonably be expected to know) of the disadvantage to which the PCP put the claimant.

[56]Mr Lassey submits that even if the claimant satisfies the other requirements for a reasonable adjustments claim, the respondent can rely upon this defence, as , firstly, in terms of actual knowledge, the claimant accepted in evidence that she did not tell explicitly tell anyone at the school that she would struggle to perform a split role (or at least elements of it) because of her disability.

[57]As to constructive knowledge, he reminded the Tribunal that anxiety and depression are variable conditions. They effect different people in different ways. The disadvantage that the claimant relies upon in this case is very specific; and is not something that can be logically inferred from the fact of the condition itself. Neither is there anything in the three OH reports commissioned which would have alerted the respondent to this very specific disadvantage she was experiencing. They referred only to the claimant ’s concerns over workload [see pages 494 – 500 of the bundle]. In other words, short of the claimant raising the issue with them directly, it is difficult to see how the respondent could reasonably have been expected to know that the claimant was being put at this disadvantage by being required to return to this split role.

[58]The claimant addresses this point in her submissions. She disputes that the proposed role was as beneficial for her as the respondent’s witnesses made out. We are not persuaded by that, but we agree that the communication about this role was poor, a factor which will be relevant to other issues (see the constructive dismissal discussion below) but is far less pertinent to this claim. Of greater force, however, is the contention that the respondent cannot rely upon its lack of knowledge of the effect of this PCP upon the claimant because it ought reasonably to have known, and would have done if it had carried out the SRA that had been advised back in 2021. Whilst we can see that argument, we are not persuaded by it. Quite what an SRA would have revealed is somewhat speculative, and would probably depend upon when it was carried out. It would not be of much utility if carried out in a vacuum. The proposal was only ever that, so an SRA would have to be carried out when the claimant was back at work, or close to being so. Whilst not strictly necessary for the Tribunal to decide, on balance, the Tribunal would not find that the respondent’s plea of lack of knowledge would falter on the absence of the SRA being carried out. For these reasons too this claim must fail, and is dismissed. Maternity Discrimination.

[59]The next claim on the List of Issues is that of maternity discrimination, which too is based solely upon the proposal that the claimant return from her maternity leave in November 2022 to teach across two classes across two Key Stages.

[60]The statutory provisions are contained in s.18 of the Equality Act 2010, and operate to make pregnancy and maternity a protected characteristic for the purposes of claims of direct discrimination. The other subsections operate to prescribe the protected period during which a woman has this particular protection, and there is no issue but that the claim falls within that period.

[61]Whilst Mr Lassey refers to the burden of proof, and the need for the claimant to do more than simply point to the treatment complained of and her maternity leave, and warns the Tribunal against confusing treatment during a return from maternity leave with treatment because the claimant was returning from such leave, his first point is that the claimant was not treated unfavourably at all because she was allowed to return to work as a class teacher.

[62]He cites the EAT case of Blundell v Governing Body of St Andrew's Catholic Primary School and another [2007]

UKEAT/0329/06/RN

in support of this contention. That is a case which concerned an appeal against the dismissal of claims made by a teacher returning from maternity leave, who was allocated a class different from that which she taught before she went on maternity leave. She brought two claims, one of sex discrimination, and the other of breach of reg. 18 of the Maternity and Parental Leave Regulations 1999. The latter provides that an employee who takes additional maternity or parental leave is entitled to return from leave “to the job in which she was employed before her absence …” The Employment Tribunal held, dismissing that claim, that the claimant was not thereby entitled to return to teach the same class as she had been doing before her maternity leave, only that she entitled to return to a role as class teacher, not to the same class as she previously taught.

[63]The latter part of the judgment of the EAT deals with this aspect, and upheld the Tribunal’s finding. This is relied upon by Mr Lassey as defeating the claimant’s claim under these provisions.

[64]With respect , the Tribunal does not agree that this case has that effect upon this claimant’s claim in this regard. The obvious reason for that is that Blundell in this aspect is a decision upon a claim made under the 1999 Regulations. This claimant makes no such claim. The case may, we accept, have some relevance to an argument that returning to a different role is not unfavourable treatment for the purposes of the s.18 claim that is made, but that is as far as it goes, in our view.

[65]What was also considered in Blundell , in a different context, however, was the issue of causation, and the burden of proof. The context was that of the direct sex discrimination claim, based on some of the same facts. There the EAT examined the Tribunal’s finding that the treatment complained of (some of which was before the claimant commenced maternity leave) was not because of the claimant’s pregnancy or maternity leave. Reference is made in the judgment to Madarassy v Nomura International plc

[2007] EWCA Civ 33

which has long been, and remains, a leading authority on causation and the burden of proof in discrimination claims, approved in Greater Manchester Police v Bailey

[2017] EWCA Civ 425

, holding that 'It is trite law that the burden of proof is not shifted simply by showing that the claimant has suffered a detriment and that he has a protected characteristic or has done a protected act: see Madarassy, per Mummery LJ at paras. 54–56 (pp. 878–9).'

[66]Mr Lassey submits that the claimant has done no more in this case than to refer to her unfavourable treatment , and her maternity leave. He is right. There was ample evidence of the frequent need to juggle the teaching requirements of the timetable against the varying availability, for whatever reasons, of teaching staff who worked part time, or were off work sick, or were returning from maternity leave. The claimant, as Mr Lassey submits, could not point to anything else to suggest that Martin Henderson allocated her this role because she was returning from maternity leave. There is no “something more” . As Mummery L J said in Madarassy : “The bare facts of a difference in status and a difference in treatment only indicate a possibility of discrimination. They are not, without more, sufficient material from which a tribunal “could conclude” that, on the balance of probabilities, the respondent had committed an unlawful act of discrimination.’ That is, the Tribunal concludes, the position here, and this claim is dismissed. The constructive dismissal claim.

[67]That leaves the Tribunal with one final claim to consider, that of unfair constructive dismissal. There are no time limit issues in relation to this claim, of course, so it falls to be considered on its merits. This claim has been carefully formulated through the case management process, so is put now put (solely , as a previous iteration which relied upon breach of an express term of the claimant’s contract of employment has been abandoned) on the basis of breach of the implied term of trust and confidence. The matters relied upon by the claimant as amounting to such a breach are the respondent : a) Giving the claimant a disproportionate workload as a part-time worker by requiring her to do the same amount of planning work as the full-time teachers; b) Requiring the Claimant to return from maternity leave into a role with split responsibility for different classes in different Key Stages; c) Failing to carry out a stress risk assessment; d) Failing to have an informal "coffee" meeting with the claimant in advance of her return to work; e) Failing to arrange mediation between the claimant and the Senior Leadership Team f) Failing to open the school at the weekend in advance of the claimant's return to work so that the claimant could visit and familiarise herself with it; g) Failing to contact the Business Manager, Jill Rippon; and h) Failing to discuss with the claimant in advance of her return to work what adjustments would be made to her 2021 role.

[68]Before examining these issues in detail, it is worth reminding ourselves of the law on the implied term of trust and confidence, as it is known, but which is a form of legal shorthand. The full formulation of the implied term was finally affirmed in Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA

[1997] IRLR 462

where it was held to be as follows: ''The employer shall not without reasonable and proper cause conduct itself in a manner calculated and likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee.'' This goes back to , and approves the formulation, in Woods v WM Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd

[1981] IRLR 347

[69]The claimant does really not put her case on the first limb, that the respondent behaved in a manner calculated to have this effect (although she does come close to suggesting that she was being forced out, but the Tribunal can see no basis for such a conclusion), so the Tribunal has to consider this claim under the second limb.

[70]In terms of the eight matters relied upon as constituting the fundamental breach of this implied term, the respondent’s responses are: a) The respondent did not give the claimant a disproportionate workload upon her first return to work in 2021; b) The respondent did propose to require the claimant to return to split classes upon her proposed return to work in autumn 2022, but this was not actually ever actioned, was not unfavourable to her, or was not without reasonable and proper cause; c) to f) The respondent did not fail to any of these things. It simply proposed that they be should be carried out in a particular order. It was genuinely committed to making these things happen. After the claimant went on her second period of maternity leave it was agreed that there would be no point in progressing them at that time. Agreement was made that the respondent would commit to looking at these matters again upon her return in late 2022; g) The respondent is unclear what the claimant means by this, and the claimant has not advanced this matter in evidence; h) The claimant was told what her role upon her return to work would be, and directed to contact the relevant phase leaders for answers to her questions, but she failed to do so.

