Mr A L A Vega v HCA International Ltd and Ms P Pavlikou: 2307676/2023 and 2301883/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2307676/2023, 2301883/2024

Between

Mr A L A VegaClaimant

Ms G Corby (Counsel)Respondent

Before

Employment Judge Mr J S Burns

In person for claimant

Ms G Corby (instructed by Counsel) for respondent

Date 14 August 2025

JUDGMENT

Any claims and allegations which predate 11/10/25 which are not included as claims in 2307676 2023, but which are included as claims in 23011883 2024, are struck out as vexatious and/or as an abuse of process (save that the Claimant may rely on the claimed protected acts (identified in the List of Issues attached to my CMO of even date) prior to 1/4/2023 in support of part of his victimisation claims relating to claimed post-1/4/23 detriment).

REASONS

[1]In Scott v Russell

2013 EWCA Civ 1432

, CA the Court of Appeal cited with approval the definition of 'vexatious' given by Lord Bingham in Attorney General v Barker

2000 1 FLR 759

, QBD (DivCt): 'the hallmark of a vexatious proceeding is... that it has little or no basis in law (or at least no discernible basis); that whatever the intention of the proceedings may be, its effect is to subject the defendant to inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to any gain likely to accrue to the claimant, and that it involves an abuse of the process of the court, meaning by that a use of the court process for a purpose or in a way which is significantly different from the ordinary and proper use of the court process'.

[2]It follows that vexatious conduct does not need to have a vexatious motive.

[3]The Henderson abuse of process precludes a party from raising in subsequent proceedings matters which were not, but could and should have been, raised in the earlier ones (arising from Henderson v Henderson 1843 3 Hare 100, ChD).

[4]Unlike the latter types of estoppel, which relate to 'those points which were actually decided by the court', the rule in Henderson v Henderson relates to 'those which might have been brought forward at the time, but were not': Talbot v Berkshire CC

[1993] 4 All ER 9

at 294, per Stuart-Smith LJ). It is a form of estoppel based on abuse of process, and involves the court striking a balance between a claimant's right to bring before the court 'genuine and legitimate claims with a defendant's right to be protected from being harassed by multiple proceedings where one should have sufficed' (Manson v Vooght

[1999] BPIR 376

at 389, per May LJ, CA).

[5]In Franked Income Investment Group Litigation v Revenue and Customs Commissioners

[2020] UKSC 47

, Lord Reed and Lord Hodge said: “76 ......it is clear that for the courts to uphold a plea of abuse of process as a bar to a claim or a defence it must be satisfied that the party in question is misusing or abusing the process of the court by oppressing the other party by repeated challenges relating to the same subject matter. It is not sufficient to establish abuse of process for a party to show that a challenge could have been raised in a prior litigation or at an earlier stage in the same proceedings. It must be shown both that the challenge should have been raised on that earlier occasion and that the later raising of the challenge is abusive.”

[6]Factors that might be relevant include whether the claimant is a litigant in person (Foster v Bon Groundwork

2012 EWCA Civ 252

(obiter)), and the extent to which the claims overlap factually or legally or are different (Sheriff v Klyne Tugs (Lowestoft) Ltd

1999 IRLR 481

). It might also be relevant to weigh into the balance whether or not there was a determination of the first claim on the merits: Thomas v Devon County Council

UKEAT/0513/07

[7]According to Judge Eady QC in London Borough of Haringey v O'Brien

UKEAT/0004/16

(22 December 2016, unreported), where further claims accrue between presentation and the merits hearing, they should be added to the existing proceedings by way of amendment, otherwise it may be an abuse of process to bring them in separate proceedings at a later stage.

[8]In Szucs v Greensquareaccord Ltd EA-2023-000770-RN on 12/8/25, the EAT upheld a Tribunal’s decision to strike out as an abuse a second claim that could and should have been included in the first claim by way of an amendment application, or at least made the subject of an application to amend in that claim. The abuse of process was that by failing to do so, the claimant in that case deprived the Employment Tribunal of the opportunity of deciding (and the respondent of the opportunity to make representations about) how best to allot time and resources to dealing with the claimant’s two claims (see paragraph 38).

[9]In the instant case on 21/12/23, the Claimant brought a claim 2307676 2023 against R1 only. ACAS Conciliation took place from 11/10/2023 to 22/11/2023, so that acts occurring before 12/7/23 are outside of the primary limitation period. The first claim was brought postdismissal, but while the dismissal appeal process was ongoing; and appeared to pertain to disability discrimination alone. The Claimant stated “this case covers the period from 1/April/2023 until 11/Oct/2023” and that the earlier dates are “for reference and provide background”. Hence he expressly disavowed any claim in relation to any matter referred to before 1/4/23.

[10]The Claimant included facts in the first claim only up to 11/10/23 because that was the date when the Claimant first contacted ACAS as he assumed wrongly that any events after this date should not be included. The Claimant stated that if the appeal of his termination failed (and/or his other grievances/Whistleblowing Letter) he would bring a further claim. He wrote: “From 11/Oct/2023 onwards, I submitted other grievances, because the discrimination continued, and whistleblowing after submitting to ACAS for the conciliation process on 11/October”.

[11]On 6 February 2024 the Claimant brought claim 23011883 2024 against R1 and R2. ACAS Conciliation took place from 8/1/24 to 25/1/24 for R1 (and from 8/1/24 to 29/1/24 for R2), so that the primary limitation period ends with acts occurring before 9/10/23.

[12]In the second claim, the Claimant set out that he was claiming unfair dismissal and race and disability discrimination. He also sought to bring a whistleblowing claim (not however pleading any comprehensible cause of action) and a claim for “personal injury caused by disability”. He stated when summarising the claim “I have a previous claim... against the same employer made when I was still working. In this new claim, my employment was terminated after I raised grievances about more acts of discrimination against me and submitted whistleblowing. I added another person to the claim as well”.

[13]Thereafter, he attached a lengthy document (29 pages) which duplicated much of the material from the first claim but also raised largely unspecified claims and various new factual matters pertaining to both before and after 11/10/23. Some of these (which are now elevated as claims rather than background references), predate 1/4/23.

[14]For purposes of its application to strike out, the Respondents produced a document comparing the two claims. This shows that in the second claim factual references and accounts included in the first claim (some of which go back to April 2021) are stated materially differently in the second claim, usually by adding new averments and circumstances. In other instances, important wording has been moved to a place other than where it appears in the first claim. In further instances, important wording has not been included in the second claim, whereas it remains in the first claim when describing the same matter.

[15]The effect was to produce two claims, which insofar as they both deal with the same pre11/10/23 allegations, are in part at least, inconsistent. In order to bring the two into harmony it would be necessary to amend at least one of the claims so they both say the same when dealing with the same material. However no such application was made at the time.

[16]Subsequently, a very considerable amount of time has been spent at two previous preliminary hearings, as well as in correspondence and applications outside formal hearings, to try to sort out and clarify the claims, and the process has had to continue before me over the last two days. In large part this has been caused or contributed to by the piecemeal and inconsistent manner in which the Claimant has presented his complaints, and especially by the fact that he has waited until the second claim to bring claims about matters which he either did not mention at all, (but which he could and should have dealt with in the first claim) or which he did mention but did so differently in the first claim.

[17]The Claimant could and should have brought the entirety of his claims up to 11 October 2023 in his first claim and as a single claim, thus not requiring the Tribunal and the Respondent to waste time and resources covering the same chronology by trying to understand and compare and contrast in two different lengthy competing narratives.

[18]The Claimant when already aware of all the events and matters going back to April 2021, made a deliberate decision when presenting his first claim to leave all matters before April 2023 as background. He then changed his mind. The proper way of trying to do that would have been for him to make an application to amend the first claim, which could have been dealt with in the usual way. By instead including new matters in a second claim inconsistent with the first he has abused the process in a manner similar to that described in Szucs v Greensquareaccord.

[19]The Respondents accept that the Claimant was confused about whether he could bring matters post-dating the ACAS certificate in the First Claim, and accordingly does not seek to strike out any allegations from the Second Claim after that date. I agree that this is a proportionate manner in which to bring the application.

[20]I accept that the Claimant suffers from mental health problems and is a LIP, but the problem arises not from these impairments but from the fact that he made a deliberate decision to act in one way and then unilaterally decided to change tack and return to and expand on matters that should have been covered in the First Claim (and which he had plainly chosen to leave out). This is a repeated challenge relating to the same matter. It has involved (and has continue to involve) significant limited Employment Tribunal resources. Its effect has been to subject the Respondents to inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to any gain likely to accrue to the Claimant.

[21]For the avoidance of doubt, and to the extent necessary, I make an exception in relation to claimed protected acts prior to 1/4/2023 (identified in the LOI attached to my CMO of even date) on which the Claimant relies in support of part of his victimisation claims relating to claimed post-1/4/23 detriment. It seems to me that, regardless of the way in which they have been identified, there is no good reason to preclude the Tribunal determining those claims, in the course of which it would be bound to consider those claimed protected acts in any event. J S Burns