S Catchpole v King’s College London and L Sanderson: 2309321/2025
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 2309321/2025, 2305973/2024, 2306248/2024
Between
S CatchpoleClaimantKing’s College London and L SandersonRespondent
Before
Employment Judge W AndersonK Pal (instructed by counsel) for respondentDate 28 July 2026
JUDGMENT
[1]The entire claim is struck out under Employment Tribunal Rule 38(1)(a).
REASONS
[1]The claimant has filed four claims in the employment tribunal. Claim no: 2305973/2024 (claim 1), filed on 8 August 2024, was struck out on 24 March 2025, EJ Perry having found that there were no reasonable prospects of success. The claim was one of unfair dismissal. The claimant was, and is, still employed by the first respondent. Claim no: 2306248/2024 (claim 2), filed on 21 August 2024, was heard on 15 to 19 June 2026. The claim, one of harassment related to race and protected disclosure detriment, was dismissed. The claimant’s third claim, no. 2309321/2025 (claim 3), filed on 15 October 2025, is a claim of victimisation. That is the claim under consideration of strike out in this judgment. The claimant filed a fourth claim, no: 2309930/2025 (claim 4) on 17 October 2025. That is a claim of direct discrimination on the grounds of sex.[2]When filing their response to claim 3 the respondents applied for the claim to be struck out in its entirety on the grounds of it having no reasonable prospect of success and/or being scandalous or vexatious.[3]Claim 3 is a claim of victimisation. Six protected acts are relied upon, the first dated 25 July 2023 and the last dated 12 September 2025. The claimant relies on 22 detriments.
The Hearing
[4]The parties filed two bundles. A bundle containing 1233 pages which was used at the hearing for claim 2 last month and a supplementary bundle of 27 pages including amongst other documents the judgment on claim 2 and an application dated 1 July 2026 from the claimant to amend his claim. That application was granted in part in that one further detriment was added to the list of twenty detriments contained in the particulars of claim. Ms Mouzakitis said that detriment 22w as set out in the list in the particulars of claim was withdrawn.[5]In addition, Mr Pal filed a skeleton argument, and the claimant filed written submissions. Submissions[6]I have summarised the parties’ positions below. Other specific points raised are addressed in the decision section.[7]On behalf of the respondents, Mr Pal put forward their argument that the claim should be struck out in its entirety as being vexatious or having no reasonable prospect of success as the allegations were largely out of time and/or they had been litigated previously. Mr Pal said the claimant had issued four claims. These were unmeritorious and two had already been disposed of, one having been struck out as having no reasonable prospects of success and the other dismissed after a full hearing before a tribunal. He said the litigation was vexatious and causing serious detriment to the named respondent, who the claimant insisted on retaining as a named respondent despite the first respondent accepting responsibility for any of her acts should his claims be successful. Intent was not necessary for a finding that litigation was vexatious. It was the effect of the claimant’s actions that were relevant. If the tribunal did not accept this argument, then the respondents asked for a deposit order of £1000 in respect of each allegation on the grounds that the allegations had little reasonable prospects of success, for the same reasons.[8]Mr Pal provided a table of the 22 allegations of detriment and put forward the argument that all of them should be struck out where they all fell into one or more of the following four categories and/or were out of time: Category 1: Any factual allegation which is a re-labelling of facts determined in the second claim is issue estopped from proceeding. Category 2: Any factual allegation pre-dating the Second Claim (21 August 2024) but not raised therein should have been raised in the Second Claim and constitutes a Henderson abuse. Category 3: Any allegation which was subject to an amendment application in the Second Claim as a claim other than for victimisation is a Henderson abuse. Category 4: Any allegation which was not contained within the Second Claim or subject to an amendment application in the Second Claim is a Henderson abuse.[9]The claimant’s position is that the subject matter of claim 1 was different to the subject matter of the later claims. The claim for harassment which formed part of claim 2 may not have been struck out had the respondents disclosed certain documents that were in its possession at the time and which the claimant did not have. The claim for victimisation, claim 3, is based on a different legal framework and unfavourable treatment constituting an act extending over time. Overlap with the allegations pleaded in claim 2 is minimal. The respondents have misrepresented the outcome of the preliminary hearing in September 2025. The cut off point for in time allegations given by the respondents is incorrect. In any event the claimant claims acts extending over time. The claim should not be struck out and nor should a deposit order be made. The respondents have not shown that claim has little prospect of success.[10]In oral submissions Ms Moutziki, for the claimant, said that the respondents were making a completely different justification for the strike out and she thought that this was unfair. If we needed to discuss difficult technical criteria then the claimant should have had an opportunity to consider the arguments. It cannot be that where an amendment is proposed and refused without looking at the substantive facts of the amendment that that is an actual determination of any given allegation of detriment. In relation to a Henderson abuse the point is that a claimant is holding back. The claimant did not do that. When amendments were refused the claimant brought back the amendment application. The claimant was diligent. It is not enough to have a voice here to say something when the claimant has not had time to prepare. Furthermore, many of the events complained about in claim 3 happened a later than the filing date of the second claim. The argument the respondents are now bringing is not about being vexatious.[11]Ms Moutziki said the respondents always opposed the claimant’s amendments, so it was the respondents that created the problem. The case of Air Canada v Basra EAT/367/99 is authority for the proposition that a decision on an amendment is not a judgment for the purposes of an issue estoppel. Furthermore, in relation to Henderson abuse the claimant is claiming acts extending over a period whereas Henderson applies more to a static situation. The respondents claim that the claimant’s claims are weak and he will struggle on causation but in the past that is only being because he has not had relevant disclosure.[12]Chronology 08.08.24 Claim 1 filed, unfair dismissal on Hogg v Dover principles. 21.08.24 Claim 2 filed, disability discrimination and race discrimination, specifically harassment. 23.10.24 Respondents seeks strike out of claim 2 on time grounds in grounds of resistance. 14.11.24 Respondents seeks strike out of claim 1 on time grounds in grounds of resistance. 21.03.25 Claimant applies to amend claim 2 to add protected disclosure detriment. 