Ms A Thompson v No5 Beauty and Aesthetics Ltd and Others: 2302606/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2302606/2024

Between

Ms A ThompsonClaimant

Did not attendRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Cawthray

Not represented for respondent

Date 10 January 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The Claimant’s complaint of unfair dismissal is upheld, the Claimant was unfairly dismissed.

[2]The Claimant is awarded the following:a. A basic award of £712.50

b. A compensatory award of £1,038.57

c. Compensation for loss of statutory rights of £250.00. Note that these are actual the sums payable to the Claimant after any deductions or uplifts have been applied.

[3]The following complaints under section 18 of the Equality Act 2010 are well-founded and succeed:a. Refusing to implement a pay increase in November 2022 and December 2022; and

b. Deliberate non-payment of maternity pay in September and October 2023.

[4]The remaining complaints under section 18 of the Equality Act 2010 are not well-founded and are dismissed.

[5]The Claimant is awarded £2,343.23 as compensation for injury to feelings and interest thereon.

[6]The First Respondent has made an unauthorised deduction from the Claimant’s wages by failing to pay the Claimant the full amount of wages due on 4 October 2023 and 4 November 2023 and is ordered to pay to the Claimant the gross sum of £1,552.31 in respect of the amount unlawfully deducted.

[7]The First Respondent has made an unlawful deduction of wages in relation to the holiday pay. The Respondent is ordered to pay to the Claimant the gross sum of £1,144.75 in respect of accrued holiday pay.

[8]The Claimants detriment complaint under section 47C of the Employment Rights Act 1996 fails and is dismissed.

[9]The Claimant’s complaints of non-provision of itemised pay slips and breach of a duty to provide a P45 were withdrawn and are dismissed.

REASONS

[1]The Claimant submitted her claim to the Employment Tribunal on 29 February 2024 following ACAS Early Conciliation taking place between 7 December 2023 and 11 January 2024. The claim was brought against three respondents.

[3]The claim was served on all three respondents but no responses were received.

[4]The Claimant applied for a Rule 21 default judgment but on 14 June 2024 Employment Judge Dyal wrote to the parties directing that it was not appropriate for a default judgment to be issued and that a hearing would be listed to consider liability and quantum.

[5]A notice of hearing was subsequently sent to the parties.

[6]The Claimant and her representative attended the hearing today. None of the Respondents attended the hearing.

[7]At the start of the hearing I spent approximately 45 minutes discussing the issues in the claim with the Claimant’s representative, noting that the issues to be determined were not entirely clear from the pleadings. Set out below are the issues, as agreed by the Claimant’s representative.

[8]The Claimant’s representative confirmed that the Claimant was not pursing complaints in relation to non-provision of itemised pay slips or breach of a duty to provide a P45 and confirmed such complaints were withdrawn and should be dismissed.

[9]The Claimant’s representative had prepared a bundle running to 115 pages. A page from the contract of employment was missing and this was sent during the hearing.

[10]The Claimant had produced three witness statements. The main statement contained 37 numbered paragraphs, the remedy statement contained 14 numbered paragraphs and the injury to feelings statement contained 21 numbered paragraphs.

[11]The Claimant has got married since submission of the claim, and the statements use her married name, Fuller.

[12]The Claimant affirmed her witness statements. Her representative asked her some clarification questions and I asked her some questions. The Issues 1. Time limits 1.1 Were the discrimination complaints made within the time limit in section 123 of the Equality Act 2010? The Tribunal will decide:1.1.1 Was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the act to which the complaint relates?

1.1.2 If not, was there conduct extending over a period?

1.1.3 If so, was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the end of that period?

1.1.4 If not, were the claims made within a further period that the Tribunal thinks is just and equitable? The Tribunal will decide:1.1.4.1 Why were the complaints not made to the Tribunal in time?

1.1.4.2 In any event, is it just and equitable in all the circumstances to extend time? 2. Unfair dismissal 2.1 Was the claimant dismissed? The Claimant says she was forced to resign.

2.1.1 Did the First Respondent do the following things:2.1.1.1 In February 2023 refuse to allow the Claimant to take annual leave until after maternity leave. [The Claimant says this is a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence.]

2.1.1.2 Deliberately not pay the Claimant maternity pay in August, September and October 2023. [The Claimant says this is a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence and a breach of an express term set out at clause 11 of her contract of employment.]

2.1.2 In relation to 2.1.1.1 and 2.1.1.2 did that breach the implied term of trust and confidence? The Tribunal will need to decide:

2.1.3

2.1.3.1 whether the respondent behaved in a way that was calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the trust and confidence between the claimant and the respondent; and

2.1.3.2 whether it had reasonable and proper cause for doing so.

2.1.4 In relation to 2.1.1.2 did that breach clause 11 of the contract of employment?

2.1.5 Was the breach a fundamental one? The Tribunal will need to decide whether the breach was so serious that the claimant was entitled to treat the contract as being at an end.

2.1.6 Did the claimant resign in response to the breach? The Tribunal will need to decide whether the breach of contract was a reason for the claimant’s resignation.

2.1.7 Did the claimant affirm the contract before resigning? The Tribunal will need to decide whether the claimant’s words or actions showed that they chose to keep the contract alive even after the breach. 3. Remedy for unfair dismissal

3.1 If there is a compensatory award, how much should it be?

3.2 What basic award is payable to the claimant, if any? 4. Pregnancy and Maternity Discrimination (Equality Act 2010 section 18)

4.1 Did the respondents treat the Claimant unfavourably by doing the following things: 4.1.1 Refusing to implement a pay increase in November 2022 and December 2022. Mrs. Carter is said to be the person who refused the pay increase.

4.2 Did the unfavourable treatment take place in the protected period?

4.3 If not, did it take place after the protected period?

4.4 Was the unfavourable treatment because of the pregnancy?

4.5 Did the respondents treat the claimant unfavourably by doing the following things:4.5.1 In February 2023 refused to allow the Claimant to take annual leave until after maternity leave. Mrs. Carter is said to be the person who refused the leave request.

4.5.2 Deliberate non-payment of maternity pay in August, September and October 2023.

4.5.3 Refuse to give the Claimant’s new employer a reference in

4.6 Was the unfavourable treatment because the claimant was on compulsory maternity leave or equivalent compulsory maternity leave/ the claimant was exercising or seeking to exercise, or had exercised or sought to exercise, the right to ordinary or additional maternity leave or equivalent maternity leave? 5. Remedy for discrimination

5.1 What financial losses has the discrimination caused the claimant?

5.2 What injury to feelings has the discrimination caused the claimant and how much compensation should be awarded for that?

