L Jackson v M Beattie as Chairman of, and on behalf of, the Members of Bradshaw Conservative Club: 2402095/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2402095/2024

Between

L JacksonClaimant

M Beattie as Chairman of, and on behalf of, the Members of Bradshaw Conservative ClubRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Cline

Miss Romona Morgan (instructed by counsel) for claimant

Mrs Ambrat Singh (instructed by solicitor) for respondent

Date 13 October 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The Claimant’s claims for unfair dismissal and wrongful dismissal are not well-founded and are both dismissed.

REASONS

[1]By way of her ET1 claim form and particulars of claim received by the Tribunal on 4th April 2024, the Claimant, Ms Lesley Jackson, brings claims (both of which are denied by the Respondent) for unfair dismissal and wrongful dismissal. The matter was heard over 4 days and a reserved oral decision was given on 13th October 2025. Both parties were represented, by Miss Morgan for the Claimant and Mrs Singh for the Respondent; we thank them both for setting out their respective cases in a helpful and concise manner and assisting us in reaching our decision. We were provided with a hearing bundle running to 162 pages and any references to specific pages of that bundle herein will be by way of square brackets, for example [220] or [34-54]. We made it clear to the parties that it should not be assumed that we would be aware of, or would take into account, any document to which we were not referred during the course of the hearing. Case No: 2402095/2024

[2]We received witness statements from the Claimant and, on behalf of the Respondent, Manny Beattie, Mark Davis and Keith Howcroft. We refused the Respondent permission to rely on any evidence from Mr Howcroft because it had been served at a very late stage without good reason so we heard oral evidence from the Claimant, Mr Beattie and Mr Davis. There was some discussion at the start of the hearing about who the correct Respondent was but it was ultimately resolved on the basis that it is “Manfred Beattie as Chairman of, and on behalf of, the Members of Bradshaw Conservative Club”, which appeared to be an unincorporated association.

[3]Where material facts were in dispute and we were required to make findings, we did so on the balance of probabilities and have set out, to the extent we consider to be required, how we came to those findings. We were conscious throughout of the inevitable frailties of human memory and that we were dealing with matters which took place several years ago which we had to examine in some detail in order to deal justly with the case; however, for the reasons set out, we recognised that questions of dishonesty did arise and reminded ourselves that the standard of proof remained the balance of probabilities nonetheless. When deciding which findings of fact we were required to make, we had regard to the list of issues drafted by Mrs Singh at our request and agreed by Miss Morgan. Chronology

[4]The Claimant worked for the Respondent from 2017 until December 2023, when she was summarily dismissed for gross misconduct, in various roles relating to their bar. There appear to have been no significant issues between the Claimant and the Respondent prior to mid-2023. As with many similar bodies, the Respondent was a largely voluntary organisation and had approximately 500 members at the relevant time. It operated as a member-based social organisation with a committee-led governance structure and the committee was responsible for overseeing operations, including staffing, financial management and strategic decisions. There was a function room and bar facilities and its activities were supported by a team of employees, including bar staff, one of whom was the Claimant. The committee was composed of elected members and decisions were made Case No: 2402095/2024 collectively, often through formal meetings. Minutes from these meetings were generally recorded and retained although, as set out below, this was not universally the case. We were told by the Respondent’s witnesses that the committee had final authority over employment matters, including the creation and amendment of staff contracts and decisions regarding disciplinary action, although, again, the specifics of this were not always clear during the events we were considering.

