Ms S Sanders v The Chief Constable of Lancashire Constabulary: 2401657/2022
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 2401657/2022
Between
Ms S SandersClaimantThe Chief Constable of Lancashire ConstabularyRespondent
Before
Employment Judge Leach, Mr P Dobson; Ms J Williamson.Mr D Leach (instructed by Counsel) for claimantMr D Tinkler (instructed by Counsel) for respondentDate 13 March 2025
JUDGMENT
The unanimous decision of the Tribunal is that the claimant was not subjected to detriments on the grounds that he had made protected disclosures. His complaints made under section 47B Employment Rights Act 1996 do not succeed and the claim is dismissed.
REASONS
[1]The claimant was until recently a police inspector in the service of the respondent.[2]The claimant complains that he was subjected to detriments on the grounds that he made protected disclosures.[3]The individual who he claims subjected him to detriments was another police officer; a sergeant within the claimant’s line of command. We refer to this individual as X. The claimant says he made various protected disclosures about X to senior officers and to members of the respondent’s Professional Services Department (PSD) and as a result, X subjected the claimant to detriments. B. The Issues (liability only).[4]The issues were identified in a preliminary hearing that took place on 12 June 2023. Prior to that hearing there were 3 claimants; by the time of that hearing, just the claimant remained. Through withdrawal of other claims and through case management, the number of alleged protected disclosures and alleged detriments reduced. There was a further reduction made at the start of this hearing.[5]We set out below the issues and remaining protected acts and detriments. The parties have continued to refer to the numbering initially given to the alleged protected disclosures and detriments and we have decided not to depart from this. The alleged protected disclosures are set out in the Appendix to this Judgment. Time limits1.1 Given the date the claim form was presented and the effect of early conciliation, any complaint about something that happened before 3 November 2021 may not have been brought in time.1.2 Was the whistleblowing complaint made within the time limit in section 48 of the Employment Rights Act 1996? The Tribunal will decide:1.2.1 Was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (allowing for any early conciliation extension) of the act complained of?1.2.2 If not, was there a series of similar acts or failures and was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (allowing for any early conciliation extension) of the last one?1.2.3 If not, was it reasonably practicable for the claim to be made to the Tribunal within the time limit?1.2.4 If it was not reasonably practicable for the claim to be made to the Tribunal within the time limit, was it made within such further period as the Tribunal considers reasonable? Protected disclosures2.1 Did the claimant make one or more qualifying disclosures as defined in section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996? The Tribunal will decide:2.1.1 What did the claimant say or write? When? To whom? The claimant says he made disclosures of information and on the occasions set out in the Appendix document.2.1.2 Did he disclose information?2.1.3 Did he believe the disclosure of information was made in the public interest?2.1.4 Was that belief reasonable?2.1.5 Did he believe it tended to show that:2.1.5.1 a criminal offence had been, was being or was likely to be committed;2.1.5.2 a person had failed, was failing or was likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation;2.1.5.3 a miscarriage of justice had occurred, was occurring or was likely to occur;2.1.5.4 the health or safety of any individual had been, was being or was likely to be endangered;2.1.5.5 the environment had been, was being or was likely to be damaged;2.1.5.6 information tending to show any of these things had been, was being or was likely to be deliberately concealed.2.1.6 Was that belief reasonable?2.2 If the claimant made a qualifying disclosure, it was a protected disclosure because it was made to the claimant’s employer. 3. Detriment (Employment Rights Act 1996 section 48)3.1 What are the facts in relation to the following alleged acts or deliberate failures to act by the respondent? 3.1.1 that X submitted a “whistleblowing complaint”/grievance on 10 March 2021. That grievance implicated the claimant in alleged discrimination surrounding the misconduct matters pursued against X. Pursuant to that grievance, X produced a “structured statement” for use by (Superintendent Karen Edwards) in interviewing the claimant on 13 August 2021 (referred to by the parties as D7). 3.1.3 that X sent emails on 1 February 2022 to “all staff” making allegations of criminal offences and corruption by the claimant? (referred to by the parties as D8)3.2 Did the claimant reasonably see that act or deliberate failure to act as subjecting him to a detriment?3.3 If so, was it done on the ground that he made a protected disclosure? C. This hearing[6]This 5-day hearing was listed to determine liability only. On the afternoon of day one and on day 2, we heard evidence from the claimant.[7]Superintendent Sally Riley (SR) gave evidence on the afternoon of day 2. SR was, at relevant times, the officer to whom the claimant reported.[8]On day 3, we heard from Detective Superintendent Jonathan Clegg (JC); Faye Forshaw (FF) and Temporary Detective Inspector Joanne Duncan (JD).[9]JC was at relevant times, a senior officer within the respondent’s PSD and the officer known as the “Appropriate Authority” (AA).[10]FF was at relevant times a civilian member of staff employed by the respondent in the role of Police Investigation Officer within the PSD.[11]JD was also based within the PSD.[12]We did not hear from X. We say more about this in our conclusions below.[13]We decided not to name X in this judgment. We discussed this with the parties during the hearing. The claimant makes serious allegations against X including ones of sexual misconduct. X has not been called to give evidence, He has been unable to defend his position and may not be aware of these proceedings. We learned that X has longstanding mental health issues and, in 2022, he retired from service with the respondent on grounds of mental ill health.[14]We considered X’s right to privacy and an appropriate balance between that right and the principle of open justice. It was too late by that stage to require anonymisation in all documents before the Tribunal. We decided that a limited restricting reporting order and anonymising X in this judgment, struck the right balance. Open justice does not require us to name X.[15]The respondent agreed this approach and the claimant raised no objection. Neither party applied for additional or alternative privacy orders. D. Findings of Fact The claimant.[16]The claimant resigned from service with the respondent in December 2023 after serving 30 years as a police officer.[17]At all relevant times the claimant served at the rank of inspector. For much of his career the claimant was based in the Blackpool and Fylde area. In December 2019 he was transferred at short notice to the post of response inspector for the areas of Fleetwood, Lancaster and Morecambe. The officer who had held that position prior to the claimant’s transfer was on long term sickness absence.[18]Amongst those officers reporting into him were 4 sergeants. One of these was X, whose role based him at Fleetwood police station.[19]The claimant encountered significant difficulties in trying to manage X. He was not the first senior officer to have had difficulties with X. The claimant’s evidence ( which was not challenged) was that the long-term absence of the claimant’s predecessor was caused or at least closely linked to X’s behaviour.[20]We heard evidence about X which included allegations of misconduct (including criminal activities) that the claimant made. It is not our role to make any decisions about whether X did any of those things.[21]We set out below our findings of facts relevant to the various protected disclosures that claimant claims to have made.[22]On 10 November 2020, the claimant met with 2 senior officers assigned to the respondent’s Professional Standards Department (PSD) to discuss X’s conduct. The PSD officers were Detective Inspector O’Neil and Chief Inspector Clegg. The main reason for the meeting was to discuss X’s behaviour around police attendance at Remembrance Sunday events and the claimant’s view that X had disobeyed instructions about how these should be policed. Those instructions had been issued by (then) Chief Inspector Sally Riley (SR). At that time the country was in lockdown and restrictions concerning group meetings applied.[23]The discussion between the 3 officers was wider though. For example, an email from SR to PSD dated 9 November 2020 noted that the Remembrance Sunday issue was part of “a pattern of misconduct.” (page 312).[24]By this stage the claimant had managed X for almost a year and had growing concerns about him. Several months earlier, he had met the response inspector who the claimant had taken over from (Inspector Cara Leadbetter (CL)) and she told the claimant that her illness had been brought on by X’s bullying behaviour. She also told the claimant about an assault that she said X had carried out on a member of the public and which led to a complaint from that person (who we refer to as the victim). CL considered that assault may have been illegal (in other words, beyond the use of reasonable force by a police officer in the conduct of his duties) and although 2 of the officers working with X at the time of the assault had given accounts that supported him, a probationary officer’s account had supported the victim’s complaint, as had a third-party witness. CL provided the claimant with a file of documents that had been submitted to the PSD at the time. (We refer to this issue as the Assault Issue). The claimant’s concerns at this time included ones that X was overbearing and a bully and this in turn led him to be concerned that junior officers working under X may have lied about the assault in order to protect him. In other words, he understood the concerns that CL was expressing.[25]By November 2020 the claimant had also witnessed at first hand, some behaviours by X that he considered to be unacceptable and unprofessional. Some of the behaviours led the claimant to be concerned that X was engaged in more serious or sinister activities than a tardy approach to his duties. For example, X would attend late for a shift or be absent from a shift for a period of time. The claimant’s concerns went beyond concerns about X’s timekeeping. The claimant was concerned that X was, when on duty, meeting with a woman for sex; as well as concerns that he may be taking illegal drugs.[26]Some of these wider concerns were raised in the meeting on 10 November 2020. The claimant was raising his suspicions because he wanted PSD to conduct an investigation into X’s activities.[27]We need to make a finding as to what information the claimant provided at this meeting. Unfortunately there are no notes of the meeting. There is a contemporaneous list (compiled by SR just before the meeting) of potential topics for the meeting:• Below use of force complaint• The Remembrance event issue• The apparently deliberate non-clocking of certain DMS duties over a period of months meaning he didn't work 2 hours most early shifts, which Marie Haworth passed to me;• Concerns from [the claimant] about extended periods of time within shifts for which X is unaccountable and is thought to be at a certain colleague's home address (this has only recently been identified and not yet been shared beyond the recipients of this email);• X's handling of the complaint (IOPC overturned X's ruling of nothing being substantiated - are there integrity issues around X brushing evidence under the carpet or was it an honestly managed enquiry?)• Issue around DI Finch-Hall being spoken to very rudely and aggressively by X some time back, which might need a revisit. The topics in the final 2 bullet points are not relevant to any of the issues we need to consider although indicate long standing concerns about X’s behaviour.[28]We have heard from 2 of the 3 attendees at the meeting, being JC and the claimant. The third attendee was Inspector O’Neill, another officer with PSD. As for what information the claimant provided in this meeting:-a. He discussed with the other 2 attendees an issue that occurred on Remembrance Sunday (the “Remembrance Sunday” issue) that SR had informed them about. As part of that discussion the claimant referred to information that had been provided by SR as well as his own observations. He did this because he was the operational officer in attendance at the meeting and therefore the person who was to relay and reinforce the information already provided by SR. We are satisfied that he did this and when doing so regarded X’s behaviour on Remembrance Sunday as a serious concern. The claimant is an experienced police officer who (then and now) understands the importance (and legal requirement) for officers to abide by lawful orders. As an experienced officer and a manager of other police officers, we are satisfied that the claimant was aware of the professional standards binding police officers. We note that JC’s account of this meeting in his statement makes no reference to this topic being discussed. We find that it was discussed; it was the main reason why SR called for the meeting.b. The Assault Issue was discussed. The claimant was part of a discussion about the concern that SR had expressed in her email just before the meeting, that others in the team may have provided untruthful statements in support of X’s version of events. That concern was also raised with the claimant some months previously (June 2020) by CL. Effectively the claimant was at that meeting repeating concerns about the Assault Issue that had already been raised by others. By this stage 3 senior officers (including the claimant) had voiced their concerns in the expectation that PSD would take them into account in their investigations. Whilst the claimant was not X’s managing officer at the time the alleged assault took place, he had by then discussed the issue with others, reviewed the statements of evidence himself and reached a view that there may have been a breach of a legal obligation by X and/or that X may have committed a criminal offence. JC accepted in evidence that, whilst the PSD’s eventual conclusion on the Assault Issue was that X had not done anything significantly wrong, based on the evidence in the witness statements, an investigator could hold a reasonable view that the information tended to show wrongdoing had occurred. Indeed, based on the same evidence, PSD decided to issue X with a misconduct notice and conduct its own investigation (see further, below).c. Information was provided about extended periods of time on shift when X was not contactable, and the claimant’s concern that he was visiting a woman at a particular address on a regular basis during these times when he was not contactable.[29]One outcome of the meeting was that the PSD completed a severity assessment report into the Assault Issue and a complaint that had been raised by the victim in September 2019. The date of the severity assessment is 11 November 2020, the day after the meeting. In summary it recommended that X be served with a Notice of Investigation under the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012 and that an investigator be appointed. It had taken the respondent 14 months from receiving the complaint from the victim in September 2019 to reach that stage.[30]FF took on some of PSD’s responsibility to investigate and consider the issues raised by the claimant and others against X. The claimant and FF corresponded by email on various dates in December 2020 (pages 331 to 337). The correspondence concerned X’s whereabouts when on duty. The claimant suspected that X regularly visited a woman for sex. The claimant provided FF with a map showing X’s approximate location on the occasions that he suspected these visits were taking place. These had been referenced from location information obtained from X’s police radio. The claimant had been asked to do this by PSD (Inspector O Neill) (email of 2 December 2020).[31]We are satisfied, having reviewed these emails and particularly the emails at page 333 (dated 21 December 2020) that the claimant suspected that X was visiting a member of the public, whilst on duty, including to have sex (see para 38 of Claimant statement.) He provided the following information:a. That X frequently visited 2 addresses when on duty;b. that X was not contactable for long periods during a night shift;c. that an anonymous source told him that the purpose of his visits were for sex.[32]The information tended to show that X was frequently unavailable when on duty, that this was not a one off but a regular occurrence. The claimant regarded this as a serious conduct issue, that the information tended to show that X was in breach of the professional standards binding police officers. We refer to this below as the “Whereabouts Issue”.[33]On 20 January 2021 the claimant emailed an officer called Simon Fetigan (SF) to inform him that X had not been carrying a PAVA and a Samsung handheld device that had been issued to him.[34]This email was sent a day after X had been served with formal misconduct notices telling him that the PSD would carry out investigations into(1) the Assault Issue;(2) the Whereabouts Issue and(3) the Remembrance Sunday issue (see below).[35]X became absent on being served with these notices and did not at any stage return to duty.[36]The claimant provided the information in the email of 20 January 2021, because he knew that investigations were taking place into X’s conduct. He informed SF about what he had found about PAVA because he considered it may be relevant to the Assault Issue being investigated. He informed SF about the Samsung issue because he considered it was relevant to the Whereabouts Issue. We make these findings based on the terms of the email. The email includes the following (with our emphasis on parts that are particularly relevant to this finding): Simon, Forgive me if this sounds like I’ve lost the plot. Last night after [X] left the building I thought it best to check his PAVA had been stowed properly. I have been unable to identify a locker with his collar number on and the morse system does not show a cannister registered. X keeps his utility belt in the Sgts office in a filing cabinet drawer, I have checked this and there is no PAVA holster attached to it. The holster is not something you would take on and off because it’s a faff, so my only conclusion is that he simply does not carry any. All of that is a long way of me asking if this would impact on the assault complaint. Most officers will have received the PAVA before POWER inputs and we are encouraged to use PAVA prior to hands on restraint. But if you don’t have any, its not an option. On a similar note. I have noticed that Xs Samsung is in his tray, still in the box, in the brown envelope it was delivered in. I don’t think it has ever been turned on. This would be why he couldn’t view logs when asked and was AWOL. It also means he is very unlikely to have been able to log onto any of the last 4 training days as they have been via teams.[37]The claimant provided information to FF and JD (2 members of the PSD) during a meeting on 9 February 2021. At this stage the PSD were carrying out investigations in to the 3 issues identified above. The claimant knew that and of course was cooperating.[38]We heard evidence from all 3 attendees at this meeting, namely the claimant, FF and JD. We also considered FF’s notes of the meeting (683-687).[39]At the end of the meeting, FF asked the claimant to provide a statement on a form called MG11, to set out the things that the claimant wanted to tell PSD. This statement is the subject of PD8 which we refer to below.[40]The MG11 statement does not make any reference to the Assault Issue although we do find that this was discussed during the meeting itself. The claimant referred to the probationary officer whose report of the incident was consistent with the accounts of the victim and thirdparty onlooker. It therefore differed to X’s statement and the statements of the other attending officers. The claimant told FF and JD that he had spoken with the sergeant to whom the probationary officer reported and that the sergeant had told the claimant that the probationary officer had reported his concerns straightaway to him.[41]The claimant also raised a new concern. X and another officer had been rostered to attend court for a murder trial at Preston Crown Court on 9,10 and 11 January 2021. The claimant had learned that the trial had been cancelled/postponed but that neither the claimant nor colleague had declared this. Their whereabouts on these days were unknown to the claimant. We refer to this as the “Crown Court Issue.”[42]The claimant also stated his view that the various issues with X could not be considered in isolation; that they had to be viewed together, otherwise the PSD would not obtain a true picture of X’s behaviour and the consequences.[43]The claimant set out a considerable amount of information in the MG11 statement. He provided the statement to PSD on or about 26 February 2021.[44]We consider this statement to be particularly important because a redacted version of the statement was sent to X in response to a Data protection subject access request (“SAR”) made by him. We have not been told precisely what date X was given the redacted version of the statement although we know it was around the end of 2021. We include comments below about parts that were redacted and parts that were not. Much of the statement is a narrative that the claimant provided about his experience of managing X including the claimant’s concerns about X’s time management, his behaviour around colleagues and with the claimant and his work relationships.[45]In the statement (at page 379) the claimant provided an example of an incident where he alleges X had caused the respondent’s time recording system (called DMS) to be altered to show X as working on days/at times when he was not. (Redacted from the version sent to X).[46]Also at page 379 the claimant provided information about the Crown Court issue. This included information that the claimant and colleague had been told the day before they were due to attend trial that it was not going ahead, yet neither had responded to this by reporting for duty. The claimant also provided information that the respondent’s DMS had still shown the 2 officers to be at court. The claimant was not told that the trial had been cancelled until the third day of X’s supposed attendance when he was told about the cancellation at a meeting with senior officers. He then contacted X later that morning who told him that he and the colleague were “in the division” and would be in later that day. (Redacted from the version sent to X).[47]Also within the MG11, the claimant provided an account (at page 385-387) of the Remembrance Sunday Issue. In this account the claimant provided information that X had acted against an order that had been issued by SR and also that he directed other officers to act against SR’s order (bottom of 386). (Redacted in part).[48]The claimant also raised the issues in the MG11, of the PAVA and the Samsung device (page 391). When he raised these issues on this occasion, he did not do so in support of the Assault Issue and Whereabouts Issue (as he had before). This is what he says:- The discovery of the PAVA and Samsung has caused me further confusion as to how could an operational Sergeant fulfil his role without the use of his Samsung, but even more concerning going out to incidents without PAVA which is a standard piece of kit for a response Officer. How could he protect himself, colleagues, or members of the public without such equipment? I am not saying we use our PAVA in every situation, but you do not know what incidents you will attend during a tour of duty and what you would be dealing with. [X] has potentially left himself and others vulnerable by not having access to either item. (Not redacted).[49]The MG11 also included an account that is relevant to the Whereabouts Issue. This account included the following, at page 392:- Given the nature of [X]’s open hostility to managers and supervisors together with the historic reports, I considered this was something more than I should be managing myself and was potentially beyond the remit of local resolution. As a result, I escalated the reports to supervision, who advised me to continue to monitor [X]’s whereabouts which I did via ARLS. I later collated, recorded, and passed the information on to PSD to enable them to review this as a whole.[50]The claimant was referring here to the information provided in alleged PD3 above. That information led to the service of one of the 3 the misconduct notices. This part of the MG11 was redacted before it was later sent to X.[51]An unredacted copy of the MG11 is at pages 372-393. The redacted copy that was provided to X was disclosed part way through this hearing and is at pages 1375-1394.[52]The MG11 did not refer to the Assault Issue.[53]We are satisfied that the claimant raised the PAVA and the Samsung in this MG11 because he reasonably believed that it was information that tended to show that X was not carrying out his role as a police officer with the diligence expected of him; further that in not having a PAVA available when attending incidents where a member of the public was acting violently and/or might need to be restrained, he was putting his own safety and the safety of other officers and the public at risk in not being able to rely on this device. This concern included concern about the person being restrained, given his concerns about the assault issue. The claimant considered (then and now) that if X had carried a PAVA device, then the victim could have been restrained (to the extent that was necessary) using that rather than adopting a manual restraint method as X did and that led to a complaint and concerns about the use of excessive force.[54]There was an email exchange involving the claimant, SR and officers within PSD on various dates between 24 March 2021 and 8 April 2021. In this email exchange, the claimant raised again that the Samsung device allocated to X had not been used for 411 days. He stated his view that the device had never been used. In an email to SR, the claimant informed her of an occasion when X was contacted and asked to view something on his Samsung device and he replied he was unable to do so, noting at that time he was in the location that the claimant was suspicious about. This is what the email says (28 March 2021 – page 181) Ma’am, I don’t think the device has ever been used, not that it just hasn’t been used in 411 days. For me it added weight to the argument that X was not on duty when at the various locations and addresses as he could not have performed in the way that is expected of a response sergeant. I have referred to an occasion in my statement where comms ask X to view a log and he stated he is unable to do so, he was in [Name of Location] at the time…[55]In disclosing information about the Samsung device, culminating in this email, the claimant provided the respondent with information that tended to show that X was not complying with the standards required of police officers. 