Mr Brian SidellClaimantSurrey County CouncilRespondent
Before
Employment Judge N WilsonMr Elliott Stenson (instructed by counsel) for claimantMr Peter Doughty (instructed by counsel) for respondentDate 5 February 2025
JUDGMENT
[1]The complaints of constructive unfair dismissal under the Employment Rights Act 1996 and Wrongful Dismissal (notice pay) were not presented within the applicable time limit. It was reasonably practicable to do so. The complaint of unfair dismissal and wrongful dismissal are therefore dismissed.[2]The complaints of failure to make reasonable adjustments, harassment relating to disability and direct discrimination on the grounds of sex under the Equality Act 2010 were presented out of time. It is not just and equitable to extend the time limit. The complaints are therefore dismissed.[3]There being no surviving claims this Judgment brings the claimant’s claim to an end.[1]The respondent made a costs application against the claimant on 9 March 2025 [a Sunday]. Unfortunately, the application for costs was not sent to Employment Judge Wilson until 2 June 2025. Due to periods of annual leave over the summer and other judicial commitments there has therefore been a delay in providing this decision for which I apologise.[2]I have received the claimant’s response to the application in writing dated 18 March 2025.[3]I consider I have sufficient information in respect of the application from both parties to make a decision on the papers. It is also noted the claimant has requested the application be dealt with on the papers. The respondent similarly does not request a hearing when making its application. This is an appropriate application to be deal with without a hearing. In this regard I take into account the overriding objective. Page 1 of 7[4]The respondent’s application is made under both rule 74a. andb. namely: a. a party (or that party’s representative) has acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in either the bringing of the proceedings, or part of it, or the way that the proceedings, or part of it, have been conducted, b. any claim, response or reply had no reasonable prospect of success.[5]The claim was listed for a preliminary hearing on 5 February 2025.[6]The claimant was employed by the respondent, as a fire fighter from 2003 until his resignation on 31 January 2023. ACAS early conciliation started on 30 January 2023 and ended on 13 March 2023. The claim form was presented on 17 November 2023[7]The claim was about: Constructive unfair dismissal Harassment relating to disability Failure to make reasonable adjustments Direct discrimination on the grounds of sex[8]At the preliminary hearing I was deciding whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the case and if the claims were out of time whether to extend time. I also had the task of whether to permit any amendments and to determine disability which was not admitted (in relation to the claimant’s anxiety and depression at the material time). This would only be required if the claims survived the jurisdiction /time limit point.[9]I had to determine whether time should be extended pursuant to the two statutory tests contained in section 111 of the Employment Rights Act and section 123 of the Equality Act.[10]The test for the all the complaints save for the discriminatory ones is the reasonable practicability test.[11]The test for the discrimination complaints is wider, the just and equitable test.[12]If any claims survived the claimant makes an application to amend to include the following complaints: a) Wrongful dismissal/notice pay b) Indirect disability discrimination claim c) Additional allegations pleaded for the unfair dismissal claim d) Failure to make reasonable adjustments – additional allegations? Page 2 of 7[13]The Claim Form was issued on 17 November 2023. The claimant commenced the Early Conciliation process with ACAS on 30 January 2023 (Day A). The Early Conciliation Certificate was issued on 13 March 2023 (Day B). Accordingly, allowing for any extension under the Early Conciliation provisions any complaint about something that happened before 11 June 2023 is potentially out of time so that the Tribunal may not have jurisdiction to hear the complaint.[14]The effective date of dismissal was 31 January 2023. The Claim Form should have been submitted by 11 June 2023 and not on 17 November 2023 as it was. This made the claim for unfair constructive dismissal, and the discrimination claims out of time by some 5 months.[15]My decision was delivered orally at the preliminary hearing and the decision related to jurisdiction for all the complaints which had been pleaded including the wrongful dismissal complaint.[16]There was no indication that the reasons for the delay in bringing the wrongful dismissal complaint differed in nature to the reasons advanced for the lateness of the other claims and the test is the more stringent one for the wrongful dismissal claim. As such it was appropriate to also make a decision for that complaint.[17]The other claims would require an amendment application, but no complaints survived upon which to make any amendment application.[18]The test for the unfair dismissal and wrongful dismissal complaints is set out in section 111 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.[19]I made my decisions based on my findings of fact which I explained orally. I found that it was reasonably practicable for the relevant complaint to have been brought in time and that it was not just and equitable to extend time for the complaints to which the wider test applied.[20]The claimant argued his mental health was such that it was not reasonably practicable for him to bring the claim until the time he did which encompasses a period from the end of his employment in January 2023 until he posted the ET1.