[5]There was some restructuring of staff arrangements in 2018 and 2019, largely in response to an increasingly difficult financial situation. In mid-2023, Mark Davis was briefly the chairman and then took over as secretary and there appear to have been discussions which led to Mr Davis noting that the Claimant was regularly working more than the 35 hours per week which he thought she had been contracted to work. In his statement, Mr Davis says that, on 3rd October 2023, he spoke to both John Heald (the president of the Association) and Keith Howcroft (the secretary between April 2018 and June 2023) to ask if they recalled the Claimant ever being told she can work more than 35 hours per week and, Mr Davis says, they both said that they could not recall her contractual terms ever being revised upwards from 35 hours. Furthermore, although what purports to be the minutes of a committee meeting on 2nd October [78] is actually what appears to be the agenda, Mr Davis says at paragraph 7 of his statement that, at that meeting, the Claimant said that she was contracted to work 45 hours per week. This is also noted in Mr Davis’ report into the uncertainty regarding the Claimant’s working hours [87], noting that it was not queried by Mr Davis at that stage as he had not yet had time to get up to speed on everything since becoming secretary. This is not mentioned by the Claimant in her statement and, when asked about it in cross-examination, she said that she could not recall either being at that meeting or saying that she worked 45 hours per week, but accepted that it was possible that she did. In these circumstances, we found on the balance of probabilities that this was said by the Claimant at the meeting but, in reality, it serves more as background to what came later rather than as an important or central issue.

[6]According to Mr Davis’ report [87], on 12th October 2023 he spoke to the Claimant and told her that John Fellowes (a past chairman) had told him Case No: 2402095/2024 that, as far as he could recall, she worked 42 hours but that he (Mr Davis) had been given a copy of a contract [43-45] by Mr Howcroft for 35 hours which is signed by the Claimant and dated 5th October 2018 but is neither signed nor dated on behalf of the Respondent. It seemed to be uncontroversial between the parties that, as noted in the investigation report [87], the Claimant told Mr Davis on 12th October that she would check at home for a copy of the contract for 45 hours, which she said had been revised by Mr Howcroft.

[7]There was a committee meeting on 18th October 2023 and the minutes [144A] note that the Claimant’s duties and responsibilities were to be reduced to enable her to work “only her contracted 35 hours per week”. Mr Davis’ evidence was that this had been discussed at the meeting in light of his concerns about the discrepancies in what different people, including the Claimant, were saying about her contracted hours. Again, this was not covered in the Claimant’s statement and, when asked about it in cross-examination, she said that she could not recall if she was at that meeting (although suggested she would have been asked to leave if her contract was being discussed) and accepted that she could therefore not disagree with what Mr Davis said about the meeting.

[8]The next day, 19th October 2023, Mr Davis told the Claimant that the meeting had agreed that she was contracted to work 35 hours; she replied that she had a copy of her 45-hour contract at home and would retrieve it from her loft. When asked in cross-examination why she was unable to simply provide a copy of the 45-hour contract at that point, the Claimant said that she had been very busy at work and was experiencing personal issues at the time so she was unable to get it immediately; she also said that it was still in one of several boxes after moving house at the start of 2020 so she had to look through them all to find it. The same day (19th October), the Claimant emailed Mr Davis [79] asking for a copy of the contract “that was in Keith’s stuff”, which was taken to be referring to the office at the Respondent’s premises.

[9]Two days later, on 21st October, Mr Davis sent the Claimant an email [79] attaching a scanned copy of the contract he said he had found in the office. A copy of this contract was in the bundle [43-45] and has been noted above Case No: 2402095/2024 already; it has the Claimant’s name typed at the top and refers to her as the bar supervisor, contracted to work 35 hours per week. The contract is not signed or dated on behalf of the Respondent but is signed by the Claimant and dated 5th September 2018. Mr Davis’ evidence was that, having received that email, the Claimant telephoned him to say that there was another contract in the office which had been “done” by Keith Howcroft; this conversation is not recalled in the Claimant’s statement and, during her oral evidence, she said that she had a lot going on at that time and could not remember if the conversation happened or not. We found on the basis of this evidence that it did happen as set out by Mr Davis.

[10]Following that conversation, Mr Davis went to look in the office again and says that he found a contract [46-48]. This contract does not have the Claimant’s name in its body anywhere and has blank spaces where the job role and hourly rate of pay should be filled in. It refers to 45 hours per week and this is highlighted in colour by what looks to be a blue highlighter pen. It is not signed or dated on behalf of the Respondent. It is signed by the Claimant but not dated and there is one small almost horizontal line immediately to the right of her signature, which we found to be important for reasons to be set out below. In his statement (and also during his oral evidence), Mr Davis noted these features and also that that the contract he found in the office had a label attached at the top left corner saying “manager’s contract” and that, when he had spoken to Mr Howcroft about the 45-hour contract, Mr Howcroft had told him that he had no recollection of issuing a 45-hour contract to the Clamant and only ever for 35 hours.

