Ms I Woodhead v Shell International Trading and Shipping Company Ltd: 2302048/2023 and Others
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 2302048/2023
Between
Ms I WoodheadClaimantShell International Trading and Shipping Company LtdRespondent
Before
Employment Judge EvansIn person for claimantMr A Smith (instructed by counsel) for respondentDate 11 December 2024
JUDGMENT
The claimant’s application for interim relief pending the determination of her claim of unfair dismissal fails and is dismissed.
REASONS
The judgment set out above was given orally with reasons at the conclusion of the hearing on 14 July 2023. The claimant has requested written reasons. These are those reasons. Preamble[1]On 11 May 2023 the claimant presented a claim of unfair dismissal to the Tribunal following her dismissal with effect from 5 May 2023. Within that claim she included a claim for “automatic Interim Relief pursuant to section 128 of the Employment Rights Act 1996”. That application was listed for hearing before me today. The listing was for a 3-hour hearing. The hearing today, 14 July 2023[2]The parties had each produced very lengthy bundles of document. In addition, the respondent had produced a draft witness statement for Mr Alistair Tucker (who took the decision to dismissal the claimant) and a skeleton argument. This morning at the beginning of the hearing the claimant emailed to the Tribunal and to the respondent’s representative her own skeleton argument running to 26 pages.[3]As is invariably the case in applications of this sort – see rule 95 of the Tribunal’s rules - I did not hear oral evidence. There was a 30-minute adjournment to read the claimant’s skeleton argument once it had been received. The parties then made submissions. Mr Smith made his submissions before the claimant so that as an unrepresented party she would have the advantage of having heard his submissions before she made her own. I then retired briefly to reach a decision. I then gave my decision with oral reasons. The issues for the Tribunal to decide today[4]There was a brief discussion at the beginning of the hearing in which I outlined what I considered to be the relevant law – for the benefit of the claimant - and identified what appeared to me to be the relevant issues. The parties agreed with my analysis.[5]The claimant contends that the reason for her dismissal given by the respondent – misconduct – is a sham. In box 9.2 of the claim form she stated (page 97 of the respondent’s bundle): I am claiming unfair dismissal by reason of whistleblowing and/or health and safety, and I am applying for Interim Relief pursuant to section 128 ERA 1996.[6]As such, what I must consider today is whether it is “likely” that on determining the claimant’s unfair dismissal claim the Tribunal will find that the reason (or if more than one the principal reason) for the dismissal was that: 6.1. The claimant had made one or more protected disclosures (with the result that the dismissal will be unfair under section 103A of the Employment Rights Act 1996); or 6.2. The claimant, having been designated by their employer to carry out activities in connection with preventing or reducing risks to health and safety at work, had carried out or proposed to carry out any such activities (with the result that the dismissal will be unfair under section 100(1)((a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996). As short-hand I refer to this below as “carrying out health and safety activities”.
The law
[7]Section 129(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 sets out the relevant test on an application for interim relief. It provides where relevant that: This section applies where, on hearing an employee's application for interim relief, it appears to the tribunal that it is likely that on determining the complaint to which the application relates the tribunal will find— (a) that the reason (or if more than one the principal reason) for the dismissal is one of those specified in— (i) section 100(1)(a) and (b), 101A(d), 102(1), 103 or 103A, or[8]The meaning of “likely” in this context has been considered in a number of authorities. The oldest of these is perhaps Taplin v C Shippam Ltd [1978] IRLR 450, in which Slynn J held, at [23], that “likely” means does the claimant have a “pretty good” chance of success?[9]More recently, in Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz [2011] IRLR 562, it was interpreted by the then President of the EAT, now Lord Justice Underhill, as meaning “a significantly higher degree of likelihood” than just more likely than not. This is a fairly high bar, and the reason for it being a fairly high bar was explained, again by the then President, in Dandpat v University of Bath [2009] UKEAT/0408/09/LA. He explained the rationale for keeping it high (at [20]): if interim relief is granted, “the respondent is irretrievably prejudiced because he is obliged to treat the contract as continuing, and pay the claimant, until the conclusion of proceedings: that is not [a] consequence that should be imposed lightly.”[10]Further, in order to succeed the claimant must show that it is “likely” that all the necessary component parts of the relevant claim will be proved. So, for example, in the context of the claim that the reason or principal reason was that the claimant had made a protected disclosure, the claimant would need to show this in relation to matters including: 10.1. that she made a disclosure of information; 10.2. that she believed that the disclosure tended to show one of the types of wrongdoing identified in section 43B(1) ERA; 10.3. that such belief was reasonable; 10.4. that she believed that the disclosure was in the public interest; 10.5. that such belief was reasonable; 10.6. that the reason or principal reason for the dismissal was the fact that she had made a protected disclosure.
Conclusions
[11]It does not appear to me to be “likely” that the Tribunal deciding the claimant’s claim of unfair dismissal will conclude that the reason or principal reason for her dismissal was either that she had made one or more protected disclosures or that she had been carrying out health and safety activities.[12]That is to say it does not appear to me to be likely that the Tribunal will conclude that the claimant’s dismissal was automatically unfair under either section 100(1)(a) or section 103A of the Employment Rights Act 1996. My reasons for reaching this conclusion are as follows: 12.1. First, the backdrop to the claimant’s dismissal was lengthy disciplinary proceedings beginning in or around September 2022. There is extensive documentary evidence contained in the respondent’s bundle concerning these proceedings which resulted: 12.1.1. Initially, in a final written warning dated 13 December 2022, said to result from the claimant’s persistent failure to attend a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) meeting (and so her failure to follow a reasonable management instruction) and the fact that the relationship between the respondent and claimant had broken down. (pages172-176 of the respondent’s bundle); 12.1.2. Subsequently, in her dismissal, said to result from her ongoing refusal to engage constructively with the PIP process (and so her failure to follow a reasonable management instruction) and the fact the relationship between the respondent and claimant had broken down (the dismissal letter dated 5 April 2023 is at pages 678 to 685 of the respondent’s bundle). 12.2. Now it is of course possible that at the final hearing the Tribunal will conclude that in fact the disciplinary process ultimately resulting in dismissal was not followed for the reasons that the respondent states and that in fact it was pursued either because the claimant had made a protected disclosure or because she had been carrying out health and safety activities. However, given the volume of the disciplinary documentation and the lengthy period that it covers, it does not appear to me “likely” that that is what the Tribunal will conclude. 12.3. In reaching this conclusion I have taken into account that the disciplinary process resulting both in the initial final written warning and the dismissal was detailed and extensive. Further, I have taken into account that the documents appear to show the respondent choosing not to dismiss the claimant at the conclusion of the first disciplinary hearing in circumstances where the documents appear to show the respondent believed it had grounds to do so. 12.4. In summary, there is an extremely detailed and coherent narrative underlying the respondent’s defence of the claim which is apparently reflected in extensive documentary evidence. Now of course it may be that the Tribunal will conclude, as the claimant contends, that the whole disciplinary process was a “sham”, but it does not appear to me to be likely that it will do so. This is not a dismissal that came out of nowhere. 12.5. Secondly, and further and separately, the contents of the first claim with case number 2301998/2022 (which the claimant says are relevant to this claim – see [55] of the particulars of claim in this claim) and the contents of this claim, as set out in the particulars of claim, result in the argument that the claimant is seeking to pursue in this claim being unclear. In making this finding I have taken full account of the fact that the claimant is unrepresented and therefore cannot reasonably be expected to set out her claim as clearly as she would be expected to if professionally represented. 12.6. Turning to the first claim, the claimant presented it to the Tribunal on 12 June 2022 and a preliminary hearing for case management purposes was held in it on 5 July 2023 (page 80 of the respondent’s bundle). The particulars of claim attached to the claim form are very long indeed (50 pages) and largely comprise a chronological account in which the legal basis for the claimant’s claim is not clearly or concisely set out. The case management summary prepared following the hearing on 5 July 2023 records that the claimant confirmed during the preliminary hearing that in her first claim she pursued no complaint of being subjected to a detriment for having made one or more protected disclosures, which seems to call into question to some extent what is intended by [55] of the particulars of claim in this claim. Her claim of detriment for carrying out health and safety activities appears to relate to events which took place sometime ago in 2020 (paragraph 5.3 of agreed list of issues included in case management summary at page 88 of the respondent’s bundle) – this is more than two years prior to the dismissal. 12.7. I note in this respect that today the claimant had told me that paragraph 14 of the case management summary relating to the hearing on 5 July 2023 is not correct and that in fact she does pursue a complaint in the first claim of having been subjected to a detriment for having made protected disclosures. I make no comment in relation to this other than to find that this tends to highlight the lack of clarity in the first claim. 12.8. I then turn to the particulars of claim in the current claim. It is not clear from them either on what basis the claimant says she made protected disclosures – the way this is described at paragraph [55] of her particulars of claim does not explain the protected disclosure(s) on which she relies clearly at all, but simply refers to the first claim. Nor do they set out clearly what activities she says fell within section 100(1)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 12.9. I invited the claimant in her oral submissions to identify for me any passage in either the particulars of claim in this claim or her skeleton argument which sets out clearly the protected disclosures upon which she relies. She was not able to do so. 12.10. In summary, the claimant’s case remains far from clear. Now of course it may become clearer as it proceeds, but at the moment it lacks the clarity and focus which would be necessary for it to appear likely to me that at the final hearing the Tribunal will conclude that the reason or principal reason for the claimant’s dismissal was either that she had made a protected disclosure or that she had been carrying out health and safety activities.[13]Because it does not appear to me that the claimant has a “pretty good chance” of establishing at the final hearing that the reason or if more than one the principal reason for her dismissal was one of the two reasons upon which she relies, her application for interim relief fails and is dismissed.[1]This hearing was arranged, in part, to consider an application by the respondent to strike out the claim and a counter application by the claimant to strike out the response. A considerable time was also spent in case management, as set out in the private case management order of today’s date.[2]As noted in that document, this case (2303949/2023) is the third claim brought by Mrs Woodhead and follows her dismissal on 5 May 2023. It includes a number of claims as follows:(a) unfair dismissal, including that the dismissal was also automatically unfair by reason of protected disclosures, trade union activities and / or health and safety detriments;(b) that Mrs Woodhead suffered detriments on the same three grounds;(c) direct discrimination on grounds of age and / or sex;(d) harassment on grounds of age and / or sex;(e) victimisation;(f) unlawful deduction from wages;(g) wrongful dismissal. It also includes mention of equal pay.[4]The respondent seeks a deposit order in relation to the claims of automatically unfair dismissal and to strike out the rest (apart from unfair dismissal) on the grounds that they are vexatious. In that context I was referred to the words of Lord Bingham in Attorney General v Barker [2000] EWHC 453, at paragraph 19: “The hallmark of a vexatious proceeding is in my judgment that it has little or no basis in law (or at least no discernible basis); that whatever the intention of the proceeding may be, its effect is to subject the defendant to inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to any gain likely to accrue to the claimant; and that it involves an abuse of the process of the court, meaning by that a use of the court process for a purpose or in a way which is significantly different from the ordinary and proper use of the court process.”[5]The application also asserts that many of the individual claims have no reasonable prospect of success. 2 of 10
Background
[6]It is necessary to repeat some of the background set out in the case management order as this is a public document.[7]Mrs Woodhead worked for Shell from July 2019 as a Technical and Process Safety Advisor. It was a senior engineering role, working at the London Shell Centre. On arrival, she was disappointed to find that she was not, as she had expected, reporting directly to the General Manager, and felt that her role had been downgraded. At the risk of over-simplifying matters, she feels that because she kept raising issues about her position and pay she was unfairly placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). She raised a grievance about this, which was rejected. She appealed, but that too was refused. The company tried to restart the PIP process but she refused to come to a meeting to discuss it. That was treated as a disciplinary matter and she was given a final written warning. She appealed that decision too, again without success. She did finally attend a PIP meeting but the company says that she refused to acknowledge any underperformance or to engage with the PIP. That led to a further disciplinary hearing and she was given notice by letter dated 5 April 2023 on grounds of misconduct and a breakdown of the working relationship. The source of the disagreement therefore was the decision to put her on a PIP in July 2021, and a key issue for the tribunal in due course will be whether Shell was justified in doing so, or whether it was an act of discrimination or retaliation of some sort.[8]In this third claim Mrs Woodhead has introduced a number of new claims, including age discrimination / harassment, trade union detriment (and dismissal), equal pay, and also that she was not provided with a written statement of reasons for dismissal, which does not in fact appear on the respondent’s list.
The applicable law
[9]Rule 37 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure provides that: (1) At any stage of the proceedings, either on its own initiative or on the application of a party, a Tribunal may strike out all or part of a claim or response on any of the following grounds— (a) that it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success; …[10]In Anyanwu and anor v South Bank Student Union and anor 2001 ICR 391, HL, the House of Lords highlighted the importance of not striking out discrimination claims except in the most obvious cases, because of the public importance of such cases being heard.[11]In Ezsias v North Glamorgan NHS Trust 2007 ICR 1126, CA, the Court of Appeal held that the same approach should generally be taken in whistleblowing 3 of 10 cases, which are similar in that they involve an investigation into why an employer took a particular step.[12]In Balls v Downham Market High School and College 2011 IRLR 217, EAT, Lady Smith said that the tribunal must first consider whether, on a careful consideration of all the available material, it can properly conclude that the claim has no reasonable prospect of success. That includes, for example, material on the employment tribunal file. There may be correspondence or other documentation which contains material that is relevant to the issue or which assists in determining whether it is fair to strike out the claim.[13]In Cox v Adecco [2021] ICR 1307, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (HHJ Tayler) reviewed the authorities in this area and distilled the principles governing the approach to strike-out applications as follows:(1) No one gains by truly hopeless cases being pursued to a hearing.(2) Strike out is not prohibited in discrimination or whistleblowing cases; but especial care must be taken in such cases as it is very rarely appropriate.(3) If the question of whether a claim has reasonable prospects of success turns on factual issues that are disputed, it is highly unlikely that strike out will be appropriate.(4) The claimant’s case must ordinarily be taken at its highest.(5) It is necessary to consider, in reasonable detail, what the claims and issues are. Put bluntly, you can’t decide whether a claim has reasonable prospects of success if you don’t know what it is.(6) This does not necessarily require the agreement of a formal list of issues, although that may assist greatly, but does require a fair assessment of the claims and issues on the basis of the pleadings and any other documents in which the claimant seeks to set out the claim.(7) In the case of a litigant in person, the claim should not be ascertained only by requiring the claimant to explain it while under the stresses of a hearing; reasonable care must be taken to read the pleadings (including additional information) and any key documents in which the claimant sets out the case. When pushed by a judge to explain the claim, a litigant in person may become like a rabbit in the headlights and fail to explain the case they have set out in writing.(8) Respondents, particularly if legally represented, in accordance with their duties to assist the tribunal to comply with the overriding objective and not to take procedural advantage of litigants in person, should assist the tribunal to identify the documents in which the claim is set out, even if it may not be explicitly pleaded in a manner that would be expected of a lawyer.(9) If the claim would have reasonable prospects of success had it been properly 4 of 10 pleaded, consideration should be given to the possibility of an amendment, subject to the usual test of balancing the justice of permitting or refusing the amendment, taking account of the relevant circumstances.
Discussion and Conclusions
[14]This guidance in Cox, to which I was referred by Mrs Woodhead, is of course adapted to the more usual category of case in which the allegations are not clearly defined and which might be improved or rectified by further discussion or amendment. In this case however, the issues have been extensively considered now on three separate occasions, now including over two days at this hearing, which has been an attempt to refine Mrs Woodhead’s 28 page draft list of issues into a more workable format.[15]In the course of that exercise it became clear that some allegations had been advanced with less thought than others. Some indeed have little or no basis in law, to quote from the test in Barker above. Overall, I formed the view that Mrs Woodhead had carried out impressive legal research and had advanced as many claims as she felt properly arguable. Further, she had not done so with the principal aim of causing inconvenience or expense to the respondent but in order to strengthen her hand in these proceedings. I prefer to approach the application on the basis that individual claims may, on examination, be seen to have little reasonable prospect of success and to make appropriate orders in such cases. Age discrimination[16]The first new claim is for age discrimination. Mrs Woodhead described herself as about 50 and compared her treatment with younger age groups. That still begs the question why she did not mention age discrimination in either of her previous claims, including in her second claim which was also submitted after her dismissal and which set out her claims over thirty pages. No explanation was put forward.[17]This third claim is an extension of her previous claims that she was unfairly placed on a PIP, that she raised a grievance about that which was rejected, the PIP was then resumed, the company unfairly gave her a final written warning for refusing to engage with that process and then ultimately dismissed her. Her first claim dealt with events before the outcome of her grievance appeal and before any disciplinary action had been taken against her but she clearly had the view that the company had an unfair view of her performance and were not prepared to let it go. There is no reason why, if age was not a factor in those earlier events that it became a factor later on.[18]Another feature of this case is the number of different explanations put forward by Mrs Woodhead for her dismissal and other treatment, as already listed. Since that includes whistleblowing allegations, she brought an application for interim 5 of 10 relief which was unsuccessful, but in the course of that disclosed a bundle of over 1800 pages. In the course of this hearing I had that bundle available to me but neither side referred me to any document in which age or experience or any euphemism for age was employed, or even to suggest during the course of the various grievance and disciplinary processes undertaken that Mrs Woodhead had suggested age as a factor at the time. A search in those 1800 pages against the term “age discrimination” does not bring up any response.[19]Again, not only is this the third claim but it is the third preliminary hearing, and Mrs Woodhead did not raise age discrimination at either of the previous hearings or ask to amend her earlier claims to include it.[20]It is not therefore simply a case of an allegation of discrimination being put forward without any express reference by the relevant managers to her age. Normally that would not be a matter for a strike out application. People are reluctant to admit or display any prejudice and so the existence of such discrimination is a matter to be inferred from all of the circumstances. However in this case, not only is it one of many explanations put forward for the events in question but it is raised at a very late stage and Mrs Woodhead could give me no real explanation as to why it had been included at all. No comparator was suggested in any instance. In those circumstances I have to conclude that it has no reasonable prospect of success. Sex discrimination[21]The time limit for events in the third claim is 19 April 2023 and Mrs Woodhead was given notice by letter on 5 April 2023. She was placed on garden leave at that point. Hence, unless it was part of conduct extending over a period of time, any events which occurred during Mrs Woodhead’s employment are out of time.[22]The first complaint (2.1.1) concerns training courses which Mr Jim Brown is said to have refused to allow Mrs Woodhead to attend and the second (2.1.2) concerns his refusal to sign off on her Individual Development Plan in June or July 2022. These points were in fact set out in the second claim in the following terms: “Also, on 21 July 2022 at 09:50 Mr. Jim W. Brown refused to sign off my Individual Development Program, which was due 31 July 2022 as per his line duties and in which the training option was included for: ‘Powering Women in Mid-Career Program’ and/or ‘Leading to Engage & Deliver’ aligned with my role and career aspirations.”[23]So the two allegations relate to a particular occasion on 21 July 2022.[24]Complaint 2.1.3 is that Mr Brown wanted Mrs Woodhead to ask him for time off before submitting a leave application via the HR online system. The allegation is at paragraph 3.8 of the Particulars of Claim, which states that this happened more than once but otherwise gives no date. The draft list of issues refers to two emails, one from 23 August 2022 (and therefore well out of time) and one 6 of 10 on 30 March 2023, but I was not referred to them. I cannot see them, or any mention of them, in either bundle for the interim relief hearing. Nor was it mentioned in the second Particulars of Claim which run to 34 pages.[25]All these three allegations are therefore significantly out of time and are unconnected with the which followed, and which led to the dismissal. These can be traced back to the PIP and then continued from the rejection of Mrs Woodhead’s grievance appeal in August 2022 onwards. I conclude that there is no reasonable prospect of the tribunal being persuaded that they were in time. Harassment on grounds of sex[26]There is a single allegation of harassment on grounds of sex, which concerns a remark which appeared in Ms Ferguson’s grievance appeal decision. It records that Mrs Woodhead made an allegation that someone had said to her “don’t f*** with me”. Mrs Woodhead now says that this was only ever hypothetical, and that Ms Ferguson knew that she did not want to pursue it as an allegation, so it should not have been included in her report. However, this remark was mentioned in an email from Mrs Woodhead which also included an alleged remark about women labour (which has already been included in the list of issues from the first claim). There is nothing to suggest that one was hypothetical and one was genuine, and no reason to criticise Ms Ferguson for including mention of it in her outcome letter. That allegation therefore has no reasonable prospects of success. Breach of contract / notice pay arrangements[27]A number of claims are made about the arrangements for Mrs Woodhead’s dismissal. She was given one month’s notice and paid for that one month, during which she was on garden leave, so it is not clear what breach of contract has taken place.[28]One allegation involves sections 87 and 88 Employment Rights Act 1996, which provides for a minimum period of notice in certain cases. That does not apply here. Having less than five years’ service Mrs Woodhead’s contractual notice period was one month. She joined the company on 22 July 2019 and was dismissed with effect from 6 May 2022, a period of less than three years, so her statutory minimum notice period was two weeks. Since her contractual notice period exceeded her statutory notice period by more than a week, by section 87 (4) the rest of that section does not apply. Even if it did, that section assists a claimant who would otherwise not have been paid for her notice period, but Mrs Woodhead was. Hence, that claim too has no reasonable prospects of success. It is also an indication that not every point advanced is soundly based.[29]A similar claim is that the respondent failed to provide a written statement of reasons for dismissal, but there was a very extensive outcome letter explaining the reasons for her dismissal, which amply meets this requirement. It is not clear what else Mrs Woodhead was expecting. 7 of 10[30]Mrs Woodhead also disputes the company’s right to put her on garden leave for her last month. There is no garden leave clause in her contract of employment and it is not clear to me that there is any other policy or provision which allowed this. Putting someone on garden leave may involve a breach of the implied right to work. There have been cases where, for example, entertainers, have sought an injunction to allow them to continue to work and practice their skills, but even then it does not affect the amount of notice pay to which the person is entitled.[31]A further ground of complaint is that she was required to take her holiday during the period of garden leave and she makes the point that under the Working Time Regulations 1998 an employer has to give suitable notice of any requirement to take holiday on a particular date - that notice being at least twice the period of the absence in question. However, Regulation 15(5) makes that subject to any relevant agreement and here the company has the right to do so in the contract of employment.[32]The final issue in relation to her notice pay is that she was not paid a performance bonus. Any such bonus would be unusual in the circumstances, but there is no contractual right to a bonus on dismissal, or at all. Indeed, one of her claims is that she was not provided with a valid statement of terms and conditions of employment as it did not include any mention of her bonus. I was not referred to any document which indicated any such definite bonus obligation on the part of the company, and so this point too appears to be misconceived. All these complaints appear to have no reasonable prospects of success.[33]In many cases, the arrangements for her garden leave and the payments made on dismissal are also raised as allegations of discrimination, victimisation or other detriment. Those complaints are also struck out on the basis that there was nothing wrong or inappropriate about the steps taken by the respondent, which were all in accordance with its normal practice, and so no basis to infer that a man or a younger person etc. would have been treated any differently. Trade union detriments[34]Mrs Woodhead had support from her trade union during the course of the disciplinary process and says that by revealing her trade union membership she was carrying out trade union activities and suffered detriments as a result. Such protections are contained in the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 at section 156. It applies where a worker takes action in relation to obtaining recognition, or in relation to bargaining arrangements, or tried to influence voting or ballot arrangements. None of this is of any relevance on the facts of this case and again this seems misconceived. I also repeat my earlier comments about the multiplicity of explanations put forward. Equal Pay 8 of 10[35]The final issue of potential significance is Equal Pay. Again, this was not mentioned in either of the two previous claims or at either of the preliminary hearings.[36]This seems to have become the subject of some confusion. It is mentioned a few times Mrs Woodhead’s draft list of issues but always in brackets and after mention of discrimination, e.g. at the heading of section 2: “Direct sex (incl. equal pay) / age discrimination (Equality Act 2010 sections 13 and/or 39)”[37]It is therefore put forward as a facet of sex discrimination, or as jargon term included for completeness, not as a standalone claim that Mrs Woodhead’s pay was lower in general than male colleagues, or male colleagues in other areas of the business. There is no mention of a male comparator at any point, or as to whether the claim relates to like work, work rated as equivalent or work of equal value. It appears to be referred to solely in the context that Mrs Woodhead was treated less favourably in various respects.[38]The nearest that the claim form comes to advancing an equal pay claim is at paragraph 3.25 which refers to different salary ranges across the company causing a pay gap. The gap is between technical staff, like her, and more general staff, and she says that she should have been included amount the technical staff, having an MSc in engineering. But that does not suggest a difference based on sex, it is based on role.[39]Accordingly, and for the avoidance of doubt, any equal pay claim is struck out as having no reasonable prospects of success as currently pleaded. Deposit Order[40]There was an application for a deposit order in respect of the automatically unfair dismissal claims, which are no different in principle to the detriment claims. The claim in relation to trade union activities has been struck out in any event for the reasons already given.[41]The remaining claims of automatically unfair dismissal are overlapping – for health and safety activities and for making a protected disclosure. That does not seem to present such a multiplicity of claims that a deposit order is indicated. The claimant’s application[42]There was a counter application from Mrs Woodhead, made on 1 April 2024, to strike out the response or for deposit orders to be made against the respondent. At this hearing little further was said in support of that application, the basis of which is that the respondent has failed to comply with the requirement to set out its case in full. It made a brief response to the third claim because it had set out its response very fully to the second claim, which was then incorporated by reference. There was no need in the circumstances to laboriously restate the 9 of 10 same points. The rest of her concerns relate to attempts by the respondent to obtain clarification of various aspects of her own claim and what was said to be an unreasonable failure to clarify which of her complaints were accepted. Some further clarity should now have been achieved, and these arguments do not undermine the respondent’s prospects of success.