25.03.25 Claimant applies to amend claim 2 to add failure to make a reasonable adjustment. 02.04.25 Judgment of EJ Perry following hearing on 25.03.2025 on strike out application for claim 2. Harassment relating to disability is struck out as misconceived because the claimant argues the harassment worsened his disability not that it was because of it. 02.04.25 Judgment of EJ Perry following hearing on 25.03.2025 on strike out application for claim 1. Struck out on time only, not merit. 02.04.25 Decision of EJ Perry on application to amend to add a complaint of protected disclosure detriment and a further act of harassment on the grounds of race. Permission to amend to add a claim of protected disclosure detriment was allowed in respect of nine of the fifteen alleged detriments. Permission was granted to add a further act of race discrimination. At paragraph 3 of the order EJ Perry makes the following comment: The application was ostensibly to add a whistleblowing detriment claim under section 47B Employment Rights Act 1996. The alleged protected disclosure is an email to Bethan Jones dated 25 July 2023 in which the Claimant says he raised the first alleged instance of harassment related to race. On that basis, I explored with the Claimant whether the amendment was actually to include a claim of victimisation contrary to section 27 Equality Act 2010. For the purposes of the application to amend the difference is material because of the different tests in relation to extension of time. The Claimant did not positively assert that he wanted to change his application to one of victimisation and it is not my place to substitute it for him. 28.04.25 Claimant applies for reconsideration of claim 1 strike out. 28.04.25 Claimant renews application to amend of 21.03.25 in relation to three protected disclosure detriments that were refused, and to add further detriments concerning the behaviour of the second respondent. 08.05.25 Rejection of application to reconsider the claim 1 strike out. 04.06.25 Response of EJ Perry to application of 28.04.25: Variations to include the grievance/appeal process, the delayed DSAR and mediation were refused. Requested expansion on the detriments is an attempt to bring back in claims of harassment related to disability which were struck out previously and the application needs to be considered at a hearing. 18.06.25 Respondents file written objections to the application to expand detriments 12.09.25 Claimant files amended particulars of claim which includes victimisation, further race harassment claims and a claim of failure to make a reasonable adjustment (the latter based on the amendment allegedly sought at a hearing on 24 March 2025 and applied for in writing on 25 March). Though not titled as such this is a further, substantive application to amend. 16.09.25 Respondents apply for a deposit order for each of the three race allegations and for the second respondent to be removed. 18.09.25 Decision of EJ Wright after hearing on 17.09.25 The application to amend was refused. Reasons were not given in the order. The application to remove the second respondent was refused. A deposit order was granted in respect of one of the three allegations of race discrimination. A list to of issues for the final hearing on 15 June 2026 was agreed. unknown Claimant requests written reasons for refusing amendment. 15.10.25 Claimant files claim 3, victimisation. 17.10.25 Claimant files claim 4, direct sex discrimination. 20.10.25 Written reasons for refusal of amendment provided: Reasonable adjustments application refused on time, timing and merit. Victimisation refused. EJ Wright notes 25. The whistle blowing amendment application was only partially allowed [by EJ Perry in April 2025]. A number of elements were refused, and it does appear to me that the bulk of this new victimisation claim, is simply seeking to relitigate an application that has already been refused. 26. It was not just at that previous hearing that it was refused. The claimant then made a subsequent application to try and amend the elements of the whistle blowing claim on 28 April 2025. That was refused by Judge Perry on the papers subject to one point which I will come on to shortly. Additional whistleblowing detriments refused. EJ Wright notes: 36. I adopt that assessment from Judge Perry. I find that the claimant is attempting to crowbar in detriments which have already been struck out having been labelled as harassment related to disability. 37. I find that this is a cynical attempt to keep elements of the claim alive, because if, as Judge Perry said, the claimant had genuinely thought these to be detriments due to whistle blowing, then they would have been included in the application to amend the claim to include one for whistleblowing, and therefore I refused that element of the application as well. 22.12.26 Respondents seek(i) strike out of claim 3 on grounds of having no reasonable prospect of success and/or for being scandalous and vexatious(ii) a deposit order due to the claim being out of time and the claims are already litigated in claim 2. 13.01.26 Claimant appeals decision of EJ Wright’s refusal to allow amendments to EAT. 13.03.26 Claimant makes 14 page application for specific disclosure in claim 2. 07.04.26 Claimant applies to amend claim 3 to add two further victimisation detriments. 11.05.26 Claimant makes application for witness orders in claim 2. 12.05.26 EJ Heath refuses the application to amend claim 3 as no reasons were provided to support the application. 15.06.26- Hearing of claim 2. Oral judgment given. All claims dismissed. 19.06.26 30.06.25 Written judgment (without reasons) issued. 01.07.26 Claimant applies to amend claim 3 to add four further victimisation detriments including the two which were refused on 12 May 2026 21.07.26 Hearing of application to amend claim 3 and strike out application for claim 3. Law, Decision and Reasons[13]I will first address the complaint made by Ms Moutziki during the hearing that the respondents were bringing a different argument to the one the claimant had expected and that this was unfair. Ms Moutziki did not request a postponement of the hearing. I addressed the complaint in the hearing. At the point the complaint was raised, which was after there had been a two hour reading break, and after Mr Pal had made his submissions, I said to the claimant that I did not agree. The respondents had raised the issues of vexatious and scandalous behaviour, the claims having no or little prospect of success, the claims being out of time and the same claims being relitigated in its application. In the skeleton argument Mr Pal had used the terms estoppel and Henderson abuse but was essentially setting out the respondents’ arguments as to why the claim was vexatious. Furthermore, having read the claimant’s submissions, they had clearly set out their response as to why they had brought amendments when they did, and why they did not accept that claim 3 was a relitigating of matters already decided. I noted that the claimant had had two hours to consider the skeleton argument and I offered the claimant a further one hour break, which he took. I heard submissions from Ms Moutziki after that further break. She again raised that it was difficult to engage with case law and complex legal points. I noted that that was not necessary, as a litigant in person, and she need only address the substantive argument, which I believed the claimant had both clearly understood and clearly responded to in his submissions. I am satisfied that the claimant had a fair hearing and was given the opportunity to consider and respond to the arguments put forward by the respondents. The basis of respondents’ application, which is clear to me and, from the written submissions of the claimant I conclude was clear to him, is that the claimant’s claim should be struck out as he is simply bringing back claims that he has already raised and he has either been refused permission to bring them, or they have been dismissed, and that these claims are now considerably out of time.