[11]It seems to be at this point that Mr Davis became concerned about the various discrepancies he had noticed and, on 23rd October, he checked the Respondent’s computer system to see if there was any evidence of blank contracts being downloaded or any suggestion of documents being tampered with. He found no such evidence, nor of any editable documents which seemed to him could have been edited in a relevant manner. He also found various printed documents of a similar nature to the contract in question but, he said, none which were an exact match.

[12]Against this background, Mr Davis spoke to the Claimant and she said that the contract had been issued in approximately October 2019, when Andrea Case No: 2402095/2024 Beattie (a previous employee in the bar) had said that she was not going to return from maternity leave. Mr Davis then spoke to Mr Howcroft, who said in an email on 24th October [80] that his recollection was that Andrea Beattie had given notice in May 2018 and not in 2019 and that, as a consequence, the Claimant had been appointed as bar supervisor on a 35-hour contract (having been the acting bar manager whilst Andrea was away on maternity leave). Mr Davis also checked through the minutes of past meetings from August 2018 onwards to see if there was any mention of the Claimant’s hours being increased from 35 to 45 and he found no such reference, although he did find references to her hourly rate of pay being increased. Having discussed the matter further with other committee members, on 27th October Mr Davis gave the Claimant a letter (which was not in the bundle but was not controversial between the parties) asking her to produce, by 3rd November, the copy of the contract which she said she had at home so that the uncertainty can be resolved.

[13]On 2nd November 2023, the Claimant attended the office with an envelope and handed over a version of the contract [49-50] which she claimed was the one she had stored at home. This version is incomplete, most notably missing one page, and contains both typed and handwritten elements. It is not signed on behalf of the Respondent. The Claimant’s name, role of bar manager and hourly rate of £11.50 are written by hand. The weekly hours of 45 per week are typed and are highlighted but that highlighting appears to be a copy of original highlighting as it is dark and not in colour; the same is the case for the label in the top-left corner saying “Manager’s Contract”, which seems to be a copy. The contract is signed but not dated by the Claimant and there are two horizontal lines, one below the other, to the immediate right of her signature. The Claimant’s witness statement does not mention this office visit, which she described as an oversight when asked why it in cross-examination. The Respondent contended that this contract must have been fabricated and it was suggested (although this was not specifically put to the Claimant in cross-examination) that she may have done this during this visit to the office by copying a blank version she had found there. The Claimant maintained that she was simply submitting a copy of a genuine document she had been given in 2019. Case No: 2402095/2024

[14]On 4th November 2023, Mr Davis contacted Mr Howcroft to ask whether the handwriting on the contract was his; Mr Howcroft said that it was not. The Claimant had previously implied that Mr Howcroft had prepared the contract but later clarified this by saying that she had filled in the details herself after being given a blank copy, but maintained that it was based on a genuine document provided to her.

[15]On 9th November, the Claimant attended a formal investigation meeting chaired by Mr Davis (the minutes of which are at [84-86]). During the meeting, the Claimant agreed that she had filled in the contract herself by hand but maintained that she had been given the original document by Mr Howcroft. She was not asked when she had filled it in or who had highlighted the hours and she did not volunteer any further details about how that had happened and when. The Respondent argued that Ms Jackson’s admission supports a finding of fabrication but the Claimant maintained that she had been completing a legitimate document, which was common practice at the Club.

[16]The Committee was provided with a summary of what had happened thus far [99] and, at a meeting on 16th November 2023, voted by a majority that, if no genuine contradictory evidence or reasonable explanation is provided by the Claimant during the discplinary process that had now been commenced, she was to be summarily dismissed on the basis that she has fabricated the 45-hour contract, which would constitute an act of gross misconduct. There are no minutes of this meeting but this is the account given by both Mr Beattie and Mr Davis and was not challenged to any significant degree on behalf of the Claimant during the course of the hearing.

