Mr A Khan v Anthem Schools Trust and Ms S Bhadare: 2304005/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2304005/2023

Between

Mr A KhanClaimant

Anthem Schools Trust and Ms S BhadareRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Rice-Birchall; Ms J Forecast; Mr T Harrington-

In person for claimant

Mr Baran (instructed by counsel) for respondent

Date 21 April 2026

JUDGMENT

The claimant’s claim of direct disability discrimination is not well-founded and is dismissed. The claimant’s claim of discrimination arising from disability is not well founded and is dismissed.

REASONS

[1]The first respondent is an education charity that runs a group of state-funded primary and secondary schools. The second respondent is Vice Principal of the Academy. The claimant applied to work at St Marks Church of England Academy as a second in charge of science teaching position in November 2022. The claimant was not offered the position. The claimant applied again for a science teacher position in February 2023 and again was not offered the position. It is those two recruitment processes which form the basis of the claimant’s claim.

[2]Early conciliation with both respondents started on 25 May 2023 and ended on 6 July 2023. The claim form was presented on 31 July 2023.

[3]The respondent concedes that the claimant has a disability, namely diabetes, but says it did not know and could not reasonably be expected to know, at the material times, that the claimant had the disability.

The Issues

[4]The issues in this case were agreed at the preliminary hearing as follows:

The Issues

[1]Time limits1.1 Given the date the claim form was presented and the dates of early conciliation, any complaint about something that happened before 26 February 2023 may not have been brought in time.

1.2 Were the discrimination complaints made within the time limit in section 123 of the Equality Act 2010? The Tribunal will decide:1.2.1 Was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the act to which the complaint relates?

1.2.2 If not, was there conduct extending over a period?

1.2.3 If so, was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the end of that period?

1.2.4 If not, were the claims made within a further period that the Tribunal thinks is just and equitable? The Tribunal will decide:1.2.4.1 Why were the complaints not made to the Tribunal in time?

1.2.4.2 In any event, is it just and equitable in all the circumstances to extend time?

[2]Direct disability discrimination (Equality Act 2010 section 13)2.1 Did the respondents do the following things:2.1.1 Not appoint the claimant in November 2022;

2.1.2 Not appoint the claimant in February 2023.

2.2 Was that less favourable treatment? The Tribunal will decide whether the claimant was treated worse than someone else was treated. There must be no material difference between their circumstances and the claimant’s. If there was nobody in the same circumstances as the claimant, the Tribunal will decide whether they were treated worse than someone else would have been treated. The claimant has not named anyone in particular who they say was treated better than they were in respect of the November appointment but has named Mr Singh and Ms Islam who were appointed in February 2023.

2.3 If so, was it because of disability?

[3]Discrimination arising from disability (Equality Act 2010 section 15)3.1 Did the respondents treat the claimant unfavourably by:3.1.1 Not appointing the claimant in November 2022;

3.1.2 Not appointing the claimant in February 2023.

3.2 Did the following things arise in consequence of the claimant’s disability: 3.2.1 Information about the claimant’s medical conditions and medication, and/or a recommendation by Maitland Medical, was provided to the respondent by the claimant’s former employer (Harris Academy) in November 2022.

3.3 Was the unfavourable treatment because of that information?

3.4 Was the treatment a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim? The respondent says that its aims were: 3.4.1 The respondents do not rely on a legitimate aim (but simply dispute that the above occurred).

3.5 Did the respondents know or could it reasonably have been expected to know that the claimant had the disability? From what date? The respondents dispute that they had the requisite knowledge at any relevant time.

[4]Remedy for discrimination4.1 Should the Tribunal make a recommendation that the respondents take steps to reduce any adverse effect on the claimant? What should it recommend?

4.2 What financial losses has the discrimination caused the claimant?

4.3 Has the claimant taken reasonable steps to replace lost earnings, for example by looking for another job?

4.4 If not, for what period of loss should the claimant be compensated?

4.5 What injury to feelings has the discrimination caused the claimant and how much compensation should be awarded for that?

4.6 Has the discrimination caused the claimant personal injury and how much compensation should be awarded for that?

4.7 Is there a chance that the claimant’s employment would have ended in any event? Should their compensation be reduced as a result?

4.8 Did the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures apply?

4.9 Did the respondents or the claimant unreasonably fail to comply with it ?

4.10 If so is it just and equitable to increase or decrease any award payable to the claimant?

4.11 By what proportion, up to 25%?

4.12 Should interest be awarded? How much?

Evidence

[5]The Tribunal had the benefit of a joint bundle of documents and had a witness statement prepared by the claimant and another by the second respondent (R2). The Tribunal heard oral evidence from both witnesses. An additional document was included at the request of the claimant (and with the consent of the respondents) at the outset of day 2. That was an email dated 27 February 2023 and timed 1302 and was an email to the claimant to tell him that his second application had been unsuccessful.

[6]At the outset of the hearing the claimant made an application for a witness order in respect of two witnesses. For (summary) reasons given orally at the hearing, that application was refused. The parties were informed of their right to request written reasons.

[7]An oral decision was given summarily at the conclusion of the hearing. The claimant made a request for full written reasons. Findings of fact relevant to the issues on the balance of probability

[8]R1 is a school. Its Vice-Principal is R2. R1’s heads of department report to R2, who takes responsibility for recruitment, has been trained in recruitment, and may run up to 30 recruitment exercises in an academic year.

[9]R1’s established recruitment procedure is that CVs are reviewed in order to decide who to invite for interview. From that point on, the CV is not referred to and the decision as to who will be appointed would be on the basis of the selection day, which includes an interview and an observed lesson. 10.The claimant is a teacher who applied on two occasions for roles with R1. R2 was involved in the selection process on both occasions. The claimant’s first application was made in November 2022, and the second in February 2023.

[11]When he made the applications, the claimant was working (or had recently been working) for Harris Academy Merton (Harris) who had, in September 2022, received a New Starter Review from Maitland Medical, which described the claimant as “fit with recommendations” and went on to state: “This new starter has disclosed a medical condition which they report is well controlled. We would however recommend that regular meal breaks are taken and an allocation of the same classroom on the ground floor near a toilet at all times throughout the week as at times the facilities may be required urgently.” It concluded: “We would recommend an early referral to Occupational Health should they or you have any concerns in the future in relation to their health and wellbeing.”

[12]The claimant admitted in cross examination that his disability was a “hidden” disability and that, on meeting him, no one would know that he was disabled. November 2022 application

[13]The claimant applied for a role with R1 through an agency. It is standard practice for an agency to withhold the names of the referees/current school where the applicant works, presumably because it means the recruiter needs to contact them directly in order to be able to progress the application. As such, when an applicant comes to the respondent through an agency, R1 does not seek references prior to interview.

[14]In accordance with that practice, Harris was not named in the claimant’s application to R1. Although Harris is likely to have been mentioned during the claimant’s interview, there was no evidence from the notes of the interview that the name of the school was written down as the claimant alleged, and consequently the Tribunal accepts the respondents’ evidence that there was no contact with Harris in connection with that recruitment exercise.

[15]The claimant was interviewed by two interviewers whose scores and notes appeared in the bundle. The Tribunal prefers R2’s evidence that there were two, rather than three, interviewers as that is consistent with the contemporaneous documentation, which included the interview notes of R2 and the other interviewer.

[16]Following the panel interviews, a candidate named Amsham was preferred to the claimant. However, the interviewers were impressed by the claimant and recorded in their notes that they would like to offer him the role if Amsham turned it down, and, otherwise, offer an alternative role. In the event, Amsham negotiated more money for the role he was offered and accepted the role and no alternative role was offered to the claimant. R2 said that was because, after Amsham negotiated more money, the budget was less and therefore there was no role to be offered to the claimant, despite their desire following the interview to want to offer something if possible. The claimant believes that no role was offered because R1/2 had contacted Harris and had been informed of his

[17]There was no reason for the respondents to contact the agency for the claimant’s references until he was offered the role, in accordance with their standard practice when an application is made through an agency. There was no evidence to suggest that any such contact was made and, accordingly, the Tribunal finds that there was no contact between the respondents and Harris at any stage of the November recruitment exercise.

[18]The claimant was taken out of the running because the other candidate did better and in the event, it was not possible to offer the claimant an alternative role due to budgetary constraints.

[19]Finally, there is no evidence to support the claimant’s allegation that he lost out on more than one role during this recruitment process. The claimant applied for a specific role. Whilst there may have been the possibility of an alternative role being offered, there was no obligation on the respondent to do so in circumstances in which the role for which the claimant applied was given to a candidate the respondent considered had performed better than the claimant. February 2023 application

[20]When a further vacancy arose with R1 in February 2023, this time for a more junior role, the claimant applied again. The Tribunal finds that, as he had done well in the previous application process, he felt he would easily be successful, especially as it was a more junior role. However, that approach was naïve and showed a lack of understanding of the recruitment process within R1, in which no account was taken of how the claimant performed in a previous application process for a different role.

[21]On this occasion, the claimant applied for the role directly, rather than through an agency, and included the names of three referees, all of which he indicated could be contacted prior to his interview. Once he was shortlisted for interview, the referees were contacted. The second referee was the head teacher at Harris. She responded as follows: “I am unable to provide a reference for this candidate. He is currently appealing against the decision to dismiss following unsuccessful completion of his probationary period.” The difference on this occasion was because, this time, the claimant had applied directly, rather than through an agency, hence the approach to the claimant’s current employer prior to interview. It was the respondents’ preference to seek references in advance of interview where possible, as any possible issues could be discussed and, usually, ironed out.

[22]The Tribunal accepted R2’s evidence that the respondents would never take problems at another school as a reason not to interview someone. Consequently, when they received the response from Harris, the respondent proceeded to interview the claimant. The interview process would allow an explanation to be given. R2 noted that, on this occasion, the claimant had indicated that a difficulty had arisen at Harris on his application form.

[23]Although there may have been deficiencies in the respondents’ records, as the notes were sparse, in terms of what was recorded of the decision making process, the claimant’s cross examination of R2 about how he could possibly have scored lower than his two comparators for the role (Ms Islam and Mr Singh who were appointed to the roles) amply demonstrated why the claimant received the scores he did during the interview process. He simply sought to rely on his experience and didn’t attempt to answer the questions posed. As a result, two far more junior and inexperienced candidates were offered the role. Further, there was nothing whatsoever to suggest that the scoring had anything to do with the claimant’s disability, or that the respondent knew about his disability. As the claimant himself conceded during cross examination, no one could possibly tell from looking at him or meeting him that he had a disability. By the claimant’s own evidence his disability was not discussed during the interview process.

[24]In this selection exercise, the claimant said that the fact that the classroom for his lesson was on the ground floor and near a toilet was evidence that the respondents knew about his needs and therefore must have known about his disability. The claimant also suggested that selecting a ground floor classroom near a toilet was a non-verbal communication from R2 to indicate that she knew about his disability and would not entertain any future applications because of it.

[25]The Tribunal finds that it was pure coincidence that the classroom was on the ground floor as R2 had selected the classroom on the basis of the class she considered the most appropriate for the lesson to be conducted in.

[26]Further, even if she had known about the claimant’s disability, the Tribunal finds that this would not have influenced R2. Her evidence was that she had employed people with diabetes and that needing to go to the toilet during lessons would not be a reason not to employ someone.

[27]Finally, the claimant’s alleges that the decision was predetermined based on the claimant’s view that the respondent had not followed its own process, which requires a panel discussion and a consideration of the scoring before the final decision is made. The Tribunal does not agree that the decision was predetermined. The scores given to the claimant by both interviewers was similar and the claimant scored less well that the two comparators for reasons set out above. Law Discrimination

Law

[28]The relevant law is set out in the Equality Act 2010 (EqA). Direct Discrimination

[29]The claimant says that he was directly discriminated against because of his disability. Direct discrimination is defined at s.13(1): “A person(a) (A) discriminates against another

(b) (B) if, because of a protected characteristic (A) treats (B) less favourably than (A) treats or would treat others”.

[30]Section 23 provides that in making comparisons under section 13, there must be no material difference between the circumstances of the claimant and the comparator. The comparator may be an actual person identified as being in the same circumstances as the claimant, but not having his protected characteristic, or it may be a hypothetical comparator, constructed by the Tribunal for the purpose of the comparison exercise. The claimant must show that he has been treated less favourably than that real comparator was treated or than the hypothetical comparator would have been treated.

[31]The leading authority on when an act is because of a protected characteristic is Nagarajan v London Regional Transport

[1999] IRLR 572

and in particular, the speech of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, (paragraphs 13 and 17): “…in every case it is necessary to enquire why the complainant received less favourable treatment. This is the crucial question. Was it on grounds of race? Or was it for some other reason, for instance, because the complainant was not so well qualified for the job? Save in obvious cases, answering the crucial question will call for some consideration of the mental processes of the alleged discriminator… I turn to the question of subconscious motivation. All human beings have preconceptions, beliefs, attitudes and prejudices on many subjects. It is part of our make-up. Moreover, we do not always recognise our own prejudices. Many people are unable, or unwilling, to admit even to themselves that actions of theirs may be racially motivated. An employer may genuinely believe that the reason why he rejected an applicant had nothing to do with the applicant's race. After careful and thorough investigation of a claim members of an employment tribunal may decide that the proper inference to be drawn from the evidence is that, whether the employer realised it at the time or not, race was the reason why he acted as he did. It goes without saying that in order to justify such an inference the tribunal must first make findings of primary fact from which the inference may properly be drawn.”

[32]The protected characteristic does not have to be the only, nor even the main, reason for the treatment complained of, but it must be an effective cause. Lord Nicholls in Nagarajan referred to it being suffice if it was a, “significant influence”: “Decisions are frequently reached for more than one reason. Discrimination may be on racial grounds even though it is not the sole ground for the decision. A variety of phrases, with different shades of meaning, have been used to explain how the legislation applies in such cases: discrimination requires that racial grounds were a cause, the activating cause, a substantial and effective cause, a substantial reason, an important factor. No one phrase is obviously preferable to all others, although in the application of this legislation legalistic phrases, as well as subtle distinctions, are better avoided so far as possible. If racial grounds or protected acts had a significant influence on the outcome, discrimination is made out.” Burden of Proof

[33]Section 136 deals with the burden of proof: “(2) If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred. (3) But subsection (2) does not apply if (A) shows that (A) did not contravene the provision.

[34]It is therefore for the Claimant to prove facts from which the tribunal could properly conclude, absent explanation from the Respondent, that there had been discrimination. If he does so, the burden of proof shifts to the Respondent to prove to the tribunal that in fact, there was no discrimination. The appeal courts’ guidance under the previous discrimination legislation continues to be applicable in the context of the wording as to the burden of proof that appears in the Equality Act 2010. That guidance was provided in Igen Limited v Wong and others [2005[ IRLR 258, which sets out a series of steps that we have carefully observed in the consideration of this case. We will set them outa. It is for the Claimant to prove, on the balance of probabilities, facts from which the Tribunal could conclude, in the absence of an adequate explanation that the Respondent has committed an act of discrimination against the Claimant. b. If the Claimant does not prove such facts, he will fail. c. It is important to bear in mind that it is unusual to find direct evidence of discrimination. Few employers would be prepared to admit discrimination even to themselves. d. The outcome, at this stage, of the analysis by the Tribunal will, therefore, depend upon what inferences it is proper to draw from the primary facts found by the Tribunal. e. At this stage, the Tribunal does not have to reach a definitive determination that such facts would lead to the conclusion that there was an unlawful act of discrimination. At this stage, the Tribunal is looking at the primary facts proved by the Claimant to see what inferences of secondary fact could be drawn from them. f. In considering what inferences or conclusions can be drawn from the primary facts, the Tribunal must assume that there is no adequate explanation for those facts. g. These inferences can include, in appropriate cases, any inferences that are just and equitable to draw from evasive or equivocal replies to questionnaires. h. Likewise, the Tribunal must decide whether any provision of any relevant Code of Practice is relevant and if so to take it into account. This means that inferences may also be drawn from any failure to follow a Code of Practice. i. Where the Claimant has proved facts from which conclusions could be drawn, that the Respondent has treated the Claimant less favourably on the prohibited grounds, then the burden of proof moves to the Respondent. j. It is then for the Respondent to prove that it has not committed the act. k. To discharge that burden of proof it is necessary for the Respondent to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the prohibited ground in no sense whatsoever influenced the treatment of the Claimant, (remembering that the test now is whether the conduct in question was, “because of” the prohibited ground – see Onu v Akwiwu ). l. The above point requires the Tribunal to assess not merely whether the Respondent has provided an explanation for the facts from which such inferences can be drawn, but further that it is adequate to discharge the burden of proof on the balance of probabilities that the prohibited ground was not a ground for the treatment in question. m. Since the facts necessary to prove an explanation would normally be in the possession of the Respondent, the Tribunal would normally expect cogent evidence to discharge that burden of proof. In particular the Tribunal will need to examine carefully explanations for failure to deal with the questionnaire procedure and/or code of practice.

[35]This does not mean that we should only consider the Claimant’s evidence at the first stage; Madarassy v Nomura International plc

[2007] IRLR 246

CA is authority for the proposition that a Tribunal may consider all the evidence at the first stage in order to make findings of primary fact and assess whether there is a prima facie case; there is a difference between factual evidence and explanation.

[36]In Hewage v Grampian Health Board

[2012] UKSC 37

Lord Hope of Craighead said: “It is important not to make too much of the burden of proof provisions. They will require careful attention where there is room for doubt as to the facts necessary to establish discrimination. But they have nothing to offer where the tribunal is in a position to make positive findings on the evidence one way or the other.”

[37]Having said that, HHJ Tayler cautioned in Field v Steve Pye and Co limited & Others

[2022] EAT 68

: “Although it is legitimate to move straight to the second stage, there is something to be said for an employment tribunal considering why it is choosing that option “

[38]In essence, one may as well set out the reasoning in the two stages as simply going straight to and accepting the Respondent’s explanation.

[39]Tribunals are cautioned against taking too fragmented an approach when there are many individual allegations of discrimination. Although we should make individual findings of fact on each allegation and consider whether they amount to an instance of discrimination, we should also stand back, look at the bigger picture and adopt a holistic view on whether the Claimant has been subject to discrimination. See Quershi v Victoria University of Manchester

[2001] ICR 863

and Rihal v London Borough of Ealing

[2004] IRLR 642

. Knowledge of disability

[40]It is trite law that an employer cannot be liable for direct disability discrimination unless it knew, or should have known, about the employee’s Discrimination arising from disability

[41]Section 15 EqA provides:- (1) A person (A) discriminates against a disabled person (B) if— (a) A treats B unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of B's disability, and (b) A cannot show that the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.(2)Subsection (1) does not apply if A shows that A did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, that B had the disability.

[42]In relation to causation, in Basildon & Thurrock NHS Foundation Trust v Weerasinghe

UKEAT/0397/14

, EAT, Langstaff P held that there were two distinct steps to the test to be applied by tribunals in determining whether discrimination arising from disability has occurred:a. Did the claimant's disability cause, have the consequence of, or result in, "something"?

b. Did the employer treat the claimant unfavourably because of that "something"?

[43]As to the discriminators alleged motivations, Simler P in Secretary of State for Justice and anor v Dunn EAT 0234/16 said the following: ‘[Counsel for the claimant asserts] that motive is irrelevant. Moreover, he submits that the claimant did not have to prove the reason for the unfavourable treatment but simply that disability was a significant influence in the minds of the decision-makers. We agree with him that motive is irrelevant. Nonetheless, the statutory test requires a tribunal to address the question whether the unfavourable treatment is because of something arising in consequence of disability… [I]t need not be the sole reason, but it must be a significant or at least more than trivial reason. Just as with direct discrimination, save in the most obvious case, an examination of the conscious and/or unconscious thought processes of the putative discriminator is likely to be necessary’.

[44]It is not necessary for an employer to be aware that the "something" arises in consequence of the employee's disability for it to be liable under section 15, if it treats the employee unfavourably because of that "something". The test is an objective one. In City of York Council v Grosset

[2018] EWCA Civ 1105

, an employee was dismissed for misconduct. The employer was liable under section 15 even though it was not aware that the employee's actions were due to their disability. Employer's knowledge of disability

[45]An employer cannot be liable for discrimination arising from disability under the EqA unless it knew (or should have known) about the claimant's disability. Section 15(2) states that there will be no discrimination arising from disability "if A shows that A did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, that B had the disability".

[46]Section 15 of the EqA requires knowledge of disability because Parliament felt that it would be unfair to judge an employer liable for a type of disability discrimination if the employee in question kept their disability secret (as might be their prerogative).

[47]Nevertheless, it might be difficult for an employer to argue that they could not reasonably have expected to know about a job applicant's or employee's disability. In the words of the EHRC Code, "an employer must do all they can reasonably be expected to do to find out if a worker has a disability" (paragraph 5.15). Claimant’s submissions

[48]Inter alia, the claimant referred the Tribunal to the case of Mc C Burton- York v Diocese of Westminster Academy Trust (3314332/2019 and others). He says that case is directly relevant because scoring sheets were used as a pretext to mask discriminatory treatment; there was no direct evidence or physical document proving discrimination; and the outcome turned on a single admission in cross examination by a respondent witness. In this case the claimant submits that the scoring sheets were not an objective measure, but were used inconsistently; and that there is no contemporaneous document explicitly recording discriminatory intent; and invites the Tribunal to consider the pattern of evidence, inconsistencies and procedural irregularities to draw inferences of discrimination.

Conclusions

[49]It is accepted by the respondents that they did not appoint the claimant in November 2022 or February 2023. The claimant infers that the respondents did not offer him a position because his former employer supplied information to the respondents about Maitland Medical’s recommendation in respect of the claimant’s medical condition, namely diabetes. He does not have any direct knowledge of this but infers this from the fact his first interview went very well; he did not get offered any of the teaching vacancies the respondent had available in November 2023 despite positive feedback; he believes it is routine that a candidate’s former employer would have been approached; his former employer had reacted unfavourably to Maitland Medical’s recommendation; and when he attended the second interview in February 2023 the room he was offered for his demonstration lesson was not a science room and appeared unused and not prepared for him, but was consistent with Maitland Medical’s recommendation for a ground floor room. Knowledge

[50]For the claimant to succeed in his claim for either direct disability discrimination or discrimination arising from disability, he must satisfy the Tribunal that the respondent had at least knowledge of an impairment.

[51]The Tribunal finds that the claimant had no knowledge of the claimant’s disability, or, indeed, of any impairment. The claimant’s disability is, as accepted by the claimant, a hidden disability. The claimant admitted that he did not display any signs of a disability when he attended either of the interviews.

[52]Further, the Tribunal has concluded that there was no contact whatsoever between Harris Academy Merton and the respondents before the claimant was unsuccessful in respect of his first application. There was no evidence to the contrary to suggest that such contact had been made so as to make the respondents aware of the claimant’s disability or to put them on notice to make further enquiries.

[53]In relation to the second application process the only communication between the respondents and Harris was the email exchange on 22/23 February in which Harris said it was unable to give a reference due to the claimant’s ongoing appeal against dismissal. There was no mention of

[54]The claimant did not declare his disability on either application, nor did he ask for any adjustments in respect of the interview process. There was no evidence to suggest that the respondent knew or could reasonably be expected to know of the claimant’s disability. Accordingly, both claims must fail on that basis alone. Direct discrimination

[55]For completeness, in relation to the direct discrimination claim, there were no facts from which the Tribunal could conclude that the reasons the claimant was turned down for the roles was his disability.

[56]Moving to the reasons for the claimant’s treatment, the Tribunal is satisfied that, in respect of the November 2022 recruitment process, the reason he was turned down had nothing whatsoever to do with his disability and was because he was “pipped at the post” by another candidate. Although the respondent would have liked to appoint him to another role there were budgetary constraints which meant that was not possible and in any event these were proposed roles and not advertised vacancies. Amsham did better and was therefore appointed to the role. In relation to the February 2023 recruitment exercise, Mr Singh and Ms Islam scored better in the interview process than the claimant and were appointed to the role. Because the claimant scored poorly the respondents decided not to consider him for any other roles.

[57]In any event, the claimant is satisfied that R2 would not have been influenced by the fact that the claimant had the disability in question and it would not have deterred her from recruiting him if he had been the right candidate for the role. Discrimination arising from disability

[58]In relation to the discrimination arising from claims, the Tribunal is satisfied that the alleged “something arising”, namely: “information about the claimant’s medical conditions and medication, and/or a recommendation by Maitland Medical, was provided to the respondent by the claimant’s former employer (Harris) in November 2022” simply did not happen, whether in November 2022 or in February 2023. There is no evidence whatsoever before the Tribunal to suggest that this information was shared with the respondents.

[59]Consequently, the claimant's disability did not cause, have the consequence of, or result in, "something".

[60]In any event, the employer did not treat the claimant unfavourably because of that "something". Rather, as set out above, other candidates did better than the claimant during the interview and recruitment process and were consequently appointed to the roles being advertised.

[61]The claimant’s claims fail and are dismissed. Approved by: Employment Judge Rice-Birchall 21 April 2026 Notes All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 51) and any written reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimants and respondents. If a Tribunal hearing has been recorded, you may request a transcript of the recording. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, you will have to pay for it. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings and accompanying Guidance, which can be found here: www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislationpractice-directions/