[14]As the parties had spent significant time addressing each of the 22 allegations of detriment I decided that in deciding the application I would also start by considering each allegation and the points made by the parties. If, after that exercise, there were detriments not struck out, or if no detriments had been struck, out I would consider the respondent’s argument that the claim should be struck out in its entirety because of the vexatious nature of the litigation. After that I would decide the matter of deposit orders if any of the claim continued.[15]The detriments pleaded are set out in the claimant’s grounds of claim and labelled 22a to 22w. I have appended them to this judgment. One further detriment was allowed by way of amendment today. This is: The claimant was offered on 21 April 2026 the option to return to his team without the underlying relationship issues being resolved, which would involve a risk assessment and consideration of adjustments. These matters were not addressed in a series of emails between the claimant and Bethan Jones from 21 April 2026 to 21 May 2026.[16]I have labelled the further detriment as 22x. During the hearing Ms Moutziki said that detriment 22w was withdrawn. It was also agreed that detriments 22s to 22v were examples of the detriment claimed in 22r, so detriments 22r to 22v are dealt with as one.[17]In relation to each of the alleged detriments Mr Pal set out why the respondents say the allegations should be struck out. Ms Moutziki and the claimant addressed each of those submissions. I have taken into account both parties arguments in reaching the decisions set out below.[18]The Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 confer on the tribunal a discretion to strike out claims on the following grounds: 38.— Striking out(1) The Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party, strike out all or part of a claim, response or reply on any of the following grounds— (a) that it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success; (b) that the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by or on behalf of the claimant or the respondent (as the case may be) has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious; (c) for non-compliance with any of these Rules or with an order of the Tribunal; (d) that it has not been actively pursued; (e) that the Tribunal considers that it is no longer possible to have a fair hearing in respect of the claim, response or reply (or the part to be struck out).(2) A claim, response or reply may not be struck out unless the party advancing it has been given a reasonable opportunity to make representations, either in writing or, if requested by the party, at a hearing.(3) … Res judicata[19]In Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v Zodiac Seats UK Ltd (formerly Contour Aerospace Ltd) [2014] AC 160, SC, Lord Sumption explained the principles of res judicata and abuse of process, the purpose of which is to limit abusive litigation and avoid duplication. He set out six different categories which would fall under the heading of res judicata and abuse of process. The respondents rely on two of these in their strike out application: issue estoppel and the principle in Henderson v Henderson. Issue estoppel[20]Issue estoppel is defined by Lord Sumption in Virgin Atlantic Airways [17] as being 'where the cause of action is not the same in the later action as it was in the earlier one, some issue which is necessarily common to both was decided on the earlier occasion and is binding on the parties'. Mr Pal’s argument was that allegations a, e, h, j, p and r-v were issue estopped as they were allegations that had been adjudicated on in claim 2. Furthermore, allegations b, d, l and m were issue estopped as they had been brought within an amendment application and the application had been refused.[21]In relation to those issues adjudicated on in claim 2, while I agree that some of the allegations identified by Mr Pal have been adjudicated on (this is clear from the list of issues for that claim and the claimant’s comments in the preliminary hearing) the claimant said that the tribunal had found that some of the allegations raised were detriments but the claim had failed on causation. As there was only a short form judgment before me (no written reasons), I cannot make assumptions about what fact finding decisions the tribunal made or why it ultimately dismissed the claim and therefore I cannot conclude on the evidence before me that issue estoppel applies in respect of these allegations.[22]In relation to those issues which were the subject of an amendment application which was refused, Ms Moutziki referred to the case of Air Canada v Basra EAT/367/99 and submitted that estoppel can only apply where a determination of the issues has been made, i.e. a judgment, or as set out in Virgin Atlantic by Lord Sumption ‘a cause of action has been held to exist or not to exist’, and that a decision on an amendment was not a judgment for the purposes of estoppel. I note that the definition of judgment in the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024 is different to the definition in the equivalent rule at the time of the Basra decision. The definition now includes ‘’any issue which is capable of finally disposing of any claim, or part of a claim, even if it does not necessarily do so (for example, an issue whether a claim should be struck out or a jurisdictional issue). It is my view that an amendment decision could potentially create an estoppel. However, having considered carefully the reasons of EJ Wright dated 20 October 2025 I find that he carried out a full consideration of all the issues in relation to the application and while taking time issues into consideration, made his decision on a balance of hardship basis, which is not a decision on a jurisdictional issue. For that reason, I do not agree that any of the alleged detriments that formed part of an earlier amendment application are issue estopped. Henderson abuse[23]In Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 110 ChD, Sir James Wigram VC said, “where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case.”[24]As noted in the skeleton argument of Mr Pal, and drawn to my attention also by Ms Moutziki, Lord Bingham said in Johnson v Gore Wood and Co [2002] 2 AC 1, HL: “It is, however, wrong to hold that because a matter could have been raised in earlier proceedings it should have been, so as to render the raising of it in later proceedings necessarily abusive. That is to adopt too dogmatic an approach to what should in my opinion be a broad, merits-based judgment which takes account of the public and private interests involved and also takes account of all the facts of the case, focusing attention on the crucial question whether, in all the circumstances, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the court by seeking to raise before it the issue which could have been raised before.”[25]The respondents argue that many of the allegations of victimisation detriment could have been brought either at the time claim 2 was filed or as an amendment to claim 2. Claim 2 was filed on 21 August 2024 and the claimant brought applications to amend claim 2 on 21 and 25 March 2025, 28 April 2025 and 12 September 2025.[26]In an order dated 2 April 2025 following a hearing on 25 March 2025 EJ Perry records a conversation with claimant as follows: I explored with the Claimant whether the amendment [to add a complaint of protected disclosure detriment] was actually to include a claim of victimisation contrary to section 27 Equality Act 2010. For the purposes of the application to amend the difference is material because of the different tests in relation to extension of time. The Claimant did not positively assert that he wanted to change his application to one of victimisation and it is not my place to substitute it for him.[27]The claimant is a litigant in person but has brought claims under many different heads in detailed claims and applications to amend and can be assumed to have knowledge of the concept of victimisation as it is set out in the Equality Act 2010, particularly where he had decided to bring a claim of harassment. Furthermore, it was specifically pointed out to him by EJ Perry on 25 March 2026. The application to amend to include victimisation was not filed until 12 September 2025.[28]When considering the application to amend to add a claim of whistleblowing detriment EJ Perry noted in relation to the grievance process amendments that ‘if the claimant considered these matters to be detriments due to whistleblowing, he should have included that in his original claim’. I would go further. If the claimant considered that any of the matters he has raised as victimisation claims that postdate an alleged protected act and predate the filing of the second claim were detriments due to the making of a protected act, he should have included those in the original claim. The allegations of detriment that fall into this category are: e, i (insofar as it relates to the first grievance), j, k, n, o, p and q. I note that detriment e begins in June 2024, but examples are given that run into August 2025. Simply adding more examples of the same matter complained of (this matter was clearly a matter litigated in detail in claim 2 under the heading of protected disclosure detriment) does not mean that the allegation could only have been raised in July 2025.[29]All of those detriments constitute an abuse of process in that they could have been brought in earlier proceedings and therefore they are an abuse of process under the rule in Henderson and they are struck out under Rule 38(1)(a). I accept the point of Ms Moutziki that it is not every failure to bring a claim at the earliest opportunity that would lead to a Henderson abuse, but here there was simply no reason for the allegations not to have been brought as victimisation claims until 15 October 2025.[30]For allegations a, c, f, h, j and r-v, these could all have been brought as applications to amend either in March 2025 or thereafter including within the amendment application dated 12 September 2025. All of those detriments constitute an abuse of process in that they could have been brought in earlier proceedings and therefore they are an abuse of process under the rule in Henderson and they are struck out under Rule 38(1)(a). I note that these allegations were not included in the application to amend of 12 September 2025 but were included in this claim filed on 15 October 2025. There is no explanation for this and the period between those two dates bears no relevance to the allegations as pleaded. I do not accept that the final paragraph of r-v, which is unnumbered, saves that allegation. Again, it is simply referring to more of the same complaint and without any particulars.[31]In relation to all of the allegations struck out as an abuse of process I considered whether even though a finding of abuse of process had been made strike out was proportionate. I have noted that strike out is considered to be a draconian measure and have had regard to the overriding objective and particularly that cases should be dealt with in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues (Rule 3 (2)(a) Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024). I am satisfied that where the claimant has had one claim decided on much the same facts and where the allegations relate to issues that took place between two and three years ago, and he has failed to bring them to the tribunal as a claim of victimisation in a timely manner, with no good reason, that my discretion should be exercised to strike out the allegations[32]The allegations not struck out as a Henderson abuse are b, d, g, i, (insofar as it relates to the second grievance), l, m, and x. While these allegations do not fall under that heading, it is my view that all of them, including x relate to the same facts and are largely a repeat or extension of allegations already pleaded in claim 2 which was dismissed. Vexatious litigation[33]Mr Pal said that I should exercise my discretion to strike out the entire claim as being vexatious and conducted in an unreasonable manner. There had been a full hearing of claim 2 over four days in June in which the tribunal looked extensively at this period of the claimant’s working life. The claimant was asking the tribunal, and the respondent, to re-open that matter. The claimant’s claims were taking up a disproportionate amount of the tribunal’s time and disadvantaging other tribunal users. The claimant, in insisting on retaining the second respondent as a named respondent, was dragging her into stressful litigation where she had already defeated the previous claim against her. The third and fourth claims were brought on the same or similar facts to claim 2. The claim is vexatious and repeats earlier claims. The claimant is wrong to submit that a vexatious claim must be intentionally vexatious. What is relevant is the effect (Attorney General v Baker [2001]FLR 759).[34]The claimant submitted that the claim is not vexatious but brought so that the tribunal could judge his treatment by the respondent. The respondents were wrong to say that previous judges had characterised the litigation as vexatious. The claimant as a litigant in person had tried to act in what he saw as the most efficient way in the actions he had taken as regards issuing claims and amendment applications. The respondents had caused the problems by opposing the claimant’s applications.[35]In Attorney General v Barker Lord Bingham defined vexatious litigation: The hallmark of a vexatious proceeding is in my judgment that it has little or no basis in law (or at least no discernible basis); that whatever the intention of the proceeding may be, its effect is to subject the defendant to inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to any gain likely to accrue to the claimant; and that it involves an abuse of the process of the court, meaning by that a use of the court process for a purpose or in a way which is significantly different from the ordinary and proper use of the court process.