[17]By way of a letter dated 25th November 2023 [103], the Claimant was invited to attend a discplinary hearing on 28th November in relation to allegations of attempting to mislead the Respondent’s management team and falsifying contractual paperwork. It was noted that this was considered to be gross misconduct and that a finding may lead to dismissal, with the collated evidence being attached. The Claimant attended the meeting, which was chaired by Mr Davis, and the minutes are at [114-116]; she was accompanied at the meeting by a David Robson. The details will not be set Case No: 2402095/2024 out here but, in effect, the Claimant maintained that the previous Committee had issued her with a 45-hour contract but did not provide any further detail and suggested that this contract had not been recorded or signed due to disruptions experienced by the previous committee.

[18]It was unfortunately unclear precisely what happened next in respect of any further reference to the Committee to consider a final decision. We were provided with additional minutes of the Committee meeting which took place on 28th November; this was a very brief document and the only reference to this issue was that there was an update given following the hearing and that David Blakey questioned whether the Committee felt there is sufficient evidence to warrant disciplinary action, which was said to be in the best interests of the Club, and that debate ensured regarding the evidence. Most notably, it did not say if a further vote was taken on dismissal or, if so, what the outcome was.

[19]The Claimant was sent a letter dated 6th December 2023 [117-118] setting out the reasons for the Respondent’s finding that she had committed an act of gross misconduct and would be summarily dismissed as a result. Although the letter does not say specifically that the finding was that the Claimant had falsified her contract, this is set out as the allegation and it is said that she had been unable to provide a satisfactory explanation in the context of the discrepancies noted in the paperwork and there being nobody on the Committee who could recall agreeing to a 45-hour contract.

[20]The Claimant appealed against her dismissal by way of a letter dated 9th December 2023 [119], saying that she did not agree with the outcome, asserting that there had not been any real evidence, that the penalty was too harsh in the circumstances (including her length of service), that there had not been a vote to dismiss her and that not all the relevant Committee members had been questioned.

[21]The appeal hearing took place on 20th December 2023, the minutes of which are at [120-121]. It was chaired by Mr Beattie and the Claimant was supported by a colleague. The appeal was not upheld and the Claimant was informed of the outcome by way of a letter dated 6th January 2024 [122-126], the contents of which we considered carefully. Case No: 2402095/2024 Relevant Law: Unfair Dismissal and Wrongful Dismissal

[22]A brief summary of the applicable legal principles which we kept in mind when considering these issues is appropriate at this point. Unfair Dismissal

[23]Section 94 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”) confers on the Claimant the right not to be unfairly dismissed. Enforcement of the right is by way of complaint to the Tribunal under section 111. The Claimant must show that she was dismissed by the Respondent under section 95, but, as outlined above, in this case the Respondent does not dispute that the Claimant was dismissed within the framework of section 95(1)(a) of the ERA.

[24]Section 98 of the ERA deals with the fairness of dismissals. There are two stages within Section 98. First, the Respondent must show that it had a potentially fair reason for the dismissal within Section 98(2). Second, if the Respondent shows that it had a potentially fair reason, the Tribunal must consider, without there being any burden of proof on either party, whether the Respondent acted fairly or unfairly in dismissing for that reason. In this case it is not in dispute that the Respondent dismissed the Claimant because it believed she was guilty of misconduct. Misconduct is a potentially fair reason for dismissal under section 98(2). The Respondent has therefore satisfied the requirements of section 98(2).

[25]Section 98(4) then deals with fairness generally and provides that the determination of the question whether the dismissal was fair or unfair, having regard to the reason shown by the Respondent, shall depend on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the Respondent’s undertaking) the Respondent acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the Claimant; and this shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case.

[26]In misconduct dismissals, there is well-established guidance for the Tribunal on fairness pursuant to Section 98(4) in the decisions in British Home Stores Case No: 2402095/2024 Ltd v Burchell

1978 IRLR 379

and Post Office v Foley

2000 IRLR 827

. The Tribunal must decide whether the Respondent had a genuine belief in the Claimant’s guilt. Then the Tribunal must decide whether the employer held such genuine belief on reasonable grounds and after carrying out a reasonable investigation. In all aspects of the case, including the investigation, the grounds for belief, the penalty imposed, and the procedure followed, in deciding whether the Respondent acted reasonably or unreasonably pursuant to Section 98(4), the Tribunal must decide whether the employer acted within the band or range of reasonable responses open to an employer in the circumstances. We reminded ourselves that it is immaterial how this Tribunal would have handled the events or what decision it would have made, and that the Tribunal must not substitute its view for that of the reasonable employer (Iceland Frozen Foods Limited v Jones

1982 IRLR 439

, Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Limited v Hitt

2003 IRLR 23

and London Ambulance Service NHS Trust v Small

2009 IRLR 563

). Wrongful Dismissal

[27]The Claimant was dismissed without notice and brings a breach of contract claim in respect of her entitlement to this notice. The Respondent says that it was entitled to dismiss her without notice as a result of her gross misconduct. In contrast to the position where unfair dismissal is being considered, here we must decide on the evidence before us if the Claimant had in fact acted in such a way that she breached her contract of employment such that she was in repudiatory breach of its basic terms, thereby entitling the employer to terminate her employment without notice. Although the terms “misconduct” and “gross misconduct” are used very frequently in this context (and have indeed come to be recognised as terms of art at common law), we did not consider ourselves bound to analyse matters within this specific framework and the basic question we asked ourselves was whether or not we considered the Claimant’s conduct to justify summary dismissal in all the circumstances. Analysis and Findings Case No: 2402095/2024

[28]There were a number of criticisms made on behalf of the Claimant of the investigation and discplinary process and they were helpfully summarised by Ms Morgan in her written and closing submissions. We considered each area of criticism and came to the findings set out below.

[29]First, it was argued that the process lacked independence. The same individual, Mr Davis, raised the concerns, conducted the investigation, and chaired the disciplinary hearing. It was asserted that the Committee voted to dismiss the Claimant on 16th November 2023, before the disciplinary hearing took place, suggesting that the outcome was predetermined.

[30]We reminded ourselves that we must take into consideration the nature and size of the Respondent when assessing the reasonableness of the process and also kept in mind that we cannot expect perfection, only reasonableness. This was a small organisation run by a voluntary committee; as such, we did not consider it to be unusual or fundamentally inappropriate in itself that Mr Davis, given his position at the relevant time, undertook these roles. We were not persuaded on the basis of the evidence we heard that he had done anything other than act in good faith by raising the issue with the Claimant and giving her an opportunity to explain the position before investigating his concerns. The report set out at [87-97] and [109-110] was, in our view, a good illustration of the care with which Mr Davis went about this task as it provided a detailed factual timeline with a summary of all the relevant information he had collated, as well as his thoughts and comments thereon.

[31]In respect of the vote to dismiss the Claimant, as noted above, the vote on 16th November was to dismiss her unless any further evidence or explanation came to light during the discplinary hearing. This was presented by the Respondent as an appropriate delegation of a decision by the Committee, which was ultimately responsible for such matters. We accepted this as a reasonable process given that it would be unfeasible for the whole of the Committee to conduct the discplinary process. We were troubled by the paucity of information in the minutes of the meeting on 28th November and considered this to reflect what was a pattern of record-keeping that did leave a lot to be desired in some respects; however, given that, as we saw it, there had been a vote to delegate the decision to Mr Case No: 2402095/2024 Davis on the basis of his findings and there had been, at the very least, a discussion about the evidence at the meeting on 28th November, we did not consider that the overall fairness of the procedure could be impugned. On this basis, we also rejected the assertion that the vote on 16th November was a pre-judged decision to dismiss the Claimant as it was expressly subject to any further findings to be made in due course.