5.3 Should interest be awarded? How much? 6. Unauthorised deductions – Statutory Maternity Pay and Holiday Pay

6.1 Did the First Respondent make unauthorised deductions from the claimant’s wages and if so how much was deducted?

6.2 The Claimant says she was due to be paid statutory maternity pay of £758.91 on 4 October 2023 and £793.40 on 4 November 2023. The Claimant says she was not paid these sums.

6.3 The Claimant says that she was not paid for annual leave the claimant had accrued but not taken when their employment ended. She says she is owed £1,144.75 based on 4.82 weeks at a rate of £9.50 for 25 hours per week. 7. Detriment (Employment Rights Act 1996 section 47(c))

7.1 Did the respondents do the following things: 7.1.1 Refuse to give the Claimant’s new employer a reference in

7.2 By doing so, did they subject the claimant to detriment?

7.3 If so, was it done on the grounds pregnancy and/or maternity leave.

Findings of Fact

[13]The Claimant engaged in ACAS Early Conciliation between 7 December 2023 – 11 January 2024. She submitted her claim form on 29 February 2024.

[14]The Claimant commenced employment on 1 September 2020. On average the Claimant worked 25 hours per week at £9.50 per hour. The Claimant was paid on a monthly basis. Clauses 10 and 11 of her contract of employment states: “10. Remuneration paid to the Employee for the services rendered by the Employee as required by this Agreement (the “Remuneration”) will include a wage at the rate of £9.50 per hour. 11. This Remuneration will be payable once per month while this Agreement is in force. The Employer is entitled to deduct from the Employee’s Remuneration, or from any other remuneration in whatever form. any applicable deductions and remittances as required by law.”

[15]There are payslips in the bundle that show that the Claimant was paid on a monthly basis either at the end of the month or early in the next month.

[16]The contract sets out provisions in relation to holiday at clauses 21 to 24 and provides that the holiday year runs from 1st January, that the Claimant was entitled to 140 hours per year and that on termination of employment the First Respondent will pay for any accrued but unused holiday. The Claimant did not take any holiday in 2023.

[17]On 15 November 2022, in a conversation with the Second Respondent, the Claimant requested a pay rise. The Second Respondent said she would look into it. The Claimant sent the Second Respondent a WhatsApp message at 21:02 in 15 November 2022 saying that it would be helpful for her to have a pay review sooner rather than later as money was tight. The Second Respondent did not reply to the Claimant’s message but sent a meme the following day about unrelated matters.

[18]On the same day the Claimant also told the Second Respondent that she was pregnant.

[19]The Claimant provided the First Respondent with a MATB1 form on 7 December.

[20]In December 2022, Beth Roach, a colleague working at the First Respondent, told the Claimant that Second Respondent had told her that she would not give the Claimant a pay rise until she returned from maternity leave. Around the same time the Claimant discovered that her colleagues were paid more than her despite the Claimant having worked at the Respondent longer than her colleagues and dealt with more client and management related matters than her colleagues.

[21]In December 2022 the Claimant was admitted to hospital with a pregnancy related illness, pre eclampsia. She told Mrs. Carter about her hospital admission in a message and says the Second Respondent replied: who replied in a sharp tone “I guess I’ll just have to come in then”. This message is not in the Bundle.

[22]The Claimant asked the Second Respondent what her maternity entitlements, including annual leave, were. The Second Respondent told the Claimant she would find out.

[23]On 11 January 2023 the Second Respondent messaged the Claimant in relation to her query annual leave and maternity entitlement. The message said: “You Can take it all after maternity leave or carry it over to the following year as it was not viable for you to take it whilst off. 39 weeks are paid. First 6 weeks at 90% of wages 36 weeks are at statutory pay. The last 13 weeks are unpaid. Tina Mcabe Ford Williams”.

[24]It is not said what the reference to Tina Mcabe Ford Williams means, but based on other messages in the Bundle I find that the above text was written by Tina Mcabe Ford Williams and not the Second Respondent, the Second Respondent forwarded information.

[25]The Claimant replied asking: “Would it be better instead of going on maternity on 4th Feb, I use annual leave up first as I get 140hrs per year otherwise next year it would add up if it’s carried over to 280 hours (just thinking that’s a lot of hours to then use next year if that makes sense) x”

[26]The Second Respondent replied to say she would discuss it with the Claimant the next day.

[27]The usual practice for taking leave was for staff to speak with or message the Second Respondent indicating the dates they wished to take leave and if agreed the Second Respondent would give staff a holiday form to complete. The Claimant spoke with the Second Respondent about her leave. The Claimant says she thought taking some annual leave before starting maternity leave would help the business. The Claimant says the Second Respondent fluffed over the request and said it would be fine to leave taking her annual leave till the next year. The Claimant was not given and did not complete a holiday form.

[28]The Claimant started maternity leave on 4 February 2023.

[29]On 4 August 2023 the Claimant messaged the Second Respondent in relation to pay. For completeness, the message exchange is set out below. The exchange between them was friendly page 90. “Hey babes. What does payroll go through? Got 3 quid to my name [crying emojs] How’s the new puppy? He’s so cute! We need to have another catch up soon please [smiling empoji] xxxx [From Claimant] Abbi you know what Iv done? Iv been so unwell with head cold and sinus and spent most of the week in bed I completely forgot to submit you hours.. out of sigh out of mind [shocked emojis] and my heads just been in the clouds im so sorry! X But il send you money now And submit your hours but like not to get them back til Monday now [hands over face emoji] [From Second Respondent] You forgot about me [crying emoji you did look pretty puffy to be fair!!! Xx [From Claimant]”

[30]On the same thread they exchanged further messages about the Second Respondent being unwell and possible surgery. The Second Respondent also said “And I did completely forget about you I’m so sorry [hand over face emoji] Iv sent over £500 when I get your wages back il make up the rest x Sorry darling x”

[31]The Claimant replied: “That’s ok easily done babe [kissing emoji xxx”.

[32]On 9 August 2023 the Claimant messaged the Second Respondent asking her if she had managed to sort the payroll. The Second Respondent replied with a picture of a payslip saying that it had been sent and referenced being in hospital with her father. The Claimant replied saying that she had only received £500. The Second Respondent messaged the Claimant early on 10 August 2023 and said the money had definitely left her end and the Claimant replied shortly after and said it had come through. The messages were friendly and used kisses and amicable language.

[33]On 31 August 2023 the Second messaged the Claimant asking if she was returning from maternity leave so that she could try and find a replacement. The Claimant responded saying she was considering childcare for her return and would message her should it not be possible to arrange it. These messages were not in the Bundle. There was no further dialogue about a return to work.

[34]On 4, 5 and 6 October 2023 the Claimant messaged the Second Respondent as she had not received her maternity pay. The messages state: “Hi babe, just double checking I haven’t been paid my SMP yet, did you forget to put it through? Xxx Amy can you get back to me so I know what’s going in please? X Hi Amy, because you’ve not gotten back to me and I don’t have a clue what’s going on with my SMP I’ve had no choice but to contact HMRC for advice. They’ve informed me that you claimed you have paid me on 1st October and received the SMP back to you and that there is also a gazette against the business. Please can you just let me know what is going on as I have bills to pay and a family to feed, it’s been a few days now and I’m getting really worried about it all.”

[35]The Second Respondent replied shortly after the Claimant’s last message and said: “Morning Abbie you will be payed today. Just for future reference as it isn’t fair to Beth but Beth has no doings or answers to payroll of as to when anyone is being payed so please stop hassling her in regards to pay. You will be payed today.”

[36]The Claimant replied the following day saying “Can you pay me please as you promised yesterday along with my payslip”.

[37]The Claimant resigned on 11 November 2023 and her last day of employment was 11 November 2023. The Claimant sent her resignation letter by email to the Respondent’s business email an via the post. A copy of the resignation letter is not in the Bundle. The Claimant says that the resignation letter mentioned that she had not been paid SMP or annual leave and that she intended to pursue legal advice. She says she said she was happy to work notice.

[38]The Claimant received no response to her resignation letter.

[39]The Claimant started to look for alternative work in mid to end November 2023 after submitting her resignation. She looked at all different types of

[40]The Claimant was offered a role working in a school, this is her current job. Her current employer required references and details of where the Claimant had worked since she was 18. Two members of staff at the Claimant’s current employer contacted the First Respondent to obtain a reference. One of the persons spoke to someone at the First Respondent and was told they would get a call back. None of the respondents provided a reference. The Claimant’s new employment was delayed for several weeks because a reference was not provided

[41]In mid-November 2023 the Claimant’s husband took out a loan for £4,000. The monthly interest is £111 and the Claimant pays this amount to her husband each month.

[42]The Claimant obtained jobseekers allowance. Between 15 November 2023 and 26 January 2024 the Claimant received jobseekers allowance every two weeks in the sum of £169.50. This amounts to five payments and a total of £847.50.

[43]The Claimant started her current role on 27 January 2024. She works 16 hours per week as a school receptionist and is paid approximately £11.53 per hour.

[44]The Claimant experiences stress and anxiety and was first prescribed Citalopram before her pregnancy.

[45]The Claimant answered questions openly and her evidence is accepted, noting that it was given under affirmation and has not been challenged. The Law Constructive Dismissal

The Law

[46]The right not to be unfairly dismissed is set out at section 94 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA).

[47]Section 95 ERA defines the circumstances in which a person is dismissed as including where: “(c) the employee terminates the contract under which he is employed (with or without notice) in circumstances in which he is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer's conduct.”

[48]That is known as constructive dismissal. The leading explanation of when those circumstances arise was given by Lord Denning in Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharpe

1978 ICR 221

: “If the employer is guilty of conduct which is a significant breach going to the root of the contract of employment, or which shows that the employer no longer intends to be bound by one or more of the essential terms of the contract, then the employee is entitled to treat himself as discharged from any further performance. If he does so, then he terminates the contract by reason of the employers conduct. He is constructively dismissed.”

[49]The Tribunal, when looking at an alleged breach of contract, must look at the employer’s conduct as a whole and determine whether it is such that the employee cannot be expected to put up with it. (see Browne – Wilkinson J in Woods v W M Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd

[1981] IRLR 347

[50]Where there is a complaint of constructive dismissal, the burden is on the employee to prove the following:a. That there was a fundamental breach of contract on the part of the employer;

b. That the employer’s breach caused the employee to resign;

c. The employee did not affirm the contract and lose the right to resign and claim constructive dismissal.

[51]A fundamental breach of any contractual term might give rise to a claim of constructive dismissal. However, a contractual term often relied upon in cases such as this is that which is described as the implied term of mutual trust and confidence.

[52]The leading authority on this implied term is the House of Lords decision in Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International AS

[1997] IRLR 462

. In this case Lord Steyn adopted the definition which originated in Woods v W M Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd namely, that an employer shall not, without reasonable or proper cause, conduct itself in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of trust and confidence between the employer and employee.

[53]It is noted that a breach of trust and confidence has two limbs: the employer must have conducted itself in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee; and there be no reasonable or proper cause for the conduct.

[54]The test is objective. As set out by Lord Steyn in Malik: “The motives of the employer cannot be determinative or even relevant…. If conduct objectively considered is likely to destroy or serious damage the relationship between employer and employee, a breach of the implied obligation may arise.”

[55]Reasonableness is one of the tools in the employment tribunal’s factual analysis kit for deciding whether there has been a fundamental breach; but it is not a legal requirement (see Bournemouth University v Buckland

[2010] ICR 908

at para 28).

[56]In addition, it is clear from Leeds Dental Team v Rose

[2014] IRLR8

that whether or not behaviour is said to be calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the trust and confidence between the parties is to be objectively assessed, and does not turn on the subjective view of the employee.

[57]Individual actions taken by an employer which do not in themselves constitute a fundamental breach of any contractual term may have the cumulative effect of undermining trust and confidence, and in such a case, the employee is entitled to resign and claim constructive dismissal. This is referred to as “the last straw” (Lewis v Motorworld Garages Ltd

[1985] IRLR 465

[58]In particular, in such a case the last action of the employer which leads to the employee leaving need not itself be a breach of contract; the question is, does the cumulative series of acts taken together amount to a breach of the implied term?

[59]The last straw itself does not need to be unreasonable or blameworthy conduct, all it must do is contribute, however slightly, to the breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, (London Borough of Waltham Forrest v Omilaju

[2005] IRLR 35

). However, an entirely innocuous act cannot be a final straw, even if the employee genuinely but mistakenly interprets the act as hurtful and destructive of mutual trust and confidence.

[60]The final straw should be an act in a series whose cumulative effect is to amount to a breach of the implied term. The act does not have to be of the same character as the earlier acts but it must contribute something to that breach, although what it adds may be relatively insignificant.

[61]In Kaur v Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust [2018] IRLR, the Court of Appeal approved the guidance given in Waltham Forest LBC v Omilaju. The authorities give comprehensive guidance on the “last straw” doctrine.

[62]The employee must prove that an effective cause of her resignation was the employers’ fundamental breach. However, the breach does not have to be the sole cause, there can be a combination of causes provided an effective cause for the resignation is the breach, the breach must have played a part (see Nottingham County Council v Miekel

[2005] ICR 1

and Wright v North Ayrshire Council

UKEAT/0017/13

). 59. In Bournemouth University Higher Education Corporation v Buckland

2010 ICR 908

the Court of Appeal held that a repudiatory breach cannot be unilaterally cured by the party in default. However, Lord Justice Sedley warned: “A wronged party, particularly if it fails to make its position entirely clear at the outset, cannot ordinarily expect to continue with the contract for very long without losing the option of termination, at least where the other party has offered to make suitable amends”. Maternity Discrimination

[63]Section 18 of the Equality Act 2010 states: 18 Pregnancy and maternity discrimination: work cases(1) This section has effect for the purposes of the application of Part 5 (work) to the protected characteristic of pregnancy and maternity.

(2) A person (A) discriminates against a woman if, in the protected period in relation to a pregnancy of hers, A treats her unfavourably — (a) because of the pregnancy, or (b) because of illness suffered by her as a result of it.

(3) A person (A) discriminates against a woman if A treats her unfavourably because she is on compulsory maternity leave.

(4) A person (A) discriminates against a woman if A treats her unfavourably because she is exercising or seeking to exercise, or has exercised or sought to exercise, the right to ordinary or additional maternity leave.

(5) For the purposes of subsection (2), if the treatment of a woman is in implementation of a decision taken in the protected period, the treatment is to be regarded as occurring in that period (even if the implementation is not until after the end of that period).

(6) The protected period, in relation to a woman's pregnancy, begins when the pregnancy begins, and ends— (a) if she has the right to ordinary and additional maternity leave, at the end of the additional maternity leave period or (if earlier) when she returns to work after the pregnancy; (b) if she does not have that right, at the end of the period of 2 weeks beginning with the end of the pregnancy.

(7) Section 13, so far as relating to sex discrimination, does not apply to treatment of a woman in so far as— (a) it is in the protected period in relation to her and is for a reason mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (2), or (b) it is for a reason mentioned in subsection (3) or (4). Section 136 of the Equality Act 2010 states: 136 Burden of proof (1) This section applies to any proceedings relating to a contravention of this Act. (2) If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred. (3) But subsection (2) does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the provision. (4) The reference to a contravention of this Act includes a reference to a breach of an equality clause or rule. (5) This section does not apply to proceedings for an offence under this Act. (6) A reference to the court includes a reference to— (a) an employment tribunal; (b) the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal; (c) the Special Immigration Appeals Commission; (d) the First-tier Tribunal; (e) the Education Tribunal for Wales; (f) the First-tier Tribunal for Scotland Health and Education Chamber.

[64]Under section 18, direct discrimination takes place where a person treats the claimant less favourably because of pregnancy or because she is exercising or seeking to exercise, or has exercised or sought to exercise, the right to ordinary or additional maternity leave.

[65]Decisions are frequently reached for more than one reason. Provided the protected characteristic had a significant influence on the outcome, discrimination is made out. (Nagarajan v London Regional Transport

[1999] IRLR 572

, HL).

[66]The case law recognises that very little discrimination today is overt or even deliberate. Witnesses can even be unconsciously prejudiced.

[67]There are two stages to the burden of proof test as set out in section 136 of the Equality Act 2010.

[68]Stage 1: There must be primary facts from which the tribunal could decide – in the absence of any other explanation, that discrimination took place. The burden of proof is on the claimant (Ayodele v(1) Citylink Ltd

(2) Napier

[2018] IRLR 114

, CA; Royal Mail Group Ltd v Efobi

[2021] UKSC 22

). This is sometimes referred to as proving a prima facie case. If this happens, the burden of proof shifts to the respondent.

[69]Stage 2: The respondent must then prove that it did not discriminate against the claimant.a. In other words, where the claimant has proved facts from which conclusions could be drawn that the respondent has treated the claimant less favourably on the ground of sex, then the burden of proof moves to the respondent. It is then for the respondent to prove that it did not commit, or as the case may be, is not to be treated as having committed, that act.

b. The burden of proof provisions requires careful attention where there is room for doubt as to the facts necessary to establish discrimination, but have nothing to offer where the tribunal is in a position to make positive findings on the evidence one way or another. (Hewage v Grampian Health Board

[2012] IRLR 870

, SC.)

[70]Guidelines on the burden of proof were set out by the Court of Appeal in Igen Ltd v Wong

[2005] EWCA Civ 142

;

[2005] IRLR 258

. Once the burden of proof has shifted, it is then for the respondents to prove that they did not commit the act of discrimination. To discharge that burden it is necessary for the respondents to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the treatment was in no sense whatsoever on the grounds of the protected characteristic, since 'no discrimination whatsoever' is compatible with the Burden of Proof Directive. Since the facts necessary to prove an explanation would normally be in the possession of the respondents, a tribunal would normally expect cogent evidence to discharge that burden of proof.

[71]The Court of Appeal in Madarassy, a case brought under the then Sex Discrimination Act 1975, states: ‘The burden of proof does not shift to the employer simply on the claimant establishing a difference in status (e.g. sex) and a difference in treatment. Those bare facts only indicate a possibility of discrimination. They are not, without more, sufficient material from which a tribunal ‘could conclude’ that on the balance of probabilities, the respondent had committed an unlawful act of discrimination.

[72]A false explanation for the less favourable treatment added to a difference in treatment and a difference in sex can constitute the ‘something more’ required to shift the burden of proof. (The Solicitors Regulation Authority v Mitchell

UKEAT/0497/12

[73]In Glasgow City Council v Zafar

1998 ICR 120

, HL, Lord BrowneWilkinson said that in the context of a discrimination claim ‘the conduct of a hypothetical reasonable employer is irrelevant. The alleged discriminator may or may not be a reasonable employer. If he is not a reasonable employer he might well have treated another employee in just the same unsatisfactory way as he treated the complainant, in which case he would not have treated the complainant “less favourably”.’ He approved the words of Lord Morison, who delivered the judgment of the Court of Session, that ‘it cannot be inferred, let alone presumed, only from the fact that an employer has acted unreasonably towards one employee, that he would have acted reasonably if he had been dealing with another in the same circumstances’. It follows that mere unreasonableness may not be enough to found an inference of discrimination. Unfair treatment itself is not discriminatory.

[74]In Amnesty International v Ahmed

UKEAT/0447/08/ZT

the EAT stated, paragraph 36, “…the ultimate question – is – necessarily – what was the ground of the treatment complained of (or – if you prefer – the reason why it occurred)…”.

[75]Evidence of discriminatory conduct and attitudes in an organization may be probative in deciding whether alleged discrimination occurred: Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police v Bailey

[2017] EWCA Civ 425

. Unlawful deductions from wages

[76]An employee has the right to complain to an Employment Tribunal of an unauthorised deduction from wages pursuant to section 23 ERA. The definition of “wages” in section 27 ERA includes statutory maternity pay and holiday pay.

[77]A claim about an unauthorised deduction from wages must be presented to an Employment Tribunal within three months beginning with the date of payment of the wages from which the deduction was made, with an extension for early conciliation if notification was made to ACAS within the primary time limit, unless it was not reasonably practicable to present it within that period and the Tribunal considers it was presented within a reasonable period after that. Section 47C of the Employment Rights Act 1996 Section 47C is set out in full below. 47CLeave for family and domestic reasons.(1) An employee has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by his employer done for a prescribed reason.

(2) A prescribed reason is one which is prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State and which relates to— (a) pregnancy, childbirth or maternity, (aa)time off under section 57ZE, (ab)time off under section 57ZJ or 57ZL, (b) ordinary, compulsory or additional maternity leave, (ba)ordinary or additional adoption leave, (bb)shared parental leave, (bc)carer’s leave, (c)parental leave, (ca) paternity leave, (cb)parental bereavement leave, or (d) time off under section 57A.

(3) A reason prescribed under this section in relation to parental leave may relate to action which an employee takes, agrees to take or refuses to take under or in respect of a collective or workforce agreement.

(4) Regulations under this section may make different provision for different cases or circumstances. (5)An agency worker has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by the temporary work agency or the hirer done on the ground that— (a) being a person entitled to— (i) time off under section 57ZA, and (ii) remuneration under section 57ZB in respect of that time off, the agency worker exercised (or proposed to exercise) that right or received (or sought to receive) that remuneration, (b) being a person entitled to time off under section 57ZG, the agency worker exercised (or proposed to exercise) that right, (c)being a person entitled to— (i)time off under section 57ZN, and (ii)remuneration under section 57ZO in respect of that time off, the agency worker exercised (or proposed to exercise) that right or received (or sought to receive) that remuneration, or (d)being a person entitled to time off under section 57ZP, the agency worker exercised (or proposed to exercise) that right. (6)Subsection (5) does not apply where the agency worker is an employee. (7)In this section the following have the same meaning as in the Agency Workers Regulations 2010 ( S.I. 2010/93)—  “agency worker”;  “hirer”;  “temporary work agency”.

[78]Section 47C provides that an employee has the right ‘not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by his employer’ done for a prescribed reason. The prescribed reasons include pregnancy and maternity. Detriment is not defined, but is taken to have a wide meaning. There must be a link between the employers act of detriment and the exercising of a right/rights.

[79]It is for the employer to show the ground on which any act or deliberate failure to act was done. However, the burden of showing that a detriment was suffered will fall on the employee. Conclusions Constructive Unfair Dismissal

Conclusions

[80]The first issue for determination is whether the Claimant was constructively unfairly dismissed.

[81]The Claimant relies on two breaches that she says led to her resignation:a. Firstly, In February 2023 refuse to allow the Claimant to take annual leave until after maternity leave. The Claimant says this is a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence; and

b. Secondly, deliberately not pay the Claimant maternity pay in August, September and October 2023. The Claimant says this is a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence and a breach of an express term set out at clause 11 of her contract of employment.

[82]I firstly considered whether or not the refusal to allow the Claimant to take annual leave until after her maternity leave was a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence.

[83]The evidence demonstrates that the Claimant asked for information about maternity entitlements and the Second Respondent provided it. The Claimant’s own evidence is that this information was provided and when she discussed it with the Second Respondent she did not make a specific request but raised whether it would be better for the First Respondent to take leave before her maternity leave. The Second Respondent told the Claimant it would be fine to take all the annual leave the next year.

[84]Based on these facts, I do not consider there was a refusal to allow the Claimant to take annual leave until after her maternity leave. Accordingly, this allegation fails on a factual basis.

[85]However, for completeness, I am wrong and there was a refusal, I do not consider, in this respect, that objectively assessed, the First Respondent, via the Second Respondent conducted itself in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of trust and confidence. The Second Respondent told the Claimant it was fine for her to take the leave after her maternity. On the Claimant’s own evidence, she framed the discussion in the context of it being a help to the business, rather than a request she was seeking.

[86]Further, if I was wrong and there was a breach, I do not consider that any such breach was a fundamental one and it was not a breach that the Claimant resigned in response to. The Claimant’s own evidence is that the reason why she felt she could not go back to work was because she had had to chase for maternity pay. There is no reference in her witness statement of the discussion regarding annual leave forming any part of her decision to leave. Further, as demonstrated by the message exchange in August 2023, the relationship between the Claimant and the Second Respondent remained friendly and amicable after the discussion about annual leave.

[87]I then went on to consider the second allegation, namely whether the First Respondent did deliberately not pay the Claimant her maternity pay in August, September and October 2023. The Claimant says this is a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence and a breach of an express term set out at clause 11 of her contract of employment.

[88]Based on the findings of fact as set out above, in relation to the payment due at the start of August 2023, I do no consider that there was any deliberate non-payment of the Claimant. The Second Respondent explained that she had been very unwell and had forgotten to put the Claimant’s pay through. There was an exchange of messages about the Second Respondent’s health and the Claimant appeared to accept the Second Respondent had simply made a mistake.

[89]As set out in the findings of fact above, the Claimant was not paid at the start of October, as she expected to be. This caused her to contact the Second Respondent, and seemingly Beth Roach also, in relation to her non-payment. There was no explanation for the late payment, and although the Second Respondent told the Claimant she would be paid, the Claimant’s position is that she did not receive any payment in either October or November. When flagged, the Second Respondent provides no explanation provided for the payment due end of September/ start of October being late. However, I note that this exchange followed the Second Respondent querying whether the Claimant would be returning to

[90]On an objective assessment, I do consider that this to be a fundamental breach of the implied term of trust and confidence and clause 11 of the contract of employment. An employee is entitled to be paid, and be paid on time. The Respondent had no reasonable or proper cause for acting in this way.

[91]As I have found the Respondent did breach the implied term of trust and confidence and clause 11 I have gone on to consider whether the breach, caused the Claimant to resign.

[92]I have concluded that the Respondent’s breaches did cause the Claimant to resign. There is no evidence that the Claimant was unhappy in her role prior to August 2023. Indeed the message exchange indicated a friendly relationship in which the Claimant referred to catch up. The Claimant chased her pay in October 2023, and in November 2023 she was not paid. The Claimant acted promptly in resigning on 11 November 2023 after not receiving the pay due early in November 2023.

[93]I do not find that the Claimant affirmed the contract following the breach.

[94]Accordingly, the Claimant was unfairly dismissed in accordance with section 95 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. Remedy – Constructive Unfair Dismissal

[95]The Claimant set out calculations of the compensation she says was due in a Schedule of Loss, that the Claimant’s representative amended during the course of the hearing in discussion with me.

[96]The Claimant has not brought a claim for notice pay. I spent considerable time at the start of the hearing seeking to clarify the issues for determination and read them back several times.

[97]Basic Award – The Claimant seeks a basic award. She was employed for 3 years. Her weekly pay is £237.50. Accordingly, the basic award awarded to the Claimant is £712.50.

[98]Compensatory Award – The Claimant started a new job on 27 January 2024. The Claimant seeks a compensatory award of £1,886.07. Mr. Raffel calculated this based on losses incurred between 2 December 2023 to 26 January 2024, at a rate of £9.50 per hour x 25 hours per week x 7 weeks and 6 days. This sum is £1,886.07.

[99]However, Mr. Raffel confirmed that the sums that the Claimant received for jobseekers allowance. He says she received a payment of £169.50 every two weeks between 15 November 2023 and 26 January 2024 being 5 payment x £169.50 = £847.50 to be deducted.

[100]Accordingly, the compensatory award claimed and awarded is £1,038.57.

[101]On the evidence available, I do not think there was any basis for a deduction under the principles of Polkey or contributory fault. I do not consider this to be a case where any uplift or deduction for failure to apply the ACAS Code should be made.

[102]On the evidence presented I did not consider it appropriate to award any other sum for financial losses.

[103]I consider it appropriate to award a sum of £250 for loss of statutory rights. Pregnancy and Maternity Discrimination

[104]The Claimant seeks to bring claims under section 18(2) and 18(4) of the Equality Act 2010.

[105]Dealing firstly with the section 18(2) claims, the Claimant alleges that she has been treated unfavourably by a pay increase being refused in November 2022 and December 2022. Mrs. Carter, the Second Respondent, is said to be the person who refused the pay increase.

[106]The Claimant was pregnant at the time of the alleged unfavourable treatment. She told the Second Respondent on the day that she asked for a pay increase in November 2022. There is no evidence of a discussion around pay between the Claimant and the Second Respondent in December 2022.

[107]I conclude that refusing a pay rise in November 2022, in the context of the Claimant’s colleagues being on a higher rate of pay, was unfavourable treatment.

[108]Accordingly, I have gone on to consider whether the Claimant has discharged the burden on her to show evidence from which I can conclude that the alleged unfavourable treatment was because of the Claimant’s pregnancy.

[109]The Claimant’s unchallenged evidence is that a colleague told her that the Second Respondent had said the Claimant would not be given a pay rise until returning from maternity leave. A period of maternity leave only arises from a woman being pregnant. On the facts of this case, I conclude that the reason why the Claimant was not given a pay rise when she asked in November was because she had told her employer that she was pregnant, and her employer knew that she would be going on maternity leave.

[110]The Claimant the only brought one allegation brought under section 18(2). The claim was submitted on 29 February 2024.

[111]I asked the Claimant’s representative about the Claimant’s position on time limits. I did not understand this allegation to be an allegation of an ongoing omission, but that there were allegedly two refusals on two specific dates. I found as a matter of fact that there was only evidence of one refusal, in November 2023. Accordingly, on the face of it the claim is considerably out of time.

[112]The Claimant’s representative submitted that it was part of a chain of continuing conduct by the same person, the Second Respondent, and that if not in time it would be just and equitable to extend time if I did not find it to form part of conduct extending over a period. I conclude that, when read with my conclusions set out below, that this matter forms part of a course of conduct extending over a period ending on 4 November 2024. The Second Respondent did not give the Claimant a pay rise because she was pregnant, and would be going on maternity leave, and the Second Respondent did not ensure the Claimant was paid the maternity pay in October and November 2024. I consider the matters linked due to the reluctance and failure to increase pay and make payments related to pregnancy and maternity and therefore this brings this allegation in time.

[113]In relation to her section 18(4) claims, the Claimant alleges that she was treated unfavourably as set out in the list of issues above. I have dealt with each allegation separately.

[114]For ease, it is established that the Claimant went on maternity leave on 4 February 2023 and remained on maternity leave until her employment ended on 11 November 2023.

[115]In February 2023 refused to allow the Claimant to take annual leave until after maternity leave. Mrs. Carter is said to be the person who refused the leave request.

[116]As set out above in relation to the complaint of constructive unfair dismissal I do not consider that the there was a refusal to allow the Claimant to take annual leave. Accordingly, this complaint fails.

[117]Deliberate non-payment of maternity pay in August, September and October 2023.

[118]Again, there is some overlap here with my conclusions in relation to the complaint of constructive unfair dismissal. I do not find that there was a deliberate non-payment of maternity pay in August for the reasons set out in relation to the unfair dismissal complaint above. However, in the absence of any other explanation, as the First Respondent and the Second Respondent were aware, that the Claimant was entitled to maternity pay in September and October 2023 I conclude that a decision not to make the payment must have been deliberate. I consider nonpayment to be unfavourable treatment.

[119]I must decide whether that was because the Claimant exercising or seeking to exercise, or has exercised or sought to exercise, the right to ordinary or additional maternity leave. The Claimant points towards the Second Respondent using the phrase “out of sight out of mind”. This was made with reference specifically to the Second Respondent making the payment due in August 2023 in time. I do not consider the same reason is likely to apply to the payments due in October and November. Indeed, the Claimant raising the concern in August reminded the Respondents that she needed paying whilst on maternity leave.

[120]I note that at the end of August 2023 the Second Respondent asked the Claimant if she was returning to work. On the Claimant’s own case, she replied that she was looking at childcare and would let her know if it was not possible. There was no further discission regarding a return to

[121]The relationship between the parties appears to become strained in early October 2023 in view of the message the Second Respondent sent the Claimant on 6 October 2023. It can be drawn from that message that the Second Respondent was no longer communicating in a friendly tone and was frustrated by the Claimant contacting Beth and chasing her maternity pay. On balance, noting this message and no explanation for the late and subsequent non-payment, I conclude that the Claimant was not paid in October and November 2023 because she was on maternity leave and the First Respondent and the Second Respondent were not clear on whether the Claimant intended to return to work after her maternity leave.

[122]This complaint of unfavourable treatment is upheld.

[123]I consider the failure to pay in October and November 2023 to be conduct extending over a period, a continuous act, and taking the last date of non-payment as 4 November 2023, this allegation is in time.

[124]Refuse to give the Claimant’s new employer a reference in

[125]It is found that the Claimant’s new employer sought a reference from the First Respondent and that a reference was not provided.

[126]I have kept in mind that in this situation the First Respondent is not under any legal obligation to provide a reference. However, when a person is seeking to start work in a school, or any environment where references are of considerable importance, I conclude that not providing a reference when asked to do so can, and in this case does, amount to unfavorable treatment.

[127]However, in relation this allegation, noting that the non-provision of a reference is after the Claimant has resigned and has referred to taking legal advice, I do not consider there to be sufficient evidence for me to conclude that the reason why a reference was not given was because the Claimant had taken maternity leave. I do not consider there to be any inference to support such a conclusion. The non-provision of the reference came some weeks after the Claimant’s employment, and maternity leave, had ended. Further the Claimant referenced taking legal advice in her resignation letter. I consider at this stage the relationship between the parties had broken down. Indeed, in closing submissions the Claimant’s representative said, with reference to the message from the Second Respondent to the Claimant on 6 October 2024, that relations were strained and more likely than not that the breakdown was the reason a reference was not provided.

[128]Accordingly, this complaint fails. Section 18 - remedy

[129]The Claimant seeks an injury to feeling award of £11,200. I have considered all the evidence and although I have concluded that there were two acts of discrimination by the Second Respondent, I do not consider the Claimant was significantly upset by the first act of discrimination. Indeed, she did not raise it further internally and she also states that the reason she started looking for employment elsewhere was because of and following the failure to pay her statutory maternity pay. On balance taking all the evidence into account, I consider including the fact the Claimant was able to apply for and commence work quickly, that an award in the lower part of the lowest Vento band is appropriate.

[130]Accordingly I have awarded a sum of £2,000 as injury to feelings.

[131]The Claimant has been awarded a sum of £2,500 by way of injury to feelings award. As per Regulation 6(1)(a) of the Interest Regulations, unless the Tribunal considers a “serious injustice” would be caused to do otherwise, interest accrues for the period since the date of the injury and the date of award. The date of the first act of discrimination was 15 November 2022, and the decision today, on 6 January 2025, so the number of days in that period is 784 days.

[132]I do not think a serious injustice would be caused to calculate interest on the Claimant’s injury to feelings award in this way, so the value of that interest is calculated as follows: (784/365) x 0.08 x £2,000 yielding a total interest payment of £343.23

[133]The total compensation award payable to the Claimant is £2,343.23 Unauthorised deductions from wages

[134]The Claimant was entitled to be paid her statutory maternity pay on a monthly basis.. The Claimant was due to be paid £758.91 no later than 4 October 2023 and £793.40 no later than 4 November 2023. She was not paid the sums owed to her.

[135]I conclude that the First Respondent has made an unauthorised deduction from the Claimant’s wages by failing to pay the Claimant the full amount of wages due on 4 October 2023 and 4 November 2023 and is ordered to pay to the Claimant the gross sum of £1,552.31 in respect of the amount unlawfully deducted.

[136]The First Respondent will be entitled to deduct any tax and employee’s national insurance contributions due on this amount before payment to the Claimant.

[137]The Claimant is entitled to 140 hours holiday per year. The leave year starts on 1 January. The Claimant did not take any holiday in 2023. The Claimant’s unchallenged case is that she is owed holiday pay for 4.82 weeks accrued but untaken holiday at a rate of £9.50 for 25 hours per week being a total of £1,144.75.

[138]I conclude that the First Respondent has made an unlawful deduction of wages in relation to the holiday pay. The Respondent is ordered to pay to the Claimant the gross sum of £1,144.75 in respect of accrued holiday pay.

[139]The First Respondent will be entitled to deduct any tax and employee’s national insurance contributions due on this amount before payment to the Claimant. Detriment section 47C Employment Rights Act 1996

[140]The Claimant alleges that the refusal to give her new employer a reference in December 2023 and January 2024 is a detriment and was done on the grounds of pregnancy and/or maternity.

[141]There is some overlap with her direct discrimination complaint as set out above.

[142]In section 47C claims, the Claimant must show that a detriment was suffered. The Claimant has started new employment, and therefore the refusal to give a reference has not, in itself resulted in any actual detriment other than a delay in her starting her new role. However, I do consider that not providing a reference can in general terms constitute a detriment.

[143]It is for the employer to show the ground on which any act, in this case, the refusal to give a reference, was done.

[144]The Respondents have not responded to this claim, and therefore I have not heard any evidence from any Respondent. However, my conclusions as set out above are relevant. In this complaint, a considerable period had passed between the Claimant’s pregnancy and the refusal to give a reference and the relationship between the parties was amicable after her pregnancy, as evidenced in the messages in early August 2023. I cannot see any link between the Claimant’s pregnancy and the detriment, and therefore that part of the allegation fails.

[145]In relation to whether the detriment was on the ground of maternity, as set out above, the non-provision of a reference was after the Claimant has resigned and referenced taking legal advice, I do not consider there to be sufficient evidence for me to conclude that a reference was not given on the grounds that the Claimant exercised her right to take maternity leave. I do not consider there to be any inference to support such a conclusion. The non-provision of the reference came some weeks after the Claimant’s employment, and maternity leave, had ended. Further the Claimant referenced taking legal advice in her resignation letter. Indeed, in closing submissions the Claimant’s representative said, with reference to the message from the Second Respondent to the Claimant on 6 October 2024, that relations were strained and more likely than not that the breakdown was the reason a reference was not provided.

[146]I consider at this stage the relationship between the parties had broken down. The allegation fails. Approved by

Conclusions

[1]Employment Judge Cawthray conducted a final hearing on 6 January 2025. The judgment and reasons were approved on 10 January 2025, but were not sent to the parties until 4 March 2025.

[2]The hearing had been listed as one where the Respondents had not submitted a response and there was no evidence of any engagement by the Respondents. Accordingly, the hearing took place without the Respondents being present.

[3]On 12 May 2025 the Respondents, via the Third Respondent, submitted a request for reconsideration. However, it contained very little information and simply said they were not aware of the hearing date, without any further information. The application for reconsideration was out of time, and was rejected. The Respondents appealed the judgment to the EAT.

[5]Following receipt of correspondence from the EAT, Employment Judge Cawthray reviewed the file. In short, the information gleaned from the appeal to the EAT indicated to Employment Judge Cawthray that the claim form may not have been served at the correct respondent address/es.

[6]Accordingly, on 17 October 2025, the Tribunal (on instruction by Employment Judge Cawthray) wrote to the parties as below: “Employment Judge Cawthray is of the view, of her own initiative, that in the interests of justice the judgment dated 10 January 2025 should be reconsidered. The grounds for the proposed reconsideration are that it appears that the Respondents were not served with the claim form and notice of hearing. Employment Judge Cawthray has reviewed the matter, and considered the comments made by the Respondents to the Employment Appeal Tribunal and the information available at Companies House. Having considered this information, she understands the position to be as set out below. The claim was submitted against three respondents: First Respondent: NO5 Beauty & Aesthetics Ltd Second Respondent: Mrs. Amy Carter Third Respondent: Mr. James Carter The Claimant considered the Second Respondent and the Third Respondent to be owners and directors of the First Respondent. The ET1 gives an address of 5A Swan Street for the Respondents. The Notice of Hearing sent 21 June 2024 to 5A Swan Street. It is not clear from the electronic file where the claim form was served, but it was likely sent to 5A Swan Street. In short, from the appeal to the EAT, it is understood the Respondents say they never received the notice of claim or notice of hearing. It appears: NO5 Beauty & Aesthetics Ltd, the First Respondent, has a registered address 5 Swan Street – not 5A. This is still an active company, albeit there appears to be a proposal to strike it off. The sole director is Amy Ripley, who is understood to be the Second Respondent, Amy Carter. NO5 Beauty Aesthetics Ltd, is not a party to the claim, and has registered address 5A Swan Street. This company dissolved 27 August 2024. The director was the Third Respondent, who says the company never traded and never employed anyone. Accordingly, it appears that claim service and the Notice of Hearing was sent to 5A and the registered address for the First Respondent was number 5. Further, it is noted that the EAT Registrar has found: “I find that it is certain that the Appellants had got to know about the ET judgment when they received the enforcement letter dated 17/04/25. The enforcement letter was sent by the Respondent’s legal representative to another (active and valid) postal address of the Appellants. It seems unclear whether this address had been known to the Respondent and or her legal representatives throughout the proceedings or whether it became apparent only for the purpose of the enforcement stage. I find that the Appellants did not participate in the proceedings before the Employment Tribunal, and that the Notice of Appeal appears to be the first opportunity to put their arguments across. I find therefore that the interest of justice require that they would be for their side of the story to be heard and that the extension of time should be granted.” The EAT have stayed proceedings. In view of the above, Employment Judge Cawthray considers that, on reconsideration, a potential fair way forward is for her to set aside her judgment dated 10 January 2025, for the Respondents to be served with the ET1 and for the process to recommence. If you think the judgment should not be reconsidered, you must write to us, giving reasons, within 14 days of receipt of the letter. In any event, you are asked to write to us by that date setting out your views on whether the reconsideration can proceed without a hearing.” The Claimant did not reply at all.

[8]The Respondents (via Mr. Carter) replied on 3 November 2025 giving contact details only and 16 December 2025 as set out below. “Please advise on the below and our case as I’ve not heard anything in regards to restarting it unless the claimant no longer wants to pursue us.”

[9]The Respondent did not address the specific questions raised by Employment Judge Cawthray.

[10]Accordingly, on further review, on 8 January 2026 Employment Judge Cawthray directed the parties: Dear Parties, Employment Judge Cawthray has instructed me to write to you as follows: The parties are redirected to the letter sent on 17 October 2025. Employment Judge Cawthray does not consider the parties have replied as directed. The Tribunal has not received any response from the Claimant at all. The Tribunal has received correspondence from the Respondent on 3 November 2025 regarding contact details and on 16 December 2025. The parties, in the letter dated 17 October 2025, were ordered to reply at as set out below, emphasis underlined: “In view of the above, Employment Judge Cawthray considers that, on reconsideration, a potential fair way forward is for her to set aside her judgment dated 10 January 2025, for the Respondents to be served with the ET1 and for the process to recommence. If you think the judgment should not be reconsidered, you must write to us, giving reasons, within 14 days of receipt of the letter. In any event, you are asked to write to us by that date setting out your views on whether the reconsideration can proceed without a hearing.” Both parties must reply, copied to each other, within 7 days, with any comments on the proposal to set aside the judgment and any comments on whether they are content or otherwise for any reconsideration to set aside the judgment to be done without a hearing. If the parties do not reply, adequately or at all, Employment Judge Cawthray will determine how to move forward.”

[11]Employment Judge Cawthray has reviewed the file again. There is no record of the Claimant replying at all.

[12]The Respondents, via Mr. Carter, wrote to the Tribunal on 6 March 2026 saying they had not heard anything. The Tribunal staff re-sent the letter dated 8 January 2026 and Mr. Carter replied on 10 March 2026 stating: “We had received this but have not heard anything from the Claimants at all and one would assume under the circumstances they no longer wish to proceed as this was all incorrect in the first place can you confirm as there must be a time limit on this.”

[13]In view of the above, and for the same reasons as set out in the letter dated 17 October 2025, Employment Judge Cawthray has set aside the judgment dated 10 January 2025.

[14]The claim form will be sent to the Respondents, by email care of Mr. Carter, and in part to the following addresses, First Respondent: NO5 Beauty & Aesthetics Ltd – 5 Swan Street Swan Street, West Malling, Kent ME19 6JU Second Respondent: Mrs. Amy Carter - Lower Gallants, Lower Road, East Farliegh ME15 0JS Third Respondent: Mr. James Carter - Lower Gallants, Lower Road, East Farliegh ME15 0JS

[15]In simple terms, the process will start again. If the Respondents wish to defend the claim they must submit a response.

[16]If the Claimant no longer wishes to pursue the claim, and seeks to withdraw the claim, she must write to the Tribunal within 7 days. Date 21 April 2026 Approved by