[19] …the court has become familiar with the hallmark of persistent and habitual litigious activity. The hallmark usually is that the plaintiff sues the same party repeatedly in reliance on essentially the same cause of action, perhaps with minor variations, after it has been ruled upon, thereby imposing on defendants the burden of resisting claim after claim; that the claimant relies on essentially the same cause of action, perhaps with minor variations, after it has been ruled upon, in actions against successive parties who if they were to be sued at all should have been joined in the same action; that the claimant automatically challenges every adverse decision on appeal; and that the claimant refuses to take any notice of or give any effect to orders of the court. The essential vice of habitual and persistent litigation is keeping on and on litigating when earlier litigation has been unsuccessful and when on any rational and objective assessment the time has come to stop. [20][36]I find that this litigation is vexatious. As can be seen from the chronology above the claimant has challenged almost every refusal of an amendment, he has challenged the strike out of claim 1 and has in addition sought to renew or repeat amendment applications that were refused. This claim, claim 3, is almost identical to the application to amend made on 12 September 2025 and which was refused by EJ Wright, other than it includes a few more recent allegations, but still of essentially the same nature. All of claims 2, 3 and 4 rely on the same underlying facts. Claim 2, has been heard in full and dismissed. It is my decision that the actions of the claimant fall clearly into the definition of vexatious litigation set out by Lord Bingham in paragraph 20 of Baker. I do not accept that the claimant was simply trying to be efficient. I find that the effect of the claimant’s actions has been to impose on the respondents the time, expense, and for the second respondent anxiety, of defending multiple repetitive claims which is disproportionate to the claims brought and gains likely to be accrued. In this respect the first respondent had to respond to claim 1 which was struck out. The respondents have had to defend claim 2 which was dismissed. It has had to respond to numerous unmeritorious amendment applications. I note that the claimant made a long and detailed application for specific disclosure in claim 2 and Ms Moutziki still maintained at the preliminary hearing that one of the reasons for the late complaints about allegations was withholding of disclosure by the respondent. When I asked if this had been made known to the tribunal panel hearing claim 2 and if it had decided to proceed despite that complaint, she confirmed that it had known and proceeded in any event. The claimant also made a detailed application for witness orders. To my knowledge these were not granted but the respondents still had to respond. In the words of Lord Bingham, what the claimant is doing is refusing to take any notice of or give any effect to the orders of the court.[37]A claim can be struck out under Rule 38(1)(a) but even where a claim is determined to be vexatious, I still need to go on to consider whether to exercise my discretion to strike out the claim and in doing so consider whether it is proportionate to do so. Again, I have had regard to the overriding objective and particularly that cases should be dealt with in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues (Rule 3 (2)(a) Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024). I include in the reasoning below the entirety of the claim including those allegations which I have already deemed to be a Henderson abuse. I note that the claimant has had a claim of protected disclosure detriment determined by the tribunal at a full hearing. He still has a live discrimination claim (claim 4). The time already taken up in the tribunal is not proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues and the likelihood, based on the chronology set out above, is that if this claim continues, the future conduct of the proceedings will be of a nature that continues to take up a disproportionate amount of the tribunal’s resources. Furthermore, I am not convinced of the merits of the claim. On the same facts under a different head of claim the tribunal has found that the claim was without merit. If the claimant was clear that he had a meritorious victimisation claim when he issued claim 2, he would have brought it then or sought an amendment at the hearing with EJ Perry on 25 March 2025, but he did not do so. For all of these reasons I find that the entire claim should be struck out under Rule 38(1)(a) as being vexatious. Approved by: Employment Judge W Anderson 28 July 2026 Notes Reasons for the judgment having been given orally at the hearing, written reasons will not be provided unless a request was made by either party at the hearing or a written request is presented by either party within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision. If written reasons are provided they will be placed online. All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 51) and any written reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimants and respondents. If a Tribunal hearing has been recorded, you may request a transcript of the recording. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, you will have to pay for it. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings and accompanying Guidance, which can be found here: www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislationpractice-directions/ Appendix to Judgment on case 2309321/2025 Protected Acts 21. The protected acts this claim relies on are:a. Sending an email titled “Meeting” (25 July 2023) ahead of a meeting with Bethan Jones, School manager for BMBS, in which I listed the issues I wanted to discuss. The issues included the “tribal hierarchy” comments as well as the lack of any adjustments following my return to work from medical leave in June 2023.b. Raising a formal grievance on 8 August 2024 in which I complained about the Second Respondent’s ethnic minority bias as well as bullying and harassment relating to disability.c. Bringing claims for harassment related to race and disability to the Employment Tribunal by filing an ET1 on 21 August 2024d. Appealing the grievance outcome in January 2025 by sending an appeal letter to Caroline Brayshaw in which I raised the issue of bias against ethnic minorities, as well the issues of bullying and harassment.e. Filing a claim for whistleblowing detriment on 20 March 2025 that relied on the “Meeting” email and my reporting of racial bias as the protected disclosure.f. My formal application to the Employment Tribunal on 12 September 2025 to relabel my claim for whistleblowing detriment to one of victimisation under the Equality Act 2010. This was a procedural step taken for the purposes of and in connection with the Act Detriments 22. Because I performed these protected acts the Respondents subjected me to the following detriments (starting with the most recent) which constitute conduct extending over a period within the meaning of section 123 of the Equality Act 2010. The continuing campaign of victimisation includes direct retaliation by the Second Respondent as well as systemic detrimental treatments by the First Respondent’s staff. a. The First Respondent’s failure to discuss the outcome of my appeal, the organisation’s plans for my role, and the resumption of my full duties in a meeting on 20 August 2025. The