Ms Y Harris v Mr C Charalambous (as executor of Mr J Charalambous) and Ms J Crossfield: 2302139/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2302139/2024

Between

Ms Y HarrisClaimant

Mr C Charalambous (as executor of Mr J Charalambous) and Ms J CrossfieldRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Beck

In person for claimant

In person for respondent

Date 29 April 2026

JUDGMENT

[1]The claimant's complaint of unfair dismissal against respondent 1 is not well founded and is dismissed.

[2]The claimant’s complaint of unfair dismissal against respondent 2 is well founded and succeeds.

[3]The claimant’s complaint for a statutory redundancy payment against respondent 1 / respondent 2 arising from 16/3/23 is dismissed as having been presented out of time. The time limit cannot be extended because it is not just and equitable to do so.

[4]The claimant’s complaint for a statutory redundancy payment against respondent 2 arising from the 1/2/24 dismissal succeeds.

[5]The claimant’s complaint of failure to pay notice pay succeeds against respondent 2.

[6]The claimant's complaint for accrued holiday pay succeeds against respondent 2.

[7]The claimant’s complaint for Statutory Sick Pay succeeds against respondent 2.

REASONS

[1]The claimant lodged an ET1 on the 19/2/24, bringing complaints of unfair dismissal, redundancy pay, holiday pay, arrears of pay and notice pay. The respondent was recorded on the ET1 form as the Barber Store Limited, a hairdressing shop run by Mr Jack Charalambous. Mr Jack Charalambous unfortunately died in a car accident on the 16/3/23. It is accepted the claimant was employed by him as a hairdresser from the 1/6/19 and remained employed by him until he died.

[2]At a preliminary hearing on the 9/1/25, Employment Judge Morton with the consent of Mr Tzourou, solicitor present at the hearing, who was dealing with the estate of the late Mr Jack Charalambous, substituted Mr Christos Charalambous (as executor of Mr J Charalambous), his son, and Janet Crossfield as respondents. Ms Crossfield had not been served with notice of the claim, and the case was adjourned to a further case management hearing for this to take place. Ms Crossfield occupied the upstairs premises above the Barber Store Limited under the terms of a lease, running a beauty salon.

[3]On the 19/12/25, a further case management hearing took place before Employment Judge Sudra, the claimant and both respondents were in attendance, and a final hearing 2 -day hearing was listed on the 17th and 18th March 2026. Directions for bundles and statements were made, and the issues identified, as replicated in the list below.

List of issues

[1]Time limits1.1 Given the date the claim form was presented and the dates of early conciliation, any complaint about something that happened before 24th October 2024 may not have been brought in time.

1.2 Was the unauthorised deductions complaint made within the time limit in s.23 the Employment Rights Act 1996 (‘ERA’)? The Tribunal will decide:1.2.1 Was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the effective date of termination / date of payment of the wages from which the deduction was made etc]?

1.2.2 If not, was there a series of deductions and was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the last one?

1.2.3 If not, was it reasonably practicable for the claim to be made to the Tribunal within the time limit?

1.3 If it was not reasonably practicable for the claim to be made to the Tribunal within the time limit, was it made within a reasonable period?

[2]Employment status2.1 Was the Claimant an employee of the first or Second Respondent within the meaning of s.230 of the ERA?

2.2 If so, who was her employer or employers and during what periods of time?

[3]Unfair Dismissal3.1 Was the Claimant dismissed or did she resign from her employment?

3.2 If she was dismissed, who dismissed her? When did this happen?

3.3 If she was dismissed what was the reason for her dismissal? Was it a potentially fair reason under s.98 ERA?

3.4 If so, did the employer who dismissed her follow a fair procedure and act reasonably in treating the reason as a reason to dismiss the Claimant?

3.5 Was the Claimant dismissed for redundancy and was she entitled to a redundancy payment?

[4]Remedy for Unfair Dismissal4.1 If there is a compensatory award, how much should it be? The Tribunal will decide:4.1.1 What financial losses has the dismissal caused the Claimant?

4.1.2 Has the respondent proven that the Claimant failed to take reasonable steps to replace their lost earnings, such as by failing to take reasonable steps to find another job?

4.1.3 For what period of loss should the Claimant be compensated?

4.1.4 Is there a chance that the Claimant would have been fairly dismissed anyway if a fair procedure had been followed, or for some other reason?

4.1.5 If so, should the Claimant’s compensation be reduced? By how much?

4.1.6 Did the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures apply?

4.1.7 Did the Respondent or the Claimant unreasonably fail to comply with it?

4.1.8 If so is it just and equitable to increase or decrease any award payable to the Claimant? By what proportion, up to 25%?

4.1.9 If the Claimant was unfairly dismissed, did they cause or contribute to dismissal by blameworthy conduct?

4.1.10 If so, would it be just and equitable to reduce the Claimant’s compensatory award? By what proportion?

4.1.11 Does the statutory cap of fifty-two weeks’ pay or [£115,115] apply?

4.2 What basic award is payable to the Claimant, if any?

4.3 Would it be just and equitable to reduce the basic award because of any conduct of the Claimant before the dismissal? If so, to what extent?

[5]Wrongful Dismissal / Notice Pay5.1 What was the Claimant’s notice period?

5.2 Was the Claimant paid for that notice period?

[6]Unauthorised Deductions6.1 What were the terms of the Claimant’s employment as regards pay, holiday and notice?

6.2 Was the Claimant owed any money for holiday, notice or unpaid wages at the end of her employment? 17/18 March 2026 hearing 4.I was provided with a 341 -page bundle which contained the claimant’s documents at pages 58-70, respondent 1’s documents at pages 71-287, and respondent 2’s documents at pages 288-341. Respondent 2 provided an additional document, exhibit 32 – e mail dated 22/1/26 which was included. The claimant in her evidence referred to e mails to the second respondent dated 20/12/23, 23/12/23, 25/12/23, 27/12/23, and 23/1/24, which she sought permission to adduce as evidence, neither respondent objected to this course of action, and those e mails were adduced in evidence. Respondent 1 sought to adduce in evidence 3 WhatsApp messages between his sister Miss M Leaney and respondent 2 dated the 8/6/23 and 11/8/23. The claimant did not oppose this evidence being introduced, respondent 2 left the decision to the tribunal. I determined the messages were relevant to employer status, a central issue in the case, and that it was in the interests of justice and the overriding objective to adduce them. 5. All 3 parties appeared via CVP in person and gave evidence on affirmation to the tribunal. They were each cross examined by the other 2 parties. This took some time, and the parties made closing submissions to the tribunal. There was insufficient time for me to deliberate and deliver an oral judgment, so this reserved judgment is provided. Law Death of employer Common law applies, on the death of an employer, where the employment contract is with the individual, the death automatically dissolves the contract – Farrow and Wilson 1869. Redundancy Section 136 (5) ERA (1996) 136.— Circumstances in which an employee is dismissed.

(1) Subject to the provisions of this section and sections 137 and 138, for the purposes of this Part an employee is dismissed by his employer if (and only if)— (a) the contract under which he is employed by the employer is terminated by the employer (whether with or without notice), (b) he is employed under a limited term contract and that contract terminates by virtue of the limiting event without being renewed under the same contract, or (c) the employee terminates the contract under which he is employed (with or without notice) in circumstances in which he is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer's conduct.

(2) Subsection (1)(c) does not apply if the employee terminates the contract without notice in circumstances in which he is entitled to do so by reason of a lock-out by the employer.

(3) An employee shall be taken to be dismissed by his employer for the purposes of this Part if— (a) the employer gives notice to the employee to terminate his contract of employment, and (b) at a time within the obligatory period of notice the employee gives notice in writing to the employer to terminate the contract of employment on a date earlier than the date on which the employer's notice is due to expire.

(4) In this Part the “obligatory period of notice” , in relation to notice given by an employer to terminate an employee's contract of employment, means— (a) the actual period of the notice in a case where the period beginning at the time when the notice is given and ending at the time when it expires is equal to the minimum period which (by virtue of any enactment or otherwise) is required to be given by the employer to terminate the contract of employment, and (b) the period which— (i) is equal to the minimum period referred to in paragraph (a), and (ii) ends at the time when the notice expires, in any other case.

(5) Where in accordance with any enactment or rule of law— (a) an act on the part of an employer, or (b) an event affecting an employer (including, in the case of an individual, his death), operates to terminate a contract under which an employee is employed by him, the act or event shall be taken for the purposes of this Part to be a termination of the contract by the employer. Section 139 ERA (1996) 139 - Redundancy (1) For the purposes of this Act an employee who is dismissed shall be taken to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if the dismissal is wholly or mainly attributable to— (a) the fact that his employer has ceased or intends to cease— (i) to carry on the business for the purposes of which the employee was employed by him, or (ii) to carry on that business in the place where the employee was so employed, or (b) the fact that the requirements of that business— (i) for employees to carry out work of a particular kind, or (ii) for employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place where the employee was employed by the employer, have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1) the business of the employer together with the business or businesses of his associated employers shall be treated as one (unless either of the conditions specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of that subsection would be satisfied without so treating them). (3) For the purposes of subsection (1) the activities carried on by a [local authority] with respect to the schools maintained by it, and the activities carried on by the [governing bodies] of those schools, shall be treated as one business (unless either of the conditions specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of that subsection would be satisfied without so treating them). (4) Where— (a) the contract under which a person is employed is treated by section 136(5) as terminated by his employer by reason of an act or event, and (b) the employee's contract is not renewed and he is not re-engaged under a new contract of employment, he shall be taken for the purposes of this Act to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if the circumstances in which his contract is not renewed, and he is not re-engaged, are wholly or mainly attributable to either of the facts stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1). (5) In its application to a case within subsection (4), paragraph (a)(i) of subsection (1) has effect as if the reference in that subsection to the employer included a reference to any person to whom, in consequence of the act or event, power to dispose of the business has passed.

