Mr M Qureshi and others v Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Ltd: 2305183/2021 and others
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 2305183/2021, 2305065/2021, 2305178/2021, 2305180/2021, 2305182/2021, 2305069/2021, 2305067/2021, 2305066/2021
Between
Mr M Qureshi and othersClaimantPakistan International Airlines Corporation LtdRespondent
Before
Employment Judge Truscott KCMr M Humphreys barrister for claimantMs E Mayhew-Hills consultant for respondentDate 17 October 2024
REASONS
[1]This preliminary hearing was fixed to address the issues set out at a case management hearing on 17 February 2023 [293-306].[2]The claimants were asked to provide further Information of the specific acts of sex discrimination relied on by Miss Habib, Ms. Javed and Mrs. Bhatti. They did so [309-313 paras.10-19]. Case Number: 2305183/2021 2305065/2021 2305178/2021 2305180/2021 2305182/2021 2305069/2021 2305067/2021 2305066/2021[3]They also provided further information in relation to the age discrimination and other claims [307-313]. The respondent set out its position in a written submission [314-316].[4]There was a bundle of documents to which reference will be made where necessary.[5]During the course of this hearing, the issues were condensed to the claimants’ application to amend and respondent’s application to strike out the age discrimination claims and the sex discrimination claims.[6]The Tribunal had the benefit of oral arguments from the parties and a written Note by Counsel. Case Management matters are dealt with in a separate order. Law Amendment
Law
[7]In the case of Selkent Bus Company Limited v. Moore [1996] ICR 836 EAT, the Employment Appeal Tribunal set out the test to be applied by a Tribunal in deciding whether to exercise its discretion to grant an amendment at 843-844: “(4) Whenever the discretion to grant an amendment is invoked, the tribunal should take into account all the circumstances and should balance the injustice and hardship of allowing the amendment against the injustice and hardship of refusing it. (5) What are the relevant circumstances? It is impossible and undesirable to attempt to list them exhaustively, but the following are certainly relevant.(a) The nature of the amendment. Applications to amend are of many different kinds, ranging, on the one hand, from the correction of clerical and typing errors, the addition of factual details to existing allegations and the addition or substitution of other labels for facts already pleaded to, on the other hand, the making of entirely new factual allegations which change the basis of the existing claim. The tribunal have to decide whether the amendment sought is one of the minor matters or is a substantial alteration pleading a new cause of action.(b) The applicability of time limits. If a new complaint or cause of action is proposed to be added by way of amendment, it is essential for the tribunal to consider whether that complaint is out of time and, if so, whether the time limit should be extended under the applicable statutory provisions, e.g., in the case of unfair dismissal, section 67 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978.(c) The timing and manner of the application. An application should not be refused solely because there has been a delay in making it. There are no time limits laid down in the Regulations of 1993 for the making of amendments. The amendments may be made at any time — before, at, even after the hearing of the case. Delay in making the application is, however, a discretionary factor. It is relevant to consider why the application was not made earlier and why it is now being made: for example, the discovery of new facts or new information appearing from documents disclosed on discovery. Whenever taking any factors into account, the paramount considerations are the relative injustice and Case Number: 2305183/2021 2305065/2021 2305178/2021 2305180/2021 2305182/2021 2305069/2021 2305067/2021 2305066/2021 hardship involved in refusing or granting an amendment. Questions of delay, as a result of adjournments, and additional costs, particularly if they are unlikely to be recovered by the successful party, are relevant in reaching a decision.”[8]The focus is “not on questions of formal classification [e.g., “relabelling” etc] but on the extent to which the new pleading is likely to involve substantially different areas of inquiry than the old: the greater the difference between the factual and legal issues raised by the new claim and by the old, the less likely it is that it will be permitted”. (Abercrombie v. Aga Rangemaster Ltd [2014] ICR 209 at [48]).[9]Time limits are “a factor – albeit an important and potentially decisive one – in the exercise of the discretion” whether or not to grant permission to amend (Safeway Stores Ltd v. TGWU UKEAT/0092/07 at [10] and [13]). Although Selkent says it is essential for the Tribunal to consider whether a complaint is made out of time and if so whether the time limit should be extended, in Galilee v Commission of Police of the Metropolis [2018] ICR 634 the EAT held it is not always necessary to determine time points as part of an amendment application. A Tribunal can decide to allow an amendment subject to limitation points being determined at a later stage in the proceedings, usually at the final hearing. That might be the most appropriate route in cases where there is alleged to be a continuing act and the Tribunal needs to make findings of fact on this issue.[10]Also relevant are:(1) the extent to which the amended claim would require the adducing of wholly different evidence from that required by the original claim; and(2) the nature of the explanation or excuse offered for the failure to plead the claim in the original ET1 Claim Form (New Star Asset Management Holdings Ltd v. Evershed at [16], [22] and [33]).[11]In the case of Vaughan v Modality Partnership [2021] IRLR 97 EAT, the Employment Appeal Tribunal reminded parties and Tribunals that the core test in considering applications to amend is the balance of injustice and hardship in allowing or refusing the application. The exercise starts with the parties making submissions on the specific practical consequences of allowing or refusing the amendment. That balancing exercise is fundamental. The Tribunal’s focus generally should be on the: “real practical consequences of allowing or refusing the amendment. If the application to amend is refused how severe will the consequences be, in terms of the prospects of success of the claim or defence; if permitted what will be the practical problems in responding” The Selkent factors should not be treated as if they are a list to be checked off.[12]The assessment of the balance of injustice and hardship may include an examination of the merits but there is no point in allowing an amendment if it will subsequently be struck out. That extends to cases not only which are utterly hopeless but also to ones where the proposed claim has no reasonable prospect of success. The authority for that is Gillett v Bridge 86 Limited [2017] 6 WL UK 46. Striking out[13]An employment judge has power under Rule 37(1)(a), at any stage of the proceedings, either on its own initiative or on the application of a party, to strike out all Case Number: 2305183/2021 2305065/2021 2305178/2021 2305180/2021 2305182/2021 2305069/2021 2305067/2021 2305066/2021 or part of a claim or response on the ground that it has no reasonable prospect of success. In Hack v. St Christopher’s Fellowship [2016] ICR 411 EAT, the then President of the Employment Appeal Tribunal said, at paragraph 54: Rule 37 of the Employment Tribunal Rules 2013 provides materially:- “(i) At any stage in the proceedings, either on its own initiative or on the application of a party, a Tribunal may strike out all or part of a claim or response on any of the following grounds – (a) Where it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success…”55. The words are “no reasonable prospect”. Some prospect may exist, but be insufficient. The standard is a high one. As Lady Smith explained in Balls v Downham Market High School and College [2011] IRLR 217, EAT (paragraph 6): “The Tribunal must first consider whether, on a careful consideration of all the available material, it can properly conclude that the claim has no reasonable prospects of success. I stress the words “no” because it shows the test is not whether the Claimant’s claim is likely to fail nor is it a matter of asking whether it is possible that his claim will fail. Nor is it a test which can be satisfied by considering what is put forward by the Respondent either in the ET3 or in the submissions and deciding whether their written or oral assertions regarding disputed matters are likely to be established as facts. It is, in short, a high test. There must be no reasonable prospects…”56. In Romanowska v. Aspirations Care Limited [2014] (UKEAT/015/14) the Appeal Tribunal expressed the view that where the reason for dismissal was the central dispute between the parties, it would be very rare indeed for such a dispute to be resolved without hearing from the parties who actually made the decision. It did not however exclude the possibility entirely.[14]The EAT has held that the striking out process requires a two-stage test in HM Prison Service v. Dolby [2003] IRLR 694 EAT, at para 15. The first stage involves a finding that one of the specified grounds for striking out has been established; and, if it has, the second stage requires the tribunal to decide as a matter of discretion whether to strike out the claim, order it to be amended or order a deposit to be paid. See also Hassan v. Tesco Stores UKEAT/0098/19/BA at paragraph 17 the EAT observed: “There is absolutely nothing in the Judgment to indicate that the Employment Judge paused, having reached the conclusion that these claims had no reasonable prospect of success, to consider how to exercise his discretion. The way in which r 37 is framed is permissive. It allows an Employment Judge to strike out a claim where one of the five grounds are established, but it does not require him or her to do so. That is why in the case of Dolby the test for striking out under the Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1993 was interpreted as requiring a two stage approach.” .[15]It has been held that the power to strike out a claim on the ground that it has no reasonable prospect of success should only be exercised in rare circumstances (Tayside Public Transport Co Ltd (t/a Travel Dundee) v. Reilly [2012] IRLR 755, at para 30). More specifically, cases should not, as a general principle, be struck out on this ground when the central facts are in dispute.Case Number: 2305183/2021 2305065/2021 2305178/2021 2305180/2021 2305182/2021 2305069/2021 2305067/2021 2305066/2021[16]In Mechkarov v. Citibank N A UKEAT/0041/16, the EAT set out the approach to be followed including:-(i) Ordinarily, the claimant’s case should be taken at its highest.(ii) Strike out is available in the clearest cases – where it is plain and obvious.(iii) Strike out is available if the claimant’s case is conclusively disproved or is totally and inexplicably inconsistent with undisputed contemporaneous documents.[17]As a general principle, discrimination cases should not be struck out except in the very clearest circumstances, Anyanwu v. South Bank Students’ Union [2001] IRLR 305 HL. Similar views were expressed in Chandhok v. Tirkey [2015] IRLR 195, EAT, where Langstaff J reiterated (at paras 19–20) that the cases in which a discrimination claim could be struck out before the full facts had been established are rare; for example, where there is a time bar to jurisdiction, where there is no more than an assertion of a difference of treatment and a difference of protected characteristic, or where claims had been brought so repetitively concerning the same essential circumstances that a further claim would be an abuse. Such examples are the exception, however, and the general rule remains that the exercise of the discretion to strike out a claim should be ‘sparing and cautious’.[18]In Ahir v. British Airways plc [2017] EWCA Civ 1392 CA, Lord Justice Underhill reviewed the authorities in discrimination and similar cases and held at paragraph 18, that: “Employment tribunals should not be deterred from striking out claims, including discrimination claims, which involve a dispute of fact if they are satisfied that there is indeed no reasonable prospect of the facts necessary to liability being established, and also provided they are keenly aware of the danger of reaching such a conclusion in circumstances where the full evidence has not been heard and explored, perhaps particularly in a discrimination context.” Discussion and decision The claims as they stand[19]The claims for each claimant appear to be fully pled with the assistance of a solicitor. In relation to Ms Habib, paragraph 6 of her ET1 sets out her narrative of why she was wrongly included in the pool for selection for redundancy. As part of that narrative, she says that she was told that she had been marked by Mr Imran Khan. Later in the paragraph, she sets out her case that she was wrongly marked by Mr Khan because of her sex. Paragraph 14 links the actions of the respondent to her gender. The claim by Mrs Bhatti is set out in similar terms. The claim by Ms Javed is different to the other two, although the box in the ET1 is ticked sex discrimination and there are references to gender in paragraphs 14 and 15, there is no notice in the ET1 of what the claim actually is.[20]The age discrimination claims for each claimant arise from similar narratives in the ET1 which says: “The redundancy selection procedure was simply a sham exercise and a vile Case Number: 2305183/2021 2305065/2021 2305178/2021 2305180/2021 2305182/2021 2305069/2021 2305067/2021 2305066/2021 to get rid of older employees on the pretext of redundancy. “ The proposed amendment[21]Miss Habib, and Mrs. Bhatti have provided further details of claims already set out in the ET1 against Mr Khan. This gives the respondent fair notice of the basis of the claim. The respondent accepted that the amendments should be allowed so far as relating to the dismissal claim.[22]Counsel for the pursuer went further and sought the inclusion of the additional material as new free standing claims. The Tribunal noted that the issues in the case addressed at a previous case management hearing are related to the dismissal with the exception of a failure to promote one claimant in 2018 on the grounds of race.[23]The Tribunal was not prepared to expand the scope of the claims by Ms Habib and Mrs Bhatti. Their claims are plainly directed at the reason for dismissal and were prepared with the assistance of a solicitor. The claims made by each claimant are complex so far as they are directed at dismissal. It is prejudicial to the respondent that they have to meet free standing claims against Mr Khan for earlier period in respect of which time bar issues may arise. The Tribunal also considers that the main claim should not spawn satellite litigation which could give rise to an even more extended hearing.[24]The claim by Ms Javed is absent any basis in the ET1. A basis is provided in the further information and seeks to make a claim against Mrs Khan. Her original claim was prepared by a solicitor and no explanation was given as to why the details of the claim were being added at this stage and in the manner of further information. Even if it had been provided, the events except dismissal were out of time. Whether freestanding or as an attack on the reason for dismissal, the balance of prejudice favours the respondent. The allegations will require a significant increase in the scope of the enquiry to be undertaken. It should not have to defend an additional claim arising in 2021 at this stage of proceedings. The Tribunal also considers that the main claim should not spawn satellite litigation which could give rise to an even more extended hearing.[25]The claimants provided further information about the basis of their age discrimination claims which did not seem to add anything to an understanding of what was being alleged which could be answered by the respondent. Strike out[26]The Tribunal took the claimant’s claims at their highest and considered all the material in the round.[27]The basis for the age discrimination claims is hard to understand in that even taking into account the further information supplied by the claimants, the respondent does not seem to have fair notice of the basis of the claim made against it. The respondent submitted that the group for the purposes of age discrimination is so broad as to weaken the claim for age discrimination. The claimants are aged at the date of termination from Ambreen Javed at 41 to 73 in the case of the eldest Nusrat Bano Case Number: 2305183/2021 2305065/2021 2305178/2021 2305180/2021 2305182/2021 2305069/2021 2305067/2021 2305066/2021 Bhatti. The fact there is such a broad age range dismissed indicates there was no age discrimination. The respondent may well be correct in that submission. However, the claimants’ cases should be taken at their highest. They have all claimed age discrimination and it may be that one or other might have been subjected to age discrimination in the selection process. The Tribunal is not in a position to know and cannot strike all the claims without knowing that there is no validity in any of the claims. With considerable hesitation, the Tribunal decided not to strike out the age discrimination claims. The Tribunal considered a deposit order but considered that the issue of the reason for dismissal should be addressed by the fact finding Tribunal which would have available to it all the possible pled alleged grounds of discrimination.[28]The Tribunal decided to strike out the claim by Ms Javed as it lacked any basis in the ET1. Accordingly, it was struck out as having no reasonable prospects of success. On the basis of the guidance set out earlier and weighing all the relevant factors, the Tribunal considered that it is not proportionate for the claim to proceed to a full hearing as it has no reasonable prospects of success.[29]The Tribunal allowed the amendment sought by Miss Habib and Mr Ahmed changing the statutory basis of their claims to section 152 and 153 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 by consent ___________________________________ EMPLOYMENT JUDGE TRUSCOTT QC Date 16 May 2023 Case Number: 2305183/2021 2305065/2021 2305178/2021 2305180/2021 2305182/2021 2305069/2021 2305067/2021 2305066/2021 1 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Claimant Respondent Mr M Qureshi & Ors v Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Limited JUDGMENT upon RECONSIDERATION
Law
[1]The Tribunal grants the application for reconsideration of its judgment dated 12 May 2023.[2]The Tribunal varies its judgment by adding: The application to strike out the claims of race discrimination as having no reasonable prospects of success is refused.
Law
[1]By way of a letter dated 29 May 2023, the respondent made an application for a reconsideration of the decision and reasons of this Tribunal dated 12 May 2023.[2]Any application for the reconsideration of a judgment must be determined in accordance rules 70 to 74 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2013. Rules[3]The relevant Employment Tribunal rules for this application read as follows: RECONSIDERATION OF JUDGMENTS Principles 70. A Tribunal may, either on its own initiative (which may reflect a request from the Employment Appeal Tribunal) or on the application of a party, reconsider any judgment where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. On reconsideration, the decision (“the original decision”) may be confirmed, varied or revoked. If it is revoked it may be taken again. Application 71. Except where it is made in the course of a hearing, an application for reconsideration shall be presented in writing (and copied to all the other parties) within 14 days of the date on which the written record, or other written communication, of the original decision was sent to the parties or within 14 days Case Number: 2305183/2021 2305065/2021 2305178/2021 2305180/2021 2305182/2021 2305069/2021 2305067/2021 2305066/2021 2 of the date that the written reasons were sent (if later) and shall set out why reconsideration of the original decision is necessary. Process 72.—(1) An Employment Judge shall consider any application made under rule 71. If the Judge considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked (including, unless there are special reasons, where substantially the same application has already been made and refused), the application shall be refused and the Tribunal shall inform the parties of the refusal. Otherwise, the Tribunal shall send a notice to the parties setting a time limit for any response to the application by the other parties and seeking the views of the parties on whether the application can be determined without a hearing. The notice may set out the Judge’s provisional views on the application.(2) If the application has not been refused under paragraph (1), the original decision shall be reconsidered at a hearing unless the Employment Judge considers, having regard to any response to the notice provided under paragraph (1), that a hearing is not necessary in the interests of justice. If the reconsideration proceeds without a hearing the parties shall be given a reasonable opportunity to make further written representations.(3) Where practicable, the consideration under paragraph (1) shall be by the Employment Judge who made the original decision or, as the case may be, chaired the full tribunal which made it; and any reconsideration under paragraph (2) shall be made by the Judge or, as the case may be, the full tribunal which made the original decision. Where that is not practicable, the President, Vice President or a Regional Employment Judge shall appoint another Employment Judge to deal with the application or, in the case of a decision of a full tribunal, shall either direct that the reconsideration be by such members of the original Tribunal as remain available or reconstitute the Tribunal in whole or in part.[4]In accordance with rule 70, a Tribunal may reconsider any judgment “where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so”. On reconsideration, the decision may be confirmed, varied or revoked. If it is revoked, it may be taken again.[5]The case authorities remind Tribunals that there is no automatic entitlement to reconsideration for any unsuccessful party. On the contrary, there is an underlying public policy principle in all proceedings of a judicial nature that there should be finality in litigation. Reconsideration of a judgment should be regarded as very much the exception to the general rule that Tribunal decisions should not be reopened and relitigated. In reference to the antecedent review provisions, in Stevenson v. Golden Wonder Ltd [1977] IRLR 474 EAT, Lord McDonald said that the (exceptional) process was ‘not intended to provide parties with the opportunity of a rehearing at which the same evidence can be rehearsed with different emphasis, or further evidence adduced which was available before’.[6]When dealing with the question of reconsideration, a Tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective to deal with cases ‘fairly and justly’. The Tribunal should also be guided by the common law principles of natural justice and fairness. Her Honour Judge Eady QC (as she then was) gave guidance as to the approach to Case Number: 2305183/2021 2305065/2021 2305178/2021 2305180/2021 2305182/2021 2305069/2021 2305067/2021 2305066/2021 3 be be takentaken iinn Outasight VB Ltd v. Brown [2015]2015] ICR D11 EAT. Although a tribunal’s discretion can be broad, it must be exercised judicially “which means having regard not only to the interests of the party seeking the review or reconsideration, but also to the interests of the other party to the llitigationitigation and to the public interest requirement that there should, so far as possible, be finality of litigation”.[7]Earlier guidance as to the approapproachach of Tribunals to the matter of reconsideration remains equally pertinent. In Trimble v. Supertravel Ltd [1982] ICR 440, the EAT made the following observations: 7.1. 7.1. it is irrelevant whether a tribunal’s alleged error is major or minor; 7.2. 7.2. what is relevant is whether or not a decision has been reached after a procedural mishap; 7.3. 7.3. since, in that case, the tribunal had reached its decision on the point in issue without hearing representations, it would have been appropriate for it to hear argument and to grant the review if satisfied that it had gone wrong; 7.4. 7.4. if a matter has been ventilated and properly argued, then any eerrorrror of law falls to be corrected on appeal and not by review.[8]This Tribunal decided that it was appropriate to reconsider its judgment as the claims included a claim of nationality discrimination which had not been addressed in the original judgment. Submissions had already been made on this issue by both parties at the hearing, the Tribunal invited any further submissions from the parties and decided a further hearing was not necessary. No further submissions were received from the parties.[9]Having ticked the race discrimination box, the ET1s narrate: In Pakistan under the Voluntary Separation Scheme proper redundancy package was given to employees who took up voluntary redundancy. The Respondent has also treated me differently as my redundancy package was not on parity with other employees who took redundancy in Pakistan. Employees in Pakistan have received substantial enhanced redundancy packages whereas UK employees have only received statutory rights. I contend that I was treated less favourably on the grounds of nationality by deliberate omission of the Respondent by not offering the same redundancy package (VSS).[10]The further particulars provided by the claimants state: Each of the Claimants pursue claims for race discrimination, relying on nationality within the meaning of s.9(1 )(b) of the Equality Act 2010. Each of the Claimants are British nationals. Each of the Claimants rely on a hypothetical comparator, being someone who is a Pakistani national, but is otherwise in materially the same circumstances as the Claimant, within the meaning of s.23 of the Equality Act 2010. Each of the Claimants also rely on a specific comparator, being Mr. Sikander Zia, a finance manager based in Bradford. Mr. Zia is a Pakistani national who was able to apply for and provided with enhanced redundancy terms, which were not available to the Claimants being British nationals. Case Number: 2305183/2021 2305065/2021 2305178/2021 2305180/2021 2305182/2021 2305069/2021 2305067/2021 2305066/2021 4[11]The respondent argues that the EHRC Code states that nationality is "the specific legal relationship between a person and a state through birth or naturalisation" (paragraph 2.38). The claimants claim that the better conditions of Pakistani citizen PIA employees sent to UK to work for PIA as compared to locally employed British citizen staff such as the claimants constitute race discrimination. However the claimant’s claims conflict with the guidance on comparators set out in the EHRC code of practice, Employment Statutory Code of Practice. The Equality Act 2010 states that in comparing people for the purpose of direct discrimination there must be no material difference between the circumstances relating to each case. Though it is not necessary for the circumstances of the two people (that is, the worker and the comparator) to be identical in every way; what matters is that the circumstances which are relevant to the treatment of the worker are the same or nearly the same for the worker and the comparator. Further at page 52 of the EHRC guidance, so far as relevant states in relation to direct discrimination: “The head office of a Japanese company seconds a limited number of staff from Japan to work for its UK subsidiary, alongside locally recruited UK staff. One of these local workers complains that his salary and benefits are lower than those of a secondee from Japan employed at the same grade. Although the two workers are working for the same company at the same grade, the circumstances of the Japanese secondee are materially different. He has been recruited in Japan, reports at least in part to the Japanese parent company, has a different career path and his salary and benefits reflect the fact that he is working abroad. For these reasons, he would not be a suitable comparator.”[12]From the information available to the Tribunal, the claimants are all of Pakistani nationality as well as British citizenship [317]. The claimants position is that they are all British Nationals [313 para. 21]. The submission for the respondent focuses on the legal position of multinational company staff however, this Tribunal does not have the facts to determine that the legal proposition is valid. Comparators are names who it is assumed are of a different nationality, if not a hypothetical comparator is identified who would be of a different nationality [313 Para. 22]. The race discrimination claims have been set out by the Tribunal [302 para. 52.1] and do not require a comparator who is seconded from another country. The claim is directed at the alleged failure to pay enhanced redundancy. The list of issues from the 17 February case management hearing shows that this is brought as a breach of contract claim [305 Para. 56].[13]The Tribunal took the claimant’s claims at their highest and considered all the material in the round. The basis for the race discrimination claims is easy to understand and the question of whether or not they can be established is a matter for evidence. The Tribunal is not in a position to know and cannot strike all the claims without knowing that there is no validity in any of the claims. The Tribunal decided not to strike out the race discrimination claims. The Tribunal considered a deposit order but considered that the issue of discrimination in the level of redundancy payment should be addressed by the fact finding Tribunal. Case Number: 2305183/2021 2305065/2021 2305178/2021 2305180/2021 2305182/2021 2305069/2021 2305067/2021 2305066/2021 5 ......................................................... I D Truscott QC Employment Judge Date: 6 September 2023 Case Numbers: 2305183/2021 2305065/2021 2305178/2021 2305180/2021 2305182/2021 2305069/2021 2305067/2021 2305066/2021 6.9 Judgment on Withdrawal – part - rule 52 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Claimants:(1) Zaheer Shah(2) Saeed Ahmed(3) Ambreen Javed(4) Nusrat Bhatti(5) Amira Habib(6) Muhammed Qureshi(7) Khalid Bashir Respondent: Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Limited