[32]Second, it was argued on the Claimant’s behalf that the Respondent had failed to investigate conflicting evidence. Again, we reminded ourselves of the requirement for reasonableness and not perfection. It can almost always be said that more people could have been questioned in any investigation process but, in this case, we were satisfied that the relevant people had been consulted. There were no minutes suggesting that the Claimant had been given increased hours so Mr Davis asked those who appear to have been the most active Committee members if they recalled anything to the contrary; and they did not. He even went to the extent of getting a handwriting sample from Mr Howcroft. If we were to find that there was unfairness in the context of a failure to question more people, we would have to be satisfied that there was a real likelihood that this may give rise to a different outcome and, on the evidence we heard, were not satisfied of this. We also note the detail in Mr Davis’ report and his witness statement in respect of how he balanced the conflicting evidence before him and were satisfied that he acted reasonably and fairly when doing this.

[33]Third, it was argued on the Claimant’s behalf that the Respondent had assumed that the contract had been highlighted by the Claimant without investigating this further. We rejected this argument because, whilst there was clearly an issue to be considered, during the investigation and discplinary process the Claimant had given very little detail at all about how she came to have the putative contract; it was in fact during her evidence before the Tribunal that, apparently for the first time, the Claimant gave a detailed account about to whom she spoke, which paperwork was handed to whom and when it was signed. Mr Davis cannot, in our view, be criticised for failing to take this into account when the Claimant did not mention it when given at least two opportunities to explain it. Case No: 2402095/2024

[34]Fourth, it was argued that the Respondent failed to investigate why the contracts were unsigned on their part and whether the 2019 version was a legitimate older version of a template contract. We were certainly troubled by the absence of a signature on the Respondent’s behalf but we noted that this applied to all the other versions of the contracts before us, none of which the Claimant alleged was incorrect save for the one in dispute. It was, without doubt, extremely poor practice for an employee or agent of the Respondent not to have signed these contracts but, given that it seemed to reflect repeated poor practice, and given that the Claimant did not raise issue with any of the other unsigned contracts, we found that it did not assist us in determining the authenticity of the 45-hour contract which was in dispute. In respect of the template issue, we were satisfied that Mr Davis had looked into this issue and had found no information that assisted one way or the other; there was no direct challenge to this and no alternative evidential basis to consider.

[35]Fifth, it was argued that the Claimant was allowed to carry on with tasks involving cash, keys and stock and was not suspended, which it was said suggested the Respondent did not have a genuine belief that she had been dishonest in respect of her contract. We rejected this assertion for three reasons. First, there is no blanket principle that somebody is presumed to merit suspension just because an allegation of dishonesty has been made against them. Second, the Respondent is a small organisation and they would have needed to keep the bar staffed, which was the Claimant’s job. Third, we considered there to be a difference between handling cash and keys, which we were not told had ever been a concern in respect of the Claimant, and the very narrow issue relating to the veracity of her purported employment contract.

[36]Sixth, we were asked to find that the appeal process was inadequate because it was chaired by the same person who took notes during the investigation and because the contracts and overall evidence were not reviewed directly. In respect of the first point, we did not consider that it would be reasonable to expect there to be someone appointed to deal with the appeal who had no involvement whatsoever with the Claimant’s case prior to that appeal given the small pool of appropriately qualified people Case No: 2402095/2024 that the Respondent had available; in the absence of any positive evidence that Mr Beattie had acted in a biased manner, we did not find that his relatively minor involvement prior to the appeal cast any significant doubt on the fairness of the process. Second, there is no blanket requirement for an appeal to reconsider all of the evidence from scratch and we were satisfied from the contents of the appeal outcome letter that Mr Beattie had considered all the issues raised by the Claimant in a satisfactory manner.

[37]Seventh, the delay informing the police was suggested to be illustrative of the unfairness of the Respondent’s approach. We were unimpressed by this argument given that, as we were told during the oral evidence, there would inevitably have been discussions amongst the Committee about whether or not to involve the police at all. We did not find that there was anything to be made of the time gap between the Respondent’s internal process and contacting the police.

[38]Finally, the Claimant complained that there had been a failure to try and resolve the matter through negotiation or, indeed, by applying any lesser sanction than dismissal. We found that, given the seriousness of the act which she was found to have committed, it was entirely within the band of reasonable responses for the Respondent to have considered it sufficiently serious that only dismissal was the appropriate outcome. We were also satisfied on the evidence before us that lesser sanctions were considered before the final decision was made.

[39]Whilst considering the overall question of whether or not the finding of gross misconduct was one which was reasonably open to the Respondent, we also considered our own findings on the matter in respect of the claim for wrongful dismissal. These are, of course, two distinct claims with different legal tests to be applied. However, we were considering the same evidence and information so there was bound to be an overlap in that respect.

[40]When considering if we were satisfied that the Claimant had, in effect, fabricated the 45-hour contract, we took into account the fact that she had not given any detailed account of how it had come into existence during the investigation, the discplinary hearing, the appeal hearing or in her witness Case No: 2402095/2024 statement for these proceedings. However, when cross-examined, she provided a detailed account, summarised above, of how she had a meeting and which documents she was given, which she signed and how and which she filled in afterwards. Her explanation of why there was a single horizontal line next to her signature on the Respondent’s copy but two lines on her own copy was that she needed to demarcate which was which. Given that she had described signing them both at the same time and handing one back whilst keeping the other, we did not find this to be credible, especially given that this account had never been given before the moment it was heard before us.

[41]During our deliberations, we studied the two versions of the contracts very carefully and we put them side by side on a computer screen. The signatures were, we found, identical. Each and every pen stroke was in the same position on both copies and we considered it to be fanciful that these were both handwritten by the Claimant, leaving us, in our view, with no realistic option but to find that one must be a copy of the other. We were fortified in this finding by the fact that the coloured highlighting in the Respondent’s copy was replaced by grey in the Claimant’s copy and that the raised label in the top left corner of the Respondent’s copy was replaced by a flat copy in the Claimant’s version. All of this pointed to the Claimant’s copy being a photocopy of the Respondent’s version, which was effectively the polar opposite of the Claimant’s account that she had signed both at the same time and handed one back for the Respondent.

[42]It was suggested by Mrs Singh in submissions that the Claimant had copied a contract in the office when she went in with an envelope on 2nd November. We were frankly unimpressed that such an important and serious allegation had not been put specifically to the Claimant in cross-examination but, nonetheless, we were satisfied that it did not prejudice the Claimant’s position in any way as she would clearly have rejected the allegation given the account she was giving and that would not have taken the matter any further. On the balance of probabilities, this is what we found that the Claimant did. She had been unable to provide a copy of the contract before the meeting at the office despite numerous requests and the physical evidence points to her version being a photocopy and not an original. The Case No: 2402095/2024 fact that some aspects were filled in by hand was, in our view, indicative of the poor attention to important paperwork on the Respondent’s part which was illustrated by there being no signatures on any of the contracts we saw. However, it was also, in our view, consistent with the Claimant being able to fabricate the contract in the way we found her to have done.

[43]We therefore found on the balance of probabilities that the Claimant did fabricate the 45-hour written contract. Whether she did this in haste after saying that she had a copy and could not find it, or whether she did it with dishonest intent throughout, is unclear to us on the evidence but we did not consider it necessary to make a finding on this question in order to resolve the matter. The very fact that she did this was, in our view, more than sufficient to warrant a finding of fundamental breach of the relationship of trust and confidence between her and her employer such that dismissal was an appropriate outcome. The claim for wrongful dismissal therefore fails.

[44]As already set out above, we found that, whilst not perfect, the process leading to the Claimant’s dismissal was fair and reasonable in all the circumstances, keeping in mind, as we did, the relevant legal test as also set out in the agreed list of issues. In addition, the fact that we were satisfied on the evidence before us that the Claimant had committed an act of gross misconduct supported the assertion that the Respondent was acting within the range of reasonable responses to make the same finding on the same evidence. The claim for unfair dismissal is therefore also dismissed.