(6) In subsection (1) “cease” and “diminish” mean cease and diminish either permanently or temporarily and for whatever reason. [(7) In subsection (3) “local authority” has the meaning given by section 579(1) of the Education Act 1996.] Section 145 (2) (b) ERA (1996) 145.— The relevant date. (1) For the purposes of the provisions of this Act relating to redundancy payments “the relevant date” in relation to the dismissal of an employee has the meaning given by this section. (2) Subject to the following provisions of this section, “the relevant date” — (a) in relation to an employee whose contract of employment is terminated by notice, whether given by his employer or by the employee, means the date on which the notice expires, (b) in relation to an employee whose contract of employment is terminated without notice, means the date on which the termination takes effect, and (c) in relation to an employee who is employed under a limited-term contract which terminates by virtue of the limiting event without being renewed under the same contract, means the date on which the termination takes effect. (3) Where the employee is taken to be dismissed by virtue of section 136(3) the “relevant date” means the date on which the employee's notice to terminate his contract of employment expires. (4) Where the employee is regarded by virtue of section 138(4) as having been dismissed on the date on which his employment under an earlier contract ended, “the relevant date” means— (a) for the purposes of section 164(1), the date which is the relevant date as defined by subsection (2) in relation to the renewed or new contract or, where there has been more than one trial period, the last such contract, and (b) for the purposes of any other provision, the date which is the relevant date as defined by subsection (2) in relation to the previous contract or, where there has been more than one such trial period, the original contract. (5) Where— (a) the contract of employment is terminated by the employer, and (b) the notice required by section 86 to be given by an employer would, if duly given on the material date, expire on a date later than the relevant date (as defined by the previous provisions of this section), for the purposes of sections 155, 162(1) and 227(3) the later date is the relevant date. (6) In subsection (5)(b) “the material date” means— (a) the date when notice of termination was given by the employer, or (b) where no notice was given, the date when the contract of employment was terminated by the employer. Section 155 ERA (1996) 155 - Qualifying period of employment. An employee does not have any right to a redundancy payment unless he has been continuously employed for a period of not less than two years ending with the relevant date. Section 163 ERA (1996) 163 - References to employment tribunals (1) Any question arising under this Part as to— (a) the right of an employee to a redundancy payment, or (b) the amount of a redundancy payment, shall be referred to and determined by an employment tribunal. (2) For the purposes of any such reference, an employee who has been dismissed by his employer shall, unless the contrary is proved, be presumed to have been so dismissed by reason of redundancy. (3) Any question whether an employee will become entitled to a redundancy payment if he is not dismissed by his employer and he terminates his contract of employment as mentioned in section 150(1) shall for the purposes of this Part be taken to be a question as to the right of the employee to a redundancy payment. (4) Where an order under section 157 is in force in respect of an agreement, this section has effect in relation to any question arising under the agreement as to the right of an employee to a payment on the termination of his employment, or as to the amount of such a payment, as if the payment were a redundancy payment and the question arose under this Part. [(5) Where a tribunal determines under subsection (1) that an employee has a right to a redundancy payment it may order the employer to pay to the worker such amount as the tribunal considers appropriate in all the circumstances to compensate the worker for any financial loss sustained by him which is attributable to the non-payment of the redundancy payment.] [(6) Where in accordance with Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules an employment tribunal determines in the same proceedings a complaint presented under section 111 (unfair dismissal) and a question referred under this section, subsection (2) has no effect for the purposes of the proceedings in so far as they relate to the complaint under section 111. Section 164 (1) and (2) ERA (1996) 164 - Claims for redundancy payment (1) An employee does not have any right to a redundancy payment unless, before the end of the period of six months beginning with the relevant date— (a) the payment has been agreed and paid, (b) the employee has made a claim for the payment by notice in writing given to the employer, (c) a question as to the employee's right to, or the amount of, the payment has been referred to an [employment tribunal], or (d) a complaint relating to his dismissal has been presented by the employee under section 111. (2) An employee is not deprived of his right to a redundancy payment by subsection (1) if, during the period of six months immediately following the period mentioned in that subsection, the employee— (a) makes a claim for the payment by notice in writing given to the employer, (b) refers to an [employment tribunal] a question as to his right to, or the amount of, the payment, or (c) presents a complaint relating to his dismissal under section 111, and it appears to the tribunal to be just and equitable that the employee should receive a redundancy payment. (3) In determining under subsection (2) whether it is just and equitable that an employee should receive a redundancy payment an [employment tribunal] shall have regard to— (a) the reason shown by the employee for his failure to take any such step as is referred to in subsection (2) within the period mentioned in subsection (1), and (b) all the other relevant circumstances. [(4) . . .] [(5) Section 207B (extension of time limits to facilitate conciliation before institution of proceedings) applies for the purposes of subsections (1)(c) and (2). Section 218(4) ERA (1996) 218.— Change of employer. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, this Chapter relates only to employment by the one employer. (2) If a trade or business, or an undertaking (whether or not established by or under an Act), is transferred from one person to another— (a) the period of employment of an employee in the trade or business or undertaking at the time of the transfer counts as a period of employment with the transferee, and (b) the transfer does not break the continuity of the period of employment. (3) If by or under an Act (whether public or local and whether passed before or after this Act) a contract of employment between any body corporate and an employee is modified and some other body corporate is substituted as the employer— (a) the employee's period of employment at the time when the modification takes effect counts as a period of employment with the second body corporate, and (b) the change of employer does not break the continuity of the period of (4) If on the death of an employer the employee is taken into the employment of the personal representatives or trustees of the deceased— (a) the employee's period of employment at the time of the death counts as a period of employment with the employer's personal representatives or trustees, and (b) the death does not break the continuity of the period of employment. (5) If there is a change in the partners, personal representatives or trustees who employ any person— (a) the employee's period of employment at the time of the change counts as a period of employment with the partners, personal representatives or trustees after the change, and (b) the change does not break the continuity of the period of employment. (6) If an employee of an employer is taken into the employment of another employer who, at the time when the employee enters the second employer's employment, is an associated employer of the first employer— (a) the employee's period of employment at that time counts as a period of employment with the second employer, and (b) the change of employer does not break the continuity of the period of Unfair dismissal Section 95(1) Employment Rights Act (1996) provides that for the purposes of this part, an employee is dismissed by his employer if (and subject to subsection (2) only if)- (a) the contract under which he is employed is terminated by the employer (whether with or without notice); (b) he is employed under a limited term contract and that contract terminates by virtue of the limiting event without being renewed under the same contact; (c) the employee terminates the contract under which he is employed (with or without notice) in circumstances in which he is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer’s conduct. Section 98 (1) and (2) Employment Rights Act (1996) provides: (1) In determining for the purposes of this part whether the dismissal of an employee is fair or unfair it is for the employer to show- (a) the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for dismissal, and (b) that it is a reason falling within subsection(2) or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the employee held. (2) A reason falls within this subsection if it (a) relates to the capability or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do, (b) relates to the conduct of the employee, (c) is that the employee was redundant, or (d) is that the employee could not continue to work in the position which he held without contravention (either on his part or on that of his employer) of a duty or restriction imposed by or under an enactment. Section 98(4) Employment Rights Act (1996) provides: Where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (1), the determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair (having regard to the reason shown by the employer)- (a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employers undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and (b) shall be determined in accordance with the equity and substantial merits of the case. Section 108 Employment Rights Act (1996) provides: (1) Section 94 does not apply to the dismissal of an employee unless he has been continuously employed for a period of not less than [two years]1 ending with the effective date of termination. (2) If an employee is dismissed by reason of any such requirement or recommendation as is referred to in section 64(2), subsection (1) has effect in relation to that dismissal as if for the words “ [two years]1 ” there were substituted the words “one month”. Unauthorised deductions from wages /holiday pay Section 13(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides that an employer shall not make a deduction from wages of a worker employed by him unless the deduction is required or authorised to be made by virtue of a statutory provision or a relevant provision of the worker's contract or the worker has previously signified in writing his agreement or consent to the making of the deduction. An employee has a right to complain to an Employment Tribunal of an unlawful deduction from wages pursuant to Section 23 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. Section 23 (1) of the Employment Rights Act (1996) provides that a claim about an unauthorised deduction from wages must be presented to an employment tribunal within 3 months beginning with the date of payment of the wages from which the deduction was made, with an extension for early conciliation if notification was made to ACAS within the primary time limit, unless it was not reasonably practicable to present it within that period and the Tribunal considers it was presented within a reasonable period after that. Section 27 (1) Employment Rights Act (1996) defines wages in relation to any worker means any sums payable to the worker in connection with his employment including (a) any fee, bonus, commission, holiday pay or other emolument referable to his employment, whether payable under his contract or otherwise. It includes other categories such as statutory sick pay but excludes any payments within subsection (2). Subsection (2) defines the excluded categories as (a) any payment by way of an advance under an agreement for a loan or by way of an advance of wages (b) any payment in respect of expenses incurred by the worker in carrying out his employment, (c ) any payment by way of pension, allowance or gratuity in connection with the workers retirement or as compensation for loss of office, (d) any pay referable to the workers redundancy and (e) any payment to the worker otherwise than in his capacity as a worker. Notice pay Article 3 [Employment Tribunals] Extension of Jurisdiction (England and Wales) Order (1994) provides that proceedings may be brought before an [employment tribunal] in respect of a claim of an employee for the recovery of damages or any other sum (other than a claim for damages, or for a sum due, in respect of personal injuries) if - (a) the claim is one to which section 131(2) of the 1978 Act applies and which a court in England and Wales would under the law for the time being in force have jurisdiction to hear and determine; (b) the claim is not one to which article 5 applies; and (c ) the claim arises or is outstanding on the termination of the employee’s Section 86 (1) Employment Rights Act (1996) The notice required to be given by an employer to terminate the contract of employment of a person who has been continuously employed for one month or more - (a) is not less than one week’s notice if his period of continuous employment is less than two years; (b) is not less than one week’s notice for each year of continuous employment if his period of continuous employment is two years or more but less than twelve years, and (c ) is not less than 12 weeks' notice if his period of continuous employment is twelve years or more. Holiday pay Working Time Regulations 1998 13.— Entitlement to annual leave (A1) This regulation applies to— (a) a worker in respect of any leave years beginning before 1st April 2024, and (b) a worker to whom regulation 15B does not apply in respect of any leave years beginning on or after 1st April 2024. (1) Subject to paragraph (5), a worker is entitled to four weeks' annual leave in each leave year. (3) A worker's leave year, for the purposes of this regulation, begins– (a) on such date during the calendar year as may be provided for in a relevant agreement; or (b) where there are no provisions of a relevant agreement which apply– (i) if the worker's employment began on or before 1st October 1998, on that date and each subsequent anniversary of that date; or (ii) if the worker's employment begins after 1st October 1998, on the date on which that employment begins and each subsequent anniversary of that date. (4) Paragraph (3) does not apply to a worker to whom Schedule 2 applies (workers employed in agriculture [ in Wales or Scotland] ) except where, in the case of a worker partly employed in agriculture [ in Wales or Scotland], a relevant agreement so provides. (5) Where the date on which a worker's employment begins is later than the date on which (by virtue of a relevant agreement) his first leave year begins, the leave to which he is entitled in that leave year is a proportion of the period applicable under [paragraph (1)] equal to the proportion of that leave year remaining on the date on which his employment begins. (9) Leave to which a worker is entitled under this regulation may be taken in instalments, but– (a) subject to the exceptions in paragraphs (14), (15) and (17) it may only be taken in the leave year in respect of which it is due, and (b) it may not be replaced by a payment in lieu except where the worker's employment is terminated. (14) Where, as a result of taking a period of statutory leave in any leave year, a worker is unable to take some or all of the annual leave to which the worker is entitled in that leave year under this regulation, the worker is entitled to carry forward such untaken leave into the following leave year. (15) Where, as a result of taking a period of sick leave in any leave year, a worker is unable to take some or all of the annual leave to which the worker is entitled in that leave year under this regulation, the worker is entitled to carry forward such untaken leave into the following leave year provided it is taken by the end of the period of 18 months from the end of the leave year in which the entitlement originally arose. (16) Paragraph (17) applies where, in any leave year, an employer fails to— (a) recognise a worker's right to annual leave under this regulation or to payment for that leave in accordance with regulation 16; (b) give the worker a reasonable opportunity to take the leave to which the worker is entitled under this regulation or encourage them to do so; or (c) inform the worker that any leave not taken by the end of the leave year, which cannot be carried forward, will be lost. (17) Where this paragraph applies and subject to paragraph (18), the worker is entitled to carry forward any leave to which the worker is entitled under this regulation which is untaken in that leave year or has been taken but not paid in accordance with regulation 16. (18) Annual leave that has been carried forward pursuant to paragraph (17) cannot be carried forward beyond the end of the first full leave year in which paragraph (17) does not apply. 13A.— Entitlement to additional annual leave (A1) Subject to paragraph (8), this regulation applies to— (a) a worker in respect of any leave years beginning before 1st April 2024, and (b) a worker to whom regulation 15B does not apply in respect of any leave years beginning on or after 1st April 2024. (1) Subject to regulation 26A and paragraphs (3) and (5), a worker is entitled in each leave year to a period of additional leave determined in accordance with paragraph (2). (2) The period of additional leave to which a worker is entitled under paragraph (1) is— (a) in any leave year beginning on or after 1st October 2007 but before 1st April 2008, 0.8 weeks; (b) in any leave year beginning before 1st October 2007, a proportion of 0.8 weeks equivalent to the proportion of the year beginning on 1st October 2007 which would have elapsed at the end of that leave year; (c) in any leave year beginning on 1st April 2008, 0.8 weeks; (d) in any leave year beginning after 1st April 2008 but before 1st April 2009, 0.8 weeks and a proportion of another 0.8 weeks equivalent to the proportion of the year beginning on 1st April 2009 which would have elapsed at the end of that leave year; (e) in any leave year beginning on or after 1st April 2009, 1.6 weeks. (3) The aggregate entitlement provided for in paragraph (2) and regulation 13(1) is subject to a maximum of 28 days. (4) A worker's leave year begins for the purposes of this regulation on the same date as the worker's leave year begins for the purposes of regulation 13. (5) Where the date on which a worker's employment begins is later than the date on which his first leave year begins, the additional leave to which he is entitled in that leave year is a proportion of the period applicable under paragraph (2) equal to the proportion of that leave year remaining on the date on which his employment begins. (6) Leave to which a worker is entitled under this regulation may be taken in instalments, but it may not be replaced by a payment in lieu except where— (a) the worker's employment is terminated; or (b) the leave is an entitlement that arises under paragraph (2)(a), (b) or (c); or (c) the leave is an entitlement to 0.8 weeks that arises under paragraph (2)(d) in respect of that part of the leave year which would have elapsed before 1st April 2009.

(7) A relevant agreement may provide for any leave to which a worker is entitled under this regulation to be carried forward into the leave year immediately following the leave year in respect of which it is due. (7A) Where, as a result of taking a period of statutory leave in any leave year, a worker is unable to take some or all of the annual leave to which the worker is entitled in that leave year under this regulation, the worker is entitled to carry forward such untaken leave into the following leave year.

(8) This regulation does not apply to workers to whom the Agricultural Wages (Scotland) Act 1949 applies (as that Act had effect on 1 July 1999).] 14.— Compensation related to entitlement to leave (1) [Paragraphs (1) to (4) of this regulation apply where–] (a) a worker's employment is terminated during the course of his leave year, and (b) on the date on which the termination takes effect (“the termination date”), the proportion he has taken of the leave to which he is entitled in the leave year under [regulations 13(1) and 13A(1)] differs from the proportion of the leave year which has expired. (2) Where the proportion of leave taken by the worker is less than the proportion of the leave year which has expired, his employer shall make him a payment in lieu of leave in accordance with paragraph (3). (3) The payment due under paragraph (2) shall be– (a) such sum as may be provided for for the purposes of this regulation in a relevant agreement, or (b) where there are no provisions of a relevant agreement which apply, a sum equal to the amount that would be due to the worker under regulation 16 in respect of a period of leave determined according to the formula– (A × B) − C where– A is the period of leave to which the worker is entitled under [regulation 13] [ and regulation 13A] B is the proportion of the worker's leave year which expired before the termination date, and C is the period of leave taken by the worker between the start of the leave year and the termination date. (4) A relevant agreement may provide that, where the proportion of leave taken by the worker exceeds the proportion of the leave year which has expired, he shall compensate his employer, whether by a payment, by undertaking additional work or otherwise. (6) Where a worker's employment is terminated and on the termination date the worker remains entitled to leave in respect of any previous leave year which carried forward under paragraph (14), (15) or (17) of regulation 13 or paragraph (7) or (7A) of regulation 13A, the employer shall make the worker a payment in lieu of leave equal to the sum due under regulation 16 for the period of untaken leave. 30.— Remedies (1) A worker may present a complaint to an employment tribunal that his employer– (a) has refused to permit him to exercise any right he has under–[ (i) [regulation 10(1) or (2), 11(1), (2) or (3), 12(1) or (4), 13, 13A, 15B or 15D]; (ii) regulation 24, in so far as it applies where regulation 10(1), 11(1) or (2) or 12(1) is modified or excluded; [...] (iii) regulation 24A, in so far as it applies where regulation 10(1), 11(1) or (2) or 12(1) is excluded; or (iv) regulation 25(3), 27A(4)(b) or 27(2); or (b) has failed to pay him the whole or any part of any amount due to him under [regulation 14(2), 15E, 16(1) or 16A] (2) [Subject to [regulation 30B], an employment tribunal] shall not consider a complaint under this regulation unless it is presented– (a) before the end of the period of three months (or, in a case to which regulation 38(2) applies, six months) beginning with the date on which it is alleged that the exercise of the right should have been permitted (or in the case of a rest period or leave extending over more than one day, the date on which it should have been permitted to begin) or, as the case may be, the payment should have been made; (b) within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three or, as the case may be, six months. (2A) Where the period within which a complaint must be presented in accordance with paragraph (2) is extended by regulation 15 of the Employment Act 2002 (Dispute Resolution) Regulations 2004, the period within which the complaint must be presented shall be the extended period rather than the period in paragraph (2). (3) Where an employment tribunal finds a complaint under paragraph (1)(a) wellfounded, the tribunal– (a) shall make a declaration to that effect, and (b) may make an award of compensation to be paid by the employer to the worker. (4) The amount of the compensation shall be such as the tribunal considers just and equitable in all the circumstances having regard to– (a) the employer's default in refusing to permit the worker to exercise his right, and (b) any loss sustained by the worker which is attributable to the matters complained of. (5) Where on a complaint under paragraph (1)(b) an employment tribunal finds that an employer has failed to pay a worker in accordance with [regulation 14(2) or (5), 15E, 16(1) or 16A], it shall order the employer to pay to the worker the amount which it finds to be due to him. Employee and worker status An “employee” is defined by section 230(1) Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA) as being “an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) a contract of employment.” “Contract of employment” is defined as meaning a contract of service or apprenticeship. Whether an individual works under a contract of service is determined according to various tests established by case law. A tribunal must consider relevant factors in considering whether someone is an employee. An irreducible minimum to be an employee will involve control, mutuality of obligation and personal performance, but other relevant factors will also need to be considered. In Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Limited –v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance

[1968] 2QB 497

(HC), McKenna J summarised the essential elements of the contract of employment as follows:- (a) The servant agrees that, in consideration of a wage or other remuneration, he will provide his own work and skill in the performance of some service for hid Master. (b) He agrees expressly or impliedly that in the performance of that service he will be subject to the other's control in a sufficient degree to make that other Master. (c) The other provisions of the contract are consistent with its being a contract of service. In Autoclenz Limited -v- Belcher & Others

[2011] IRLR 820

(SC), the Supreme Court established the following principles to be considered by the tribunal in determining the true nature of the relationship:- (a) It is important to be aware that employers may place substitution clauses, or clauses denying any obligation to accept or provide work, in employment contracts as a matter of form, even where such terms do not reflect the real employment relationship. (b) A finding that a contract is in part a sham does not require a finding that both parties intended it to paint a false picture as to the true nature of their respective obligations. The question in every case is what is the true agreement between the parties? (c) Where there is a dispute as to the genuineness of a written term in an employment contract, the focus of the enquiry must be to discover the actual legal obligations of the parties. All the relevant evidence must be examined, including: the written term itself, read in the context of the whole agreement; how the parties conduct themselves in practice; and their expectations of each other. (d) Evidence of how the parties conduct themselves in practice may be so persuasive that an inference can be drawn that the practice reflects the true obligations of the parties, although the mere fact that the parties conduct themselves in a particular way does not of itself mean that the conduct accurately reflects the legal rights and obligations. For example, there could well be a legal right to provide a substitute worker and the fact that the right is never exercised in practice does not mean that it is not a genuine right. (e) The relative bargaining power of the parties must be taken into account in deciding whether the terms of any written agreement in truth represent what was agreed. The circumstances in which contracts relating to work or services are concluded are often very different from those in which commercial contracts between parties of equal bargaining power are agreed. Organisations which offer work or require services to be provided by individuals are frequently in a position to dictate the written terms which the other party has to accept. In practice, in employment cases, it may be more common for a court or tribunal to have to investigate allegations that the written contract does not represent the actual terms agreed and the court or tribunal must be realistic and worldly wise when it does so. Statutory Sick Pay Taylor Gordon & Co Ltd v Timmons

[2004] IRLR 180

held that the Employment Tribunal does not always have jurisdiction to decide whether an employee is entitled to statutory sick pay. The Employment Tribunal only has power to decide whether statutory sick pay is payable as an unpaid wages claim where the employer accepts that it is payable and has not paid it. Regulation 7 Statutory Sick Pay (General) Regulations (1982) Time and manner of notification of incapacity for work (1) Subject to paragraph (2), notice of any day of incapacity for work shall be given by or on behalf of an employee to his employer— (a) in a case where the employer has decided on a time limit (not being one which requires the notice to be given earlier than . . . the first qualifying day in the period of incapacity for work [or by a specified time during that qualifying day] which includes that day of incapacity for work) and taken reasonable steps to make it known to the employee, within that time limit; and (b) in any other case, on or before the seventh day after that day of incapacity for work. (2) Notice of any day of incapacity for work may be given [one month] later than as provided by paragraph (1) where there is good cause for giving it later [or if in the particular circumstances that is not practicable, as soon as it is reasonably practicable thereafter], so however that it shall in any event be given on or before the 91st day after that day. (3) A notice contained in a letter which is properly addressed and sent by prepaid post shall be deemed to have been given on the day on which it was posted. (4) Notice of any day of incapacity for work shall be given by or on behalf of an employee to his employer— (a) in a case where the employer has decided on a manner in which it is to be given (not being a manner which imposes a requirement such as is specified in paragraph (5)) and taken reasonable steps to make it known to the employee, in that manner; and (b) in any other case, in any manner, so however that unless otherwise agreed between the employer and employee it shall be given in writing. (5) The requirements mentioned in paragraph (4)(a) are that notice shall be given— (a) personally; (b) in the form of medical evidence; (c) more than one in every 7 days during a period of entitlement; (d) on a document supplied by the employer; or (e) on a printed form. Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employments Rights) Regulations (2006) 3 - A relevant transfer (1) These Regulations apply to— (a) a transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or business situated immediately before the transfer in the United Kingdom to another person where there is a transfer of an economic entity which retains its identity; (b) a service provision change, that is a situation in which— (i) activities cease to be carried out by a person (“a client”) on his own behalf and are carried out instead by another person on the client's behalf (“a contractor”); (ii) activities cease to be carried out by a contractor on a client's behalf (whether or not those activities had previously been carried out by the client on his own behalf) and are carried out instead by another person (“a subsequent contractor”) on the client's behalf; or (iii) activities cease to be carried out by a contractor or a subsequent contractor on a client's behalf (whether or not those activities had previously been carried out by the client on his own behalf) and are carried out instead by the client on his own behalf, and in which the conditions set out in paragraph (3) are satisfied. (2) In this regulation “economic entity” means an organised grouping of resources which has the objective of pursuing an economic activity, whether or not that activity is central or ancillary. [(2A) References in paragraph (1)(b) to activities being carried out instead by another person (including the client) are to activities which are fundamentally the same as the activities carried out by the person who has ceased to carry them out.] (3) The conditions referred to in paragraph (1)(b) are that— (a) immediately before the service provision change— (i) there is an organised grouping of employees situated in Great Britain which has as its principal purpose the carrying out of the activities concerned on behalf of the client; (ii) the client intends that the activities will, following the service provision change, be carried out by the transferee other than in connection with a single specific event or task of short-term duration; and (b) the activities concerned do not consist wholly or mainly of the supply of goods for the client's use. (4) Subject to paragraph (1), these Regulations apply to— (a) public and private undertakings engaged in economic activities whether or not they are operating for gain; (b) a transfer or service provision change howsoever effected notwithstanding— (i) that the transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or business is governed or effected by the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or that the service provision change is governed or effected by the law of a country or territory outside Great Britain; (ii) that the employment of persons employed in the undertaking, business or part transferred or, in the case of a service provision change, persons employed in the organised grouping of employees, is governed by any such law; (c) a transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or business (which may also be a service provision change) where persons employed in the undertaking, business or part transferred ordinarily work outside the United Kingdom. (5) An administrative reorganisation of public administrative authorities or the transfer of administrative functions between public administrative authorities is not a relevant transfer. (6) A relevant transfer— (a) may be effected by a series of two or more transactions; and (b) may take place whether or not any property is transferred to the transferee by the transferor. (7) Where, in consequence (whether directly or indirectly) of the transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or business which was situated immediately before the transfer in the United Kingdom, a ship within the meaning of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 registered in the United Kingdom ceases to be so registered, these Regulations shall not affect the right conferred by section 29 of that Act (right of seamen to be discharged when ship ceases to be registered in the United Kingdom) on a seaman employed in the ship. 4 Effect of relevant transfer on contracts of employment (1) Except where objection is made under paragraph (7), a relevant transfer shall not operate so as to terminate the contract of employment of any person employed by the transferor and assigned to the organised grouping of resources or employees that is subject to the relevant transfer, which would otherwise be terminated by the transfer, but any such contract shall have effect after the transfer as if originally made between the person so employed and the transferee. (2) Without prejudice to paragraph (1), but subject to paragraph (6), and regulations 8 and 15(9), on the completion of a relevant transfer— (a) all the transferor's rights, powers, duties and liabilities under or in connection with any such contract shall be transferred by virtue of this regulation to the transferee; and (b) any act or omission before the transfer is completed, of or in relation to the transferor in respect of that contract or a person assigned to that organised grouping of resources or employees, shall be deemed to have been an act or omission of or in relation to the transferee. (3) Any reference in paragraph (1) to a person employed by the transferor and assigned to the organised grouping of resources or employees that is subject to a relevant transfer, is a reference to a person so employed immediately before the transfer, or who would have been so employed if he had not been dismissed in the circumstances described in regulation 7(1), including, where the transfer is effected by a series of two or more transactions, a person so employed and assigned or who would have been so employed and assigned immediately before any of those transactions. [(4) Subject to regulation 9, any purported variation of a contract of employment that is, or will be, transferred by paragraph (1), is void if the sole or principal reason for the variation is the transfer. (5) Paragraph (4) does not prevent a variation of the contract of employment if— (a) the sole or principal reason for the variation is an economic, technical, or organisational reason entailing changes in the workforce, provided that the employer and employee agree that variation; or (b) the terms of that contract permit the employer to make such a variation. (5A) In paragraph (5), the expression “changes in the workforce” includes a change to the place where employees are employed by the employer to carry on the business of the employer or to carry out work of a particular kind for the employer (and the reference to such a place has the same meaning as in section 139 of the 1996 Act). (5B) Paragraph (4) does not apply in respect of a variation of the contract of employment in so far as it varies a term or condition incorporated from a collective agreement, provided that— (a) the variation of the contract takes effect on a date more than one year after the date of the transfer; and (b) following that variation, the rights and obligations in the employee's contract, when considered together, are no less favourable to the employee than those which applied immediately before the variation. (5C) Paragraphs (5) and (5B) do not affect any rule of law as to whether a contract of employment is effectively varied.] (6) Paragraph (2) shall not transfer or otherwise affect the liability of any person to be prosecuted for, convicted of and sentenced for any offence. (7) Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not operate to transfer the contract of employment and the rights, powers, duties and liabilities under or in connection with it of an employee who informs the transferor or the transferee that he objects to becoming employed by the transferee. (8) Subject to paragraphs (9) and (11), where an employee so objects, the relevant transfer shall operate so as to terminate his contract of employment with the transferor but he shall not be treated, for any purpose, as having been dismissed by the transferor.

(9) Subject to regulation 9, where a relevant transfer involves or would involve a substantial change in working conditions to the material detriment of a person whose contract of employment is or would be transferred under paragraph (1), such an employee may treat the contract of employment as having been terminated, and the employee shall be treated for any purpose as having been dismissed by the employer.

(10) No damages shall be payable by an employer as a result of a dismissal falling within paragraph (9) in respect of any failure by the employer to pay wages to an employee in respect of a notice period which the employee has failed to work.

(11) Paragraphs (1), (7), (8) and (9) are without prejudice to any right of an employee arising apart from these Regulations to terminate his contract of employment without notice in acceptance of a repudiatory breach of contract by his employer. Agreed facts 1. The claimant did not have a written contact of employment with Mr J Charalambous. She had a verbal agreement with him and began working for him from the 1/6/19 as a hairdresser. She worked approximately 24 hours a week, Monday to Friday every week and some Saturdays. She / Miss S Correia (the other employed hairdresser) would go home early if the salon was not busy. She was paid for the hours she worked at the minimum wage. 2. R2 sent payslips by e mail on behalf of Mr J Charalambous throughout this time as R2 assisted him with administration matters, as he was not computer literate. Payment was either cash from the till or from Mr J Charalambous’s bank account. The claimant took approximately 10 days holiday a year. The claimant worked for Mr J Charalambous up to the date of his death. 3. Mr Jack Charalambous died on the 16/3/23. 4.A meeting took place on the 21/4/23 at the salon, claimant, R1, R2, Miss S Correia and Miss M Leaney (R1 sister and beneficiary of estate) were in attendance. Mr M Dean (R2 fiancée also in attendance). 5. The claimant continued working in the salon during the period 17/3/23 - 27/11/23. She received payslips which contained Mr J Charalambous details as before and was paid in cash from the till by R2. 6.R2’s partner Mr M Dean was present in the salon assisting R2 from April 2023 whilst on sabbatical from work.

Law

[7]In June / July 2023 Miss S Correia left her role of hairdresser, as she had secured an alternative role. Mr L Hamblin began working in the salon as a hairdresser, he was paid in cash from the till by R2.

[8]On the 6/9/23 there was a break in in the salon and R2 organised for the glass to be replaced.

[9]Between June / July 2023 and December 2023, the claimant and Mr L Hamblin agreed to go on holiday to Las Vegas with R2 and her partner Mr M Dean, for Christmas in December 2023. It was agreed that R2 would deduct £50.00 per month each from the claimant and Mr Hamblin's cash wages to pay for this trip.

[10]On the 29/11/23 the claimants 12-year-old daughter went missing. The claimant telephoned R2 and spoke to R2’s partner Mr M Dean on the 29/11/23 and 30/11/23 advising she could not come to work.

[11]R2 signs deed of surrender in respect of upstairs premises on the 4/12/23.

[12]Sometime during December 2023, the claimant attends the workplace with her friend Miss S Ullah.

[13]Claimant sends an e mail on 23/1/24 to R2 with a sick note requesting SSP.

[14]R2 ceases trading and vacates the premises sometime in February / March 2024. Disputed facts 1. Did a meeting take place at the salon on the 17/3/23, claimant, R1, R2, and other staff member Miss S Correia being present? 2.Was the claimant advised by R1 at the meeting on the 17/3/23 that redundancy was an option? Did R1 offer the claimant the opportunity to continue working for the personal representatives? Did R2 offer to take over the running of the business? 3. At the meeting on the 21/4/23, did R1 ask R2 to undertake the role of caretaker manager of the salon on behalf of the estate? Or did R2 offer to takeover and run the salon as her own business and propose a weekly contract? 4. Sometime between April – June 2023 did R2 display business cards in the salon with her business and the salon recorded jointly? Were previous business cards issued for the salon only? 5. In June / July 2023, did R2 employ Mr L Hamblin to work in the salon? 6. Did R2 advise R1 that Mr L Hamblin was now working at the salon? 7.To what extent was Mr M Dean involved in the day to day running of the salon and for what period? Was he present every day? Did he answer the phones and make bookings? Did he take cash and card payments? Was a separate laptop and sum up card payment machine used? Were the claimant and Mr L Hamblin able to take cash and card payments? 8. Were the deductions made to the claimant's salary between June – December 2023 by R2 for the Las Vegas trip made in a personal capacity or as the claimant's employer? 9. Was the claimant at work on the 28/11/23? 10. Did R2 visit the claimant's property on the 28/11/23? Did the claimant resign verbally to R2 and hand back her keys for the salon? 11.Did R2 advise R1 that the claimant had resigned after 28/11/23? 12. Alternatively, did the claimant verbally resign to R2 and were the keys anded back on the 2/12/23 by the claimant when R2 visited the claimant's property? 13. When the claimant attended the salon with her friend Miss Ullah, sometime in December 2023, did she ask R2 if she could have any pay? Did she ask R2 for a refund of her payments for the Las Vegas trip as she was unable to go due to difficulties with her daughter? Did the claimant ask R2 for time to deal with her daughter's issues? Did R2 agree to allow time? Evidence heard and considered / findings of fact Was a meeting held on the 17/3/23 and what was discussed 6. R1 and R2 were both consistent with each other in their evidence to the tribunal, that a meeting was held on the 17/3/23, the day after Mr J Charalambous death. The claimant was unable to recall if a meeting took place. On balance, I accept that a meeting took place that day. 7. Respondent 1 described R2 advising him at this meeting of a rent-free arrangement with his father for her beauty salon, in return for helping him with administrative tasks. He stated that R2 offered to run the business at this meeting. He and his sister made it clear they could not run the business, and it would have to cease trading. In evidence, he confirmed he explained redundancy to both staff members, and they both stated they wanted to carry on working. R1 described making it clear to both members of staff that they would not be working for the estate / him or his sister, and arrangements would need to be made by R2 to reflect that she was running the business. 8. R2 in her letter dated 22/1/26 exhibit 32 confirms a meeting was held that day, with both staff members being advised about the redundancy situation, given the option to take redundancy, and both expressing that they wished to continue working. 9. I accept that both staff members were offered redundancy on the 17/3/23, both R1 and R2 corroborate each other’s evidence that this was offered by R1, and both have been consistent in their oral evidence and written statements on this point. I accept both R1 and R2 accounts that the 2 staff members, including the claimant, expressed a wish to continue working. Considering R1’s evidence, I find he did not offer either employee the option to continue working for the personal representatives at this meeting. I accept a generic conversation took place between R1 and R2 about the running the business at this meeting, and R2 offered to run the business. Meeting 21/4/23 10. The claimant stated in evidence she took from this meeting that R2 could not continue her business if the salon premises downstairs did not remain open, as she would not have any footfall, and she wanted to continue her beauty business. She states redundancy was not discussed, but she wanted to continue working anyway as she had children to provide for. She states she was asked if she was happy to work with Janet in charge. There was no discussion about salary or holiday pay. She said she was happy to work for Janet. Under cross examination from R2 the claimant did not recall a staff vote and stated she understood R2 was not a caretaker / manager but had a contract for the upstairs premises and needed the downstairs business to carry on. 11. R1’s account of the meeting in his statement was that R2 offered to run the salon on a week-to-week basis whilst probate was obtained, and he understood this to be under R2 taking on the business as a new owner, including managing the staff. R1 denies asking R2 to run the salon as an employee of the estate or as a manager accountable to the estate. In evidence, in answer to my questions, R1 stated that he and his sister wanted to sell the salon, and R2 expressed an interest in buying it. The estate had requested R2 to provide a copy of the lease agreement for the top floor, and a contract setting out the arrangements she proposed for the salon. A vote did not take place appointing R2 as caretaker manager, and R1 did not ask R2 to undertake this role. 12. R2 in her statement and evidence refers to a vote at the meeting by staff, who voted for her to take a caretaker role. She states that R1 informed staff there was no holiday pay, and staff would only be paid for hours they worked; they were to report to R2 daily. R2 when cross examined by R1 conceded that R1 did say during the meeting that the estate could not run the salon. R2’s fiancée Mr M Dean was also at this meeting. R2 states in her evidence that she never offered to run the salon as her own business or take over responsibility for the staff. R2 confirmed during my questions that R1 had stated Mr J Charalambous wanted her to buy the premises. 13. On the balance of probabilities, I consider it more likely than not that R2 offered to continue running the business herself during this meeting. This accords with her offering to run the business at the 17/3/23 meeting, as I have found in paragraph 9 above. The claimant and R1 are consistent on the point that a vote amongst the staff did not take place, nominating R2 as caretaker manager. I note that whilst the vote is referred to in exhibit 32, e mail dated 22/1/26, put forward by R2, it is not referred to in her written statement dated 28/2/26, but was mentioned in her oral evidence, which demonstrates a degree of inconsistency. I do not find a vote took place. I do not accept that R1 asked R2 to act in a manager's capacity in respect of the salon. In reaching this conclusion I consider it would have been difficult for R2 to continue her business upstairs if the salon was shut downstairs. In my view it is likely R2 made a proposal to take over the salon to ensure her own business could remain afloat. 14. R2 did accept when I asked her questions that she and her partner were going to consider the viability of the business; her partner may loan her the money to purchase the premises in due course. I consider this would be a legitimate basis on which R2 would be prepared to operate the business in her own right, so she was able to run the business and form a view on its viability. This would also account for the presence of Mr M Dean at the meeting, and accords with R1’s account that R2 expressed an interest in buying the premises. This is supported by subsequent What's App messages from Miss M Leaney 10/8/23, page 76 regarding status of staff and R2’s absent contract. I note there is no evidence in the bundle of a contract being provided by R2 to R1 setting out arrangements, and Miss M Leaney’s e mail dated 14/8/23 at page 150 refers to a lack of communication from R2 in that regard. I accept R1’s consistent oral and written evidence that the estate did not receive any profit or was responsible for any losses after 16/3/23. I did not consider it significant that R1’s solicitors referred to R2 as the deceased’s manager, for the limited purposes of an insurance claim for a broken window in November 2023 at page 307, I viewed this as a one-off event. Operation of the salon from 17/3/23 onwards

[15]The claimant’s evidence to the tribunal was that she worked consistently for the period 17/3/23 - 27/11/23 and was paid cash weekly out of the till by R2 or her partner. She maintained approximately the same number of hours per week, and her wage slips for example for 27/10/23, reflecting the period of work 28/9/23 - 27/10/23, showing 70 hours worked that month and a salary received of £729.40. Other pay slips show the same salary received, for example, on the 27/5/23, for the period 28/4/23 - 27/5/23. R2 sent her salary slips by e mail to her monthly. No discussion took place regarding her hours; she worked the same way she had always worked. If she needed a day off, she would ask R2, R1 attended the salon to collect mail a few times only in this period. R2 worked out what hours she was due to be paid and let her go if she was not needed. She attended at 9.30am every day and awaited her instructions.

[16]She described when Mr L Hamblin joined, he was there every day near enough. R2’s partner was present soon after the April meeting. He was in the salon most days, was opening up, dealing with the stock, answering the phone, making bookings, taking cash and card payments. He brought his own laptop and sum up card payment machine. Prior to this the claimant and Miss S Correia answered the phone took bookings and payments, but not after Mr M Dean arrived.

[17]The claimant, when cross examined by R2 stated she had always gone to the printers for Mr J Charalambous to obtain his printed business cards, which contained the salon details only. After the April meeting, she stated new cards appeared in the salon, which contained the details of both the hairdressing salon and beauty salon businesses. Whilst there had been flyers before with both business details recorded, this was the first time she had seen a joint business card.

[18]R1 in his evidence referred to seeing the joint business cards in the salon in May / June 2023 and taking photos which appear in the bundle at page 174. He stated he drove past the salon a number of times during this period and saw Mr M Dean sitting in the salon. Whilst the estate awaited a contract from R2 setting out the terms of the arrangements, weekly / fortnightly updates were provided by R2 to R1. Miss M Leaney chased the agreement/contract. There was an admission by R2 that she did not have a rent-free agreement with the late Mr J Charalambous regarding the beauty salon, and the chasing of R2 by R1’s solicitor to produce a copy of the lease, which was produced in July 2023. R1 stated he did not know Mr L Hamblin had been taken on as a hairdresser until he attended the premises one day and met him, on the 9/6/23.

[19]R2 stated she did not order new stock for the salon, or employ Mr L Hamblin. He came into help from June 2023 onwards when Miss S Correria left and he was paid cash out of the till for hours worked; in the same way the claimant was. Mr L Hamblin was a friend of a friend who stopped by and asked for temporary work; she had rung the estate solicitors to advise Miss S Correia was leaving and a new hairdresser was needed. Utility bills had to be changed into R2’s name, as R1 was not available to organise this, they were transferred back into R1’s name in March 2024. The business cards always had both names on the cards. In cross examination by R1 R2 accepted she was not paid a salary as a manager and did deal with payroll. R2 was asked about page 173 in the bundle, and an entry in the salon notebook for cash £60 and card payment £179 for the same customer. R1 suggested that the notebook contained all the salon bookings. R2 stated that card payments were not taken, and she did not know who’s writing the entry was in the notebook.

[20]R1 referred R2 to a What's App message from Miss M Leaney dated 8/6/23 concerning Mr L Hamblin, in which R2 responds ‘he is employed on a weekly basis, paid by the number of hours he works i.e. no sick pay, and employed by myself’. When I asked R2 about this message, she stated it was a flippant remark, and she had not employed him at that time. In respect of a subsequent What’s App message from Miss M Leaney dated 11/8/23 ‘please send the e mail confirming both employees are under your company like you said you were going to’, R2 stated she was under pressure to take responsibility for the staff from the estate.

[21]The claimant cross examined R2 about the use of card machines in the salon, and R2 advised the salon took mainly cash; she could not remember if her partner was using a different laptop or a sum up card payment machine. She disagreed that the claimant and Mr L Hamblin were not allowed to sit at the desk. Business cards

[22]I find that that R2 was displaying joint business cards in the salon from April 2023 onwards and accept the claimant's account in respect of this. It is corroborated by the photos in the bundle at page 174, and R1’s evidence he saw the joint business cards in the premises in May / June 2023. The claimant gave candid evidence to the tribunal, that previously she went to the printers to obtain business cards for the late Mr J Charalambous, and they only ever referred to his business, which I accept. I have no reason to doubt this evidence and anticipate the claimant would have had good reason to notice this change, in view of her previous involvement in getting the business cards printed. Mr L Hamblin

[23]I conclude that Mr L Hamblin was employed by R2 in the salon, by R2 in her own capacity. She accepted he called in the salon to enquire about work, and her What's App message to Miss M Leaney, dated 8/6/23, supports that, she had agreed a weekly contract with him, he was to be paid by the number of hours worked and was ‘employed by myself’. I reject R2’s account that she was being flippant in her use of language on the message. This is a message sent contemporaneous to the recruitment of Mr L Hamblin, reflecting the intentions of R2 at this time, June 2023.

[24]I note Miss M Leaney's What's App message of the 11/8/23, asking for clarification that both employees were employed by R2 under her company. I conclude R2 did let R1 know about the recruitment of an additional staff member, sometime between 9/6/23 and August 2023. R1 met Mr L Hamblin at the premises on the 9/6/23, so was aware at this point. The message on the 11/8/23 is some 2 months after Mr L Hamblin started employment, indicating R1 was aware. I have noted an e mail in the bundle from Miss Leaney dated 14/8/23, page 150 referring to a ‘lack of communication from Janet’. Mr M Dean’s involvement in the salon

[25]I accept R2’s evidence, that Mr Dean took a sabbatical from work and was present in the salon helping R2 for at least the period April – September 2023. R2 accepted he took phone calls from the claimant in the salon on the 29 and 30th November 2023 also, which indicate he was present after September 2023. In my view, this indicates a serious intention on behalf of R2 and her partner to run the business and determine if it was profitable enough to enable them to consider buying the premises.

[26]I found the claimant evidence on this point straightforward. There was a change in how the salon was operated, and she and her colleague no longer took phone calls and card payments. It would be consistent with R2 running the business and her attempts to establish the profitability of the business if R2 / her partner used their own laptop / card machine, and I accept that this was the position. R2’s evidence that she did not recognise the handwriting at page 173 of the bundle; a handwritten entry into the salon notebook was odd. Presumably the only individuals handwriting it could have been were hers, her partners, the claimants or Mr L Hamblin’s. On the basis she was operating the salon as a business, it is surprising she could not recognise whose writing it was.

[27]I accept R2’s account that the salon took mainly cash and find the entry at page 173 corroborates the claimants account that card payments were being taken by Mr M Dean on the sum up machine.

[28]I find Mr M Dean was undertaking an extensive role in the salon from April 2023 onwards on R2’s behalf, opening the salon, answering the phone, making bookings, taking cash and card payments, ordering stock. The claimant and Mr L Hamblin were not taking phone calls or taking cash or card payments. I accept the claimant's evidence he was present daily, and R1’s account he drove past the salon numerous times and saw Mr Dean sat in the salon. I reject R2’s assertion in oral evidence that Mr Dean was not present every day. I note R2 ‘s witness statement dated 28/2/26 did not refer to Mr Dean being present at the premises or involved in its running, which is surprising. I reject R2’s assertion that she asked Mr Dean to come in and keep an eye on the till, because money was going missing. This was raised in oral evidence for the first time and was not referred to in R2’s statement dated 28/2/26. R2 stated when I asked her in evidence why this was not included in her statement; it was because she did not think about it, which I found unconvincing. If R2 was acting in a manager's capacity, this would have been something I would have anticipated the estate would need to deal with, not R2 herself. Deductions for Las Vegas trip

[29]The deductions being made by R2 from the claimant’s cash paid salary were not reflected on the claimant's salary slips being provided by R2. R2 accepted that she did not keep any records in relation to this in terms of what the claimant had paid her and asserts this was an action taken in a personal capacity. I accept, considering the pay slips provided and oral evidence, that this was a private arrangement between the claimant and R2. In my view, this action is supportive of the existence of an employer / employee relationship between R2 and the claimant. If R2 had been acting in the capacity of manager, I would have expected this to be referred to R1, if they were the employer. There is no evidence of this in the bundle. Events on the 28/11/23 and 2/12/23

[30]The claimant account was she was at work on the 28/11/23, R2 and her partner did not attend her home that evening, and she did not verbally resign or hand back her keys to them. She points out the missing child report at page 63 of the bundle, indicating that her daughter went missing on the 29/11/23. She stated R2 and Mr M Dean collected the keys just before the 25/12/23, saying they needed the keys so Mr L Hamblin could access the premises. I have noted at page 67 the claimant's wage slip for 28/10/23 - 27/11/23, which indicates the claimant worked 70 hours that month up until 27/11/23. 31.R2 in her e mail dated 19/11/24, page 97, refers to ‘Miss Harris last day of employment was 28th November 2023, a P45 was issued in The Barber Stores name reflecting the last day of work as that date’. R2’s statement dated 28/2/26 stated ‘I attended the claimant’s home address 28/11/23 to deliver her wages’. When answering questions in cross examination, R2 stated she had attended the claimant's home address on the 28/11/23 with her partner. In evidence R2 stated a p45 was not generated; she rang the solicitors to advise of the claimant’s resignation but did not put anything in writing to the solicitors / R1. When I asked R2 why she had stated in her e mail 19/11/24 that she had issued a P45, and was now accepting in evidence she didn't, she stated she did not know why.

[32]In R2’s e mail dated 19/11/24, R2 also stated ‘she returned the keys to the premises on 2/12/23 when I attended her home address... her words to me were I won’t be coming back to work for the foreseeable future as I have some family issue to deal with’. R2 did not refer to the handing back of keys / resignation on the 2/12/23 in her written statement dated 28/2/26. I asked R2 in evidence which date was correct. Could the claimant have resigned on the 2/12/23 instead on the 28/11/23? R2 replied that the claimant could have resigned on 2/12/23.

[33]R1 corroborates the claimant's account she did not resign, in his statement at page 285 he explains the claimant has contacted him saying she had to take some time off due to problems with her daughter. He states the claimant did not mention in their 2 telephone calls that she had resigned, and he only became aware the claimant was said to have resigned after reading one of R2’s statements in these proceedings.

[34]I find that the claimant worked at the salon on the 28/11/23. I accept difficulties arose with the claimant’s daughter going missing on the 29/11/23, as evidenced at page 63 of the bundle. R2 concedes that the claimant worked this day, by the references she made in her 19/11/24 e mail to the 28/11/23 as her last day of employment. R2 has given an inconsistent account regarding visiting the claimant's property on the 28/11/23. Her statement did not refer to her partner being present. The e mail dated 19/11/24 states the keys were handed back and the visit to the claimant took place on the 2/12/23. R2 has previously accepted the claimant telephoned her partner on the 29/11/23 and 30/11/23 advising about her daughter. Why would the claimant be doing this if she had resigned on the 28/11/23?

[35]On the basis the claimant worked up to the 28/11/23, there would be no reason for her to resign that day; the difficulties in relation to her daughter going missing arose the next day. I do not accept R2’s account that she attended the claimant's property, or that the claimant resigned / handed her keys back on the 28/11/23; this is supported by R2’s evidence regarding telephone calls made. I do not accept R2’s alternative account that the claimant may have resigned on 2/12/23. R2 accepted the claimant telephoned her partner on the 29/11/23 and 30/11/23, which do not form a background of a person's behaviour who is intent on resigning. I find R2’s evidence inconsistent regarding resignation on the 2/12/23, and do not accept the claimant resigned / handed her keys back on this date either. R2’s conflicting evidence concerning the issuing of a P45 does not support her contention the claimant resigned.

[36]R1 cross examined R2 as to whether R2 had advised the estate the claimant had resigned. R2 replied that the estate were very hands off, and she had made a couple of phone calls to the solicitor concerning it. She accepted there were no e mails confirming the claimants resignation. I have not been provided with any evidence R2 notified R1 of the resignation in writing. I find this surprising, given R2’s assertions that she was acting in a manager’s capacity only. I find this adds weight to my previous findings that the R2 was running the salon as her own business. Claimant’s visit to salon December 2023

[37]The claimant stated in her statement that she attended the workplace with her friend and asked for time off whilst her daughter was found and was told this would be ok by R2 and Mr Dean. She stated in evidence she asked them on that date do I get any pay and was told no. R2 in her statement dated 28/2/26 stated the claimant did not return to the salon in person or contact the business. When I asked R2 if the claimant had attended the premises in December 2023, R2 said she remembered the claimant attending with her friend was tearful, R2 asked her about her daughter but there was no discussion about work. R2 stated she could not remember the claimant saying she needed time off, and she had no authority to organise holiday / other pay.

[38]It is not clear what date the claimant attended the salon in December 2023. However, given that she had telephoned on at least the 29/11/23 and 30/11/23 explaining her positions, and sent e mails on the 20/12/23, 23/12/23, 27/12/23, it seems highly unlikely she did not attend the salon to discuss her work position as R2 suggests. I accept the claimant’s account that she attended and was told it was ok to have time off work and asked for holiday pay / other pay which was refused. As the claimant appears to have been in receipt of no monies at that time, it is also credible that the claimant asked R2 to refund her monies for the Las Vegas trip, as she would have been unable to attend due to difficulties with her daughter. Deed of surrender 4/12/23

[39]At page 179, R2 signed a deed of surrender on the 4/12/23 relating to the upstairs premises at the salon. Whilst this document deals with the surrender of the upstairs premises from the 29/2/24, it also includes an agreement for R2 to be assigned the salon for the period April 2023 – April 2024. This included being responsible for any outgoings, retaining profits and being responsible for losses, and ‘all payments due to any employees including redundancy payments in particular to Yasmin’. Under cross examination from R1, R2 accepted she had taken advice from someone who knew about deeds of surrender, but not from Streeter Marshall Solicitors who witnessed the document.

[40]It is apparent that prior to the deed being signed; documents in the bundle show that negotiations were taking place between R1 and R2 regarding the lease on the upstairs premises, page 148. At page 142 there is correspondence between the parties, showing R2 offered as part of those discussions to include terms that she would deal with any staff redundancy packages on the downstairs premises, when taking it over on a short-term basis. In discussions concerning the terms of the deed, R2 refers in correspondence dated 20/10/23, to ‘taking on existing staff member Yasmin and dealing with any redundancy’. R1 cross examined R2 concerning this, R2 stated she accepted the correspondence, but did not remember writing this; R1’s solicitor had asked for this to be included and was asking her to sign it, she was not aware it was there. I do not accept R2’s assertion that she was unaware of this term. There are contemporaneous documents in the bundle which show that the term regarding Yasmin was suggested by R2. In my view this shows evidence of the claimant's intention to run the downstairs business and assume responsibility for the staff. The e mail at page 97 dated 19/11/24 supports this, R2 stating that she would have been required to issue the claimant with a new contract as she was effectively her employer from the 4/12/24. Conclusions on employment status

[41]I concluded as per point 1 of the agreed facts above, that the claimant had an oral contract of employment, with the late Mr J Charalambous as an individual, until he died on the 16/3/23. In accordance with common law, the death resulted in the dissolution of the contract.

[42]In accordance with my findings in paragraph 9 above, I found that R1 did not offer the claimant the option to continue working for the personal representatives after the death of Mr J Charalambous.

[43]I refer to my findings in paragraphs 13 and 14 above, when I conclude that R2 offered to run the salon business herself, from the 17/3/23.Whilst the week-toweek contract proposed by R2 never materialised, I find that the claimant started to work for R2 on the same basis as the oral contract previously agreed with her former employer.

[44]I have considered the tests in Ready Mix Concrete and Minister of Pensions and National Insurance. Did the worker agree to provide her own work and skill in return for remuneration?

[45]The claimant agreed on the 17/3/23 to continue working (agreed facts 5) (findings at paragraph 9) in return for her salary; 24 hours worked per week at the minimum wage. I find the pay slips in the bundle corroborative of the claimant's evidence that she worked consistently for the period 17/3/23 - 27/11/23, for R2. I am satisfied that this is evidence of the wage / work bargain. Did the worker agree expressly or impliedly to be subject to a sufficient degree of control for the relationship to be one of employer / employee?

[46]I accept the claimant's evidence as summarised in paragraph 15 above. A discussion about hours did not take place; she worked as she had before, attending the salon at 9.30am every day and awaiting her instructions. If she needed days off she would ask R2, and R2 would let her go home early if she was not needed. My conclusions at paragraph 23 regarding Mr Hamblin and R2’s text messages to Miss Leaney dated 8/6/23, support the existence of an employment contract with the newly recruited member of staff, who joined the claimant. I find the claimant impliedly agreed to be subject to a sufficient degree of control to evidence an employment relationship. The other provisions of the contract are consistent with it being an employment contract

[47]The claimant was providing work personally; there is no evidence she was able to substitute another worker in her place. The claimant received monthly pay slips and was paid monthly cash out of the till.

[48]I have also considered other evidence in the bundle in respect of the claimant's employment status. R2 conceded in her e mail dated 19/11/24 at page 97 in the bundle, that she would have been responsible for the claimant as an employer if she had come back to work on the 4/12/23, as she would have been issued with a new contract and terms. The reference to issuing a P45 (the claimant in evidence then said she did not issue it), is in my view, indicative of R2 assuming the responsibilities of an employer, and treating the claimant as an employee. I also refer to the What's App messages between R2 and Miss Leaney in June 2023, indicative of an employment relationship with Mr Hamblin ‘employed by myself’. It is apparent from Miss Leaney's message on the 11/8/23, that she has been requesting R2 provide confirmation both employees are working for R2, for some time.

[49]The deed of surrender signed on 4/12/24 supports my conclusion that R2 had assumed the role of employer in respect of the claimant. I rely on my findings in paragraph 39/40 above. I note the terms of the deed and the assuming of responsibility for the salon between April 2023 – April 2024 by R2. Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations (2006)

[50]I have made a finding that the claimant physically worked continuously in the salon for the period 17/3/23 - 28/11/23. Her pay slip for the period 28/2/23 - 27/3/23 corroborates the claimant's oral evidence, that she continued working in the salon from the 17/3/23, the day after Mr J Charalambous died. She received a salary of £729.51 on the 27/3/23 based on 76.79 hours of work for that month, similar to other wage slips in the bundle, supporting the fact that she worked between the 17/3/23 and 27/3/23. The claimant did not have any gap in her working pattern after the 16/3/23 and was paid cash out of the till by R2.

[51]I have considered whether there is a ‘relevant transfer’ for the purposes of the regulations. I refer to paragraph 9 and my finding that the R1 did not offer the claimant or other employee Miss S Correia the option of working for the personal representatives. I made a finding that R2 on the 17/3/23, and on the 21/4/23 offered to run business. R1 did not run the business, take any profit or have responsibility for staff after Mr J Charalambous died. I have considered regulation 3 (1) (a), and whether there was a transfer of an economic entity which retains its identify post transfer. I note regulation 3 (6) (b) that there can still be a transfer whether or not any property is transferred. There does not need to be a direct contractual relationship between a transferor and transferee. I consider in these circumstances that Mr J Charalambous’s business was a stable economic entity, and he was the transferor. The business was transferred in a recognisable form; it continued to operate as a hair salon, in the same premises, using the same equipment and stock, with 2 employed hairdressers, and was not subject to any period of suspension. The transfer was not an excluded transfer. I consider this transfer occurred on the 17/3/23, the business continued to trade under a new employer, R2, the transferee.

[52]In these circumstances, regulation 4 (2) applies, and the transferee acquires the rights and responsibilities for the employee that the transferor held, including, for example, continuity of employment. In relation to the claimant, this equates to her service with Mr J Charalambous being preserved, from her start date of the 1/6/19. Time period 28/11/23 - 10/3/24

[53]I refer to my previous findings that the claimant physically attended work for the period 17/3/23 - 28/11/23 whilst employed by R2. The claimant contacted R2 on the 29/11/23 and 30/11/23 by telephone, with a request for time off. She attended the salon in December 2023 with her friend requesting time off which was agreed, and a request for holiday pay, salary and the return of the monies deducted for the Las Vegas trip, which was refused. Subsequent e mails sent by the claimant to R2 on the 20/12/23, 23/12/23 and 27/12/23 requesting pay / assistance were according to R2’s account, forwarded onto R1’s solicitors. R2 maintained in her evidence it was not for her to resolve as the manager. The claimant’s e mail dated 20/12/23 asked for 2 weeks holiday pay, confirming she had not taken any holiday since Mr J Charalambous died, and the e mail 27/12/23 stated she was unable to work at the moment. Her subsequent e mail dated 23/1/24, included a sick note issued on the 16/1/24 for the period 28/11/23 - 13/2/24, stating the claimant was unfit for work due to a stress related problem and depression.

[54]I have made findings at paragraphs 41-49 concerning the claimant's employment status. From the 17/3/23, I have found that R2 was responsible for the claimant as her employee. I accept the claimant's oral evidence, and e mail evidence on the 20/12/23 that she had not taken any leave whilst working for R2. I accept her oral evidence that she did not resign at any point in December 2023, January or February 2024. R2 was not entitled as her employer to simply ignore the claimant's numerous attempts to contact her by phone, e mail and by attending the salon, requesting salary/ holiday pay etc. The claimant has produced medical evidence, in the form of sick notes which cover her absence from work from the 28/11/23, until 13/2/24. I have not heard any evidence or been presented with any evidence that the claimant resigned or was formally dismissed in the period December 2023 to February 2024. She did not go back to work after the 28/11/23. Accordingly, I find she remained employed by R2 under the terms of an oral agreement as per my findings at paragraph 43, until the business ceased trading.

[55]R1’s evidence was that the premises were empty from February 2024 onwards. The claimant’s account corroborates this to some extent; she stated that no one had told her the business had folded in February 2024. I take account of the fact that the claimant had produced medical evidence some two weeks prior to the closure, on the 16/1/24, still believing herself to be employed. R2 had not responded to this. R2’s statement refers to the salon operating until the 10/3/24. I accept R1’s account that the premises were empty from February 2024 and find that R2 had closed the business on the 1/2/24. The claimant issued her ET1 form on the 19/2/24, on the basis the business had ceased trading, this supports R1’s account the premises were empty from February onwards. I accept that the keys to the premises and formal handover did not take place until the 10/3/24. The permanent closure of the employee's workplace is treated at common law as terminating the employees' contract of employment; Glenboig Union Fireclay Co Limited v Stewart 1971 ITR 14, Court Session. I find that the claimant was employed by R2 for the period 17/3/23 - 1/2/24, and her employment ended when R2 ceased trading. Conclusions on unfair dismissal

[56]In respect of R1, the death of an individual employer dissolves the employment contract, the death is not treated as a dismissal apart from under section 136 (5) ERA (1996), as discussed below, in relation to statutory redundancy claims. A claimant is only entitled to pursue Employment Tribunal proceedings against executors where the claim(s) were outstanding at the time of death. On the facts I have found the claimant was working up to the date of death for Mr J Charalambous, and therefore on the basis there is no dismissal, cannot pursue an unfair dismissal claim against R1.

[57]In respect of R2, I have made findings the claimant was employed by R2 from the 17/3/23, until the business ceased trading on the 1/2/24. My findings above in relation to TUPE add the claimants service with Mr J Charalambous to this, from the 1/6/19. The claimant has lodged a complaint of unfair dismissal within 3 months of the effective date of termination, 1/2/23, in accordance with section 111 (2) (a) ERA (1996) .The claimant would have the required 2 years' service to pursue an unfair dismissal claim against R2, under section 108 Employment Rights Act (1996). The claimant has been dismissed without notice by R2, by the closure of the business on the 1/2/24, which accords with the definition of dismissal in section 95 (1) (a) ERA (1996). R2 would be required in these circumstances to show on the balance of probabilities, that a potentially fair reason for dismissal exists. On the basis that R2 has not provided any evidence in respect of this, R2 has failed to discharge the burden of proof and the claimant's dismissal is unfair. (For the assistance of the parties, section 119 (2) (a) ERA (1996) sets out 1 and ½ weeks' pay for each year of employment under which the employee was not under 41 years of age – basic award for 4 years from 1/2/20 - 1/2/24) (section 123 ERA (1996) sets out just and equitable grounds for compensatory award) Conclusions on redundancy Redundancy arising from death of Mr J Charalambous

[58]The death of Mr J Charalambous terminated the claimant's oral contract of employment at common law. I have found at paragraph 9 that the claimant was offered redundancy, but expressed a wish to carry on working, and that R1 did not offer the claimant the opportunity to continue working for the personal representatives of the estate.

[59]Section 136 (5) ERA (1996) provides that the death of the employer is to be treated as a dismissal of his employee for the purposes of the statutory redundancy scheme. On the facts I have found that R1 did not offer the claimant the opportunity to continue working for the personal representatives; the claimant is able to claim a redundancy payment from the deceased employer's estate. The claimant would be entitled to make a claim as it was agreed she worked for Mr J Charalambous since 1/6/19, therefore having at least the minimum 2 years' service as required by section 155 ERA (1996). In accordance with section 145 (2) (b) ERA (1996), the relevant date of dismissal would be the date of death, 16/3/23, the date the termination takes effect, as the circumstances would be treated as a dismissal without notice.

[60]The claimant submitted her ET1 on the 19/2/24. Section 164(1) ERA (1996) requires a claim for a redundancy payment to be submitted to the tribunal within 6 months of the relevant date, which in this case was the date of death, 16/3/23. Therefore, the claimant should have submitted her claim by the 15/9/23. The claim was clearly not submitted within the primary time limit, as it was submitted on the 19/2/24. Section 164

(2) ERA (1996) allows a claimant to submit a claim within an extended period of a further 6 months from the end of the period allowed in sub section 1, if it appears to the tribunal just and equitable that the employee should receive a redundancy payment. This gives a claimant a 12- month period in which to make a claim from the relevant date. The relevant date in this case is 16/3/23. The claim is within the 12-month period outlined in subsection (2), as it was made on the 19/2/24, subject to the just and equitable criteria.

[61]I invited the parties to address me on the just and equitable grounds during their evidence. The claimant asked me to consider the just and equitable grounds and allow her claim to proceed. She described the level of stress she was under in November / December 2023 with her daughter, involvement of police, social workers, and that she was really struggling. She was and is a single parent trying her best. She tried to seek advice from the CAB, in January 2024, after she had e mailed R2, and she wasn't offered much support. She did not know that there was a time limit; she stated she was a hairdresser and not knowledgeable about such matters.

[62]R1 opposed the application to extend timescales on just and equitable grounds. Whilst R1 stated he understood the claimant's reasons for the delay, he did not understand why she did not contact him advising she was seeking a redundancy payment. He described finding the copy of the claim at a late stage in the post at his dad's salon. R1 ‘s position was that the claimant could have and should have made the claim for the redundancy payment at a much earlier stage.

[63]R2 opposed the application to extend timescales. R2 relied on the fact that the claimant was made aware of the redundancy option in March 2023 and indicated she did not want to pursue this. She has continued working since March 2023 and should have made her claim earlier.

[64]The onus is on the claimant to convince the tribunal it is just and equitable to extend the time limit. I am required to consider guidance in British Coal Corporation v Keeble and Ors

1997 IRLR 336

EAT. Factors to consider include the prejudice to each party of the decision reached, all the circumstances of the case, length of the delay and reasons for it, promptness of claimant's actions when they aware of possibility of claim, efforts taken to obtain appropriate advice.

[65]The claimant has not presented any reasons for the delay in not presenting her claim within the 6 months primary time limit, between the 16/3/23 and the 15/9/23. Whilst I appreciate the difficulties she had with her daughter in November / December 2023, I have not been advised of any difficulties during the March – September 2023 period. Based on my findings, at paragraph 9, that she was offered redundancy in March 2023 by R1, in my view it would have been incumbent on the claimant to seek advice on this at this time, it having been brought to her attention by R1.

[66]The claimant states she was not aware of the time limits, not that she was not aware of her rights to bring a claim, and I consider it was not reasonable for her to remain ignorant on this point, and not seek further advice throughout the primary time limit period. She approached the CAB some months later in January 2024, I consider she could have obtained advice at a much earlier point in 2023.

[67]I consider the potential prejudice to the claimant if time limits are not extended, she cannot seek recovery of a redundancy payment, although she was able to continue working immediately after Mr J Charalambous’s death. Considering prejudice to the respondent's if the claim was allowed to proceed, it is nearly 3 years since Mr J Charalambous’s death, and the reality of the situation for R1 is that the estate may have been wound up and concluded. Similarly, for R2, if liability for the redundancy payment was established to fall with R2, it is 3 years since the death and 2 years since the proceedings were commenced, creating delay and uncertainty for R2 who is also not represented.

[68]I conclude on balance I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the claimant has established reasons on which I should exercise my discretion to extend the time limits on just and equitable grounds to allow a redundancy payment claim to be presented out of time. Redundancy arising on closure of business 1/2/24

[69]I have found that the claimant’s employment contract with Mr J Charalambous was extinguished on his death on the 16/3/23. I have found that the claimant was then employed by R2 under an oral contract on the same terms from the 17/3/23 - 1/2/24. In view of my findings under TUPE, that there had been a relevant transfer, the claimant would be treated under section 218 ERA (1996), as not having a break in her continuity of service from Mr J Charalambous, from the 1/6/19. The claimant would have 2 years' service with which to pursue a claim in relation to potential redundancy on the 1/2/24, in accordance with section 155 ERA (1996). I have found that the claimant’s oral contract was terminated without notice by R2 on the 1/2/24, when she closed the premises. In accordance with section 136(1) (a) ERA (1996), this amounts to a dismissal, for the purposes of a redundancy claim. Section 163

(2) ERA (1996) contains a presumption where an employee has been dismissed, that he has been dismissed for redundancy, unless the contrary is proved. I have not been presented with any evidence to displace this presumption. I am satisfied in accordance with section 139 (1) (a) (i) and (ii) ERA (1996) those 2 subsections apply, the employer R2 had ceased to carry out the business for the purposes of which the employee was employed by him, and had ceased to carry out that business in the place where the employee was so employed. The claimant would be entitled to a redundancy payment from R2, in respect of the period 1/6/19 - 1/6/23, a 4-year period. (For the assistance of the parties, section 162 (2) (a) ERA (1996) sets out the entitlement, 1 and ½ weeks' pay for each year of employment when the employee was not below the age of 41 years). Conclusions on notice pay

[70]I am satisfied that the claimant has brought her claim for notice pay in time, within 3 months of the effective date of termination of the contract, in accordance with Article 3 Employment Tribunals Extension of Jurisdiction (England and Wales) Order (1994). The effective date of termination for these purposes is 1/2/24, the claim being brought on the 19/2/24.

[71]I have found that the claimant was an employee of R2 under the terms of an oral contract, there had been no discussion with R2 as to notice periods relevant to her. Her dates of employment with R2 are from the 17/3/23 - 1/2/24. However, section 218 ERA (1996) applies, and the claimant would be treated as having continuous service from the 1/6/19 due to the TUPE transfer on the 17/3/23. There is no written contract setting out any notice periods applicable to the claimant. In these circumstances, the default position applies under section 86 ERA (1996), which entitles a person who has been continuously employed for 2 years or more, but for less than 12 years, to a notice payment of 1 week’s salary, for each year of continuous service. The claimant would be entitled to 4 weeks for the period 1/6/19 - 1/6/23, which would be a gross figure. Conclusions on holiday pay

[72]I have previously determined that the claimant was an employee of R2 under the terms of an oral contract, and therefore is entitled to bring a claim for holiday pay as an employee. I have accepted the claimant’s account that she did not take any holiday during the time she worked for R2. This is corroborated by the lack of mention of holiday pay, on any of the wage slips contained in the bundle for the relevant period. If R2 had communicated with the claimant after the 28/11/23, it may have been the case the parties could have come to an agreement, that the claimant would take some holiday leave initially in view of her daughter's circumstances for example. However, this did not happen.

[73]Holiday pay is defined as wages in accordance with section 27 (1) Employment Rights Act (1996). In circumstances where there is no written contract setting out an employee's holiday entitlement, the default position (for a full-time member of staff) is 5.6 weeks (28 days) under the regulation 13 and 13a Working Time Regulations (1998).

[74]The claimant is required to bring her claim for holiday pay under regulation 30 (1) (a) Working Time Regulations (1998), within 3 months of a refusal to allow her to take annual leave, or within 3 months of a failure to pay a sum in lieu of leave on termination. In accordance with my findings, the claimant made a request for holiday pay in December 2023 and would have also been entitled to request a payment in lieu of outstanding holiday on termination, termination occurring on the 1/2/24. The claimant lodged her ET1 claim form on the 19/2/24, so her claim is brought in time.

[75]Regulation 14 (2) Working Time Regulations (1998) requires an employer where the proportion of leave taken by the employee is less than the proportion of the leave year which has expired, to make a payment in lieu. A formula in sub section 3 explains how this is calculated: (A x B) - C A – is the period of leave to which the employee is entitled under regulations 13 and 13a; B – is the proportion of the employees leave year which expired before the termination date; C – is the period of leave taken by the employee between the start of the leave year and termination

[76]In this case I have found the claimant worked 24 hours a week, for R2 between the 17/3/23 to the 1/2/24. Annual leave entitlement: 24 hours x 5.6 weeks = 134 hours annual entitlement Number of days between 17/3/23 - 1/2/24 = 321 days A = 134 hours x B 321 days divided by 365 days = 117.85 hours leave entitlement (on the basis the claimant did not take any annual leave)

[77]I have provided the workings above to assist the parties. It is an agreed fact (fact 1) the claimant received the minimum wage whilst working for Mr J Charalambous, and I have found this continued whilst working for R2. For the assistance of the parties the minimum wage payable for the tax year 1/4/23 - 31/3/24 was £10.42. Conclusions on Statutory Sick Pay

[78]Statutory sick pay comes within the definition of wages provided by section 27 (1) Employment Rights Act (1996). A claim is required to be made in accordance with section 23 (1) Employment Rights Act (1996), within 3 months beginning with the date of payment of the wages from which the deduction was made. The claimant obtained a sick note on the 16/1/24 and requested R2 pay statutory sick pay from the 28/11/23. On the basis that the claimant had just been paid, by a payslip dated 27/11/23 at page 67, she would have been due to receive her next salary a month later at the end of December 2023. She lodged her ET1 form on the 19/2/24, within 1 month of the request for SSP on the 16/1/24, which she sought entitlement to from 28/11/24. I am satisfied the complaint has been presented in time.

[79]The claimant does not have any contractual sick pay arrangements with R2. In these circumstances, the Statutory Sick Pay provisions apply. Any claim for SSP has to be made by an employee, in accordance with regulation 7 Statutory Sick Pay (General) Regulations (1982). This requires under regulation 7 (1) (b) the employee to notify his employer in writing on or before the seventh day after that day of incapacity for work. I accepted that the claimant phoned R2 on the 29/11/23 and 30/11/23, advising of her difficulties with her daughter. I also accepted she attended the salon in December 2023 and was told it was ok to have time off. An employer acting reasonably in these circumstances would have been considering how best to support the claimant and considering its obligations / policies in respect of special leave / holiday / sick leave.

[80]Regulation 7 (2) provides that notice of incapacity for work may be given one month later than set out in regulation 7 (1) , where there is a good cause for giving it later, or if not practicable, as soon as reasonably practicable thereafter, and in any event within 91 days. In this case the claimant did not notify R2 until the 23/1/24 when she e mailed R2 requesting SSP and including a sick note. In the circumstances, faced as the claimant was with R2 ignoring all her methods of communication in November and December 2023 and January 2024, I find the claimant had good cause to give notification later than 7 days, and 1 month, after the date of incapacity. It is clear the claimant was under a considerable amount of stress during this period due to her daughter going missing, returning home, and social service involvement. Her notification on the 23/1/24 would bring the claimant within 91 days of the 28/11/23.

[81]Whilst the regulations provide for an employer to not accept a reason put forward by an employee for delay in notification, in this case R2 ignored the claimants e mail. In normal circumstances, the employer would determine if the medical evidence is acceptable, in determining whether SSP was payable, but cannot withhold payment of SSP for late receipt of medical evidence. Again, because R2 simply ignored the claimant’s e mail, this was not addressed. I have not been presented with any arguments by R2 that the claimant was not entitled to SSP.

[82]I find that the claimant would have been entitled to statutory sick pay, for the period 28/11/23 - 1/2/24. She had submitted a sick note on the 23/1/24 referring to depression and stress related problems, which R2 should have acted on. The claimant earned over £125.00 a week gross, which would meet the average gross weekly earnings criteria. (24 hours a week at £10.42 minimum wage of £250.08 weekly gross) and would have been entitled to payments 3 days after the 28/11/23 in accordance with the regulations. (For the assistance of the parties, there is an SSP calculator on Gov.UK).

[83]I would encourage the claimant and R2, in view of my conclusions on liability, to try and settle the claim and reach an agreement on compensation. It may be that R1 / his solicitor are able to assist with this, ACAS would also be able to assist and could record in writing any agreement between the parties. If the parties cannot agree, they would need to contact the tribunal to arrange for a remedy hearing to be listed, I hope this will not be needed.