[21]I did not diminish Mr Sidell’s previous medical history nor his mental health condition, but I was not persuaded that he was so traumatised or triggered by his mental health condition at the relevant time that he was unable to present his claim within the statutory time period, having heard his evidence and considered the documents in the bundle. Page 3 of 7[22]I was not persuaded that his mental health condition was such that it was not reasonably practicable to have brought the claims in time.[23]The discrimination complaints of course have a wider test I can apply even though I found it was reasonably practicable to bring the non-discriminatory claims in time. That is the test set out in section 123 of the Equality Act 2010.[24]While Employment Tribunals have a wide discretion to allow an extension of time under the ‘just and equitable’ test in S.123, it does not necessarily follow that exercise of the discretion is a foregone conclusion.[25]I took into account the discriminatory acts appeared to have taken place long before the termination and that the claimant could have complained about them in their own right before he resigned. They were clearly within his contemplation when he contacted ACAS in 2022. I found he was aware of the deadlines and still chose to wait until September 2023 to seek legal advice. I have found during that time his mental health condition was not such that it was not reasonably practicable to bring the claim in time.[26]In looking at the balance of prejudice I took note the claimant would be prevented from pursuing the claim, however I found the balance of prejudice in this case was tipped in favour of the respondent because it was plain the cogency of the evidence will be impacted. I took account of the fact the claimant was unable to remember key matters at the preliminary hearing in his evidence and had not properly articulated when some of the discriminatory acts were alleged to have commenced from. It is clear Mr Siddell’s own recollection of pertinent events is affected. I found the forensic prejudice in this case to the respondent tipped the balance of prejudice in favour of the respondent – the evidence and memories of witnesses will inevitably be impacted particularly given the discriminatory acts go back several years and as such time was not extended to bring the discrimination complaints. The legal framework and discretion[27]I did not find, having heard the claimant’s evidence about why he did not bring his claims in time, that the claimant was dishonest. I am not persuaded his conduct falls within the definition of rule 74 (1) (a) ‘vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably’ in either the bringing of the proceedings (or part) or the way that the proceedings (or part) have been conducted.[28]I did find the claimant must have been aware of time limits having brought an earlier claim. He clearly did have a period of mental health difficulties. His evidence was that it was too much for him to bring the claims in time notwithstanding he had contacted ACAS and he did not feel able to actually advance the claims beyond that stage at that time. I found on balance I was not Page 4 of 7 persuaded his mental health during the relevant period was impacted to the degree it was not reasonably practicable to have brought the claims in time.[29]Insofar as the just and equitable test is concerned I found the balance of prejudice tipped in favour of the respondent based on the evidence I heard. This was not a foregone conclusion, and the just and equitable test is wider than the reasonably practicable test.[30]On either test whether or not the Tribunal would have exercised its discretion in favour of the claimant could ultimately only be determined after hearing evidence form the claimant. I do not find it was unreasonable vexatious disruptive or an abuse for the claimant to have brought the claim in those circumstances and for him to have reasonably believed, due to the difficulties he perceived he had at the material time, an extension of time may have been granted and permission given for the claims to be brought out of time.[31]I do not find on balance that the costs jurisdiction is engaged by reference to the claimant’s conduct relied on in the application. Even if I had found it was engaged, I would not consider it appropriate to exercise my discretion in favour of awarding costs against the claimant.[32]I take note of the EAT decision in AQ Ltd v Holden 2012 IRLR 648, EAT, an employment tribunal cannot, and should not, judge a litigant in person by the standards of a professional representative. Lay people are likely to lack the objectivity and knowledge of law and practice brought to bear by a professional legal adviser. The EAT stressed that tribunals must bear this in mind when assessing the threshold tests in the then equivalent to rule 74 of the Tribunal Rules 2024. It went on to state that, even if the threshold tests for an order for costs are met, the tribunal still has discretion whether to make an order. That discretion should be exercised having regard to all the circumstances.[33]I accept that the claimant had prior knowledge of bringing a claim in the Employment Tribunals and being a litigant in person (up to the time he sought legal advice) does not make one immune to orders for costs – far from it. However, in this case I am not persuaded of unreasonable behaviour which justifies the making of a costs order against the claimant.[34]I did not hear evidence to make any finding that the claims were vexatious as defined by Lord Bingham in Attorney General v Barker 2000 1 FLR 759, QBD (Div Ct). According to His Lordship, ‘the hallmark of a vexatious proceeding is… that it has little or no basis in law (or at least no discernible basis); that whatever the intention of the proceedings may be, its effect is to subject the defendant to inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to any gain likely to accrue to the claimant, and that it involves an abuse of the process of the court, meaning by that a use of the court process Page 5 of 7 for a purpose or in a way which is significantly different from the ordinary and proper use of the court process’.[35]The respondent in their application relies largely on the fact that the claimant did not bring the claim in time when he could have and asserts he must have been dishonest about the effect of this mental health. I made no such finding and indeed did not find the claimant to be dishonest. The evidence I heard and had before me at the preliminary hearing demonstrated he clearly has had some mental health difficulties. He has delayed in bring the claims because on his evidence he did not feel able to cope with that at the material time. My findings did not indicate any dishonesty on his part. I simply found it was reasonably practicable to bring the claims in time. I also did not find him to have behaved in an unreasonable manner.[36]The respondent refers to the claimant’s failure to comply with orders relating to evidence about his claims being presented out of time. I am not sure what orders they refer to given that their application is lacking in any particularity here. They do not state which orders were not complied with and when they ought to have been and how they say this engages Rule 74. Notwithstanding this the respondent had the opportunity to cross examine the claimant about jurisdiction and the claims being brought out of time and were not prejudiced at the preliminary hearing. It is not clear how they say they have been put to any additional cost as a result of any asserted breach. The hearing was able to still proceed. No prejudice was raised by either counsel at the outset. The costs of that hearing will still have been incurred. Again, I find any breach in this regard (if there was any breach) was not sufficient conduct to satisfy me that a) the rule is engaged and b) that discretion should be exercised in favour of making a costs order against the claimant. The respondent’s application is lacking in particularity in relation to this allegation.[37]Unreasonable conduct is to be given its ordinary English meaning and is not the same as vexatious. I have taken into account the nature gravity and effect of the the alleged conduct which largely relates to the claimant’s ability to bring the claim in time and not having done so and the fact that he had no reasonable prospects of persuading the Tribunal that he was not competent enough to bring the claim in time. The vital point in exercising discretion is to look at the whole picture. Looking at the whole picture here I do not find the claimant’s conduct in bringing the claim or pursuing it was unreasonable. The Tribunal does have discretion to extend time, and he reasonably believed that could be exercised in his favour once his evidence was heard. His understanding of the stricter reasonably practicable test may have been more limited but that does not automatically make his conduct unreasonable. This may be different if he was a serial claimant and was issuing multiple claims out of time against the respondent for example. I am aware he has issued a previous claim, but the respondent does not refer to this in their application as conduct relied on. In any event I have insufficient information about that other claim to be able to properly consider it as part of this application. Page 6 of 7[38]The respondent may have issued a costs warning. This is not unusual during the course of litigation. It does not mean the claimant was never going to be given permission to bring his claims even though they may have been plainly out of time. Respondents should equally be cautious about issuing costs warnings and should only do so if the circumstances warrant it otherwise they could similarly be accused of unreasonable conduct. I have seen the cost warning letter sent by the respondent’s solicitors to the claimant on 16 January 2025. It seeks to persuade the claimant he has no reasonable prospects of success of persuading the Tribunal that he was not competent enough to bring his claim form in time or that he should be given an extension. However, they rely on a number of matters which were matters of evidence I heard in order to make my determination. It was not a foregone conclusion that the matters they rely upon in this letter would inevitably have resulted in the non granting of an extension of time. To advance your best points in litigation and argue that it ought to have been obvious the claimant had no reasonable prospects of success disregards the claimant’s evidence. Even on those facts relied upon by the respondent in their costs warning letter I do not find that it was plainly obvious there were no reasonable prospects of the claimant persuading the Tribunal that it was not reasonably practicable to have brought his claim in time and/or to extend time.[39]Taking into account all of the matters set out above I am not satisfied the respondent has persuaded me (the burden is on them) that Rule 74 is engaged. Even if it had been the matters relied on by them in their application do not satisfy me based on my findings at the preliminary hearing that discretion should be exercised in making a costs award against the claimant.[40]The application for costs is accordingly refused.
REASONS
[1]The claimant’s complaints of constructive unfair dismissal under the Employment Rights Act 1996 and Wrongful Dismissal (notice pay) were not presented within the applicable time limit. It was determined that it was reasonably practicable to do so. The complaints of unfair dismissal and wrongful dismissal were therefore dismissed.[2]The complaints of failure to make reasonable adjustments, harassment relating to disability and direct discrimination on the grounds of sex under the Equality Act 2010 were presented out of time. It was held not just and equitable to extend the time limit. The complaints were therefore dismissed. Principles of Reconsideration[3]When approaching any application, and during the course of proceedings, the Tribunal must give effect to the overriding objective found at Rule 3 Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2024. This says: Page 1 of 9 “2 - The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable Employment Tribunals to deal with cases fairly and justly. Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes, so far as practicable—(a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing;(b) dealing with cases in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues;(c) avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings;(d) avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues; and(e) saving expense. A Tribunal shall seek to give effect to the overriding objective in interpreting, or exercising any power given to it by, these Rules. The parties and their representatives shall assist the Tribunal to further the overriding objective and in particular shall co-operate generally with each other and with the Tribunal.”[4]The power to confirm, vary or revoke a judgment is found at Rule 68. That provides that a Judgment can be reconsidered “if it is in the interests of justice to do so”. Rule 69 of the Rules requires that an application for reconsideration is made within 14 days of the written record being sent to the parties. This application for reconsideration was initially sent by the claimant as a request for an appeal. There followed correspondence between the Tribunal and the claimant to seek clarification of whether he was wishing to appeal or was asking for a reconsideration. Despite being informed an appeal needs to be submitted to the EAT the claimant has continued to correspond with the Tribunal asking for an ‘appeal’ of the Judgment. My judgment was sent to the parties on 10 February 2025. The first request for an ‘appeal’ appears to be in the email from the claimant dated 12 August 2025. This is clearly well outside the 14 days permitted to ask for a reconsideration. The application was not sent to me as a request for reconsideration until 11 September 2025 due to the confusion with what the claimant was asking for (given his continued request for an appeal). However, I will still deal with the requested reconsideration despite it being considerably out of time.[5]This is not an appeal decision. I want to make it clear to the claimant an appeal (if being pursued) is to be made to Employment Appeal Tribunal and the claimant has already been sent information about how to appeal to the EAT.[6]By rule 68, the Tribunal may reconsider any judgment where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so and, if it decides to do so, may vary, revoke or confirm the original decision. Since the introduction of the present rules there has been a single threshold for making an application. That is that reconsideration is necessary in the interests of justice. There must therefore be something about the nature of how the decision was reached, either substantively or procedurally, from which the interests of justice would be offended if the original decision was allowed to stand. Page 2 of 9[7]Rule 70(1) and(2) of the Rules provides: “A Tribunal must consider any application made under rule 69. If the Tribunal considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked (including, unless there are special reasons, where substantially the same application has already been made and refused), the application shall be refused, and the Tribunal shall inform the parties of the refusal. …”[8]Where an Employment Judge refuses an application following the application of Rule 70 (2), then it is not necessary to hear the application at a hearing.[9]The interests of justice in this case should be measured as a balance between both parties; both the applicant and the respondent to a reconsideration application have interests which must be guarded against (Outasight VB Limited v Brown [2014] UKEAT/0253/14).[10]In Brown, Her Honour Judge Eady QC said that the general public also have an interest in such cases because there should be an expectation of the finality of litigation. This was an expectation outlined by Mr Justice Phillips in Flint v Eastern Electricity Board [1975] ICR936, who said “it is very much in the interests of the general public that proceedings of this kind should be as final as possible”. He also said it was unjust to give the loser in litigation a “second bite of the cherry” where, having lost and learnt of the reasons for losing, a litigant seeks to re-argue points and bring additional evidence or information which would overcome the reasons given for the loss.[11]Consequently, the provision of evidence said to be relevant after the conclusion of the hearing will rarely serve to alter or vary the judgment given unless the party seeking to introduce the evidence can show (Ladd v Marshall [1954] EWCA Civ 1):a. the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial;b. the evidence would probably have an important influence on the result of the case; andc. the evidence must be apparently credible. Grounds and reasons of reconsideration application[12]The claimant in his email dated 12 August 2025 states the Judge did not mention there was an appeals procedure when Judgment was given. The claimant was sent with my Judgment a covering letter from the Tribunal which clearly stated: The guidance explains that you may ask the Employment Tribunal to reconsider the judgment, if reconsideration is necessary in the interests of justice. It also explains how to appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal if there is a mistake in the judgment on a point of law. These processes are quite different, and you Page 3 of 9 will need to decide whether to follow either or both. The guidance also explains about asking for written reasons for the judgment if the judgment does not have reasons with it. You will almost always need written reasons for the judgment if you wish to appeal and you will usually need them if you want reconsideration. There are strict time limits for asking for written reasons, applying for reconsideration and appealing. Those time limits are different. You must read the guidance but in general the time limits are: Written reasons 14 days from the date the judgment is sent Reconsideration 14 days from the date the judgment is sent or 14 days from the dated the separate written reasons are sent if you ask for them Appeal 42 days after the date the judgment with reasons is sent or 42 days after the date the separate written reasons are sent if you ask for them You must appeal by 4.00 pm on the last day[13]In the same letter information is given about where to obtain information from to make an appeal and where to write to for any appeal form (not this Tribunal)[14]The procedure for all options available to the claimant once the Judgment was issued is clearly explained to him in the letter accompanying the Judgment.[15]The Judge would not ordinarily explain any appeals procedure when delivering oral judgment. Furthermore, the claimant was legally represented by counsel throughout the hearing.[16]The application appears to comprise of the claimant’s email and an accompanying 3-page letter. The letter is not dated but starts ‘Dear Judge Please accept the lateness of this appeal’[17]There are a number of matters raised in the letter relating to the claimant’s medical and health issues. It appears to be explaining how his anxiety and depression affected him. It is noted that at the time of the hearing the claimant’s disability complaints did not include these conditions as impairments he was relying on although there was a pending application to amend to include those impairments.[18]I cannot comment on the claimant’s assertions that his barrister did not defend or challenge his cross examination well.[19]I can say as the Judge it is not my role to defend any party (as the claimant suggests I failed to defend him) when being cross examined. The claimant had proper and appropriate questions put to him regarding why his claims had not Page 4 of 9 been brought in time. The questions were relevant to the issues. I did not find the claimant was in difficulty in answering the questions. He was legally represented, and his counsel did not bring any matters to my attention such as the claimant needing more time to respond or any other adjustments required as a result of any anxiety or depression. I did not observe the claimant struggling to respond or notice that he was unable to answer questions because he had ‘frozen’. What I found was the claimant’s evidence was not clear, and it was evident the passage of time had affected his ability to be more specific and /or recall events.[20]The hearing was listed for one day. I explained to the parties at the outset that as there were a number of outstanding matters to be dealt with, I would hear evidence and submissions about the time limit and jurisdiction points first. Then I explained we will take a break so that I can make a decision. If any claims survived that decision, I stated we would move on to the amendment application and finally disability. I explained, in order to manage expectations, that for all 3 issues to be determined you would need at least 2 days if not a day for each one. So, I explained it was unlikely we would get to disability during that day as that would require a one-day hearing in itself. As it transpired, we spent the whole day dealing with one issue – the time limits and jurisdiction points.[21]There was an issue with the claimant not being able to access the bundle and we delayed the hearing to enable him to open it.[22]The main documents he was referred to was his own statement, ACAS certificates and documents relating to when he had put in his grievance. He was also asked questions about another claim he had brought where time limits had been raised. All of these are matters within his knowledge and he was referred to the documents to assist him answer the questions. His counsel had the opportunity to re examine him.[23]I heard submissions at 2.15 pm then delivered oral judgment. A hearing day is 10 am – 4 pm. The record of the hearing states the hearing concluded at approximately 5 pm. This means I sat beyond the usual hearing day to be able to deliver oral judgment contrary to what the claimant asserts about me saying I had ‘rushed’ my decision. There is no need for me to rush a decision and nor do I ever rush any decision. I am simply able to reserve a judgment if there is insufficient time for me to make it. An oral judgment with reasons was given to the parties. If I mentioned anything about childcare commitments it would have been because I had already stayed late well beyond the usual hearing time and by 5 pm certainly will have needed to finish as soon as the decision was delivered.[24]The claimant’s application then gives the chronology of events which were the subject matter of his claims. This is not relevant to the Judgment I made. I was not making any determination about liability nor the merits of his claims. Page 5 of 9[25]The application does not refer to any reason why the judgment was either erroneous in law or it is in the interests of justice to reconsider it.[26]The claimant was legally represented. I did not observe anything in his presentation or giving of evidence that caused me concern. The claimant answered all the questions put to him and again I did not observe any difficulties with his understanding. I did not observe his ‘freezing’. This was not a hearing where his evidence about liability was being heard, and he was being asked to recall a wider variety of matters. We were hearing evidence about why he did not bring his claims in time. The issues and matters put to him were fairly narrow and all within his own knowledge. He was asked relevant questions. I did not observe there to be any ‘bullying’ of him as asserted by the respondent’s counsel. The nature of cross examination is adversarial but nothing unusual was observed about the manner in which questions were put. Had there been I would have interjected. His counsel would have similarly objected, as his legal representative, had he observed any inappropriate questioning.[27]The claimant does not say in the application what adjustments he could have been given which would have made any difference to the oral evidence given and how it would have made difference.[28]In any event he largely seems to be relying on his barrister not representing him properly and/or that as the Judge I was not defending him and/or rushed the decision.[29]It is not agreed that the decision was rushed. I never rush a decision. I will simply reserve it and send out a written Judgment with reasons after the hearing. That said we have a limited time to conclude a hearing and make any required decision. I consider I had sufficient time to properly make that decision and was able to sit late to deliver it orally.[30]It was not in dispute that all complaints were brought out of time. The reasons for the claims being dismissed[31]Reasons were given orally at the hearing. I will briefly repeat them here.[32]The test for the unfair dismissal and wrongful dismissal claims was the reasonable practicability test under section 111 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. The decision was based on findings that the claimant had prior knowledge of bringing an ET claim having issued disability discrimination complaints (before this claim) against Surrey county council and Mr Fraine Ford in relation to matters arising from the same employment which is the subject matter of this claim. There was a Judgment on a preliminary issue in those complaints in November 2019 where the claim was dismissed for not Page 6 of 9 having been brought in time and the time was not extended. The claimant was present at that hearing. Whilst the claimant in evidence asserted that despite this earlier case he was unaware of time limits because it would not be obvious to him as he is not a solicitor, I found he had previously had to give evidence about why he could not bring those claims in time. He must therefore have been aware that time limits apply to claims such as the ones he now seeks to bring, and I found he would have been aware of those time limits before he issued this ET 1 claim and importantly at the time he resigned from his employment .[33]In addition, the claimant contacted ACAS against 5 proposed respondents between July and August 2022 and I found it unlikely that at no point were time limits not discussed, nor that the claimant, having been involved in initiating ACAS early conciliation, was not aware that time limits applied to bringing such claims in the ET. The claimant conceded he could have brought these claims at that time in 2022 but stated he was in a spiral of depression at that time.[34]I heard no cogent evidence to satisfy me that at this point in time in particular his depression and mental health condition was such that it was not reasonably practicable for him to bring the claims he accepts were in his contemplation at that time.[35]I do not diminish Mr Sidell’s previous medical history nor his mental health condition, but I was not persuaded that he was so traumatised or triggered by his mental health condition at the relevant time that he was unable to present his claim within the statutory time period. Nor was I persuaded that the claim was then brought within a reasonable period thereafter. Notably the ET1 is not issued until November 2023. My findings were supported by the numerous email communications he he was able to send within the relevant period clearly referring extensively and coherently to a number of issues and complaints which related to the same employment period and treatment. At the hearing he relied on these same matters as being too triggering or re traumatising to explain the late submission of the claim. This I did not find was consistent with someone who was still able to send numerous extensive emails about the same events but not able to put them in the ET1[36]The discrimination complaints of course have a wider test I could apply even though I had found it was reasonably practicable to bring the claims in time. That is the test set out in section 123 of the Equality Act 2010[37]The claimant’s discriminatory claims were not properly articulated in terms of precisely when the alleged discriminatory conduct started and ended. In evidence he stated the failure to promote was in 2017, but his grievances indicate that he was prevented from being promoted since 2014. His ET1 suggests the promotion issue goes back to before the brigade doctor signed him off in 2015. The reasonable adjustments claim appears to go back to events in 2022 and the sex discrimination claim also dated back to events in 2022. Page 7 of 9[38]What was abundantly evident when being questioned about the relevant time period for these complaints is that the claimant could not remember a lot with clarity in terms of the dates.[39]I took into account the discriminatory acts appear to have taken place long before the termination and he could have complained about them in their own right before he resigned. They were clearly within his contemplation when he contacted ACAS in 2022. I had found he was aware of the deadlines and still chose to wait until September 2023 to seek legal advice.[40]In looking at the balance of prejudice, I considered that the claimant would be prevented from pursuing the claim however I found the balance of prejudice in this case was tipped in favour of the respondent because it is plain the cogency of the evidence will be impacted. The claimant was unable to remember key matters today and has not properly articulated when some of the discriminatory acts were alleged to have commenced from. It was clear Mr Sidell’s own recollection of pertinent events is affected by the passage of time. I found the forensic prejudice in this case to the respondent tips the balance of prejudice in favour of the respondent. I therefore did not extend time to bring those claims and they were also dismissed. As there were no surviving claims this brought the claim to an end.[41]The purpose of reconsideration is not to re litigate or attempt to the persuade the Judge that different findings should have been made. Reasons for the decision has already been given orally. Decision on the reconsideration application[42]In my Judgment, the claimant is raising matters which are not relevant to the factors I had to take into account when making my decision. In the alternative he raises matters which are not supported by how he presented himself nor his oral testimony. He was legally represented. He was asked questions about his knowledge about ET time limits to bring his claims and why he did not bring his claims in time. He was referred to few documents in the bundle which were relevant to knowledge. His application refers to him being bullied by the defence barrister and because of that he does not think he managed to answer any questions. I am satisfied the claimant was able to answer the questions put to him. I made findings of fact accordingly which informed my decision.[43]It is not the purpose of reconsideration to allow a party to dispute a determination that a party disagrees with, especially where evidence being referred to has already been considered and deliberated on. It is a fundamental requirement of litigation that there is certainty and finality. If conclusions made are disputed with regard to whether a correct interpretation of the law was made, they are matters for an appeal which the claimant is able to make to the Employment Appeal Tribunal. Page 8 of 9[44]In view of the above determination of this application, the original judgment still stands.[45]The application for a reconsideration of the Judgment is refused.