2021 – actions of X[56]As noted above, on 19 January 2021 X was served with notices of alleged misconduct. Within the police, such notices are called Regulation 17 notices. The allegations that were the subject of these notices are as follows:-a. That X had disregarded an order about attending a Remembrance Sunday event (and encouraging or even ordering other officers to) that he had been abusive oppressive and offensive in subsequent emails to SR about this event. (the Remembrance Sunday Issue).b. That X visited a particular address during his hours of duty and did so “without a legitimate policing purpose” (page 349) (the Whereabouts Issue).c. The allegation that X grabbed a member of the public by the throat (page 354) (the Assault Issue.)[57]X began a period of long-term absence on the same day as being served with the misconduct notices. He did not return to work before his ill health retirement in around March 2022.[58]X submitted a grievance on 10 March 2021. This grievance is the first detrimental act that the claimant relies on. It is a long document. X’s account or narrative is from pages 1068 to 1143. There are also about 160 pages of attachments.[59]X classified this as a grievance about bullying and/or harassment; discrimination; working relations; health and safety and unfair working practices. He also refers to “systemic disability related discrimination” and him having “Whistle blowing status” (1070).[60]The following parts of this grievance are relevant:a. The respondent’s grievance form standard wording asks the aggrieved officer “does your grievance relate to your line manager” (p1066). X answered “no” The claimant was X’s line manager at the time.b. At appendix 15 (1240-1245), X provided copies of some messages between himself and the claimant. They are complimentary of the claimant’s management of X.c. The grievance is about the treatment of him by 5 named officers (detailed at 1133 to 1143): these include SR and his previous manager (CL). The claimant is not included.d. The individual grievances are wide ranging in terms of time and content. They include grievances against the respondent organisation itself (including industrial injuries going back to 2013); alleged breaches of the Equality Act 2010 against the organisation and various officers.e. Grievances against CL all relate to her management of X. It is not necessary for us to record the many grievance items which are presented as 29 separate complaints. Most of these refer to allegations of disability discrimination and failure to make reasonable adjustments arising out of CL’s management of X from January 2019. 3 of the bullet points refer to the Assault Issue (1140) alleging that CL was absent due to sickness but retained responsibility for the assault issue investigation and complaint and/or must have discussed this with SR. X alleges that he had reported CL for bullying and harassment and therefore her continuation of the Assault issue was unethical, was harassment and included CL making negative comments about X based on his disability.f. Grievances X raised against SL include(1) a complaint that she failed to “adhere to ACAS guidance regarding discipline matters relating to disability.”(2) complaints about X being made to relocate to Blackpool, alleging that would be an act of direct discrimination;(3) various other allegations of bullying, harassment, failure to make reasonable adjustments. X refers to the Remembrance Day issue and the Whereabouts Issue; opining that as a result of her investigations into those, she will have been aware of X’s disabilities.g. In his account X makes various positive comments about the claimant. For example:- i. At page 1117, X says: “By the start of 2020, I had already established a close working relationship with my 'opposite number’ PS Paul Hill. Both Paul and I have spoken, many a time, about how the differences in our personalities made for a good balance and how we also shared many of the same values. This made us a great working team. Tl Scott Sanders had also completed the supervisor team and the next 6 months felt like a 'Policing Nirvana’. Being a police offer can simply be the best job in the world and that is certainly how it felt working for Tl Sanders; alongside PS Hill.” ii. At page 1119: “Insp Sanders is the only supervisor that has shown any understanding of my mental health condition. He tried to assist with it, and I do acknowledge it can be difficult to 'work with'. By October, it was clear that this wasn't a 'lull' in my mental health. I was 'struggling' extensively with suicidal ruminations.” iii. As page 1237, X provides a response to the Whereabouts Issue (one of the 3 misconduct issue that he knows by then is being investigated. In this response he states that he does not believe that the claimant is the person raising a concern about him visiting a particular address.(page 1267) iv. At page 1257, in providing his version of the remembrance Sunday issue, X states “ I did not defy the instruction of DRI Sanders, for whom I have the upmost respect. I made my disagreement clear & sought clarity from Cl Riley (on Insp Sanders advice).[61]It is obvious that X was not at this stage being negative about the claimant.[62]X submitted a second grievance on 4 May 2021 (pages 1307 to 1364). Whilst this is not relied on by the claimant as a detriment, we note the following:-a. X confirmed again that the grievance did not relate to his line manager (1308).b. At 1355, X said this: I have not included my line manager, Insp Sanders, in my grievance to this point because, on the whole, I believe we have had a good working relationship (which he reflected in his entries on my PDR). He has also been full of praise and we have worked with a high level of mutual respect.”[63]Superintendent Karen Edwards (KE) was appointed to investigate X’s grievances. The bundle before us contains very little documentation about the grievance investigation and does not include a copy of the outcome to her investigations. We need to make findings about a meeting between KE and the claimant that took place on 13 August 2021. KE’s notes of this meeting are very brief.[64]Having regard to the terms of the detriment as alleged, we need to decide whether the grievance “implicated” the claimant in alleged discrimination in those matters which were the subject of the 3 misconduct notices. The claimant’s evidence is that he was told by KE at the start of the meeting that X had raised a grievance against him (claimant statement at para 68).[65]It is not in dispute that X wrote to the respondent on 2 August 2021, asking that the grievance investigation include an account from the claimant. In requesting this, X asked for the claimant to be “offered protection so that he can speak freely if he has been a victim/witness of/to unethical conduct by CI Riley (or any other senior leaders) given her position in his line management as his comments (outlined below) might suggest.” X also asked for the claimant to be given “welfare support.” And that the claimant should receive X’s correspondence in an unredacted form. A copy of X’s email is at pages 541-557. Documents in the bundle sometimes refer to this email as the “Structured Statement.”[66]In this long correspondence X set out questions/themes that he wanted the investigator (KE) to ask the claimant about. Many of these are about X raising mental health issues with the claimant; the impact that poor mental health had had on X, supportive discussions that the claimant had had with X and requests for adjustments. X also asked the investigator to ask the claimant questions indicating that the claimant had known about and was sometimes supportive of X’s visits to the location that was the subject of the Whereabouts Issue as well as questions about the Remembrance Sunday Issue. Reading this long email from X and the questions he wanted asking, the tone appears to shift in that he became more demanding in his questions and the style and language. For example, Can Insp Sanders confirm that CI Riley never once mentioned the words 'reasonable adjustments' at any time during this meeting & that she offered no other options other than those presented (I.e. Blackpool working 0800- 1600)? Will Insp Sanders also confirm that I was given no reason for why I would be banished from Fleetwood Police Station & that I was not offered any 'representation' during this meeting? Will Insp Sanders describe CI Riley's demeanour during and after the meeting please? ……. Would Insp Sanders have regarded this as an oppressive & humiliating environment if he had been on the receiving end of these actions? ……. Given his knowledge of my disability & how my ruminations manifest is it fair to say that Insp Sanders would be fully aware that I would have a very distressing few days/weeks ahead (on top of the strain that anyone would feel having 3 misconduct allegations levelled at them). Can Insp Sanders confirm that he shared this information to ensure my welfare was catered for? ……. Insp Sanders has not contacted me since 19th January 2021. Given our working relationship I have felt let down by this but again (owing to his comments outlined above) I have felt that Insp Sanders may have been held incommunicado via instructions from CI Riley and hope that he can provide an explanation via this forum. ……. Despite all of the investigations in relation to my conduct having been concluded, I remain banned from Fleetwood Police Station with the reason given that Insp Sanders has written me a Performance Plan and that this cannot be carried out from Fleetwood and that I cannot return until the plan is fulfilled. Can Insp Sanders confirm why he has written this plan despite having no discussion with me regarding needing a plan or having recorded anything on my PDR supporting such a plan? Does Insp Sanders agree that ACAS & supporting guidance suggests that a discussion around reasonable adjustments should come before a 'Performance Plan' in relation to protected characteristics & that no such discussions have taken place? Will Insp Sanders supply a copy of the plan please? If these actions were carried out under duress (as I allude to above) will Insp Sanders use this forum to explain this please? Can Insp Sanders outline any conversations between him and CI Clegg (in relation to me) since 19th January along with conversations with CI Riley in relation to my future/returning to Fleetwood?[67]The claimant was not sent this email. It later becomes clear that the performance plan referred to above was something that the claimant objected to and led to him making allegations against the claimant.[68]We find the meeting with KE and the claimant was an investigation meeting that KE held as part of her investigations into X’s grievances. The claimant was X’s line manager and part of his role as a senior officer and line manager was to assist an investigation into a grievance that a member of the team he was managing had made. In this instance, X had specifically asked KE to speak with the claimant; he had given reasons why (indicating that he expected the claimant to be supportive of X) and put questions for KE to ask.[69]There are almost no notes of this meeting. We have not heard from KE either. An absence of meeting notes however would be more questionable had this been a grievance meeting as the claimant now says it was. It is surprising to us why, if the claimant was told that there were grievances against him, there was no follow up correspondence from him about that; why he did not ask for details of the grievance, possibly involving a representative from the Police Federation. The evidence we have, shows the claimant to be a good administrator, someone who documents activities and concerns that he has and someone who is tenacious in his investigations and his wish for the respondent to take seriously the concerns that he and others had raised about X. It would be contrary to our conclusions about the claimant for him to have been told that X had raised grievances against him and not follow this up with at least a request for more information; for an understanding about exactly what it was that X had said about the claimant.[70]It would also be surprising if KE told the claimant that X had raised a grievance against him when plainly he had not.[71]We find that the claimant was not told that X had raised a grievance against him. X had directed KE to certain questions and themes of questions he wanted KE to ask the claimant as part of her investigation into X’s grievances against others and the matters that X said were protected disclosures. The claimant was required to attend this meeting because he would have information relevant to the matters being investigated and because X had raised questions that he wanted KE to ask the claimant.[72]On 21 September 2021, X appealed against the grievance outcome (an outcome we have not seen). In the same document he raised for the first time a grievance against the claimant. Part of his appeal document says that he “can present material (text or emails) or witness evidence to disprove/discredit the accounts provided by:” various officers including the claimant. X also stated in his appeal document (514B) “ I would like to add Insp Sanders, C Supt Edwards to my formal grievance due to dishonest and unethical conduct which I can prove with material evidence and witness statements.”[73]Whilst we have not seen the grievance outcome, it must have included information that the claimant provided to KE in the meeting between them – and we find that it did. Subject Access Request[74]We know that X made an application under data protection legislation for disclosure of his personal data (a subject access request (“SAR”)). On day 4 of this hearing, we were provided with some extracts of what X was sent by the respondent. We were not provided with an email or any other evidence telling us when this was provided to X. Our assessment from our reading of the documents we have been provided with is that it was sometime after 11 November 2021 and before 9 January 2022. (see particularly, reference at pages 525 – a page of a long email from X to various respondent email addresses and to the Police Federation dated 9 January 2022 – in which X noted that “I now have a heavily redacted (which I believe is also unlawful) version of Insp Sanders’ statement ….) In a later email dated 17 January 2022 he notes that information received from his subject access application “adds considerably” to allegations he says he made and sent to the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) on 11 November 2021. We also note reference in X’s email of 29 January 2022 to him having recently received the documents in response to his SAR (574).[75]We conclude from these references that X did not have the information when making complaints to the IOPC on 11 November 2021 but had received it by 9 January 2022.[76]One of the documents disclosed to X in response to his SAR, was a heavily redacted version of the MG11 statement completed by the claimant, the same version that is at pages 1375-1394.[77]As already noted, the Assault Issue was not covered by the claimant in the MG11 statement. Most of the claimant’s comments about PAVA and Samsung were not redacted (pages 1392-3). Some comments about discussions the claimant says he had with X about correct use of DMS were included but information in the MG11 about X’s whereabouts were not. Much of the claimant’s account about the Remembrance Day Issue were included in the redacted version sent to X. Dismissal of misconduct notices[78]The respondent’s investigation in to the 3 misconduct issues concluded in July 2021.[79]The conclusion to the Assault Issue was set out in a document headed “Final assessment of conduct – police sergeant [X] and was that X had no case to answer for misconduct.[80]The conclusion to the Whereabouts issue and the Remembrance Day issue was that X’s conduct did not amount to misconduct but that the matters should be progressed under “Practice requiring Improvement.” Relevant correspondence from X – January and February 2022[81]On 9 January 2022, X sent an email to a Police Federation representative and to an email address belonging to the respondent called “grievance management” (pages 523 to 557). The email started by telling the recipient (the Police Federation) that X wanted to add a criminal offence of stalking to offences that he had already by then notified to the Police Federation. We call this the “9 January email”.[82]Relevant findings about the 9 January email are set out in a separate section below. .[83]The claimant did not receive the 9 January email. He does not claim that he was subjected to a detriment by X sending this email,[84]The email that the claimant says subjected him to a detriment is one sent by X addressed to the whole of the respondent’s police force. Exactly what was sent and when is not immediately clear from the copies in the bundle. We clarified with the parties that the entirety of what was sent and received is at pages 566 to 571. We call this the “All-Staff” email.[85]The All-Staff email was sent by X on 1 February 2022. X told all recipients that he was attaching a “brief outline of how the upper ranks in Lancashire Police conduct themselves (below email). I can fully evidence the claims made with 500-1000 pages of documents, emails and a recording.” X indicated that he was “going public (internally initially in hope of an authentic investigation) because, according to X, the respondent’s PSD had refused to investigate complaints he had raised or to refer them to the IOPC. X also provided a link to guidance on “whistleblowing protected disclosures.”[86]X then attached to that email an email sent by him on 28 January 2022 to the respondent’s grievance management email address and others including the Police Federation.[87]The email of 28 January 2022 had attached to it an extract of a letter that X had sent in the course of an ill health early retirement application. That extract is at 569-571. As it was an attachment to the All-Staff email, he shared the extract with the whole of the respondent’s workforce. It included the following comment on his impending retirement on ill health grounds:- I fully agree with ACC Lawson's recommendation that I should proceed to Illhealth retirement, on the basis that Lancashire Constabulary have consistently ignored its legal commitments conferred in Section 149 of the Equality Act, commitments under The Health & Safety at Work Act 1974 & those outlined in Lancashire Constabulary's own Equality statements/commitments. Following this my position has been made untenable by further illegal & criminal acts by Chief Officers & Senior Managers within the organisation, by way of 'covering up' the illegal acts committed against me. These criminal matters include; summary offences under the Equality Act, offences under the Protection from Harassment Act, a number of offences under Section 1 & 2 of the Bribery Act 2010 & Perverting the Course of Justice.[88]The extract listed 11 officers and made very serious allegations against each of them. The most senior rank amongst those listed was the Chief Constable himself and amongst those others listed are deputy Chief Constable, Superintendents, detective Chief Inspectors and the claimant, who had the rank of Inspector.[89]This is what X wrote specifically about the claimant: “Insp Scott Sanders; Summary Offences under the Equality Act 2010/Health & Safety Act 1974, Offences under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 & 1 x Offence of Section 2 the Bribery Act. The amount of evidence & Police Witnesses that I have provided that show dishonest & corrupt behaviour regarding this is compelling (to say the least). (Gross-Misconduct in Public Office).”[90]Similar allegations are made against the 10 other officers. For example:a. the Chief Constable is accused by X of “5 x Offences under Sect 1 the Bribery Act 2010, Perverting the Course of Justice & neglect of duty (Gross-Misconduct in public Office).”b. JC is accused by X of - Summary Offences under the Equality Act 2010/Health & Safety Act 1974, 1 Offence of Section 2 the Bribery Act 2010, Perverting the Course of Justice & (wilful) neglect of duty (Gross-Misconduct in Public Office).c. As for SL -Superintendent Sally Riley; Summary Offences under the Equality Act 2010/Health & Safety Act 1974, Offences under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, Section 2 the Bribery Act 2010 (Gross-Misconduct in public office).d. As for CL: Historic Offences under the Equality Act/Health & Safety Act, 1 x Offence of Section 2 the Bribery Act with numerous witnesses & evidence in relation to bullying behaviour (she was awarded her temporary promotion after admitting calling a member of staff a grotesque name, supporting this evidence). (Gross Misconduct in Public Office).[91]Every alleged offence against the claimant also appears against other names in the list. Only when referring to the claimant and CL does X refer to other evidence. Only when referring to the claimant does X use the term corrupt. X’s description of offences against the claimant and some other officers are that they are summary offences. Where the word “summary” does not appear against an officer’s name, we have taken it that the allegations may include more serious offences; indictable offences.[92]The respondent does not dispute that the All-Staff email and particularly the allegations made, was a detriment to the claimant. The dispute is about causation. 9 January email (pages 523 -541)[93]In their submissions, both Mr Tinkler and Mr Leach made substantial references to the terms of this email. X did not attend the Tribunal and so we could not hear evidence from X about why he had sent the All-Staff email. Mr Leach made clear that, in his submissions, he would make a lot of references to the 9 January email. We wondered whether a fair hearing would require Mr Tinkler being given a right of reply to those, given that there had been little reference to this email in the evidence from the claimant and the respondent’s witnesses. As it was, Mr Tinkler had anticipated that substantial references would be made by Mr Leach and also in his submissions made various references to this email.[94]Having had the benefit of both parties submissions on this email and having read and re read it, we set out our relevant findings about it :-a. X opines that the claimant probably “commissioned” an investigation into the Whereabouts issue. X had provided a written response to PSD about this issue and PSD’s continuing investigation was discriminatory. (524 and 525).b. X refers to other data disclosed to him in response to his SAR, about the claimant’s management of X. He notes the reference to a performance plan which he calls “illegal.” There is also reference to the claimant making “slanderous, unevidenced and often untrue comments about my character, my work ethic, my relationships etc.” These are references to comments that are not relevant to any of the PDR investigations. (525)c. There are references and strong complaints about the claimant’s references to 2 issues - these are unrelated to these proceedings (525 and 526).d. X disputes in very strong terms, comments made by the claimant that (in summary) X was not managing people as he should have been ( 526) stating that the claimant was dishonest about X’s performance to justify putting in place an “action plan” (part of a performance management process).e. X refers to a comment that appears in the very brief note of KE’s meeting with the claimant on 13 August 2021, that X was “manipulating DMS.” X responds in some detail about the arrangements he says were in place regarding his hours, including arrangements with another sergeant (527-529). On this topic, at 529, X quotes a passage from the claimant’s MG11 – a passage relating to a discussion the claimant says took place with X, about adjustments to X’s hours to take account of medication – referring to it as “completely fabricated” and a conversation that never happened and “a clear, provable lie”.f. At page 530, X responds to comments made by the claimant about X’s mental health and that X had apologised to him for being difficult at times, referring to the claimant’s account as completely dishonest and then providing his own account. (530 and 531)g. At page 531 X refers to comments made by the claimant about PAVA and Samsung device. “Not content with me having been served with 3x misconduct investigations Insp Sanders attempts to explore further proceedings raising issues around PAVA and my Samsung, making numerous false and misleading comments within his statements and the emails.” The reference to the emails is to alleged PD5. ‘h. Also at page 531, X refers to the claimant’s assertions that the claimant had not condoned a visit to a person’s house ( relevant to the Whereabouts Issue) as “a false and unethical response.”i. X then refers to the claimant’s comments that the claimant had raised “several instances of professional behaviour including the way in which X treats certain members of his team, manipulating DMS and Remembrance Day” as follows. “Taking away Remembrance Day this is an entirely dishonest and slanderous comment which is also completely unevidenced.”j. Reinforcing his view that the claimant’s statement is dishonest, X also states “on top of that…..Insp Sanders language and descriptions of me are harassing to say the least. His wording on the last page of the statement probably sums this up succinctly. X then quotes from the claimant’s MG11 ‘I have worked with some difficult people in the past but none have come close to X ability to blow hot and cold. His aggression and deep resentment towards anyone in leadership is bewildering.’ X then comments “When reading this, it is worthy of remembering that Inspector Sanders has not placed a single adverse entry in my PDR during the period he supervised me.” (531 and 532).k. After making that comment X states (at 532) that he would “take this opportunity to present a different timeline of endorsements from Insp Sanders which will illuminate the dishonest nature of the MG11 and other accounts he has provided.” Pages of copied and pasted emails then follow in what X refers to as a timeline – seemingly provided to show how good X was as an officer and how well regarded he was ( including by the claimant). One of those emails copied includes a comment allegedly by the claimant as follows “ Thank you for all your hard work. You are a pleasure to work with and I hope this can continue.” X then adds the response “This is a far cry from Insp Sanders dishonest account in his MG11 statement, just over 8 months later.”l. Having provided these email extracts with multiple endorsements and other positive and friendly comments by the claimant about X, X then states (537) “It is also worthy of note that the illegal investigation that Insp Sanders brought about spans part of this period. Insp Sanders had me retrospectively electronically monitored via ARLS from 18 September - 18 December.... …Given the contrasting comments highlighted in the above timeline……..overlapping that period, Insp Sanders full knowledge of my mental health struggles and changes in medication I believe I have provided evidence that shows he had no legitimacy in bringing investigation 57/20 or contributing to investigation 56/20. X went on to describe the claimant’s actions as “targeted, calculating, malicious, oppressive and unreasonable.”m. X then provides his version of events about an investigation. At the top of page 538 he said this: “18 September - 18 December 2020 – Insp Sanders commissioned retrospective electronic surveillance by way of ARLS report/monitoring. Given his knowledge of my mental health in relation to my disability at this time, his knowledge of who (REDACTED NAME) is to my family (and that we were in a Covid bubble) and my honesty about attending there I can only view this as unwanted harassing conduct.” (top of 538)n. Much of page 538 is taken up with X’s account of the circumstances of him being told about the allegations against him on 19 January 2020 and the impact he says that being served with the misconduct notices had on him.o. At the bottom of 538 X states this. “26 February 2021 – I reasonably believe that I have shown that Insp Sanders MG11 document is misleading, defamatory and dishonest. I reasonably believe that its publishing on this date (or thereafter) is criminal in its content and intent and was intended to cause harassment, alarm and distress. Following this Inspector Sanders used the platform of his dishonest statement to publish a further document; namely a Performance Plan based on dishonest and discriminatory assertions, causing harassment.”p. At page 539 X is critical of the way that the claimant dealt with another officer who X had asked to help collect X’s property, stating that the claimant’s actions were “born out of spite and malice with intent to cause harassment.” X also complains that the claimant had not provided an honest account to KE when she investigated X’s grievance: “instead providing a misleading and dishonest account to the investigation making numerous unsubstantiated claims. This account, apart from being dishonest ………can have no other purpose other than to cause me harassment alarm and distress.”q. At the bottom of 539 and top of p 540, X states: “I reported criminal offences under the Equality Act and the Health and Safety Act in my protected disclosure. I reasonably believe that these offences are made out in the circumstances and yet PSD have unlawfully hidden Insp Sanders statement ( to this day which I only have a redacted version via FOI) and therefore hindered the investigation of these offences taking them over their prosecution time limit (Perverting the Course of Justice). However I reasonably believe that I have provided provable evidence that Insp Sanders has conducted a course of conduct that amounts to harassment of another (me) and that Insp Sanders knows or ought to know amounts to harassing another. As per the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.”r. The final comment we note ( and one of the comments that Mr Leach highlighted) is at page 540: “I have shown that I have been subject to what I reasonably believe to be: Retrospective digital surveillance. The publishing of a fraudulent legal document. [MG 11] The publishing of an official work-related document based on false claims. [Performance plan] The omission of information to health services. Omissions in relation to my issues regarding working from Blackpool. [Hence exiling me from the workplace] The omission/Ignorance in responding to my structured statement request and a thoroughly dishonest response to my protected disclosure investigation. Breach of workplace confidence and integrity issues surrounding gossiping. *** Given I have heard different reports from different people in relation to Inspector Sanders discussing details concerning me and the investigations that were held against me, I reasonably suspect he may have discussed this matter far wider. I suspect that discussions with his former team and supervision at Lancaster, Morecambe, the supervision teams at Fleetwood. [Sergeants and inspectors], Custody staff [recorded] supervision at Blackpool. [sergeants and inspectors] and his team (my former team) at Blackpool may show that he has sought to maliciously tarnish my reputation on numerous occasions throughout 2021 with misleading, unethical conversations and gossiping. With these various courses of action/omissions and the life changing effects it has had on my well-being and future I reasonably suspect that Insp Sanders has committed an offence of Protection from Harassment Act Section 4. A (1)(b)(ii) offence …….. X’s Email of 29 January 2022 (574-610)[95]This is another long email from X that is peppered with allegations against various officers about the way that he has been treated. Most of the email is in the form of what X calls a timeline that had been drafted before receiving the outcome to his SAR.[96]The following are extracts which refer to the investigation into the Whereabouts Issue. The disclosure [this is a reference to the disclosure obtained from the PSD as part of their process] consisted of one statement from [FF] which had been written on 19th January and made account of her and her colleague visiting [redacted name] whilst I was being served with misconduct papers. So PSD had made absolutely no enquires over the 6 months they had held this investigation despite also knowing that it was disability related following my response to the allegation in February. Furthermore this clearly wasn't full 'disclosure'. The investigative papers served on me had stated that this investigation had come about following concerns from "local supervision" but disclosure made no account of who that supervisor was or what concerns they had raised to bring about this investigation. Insp Sanders, my line manager, was aware of my visits to …….house and that we were in a household 'covid bubble' yet CI Riley's statement distances herself from this investigation so I have absolutely no idea who has made this allegation, what the allegation is or why it has been raised. This clearly, simply, cannot be right! And It is clear to see that DCI Clegg accepts that I was attending house for legitimate purpose (i.e. managing my disability) in his findings (hence amounting to Sect 15 Equality Act & harassment) & he tries to justify this by suggesting that my supervisor was unaware. This simply is not true! Insp Sanders was fully sighted on my mental health struggles throughout the second half of 2020, the changes to my medication & the fact that my family were in a 'Covid Bubble' with , the reasons why & that I attended there. There is therefore absolutely no justification for this investigation and it's commissioning has, without doubt, come from false information, amounting to a criminal act & yet PSD continue to hide this evidence (which would also appear to be a perversion of the administration of justice).[97]From pages 595 to 600, X provides an account that is particularly difficult to follow but which appears to lead from KE’s conclusion about the claimant’s grievance to the complicity of the Chief constable and assistant chief constable in what X refers to as an “integrity less process” that had resulted in X suffering various detriments; then from an allegation of misconduct against CL that X claims to have made a protected disclosure about, leading to X concluding as follows:- “Criminal legislation had been breached by a number of serving Senior Officers with a clear evidential trail that lead all the way to Chief Constable Rowley.” AND However, the very clear link between Chief Constable Rowley & DCC Woods advancing C Supt Edwards into a rank & role where there is a clear expectation that she acts 'properly' (i.e. Chief Superintendent rank, investigating a whistleblower protected disclosure) that really aroused my suspicion in relation to the Bribery Act 2010. It is abundantly clear (owing to her brashness) that C Supt Edwards fully intended to act improperly in relation to my disclosure & that she could do so with full knowledge that she would not be taken 'to task' in relation to her impropriety i.e. She had the full support of The Chief Officers. It is fair to say that Chief Constable Rowley had been fully briefed and informed. ………………. Furthermore, as part of her disingenuous investigation C Supt Edwards advantaged Insp Sanders with an advantageous location move & assisted him in avoiding misconduct and criminal investigations. For his levy Insp Sanders provided an improper response to C Supt Edwards investigation, as did Insp Leadbetter who also avoided a misconduct enquiry & got Temp promoted too (in circumstances that no reasonable person could justify). X then sets out terms of the Bribery Act 2010 and makes allegations that various officers have committed offences under that Act including the following:- Further to this I have reasonable belief that C Supt Edwards has committed two further offences of Section 1 of The Bribery Act 2010 in her advancement of Insp Sanders & Insp Leadbetter, meaning of course that both Officers also commit offences of Section 2 the Bribery Act by receiving significant incentives to act improperly (& doing so). ………………………… It is transparent that C Supt Edwards cannot, in any way, justify the advancement given to Insp Leadbetter following her misconduct admission. Nor can she justify the prestigious move awarded to Insp Sanders given he has clearly committed summary criminal offences by providing false & misleading statement (to assist in commissioning 2 illegal misconduct investigations), by virtue of the fact that he has openly lied to numerous officers & had presented a further integrity issue (that has been ignored) during the course of C Supt Edwards unethical investigation.[98]We also note that in reaching these conclusions, X stated he had evidence that showed the chief constable and deputy chief constable were fully aware of protected disclosures he had made; that those protected disclosures implicated officers they had promoted and there would be embarrassing outcomes for the chief constable and deputy, had KE’s investigation been properly and fully conducted. Whilst X does not use the term “conspiracy” in describing his stated conclusions, we find that is what X was advancing. X had a conspiracy theory that the most senior officers in the respondent organisation were intent on silencing X in order to avoid embarrassment to themselves and those whose careers they had advanced. X’s conclusions arising from this conspiracy theory was that various officers were guilty of perverting the course of justice and gross misconduct in public office. E. Submissions[99]Both parties provided us with written documents and supplemented these with oral submissions. We summarise these below. The submissions also assisted us in our fact finding and our analysis of the law. Respondent’s submissions[100]We note the following points (by way of summary only) raised by Mr Tinkler in his submissions:-a. That this is an unusual whistleblowing case as the alleged wrongdoer was a junior colleague of the claimant and the disclosures relate to that junior colleague. It is not the type of case that Parliament intended be caught by the legislation – a case where a manager takes issue about something their direct report has done and the direct report responds, alleging that the manager is only taking issue because the manager didn’t like him.b. Mr Tinkler anticipated (correctly) that Mr Leach would make much of the fact that X had not been called to give evidence and that Mr Leach would ask us to draw inferences from his absence. It is absolutely plain, said Mr Tinkler why X was not here; that it is apparent from correspondence that X is a deeply dishonest individual.c. The respondent does not dispute that it is vicariously liable for X’s actions.d. The claimant, in the presentation of the case, tries to illustrate that X’s grievances are all linked to the protected disclosures. But the reality is that X’s grievances are linked to the misconduct notices served on him in January 2021.e. The first alleged detriment (the grievance of March 2021) must fail on causation as, at the time X lodged his grievance, he had no knowledge of the alleged protected disclosures. Further, the claimant was not one of the officers against whom X brought his grievance.f. As for the second detriment (the “All-Staff” email), the respondent accepts that the claimant was reasonably entitled to ( and did) consider the email to be a detriment.g. However, if we decide any of the alleged disclosures were protected disclosures, (and it was not accepted that any were, Mr Tinker setting out detailed written submissions on the point) the complaint about the second detriment must also fail on causation. The same or very similar allegations are made against 11 officers. There is nothing in the list of officers that indicates the claimant was included in that list on the grounds that he had made any protected disclosures.h. An analysis of X’s 9 January email shows that there is no link between the various allegations X makes against the claimant and the protected disclosures. Further, in so far as the respondent needs to explain the reasons why X makes the allegation against the claimant as set out in the All-Staff email, the explanation is in the 9 January email. A summary of the reasons Mr Tinkler puts forward (pages 13-14 of his written submissions) is as follows:-i. breaches of the Equality Act relates to a performance plan and absence of reasonable adjustments; ii. breaches of health and safety legislation arise from various things that X alleges the claimant did, including the publication of a fraudulent document (MG11) the performance plan, omissions in information to health services, integrity issues around workplace gossip; iii. harassment – the claimant’s monitoring of X; iv. bribery – X alleges claimant provided dishonest response to the grievance and secured a favourable relocation. i. The MG11 says nothing about the Assault Issue. That immediately knocks out any causal link between that issue and the Global email.j. X says is that the complaints against him are false and comments made by the claimant about him are false. On this point, Mr Tinkler referred to the judgment in Jesudason (see below).k. Mr Tinkler referred to other authorities about the issue of separability that we have referred to below.l. Applying the judgment in Blackbay (see below) the claimant will need to explain which piece of information is linked to which detriment. Claimant’s representations[101]Mr Leach provide a written skeleton argument at the beginning of the hearing and added to these with his oral submissions on day 4. The following is a summary only, particularly of the arguments made orally.a. This case concerns a police officer, formally on duty and serving the public. These circumstances are not analogous with the manager/employee circumstance referred to by Mr Tinkler. Further and to illustrate this, Mr Leach referred to the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020.b. No actual reasons have been given by the respondent for X’s absence from this hearing and it was open to the respondent to apply for a witness order. The claimant does not know why X is not here but it would be wrong not to take notice of X’s absence.c. Mr Leach responded to Mr Tinkler’s submission that a robust defence to allegations cannot amount to detriments on the grounds of a protected disclosure. If Mr Tinkler’s assertion were accepted then any time a detriment doer retaliates to assertions made in a protected disclosure could be met with the argument that the retaliation is not because a disclosure has been made but because the disclosure is dishonest.d. It is not necessary for the detriment doer to know in detail what has been disclosed or by who. Referring to the recent decision in Nicol (below) it is enough for the detriment doer to “know at least something about the substance of what has been made; that is, they ought to have some knowledge of what the employee is complaining or expressing concerns about.”e. Whether X had enough understanding of the substance of the claimant’s disclosures is a matter from the Employment Tribunal.f. Addressing the time limit point, the 2 detriments are linked, they are of a piece for the purposes of section 48(34)A Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”). The last detriment is in time and it follows therefore that the first one is in time.g. The first detriment concerns the grievance of March 2021. Whilst the grievance is not stated to be against the claimant, if the Tribunal scratches beneath the surface and looks at the claimant’s statement of 2 August 2021, they will find that it is. Mr Leach referred us to various paragraphs within this document that he said supported this position. (Many of these are set out above in our findings of fact).h. Referring to the grievance itself (specifically passage at 1119) and the 2 August statement, it is clear that X suspected that the claimant was the originator of the misconduct investigations into him.i. As for detriment 2 (D8); that is accepted as a detriment. Vicarious liability is also accepted and so the question for the Tribunal therefore is whether the MG11 (which had at that stage been received) materially influenced the claimant to send the Global email. Like Mr Tinkler, Mr Leach also took us to various passages of X’s long email of 9 January 2022. Submissions from both sides helped inform our findings of fact about that email. F. The Law Protected Disclosures[102]The claimant claims that he was subjected to detriments on the grounds that he had made protected disclosures. Section 47B Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”) provides as follows: “(1) A worker has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act or any deliberate failure to act, by his employer done on the ground that the worker has made a protected disclosure.”[103]Section 43A ERA - Meaning of “Protected Disclosure”: “In this Act a ‘protected disclosure’ means a qualifying disclosure (as defined by section 43B) which is made by a worker in accordance with any of sections 43C to 43H.”[104]Section 43B ERA– Disclosures qualifying for protection: “(1) In this Part a “qualifying disclosure” means any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show one or more of the following –a. that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed;b. that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject;c. that the health and safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered;d. …………….[105]Section 43C ERA: “A qualifying disclosure is made in accordance with this section if the worker makes the disclosure... –(a) to his employer, or(b) where the worker reasonably believes that the relevant failure relates solely or mainly to – (i) the conduct of a person other than his employer, or (ii) any other matter for which a person other than his employer has legal responsibility, to that other person.”[106]Section 48(2) ERA: This section provides that on a complaint under these provisions: “…it is for the employer to show the ground on which any act or deliberate failure to act was done.” Qualifying disclosures[107]In considering whether there have been one or more qualifying disclosures in this case we have considered guidance provided by several cases including(1) Chesterton Global Limited v Nurmohamed [2017] IRLR 837 (“Chesterton”),(2) Kilraine v London Borough of Wandsworth [2018] ICR 1850 (“Kilraine”).(3) Korashi v Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board [2012] IRLR 4 (“Korashi”)(4) Kuzel v. Roche Products [2008] ICR 799 (“Kuzel v. Roche”)(5) Parsons v Airplus International Limited UKEAT/0111/17.(6) Simpson v.Cantor Fitgerald Europe 2020 ICR 236 (“Simpson”)(7) Wharton v Leeds City Council EAT 0409/14.[108]Having regard to the terms of the ERA and the case law referred to above, the following is relevant:(1) The worker making a disclosure must reasonably believe that it is made in the public interest and also has to reasonably believe that it “tends to show” one or more of the subject matters listed at 43B(a) to (f) ERA.(2) The terms of section 43B ERA require a reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure (our emphasis). This wording provides a mixed objective and subjective test. The test is not whether there is a reasonable belief on the part of a reasonable worker; rather the test is whether the particular worker making the disclosure has a reasonable belief. “The definition has both a subjective and an objective element: ….. The subjective element is that the worker must believe that the information disclosed tends to show one of the six matters listed in subsection (1). The objective element is that that belief must be reasonable.” (Chesterton – at paragraph 8)(3) The question as to whether the particular worker has a reasonable belief that there is or is not a disclosure in the public interest is a question to be answered by the Tribunal on a consideration of all the circumstances of the particular case.(4) There must be some objective basis for the worker’s belief, for that belief to be reasonable. Some evidence is required; rumours, unfounded suspicions, uncorroborated allegations, and the like will not be good enough to establish a reasonable belief (Korashi).(5) It is possible to consider 2 or more disclosures together in determining whether a protected disclosure has been made. As to whether 2 or more disclosures considered together amounted to a protected disclosure is a question of fact for an Employment Tribunal to determine (Simpson – paragraphs 31-34)(6) The information disclosed only must “tend to show” one or more of the matters set out in (a) to (f) of section 43B. It does not have to prove the matter and information may, in the reasonable belief of the worker “tend to show” one or more of the relevant matters even if the worker is in fact mistaken. (Kilraine).(7) A disclosure of information is required. On this we note the judgment in Simpson (paragraph 20) in which the earlier judgment in Kilraine was considered: “As the decision of the Court of Appeal in Kilraine v Wandsworth London Borough Council [2018] ICR 1850 makes clear, section 43B(1) of the 1996 Act should not be glossed to introduce into it a rigid dichotomy between “information” on the one hand and “allegations” on the other. The question in each case, as has now been made clear, is whether a particular statement or disclosure is a “disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, tends to show one or more of the [matters set out in paragraphs (a) to (f)]”. However, in order for a statement or disclosure to be a qualifying disclosure, it has to have a “sufficient factual content and specificity such as is capable of tending to show one of the matters listed in subsection (1)”. The question of whether or not a particular statement or disclosure does contain sufficient content or specificity is a matter for evaluative judgment by the tribunal in light of all the facts of the case: see Kilraine at paras 31, 35 and 36.”[109]We were also referred to the EAT judgment in Eiger Securities v. Korshunova [2017] ICR 561, particularly the guidance at paragraph 46 which is relevant in a case in which a claimant relies on section 43B(1)(b) (breach of a legal obligation) when proving that a qualifying disclosure has been made: “The identification of the obligation does not have to be detailed or precise but it must be more than a belief that certain actions are wrong. Actions may be considered wrong because they are immoral, undesirable or in breach of guidance without being in breach of a legal obligation.”[110]In deciding whether there have been protected disclosures, we have taken note of the EAT’s decision in Blackbay Ventures Limited v. Gahir (UKEAT/0449/12). In referring to this authority, Mr Tinkler stressed to us the importance of a structured approach to decision making, particularly in this case where we are presented with a number of potential protected disclosures, some of which, on the claimant’s case, may only satisfy the statutory test at 43B when considered with other potential protected disclosures. We repeat below the passage from that judgment that Mr Tinkler quoted to us. 98. It may be helpful if we suggest the approach that should be taken by employment tribunals considering claims by employees for victimisation for having made protected disclosures. 1. Each disclosure should be identified by reference to date and content. 2. The alleged failure or likely failure to comply with a legal obligation, or matter giving rise to the health and safety of an individual having been or likely to be endangered or as the case may be, should be identified. 3. The basis upon which the disclosure is said to be protected and qualifying should be addressed. 4. Each failure or likely failure should be separately identified. 5. Save in obvious cases if a breach of a legal obligation is asserted, the source of the obligation should be identified and capable of verification by reference for example to statute or regulation. It is not sufficient as here for the employment tribunal to simply lump together a number of complaints, some of which may be culpable, but others of which may simply have been references to a check list of legal requirements or do not amount to disclosure of information tending to show breaches of legal obligations. Unless the employment tribunal undertakes this exercise it is impossible to know which failures or likely failures were regarded as culpable and which attracted the act or omission said to be the detriment suffered. If the employment tribunal adopts a rolled up approach it may not be possible to identify the date when the act or deliberate failure to act occurred as logically that date could not be earlier than the latest of act or deliberate failure to act relied upon and it will not be possible for the Appeal Tribunal to understand whether, how or why the detriment suffered was as a result of any particular disclosure; it is of course proper for an employment tribunal to have regard to the cumulative effect of a number of complaints providing always they have been identified as protected disclosures. 6. The employment tribunal should then determine whether or not the claimant had the reasonable belief referred to in s.43B(1) and under the 'old law' whether each disclosure was made in good faith; and under the 'new' law whether it was made in the public interest.[111]On the issue of causation, we have been guided by the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Fecitt v. NHS Manchester [2011] EWCA 1190, including:-a. Paragraph 45: “Section 47B will be infringed if the protected disclosure “materially influences (in the sense of being more than a trivial influence) the employer’s treatment of the whistleblower.”b. Paragraph 51 “... where the whistleblower is subject to a detriment without being at fault in any way, tribunals will need to look with a critical — indeed sceptical — eye to see whether the innocent explanation given by the employer for the adverse treatment is indeed the genuine explanation. The detrimental treatment of an innocent whistleblower necessarily provides a strong prima facie case that the action has been taken because of the protected disclosure and it cries out for an explanation from the employer.”[112]Mr. Leach and Mr. Tinkler addressed us on separability. Mr. Tinkler referred us to the following extract from Underhill LJ’s judgment in Page v The Lord Chancellor [2021] EWCA Civ 254: There will in principle be cases where an employer has dismissed an employee (or subjected him to some other detriment) in response to doing a protected act (say, a complaint of discrimination) but where he can, as a matter of common sense and common justice, say that the reason for the dismissal was not the complaint as such, but some feature of it which can properly be treated as separable.[113]Mr. Tinkler also quoted a section (Chapter 9. Para 98) from the publication. “Whistleblowing Law and Practice” which comments on different circumstances where the issue of separability may arise: i) Something done by the work in preparation for a protective disclosure, such as steps taken by them to investigate or demonstrate matters in relation to its subject matter, (Bolton School v Evans [2006] IRLR 500 (EAT)). ii) A fact or matter which occurs as a consequence of the protected disclosure having been made, such as a breakdown in working relationships and the need to deal with that situation (NHS Manchester v Fecitt and others [2012] ICR 372 (CA)). iii) The manner or form in which the disclosure was made, such as the use of intemperate language or breaching of obligations of confidentiality (Aspinall v MSI Mech Forge Ltd (UKEAT/891/01)). iv) Something which is revealed or evidenced by the protective disclosure, such as underlying health concern or lack of aptitude of the worker for the job, or some other issue or dispute which may be evidenced by but which might be regarded as distinct from the disclosure (Robinson v High Highness Sheikh Khalid Bin Saqr Al Qasim [2020] IRLR 345 EAT.[114]The decision in Jesudason v Alder Hey Children’s NHS Trust [2020] ICR 122, confirms that there can be a distinction between a detriment done to an employee on the ground that they made a protected disclosure and a substantive response to allegations that were made in the protected disclosure. Causation (the “reason why” question) was described as “the critical issue” in that case. 65. This is an unusual case in that the alleged detriments arise out of communications which are a response to the appellant's disclosures to third parties. Even if the disclosures are protected disclosures, an employer is obviously entitled to respond to them in order to rebut what has been alleged and to put his side of the case, even robustly. If, as in this case, the rebuttal also contains misleading statements which constitute a detriment to the worker, it does not follow that the reason for making those statements is the fact that the worker has made the protected disclosure.[115]Jesudason also makes clear ( for example at paragraphs 30 and 31) that we need to consider and decide why the employer (in this case X) acted as he did (the “reason why” test that is sometimes applicable in discrimination cases).[116]Both counsel referred to the EAT’s recent decision in Nicol v. World Travel and Tourism Council [2024] EAT 42 and particularly paragraphs 82 and 83. We note from this decision that the employer (in this case, that means X) must know something about the substance of what the claimant has disclosed. We also note the EAT’s analogy with the victimisation protections in equalities legislation and the reference to the judgment in Nagarajan v. LRT [2000] 1 AC 501 which refers to a discriminator (someone who has subjected a claimant to detriments contrary to statutory protection against victimisation) having “knowledge of the protected act and that such knowledge caused or influenced the discriminator to treat the victimised person less favourably than he would treat other persons.” Detriment[117]The judgment of the House of Lords in Shamoon v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] UKHL 11 is a leading judgment on the meaning of detriment. Whilst that is a decision of a case brought under sex discrimination legislation, the terms of that judgment must be applied when considering whether something amounts to a detriment for the purposes of section 47B ERA. We note particularly paragraph 31-37 of that judgment and the following arising from those paragraphs:-a. That a Tribunal, in deciding whether the act a claimant complains of amounted to a detriment, should consider whether a reasonable worker would or might take the view that he had been disadvantaged in the circumstances in which he had thereafter to work. (para 34).b. To show a detriment, it is not necessary to show some physical or economic consequence ( para 35)c. That an unjustified sense of grievance cannot amount to a detriment (para 35) Burden of Proof[118]The claimant claims that he was subjected to detriments on the grounds that he made one or more protected disclosures. Section 48(2) ERA provides that on a complaint of being subjected to a detriment contrary to section 47B ERA, it is for an employer to show the ground on which any act or deliberate failure to act was done. The burden of proof therefore is on the employer/respondents. Although that burden of proof only applies if the claimant proves:-a. that he made one or more protected disclosuresb. That he was subjected to a detriment.[119]Mr Leach referred us to the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Serco Ltd v. Dahou [2017] IRLR 81, a case about Trade union detriment and dismissal, where the statutory terms on burden of proof are the same. We note:-a. It is for the employee to make out a prima facie case (a and b above)b. Assuming a prima facie case made out, it is for the employer to show the purpose of his act, proving what were the factors operating on the mind of the decision maker (in this case, X). (para 30)c. However, where an employer is unable to show to the Tribunal the reason for an act or failure to act, it does not automatically follow that the claimant succeeds in an unlawful detriment complaint although it usually would. (para 40). Police Conduct Regulations 2020[120]Mr Leach referred us to these regulations that the claimant relies on when asserting that he disclosed information that tended to show a breach of a legal obligation. Regulation 5 provides standards of professional behaviour by reference to schedule 2 to the Regulations. We repeat potentially relevant paragraphs from Schedule 2 below. Honesty and Integrity Police officers are honest, act with integrity and do not compromise or abuse their position. Authority, Respect and Courtesy Police officers act with self-control and tolerance, treating members of the public and colleagues with respect and courtesy. Police officers do not abuse their powers or authority and respect the rights of all individuals. Equality and Diversity Police officers act with fairness and impartiality. They do not discriminate unlawfully or unfairly. Use of Force Police officers only use force to the extent that it is necessary, proportionate and reasonable in all the circumstances. Orders and Instructions Police officers only give and carry out lawful orders and instructions. Police officers abide by police regulations, force policies and lawful orders. Duties and Responsibilities Police officers are diligent in the exercise of their duties and responsibilities. Police officers have a responsibility to give appropriate cooperation during investigations, inquiries and formal proceedings, participating openly and professionally in line with the expectations of a police officer when identified as a witness. Confidentiality Police officers treat information with respect and access or disclose it only in the proper course of police duties. Fitness for Duty Police officers when on duty or presenting themselves for duty are fit to carry out their responsibilities. Discreditable Conduct Police officers behave in a manner which does not discredit the police service or undermine public confidence in it, whether on or off duty.[121]We refer to the standards set out in Schedule 2 as Police Standards. G. Discussions and Conclusions[122]We first consider and reach conclusions about the alleged protected disclosures. PD1 – disclosures at meeting on 10 November 2020. What information was disclosed?[123]Remembrance Sunday issue The meeting with PSD was arranged by SR. It was SR who disclosed to PSD that X may have breached an order. However SR did not attend the meeting.[124]The claimant confirmed information that SR had provided in advance of the meeting. It is likely in the discussion that he stated views about what had happened..[125]Whilst there are no notes of the meeting, we conclude that it is more likely than not that the claimant provided information that, in his reasonable view, showed that X had refused to obey an order given by SR. The information provided resulted in the decision made by PSD to carry out an investigation.[126]Assault issue. The claimant (and others prior to the meeting) provided information to PSD about conflicting accounts of the alleged assault by X. The claimant did this because he was concerned that officers had watered down their statements to assist X and an overbearing influence by X on these officers was the reason why they did. The claimant is not the only person making the disclosure and, as he was not involved in managing X or that team at the time was repeating concerns that had been relayed to him particularly by CL. But the claimant had also formed his own view by then. That view prompted him to provide information about the conflicting accounts. Alleged failure (or likely failure) to comply?[127]In disclosing information about the 2 issues above, the claimant disclosed information that he reasonably believed showed that X was in breach of a legal obligation. The legal obligation in question is a requirement for police officers to comply with the Police Standards. Police Standards require police officers to comply with lawful orders (relevant to the Remembrance Sunday issue) and to only use force to the extent that is necessary and proportionate, to act with self-control and tolerance, not to abuse their power and authority (assault issue).[128]The claimant was also concerned that the assault may have involved a criminal offence. Public interest?[129]The claimant had a reasonable belief that the disclosure was made in the public interest. We agree with the submissions made by Mr Leach, that the subject matter of a police officer’s conduct on duty will often be different to a scenario in which an office employee for example may have underperformed or misconducted themselves. Specific legal obligations (under the Police Standards) are more likely to be or have been breached, the public’s interest is more likely to be served in disclosing such breaches.[130]The claimant raised these matters with his senior officer and with PSD, because he considered it was his duty to do so and that it was in the public interest to do so. when he raised these matters at the meeting on 10- November 2020, he made a protected disclosure. PD2 – emails from the claimant to PSD 14-21 December 2020 What information was disclosed?[131]The claimant provided the following information:a. That X frequently visited 2 addresses when on duty;b. that X was not contactable for long periods during a night shift;.c. that the claimant had an anonymous source telling him that the purpose of his visits was for sex. Alleged failure (or likely failure) to comply?[132]We are satisfied that information was disclosed concerning X’s whereabouts and times when he was not contactable. We are satisfied that the information showed that there were periods of time during a shift when X was not on duty; that this was a regular occurrence. Such conduct would breach the Police Standards, particularly those standards under the headings of Honesty and Integrity, Duties and Responsibilities and Disreputable Conduct. Public Interest?[133]The claimant reasonably believed that this disclosure was in the public interest. Our conclusions here are the same as under PD1 above. PD5 – information provided to PSD investigator concerning PAVA and Samsung[134]The claimant’s email of 20 January 2021 provides information – what the claimant has found concerning PAVA and Samsung device, once X has started his sickness absence. Alleged failure (or likely failure) to comply?[135]Having provided this information, the claimant provided a view that the absence of any evidence showing that X used either PAVA or Samsung, might assist PSD in their enquiries. It also asks a question about whether it might assist the assault complaint. The language in this email falls short of a disclosure of information tending to show a breach of a legal obligation. The claimant refers to officers being “encouraged” to carry a PAVA; to X being “very unlikely” to have been able to log on. PD6 – information provided to PSD in meeting on 9 February 2021.[136]As we make clear in our findings of fact, our bigger focus has been on the alleged PD8 – the MG11 statement that the claimant provided following this meeting.[137]However we are satisfied that the claimant made protected disclosures in the meeting itself. These are our reasons.[138]The claimant disclosed information (repeating information already disclosed) about the assault issue. He also disclosed information about the Crown Court issue.[139]In both cases he reasonably believed that there had been a breach of Police Standards.[140]His disclosures were made in the public interest. The claimant reasonably and honestly believed that it was his duty as a senior police officer to make these disclosures and that the public interest was served by him making these disclosures and wanting PSD to investigate the claimant’s conduct. Protected Disclosures were made about the Assault Issue and the Crown Court issue. PD8 – the MG11[141]In his MG11, the claimant disclosed information about X not having been in possession of a PAVA device and of a Samsung device. (pages 391-2).[142]The claimant also disclosed information about the Remembrance Sunday issue (pages 385-7) the Crown Court issue (379-80) and the Whereabouts issue (page 392).[143]The disclosure of information in each of these issues tended to show that X was in breach of his legal obligations. Again, the relevant reference is the Police Standards.[144]For the same reasons as stated previously, the claimant made the disclosures about the 3 issues noted at 142 above because he believed it was in the public interest to do so. Those parts of the MG11 contained protected disclosures. PD9 – claimant’s email of 28 March 2021 concerning Samsung device. Information disclosed.[145]The claimant disclosed information that the Samsung device allocated to X had not been used in 411 days as well as his view that it had never been used.[146]As noted above, the claimant had already made a protected disclosure about this in his MG11. The information in this email gives more evidence to support the belief that X had not used the Samsung device. The claimant reasonably believed that this further information tended to show that X had breached a legal obligation – Police standards, particularly those under the heading of Duties and Responsibilities. It was a protected disclosure. Detriments[147]Before setting out our conclusions about the 2 remaining alleged detriments, we record our conclusions about(1) X’s non-attendance at this hearing;(2) what X knew about the protected disclosures. X’s Non-attendance.[148]We prefer the submissions of Mr Tinkler to those of Mr Leach on this point. Sometimes, a key participant in (or witness to) events is not called to give evidence. Sometimes a Tribunal will draw adverse inferences against the party which has the burden of proof and whose position might have been more accurately evidenced by that absent person. Sometimes a Tribunal might note that there is a gap in the evidence that works against the party shouldering the burden of proof on the relevant point and decide that, because of that gap, the burden has not been discharged. A potentially obvious example here are circumstances of a chief executive whose decision it was to dismiss an employee but who, the Tribunal is told, has decided that they are too busy to participate in the Tribunal hearing.[149]But we do not draw any adverse inferences from X’s absence. We agree with Mr Tinkler; that it is obvious why X did not appear. From the evidence provided the following is clear:-a. X is no longer a serving police officer. He is mentally ill. He is so unwell as to have qualified for ill health early retirement.b. X believes that he has been badly treated by senior officers.c. X believes (or did at the beginning of 2022) that he has evidence that proved that senior officers at the respondent had committed criminal acts. He referred to 500- 1000 pages of evidence.d. That the allegations of criminal acts arise from conclusions that X reached that there was a conspiracy against him, to disregard protected disclosures that X says he made in his grievance ( and possibly at other times); not to engage in his grievance and therefore(1) to pervert the course of justice and(2) to be corrupt and act contrary to the Bribery Act 2010.e. X has (or had) a deep distrust of the claimant who he alleged had committed criminal acts against X.[150]The respondent’s decision not to try and involve X in these proceedings is understandable and it would be wrong for us to draw an adverse inference from X’s nonattendance. Those are the circumstances in which the respondent has necessarily been required to present its response to the allegations made. We need to reach a decision based on the evidence provided. That has necessarily included a close review of long emails from X, crammed with detail, with allegations, written with bitterness and anger. The logic of these emails is hard to follow at times but we have been through them to help us make decisions about what reasons X had for taking those action relevant to the 2 alleged detriments. Both partis referred to these emails. The respondent referred to them to discharge the burden of proof under section 48(2) ERA. Which protected disclosures did X know about and when?[151]Our conclusion is that the protected disclosures that X knew of prior to alleged detriments are those contained in the redacted MG11 and no others.[152]There is no evidence that X received earlier disclosures, or that he was informed that the claimant had made earlier disclosures. The terms of X’s grievance give no indication that he had.[153]When X sent his appeal against KE’s grievance outcome, X added the claimant to the list of those he had grievances against. We have not seen KE’s decision/grievance outcome (because the parties did not provide it) but we find that it is more likely than not that X decided to do this having read the terms of that outcome. We rely particularly on the date X raised his grievance against the claimant and the change in X’s stated position towards the claimant. Conclusions about the 2 alleged detriments. D7. -- that X submitted a “whistleblowing complaint”/grievance on 10 March 2021. That grievance implicated the claimant in alleged discrimination surrounding he misconduct matters pursued against X. Pursuant to that grievance, X produced a “structured statement” for use by (Superintendent Karen Edwards) in interviewing the claimant on 13 August 2021 (referred to by the parties as D7).[154]We need to decide:-a. Whether the claimant reasonably saw that as being subjected to a detriment.b. If so, whether it was on the ground that he had made a protected disclosure.[155]Our decision is that neither the grievance itself nor the claimant’s attendance and participation in the meeting with KE on 13 August 2021 amounted to detriments.[156]The claimant was a police inspector at the relevant time and his duties included managing a team of officers including X. Being a manager of other officers was an essential part of the claimant’s role. A member of the claimant’s team raised a long and complex grievance in March 2021. Although that grievance did not raise any complaints against the claimant it was inevitable that KE would have interviewed X’s direct line manager as part of her grievance, particularly following the many questions that X had and that he wanted KE to deal with. The meeting between KE and the claimant was a long meeting and must have taken in to account the many questions that X set out in his email to KE before that meeting.[157]As we have stated in our findings of fact, we do not accept the claimant’s account that, at the start of this meeting, KE told the claimant that X had raised a grievance against him. We do accept that the claimant did not welcome the meeting. Going through X’s grievance and the many and detailed line of questions that X had put together, was not something he wanted to do.[158]Sometimes in employment (and in service as a police officer) employees/officers have to do things they would prefer not to. But circumstances where an employee is required to carry out a duty they do not want to but are reasonably expected or required to do, does not (in itself) amount to a detriment. The claimant’s participation in the investigation of X’s grievance fell within his duties as an inspector and X’s line manager. He performed those duties.[159]Neither X’s grievance of 10 March 2021, nor his questions for the meeting of August 2021, nor the claimant’s performance of his duties in attending and participating in the meeting of 13 August 2021, disadvantaged him in the way that he had subsequently to work.[160]This complaint also fails on the following causation grounds:-a. In August 2021, X was not aware of the protected disclosures that had been made by the claimant.b. The long email indicates a particularly tenacious approach on X’s part; that he wanted his points of grievance thoroughly investigated. But the reason why X sent that email and raised so many questions was because he wanted answers to the grievances he had raised against officers other than the claimant; not because the claimant had made protected disclosures. That is a reason that is separate from the protected disclosures themselves. D8. X sent emails on 1 February 2022 to “all staff” making allegations of criminal offences and corruption by the claimant?[161]We do not need to make findings about whether, in sending the All-Staff email, X was acting in the course of his employment or that the claimant was subjected to a detriment. Those 2 important elements are accepted by the respondent.[162]We need to decide why X sent the All-Staff email and made the allegations against the claimant that are set out in that email.[163]We have made findings of fact that X decided that the claimant had no genuine regard for the claimant’s welfare when managing him; that X decided that the claimant disregarded obligations that X says were due to him under the Equality Act; that X decided the claimant had engaged in unlawful conduct when investigating X’s movements relevant to the Whereabouts Issue; that the claimant was one of the beneficiaries in the conspiracy referred to above in that KE arranged to relocate the claimant; something that the claimant wanted and was financially beneficial to the claimant.[164]Our conclusions are as follows:-a. X alleged that the claimant had committed “offences” under the Equality Act 2010 because X decided that the claimant had, in his management of X, discriminated against him and failed to make reasonable adjustments. This includes an allegation about a performance plan (see our findings at para 66 and 94b above).b. X alleged breach of the Health and Safety Act 1974 because the claimant was one of the officers who had managed X and X considered that his illness (and need for ill health early retirement) had been caused by the respondent breaching its legal health & safety commitments (see extract from claimant’s email, quoted at para 87above).c. X alleged that the claimant had committed an offence of harassment because:- i. he believed that the claimant had acted unlawfully in acting as alleged at para 94.r. above. This long list of alleged unlawful acts includes:• Publishing the MG11 (the claimant had only seen the redacted version)• The publishing of the Performance Plan• Omitting to send information to health services,• Allegations around “gossiping” throughout 2021. ii. of the electronic surveillance into X’s whereabouts that X believed the claimant had carried out (or caused to be carried out) to support an investigation into the Whereabouts Issue (see 94.m. above).d. X did not make the allegation of an offence of harassment on the grounds that the claimant had made a protected disclosure. X did not know about the claimant’s protected disclosure concerning the Whereabouts issue although he clearly suspected the claimant had been involved in the investigations into the issue. He alleged that the surveillance of X that took place was unlawful. He was complaining about the steps that the claimant took in investigating X’s suspected wrongdoings, rather than the disclosure itself.e. Further, when reading X’s account as quoted at 94.m; it reads to us as a rebuttal of the allegation on the misconduct notice (the Whereabouts issue). It summarises X’s explanation/response to the allegation and must therefore fall within distinction identified in Jesudason – a rebuttal of what was being alleged against him, putting his side of the case.f. X alleged that the claimant had committed an offence under the Bribery Act and referred to because he had decided that the claimant benefitted from the conspiracy that X had decided had taken place, that X believed was done by senior officers (up to and including the Chief Constable) to harm X by refusing to investigate the protected disclosures X says he made.g. X alleged that the claimant’s behaviour was “dishonest and corrupt” was a summary of the allegations already made about the claimant’s behaviour.h. X decided to send this as an “All Staff” email for 2 reasons:-i. because of X’s belief that he had made protected disclosures and they had been ignored by the respondent – see paragraph 85 above; ii. because he knew that he was about the leave the respondent – that is why the All-Staff email included the wording quoted at paragraph 87 above.[165]For these reasons, the claim fails and is dismissed.