First Respondent had repeatedly justified my diminished responsibilities and “special projects” arrangement as a temporary necessity while the grievance and appeal were ongoing. Following the release of the appeal outcome on 25 July 2025, I was hopeful that my full responsibilities would be restored. An email from Bethan Jones on that same day seemed to confirm this expectation: “HR have let me know that the outcome from your appeal has been released today. As you know, I will be on leave next week but will look to find a time to catch up with you about this when I’m back. I think our current Monday sessions end at the end of this month so we will need to set up some new meetings. I will need to meet with HR to understand the details beforehand so can I suggest we find a time when I’m clear about this when I’m back.” The meeting finally took place on 20 August 2025 but none of the anticipated matters were discussed. Bethan Jones did not mention the concluded appeal, offered no insight regarding the organisation’s plans for my role, and gave no reason for abandoning the conversation she had herself proposed. Despite her earlier suggestion that our weekly meetings would resume after July, no further meetings were arranged, no updates were provided, and I have effectively been left “in the dark” ever since. This apparent “change of mind” is a strong indication of events being directed at a senior level. In a chance meeting later, in October 2025, Bethan Jones claimed that the meeting fell out of the diary. The effective silence after the meeting in August which continues to this day, feels like a strategic pause compounding my sense of isolation and causing considerable uncertainty and anxiety. b. The failure to disclose the Second Respondent’s response statement with the grievance appendices in December 2024. The First Respondent’s failure to include the response statement in the grievance appendices was an act of concealment which deprived me of a fair opportunity to argue my case at the PH on 24 March 2025. In that hearing, Employment Judge Perry struck out my claim of harassment related to disability on the grounds that there was “no objective link between the conduct and the protected characteristic.” The First Respondent, however, had in its possession a statement from the Second Respondent in which she described me as “delusional”. This language, had it been disclosed, may have provided the missing link that the Tribunal had identified. It is particularly troubling that a large employer, with a large HR department and knowledge of internal procedure and litigation, would withhold material evidence relevant to a live Tribunal claim. It is likely that the document was deliberately withheld to secure the dismissal of my claim. c. The Second Respondent’s dissemination of a multitude of defamatory allegations, outright falsehoods and other misleading information in her response statement and interview for my grievance. The false allegations are not only insulting on a personal as well as professional levels but they likely influenced the grievance outcomes against me. Below are a few examples of the falsehoods (and pure inventions) contained in the response statement and interview notes: 1. Steven’s refusal to accept the restructure was manifested in several ways including … refusing to work alongside the Technical Manager in CGTRM to line manage Hakeem, the Grade 3 technician. 2. the spurious allegation that I had “discussed his contract of employment in front of Michael Allen” 3. I was not able to put anything in place and he never asked for anything specific (when asked about my requests for role clarification). 4. regarding the return-to-work meeting after his previous sick leave, which he had said I didn’t do, but I did (referring to my complaint that we did not have a return to work meeting after my first period of medical leave in April -June 2023). 5. He contacted Bethan first which is what he would do generally (when reporting sick leave). 6. I felt he was avoiding me and felt this went back to the start of the first grievance that he was trying to make me irrelevant by having regular meetings with Bethan. He wouldn’t contact me when he was off sick. He’d applied for my job, and he didn’t get the job, so he was sidelining me and would carry on as though he was being managed by Bethan. 7. I didn’t feel there was anything inappropriate going on, but I felt he used that situation to remove me from his working life (regarding imaginary meetings with Bethan Jones). 8. By December 2023, he began to send increasingly petty emails asking for direction in tasks where he should have been able to show initiative. This added to my own workload which I found difficult. 9. When I tried to set expectations, Steven was rude and completely dismissive of my authority as his line manager. d. The First Respondent’s unquestioning acceptance of the Second Respondent’s falsehoods and their failure to follow their own policy. The First Respondent’s grievance investigators demonstrated an unquestioning acceptance of the falsehoods in the Second Respondent’s response statement and interview notes. The First Respondent’s own Dignity at King’s: Prevention of Bullying, Harassment and Sexual Misconduct Policy, requires staff to report and treat as misconduct false allegations against colleagues. Having drawn attention to the falsehoods I was aware of in my appeal letter, I expected they would be examined as part of a fair process but instead they were left unchallenged. The appeal report simply concluded that “While it is not possible to conclude that there was deliberate misrepresentation, it is accepted that parts of LS account or perspective are contrary to SC’s own” e. I was subjected to ongoing professional exclusion from June 2024 onwards whereas the Second Respondent has retained her standing. I have been excluded from technical team meetings and as a result from the technical team minutes and updates which are necessary for me to keep up to date with developments. In 2025 I was removed from the line management of my direct reports. In August 2025 I became aware that I had not been given access to the SharePoint database of technical documents, a school -wide resource available to academic and technical staff as well as students. I believe that I was likely excluded from SharePoint by the Second Respondent who has oversight. In June 2025, I was excluded from the process of hiring a grade 4 technician to replace my direct report who moved to another department. The grade 4 technician will be working alongside me when I resume my role. I was not invited to review the applications for the post nor was I invited to interview the applicants or consulted in any way. I happened to be in the office when the interviews were taking place and observed the candidates being interviewed. In July 2025 the successful candidate started work but he was not introduced to me. f. In June 2025 I made an official request for clarification on two issues relating to the handling of my personal information. I asked for justification for the non compliance with a data access request from November 2024 which remains unfulfilled and for clarification on the legal basis for the First Respondent’s staff accessing my health information (OH report) multiple times without my consent during the period between June 2024 to October 2024. I received no reply so I wrote again in July 2025 asking for confirmation of receipt of my request and again received no reply. I present this here not as a failure of the First Respondent to comply with obligations under UK GDPR but as a failure to extend to me the professional courtesy of responding to a request for information regarding the handling of sensitive personal material. The failure to respond is also a failure to comply with the First Respondent’s own data protection procedure which, among other assurances, states that “The university will keep personal data secure and manage incidents effectively when things go wrong “.g. On 13 January 2025 Bethan Jones failed to attend a scheduled meeting and contacted me again nearly a month later on 6 February 2025. Again the explanation was that the meeting “fell out of the diary”. It is highly irregular for senior staff to fail to attend a regular meeting and to resurface a month later, furthermore it was Bethan Jones who requested that our weekly meetings resume after the Christmas break in an email a few days prior, on 8 January 2025.h. The First Respondent has failed to keep me up to date on the tenure of staff who have been replacing my role since June 2024. Because of this and the lack of any updates regarding my working status I was led to believe that I would be returning to work in September 2024 and went to the office only to find my temporary replacement was still in place and her tenure extended. After that I was led to believe that I would be returning to work in January 2025 only to find out, from the Second Respondent’s email to staff in MMG and SJID, that my replacement would be in place until April 2025. Following this, there was an additional extension to July 2025; I was not officially informed of this either but happened to attend the monthly meeting of academic staff in MMG in April 2025 where the information was shared with them. Such repeated failures to communicate even the most basic information about my role are not just oversights; they are deeply disrespectful acts of exclusion. To be left to discover decisions about my own position by accident, or from communications directed to others, is demeaning and falls below the most basic standards of professional conduct.i. Failure to investigate my two grievances and appeals in a prompt and fair manner. The First Respondent’s handling of both my grievances has consistently fallen short of the ACAS Code of Practice: they were neither thorough nor impartial, key evidence and witnesses I suggested were ignored, transcripts were manipulated and essential material withheld. The complaints in my second grievance about the Second Respondent’s veiled threats, sarcasm, and confrontational tone in public emails in January 2024 were reduced to a breach of “email etiquette” and “lack of professionalism that could be improved.” My complaint of ethnic minority bias against my direct report Hakeem Yusuff based on the “tribal hierarchy” comments was not investigated instead it was removed from the record until I appealed. Lisa Sanderson’s expression of supposed “regret” in her interview was accepted at face value, despite her simultaneously referring to me in dismissive terms such as “Steven started to moan about his workload.” and labelling my work emails as “bombardment” and “petty”. The investigators excused Lisa Sanderson’s behaviour by invoking her own bereavement, although it did not happen until several weeks after the incidents of January 2024. Overall, the investigations were perfunctory, unfair and did little to reassure me that the avoidance of bullying or discrimination is taken seriously by the Respondent. Overall, the second grievance investigation showed a pattern of indulgence and soft language towards Lisa Sanderson’s bereavement and personal difficulties whereas my own bereavement and distress was labelled “strongly held feelings”. The report made no reference to the health deterioration that followed Lisa Sanderson’s conduct, nor to the fact that I was signed off work for several months immediately afterwards. It is difficult to reconcile this disregard with an organisation that claims to take wellbeing and disabled staff seriously.j. Bethan Jones siding with the Second Respondent and excusing her behaviour when interviewed for the grievance investigation. In contrast to the “neutral” position taken with me, Bethan Jones sided with the Second Respondent in her interview for the grievance investigation. She described the bullying incidents in January 2024 as “a communication issue” and suggested that my objection to the public criticism was simply me “being defensive.”. She also excused the bullying behaviour as a result of “frustration” with me. When questioned about the Second Respondent referring me to my contract in front of a third person, Bethan Jones replied that “contracts don’t differ greatly between colleagues and we all have one”.k. Bethan Jones, acting as my line manager from June 2024 onwards, demonstrated what can only be described as indulgence towards Lisa Sanderson. Shortly after assuming my line management Bethan Jones pointedly urged me to discuss and explain my feelings to Lisa Sanderson so that she would not feel excluded, she also referred to my reluctance to communicate with Lisa Sanderson as “pushing Lisa away”. Otherwise, she has refused to discuss the events of January 2024 and to clarify core concerns: the persistent and unwarranted criticism in public emails, the threatening tone disguised as “concern,” the ad hoc and discriminatory allocation of tasks and resources, and the deliberate inclusion of senior staff in emails criticising my performance in order to shame me publicly. Bethan Jones has claimed neutrality pointing to the ongoing grievance process, without acknowledging the impact on me of leaving these issues unresolved. For any employee in my position, it is important to know whether criticism made against them is considered justified or not. I believe all criticism levelled by the Second Respondent was unwarranted and misinformed, and even a basic discussion to clarify the facts would have been immensely helpful without prejudicing any grievance outcomes. The lack of any engagement on this subject has left me feeling unsupported, marginalised, and discriminated against since January 2024.l. The OH assessment that followed by return to work in June 2024 was accessed by at least three members of the First Respondents staff without my knowledge or consent and I was misled about this in July 2024. I first asked Bethan Jones if she received the report shortly after its release on 24 June 2024. The reply was “I have a stack of them for the School on my desk”. When I asked again for confirmation of receipt on 12 July 2024 the reply this time was “it has not landed in my inbox yet”. In January I obtained my clinical history records which show that the report had been accessed multiple times from 24/6/ 2024 to 14/10/2024 including on 12 July 2024.m. Despite the First Respondent’s staff being in possession of the OH report since June 2024, it was never discussed with me and some of the recommendations were not implemented. I have not had a discussion regarding reasonable adjustments. In fact I have not been officially informed that the OH report has been received by the First Respondent.n. Aside from the official recommendations, the OH report also advised the removal of stressors which in my case is the Second Respondent. While this was initially implemented through a temporary change in line management, I am often reminded of the organisational needs that are contrary to this arrangement (including in my second grievance outcome) and Bethan Jones frequently referred to the prospect of me being "reintegrated back into the team” when my grievance investigations were concluded. Given that my concerns have been consistently trivialised or ignored and that the Second Respondent has been more favourably treated and supported throughout, I have been under the constant worry that I will eventually be placed back under her line management.o. Overall, the First Respondent has adopted a cold, procedural approach to my health and well being and ultimately failed in their duty of care towards me. There was no feedback, support or engagement of any kind after I reported the managerial failures, racial bias and my health deterioration in July 2023. No reasonable adjustments were discussed at that stage. The Second Respondent’s bullying behaviour in December 2023 and January 2024 happened in plain sight but there was no intervention from senior staff copied in the emails. The Transport for London staff who accompanied me to Urgent Care and subsequently to A&E on 29 January 2024 telephoned Bethan Jones to inform her of my condition but I was not contacted by the First Respondent in the four months of medical leave that followed. The only gesture of support I received since my disability diagnosis in May 2023 was the OH referral a year later in June 2024, but the report was ignored. I have not been offered the much needed role clarity more than a year after this was advised in the OH report and nearly two years after the same suggestion was made in my first grievance report in March 2024.p. My reporting of the Second Respondent’s bias against ethnic minority staff resulted in the deterioration of the Second respondent’s behaviour towards me in December 2023 when her email responses began to appear unnecessarily pointed and critical. They were also public with multiple members of staff copied in. The timing is telling; on 30 November 2023 she was interviewed for my first grievance and according to her interview notes from the second grievance appendices (released in December 2024) she believed she was being investigated for her “line management” and appeared to have resented this. The Second Respondent’s behaviour intensified in January 2024 following my return to work from compassionate leave. Her behaviour included public criticisms, veiled threats, sarcastic email responses and what can only be considered as hostile conduct during a meeting in person on 19 January 2024. In summary, she first sent a calendar invite on 17 January 2024, asking for a meeting the following day, which I had to decline due to a scheduled meeting in the morning and the need to take the afternoon off at short notice to register my father’s death. Her email reply, attaching the Respondent’s PDF on compassionate leave policy, instructed me to inform her of future absences in advance for the purpose of making TeamSeer (employee absence) entries. This felt like a veiled threat to me. The meeting was finally arranged for the following day, 19 January 2024, ostensibly to discuss additional compassionate leave requirements but was mainly used to assign blame to me for the failed maintenance of a freezer while I was on compassionate leave. She appeared to have expected that I would delegate this task to the grade 4 technician while I was on compassionate leave. When I responded saying “but Lisa my father died” she replied “I know” in a dismissive tone as if the matter was unimportant and irrelevant. Within days, further confrontations and sarcastic emails followed mainly on 25 January 2024 involving a noise incident. This incident, combined with the wider pattern of her conduct during the period between 17-25 January 2024 culminated in acute stress and distress resulting in a hypertensive crisis during my commute to work on Monday 29 January 2024 and the subsequent four-month medical leave.q. Reallocation of responsibilities in January 2024. The Second Respondent reassigned responsibility for the 8th floor of Guy’s Hospital Tower to me, contradicting the established allocation in official documentation and her own prior emails. The incident occurred during a public email exchange on 25 January 2024 in which she copied senior academic staff and her line manager, using a confrontational tone and sarcastic remarks clearly intended to undermine me professionally. This ad hoc reassignment extended my oversight to three floors of Guy’s Hospital Tower floors and while my colleague, who had been responsible for that floor, retained a much lighter workload. The incident caused professional embarrassment and significant frustration, reinforced my isolation, and directly preceded the deterioration in my health that led to my medical leave on 29 January 2024.r. The Second Respondent misrepresented my performance and behaviour to Bethan Jones (her line manager) in the period before January 2024, and appears to have succeeded. I was made aware of this after reading Bethan Jones’s interview notes in the grievance appendices released in December 2024. The false allegations are presented as facts in the interview notes. I was very disappointed to see that Bethan Jones, whom I have known for many years and who should be aware of my abilities and work ethic, accepted the Second Respondent’s defamatory allegations as facts. Bethan Jones had also undertaken an informal review of my performance (around the same time I believe) canvassing academic staff for feedback which had been positive. It is therefore difficult to reconcile the positive feedback about my work with her willingness to accept claims to the contrary. The allegations (as put forward by Bethan Jones in her interview notes) included:s. “Steve was always pleasant and expressed understanding of his job to me, with regard to the management of St John’s but Lisa reported he was less engaged on the ground”.t. “Steve also started to disengage from Lisa over time”u. “They’d have 1-1 but I think he started withdrawing from these and having them done online, but not completely sure. Lisa told me he started avoiding these meetings with her”v. “she felt he should have been picking up within his role regarding contributions in St John’s, but wasn’t”. I also have reasons to believe that the Second Respondent’s defamatory campaign is ongoing. In my opinion the Second Respondent had continued to misrepresent my character to other staff such as my temporary replacements and other technical managers in the School of BMBS.w. In July 2023, in the email and subsequent meeting with Bethan Jones, in addition to reporting the ethnic minority bias I experienced, I also raised complaints relating to Lisa Sanderson’s failure to support me with my deteriorating health and discuss adjustments after my medical leave, the failure to provide me with role clarity and a work plan and the fact that she had ignored my requests to that effect. My concerns were acknowledged politely but not acted upon. The opportunity to initiate a conversation regarding adjustments and providing me with much needed role clarity and a fair allocation of resources was missed; instead events escalated, Lisa Sanderson’s behaviour towards me worsened and resulted in clearly avoidable breakdown of my health in January 2024.