[71]Going through these the Tribunal finds that : a) is not made out by the claimant as contributing, as such, to any breach of the implied term; what is clear however, is that , rightly or wrongly, she perceived this to an issue, and raised it through the grievance process, which , in her view, did not resolve it; b) is not made out by the claimant as contributing , as such, to any breach of the implied term, but the manner in which this was done, in the Tribunal’s view, did, which is relevant to (h) below; c) is not made out; albeit tardily, the respondent did, at the end of 2022, commence the SRA process by providing the claimant with the documentation at or after the meeting on 15 December 2022 d) is not made out by the claimant as contributing, as such, to any breach of the implied term; it is, however, relevant to the respondent’s admitted preference for such a step to be taken before it would take any others; e) is made out as contributing to breach of the implied term, and is, in the Tribunal’s view a very significant factor; this had been a recommendation from the original grievance which had, with the claimant’s agreement, been put in abeyance during her maternity leave; the need for it , however, had not evaporated, and it remained as necessary before or upon the claimant’s return to work in autumn 2022 as it had been in 2021. The pre-condition of a coffee meeting was, in the Tribunal’s view , a minor issue, which should not have delayed the progress of the mediation. That should have been arranged as soon as possible, with the option of such a pre-meeting if required. The respondent, however, made no effort to arrange any mediation, or to explain how this might be delayed if there was no such pre-meeting. The Tribunal is quite sure that the claimant would have welcomed at least some progress towards a mediation, without having to await this coffee meeting; f) is not made out, as no real mention of it was made by the claimant or her union representative at the time; the claimant was generally familiar with the school, and there would have been little point in it until an imminent return to work was in sight; it is a minor issue; g) is not made, the Tribunal also cannot see what the claimant means by this, and there was contact with Jill Rippon right through into January and February 2023; h) is made out, and is another very significant factor in the breakdown of trust and confidence. The respondent did not “discuss with the claimant in advance of her return to work” in 2022 what her role would be.

[72]The respondent argues , in the alternative, that if any of these matters are found potentially to amount to breach of the implied term, they were not actions , or omissions, without reasonable and proper cause. That argument overlaps somewhat with whether the alleged acts of omissions of the respondent were any form of breach, but is also highly pertinent to whether , whatever effect they had upon the claimant , the respondent nonetheless had reasonable and proper cause for acting as it did.

[73]The Tribunal cannot accept that the respondent had reasonable and proper cause for the two major and serious findings made above. In relation to the first, the failure to arrange mediation, whilst there was clearly reasonable and proper cause for not doing so in the period of the claimant’s maternity leave, that ceased once she was due to return after her second maternity leave. Indeed, that was when it became a more pressing requirement. The grievance process had not found in her favour, but had identified issues which required addressing, and recommended mediation between her and the SLT as a way forward. Martin Henderson himself in his letter of 24 June 2021 (at pages 271 to 273 of the bundle) recognised the need for a “swift determination” of the issues between the claimant and the SLT.

[74]The claimant’s subsequent absence on her next maternity leave before that process could be undertaken did not mean that it no longer needed to be undertaken, it merely postponed when it needed to happen. Had she not taken her second maternity leave , it would have happened when she was working in the next academic year, but it did not. That meant that it still had not been arranged before she was due again to return to work after a second period of maternity leave – the very same circumstances which had given rise to her grievance in first place.

[75]The mediation , therefore, and the other steps recommended in the outcome of the grievance should have been addressed in the period leading up to the claimant’s return to work in autumn 2022. The respondent knew that the claimant’s maternity leave was due to end on 3 November 2022 at the latest. She had been in contact with Jill Rippon in July 2022, and in the email she sent the claimant on 28 September 2022 it was confirmed that the claimant would be returning from maternity leave on 3 November 2022. No one in the SLT thought at that stage to look at implementing the recommendations of the grievance outcome.

[76]Added to that, once the claimant had returned to work, of course, she then was off work sick. The OH report of 2 December 2022 stated : ‘Her symptoms are unlikely to resolve in their entirety until workplace issues are resolved’ and advised ‘that a formal stress risk assessment is carried out with Mrs Parry, in order to address and attempt to resolve any ongoing issues locally.’ This report was discussed at the meeting on 15 December 2022. Again, the need to resolve workplace issues was identified, and their effect upon the claimant’s health and her continuing absence was referred to.

[77]This made , or should have made, resolution to those issues a priority, and a key to such resolution was the previously recommended mediation. The respondent did not, however, prioritise that, but set a timetable which put the coffee meeting first, and gave no indication whatsoever of when, assuming such a meeting could be arranged, mediation might follow.

[78]After the meeting on 15 December 2022 nothing happened until Jill Rippon’s email to the claimant of 18 January 2023 seeking to arrange the coffee meeting. There then ensued the debate as to whether that was to be with Martin Henderson or Jill Rippon, the claimant believing that it was with the latter and not the former. The upshot of this was that on 3 February 2023 the claimant sent an email to Jill Rippon making it clear that she did not consider it appropriate for her first meeting to be with Martin Henderson. She made the point that mediation with the SLT, which had previously recommended, had not taken place, and it made most sense to her for that to happen first. The response to that from Jill Rippon was on 8 February 2023. This is an important email , in which Jill Rippon says this: Have you heard from Dawn regarding the meet up? My understanding is that communication with me is via email only and that Martin would have to be included in meetings as Headteacher. Perhaps if you liaise with Dawn as Martin understood that Dawn was going to discuss the various options with you which included meeting informally for a coffee, mediation, etc which will hopefully ensure your return to school is successful.

[79]The Tribunal does not understand what Martin Henderson was doing. Mediation was recommended in summer of 2021. It remained a step that needed to be taken in 2022 , and had been discussed at the meeting on 15 December 2022. It was for the respondent to organise it. Quite what needed to be discussed further is unclear. The coffee meeting was not, or should not have been, any impediment to at least making arrangements for a mediation. If there remained any doubt about matters, the claimant’s email of 12 February 2023 made it clear that, whatever Dawn Taylor may tell her now, she was of the view that she did not want to meet with Martin Henderson. She complained about the lack of flexibility, and how disappointing she found this.

[80]The respondent, the Tribunal is quite satisfied , did nothing to progress mediation. It should have done so in , at the latest, October 2022, preferably before the claimant actually returned to work. She did not, of course, do so, and one can understand how in the period up until the OH report of 2 December 2022, or the meeting of 15 December 2022, the respondent could be forgiven for holding off implementing that long standing recommendation. After the 15 December 2022 meeting, however, when it was clear that the claimant was still agreeable to mediation, and indeed welcomed it, the respondent needed to get on with it, especially as the claimant’s continued sickness absence was inextricably linked to the workplace issues that needed to be resolved. The respondent, however, did nothing to progress it, or to reassure the claimant that it was doing so. Instead the coffee morning issue arose, and was allowed to delay the urgently required mediation. That did nothing to reassure the claimant, and gave her the understandable impression that her issues were not still not being addressed.

[81]All that, of course, is against the background of the circumstances of, and communications relating to, the claimant’s return to work in autumn 2022. The claimant’s complaint in this regard is that there was no discussion with her about what role she would be returning to. The respondent’s response to this is that there was, she was invited to raise any questions about this with the phase leaders. With respect, that is a specious defence. That is not ‘discussion with the claimant’ before proposing what her duties upon her return to work would be. She was told, in answer to her enquiring (i.e she had to ask , in the first email of 28 September 2022) what the position was. She was then told to raise any questions to the phase leaders. Again, that is not a discussion, because it is after the event that was to be discussed. The point made by Mr Lassey that the claimant cannot have been too concerned because she did not complain about this is a weak one. The onus was upon the respondent to have such discussions, particularly in the light of the history to the claimant’s previous return to work , the subsequent grievance, and the recommendations therefrom. The unilateral proposal for her to return to work for a second time with no prior discussion as to what she would be returning to was hardly likely to foster any improvement in the claimant’s trust and confidence in the SLT, indeed, quite the opposite.

[82]It is further to be noted that one of the recommendations of Faye Newton in the grievance outcome was : That communication, particularly in relation to part time working, is reviewed and suggest that agreement is sought with all parties on the best way forward for both the School and the employee. What happened in September 2022 in connection with the claimant’s proposed return to part time work was hardly consistent with that.

[83]This was, even making allowances for the doubtless very difficult job that Martin Henderson and his SLT had in timetabling class teaching in this large school with its many complex and competing staffing, all without reasonable and proper cause.

[84]The next question for the Tribunal is whether what it has found above is sufficiently serious to amount to a fundamental breach of the implied term of trust and confidence. It was. The Tribunal takes all the circumstances into account, and those include matters which, whilst not giving rise to claims as such, are the background to this claim of constructive dismissal. The relationship of trust and confidence between the claimant and the respondent was, the Tribunal considers, by the time of her return to work in 2022, in a fragile condition. That was in part recognised by the grievance outcome in its recommendation for mediation. It did not therefore take much to cause further damage to it in late 2022 and early 2023, and by it actions, and , in part inaction, the respondent, whilst not intending this consequence, did behave in a manner likely to seriously damage the already wounded relationship.

[85]The final issue raised by the respondent , in the alternative, is that the claimant is precluded from claiming that she was constructively dismissed because she delayed resigning for too long , and thereby affirmed the breach.

[86]There was, the Tribunal has found no single act which amounted to the fundamental breach of contract, it was cumulative. There has been no claim that there was any “last straw” , from which date the issue of affirmation would have to be considered. Indeed, there was no act that the Tribunal would find was a final straw. That is because the essence of the culmination of the fundamental breach was not an act, but a failure to act, i.e the failure to , at the very least, instigate a mediation. That is hard to put a date on, but , by analogy with the statutory provisions on when time begins to run in discrimination claims, the date of a failure to act is to be taken as the date by which the respondent ought reasonably to have done the act. In this case that is by , at the latest 15 February 2023, the date of the claimant’s resignation. Of course, the Tribunal has found that the respondent could, and should, have been seeking to arrange mediation rather sooner. That does not, however, mean that the fundamental breach occurred at that earlier stage. Whilst Mr Lassey’s argument would have considerable force if the breach found by the Tribunal had occurred as long ago as 2021, but the Tribunal has not so found. The breach was not cohate until early 2023, and it would be from that date that any issue of affirmation would have to be judged.

[87]The other argument raised is that the claimant resigned with notice, and thereby lost her right to claim constructive dismissal . This topic has recently been considered by the EAT in Kinch v Compassion In World Farming International

[2025] EAT 41

where the President Lord Fairlie observed in his judgement that the giving of notice is not fatal to a claim of constructive unfair dismissal is clear from Section 95(1)(c) of the Employment Rights Act, 1996 provides an express statutory exception to the common law principle by allowing termination of the contract by the employee on account of the employer’s material breach to be “with or without notice” (emphasis added). He added that in Western Excavating v. Sharp (at page 225E), Lord Denning MR explained that an earlier version of this statutory exception to the common law was intended to prevent a situation arising where an employee “who was considerate enough to give notice was worse off than one who left without notice.”

[88]At para. 27. Lord Fairlie said his: “Thus, as was noted by Simler J in Cockram v Air Products plc (at para. [23]), the effect of section 95(1)(c) is that where an employee would have been entitled summarily to terminate the contract by reason of the employer’s conduct, the mere fact of giving notice does not, of itself, amount to affirmation. An extended period of delay before giving notice may, in appropriate circumstances, be still taken to have affirmed the breach. Similarly, conduct during the notice period which is consistent only with an acceptance of the continued existence of a contract may be taken to have affirmed the contract. Post resignation affirmation may be express or implied from actings. Cases of implied post-resignation affirmation are likely to be rare because the employee will already have expressly communicated to the employer the reason for the resignation (Cockram at para. [24])” That was, of course, the case here. The claimant gave the notice that she considered, rightly, she was legally required to give. She did not return to work during the notice period, and had stated clearly why she had resigned. There was no affirmation on these facts.

[89]For completeness, although it is listed in the List of Issues, the respondent (sensibly, for such a thing is a rare beast) did not maintain its plea that any constructive dismissal was for a potentially fair reason.

[90]The claim of unfair constructive dismissal therefore succeeds, but all other claims are dismissed. Remedy.

[91]The claimant is entitled to a remedy, and has sought compensation only .The Tribunal will afford the parties a period in which to seek to agree remedy, or at least to seek to narrow the issues. By way of guidance for the unrepresented claimant, she should be aware of the following matters: a) The Tribunal cannot award injury to feelings for unfair dismissal; b) The assessment of the basic and compensatory awards is subject to caps – the former is calculated on the same basis (usually) as a statutory redundancy payment, and the latter is subject to a cap of (given the date of the dismissal) £105,709 or one year’s pay, which ever is the lower, that latter cap being an amount , not a period of time over which the compensation is awarded. In the claimant’s case, therefore, that cap will likely be, on a provisional view, £19,120.99; c) The cap applies to the totality of the award, after any uplifts, additional awards, aggravated damages or any other increases to , of decreases of, the compensatory award; d) Interest cannot be claimed on awards for unfair dismissal; e) There are likely to be other issues on remedy, such as for how much longer the claimant would have remained off work sick, when, if at all, she might have returned to work, and why she has not been able to return to work elsewhere since. The Tribunal notes too that in the original response (para. 49) the respondent raises the claimant’s failure to raise a further grievance in relation to the further matters that led to her resignation, which could lead to a reduction in the compensator award.

[92]The parties have been afforded a period of time to seek to resolve remedy, or, in default to agree as much as possible, and narrow the issues that the Tribunal will be called upon to decide. If necessary , the Tribunal will re-convene to decide remedy. Approved by: