Ms A Ropkins and Others v Secretary of State for Business and Trade and Bishop Challoner School (in voluntary liquidation): 2308768/2025 and Others
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 2308768/2025
Between
(1) Ms A Ropkins, (2) Mr A Peck, (3) Ms A-M Flower, (4) Mrs A M Sweet, (5) Ms H Razii Ryall, (6) Ms C Toomey, (7) Mrs V Bastin, (8) Ms Scicluna-Chapman, (9) Mrs H Bateman-Higgs, (10) Miss C Chamberlain, (11) Mr C Coultart, (12) Mrs N Gordon, (13) Mrs D Cutting, (14) Miss E M Harding, (15) Miss G Cobalchini, (16) Mr A Fox (17) Mr M Kent-Davies, (18) Mr G Dass, (19) Mr J Dennehy, (20) Ms R ShalabiClaimant(1) Secretary of State for Business and Trade (2) Bishop Challoner School (in voluntary liquidation)Respondent
Before
Employment Judge RamsdenDate 21 June 2026
JUDGMENT
[1]In light of the significant degree of non-compliance by the Second Respondent, the Tribunal considers it appropriate to make a protective award under section 189(3) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (the 1992 Act) to each of the Claimants (being employees at the Second Respondent’s site who were dismissed for redundancy on 4 July 2025) remuneration for the period of 80 days beginning on 4 July 2025 and ending on 22 September 2025.[2]The Employment Protection (Recoupment of Benefits) Regulations 1996 (the Recoupment Regulations) apply to the protective awards.[3]The Second Respondent discriminated against the First Claimant because of something arising in consequence of her disability, contrary to section 15 of the Equality Act 2010 (the 2010 Act). The Second Respondent is Ordered to pay the First Claimant £17,500 by way of compensation for injury to feelings in respect of those of complaints. 1 of 32[4]The Second Respondent did not fail to comply with its duty to make reasonable adjustments in respect of the First Claimant (pursuant to sections 20 and 21 of the 2010 Act).[5]The Second Respondent unfairly dismissed each of the following Claimants (contrary to sections 94 and 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (the 1996 Act), and is Ordered to pay to them the sum of money identified in respect of them below: a) The First Claimant: £313.08; b) The Second Claimant: £4,977.87; c) The Fourth Claimant: £300; d) The Eighth Claimant: £300; e) The Eleventh Claimant: £31,833.35;[6]The Second Respondent breached the contract of employment of each of the following Claimants by failing to pay them for the period 5 July 2025 to 31 August 2025 (the eight-week school summer holiday) by way of holiday accrued for work performed during the academic year (the Leave Pay). The Second Respondent is Ordered to pay to that Claimant the sum of money identified in respect of them below: a) The First Claimant: £0; b) The Second Claimant: £8,612.31 gross; c) The Third Claimant: £7,721.38 gross; d) The Fourth Claimant: £3,089.85 gross; e) The Fifth Claimant: £6,010.92 gross; f) The Sixth Claimant: £8,707.70 gross; g) The Seventh Claimant: £8,246.31 gross; h) The Eighth Claimant: £2,098.46 gross; i) The Eleventh Claimant: £10,937.99 gross; j) The Twelfth Claimant: £8,639.04 gross; k) The Thirteenth Claimant: £8,442.46 gross; l) The Fourteenth Claimant: £4,125.08 gross; m) The Fifteenth Claimant: £6,527.69 gross; n) The Sixteenth Claimant: £1,406.75 gross; o) The Seventeenth Claimant: £6,915.98 gross; p) The Eighteenth Claimant: £7,404.31 gross; q) The Nineteenth Claimant: £6,365.68 gross; and r) The Twentieth Claimant: £3,975.69 gross.[7]The Second Respondent wrongfully dismissed each of the following Claimants, and is Ordered to pay to them the sum of money identified in respect of them below: a) The First Claimant: £3,166.77 gross; b) The Second Claimant: £7,104.43 gross; c) The Third Claimant: £0; d) The Fourth Claimant: £55.79 gross; e) The Fifth Claimant: £0; f) The Sixth Claimant: £0; g) The Eighth Claimant: £0; h) The Eleventh Claimant: £15,799.32 gross; i) The Twelfth Claimant: £0; 2 of 32 j) The Thirteenth Claimant: £0; k) The Fourteenth Claimant: £503.75 gross; l) The Fifteenth Claimant: £1,759.04 gross; m) The Sixteenth Claimant: £0; n) The Seventeenth Claimant: £0; o) The Eighteenth Claimant: £0; p) The Nineteenth Claimant: £4,782.82 gross; and q) The Twentieth Claimant: £0.[8]The Seventh Claimant withdrew her complaint that she was wrongfully dismissed, and that complaint is dismissed upon its withdrawal.[9]The Eleventh Claimant withdrew his complaint that he is owed a statutory redundancy payment, and that complaint is dismissed upon its withdrawal.[10]Each Claimant must account to HMRC for any income tax and/or employee’s National Insurance contributions payable on any sums received by them pursuant to this judgment.
REASONS
[11]Each of the Claimants was employed by the Second Respondent, which operated a school on a single site.[12]More than 20 employees were made redundant by the Second Respondent on the single day of 4 July 2025, and those people made redundant include the Claimants. Applicable to all Claimants Can the Claimants bring this complaint?[13]Each of the Claimants brings a complaint under section 189 of the 1992 Act that the Second Respondent failed to comply with the requirements of section 188 of the 1992 Act.[14]Section 189 concerns complaints made to the Employment Tribunal in respect of a failure to comply with section 188 of the 1992 Act. That reads: “(1) Where an employer has failed to comply with a requirement of section 188 or section 188A, a complaint may be presented to an employment tribunal on that ground-(a) in the case of any failure relating to the election of employee representatives, by any of the affected employees or by any of the employees who have been dismissed as redundant;(b) in the case of any other failure relating to employee representatives, by any of the employee representatives to whom the failure related; 3 of 32(c) in the case of failure relating to representatives of a trade union, by the trade union; and(d) in any other case, by any of the affected employees or by any of the employees who have been dismissed as redundant.[15]The Claimants here do not bring a complaint that there was a failure by the Second Respondent to elect employee representatives – so (a) does not apply.[16]The evidence of the Claimants is that: a) There were no employee representatives at the Second Respondent; and b) There was no trade union recognised in respect of them. While some of the Claimants were members of the NASUWT or NEU, neither union was not recognised by the Second Respondent.[17]The Tribunal is therefore satisfied that each of the Claimants can bring a complaint that there has been a failure by the Second Respondent to comply with section 188 in respect of them. Was the obligation to collectively consult engaged?[18]Section 188 of the 1992 Act provides: “(1) Where an employer is proposing to dismiss as redundant 20 or more employees at one establishment within a period of 90 days or less, the employer shall consult about the dismissals all the persons who are appropriate representatives of any of the employees who may be affected by the proposed dismissals or may be affected by measures taken in connection with those dismissals.”[19]As set out in the Context section above, the Second Respondent did dismiss more than 20 employees (the evidence of the Claimants to the Tribunal was that it dismissed around 60 employees) working on a single site (its only site, and only establishment) on a single day, on 4 July 2025. Therefore the Second Respondent was obliged, by the terms of section 188(1), to consult about the proposal to make those dismissals. Did the Second Respondent fail to comply with section 188 in respect of the Claimants?[20]Section 188 obliges an employer to: a) Begin that consultation “in good time”, and in any event, at least 30 days before 4 July 2025, pursuant to section 188(1A); b) That consultation was to include consultation about ways of avoiding the dismissals, reducing the numbers of employees to be dismissed, and mitigating the consequences of the dismissals, with a view to reaching agreement (section 188(2)); and c) Disclose information about:(i) The reasons for proposing the dismissals;(ii) The numbers and descriptions of employees whom it is proposed to dismiss as redundant at the establishment;(iii) The total number of employees of those employees proposed to be dismissed as redundant at the establishment; 4 of 32(iv) The proposed method of selecting those employees for dismissal;(v) The proposed method of carrying out the dismissals, including the period over which the dismissals are to take effect;(vi) The proposed method of calculating the amount of redundancy payments;(vii) The number of agency workers working temporarily for and under the supervision and direction of the employer;(viii) The parts of the employer’s undertaking in which those agency workers are working;(ix) The type of work being carried out by those agency workers (section 188(4)).[21]Where special circumstances render it not reasonably practicable for the employer to comply with the above requirements, the employer is obliged to take all such steps towards compliance as are reasonably practicable in the circumstances (section 188(7)).[22]On the facts here, the Claimants (besides the First Claimant, who was absent from work and was not informed or consulted with – and that failure in respect of her is the subject of a discrimination complaint described below) all agree that the Second Respondent: a) All employees of the Second Respondent were affected by the Second Respondent’s decision to close the school with effect from 4 July 2025. All employees of the Second Respondent were to be made redundant on that date; b) The Claimants were informed on 21 March 2025 that, due to financial circumstances, a number of positions had been identified as being at risk of redundancy, and those affected would be consulted. None of the Claimants were among those consulted with if there was consultation carried out at that time. The Claimants were told on 21 March 2025 that the Second Respondent was financially viable for the next academic year, i.e., until 31 August 2026; c) On 11 June 2025, all staff members on site were summoned to a meeting with the Second Respondent’s trustees. They were informed that the school would close permanently on 4 July 2025. There was no “proposal” discussed – the decision had been taken. Members of the team of the insolvency practitioners whom it was proposed to appoint as liquidators in respect of the Second Respondent were present at that meeting, and they made it clear that there was no intention to explore or pursue options to save the school; d) Enquiries were made by NASUWT for information, and it reminded the Second Respondent of its statutory obligations to carry out meaningful consultation, on 12 and 16 June 2025; e) On 16 June 2025, the Second Respondent sent a Staff Q&A document to the Claimants (excluding the First Claimant), and that document stated that “No specific consultation will occur due to the closure of the School”; and f) The Clerk to the Trustees of the Second Respondent replied to NASUWT replied on the Trustees’ behalf on 19 June 2025, stating the Second 5 of 32 Respondent was aware of its legal obligation to consult, but asserting that the Second Respondent had no choice but to close the school.[23]It is clear from the above, therefore, that the Second Respondent provided some, though not all, of the information it was obliged to provide to the Claimants by section 188(4), and the Second Respondent carried out no consultation whatsoever with the Claimants.[24]Specifically, the Tribunal notes that: a) The Claimants (save for Ms Ropkins) were informed on 11 June 2025 that the Second Respondent would be closing on 4 July 2025; b) No consultation was undertaken about ways of avoiding redundancies, ways of reducing the number of employees to be dismissed, or mitigating the consequences of the dismissals. The Claimants were told that the Board of Trustees of the Second Respondent had decided to close the school, and the reasons for that decision; c) As for the information provided, the Claimants were told:(i) Of the Second Respondent’s reason for closing the school; and(ii) Implicitly (by the statement that the school would close), that all of the Second Respondent’s employees would be dismissed as redundant; d) The Claimants were not told: (i) The total number of employees that would be made redundant; (ii) The way in which their redundancy payments would be calculated; or(iii) The number of agency workers working temporarily for and under the supervision and direction of the Second Respondent, or the parts of the Second Respondent’s business in which those agency workers were working, or the type of work carried out by them; and e) The Claimants were also not told about: (i) The method for selection of employees for redundancies, but there was no such selection method given all employees were affected; or (ii) The method for carrying out the dismissals, but that is because all employees were being dismissed on a single date on the closure of the school. Remedy for that non-compliance[25]Where such a complaint succeeds, a declaration is mandatory, but whether to make a protective award is discretionary (section 189(2)).[26]A protective award, if made, imposes an obligation on the employer to pay remuneration (as described in section 190) during the protected period. Should a protective award be made, and if so, what is the protected period?[27]As set out in section 189(4) of the 1992 Act, the protected period cannot exceed 90 days, and its length is to such as the tribunal considers “just and equitable in all the circumstances having regard to the seriousness of the employer’s default”. 6 of 32[28]Guidance as to how to approach this question was provided by the Court of Appeal in the case of Susie Radin Ltd v GMB [2004] IRLR 400: “Employment tribunals should have the following matters in mind when deciding in the exercise of their discretion whether to make a protective award and for what period:(1) The purpose of the award is to provide a sanction for breach by the employer of the obligations in s.188: it is not to compensate the employees for loss which they have suffered in consequence of that breach.(2) Tribunals have a wide discretion to do what is just and equitable in all the circumstances, but the focus should be on the seriousness of the employer's default.(3) The default may vary in seriousness from the technical to a complete failure to provide any of the required information and to consult.(4) The deliberateness of the failure may be relevant, as may the availability to the employer of legal advice about his obligations under s.188.(5) How the length of the protected period is assessed is a matter for the tribunal, but a proper approach in a case where there has been no consultation is to start with the maximum period and reduce it only if there are mitigating circumstances justifying a reduction to an extent which the tribunal considers appropriate.”[29]The fourth factor, “the deliberateness of the failure”, was considered in Amicus v GBS Tooling Ltd [2005] IRLR 683. In that case, the fact the employers had kept the union informed of the situation as regards their insolvency and that redundancies were likely was a mitigating factor justifying a reduction in the protective award. The EAT contrasted the situation where an employer has deliberately set out to be secretive with one where the employer failed to disclose information through negligence or misguidedness. The EAT also found that it is open to the tribunal to take account of what occurred prior to the date on which the proposal to make redundancies was made, but it is irrelevant to consider whether the consultation would have made any difference to the outcome.[30]Neither the employer’s financial state nor the fact that the burden of meeting the awards is likely to fall to the Insolvency Service (i.e., the tax payer) are relevant factors (Smith v Cherry Lewis Ltd (in receivership) [2005] IRLR 86).[31]If there has been some consultation, however limited, then the tribunal is compelled thereby to reduce the compensation below the maximum (UK Coal Mining Ltd v National Union of Mineworkers (Northumberland Area) [2008] ICR 163).[32]The Tribunal notes that, on the facts here, the Second Respondent: a) Disclosed some of the information necessary for consultation (and arguably the most important information – that everyone was to be dismissed because the whole school was closing); b) Provided a Q&A document; c) Did not do so immediately prior to dismissals taking effect, but began this disclosure process on 11 June 2025, approximately three weeks prior to the closure of the school and the redundancy of all concerned; and. 7 of 32 d) Did not consult with the affected employees about any of the matters in section 188(2), and had no intention of doing so even when reminded of its legal obligations.[33]In light of the significant degree of non-compliance by the Second Respondent, the Tribunal considers it appropriate to make a protective award under section 189(3) of the 1992 Act to each of the Claimants (being employees at the Second Respondent’s site who were dismissed for redundancy on 4 July 2025) remuneration for the period of 80 days beginning on 4 July 2025 and ending on 22 September 2025.[34]The Recoupment Regulations apply to the protective awards.[35]The Second Respondent should note that: a) It has duties under Regulation 6 of the Recoupment Regulations to provide certain information to the Secretary of State; and b) Pursuant to Regulation 7 of the Recoupment Regulations, payment of the protective award shall be treated as stayed until the Secretary of State has either:(i) Served a recoupment notice on the Respondent; or(ii) Notified the Respondent in writing that they do not intend to serve a recoupment notice, as described in Regulation 8 of the Recoupment Regulations. The First Claimant: Ms A Ropkins[36]At the time of her dismissal, the Second Claimant’s gross salary was £20,584 per Disability discrimination complaints[37]The First Claimant was diagnosed with breast cancer in May 2024. She was absent from her work for the Second Respondent as a teacher from December 2024, and did not return to work by the time of her dismissal on 4 July 2025. By reason of paragraph 6 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the 2010 Act, the First Claimant is deemed to have been disabled throughout the period in respect of which she brings legal complaints to the Employment Tribunal. Specifically, the First Claimant avers that: a) The Second Respondent treated her unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of her disability when it, in a period when the First Claimant was absent from work due to cancer treatment:(i) Failed to inform her of the closure of the school because the First Claimant was absent from work at the time that other members of staff were told at an ‘all staff’ meeting on 11 June 2025; and(ii) Failed to send her the letter that was sent to all other members of staff by the Second Respondent’s Chair of Trustees about the school closure on the evening of 11 June 2025. b) The Second Respondent failed to comply with its duty to make reasonable adjustments in respect of her when it applied the following provisions, criteria or practices (PCPs) to her: 8 of 32 (i) A contractual policy of paying employees on sick leave for a finite period (PCP 1); (ii) An absence management policy, providing for actions to be taken in response to certain levels of absence (PCP 2); and(iii) A communications approach with staff about issues affecting them all that only addressed staff in work at the relevant time (PCP 3), which the First Claimant says placed her at a substantial disadvantage compared with non-disabled people. The First Claimant suggests that the Second Respondent could have taken the following steps to ameliorate the disadvantage she suffered:(iv) The Second Respondent could have paid her for a longer period of cancer-related absence (adjustment to PCP 1);(v) The Second Respondent could have disapplied her cancer-related sickness absence from the calculation of absence for the purpose of triggering the absence management process (PCP 2); and(vi) The Second Respondent could have contacted her while she was on sickness absence to inform her about the school closure (PCP 3).[38]The First Claimant says nothing about PCP 2, as distinct from PCP 1, in her written witness statement, and in oral evidence the Employment Judge asked several times about what the Claimant meant by the absence management policy and how it disadvantaged her, and the First Claimant’s evidence was about her financial loss from a reduction in her pay due to her absence. It therefore appeared to the Tribunal that PCP 2 is the same in substance as PCP 1.[39]The First Claimant’s witness statement did not clarify when she experienced financial loss in respect of PCP 1, but her oral evidence to the Tribunal was that the Second Respondent: a) Started to pay her half-pay from 18 September 2024, and this continued until 31 December 2024; and b) Paid her no pay from January 2025 onwards. This continued until her dismissal date, as the First Claimant did not return to work.[40]The First Claimant offered oral evidence that the reason she did not return to work is because the Second Respondent did not make reasonable adjustments in respect of her, but that allegation does not form part of her Claim, as the legal complaints she raised were discussed in a Case Management Hearing on 23 January 2026, and a list of complaints and list of issues prepared in light of that, which were sent to the Parties on 27 January 2026, giving 14 days for any comments on those complaints and issues (paragraph 30 of those Orders), and no such comments were received.[41]The First Claimant says that these discriminatory acts have had a profound emotional impact on her during an already extremely difficult period of cancer treatment – that she felt ignored, unsupported and abandoned, with the lack of communication causing anxiety, distress and fear about her job, income and future. The refusal to adjust sick pay caused significant financial worry.[42]The Tribunal finds that the First Claimant’s discrimination arising from disability complaints succeed. In the absence of a response from the Second Respondent, 9 of 32 the First Claimant succeeds on her factual assertions, and the Tribunal accepts that the failure to communicate with her caused her injury to her feelings at a time when she was already vulnerable. The failure to inform and consult with her did not (as the First Claimant agrees) cause the First Claimant any financial loss. Her reasonable adjustments complaint about the Second Respondent not altering its communication practices resulted in the same injury to the First Claimant’s feelings, and so this complaint (pertaining to PCP 3) is not considered further.[43]In terms of the First Claimant’s complaints about the failure to make reasonable adjustments in respect of sick pay entitlement (PCP 1), the Tribunal notes the following principles from the applicable case law and the EHRC Employment Code: a) An assertion that an employer should ignore all disability-related sickness absence will rarely be a reasonable adjustment (Bray v London Borough of Camden [2007] 7 WLUK 598); b) The EHRC Employment Code expresses the view that there is no automatic obligation to extend contractual sick pay beyond the usual entitlement when a person is absent due to disability-related sickness (paragraph 17.21); and c) It will only be in highly exceptional circumstances that it will be a reasonable adjustment to give a disabled person higher sick pay than would be paid to a non-disabled person, because that would involve the tribunal usurping the employer’s management function of deciding whether the employer was able to financially meet the costs of modifying its policies in order to make enhanced payments (O’Hanlon v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2007] ICR 1359).[44]The Tribunal is not satisfied that the First Claimant’s complaints of failure to make reasonable adjustments in respect of PCP 1 (or PCP 2 – which is the same PCP) is made out. While the First Claimant’s circumstances – of having advanced breast cancer, of having significant surgery, chemotherapy and significant ongoing consequences as a result of that – are obviously exceptional for her, there are sadly many employees who experience the like. It is not clear that the First Claimant’s circumstances engage the “highly exceptional” circumstances considered appropriate to make the adjustment she seeks reasonable. This complaint – in respect of PCP 1 and PCP 2 – does not succeed.[45]In terms of remedy for the discrimination arising from disability discrimination complaints, the First Claimant does not claim compensation for financial loss, but seeks compensation for injury to feelings, which she says sits in the “middle” Vento band. The First Claimant presented her Claim on 11 September 2025, and therefore the Eighth Addendum to the Presidential Guidance applies. The financial figures around the bands in that addendum are as follows: a) Lower band: £1,200 to £12,100; b) Middle band: £12,100 to £36,400; and c) Upper band: £36,400 to £60,700, with only the most exceptional cases exceeding £60,700.[46]The First Claimant seeks £17,500 by way of injury to feelings award, and the Tribunal accepts that the nature of the discriminatory act here – forgetting about 10 of 32 or neglecting her during the limited information process about collective redundancies – would have (as her evidence says) caused her to feel ignored, unsupported and abandoned, anxious, distressed and fearful about her job, income and future. The timing of the discrimination was significant in inferring the degree of injury it would have caused – she was off work being treated for stage 2 and stage 3 cancer, and things must have been very difficult for her. To feel excluded and neglected as she did at that time would have been felt more deeply. The Tribunal awards the First Claimant the injury to feelings damages she seeks of £17,500.[47]The First Claimant also seeks aggravated damages – but the Tribunal disagrees that such damages are warranted here. Aggravated damages are not designed to double-compensate injury to feelings, but rather to compensate the claimant for any aggravation to their injury caused by a respondent who has behaved “in a high-handed, malicious, insulting or oppressive manner in committing the act of discrimination” (Alexander v Home Office [1988] ICR 685). Mr Justice Underhill, then-President of the EAT, considered the bases on which aggravated damages could be awarded in Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Shaw [2012] ICR 464, and identified three: a) where the manner in which the wrong was committed was particularly upsetting (i.e., acts done in a “high-handed, malicious, insulting or oppressive manner”); b) where the respondent had a discriminatory motive (i.e., the respondent’s conduct was “evidently based on prejudice or animosity or which is spiteful or vindictive or intended to wound”); and c) where the respondent’s subsequent conduct “rubs salt in the wound”, for example, by unnecessarily offensive conduct at trial.[48]The Tribunal finds that none of the above applies to the First Claimant. No aggravated damages are awarded.[49]The First Claimant had worked for the Second Respondent for more than eight years at the time of her dismissal. The First Claimant found out that the school was closing via a Facebook post, and was not informed by the Second Respondent until the Second Respondent’s insolvency practitioners, FRP Advisory, told her on the day her employment terminated. In addition to the paucity of information, there was no consultation carried out in respect of her. There was a complete failure to comply with redundancy procedures in respect of the First Claimant – her unfair dismissal complaint succeeds.[50]In terms of remedy, the First Claimant is award compensation for unfair dismissal in the amount of £313.08: a) The First Claimant would be entitled to a basic award, calculated as(i) The First Claimant had worked for the Second Respondent for eight complete years at the time of her redundancy;(ii) She was 51 years old at that time; and(iii) Her annual gross salary was £20,584, so her weekly gross salary was £395.85, 11 of 32 so she was entitled to 12 weeks’ pay at £395.85, amounting to £4,750.20. She received £4,737.12 from the Redundancy Payments Service, and so the balance outstanding on her basic award is £13.08; b) The First Claimant seeks a compensatory award from the date of her dismissal to the date of this hearing, together with a further three months’ compensation. However, the First Claimant had exhausted her entitlement to paid sick pay, and so the Tribunal is not convinced that she incurred any financial losses from her dismissal (as opposed to from the application of the Second Respondent’s sick pay policy). The First Claimant has, though, lost her accrued statutory rights, and so her compensatory award is £300.[51]The First Claimant had accrued an entitlement to be paid Leave Pay. The Second Respondent has breached the First Claimant’s contract of employment by failing to pay her the Leave Pay, but the First Claimant’s pay entitlement by this time was to £0 because she had been on long-term sick leave. Therefore no damages are payable to her in respect of Leave Pay.[52]The complaint that the Second Respondent wrongfully dismissed the First employment or pay her in lieu of the same, succeeds. The First Claimant was[53]In terms of damages, the First Claimant was, by this point in time, being paid nil pay by the Second Respondent because of her long-term sickness absence. Section 88 of the 1996 Act provides that she is to be treated for the purposes of notice pay (and therefore damages for wrongful dismissal) as if she was working and paid her normal rate of remuneration for the purposes of statutory minimum notice, which in her case (given she had accrued eight complete years’ service) was eight weeks. The Tribunal Orders Second Respondent to pay the First Claimant damages in the sum of £3,166.77 gross in respect of this complaint, being 8/52 x £20,584. Summary of compensation awarded to the First Claimant[54]The Second Respondent is Ordered to pay First Claimant: a) £17,500 by way of compensation for injury to feelings in respect of those of her disability discrimination complaints which were successful; b) £313.08 by way of damages for unfair dismissal; and c) £3,166.77 gross for wrongful dismissal. The Second Claimant: Mr A Peck[55]At the time of his dismissal, the Second Claimant earned £55,980 gross per 12 of 32[56]The Second Claimant had six complete years’ service with the Second Respondent when he was dismissed on 4 July 2025. His unchallenged evidence was that there was no individual consultation process conducted with him about his dismissal. The Tribunal therefore finds that his dismissal was unfair.[57]The Tribunal considers it appropriate to award the Second Claimant compensation, in addition to the above declaration. In terms of compensation, the Second Claimant is awarded the sum of £4,977.87, calculated as follows: a) The Second Claimant would be entitled to a basic award, calculated as(i) The Second Claimant had worked for the Second Respondent for six complete years at the time of his redundancy;(ii) He was 43 years old at that time; and(iii) His annual salary was £55,980 gross, so his weekly gross salary was £1,076.54, so he was entitled to seven weeks’ pay at £719 (the statutory cap for this purpose), amounting to £5,033. He received £4,673.50 from the Redundancy Payments Service, and so the balance outstanding on his basic award is £359.50; and (i) The Second Claimant’s financial loss in respect of the period 5 July 2025 to 31 August 2025 is already compensated for by way of the Leave Pay award below. (ii) The Second Claimant mitigated his losses by commencing new employment on 1 September 2025. In the period 1 September 2025 to 14 April 2026, the Second Claimant earned less in that employment than he had earned when employed by the Second Respondent. For some of that period (1 September 2025 to 31 December 2025), the Second Claimant’s wrongful dismissal compensation (described below) compensates him for the difference in his earnings between his role with the Second Respondent and his new employer. His remaining financial loss relates to the period 1 January 2026 to 14 April 2026. (iii) From 15 April 2026, the Second Claimant’s earnings matched his earning with the Second Respondent. The compensatory award awarded to the Second Claimant is £4,618.37, comprising:(iv) The difference in his net earnings from 1 January 2026 to 14 April 2026, calculated by deducting his net earnings in his new employment from what his net earnings would have been had he remained in the Second Respondent’s employment for that period. This is done as follows: (£36,528/12 x 3.5) – (£21,722.16/12 x 3.5), amounting to £4,318.37; and(v)£300 by way of compensation for loss of statutory rights.(vi) The Tribunal heard no evidence about any difference in pension benefits in respect of 1 January 2026 to 14 April 2026. The Second Claimant was not paid any benefits in respect of this period. 13 of 32[58]The Second Claimant had accrued an entitlement to be paid Leave Pay. The Second Respondent has breached the Second Claimant’s contract of Respondent to pay the Second Claimant damages in the sum of £8,612.31 gross in respect of this complaint, being 8/52 x the Second Claimant’s gross basic salary of £55,980.[59]The complaint that the Second Respondent wrongfully dismissed the Second employment or pay him in lieu of the same, succeeds. The Second Claimant was[60]The Tribunal Orders Second Respondent to pay the Second Claimant damages in the sum of £7,104.43 gross in respect of this complaint, being his lost earnings in the period 1 September 2025 (the day after the Leave Pay period expired) to 31 December 2025, less the sum received in respect of notice pay from the Redundancy Payments Service of £3,222.24. Summary of compensation awarded to the Second Claimant[61]The Second Respondent is Ordered to pay Second Claimant: a) £4,977.87 gross by way of damages for unfair dismissal; b) £8,612.31 gross in respect of damages for breach of contract pertaining to c) £7,104.43 gross for wrongful dismissal. The Third Claimant: Ms A-M Flower[62]At the time of her dismissal, the Third Claimant earned £50,189 gross per annum from her employment with the Second Respondent.[63]The Third Claimant had accrued an entitlement to be paid Leave Pay. The Second Respondent has breached the Third Claimant’s contract of employment to pay the Third Claimant damages in the sum of £7,721.38 gross in respect of this complaint, being 8/52 x the Third Claimant’s gross basic salary of £50,189.[64]The complaint that the Second Respondent wrongfully dismissed the Third employment or pay her in lieu of the same, succeeds. The Third Claimant was 14 of 32[65]The Third Claimant’s financial loss in respect of the period 5 July 2025 to 31 August 2025 is already compensated for by way of the Leave Pay award above.[66]With effect from 1 September 2025 Ms Flower entirely mitigated her losses by gaining new employment which was more highly remunerated than her employment with the Second Respondent.[67]The Third Claimant is therefore not entitled to any damages for wrongful dismissal. Summary of compensation awarded to the Third Claimant[68]The Second Respondent is Ordered to pay Third Claimant £7,721.38 gross in The Fourth Claimant: Mrs A M Sweet[69]At the time of her dismissal, the Fourth Claimant earned £20,084.04 gross per[70]The Fourth Claimant had 14 complete years’ service with the Second Respondent when she was dismissed on 4 July 2025. At that time, her annual salary was £20,084.04 gross. Her unchallenged evidence was that there was no individual consultation process conducted with her about her dismissal. The Tribunal therefore finds that her dismissal was unfair.[71]The Tribunal considers it appropriate to award the Fourth Claimant compensation of £300 in respect of that unfair dismissal, in addition to the above declaration. This is assessed as follows: a) In terms of basic award, the Fourth Claimant had 14 complete years’ service at the time of her dismissal, she 58 years old, and her gross weekly salary was £386.23 per week. Her basic award therefore amounted to 21 weeks’ pay, amounting to £8,110.83. The Fourth Claimant was compensated in respect of this basic award by the Redundancy Payments Service, and that compensation reduces her basic award to nil.(i) For the period 5 July 2025 to 31 August 2025 the compensation awarded to the Fourth Claimant in respect of Leave Pay compensates her for the financial losses she experienced;(ii) The Fourth Claimant experienced financial loss for one day on 1 September 2025, but that is compensated for by way of her damages for wrongful dismissal (described below);(iii) The Fourth Claimant successfully mitigated her losses by gaining new employment at a higher rate of remuneration from 2 September 2025, and so did not experience any financial loss after that point; and 15 of 32(iv) The Fourth Claimant is awarded £300 compensation for the loss of her accrued statutory rights.[72]The Fourth Claimant had accrued an entitlement to be paid Leave Pay. The Second Respondent has breached the Fourth Claimant’s contract of employment to pay the Fourth Claimant damages in the sum of £3,089.85 gross in respect of this complaint, being 8/52 x the Fourth Claimant’s gross basic salary of £20,084.04.[73]The complaint that the Second Respondent wrongfully dismissed the Fourth employment or pay her in lieu of the same, succeeds. The Fourth Claimant was[74]The compensation in respect of Leave Pay already compensates the Fourth Claimant until 31 August 2025, and so the Fourth Claimant’s remaining losses from her wrongful dismissal could be respect of 1 September 2025 to 31 December 2025. However, the Fourth Claimant successfully mitigated her losses when she commenced new, more remunerative, employment on 2 September 2025. Her financial losses in respect of wrongful dismissal are therefore confined to the single day of 1 September 2025, in respect of which the Tribunal Orders Second Respondent to pay the Fourth Claimant damages in the sum of £55.79 gross. Summary of compensation awarded to the Fourth Claimant[75]The Second Respondent is Ordered to pay Fourth Claimant: a) £300 gross by way of damages for unfair dismissal; b) £3,089.85 gross in respect of damages for breach of contract pertaining to c) £55.79 gross for wrongful dismissal. The Fifth Claimant: Ms H Razii Ryall[76]At the time of her dismissal, the Fifth Claimant earned £39,071 gross per annum from her employment with the Second Respondent.[77]The Fifth Claimant had accrued an entitlement to be paid Leave Pay. The Second Respondent has breached the Fifth Claimant’s contract of employment by failing to pay her the Leave Pay. The Tribunal Orders the Second Respondent to pay the Fifth Claimant damages in the sum of £6,010.92 gross in respect of this complaint, being 8/52 x the Fifth Claimant’s gross basic salary of £39,071. 16 of 32[78]The complaint that the Second Respondent wrongfully dismissed the Fifth employment or pay her in lieu of the same, succeeds. The Fifth Claimant was[79]The compensation in respect of Leave Pay already compensates the Fifth Claimant until 31 August 2025, and so the Fifth Claimant’s remaining losses from her wrongful dismissal could be respect of 1 September 2025 to 31 December 2025. However, the Fifth Claimant successfully mitigated her losses when she commenced new, more remunerative, employment on 1 September 2025. She is therefore not entitled to any damages for wrongful dismissal. Summary of compensation awarded to the Fifth Claimant[80]The Second Respondent is Ordered to pay Fifth Claimant £6,010.92 gross in The Sixth Claimant: Ms C Toomey[81]At the time of her dismissal, the Sixth Claimant earned £56,600.04 gross per[82]The Sixth Claimant had accrued an entitlement to be paid Leave Pay. The Second Respondent has breached the Sixth Claimant’s contract of employment to pay the Sixth Claimant damages in the sum of £8,707.70 gross in respect of this complaint, being 8/52 x the Sixth Claimant’s gross basic salary of £56,600.04.[83]The complaint that the Second Respondent wrongfully dismissed the Sixth employment or pay her in lieu of the same, succeeds. The Sixth Claimant was entitled to be given four weeks’ notice, which would have expired on 1 August 2025. The Sixth Claimant will experience no financial loss in respect of this period in light of the damages awarded to her in respect of the Leave Pay. She is therefore not entitled to any damages for wrongful dismissal. Summary of compensation awarded to the Sixth Claimant[84]The Second Respondent is Ordered to pay Sixth Claimant £8,707.70 gross in 17 of 32 The Seventh Claimant: Mrs V Bastin[85]At the time of her dismissal, the Seventh Claimant earned £53,601 gross per[86]The Seventh Claimant had accrued an entitlement to be paid Leave Pay. The Second Respondent has breached the Seventh Claimant’s contract of Respondent to pay the Seventh Claimant damages in the sum of £8,246.31 gross in respect of this complaint, being 8/52 x the Seventh Claimant’s gross basic salary of £53,601.[87]The Seventh Claimant withdrew her complaint of wrongful dismissal. The Tribunal dismisses that complaint upon its withdrawal. Summary of compensation awarded to the Seventh Claimant[88]The Second Respondent is Ordered to pay Seventh Claimant £8,246.31 gross in The Eighth Claimant: Ms S Scicluna-Chapman[89]At the time of her dismissal, the Eighth Claimant earned £13,640 gross per[90]The Eighth Claimant had accrued an entitlement to be paid Leave Pay. The Second Respondent has breached the Eighth Claimant’s contract of employment to pay the Eighth Claimant damages in the sum of £2,098.46 gross in respect of this complaint, being 8/52 x the Eighth Claimant’s gross basic salary of £13,640.[91]The complaint that the Second Respondent wrongfully dismissed the Eighth employment or pay her in lieu of the same, succeeds. The Eighth Claimant was[92]The Eighth Claimant would otherwise be entitled to damages in respect of this, Eighth Claimant until 31 August 2025; and 18 of 32 b) The Eighth Claimant successfully mitigated her losses when she[93]She is therefore not entitled to any damages for wrongful dismissal.[94]The Eighth Claimant was unfairly dismissed after nine years’ service. Her unchallenged evidence was that there was no individual consultation process conducted with her about her dismissal. The Tribunal therefore finds that her dismissal was unfair.[95]The Tribunal considers it appropriate to award the Eighth Claimant compensation of £300 in respect of that unfair dismissal, in addition to the above declaration. This is assessed as follows: a) She has already been paid a statutory redundancy payment by the Redundancy Payments Service. This reduces her entitlement to a basic award to nil, pursuant to section 122(4)(a) of the 1996 Act; and(i) For the period 5 July 2025 to 31 August 2025 the compensation awarded to the Eighth Claimant in respect of Leave Pay compensates her for the financial losses she experienced;(ii) The Eighth Claimant successfully mitigated her losses by gaining new employment at a higher rate of remuneration from 1 September 2025, and so did not experience any financial loss after that point; and(iii) The Eighth Claimant is awarded £300 compensation for the loss of her accrued statutory rights. Summary of compensation awarded to the Eighth Claimant[96]The Second Respondent is Ordered to pay Eighth Claimant: a) £2,098.46 gross in respect of damages for breach of contract pertaining to b) £300 gross by way of damages for unfair dismissal. The Ninth and Tenth Claimants: (9) Mrs H Bateman-Higgs, (10) Miss C Chamberlain[97]The sole complaint of each of the Ninth Claimant and the Tenth Claimant is in respect of a protective award.[98]The Tribunal notes, at the time of their dismissals, the Ninth Claimant’s gross annual salary was £59,712, and the Tenth Claimant’s gross annual salary was £49,437. The Eleventh Claimant: Mr C Coultart[99]At the time of his dismissal, the Eleventh Claimant earned £47,397.96 gross per 19 of 32[100]The Eleventh Claimant had 24 complete years’ service with the Second Respondent when he was dismissed on 4 July 2025. His unchallenged evidence was that there was no individual consultation process conducted with him about his dismissal. The Tribunal therefore finds that his dismissal was unfair.[101]The Tribunal considers it appropriate to award the Eleventh Claimant compensation, in addition to the above declaration. In terms of compensation, the Eleventh Claimant is awarded the sum of £31,833.35, calculated as follows: a) The Eleventh Claimant’s basic award is calculated as follows:(i) The Eleventh Claimant had worked for the Second Respondent for 24 complete years at the time of his redundancy;(ii) He was 61 years old at that time; and(iii) His annual salary was £47,397.96 gross, so his weekly gross salary was £911.50, so he was entitled to 30 weeks’ pay at £719 (the statutory cap for this purpose), amounting to £21,570. However, the Eleventh Claimant was paid that sum by the Redundancy Payments Service, and so nil is payable to the Eleventh Claimant by way of basic award. b) In respect of compensatory award, the Eleventh Claimant’s Schedule of Loss sought a compensatory award from the date of his dismissal to the date of this hearing and three months into the future. (i) The Eleventh Claimant’s financial loss in respect of the period 5 July 2025 to 31 August 2025 is already compensated for by way of the Leave Pay award (below). (ii) The period 1 September 2025 to 31 December 2025 is already compensated for by way of damages for wrongful dismissal (below). (iii) The oral evidence of the Eleventh Claimant is that he has made many job applications, but he has not yet gained new employment. The Eleventh Claimant has established his own business, but the earnings of that business have so far only met its expenses (it has made no profit).(iv) The Eleventh Claimant has been drawing a pension from the Teachers’ Pension Scheme, but he had been doing that from the age of 60 while working for the Second Respondent. The Tribunal therefore does not consider this pension to affect the Eleventh Claimant’s losses from his unfair dismissal.(v) The Eleventh Claimant has also lost the employer contributions that would have been made to its Aviva Pension Scheme, amounting to £650.93 per month, i.e., £7,811.16 per annum. (The contributions that the Eleventh Claimant would have made to that scheme do not form part of his financial loss, given those would have been a cost to him.)(vi) The Eleventh Claimant is also awarded £300 compensation in respect of his loss of statutory rights.(vii) Because of the date the Eleventh Claimant presented his Claim Form, the value of statutory cap that applies to the compensatory award for unfair dismissal in his case is the lesser of 20 of 32 £118,223 and 52 weeks’ of the Eleventh Claimant’s gross weekly pay, i.e., £47,397.96 in his case.(viii) There is no challenge from either Respondent as to the adequacy of the steps taken by the Eleventh Claimant to mitigate his losses, and his oral evidence to the Tribunal is that he has made many, many jobs applications and has tried to mitigate his losses through setting up his own business. The Eleventh Claimant has so far been unsuccessful in gaining new employment or making a profit through his business, and this has been the situation for 11.5 months. The Eleventh Claimant is now 62 years old. The Tribunal considers it reasonable to assume that he will not gain new employment in the next three months (the period in respect of which he seeks future losses). The Tribunal therefore considers it appropriate to award him compensatory damages for the full period he seeks (11.5 months of past losses plus three months of future losses), subject to the operation of the statutory cap.(ix) The period for which the Eleventh Claimant has not been compensated by the Leave Pay and his wrongful dismissal complaint (dealt with below) is 1 January 2026 to the (later) date of this hearing, 19 June 2026, plus a further three months to 19 September 2026, i.e., nine months and 19/30 days of September 2026.(x) The Eleventh Claimant’s net monthly salary when employed by the Second Respondent was £2,959.11, and the Second Respondent contributed £650.93 per month to its Aviva pension scheme (a defined contribution pension scheme). The Claimant’s financial losses for this eight month and 19/30 day period is calculated as i. Salary (complete months): 8 x £2,959.11; plus ii. Salary (19 days of September 2026): 19/30 x £2,959.11; iii. Pension (complete months): 8 x £650.93 (using the contributions method)1; and iv. Pension (19 days of September 2026): 19/30 x £650.93, which amounts to £31,166.68.(xi) Any compensatory award to the Eleventh Claimant exceeding £30,000 is subject to grossing up, and the grossing up needs to take account of the Claimant’s income from the Teachers’ Pension Scheme. The Eleventh Claimant told the Tribunal that he received/will receive £13,132.16 net by way of income from that pension scheme in the period in respect of which the compensatory award relates. 1 The contributions method for valuing defined contribution pension loss is the method anticipated by the Employment Tribunal Principles for Compensating Pension Loss: https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/PrinciplesThird-Revision-2021-1.pdf. 21 of 32(xii) The Employment Judge therefore considers that the approach to grossing up the excess of the Eleventh Claimant’s compensatory award (amounting to £31,166.68 plus £300 for loss of statutory rights, i.e., £31,466.68) over the £30,000 threshold for compensation for termination of employment to be tax-free, i.e., the approach to grossing-up £1,466.68 should be as follows:[102]Other Income Taxable Tribunal Award Gross Tax Net Gross Tax Net PA (0%) 12,570 0 12,570 0 0 0 to 12,570 BR (20%) the 702.70 140.54 562.16 1,833.35 366.67 1,466.68 next 37,700 TOTALS 13,272.70 140.54 13,132.16 0 366.67* 0 *Amount to be added to taxable and non-taxable awards is £366.67 (xiii) Therefore the compensatory award to be awarded to the Eleventh Claimant is £31,466.68 plus £366.67, so £31,833.35.[103]The Eleventh Claimant was not paid any benefits in respect of this period. Statutory redundancy payment[104]The Eleventh Claimant withdrew this complaint orally in the hearing. That complaint is dismissed upon its withdrawal.[105]The Eleventh Claimant had accrued an entitlement to be paid Leave Pay. The Second Respondent has breached the Eleventh Claimant’s contract of Respondent to pay the Eleventh Claimant damages in the sum of £10,937.99 the Second Claimant’s gross basic salary of £47,397.96.[106]The complaint that the Second Respondent wrongfully dismissed the Eleventh employment or pay him in lieu of the same, succeeds. The Eleventh Claimant 22 of 32[107]The Eleventh Claimant did not gain new employment in that period, and while he set up his own business, that business did not make a profit in this period.[108]The Tribunal therefore Orders Second Respondent to pay the Eleventh Claimant damages in the sum of £15,799.32 gross in respect of this complaint, covering the period 1 September 2025 (the day after the Leave Pay period expired) to 31 December 2025. Summary of compensation awarded to the Eleventh Claimant[109]The Second Respondent is Ordered to pay Eleventh Claimant: a) £47,397.96 gross by way of damages for unfair dismissal; b) £10,937.99 gross in respect of damages for breach of contract pertaining to Leave Pay; and c) £15,799.32 gross for wrongful dismissal. The Twelfth Claimant: Mrs N Gordon[110]At the time of her dismissal, the Twelfth Claimant earned £56,153.76 gross per[111]The Twelfth Claimant had accrued an entitlement to be paid Leave Pay. The Second Respondent has breached the Twelfth Claimant’s contract of Respondent to pay the Twelfth Claimant damages in the sum of £8,639.04 gross in respect of this complaint gross in respect of this complaint, being 8/52 x the Second Claimant’s gross basic salary of £56,153.76.[112]The complaint that the Second Respondent wrongfully dismissed the Twelfth employment or pay her in lieu of the same, succeeds. The Twelfth Claimant was[113]The Twelfth Claimant would otherwise be entitled to damages in respect of this, Eighth Claimant until 31 August 2025; and b) The Twelfth Claimant mitigated her losses when she commenced new employment on 1 September 2025. This new employment was slightly less remunerative than her employment with the Second Respondent, however the Twelfth Claimant was also paid notice pay by the Redundancy 23 of 32 Payments Service, which compensated entirely for any financial loss the Twelfth Claimant incurred in this period.[114]She is therefore not entitled to any damages for wrongful dismissal. Summary of compensation awarded to the Twelfth Claimant[115]The Second Respondent is Ordered to pay Twelfth Claimant £8,639.04 gross in The Thirteenth Claimant: Mrs D Cutting[116]At the time of her dismissal, the Thirteenth Claimant earned £54,876 gross per[117]The Thirteenth Claimant had accrued an entitlement to be paid Leave Pay. The Second Respondent has breached the Thirteenth Claimant’s contract of Respondent to pay the Thirteenth Claimant damages in the sum of £8,442.46 gross in respect of this complaint, being 8/52 x the Thirteenth Claimant’s gross basic salary of £54,876.[118]The complaint that the Second Respondent wrongfully dismissed the Thirteenth employment or pay her in lieu of the same, succeeds. The Thirteenth Claimant[119]The Thirteenth Claimant would otherwise be entitled to damages in respect of Thirteenth Claimant until 31 August 2025; and b) The Thirteenth Claimant successfully mitigated her losses when she[120]She is therefore not entitled to any damages for wrongful dismissal. The Fourteenth Claimant: Miss E M Harding[121]At the time of her dismissal, the Thirteenth Claimant earned £26,813 gross per[122]The Fourteenth Claimant had accrued an entitlement to be paid Leave Pay. The Second Respondent has breached the Fourteenth Claimant’s contract of 24 of 32 Respondent to pay the Fourteenth Claimant damages in the sum of £4,125.08 gross in respect of this complaint, being 8/52 x the Fourteenth Claimant’s gross basic salary of £26,813.[123]The complaint that the Second Respondent wrongfully dismissed the Fourteenth employment or pay her in lieu of the same, succeeds. The Fourteenth Claimant[124]The Tribunal Orders Second Respondent to pay the Fourteenth Claimant damages in the sum of £503.75 gross in respect of this complaint, calculated as Fourteenth Claimant until 31 August 2025; b) The Fourteenth Claimant undertook new employment for some of the period 1 September 2025 to 14 November 2025, but it was less remunerative than her employment with the Second Respondent (the difference in gross earnings in this period was £675.07); c) The Fourteenth Claimant earned more from new work in the period 17 November to 19 December 2025 than she earned with the Second Respondent; d) The Fourteenth Claimant did not have employment for the period 20 to 31 December 2025 (so her losses for this period were £864.94); e) The Fourteenth Claimant was paid compensation for notice pay by the Redundancy Payments Service in the amount of £1,036.26; f) Leaving a net financial loss for this period of £503.75. Summary of compensation awarded to the Fourteenth Claimant[125]The Second Respondent is Ordered to pay Fourteenth Claimant: a) £8,639.04 gross in respect of damages for breach of contract pertaining to b) £503.75 gross in respect of damages for wrongful dismissal. The Fifteenth Claimant: Miss G Cobalchini[126]At the time of her dismissal, the Fifteenth Claimant earned £42,249.96 gross per[127]The Fifteenth Claimant had accrued an entitlement to be paid Leave Pay. The Second Respondent has breached the Fifteenth Claimant’s contract of Respondent to pay the Fifteenth Claimant damages in the sum of £6,527.69 25 of 32 the Fifteenth Claimant’s gross basic salary of £42,429.96.[128]The complaint that the Second Respondent wrongfully dismissed the Fifteenth employment or pay her in lieu of the same, succeeds. The Fifteenth Claimant was[129]The Fifteenth Claimant’s financial loss in respect of the period 5 July 2025 to 31 August 2025 is already compensated for by way of the Leave Pay award above.[130]The Fifteenth Claimant mitigated her losses when she commenced new employment on 1 September 2025, which lasted until 4 December 2025. In this period, the Fifteenth Claimant suffered a financial loss of £290.57.[131]The Fifteenth Claimant did not earn any money in the period 5 to 31 December 2025, so her losses in respect of this period, compared to the pay she would have received had the Second Respondent given her the notice she was entitled to be given under her contract of employment, was £3,079.59.[132]The Fifteenth Claimant was paid £1,611.12 by the Redundancy Payments Service in respect of notice.[133]The Tribunal awards the Fifteenth Claimant damages for wrongful dismissal in the amount of the difference, being £1,759.04 gross. Summary of compensation awarded to the Fifteenth Claimant[134]The Second Respondent is Ordered to pay Fifteenth Claimant: a) £6,527.69 gross in respect of damages for breach of contract pertaining to b) £1,759.04 gross in respect of damages for wrongful dismissal. The Sixteenth Claimant: Mr A Fox[135]At the time of his dismissal, the Sixteenth Claimant earned £18,500 gross per[136]The Sixteenth Claimant had accrued an entitlement to be paid Leave Pay. The Second Respondent has breached the Sixteenth Claimant’s contract of Respondent to pay the Sixteenth Claimant damages in the sum of £1,406.75 the Sixteenth Claimant’s gross basic salary of £18,500 less the sums he earned in this period to mitigate his loss (£1,439.40). 26 of 32[137]The complaint that the Second Respondent wrongfully dismissed the Sixteenth employment or pay him in lieu of the same, succeeds. The Sixteenth Claimant[138]The Sixteenth Claimant would otherwise be entitled to damages in respect of this, Sixteenth Claimant until 31 August 2025; and b) The Sixteenth Claimant successfully mitigated his losses when he[139]He is therefore not entitled to any damages for wrongful dismissal. Summary of compensation awarded to the Sixteenth Claimant[140]The Second Respondent is Ordered to pay Sixteenth Claimant £1,406.75 in The Seventeenth Claimant: Mr M Kent-Davies[141]At the time of his dismissal, the Seventeenth Claimant earned £44,953.84 gross[142]The Seventeenth Claimant had accrued an entitlement to be paid Leave Pay. The Second Respondent has breached the Seventeenth Claimant’s contract of Respondent to pay the Seventeenth Claimant damages in the sum of £6,915.98 the Seventeenth Claimant’s gross basic salary of £44,953.84.[143]The complaint that the Second Respondent wrongfully dismissed the Seventeenth Claimant, i.e., failed to give him sufficient notice to terminate his contract of employment or pay him in lieu of the same, succeeds. The Seventeenth Claimant was entitled to be given not less than three months’ notice in the summer term, terminating at the end of a school term which, in the case of notice given on 4 July 2025, would have ended on 31 December 2025. He was not given that notice.[144]The Seventeenth Claimant would otherwise be entitled to damages in respect of Seventeenth Claimant until 31 August 2025; and 27 of 32 b) The Seventeenth Claimant successfully mitigated his losses when he[145]He is therefore not entitled to any damages for wrongful dismissal. Summary of compensation awarded to the Seventeenth Claimant[146]The Second Respondent is Ordered to pay Seventeenth Claimant £6,915.98 gross in respect of damages for breach of contract pertaining to Leave Pay. The Eighteenth Claimant: Mr G Dass[147]At the time of his dismissal, the Eighteenth Claimant earned £53,852.24 gross[148]The Eighteenth Claimant had accrued an entitlement to be paid Leave Pay. The Second Respondent has breached the Eighteenth Claimant’s contract of employment by failing to pay him the Leave Pay.[149]The Tribunal Orders the Second Respondent to pay damages to the Eighteenth Claimant in respect of this breach of contract, in the gross sum of £7,404.31. This is calculated as follows: a) 8/52 x the Eighteenth Claimant’s gross basic salary of £53,852.24, amounting to £8,284.96; b) Less the sum the Eighteenth Claimant earned in new employment commenced on 26 August 2025 and continuing until the end of the Leave Pay period of 31 August 2025, being £880.65.[150]The complaint that the Second Respondent wrongfully dismissed the Eighteenth employment or pay him in lieu of the same, succeeds. The Eighteenth Claimant[151]The Eighteenth Claimant would otherwise be entitled to damages in respect of Eighteenth Claimant until 31 August 2025; and b) The Eighteenth Claimant successfully mitigated his losses when he undertook new, more remunerative, employment throughout this period, and was paid some notice pay by the Redundancy Payments Service.[152]He is therefore not entitled to any damages for wrongful dismissal. 28 of 32 Summary of compensation awarded to the Eighteenth Claimant[153]The Second Respondent is Ordered to pay Eighteenth Claimant £7,404.31 gross in respect of damages for breach of contract pertaining to Leave Pay. The Nineteenth Claimant: Mr J Dennehy[154]At the time of his dismissal, the Nineteenth Claimant earned £41,376.92 gross[155]The Nineteenth Claimant had accrued an entitlement to be paid Leave Pay. The Second Respondent has breached the Nineteenth Claimant’s contract of Respondent to pay the Nineteenth Claimant damages in the sum of £6,365.68 the Nineteenth Claimant’s gross basic salary of £41,376.92.[156]The complaint that the Second Respondent wrongfully dismissed the Nineteenth employment or pay him in lieu of the same, succeeds. The Nineteenth Claimant[157]The compensation in respect of Leave Pay already compensates the Nineteenth Claimant until 31 August 2025, and so the Nineteenth Claimant’s remaining losses from his wrongful dismissal could be respect of 1 September 2025 to 31 December 2025. However, the Nineteenth Claimant successfully mitigated his losses when in respect of the period 13 October 2025 to 31 December 2025, when he commenced new, more remunerative, employment. His financial losses in respect of wrongful dismissal are therefore confined to the period 1 September to 12 October 2025. The Tribunal therefore awards the Nineteenth Claimant damages for wrongful dismissal in the amount of £4,782.82 gross.[158]The Nineteenth Claimant was not awarded any compensation in respect of notice pay by the Redundancy Payments Service. Summary of compensation awarded to the Nineteenth Claimant[159]The Second Respondent is Ordered to pay Nineteenth Claimant: a) £6,365.68 gross in respect of damages for breach of contract pertaining to b) £4,782.82 gross in respect of damages for wrongful dismissal. 29 of 32 The Twentieth Claimant: Ms R Shalabi[160]At the time of her dismissal, the Twentieth Claimant earned £25,842 gross per[161]The Twentieth Claimant had accrued an entitlement to be paid Leave Pay. The Second Respondent has breached the Twentieth Claimant’s contract of Respondent to pay the Twentieth Claimant damages in the sum of £3,975.69 the Twentieth Claimant’s gross basic salary of £25,842.[162]The complaint that the Second Respondent wrongfully dismissed the Twentieth employment or pay her in lieu of the same, succeeds. The Twentieth Claimant[163]The Twentieth Claimant would otherwise be entitled to damages in respect of Twentieth Claimant until 31 August 2025; and b) The Twentieth Claimant successfully mitigated her losses when she[164]She is therefore not entitled to any damages for wrongful dismissal. Summary of compensation awarded to the Twentieth Claimant[165]The Second Respondent is Ordered to pay Twentieth Claimant £3,975.69 gross in respect of damages for breach of contract pertaining to Leave Pay. Applicable to all Claimants[166]Each Claimant must account to HMRC for any income tax and/or employee’s National Insurance contributions payable on any sums received by them pursuant to this judgment. Approved by: