Mrs E Alabi v Kingsdale Foundation School: 2301949/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2301949/2023

Between

Mrs E AlabiClaimant

Kingsdale Foundation SchoolRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Tueje

Members

Mrs J Clewlow

Mr R Singh

In person for claimant

Ms D Gilbert (instructed by counsel) for respondent

Date 4 September 2024

JUDGMENT

The following is the unanimous judgment of the Tribunal and is based on the list of issues in the Appendix to this judgment

[1]The complaint of direct age discrimination is not well-founded and is dismissed.

[2]The complaint of direct sex discrimination is not well-founded and is dismissed.

[3]The complaint of direct marriage or civil partnership discrimination is not wellfounded and is dismissed.

[4]The complaint of harassment related to age is not well-founded and is dismissed.

[5]The complaint of harassment related to sex is not well-founded and is dismissed.

[6]The complaint of unfair dismissal under section 95(1)(c) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 is not well-founded and is dismissed.

[7]The complaint of breach of contract is not well-founded and is dismissed.

[8]The complaint of unauthorised deduction from wages breach is not wellfounded and is dismissed. Employment Judge Tueje / Date: 4th September 2024 / Date: 6th September 2024 APPENDIX(1) The final list of issues on which the Tribunal made its findings of fact had been updated on the first day of the final hearing on 19th August 2024, when the claimant sought to amend the list of issues previously agreed between the parties at the preliminary hearing on 19th July 2024. Some of the claimant’s proposed amendments were agreed by the respondent, others were opposed. The amendments which were opposed included adding the following words: “while deliberately hindering and boycotting evidence of high performance, promotion and pay increase.” to paragraphs 2.8 and 2.11; “Respondent started Claimant on the lowest pay scale of M1 despite Claimant’s qualification up to Master’s degree level and industry experience which is different from how others were treated.” to paragraph 2.13; and “on various occasions” to paragraph 2.19.

(2) The respondent objected partly because some amendments sought were similar to the amendments contained in her particulars of claim dated 10th September 2023, which the claimant had already been refused permission to rely on at earlier preliminary hearings on 23rd April 2024 and 16th July 2024.

(3) Despite several attempts, the claimant was unable to show how the proposed amendments which were disputed, formed part of her existing claim. Therefore, having regard to Selkent v Moore

[1996] ICR 836

, the final list of issues consisted of the previously agreed list of issues, plus only the amendments agreed by the respondent.

(4) When announcing its judgment on 23rd August 2024, the Tribunal set out its findings on each of the factual allegations as set out in the final list of issues (see the Appendix). However, initially, it applied those findings to the complaints as set out in the previously agreed list of issues not the updated/final list of issues. When the claimant pointed this out at the hearing, the Tribunal corrected the position, and confirmed its judgment in respect of all matters contained in the list of issues as updated on 19th August 2024.

(5) That final list of issues on which the Tribunal made its finding of facts was as follows: Factual allegations relevant to discrimination, harassment, constructive unfair dismissal 2. Did the respondent do the following things1:

2.1 Not confirm the claimant in her permanent role and not give her a contract of employment. (CD)

2.2 In July 2020 Mr Casco call the claimant “pretty woman”.(SH)

2.3 In September 2020 putting Miss rather than Mrs on the claimant’s payslips. (AD, MCP, CD)

2.4 Not providing the claimant with a laptop when needed during lockdown. (CD, BOC) 1 Abbreviations: AD – direct age discrimination, AH – age related harassment, SD – direct sex discrimination, SH – sex-related harassment, MCP – direct marriage or civil partnership discrimination, BOC breach of contract, CD – constructive dismissal.

2.5 Failing to support the claimant with support with student behavioural issues, including not providing the claimant with a teaching assistant and the behaviour of Mr Barot on entering the classroom in December 2020. (AD, AH, CD)

2.6 Not allowing the claimant to teach GCSE computer science or 6th form students, despite these being less challenging and demanding and being refused permission to utilise 3D Graphics and new technology, in contrast to younger colleagues. (AD, SD, CD)

2.7 February 2022 a staff member (Mr Jordan Casco) using the term “motherfucker”. (SH)

2.8 Purporting to extend the claimant’s probation from February 2022 (AD, SD, CD)

2.9 Re-rooming the claimant’s classroom in April 2022 to the D&T classroom where there were knives in a round container on a raised surface such as a stool / table, and in September 2022 to room IT1 where there were sharp computer edges and broken sockets, both in breach of health and safety regulations. (CD)

2.10 Dr Okola and Gail Harrison providing negative feedback in relation to a lesson observation on 18 October 2022 and the manner in which feedback was given, including making the claimant sit at a pupil desk. (AD, AH, SD, SH, CD)

2.11 Not being moved to level M3 or being given a 5% pay increase between September and December 2022. (AD, SD, CD)

2.12 Not allowing the claimant to apply for to role of Head of Department in comparison with Mr Young. (AD, CD, SD)

2.13 Being given a timetable in excess of other NQTs. (AD, SD, CD)

2.14 Not being given payslips from April 2022 to December 2022 (CD, BOC)

2.15 Not being given access to the intranet or needed stationery, notebooks for pupils, whiteboard pens or staplers. (BOC, CD)

2.16 Not confirm the claimant in her permanent role, not being provided with a contract of employment or particulars of her employment until after six months from the commencement of her employment (CD)

2.17 The employment of Mr Turner a much younger and less qualified person when the claimant was still awaiting confirmation of her permanent contract (AD, SD, CD)

2.18 In July 2022, refusing to hold a back to work meeting after an illness due to being too busy with a younger colleague, Mr Jordan Casco (AD, CD)

2.19 Remotely controlling the claimant’s computer on 18 October 2022 so as to hinder her work (CD,BOC)

[1]The complaint of direct age discrimination is not well-founded and is dismissed.

[2]The complaint of direct sex discrimination is not well-founded and is dismissed.

[3]The complaint of direct marriage or civil partnership discrimination is not well-founded and is dismissed.

[4]The complaint of harassment related to age is not well-founded and is dismissed.

[5]The complaint of harassment related to sex is not well-founded and is dismissed.

[6]The complaint of unfair dismissal under section 95(1)(c) of the Employment Rights Act1996 is not well-founded and is dismissed.

[7]The complaint of breach of contract is not well-founded and is dismissed.

[8]The complaint of unauthorized deduction from wages breach is not well-founded and isdismissed.

REASONS

[1]The claimant was employed by the respondent as a newly qualified teacher. Her employment began on 1st September 2020, and ended on 31st December 2022 when her resignation which took effect.

[2]The claimant alleges that during her employment, she was subjected to an extended period of discrimination and harassment, which cumulatively destroyed the relationship of trust and confidence, and left her with no option but to resign and claim constructive dismissal. The respondent contests the claim: it disputes the claimant’s allegations, saying that she resigned. It points out many matters she relies on to support her claim were not brought to the respondent’s attention at the time she says they occurred.

[3]Early conciliation started on 25 February 2023 and ended on 7 April 2023. The claimant presented her ET1 claim form on 3rd May 2023. It was accompanied by a 12-page statement of case. The respondent’s ET3 form and Grounds of Resistance is dated 15th June 2023. In response to a request by the respondent for further particulars of her claim, the claimant prepared particulars of claim dated 10th September 2023. However, the claimant was subsequently refused permission to rely on the particulars of claim (see paragraphs 19 below). Pursuant to paragraph 11 of the record of a preliminary hearing dated 23rd April 2024, the respondent submitted an amended response to the claim dated 9th May 2024.

[4]The claimant is making the following complaints:4.1 Constructive unfair dismissal.

4.2 Direct age, sex and marriage and civil partnership discrimination.

4.3 Age and sex related harassment; and

4.4 Unauthorised deductions from wages.

[5]The final hearing was a remote hearing, which took place on 19th to 23rd August 2024. The claimant gave evidence to the tribunal in support of her claim. She also relied on a 34-page witness statement e-mailed to the Employment Tribunal, and copied to the respondent, on 19th August 2024. There were also a number of documents exhibited to the claimant's witness statement; a summarised description of these is as follows:5.1 Exhibit 1: amended ET1.

5.2 Exhibit 2: application to amend ET1.

5.3 Exhibit 3: e-mail to Mercy (in HR) dated September 2020.

5.4 Exhibit 4: e-mail from Mercy (in HR) dated September 2020.

5.5 Exhibit 5: e-mail to the Employment Tribunal sent 16th July 2024.

5.6 Exhibit 6: e-mail to the Employment Tribunal sent on 8th August 2024; and

5.7 Exhibit 7: e-mail to the Employment Tribunal sent on 11th August 2024.

[6]The respondent relied on the following witness statements:6.1 Witness statement of Gail Harrison (previously employed by the respondent as a head of department, and the claimant's former line manager);

6.2 Witness statement of Andrew Sear (Acting Head Teacher - Operational); and

6.3 Witness statement of Steve Morrison (Head Teacher - Executive).

[7]In addition to the above evidence, the following documents were sent to the Tribunal:7.1 A 631-page hearing bundle.

7.2 A letter regarding the claimant dated 12th August 2024 from Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust.

7.3 The claimant’s 4-page (perfected) closing submissions dated 23rd August 2024; and

7.4 The Respondent’s 26-page closing written submissions dated 23rd August 2024.

[8]The Tribunal announced its decision orally on 23rd August 2024. By an e-mail sent to the Tribunal on 6th September 2024 the claimant requested written reasons. These are the Tribunal’s written reasons. The Tribunal notes the time that has elapsed since the claimant requested written reasons; we have endeavored to keep the parties updated and would like to thank the claimant for her patience.

PRELIMINARY MATTERS

[9]Before hearing any evidence, the Tribunal dealt with a number of preliminary matters raised by the parties, and which are set out below. Request for a Postponement

[10]As background, in an e-mail sent on 11th August 2024, the claimant requested the final hearing be postponed.

[11]Employment Judge Heath dealt with the claimant’s request, having regard to the Presidential Guidance – Seeking a Postponement of a Hearing (2013). Judge Heath provided a link to that Guidance in his written decision. In his decision, Judge Heath also quoted the relevant section of the Guidance which sets out the requirements for medical evidence required to support an application to postpone a hearing. Judge Heath noted that the claimant relied on a letter from Salford Hospital A&E department which did not meet these requirements. Accordingly, the request was refused.

[12]At the start of the hearing on 19th August, the claimant renewed her request for a postponement due to the stress caused to her by the proceedings. In support of the request, the claimant provided a letter dated 12th August 2024 from Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust, written by Ms Loone, a mental health liaison practitioner.

[13]Rule 30A(2) of the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013 states: Where a party makes an application for a postponement of a hearing less than 7 days before the date on which the hearing begins, the Tribunal may only order the postponement where—(a) all other parties’ consent to the postponement and— (i) it is practicable and appropriate for the purposes of giving the parties the opportunity to resolve their disputes by agreement; or (ii) it is otherwise in accordance with the overriding objective.

(b) the application was necessitated by an act or omission of another party or theTribunal; or

[14]The Tribunal considered this request on the evidence before it. Noting the respondent’s opposition, the Tribunal considered the remaining criteria at rule 30A(2)(b) and (c) and concluded these were not satisfied. The Tribunal also took into account that the medical evidence the claimant sought to rely on did not comply with the requirements set out in the Presidential Guidance. Furthermore, we noted Judge Heath had brought the requirements of the Presidential Guidance to the claimant’s attention around one week earlier, when dealing with her earlier postponement request. Accordingly, the claimant’s request to postpone the hearing was refused.

[15]The Tribunal adds that, because the claimant was particularly late returning after the lunch break on 20th August 2024, when she rejoined the hearing, the Tribunal enquired whether she was alright, and whether she was ready to continue being cross examined: she confirmed that she was. Strike Out

[16]The respondent applied to strike out the claim under rule 37. Essentially the application was on the grounds that since around 16th July 2024, the respondent had been requesting the parties exchange witness statement, but the claimant did not do so. The claimant’s 34-page witness statement was sent to the respondent at 9.16am on 19th August 2024, being 44 minutes before the final hearing was due to begin. Ms Gilbert argued this caused prejudice to the respondent because there was insufficient time to consider the lengthy witness statement, take instructions on its contents, and prepare cross examination.

[17]The claimant explained that she only received a provisional hearing bundle on 29th July 2024, the finalised bundle was not received until 8th August 2024. She disputed the contents of the 8th August hearing bundle, in particular she says the respondent omitted various important documents. She also explained there needed to be an agreed finalised bundle before she could prepare her witness statement, so as to cross reference the bundle in her statement.

[18]Having taken into account each parties’ representations, the Tribunal determined there would be sufficient time for Ms Gilbert to deal with the claimant’s witness statement during the Tribunal’s reading time. The hearing was to be adjourned at lunchtime on 19th August 2024 to allow for reading time and would resume at 10.00am on 20th August 2024. This would allow the respondent time to deal with the claimant’s witness statement, meaning there could still be a fair hearing despite the lateness of the claimant’s witness statement. Accordingly, the strike out application was refused. Amendments to the List of Issues

[19]On 19th August 2024 the claimant sought to make amendments to the list of issues. The background to this request is that at a case management hearing before Judge Heath on 23rd April 2024, the claimant applied to amend her claim by relying on the particulars of claim dated 10th September 2023. That application was refused. The Tribunal’s record of the preliminary hearing is dated 24th April 2024, and it sets out the list of issues to be determined at the final hearing.

[20]There was a subsequent preliminary hearing on 16th July 2024 before Judge Lumby, at which the claimant was legally represented. The record of that preliminary hearing includes an updated list of issues which the parties agreed at the hearing. The claimant e-mailed the Tribunal on 7th August 2024 seeking to amend the list of issues. The respondent opposed this and e-mailed the Tribunal with its objections. At the final hearing on 19th August 2024 the claimant renewed her request to amend the list of issues to incorporate the amendments contained in her 7th August 2024 e-mail.

[21]A number of the proposed amendments related to simply re-labelling the cause of action in respect of matters that had already been pleaded. The respondent did not object to these amendments. It also agreed to certain other amendments as follows:20.1 Combining two of the issues regarding the claimant’s permanent contract ofemployment (paragraphs 2.1 and 2.16 of the lists of issues);

20.2 Adding Ms Gail in respect of an allegation relating to feedback following a lessonobservation in October 2022; and

20.3 Amending the manner in which knives and tools were allegedly kept in the Designand Technology classroom which the claimant used.

[22]However, in respect of paragraphs 2.8, 2.11, 2.13 and 2.19 of the lists of issues (see below), the respondent objected to the amendments the claimant wished to make, by which she intended to add the following words: “while deliberately hindering and boycotting evidence of high performance, promotion and pay increase.” to paragraphs 2.8 and 2.11; “Respondent started Claimant on the lowest pay scale of M1 despite Claimant’s qualification up to master’s degree level and industry experience which is different from how others were treated.” to paragraph 2.13; and “on various occasions” to paragraph 2.19.

[23]Amongst the reasons for the respondent’s objections was that the amendments sought to incorporate allegations contained in the particulars of claim dated 10th September 2023, which the claimant had been refused permission to rely on by Judge Heath (see paragraph 19 above).

[24]In light of Judge Heath’s order, on 19th August 2024, the Tribunal asked the claimant to identify where in the original statement of case she had pleaded those matters that she now wished to add to the list of issues. Despite several attempts, the claimant could not identify where these were pleaded in the statement of case. The Tribunal also noted that the wording the claimant wished to insert amounted to additional factual assertions which the respondent would have insufficient time to deal with if a late amendment was granted. Having regard to Selkent v Moore

[1996] ICR 836

, the Tribunal considered the balance of hardship lay in favour of refusing the amendment. Accordingly, except for the amendments the respondent agreed to, the claimant’s request to amend the list of issues was refused, and the final list of issues is as set out in the Appendix.

[25]Therefore, the final list of issues on which the Tribunal’s determination was made, consisted of the list of issues recorded following the preliminary hearing on 16th July 2024, plus the amendments the respondent had agreed to on 19th August 2024.

[26]When announcing its judgment on 23rd August 2024, the Tribunal correctly set out its findings on each of the factual allegations as set out in the list of issues as updated on 19th August 2024. But initially, it applied those findings to the complaints as labelled in the list of issues recorded following the hearing on 16th July 2024. When the claimant pointed this out, the Tribunal corrected the position, and confirmed its judgment in respect of all factual allegations and causes of action contained in the list of issues as updated on 19th August 2024. Time Limits

[27]Amongst the issues to be determined in the list of issues is whether the claims were brought in time. Subsection 123(1)(a) of the 2010 Act requires a claim is brought within 3 months of the date of the act complained of. By subsection 123(1)(b), the Tribunal may extend the 3-month time limit where it is just and equitable to do so. However, where conduct has extended over a period of time, according to subsection 123(3) the 3-month time limit starts to run from the end of the period of time in which the act complained of took place.

[28]The respondent argued that many of the allegations were outside the 3-month time limit, in some cases, it was claimed, they were significantly outside that time limit. However, the Tribunal concluded that the way the claim was presented it was capable of amounting to a series of incidents of prohibited conduct extending over a period of time. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that except for direct marriage and civil partnership discrimination, as regards all other causes of action, at least one allegation took place within the 3-month time limit.

[29]Therefore, the Tribunal adopted the approach set out in Arthur v London Eastern Railway Ltd

[2007] IRLR 58

(CA), and so heard the evidence first in order to make findings of fact, in order to determine whether there is evidence to connect the acts that occurred within the 3-month time limit to the acts that occurred outside it.

FINDINGS OF FACT

[30]Unless otherwise stated, the facts below are either agreed or unchallenged. The facts are broadly set out in the same order as in the list of issues.

[31]The Tribunal’s findings of fact were reached on a balance of probabilities, having considered the parties’ arguments and the witnesses’ evidence, including documents referred to in that evidence, and taking into account our assessment of the evidence.

[32]Only findings of fact relevant to the issues, and those necessary to determine the issues, have been referred to in this judgment. It has not been necessary, and neither would it be proportionate, to determine each and every fact in dispute. We have not referred to every document that we read and/or was taken into account in the findings below, but that does not mean it was not considered if it was referred to in the evidence and was relevant to an issue. Permanent or Fixed Term Employment Contract

[33]The respondent is a single academy trust which operates the Kingsdale Foundation school, which is a co-educational secondary school and sixth form.

[34]The claimant completed a job application form dated 23rd May 2020 in which she applied to the respondent for the post of computer science teacher. The claimant was a newly qualified teacher (NQT), and the job was advertised as suitable for NQTs. A copy of the advertisement was in the hearing bundle, and stated the position offered was a permanent post.

[35]In her application form, the claimant states the subjects she has taught included computing and business and finance.

[36]Some of the claimant’s qualification certificates contained in the bundle were as follows:35.1 BSc in Economics.

35.2 MA in Multimedia Design;

35.3 Postgraduate Diploma in Marketing Level 7.

[37]The claimant was interviewed for the post in around May 2020.

[38]Following her interview, she received a telephone call from Mr Sear who offered her the position of NQT starting in September 2020. The respondent states she was offered the job on the basis that she would be teaching business studies and computer science. The claimant does not dispute this and says in her witness statement that Mr Sear said he “… would also like me to teach Business Studies as well as Computer Science which I accepted.” (see paragraph 6).

[39]As to the other relevant terms of the claimant’s employment, the parties disagree. In particular, the claimant states that she had applied for a permanent position, and she was never informed the role had changed from the permanent position advertised to a non-permanent post. In his evidence, Mr Sear accepts the post had been advertised as a permanent full time computer science teaching post. However, he said his verbal job offer was for a one-year fixed term contract. He stated that was because the claimant had no formal computer science qualification, so in accordance with the respondent’s recruitment policy, the claimant was offered a fixed term position. Mr Sear said he specifically recalls that it was a fixed term contract he offered the claimant, because he says he remembers explaining to the claimant what a fixed term contract meant, as he said she didn’t appear to know what it was.

[40]Following this telephone discussion, the respondent sent the claimant a letter confirming her appointment. Confusingly, there are two versions of the letter in the hearing bundle. The first is dated 1st June 2020, stating the appointment is fixed term starting on 1st September 2020, until 31st August 2020 (it seems to be accepted the latter should read 2021). The letter also stated there would be a review of the position in spring 2021. The job title is stated to be a computer science and business studies teacher. It is this offer letter that the respondent relies on, but the claimant states she never received this letter.

[41]The claimant relies on the second version of this letter, which is dated 3rd June 2020. The first paragraph of that letter states the appointment is for a one-year fixed term post teaching computer science. However, the second page describes the position as an indefinite contract, so it makes no reference to the role being reviewed in spring 2021.

[42]In all other material respects, these letters are the same. Both letters stated that the post is subject to a probationary period of up to two terms, but which could be extended in exceptional or particular circumstances. Both letters stated too that the probationary period will be presumed to be extended until written confirmation of the outcome of the probation is provided. Both letters also stated that other terms of the offer were as discussed at the interview or with the headteacher.

[43]That there are two versions of the letter is inexplicable, but an explanation as to why there are two versions is not directly relevant to the issue we need to determine, which is whether the claimant was offered a fixed term or permanent position. The subsequent statement of the particulars of the claimant’s employment, which is dated 30th July 2020, describes the post as fixed term. And some time later, the claimant returned a signed statement of acceptance of the terms of appointment, which also stated the contract was fixed term.

[44]In deciding whether the claimant was offered a permanent or fixed term contract, we consider that most of the contemporaneous documents support the offer made to the claimant was for a fixed term position. While the post was originally advertised as permanent, we accept Mr Sear’s unchallenged evidence that the respondent’s recruitment policy states a fixed term position is ordinarily offered where an applicant has no formal qualification in the subject they will be teaching. We note the claimant’s employment contract is dated 30th July 2020, and describes the post as fixed term. Although the claimant says she didn’t receive the contract at that time, Mr Morrison’s evidence is that it was prepared in July 2020, which evidence we accept because it is supported by the document itself. Therefore, the only contemporaneous document suggesting the contract may have been permanent is the 3rd of June 2020 letter, which in any event also makes reference to the contract being fixed term. All other contemporaneous documents state the contract was fixed term. Accordingly, as the weight of the evidence indicates the contract was fixed term, we find that it was.

[45]As to the claimant’s qualifications, she obtained further qualifications in addition to those referred to at paragraph 35.1 to 35.3 above. On 16th July 2020 she was awarded a Post Graduate Certificate in Education, having successfully completed an approved programme at the University of East London in secondary computer science. And on 12th August 2020, she was awarded the National Centre for Computing Education Certificate to teach GCSE computer science. It is evident the claimant is a highly qualified individual, and that these include qualifications in teaching computer science. However, these qualifications post-date her interview and job offer, and she does not have a degree in computing science. The “Pretty Woman” Comment

[46]In the intervening period, as part of her induction, in July 2020 the claimant attended the school, when she was shown around the school and met some staff. The claimant says that during this visit, a member of staff, Mr Casco, referred to her as “Pretty Woman” in Ms Harrison’s presence. The claimant says this comment made her feel uncomfortable, and she’s aware this term could be used to describe someone who is a prostitute. The claimant felt aggrieved that despite being in a leadership role, Ms Harrison did not rebuke Mr Casco. However, the claimant did not complain about this incident at the time because she said she did not want to be perceived as a troublemaker before she had even started in her post.

[47]Ms Harrison denies any such comment being made in her presence and states the claimant did not raise this as a complaint at the time. The claimant subsequently raised this with Ms Harrison in February 2022, some 18 months after the incident itself. Accordingly, there is a direct conflict in the evidence regarding whether Mr Casco referred to the claimant as “Pretty Woman.”

[48]We accept an individual may be reluctant to complain, particularly when they are new in their post, or in this case, have not started yet. Nonetheless, having regard to the other surrounding circumstances, we prefer Ms Harrison’s evidence, and conclude Mr Casco did not call the claimant “Pretty Woman.”

[49]That is because prior to February 2022, the claimant had complained to Ms Harrison regarding Mr Casco. For instance, in a text message she sent to Ms Harrison on 7th September 2021 she complained he had been rude towards her (see page 316 of the bundle). Therefore, while the claimant may have wanted to avoid appearing to be a “troublemaker” by making a complaint about his rudeness in July 2020, before she started working for the respondent. This does not explain why, when complaining about his rudeness in September 2021, she failed to mention that he had earlier called her “Pretty Woman”. We therefore conclude it is more likely than not that Mr Casco did not make the “Pretty Woman” comment. The Claimant’s Payslips

[50]For several months from around September/October 2020, the claimant’s payslips were left in her pigeonhole in an envelope addressed to her as Miss Alabi instead of Mrs Alabi. In her witness statement, the claimant describes the effect this had on her as follows (see paragraph 87 of the claimant’s statement): “I was picking up paper payslips and correspondence from pigeonhole/ trays from October 2020 and it would be addressed to Miss Alabi rather than Mrs Alabi or Ms Alabi. At first I thought it was a mistake until I noticed that the pay slip in itself was addressed to “Mrs Alabi” and that it took someone printing out labels with “Miss Alabi” on it and sticking it in the payslip to cover up “Mrs Alabi” before dropping it in the pigeonhole/tray in the School office (pages 546 to 556). At first, I was embarrassed and felt too humiliated to discuss it since it was being done deliberately.”

[51]The respondent explains that because payslips showed an employee’s name and address, and were left in pigeonholes, for privacy, a sticker was placed over the envelope window to conceal their address. The respondent accepts that for a period of time, the sticker used on envelopes containing the claimant’s pay slips described her title as Miss. It says this was an administrative error. Failure to Provide a Laptop During Lockdown

[52]In January 2021, when the country was in lockdown, the claimant requested the respondent provides her with a laptop. In her oral evidence she said that employees who attended the school on the first day of term were given a laptop. The claimant had been told by the course director not to attend in person, but to join remotely. So because she did not go in to the school, she was not given a laptop. However, the claimant subsequently requested a laptop because her own computer had been hacked, and she required a computer in order to teach pupils online.

[53]The respondents state its policy is that administrative staff and pupils in need were prioritised when allocating laptops, and that ordinarily laptops were not supplied to teaching staff.

[54]Nonetheless, the hearing bundle contains e-mail exchanges on 12th January 2021 in which the claimant asks Ms Harrison to authorise a laptop being provided to her. Ms Harrison e-mails the respondent’s IT Helpdesk on the same day, authorising a laptop being loaned to the claimant, if one is available.

[55]Despite these exchanges, the claimant maintains the respondent did not provide her with a laptop during lockdown. Although she was subsequently provided with a laptop in around summer 2021 when all members of teaching staff were provided with one because the school changed from providing desktop computers to laptops instead.

[56]The respondent disputes this and contends the claimant was provided with a laptop during lockdown, despite it being the standard policy that laptops are not provided to teaching staff.

[57]We prefer the claimant’s direct evidence that she was not provided with a laptop during lockdown. In her oral evidence to the Tribunal, Ms Harrison confirmed she was not directly involved in supplying the laptop. This is supported by her requesting the IT Helpdesk provide a laptop, rather than providing the laptop directly to the claimant. Ms Harrison also accepted that she believed the claimant had been provided with a laptop during lockdown because she had authorised one being provided, and she was aware the claimant in fact had a laptop. However, Ms Harrison has no direct knowledge as to whether the claimant received the laptop during the 2021 lockdown, or, as the claimant states, in summer 2021 when laptops were made generally available. Support with Managing Student Behaviour

[58]The claimant makes a number of allegations of not being adequately supported by the respondent in managing pupil behaviour. Firstly, she describes an incident on around 4th December 2020, which she relies on as an example of this.

[59]The incident involved Mr Barot, the head of learning for year 9. The incident also involved a pupil, referred to as pupil L. During one of the claimant’s lessons pupil L was using a mobile phone. The claimant describes this at paragraph 43 of her witness statement, she says “Mr Sear and Assistant headteacher Daniel Harding walked in and confiscated the phone and left the classroom.

[60]She continues Mr Barot subsequently “… walked into this lesson, completely ignored me, told the pupils they had no teacher in the classroom, and carried on shouting at them loudly and then left the classroom by banging the door really loudly behind him because Mr Sear had caught one of the pupils with a mobile phone. I found this a very distressful and humiliating experience … He would not treat other teachers like that.”

[61]The parties dispute what Mr Barot said while in the claimant’s classroom. The above extract from the claimant’s witness statement describes her evidence regarding this.

[62]Ms Harrison accepted she was not present during this incident, but she says Mr Barot denies saying there was no teacher in the claimant’s classroom. Ms Harrison considered Mr Barot's behaviour may have been a proportionate response, taking into account that he may have just had two members of the senior management team, namely Mr Sear and Mr Harding, informing him that a year 9 pupil's phone was confiscated because it was being used in the classroom.

[63]Accordingly, the dispute regarding this incident centres around whether Mr Barot claimed there was no teacher in the classroom when he walked into the claimant’s year 9 class.

[64]On the balance of probability, we find it is less likely that Mr Barot said the classroom was without a teacher. Our reason for this is that is inconsistent with the agreed facts as to what had happened. Namely that pupil L was found to be using a mobile phone (whether openly or secretly), this contravention of school rules had been brought to Mr Barot’s attention by two members of the senior management team. We find it is unlikely that in those circumstances, the head of year would leave the classroom while believing there was no teacher present to supervise.

[65]While Mr Barot’s behaviour, as described by the claimant, indicates he was angry. We note, there is no suggestion that his anger would be harmful to the students in the classroom, such that they would need support. Therefore, we consider it’s unlikely that the claimant would require support to deal with his behaviour. Furthermore, even if he had said there was no teacher in the classroom, which we found he did not say, the absence of support to the claimant to deal with this is justifiable. We do not consider the incident to be sufficiently serious for it to be necessary to provide support to the claimant.

[66]The claimant’s second example of not being supported in managing pupil behaviour is the respondent’s failure or refusal to provide a teaching assistant for her classes. Her evidence is that she had a number of students in her classes with special educational needs, but except for one student who briefly had a teaching assistant, she had no teaching assistant in her classes.

[67]The respondent’s position is that teaching assistants are not assigned to teachers or classes. A student who has special educational needs that meet the required threshold is allocated a teaching assistant if that forms part of their Education Health and Care Plan prepared by the local authority. The teaching assistant would also be funded by the local authority, which allocates those funds to the child. Those funds must be used in accordance with an agreement reached between the local authority and the parents which is entered into independently of the school. The school must then use the funds in accordance with the Education Health and Care Plan, and the parents’ and local authority’s agreement. If the school doesn’t do so, the parent may complain, and the school may be required to repay any funds which have not been applied in accordance with the Education Health and Care Plan.

[68]The respondent states it does not have any teaching assistants except for the local authority funded teaching assistants.

[69]Therefore, the respondent’s position is that if no teaching assistant was provided that was because the students in the claimant’s classes did not meet the required threshold. When Ms Gilbert put this to the claimant during cross examination, she did not dispute that was the position, and seemed unclear about how teaching assistants are funded.

[70]Accordingly, we accept that apart from a brief period, the claimant did not have a teaching assistant in her classes. However, we consider that was not a resource the respondent had the power to grant or withhold.

[71]The claimant alleges the respondent failed to support her in managing student behaviour, including as regards one student, pupil D, that the claimant experienced particular behaviour issues with.

[72]At paragraph 46 of her witness statement, the claimant gave an example, stating when she sought to impose sanctions these would be overridden. On one occasion she imposed the sanction of blended learning when pupil D was fighting with a boy in the classroom. Blended learning is referred to in the respondent’s behaviour policy as a measure that may be imposed where a pupil repeatedly breaks rules or does not cooperate. However, there are e-mail exchanges from September and October 2021 when the claimant complains that the sanction, she imposed of blended learning for pupil D fighting was not implemented. The claimant says this inconsistent approach to pupil management meant that pupils in her class would not respect her authority. She says this undermined her ability to manage student misbehaviour, rather than helping her do so.

[73]The respondent alleges the claimant did not correctly implement its behaviour policy, and that is the reason sanctions she sought to impose were overridden. It claimed that at this time, i.e. on 28th September 2021, pupil D’s mother e-mailed the respondent complaining that the claimant had imposed disproportionate sanctions, including detentions that, as her parent, she should have been notified of, but she received no notification. The respondent states that the necessary precursors to imposing detentions were not recorded by the claimant against pupil D’s records. Essentially, the respondent maintains it would be inappropriate to enforce sanctions which the claimant imposed, where they are contrary to its behaviour policy, for instance because a parent was not given adequate notice that their child would be kept behind in detention.

[74]The documentary evidence tends to corroborate the respondent’s account that the claimant did not follow all the necessary steps in the behaviour policy, and that in particular, she did not always appropriately record behavioural issues. As an example, the claimant complained of continuous problematic behaviour from pupil D whom she taught every week. However, the claimant only recorded around 7 behavioural issues per year relating to pupil D on the respondent’s Go4Schools computer system. This is also consistent with pupil D’s mother’s complaint of not being adequately notified about pupil D’s detentions. When misconduct is recorded on the Go4Schools system, it would automatically generate the appropriate notification to the parent, including any sanction imposed, such as a detention. Therefore, if pupil D’s behavioural issues were properly recorded, her parent should have received notification of pupil D’s detentions.

[75]In the circumstances, we conclude that the claimant’s sanctions were overridden because she had not complied with the respondent’s behaviour policy, especially by failing to record all relevant information. Accordingly, we do not see this as a failure to support her, but instead, the respondent ensuring its behaviour policy was followed.

[76]Another complaint the claimant made regarding inadequate support was that the faculty director had agreed that she should telephone him to come to her class when she encountered behavioural problems that she needed support with. However, the claimant says when she tried to call him for help, he didn't come because he had a class himself.

[77]As the claimant’s former line manager, Ms Harrison’s evidence in response is that her main approach to support was to try to give the claimant strategies to manage student behaviour, rather than directly intervening. However, she said the claimant looked to others to directly intervene to manage problematic behaviour from the pupils she was teaching, rather than implementing strategies to deal with this herself. As a result, the claimant would telephone for assistance when a colleague may not be available to assist. Ms Harrison states that such direct intervention by others did not equip the claimant with the skills required to deal with future problematic student behaviour.

[78]We accept the claimant’s account that when she requested other teachers come to her classroom to assist her with students misbehaving, they would not always do so. However, we consider that was not a failure to provide support. It would either be because, like the course director, they were busy, for instance teaching their own class. Or, as Ms Harrison says, and the claimant did not dispute, because they tried to equip her with the necessary strategies to manage student behaviour rather than directly intervening. Therefore, we find that appropriate support was provided to the claimant, albeit the support may not have been of the type the claimant was seeking. Not Assigning GCSE or 6th Form Classes or Allowing the Use of 3D Graphics

[79]The claimant states that amongst the classes allocated to her were around 7 to 8 different classes which were years 7 or 8, each having class sizes of around 30 students. She argues that particularly as an NQT, this was more demanding than teaching sixth form classes, which had far fewer students, and the students were motivated and more mature, making them an easier group to teach. She said she was suitably qualified to teach this group because she had a degree in computing, her qualifications included a post graduate qualification in addition to her master's degree, and she had industry experience.

[80]She also considered that she was qualified to teach GCSE computer science but was not allocated a GCSE computer science class. She says in contrast younger teachers, with less qualifications and/or experience than her were allocated GCSE classes. For instance, she said Mr Kyrell Turner who joined the respondent as an NQT in September 2021, was allocated a GCSE computer science class.

[81]There is no factual dispute here, as the respondent accepts the claimant did not have a GCSE computer science class nor a sixth form class. Its position was that the classes allocated to the claimant were appropriate and commensurate with her qualifications and experience. Ms Harrison pointed out the claimant was allocated a year 9 computer science class. This was done in anticipation that the claimant would continue teaching them during their GCSE examination years.

[82]The respondent added that where possible it liked to keep the same classroom teacher for continuity. However, Ms Harrison claims that due to complaints received about the claimant, the year 9 computer science class the claimant taught were subsequently allocated to a different teacher to teach during their GCSE years.

[83]As to Mr Turner being allocated a GCSE class, Ms Harrison explained he had been at the school as a student teacher. One of the classes he had as a student teacher was the GCSE class he was allocated when he was appointed as an NQT. And he was allocated the GCSE class to maintain continuity for the students.

[84]Ms Harrison continued that it is rare for an NQT to be allocated a sixth form year group. Furthermore, in Ms Harrison’s opinion, the claimant did not have the depth of knowledge required to teach a sixth form computer science class.

[85]Mr Morrison's evidence was that the school has a good track record for its students’ securing places at Oxford and Cambridge, some of whom wish to study computer science at those universities. He said contrary to the claimant’s assertion that such classes are less demanding, this emphasises how demanding teaching such a class can be.

[86]The claimant also complained that Mr Turner was allowed to teach topics that were not part of the specification, introducing exciting graphics and software, making his classes more engaging and appealing for the students. Whereas in her case, Ms Harrison denied her request to do so with her own class groups. Ms Harrison states the reason she refused the claimant’s request was that she initially believed the claimant’s class would be assessed, and that is why she needed the claimant’s class to follow the specification. As things turned out, the claimant’s class was not assessed. However, at the time she directed the claimant to follow the specification, Ms Harrison believed the claimant’s class would be assessed and that was what informed her decision. Mr Casco Swearing in February 2022

[87]The claimant complains about an incident on the February 2022 training day when Mr Casco used the term “motherfucker”. The incident was witnessed by the claimant and Ms Harrison; both of their evidence regarding this incident is broadly consistent. The claimant states that during a staff meeting, she reminded Mr Casco that he was supposed to attend a meeting after work that he had forgotten about. On being reminded of the meeting, he used this term.

[88]The claimant explains (see paragraph 56 of her statement): “It made her feel humiliated and harassed and discriminated against as a female and a mother.”

[89]During her evidence, the Tribunal asked whether the claimant believed Mr Casco was referring to her when he used this term. The claimant’s response was that she didn’t know what was on his mind at the time, adding that she chose not to make a judgement about that.

[90]The respondent accepts Mr Casco used this term. Ms Harrison states it was an ill-judged use of highly inappropriate language, but that it was a spontaneous reaction to him being told that there was a meeting at 5:00pm that evening which he apparently had forgotten about. Ms Harrison said she considered it inappropriate to rebuke him for this language in the presence of his colleagues, but that she later spoke to him about his inappropriate use of the term. The Claimant’s Probation

[91]As stated, there is a dispute as to whether the letter dated 1st June 2020, or the one dated 3rd June 2020, is the letter of appointment sent to the claimant. In any event, both versions of that letter have similar provisions relating to probation. That wording read: New employees to the school will be subject to a probationary period of up to two teaching terms or longer if agreed in exceptional or particular circumstances. The probationary period may be extended at the discretion of the head teacher or his/her representative. The school will assess and review your work performance, fitness to fulfil the requirements of the post and attendance during this time and reserves the right to terminate your employment subject to compliance with the Equality Act.

[92]Part of the dispute between the parties regarding this issue is whether or not by February 2022 the claimant's probationary period had ended. The claimant says that by February 2022 her probation had ended. She relies on the fact that she was notified her probationary period was for two teaching terms, she had completed two teaching terms, she therefore considered that her probationary period had come to an end.

[93]In support of her contention, the claimant asks why the respondent would give her a permanent contract of employment in July 2021 if at the same time it had kept her on an extended probation. Furthermore, she adds that prior to February 2022 she had not been informed that her probationary period was continuing. In particular, she says, that no one in HR informed her that her probation had been extended. Therefore, when Mr Sear wrote to her in February 2022 stating that she was on probation, she considered that her probation had already ended, and that the respondent was not entitled to reinstate her probation.

[94]The respondent’s position is that the claimant’s probation was continuous. The respondent maintains that due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the probationary period for all newly recruited NQTs was extended under the exceptional circumstances provision in the above quoted extract. Mr Sear states he informed all affected staff during a meeting at the beginning of the January 2021 lockdown, that their probationary period was to be extended. He had explained this was because of the disruption in their training caused by lockdown, in particular making it unfair to assess them because they had been teaching remotely. Therefore, the respondent claims that contrary to the claimant’s assertion, she was informed regarding the extension of her probation prior to February 2022. The claimant says HR did not inform her that her probation was to be extended. However, the respondent’s case is that Mr Sear informed affected staff in around January 2021.

[95]Having regard to the surrounding circumstances, we find it is more likely than not that the claimant's probationary period did not end in the spring term of 2021. Firstly, the claimant's appointment terms provided for an extension of the probationary period in exceptional circumstances. A pandemic in which classroom teaching is converted into teaching online seems just the type of exceptional circumstance that would engage those provisions. We also consider it’s more likely than not that having decided to extend the probationary period for all NQTs, Mr Sear would have informed affected staff about this. We note Mr Sear’s evidence on this point was not challenged during cross examination. The claimant’s point seems to be that HR didn’t inform her about the extension.

[96]In light of the above, we conclude that the claimant and other affected staff were informed by Mr Sear in around January 2021 that their probation was to be extended. Therefore, while we consider the claimant was on an extended probation in February 2022, we consider that she had been on probation continuously since September 2020, rather than her probation being reinstated in February 2022.

[97]Secondly, addressing why would she be given a permanent contract in July 2021 if she was on extended probation. We consider the claimant’s probation and being given a permanent contract are separate matters. An individual who has been engaged on a permanent employment contract may (and will often) still be subject to a probationary period. Therefore, we do not find any inconsistency with the claimant’s original fixed term contract being reviewed in spring 2021, and resulting in her being given a permanent contract, despite her still being on probation. It was common ground that the terms of the claimant’s permanent July 2021 contract did not deal with probation, accordingly we find there was nothing to indicate the July 2021 contract signalled the end of the claimant’s probation. Teaching in Design and Technology Classrooms

[98]In around April and September 2022 the claimant’s year 10 business studies class changed rooms, on each occasion, they were moved to a Design & Technology classroom, which she said amounted to a breach of health and safety requirements. In particular, she said the classroom had appliances in a hazardous condition, and dangerous tools and machinery in it. The claimant was especially concerned that these tools included knives, and that her year 10 class were particularly poorly behaved. The respondent maintains that the school was undergoing a multi-million-pound refurbishment, which required the cooperation of all members of staff, including moving from their usual classrooms. In his evidence, Mr Morrison disputes this situation posed a health and safety risk. According to him, all hazardous tools, were kept securely stored by a Design and Technology technician who would be nearby whenever the rooms were in use. He pointed out the technician was the school’s deputy health and safety officer, and so he was fully aware of the necessary measures required to keep the teaching environment safe.

[99]We find that to the extent there were any tools or other items that were potentially hazardous, appropriate measures were taken to ensure a safe working environment, not least because there was a suitably trained health and safety officer close by providing an additional safeguard.

[100]The claimant also complains of being moved to room IT1 where there were sharpcomputer edges and broken sockets in breach of health and safety regulations. There is a direct conflict of evidence on this point because the respondent denies this allegation. We note the claimant has not provided any photographic evidence to support this allegation, even though she had provided photographic evidence relating to other points (for instance see pages 565 to 568 of the hearing bundle). In the absence of any independent evidence to support the allegation, we find the claimant has not discharged the burden of proving that room IT1 breached health and safety regulations. Feedback on Classroom Observation in October 2022

[101]The claimant alleges the feedback she received following the classroom observation on18th October 2022 was negative both in content and the manner in which the feedback was given.

[102]Ms Harrison accepts that the feedback she and Dr Okolo-Angus gave to the claimantfollowing the lesson observation was negative. She says that the negative feedback accurately reflected their assessment based on the observation. The respondent’s usual practice was to provide verbal feedback only. Therefore, while a written assessment was also prepared, the claimant did not receive a copy. However, the written assessment was in the hearing bundle, and it contained both positive and negative feedback.

[103]One area of dispute between the parties was whether the observation criticised theteaching plan used by the claimant. The respondent says the negative feedback was due to the claimant’s performance not the teaching plan. The claimant says the teaching plan she used was criticised. She also says that it was unfair to criticise her for the plan because she was asked to use that teaching plan instead of the one, she had prepared herself. As stated by the claimant, we find the written assessment does contain some criticism of the teaching plan (see page 441 of the bundle).

[104]However, we note that the majority of negative feedback was regarding the claimant’sperformance as opposed to the teaching plan. The written feedback report says the claimant was very nervous and so did not demonstrate an appropriate way to deliver the curriculum. The claimant says she was nervous because her computer shut down unexpectedly just prior to the observation beginning.

[105]We also consider the negative feedback outweighed the positive feedback, which isconsistent with the claimant’s assertion that the feedback was negative, and Ms Harrison’s concurrence, albeit the latter considered the negative feedback was justified.

[106]However, Ms Harrison does not accept the claimant’s allegation that the manner inwhich the feedback was given was negative. The example the claimant gives to support the contention that the feedback was given in a negative manner, is that the feedback was given in a classroom, whereas others received their feedback in an office. Furthermore, she complains that she was required to sit on a pupil’s chair at a pupil’s desk while the feedback was being given, which made her feel humiliated.

[107]During her oral evidence, Ms Harrison explained feedback was given in a classroom forprivacy, because the office where others had been given feedback was going to be used by others at the time the claimant’s feedback was due to be given. As to the claimant being required to sit at a pupil’s desk, Ms Harrison said it was the same type of chair and desk that they all sat at during the feedback session. Ms Harrison added that the desks were standard desks used by pupils and teachers.

[108]We accept Ms Harrison’s evidence that the pupils’ desks were the standard desks, andthat the desks are also used by teachers. This was consistent with the evidence given by Mr Sear on a different matter: he said he was giving evidence remotely to the Tribunal sitting at such a desk. We are also persuaded by the fact that Ms Harrison’s evidence was that Dr Angus-Okolo and Ms Harrison both sat at the same type of desk that the claimant was sitting at. The claimant did not challenge this. We therefore conclude that the manner in which the feedback was given was not negative. The Claimant’s Pay

[109]The claimant has two complaints regarding her pay. The first complaint is that having been appointed on pay scale MPS 1 in September 2020, the claimant contends her pay scale should have increased annually, so that by September to December 2022, she should have been on pay scale MPS 3. But instead, she remained on pay scale MPS 2. 110. Her second complaint is that she has not been awarded a 5% pay increase.

[111]Mr Morrison’s evidence was that annual automatic progression through the pay scaleended some years previously, and the system for pay increases was replaced by a system of performance related pay. This required teachers to evidence any performance relied on to support a pay increase. We note that when the claimant signed her acceptance of the permanent contract of employment in July 2021, she accepted the terms offered, which was on MPS 1, despite the fact that she was entering the second year of her employment with the respondent. This indicates she was aware there was no automatic annual progression through the MPS pay scale.

[112]As to the 5% pay increase, Mr Morrison explained to the Tribunal that the increaseapplied only to those employees who had transferred to the KFS pay scale. He continued, that the claimant had been offered the option to transfer to KFS at the time and had expressly responded that she didn’t wish to transfer. Therefore, according to him, that is the reason she did not receive the 5% pay increase.

[113]The claimant challenged Mr Morrison about why she hadn’t been informed about thiswhen given the option to transfer to KFS; Mr Morrison responded that was because the Government hadn’t yet announced the 5% pay increase.

[114]Accordingly, it is common ground that from September to December 2022 the claimantwas not on the MPS 3 pay scale and did not receive a 5% pay increase. Not Being Allowed to Apply for the Head of Department Role

[115]The respondent maintains that the claimant was not prevented from applying for headof department role but considers it's unlikely she would have been appointed if she had applied. That is because the respondent considers that the claimant was struggling to complete her probation.

[116]The claimant's evidence accepted that no one prohibited her from applying for the role,and she recognised that being on extended probation meant it was unlikely she would have been successful if she had applied. Indeed, part of her objection to the extended probation is that it adversely affected her career progression.

[117]Part of the claimant’s criticism was that she had not been informed that the role wasabout to be advertised. She says the faculty director knew she was interested in career development, because he had supported her going on a promotional course. Although in her oral evidence, she accepted she did not specifically tell the faculty director that she might be interested in the head of department role.

[118]We do not consider that the claimant’s evidence supports the contention that she wasnot allowed to apply for the role of head of department, given that she accepts she was not prevented from doing so. Given a Timetable in Excess of other NQTs

[119]It is common ground that an NQT should not have more than 90% of timetabledteaching. However, the claimant maintains her timetable exceeded that amount. In calculating this, the claimant included the pastoral periods which were on her timetable. However, the respondent argued that the claimant’s timetabled teaching was 70% excluding the pastoral period. The respondent maintained that the unions and Ofsted regarded pastoral time as non-teaching time, and it adopted the same approach. Therefore, according to the respondent, the claimant’s allocated timetable was below the maximum permissible.

[120]The claimant didn't expressly challenge that the pastoral period was considered byunions and Ofsted to be non-teaching time. In fact, she accepted that she was unaware they categorised it as such. In the absence of any particular challenge to the respondent’s evidence on this point we accept the respondent’s evidence that pastoral time counts as non-teaching time. Therefore, factoring this into the claimant’s timetable, allocated teaching time was below the national maximum permissible by 20%. In those circumstances, we consider it is unlikely that the claimant was given a timetable in excess of other NQTs. Furthermore, she provided no evidence or argument indicating others were allocated less teaching time than her. The Claimant not being given Pay Slips

[121]The claimant maintains that she was not given payslips from April 2021 to December2022, despite her e-mailing the respondent’s HR about this. The bundle shows the claimant was sending e-mails and WhatsApp messages about her payslips in November and December 2022.

[122]It is common ground that the respondent moved to a system of issuing electronicpayslips in April 2021. There is an e-mail from Mr Sear to teaching staff sent on 13th April 2021 notifying them about the change and providing information on how to access their payslips electronically. This information was reiterated to the claimant in the November and December 2022 communications.

[123]Therefore, while the respondent no longer left the claimant’s payslip in her pigeonholeas it had previously done, it had provided her with the means to access her payslips electronically. The claimant does not dispute being provided with the means to access her payslips in 2021. We note there is no evidence she raised concerns about access to her electronic payslips between April 2021 to October 2022. Accordingly, we find that the claimant had been given the means to access her electronic payslips after the system changed. Not Being Given Intranet Access or Stationery

[124]It's the claimant’s case that the respondent failed to give her access to its intranet, norstationary for her pupils, for instance notebooks and whiteboard pens.

[125]Dealing with the intranet first, the claimant says that from the start of her employment,she made repeated requests for access to the intranet, but access details were only provided to her in March 2022, being around 18 months after the start of her employment.

[126]The respondent’s position is that the claimant was provided with an induction packcontaining essential materials as part of her induction on or prior to the start date of her employment. The claimant accepts that she was provided with the induction pack. The respondent states that amongst the information provided in the induction pack were login details to access the intranet. Ms Harrison states there was a checklist of the documents included in the pack, showing access details were provided.

[127]Additionally, the respondent says at any time, the claimant could have asked anybodyfor the access details. For instance, she could have asked the network manager or any of her colleagues. Mr Sear says he discussed the intranet during his regular briefings, and on one occasion he invited colleagues to contact him if they required access details.

[128]Although we were not provided with a copy of the induction pack checklist, all of therespondent’s witnesses confirmed that there is a checklist, and that it includes access details to the intranet, and that the claimant would have been given those details as part of her induction.

[129]We prefer the direct evidence from the respondent on this point. Each of therespondent’s witnesses gave the same evidence on this point. In light of this consistency and corroboration, on the balance of probabilities, we consider it is more likely than not that the claimant was provided with these details as part of her induction as the respondent maintains. Particularly, as we note, the claimant accepts she received the induction pack, and such access details would be the type of information typically provided at an induction.

[130]The respondent’s witnesses’ evidence is also supported by the surroundingcircumstances, which show Ms Harrison’s willingness to providing the claimant with access details when she was aware the claimant didn’t have these. For example, on 24th April 2022 the claimant asked Ms Harrison for access to the intranet. Within a few minutes Ms Harrison responded, providing the requested information. This indicates that providing the contact details to access the intranet could be dealt with swiftly and easily and is consistent with the respondent’s case that had it been aware the claimant did not have access to the intranet, but was requesting this, it would have easily and quickly provided her with the necessary access information. Therefore, we find the claimant was initially provided with information regarding how to access the intranet at her induction, which Ms Harrison subsequently provided again as soon as the claimant made a direct request to her for that information.

[131]As to the alleged failure to provide stationary such as notebooks, the claimant statesthat when she started, there was a delay in her being provided with notebooks. She also says that in around September 2022, Ms Harrison provided her with 50 notebooks when she needed 300. Ms Harrison states that when the claimant’s employment began, there was a general shortage of notebooks due to various shortages in the aftermath of the COVID-19 lockdown. As to September 2022, Ms Harrison states that she gave the claimant one box of notebooks, but informed her that she could collect additional notebooks, as needed, from her office, and so additional notebooks were available to the claimant.

[132]The claimant did not provide additional information regarding the respondent’s allegedfailure to provide other stationary such as whiteboard pens etc. No Contract of Particulars of Employment for Six Months

[133]As stated, there are two versions of the letters of appointment are dated 1st and 3rd June 2020. Both versions confirm the claimant was to be employed by the respondent, the respondent’s address, her job title, start date and salary are given, and there is also an outline of her responsibilities in the post.

[134]The contract of fixed term employment is dated 30th July 2020. However, the claimant’ssignature on the statement of acceptance is dated 22nd March 2021, around 8 months later.

[135]Mr Morrison’s evidence was that the contract was in fact prepared in July 2020 at theclaimant’s insistence. The claimant’s position is that she did not receive it until March 2021, after repeatedly chasing the respondent for a copy of her contract of employment.

[136]The information contained in both versions of the letter of appointment, does not satisfyall of the requirements at section 1 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

[137]Mr Morrison was clear in his evidence that the claimant was insistent about the contractof employment being prepared in the summer, to the point where he said he became concerned that if she did not receive the contract, she may not take up the post. This is consistent with the contract, on its face, being dated July 2020.

[138]On the other hand, there are e-mails exchanged between the claimant and Mr Sear inMarch 2021 indicating the claimant had only just received her employment contract. Those e-mails are consistent with the date she signed the statement of acceptance, therefore suggesting she had not received the employment contract back in July 2020.

[139]In our judgement it is more likely than not that the claimant’s employment contract wasposted to her in July 2020. We find it unlikely that Mr Morrison would go to the effort of obtaining an early copy of the contract, but not arrange for a copy to be sent to the claimant. Furthermore, given his concern that she would not take up the post if she wasn’t given a contract, this provides an additional reason why the respondent is likely to have arranged for a copy to be posted to the claimant. This task was outsourced to a company called Strictly Education, from whom we have not received direct evidence. However, given that the nature of their business is carrying out these types of activities, and there is, in fact, a contract dated July 2020, we are satisfied that the contract was prepared and posted to the claimant in July 2020.

[140]Regarding the claimant not being confirmed in a permanent role, it is common groundthat the claimant was offered, and accepted, a permanent role in July 2021 (see pages 295 to 297 of the hearing bundle).

[141]As stated at paragraph 44 above, we find the claimant was initially employed on a fixedterm contract from 1st September 2020 to 31st August 2021, which was to be reviewed in spring 2021. As she had been offered a permanent post by July 2021, we find her position as a permanent employee was confirmed in accordance with those provisions.

[142]The claimant’s view that she was not confirmed in a permanent role appears to be basedon the fact that she applied for a permanent role to teach computer science, but the respondent says it employed her on a fixed term contract. In support of this argument, she appears to be arguing that because Mr Turner applied for and secured a permanent role in May 2021, the job he was offered was effectively the one she had applied for back in 2020.

[143]Mr Turner’s letter of appointment is dated 26th May 2021, with a start date of 1st September 2021. It confirms he was appointed on an indefinite contract to teach computer science, business and media studies.

[144]It follows from this timing that Mr Turner was appointed before the claimant's positionwas confirmed to be permanent, and therefore his appointment was in fact while the claimant was still waiting for confirmation of her permanent contract.

[145]However, in our judgment, Mr Turner’s appointment on an indefinite position had nobearing on the job that the claimant applied for and accepted commencing September 2020. That is demonstrated by the fact that the claimant’s position as a permanent teacher was confirmed as effective from 1st September 2021. This is the same start date as Mr Turner’s new (permanent) role; therefore his employment didn’t affect or prevent the claimant from being subsequently confirmed in her role.

[146]To the extent that Mr Turner is stated to have been less qualified than the claimant, therespondent’s position was that his standard of work was already known because he had been a student teacher at the school. It also considered he performed well during interview, whereas Mr Morrison’s evidence was that when the claimant was recruited in May 2020, her interview and class observation were not of the same high standard. Ms Harrison Cancelled the Claimant’s Back to Work Meeting to Help Mr Casco

[147]Following her return to work in July 2022 after a period of sick leave, the claimantcomplains that Ms Harrison refused to hold a back to work meeting because she was too busy dealing with a younger colleague, namely Mr Casco.

[148]In cross examination the claimant accepted that the back to work meeting was notnecessarily the formal type of back to work meeting that the Employment Tribunal sometimes encounters. In her evidence, Ms Harrison confirmed she prioritised dealing with Mr Casco because he needed her help with an issue relating to GCSE exams, which was time critical. Remotely Controlling the Claimant’s Computer on 18th October 2022

[149]The claimant states that immediately prior to the lesson observation on 18th October2022 her computer unexpectedly shut down. As a result, she had to hurriedly restart her computer. This made her feel that she appeared to be disorganised in Dr Angus-Okolo’s presence, and also made her nervous about being observed.

[150]Furthermore, the claimant says her computer shut down because the respondent wascontrolling her computer remotely, and the respondent caused it to shut down in order to hinder her work, in particular to hinder her performance during the imminent observation.

[151]The respondent does not dispute the claimant’s computer shutdown, but it vehementlydenies controlling her computer remotely, causing it to shut down, and also denies that it has in any way hindered her work.

[152]There is a direct conflict of evidence, and to resolve this, we need to consider whichscenario is more likely. We also take into account that the claimant has not provided any evidence that the respondent could control her computer remotely, or that it did so. Therefore, we find the claimant has failed to discharge the burden of proving that the respondent controlled her computer remotely.

THE LAW

[153]The Tribunal has applied the following law in this case. Unfair (Constructive) Dismissal

[154]By section 95(1)(c) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, an employee who resigns willbe regarded as being constructively dismissed if the conditions at paragraphs153.1 to 153.3 below are satisfied. Those conditions are as follows: 153.1 an employee is entitled to resign where an employer’s conduct amounts to a fundamental breach of the contract of employment.

153.2 the term of the contract must be clear and certain, with the parties intending to be legally bound by it; and

153.3 the employer’s breach must be a factor causing the employee’s resignation.

[155]In these circumstances, a resignation amounts to a dismissal whether it is with or withoutnotice.

[156]In Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp

[1978] ICR 221

, CA, Lord Denning MR defined constructive dismissal as follows: “If the employer is guilty of conduct which is a significant breach going to the root of the contract of employment, or which shows that the employer no longer intends to be bound by one or more of the essential terms of the contract, then the employee is entitled to treat himself as discharged from any further performance. If he does so, then he terminates the contract by reason of the employer’s conduct. He is constructively dismissed. The employee is entitled in those circumstances to leave at the instant without giving any notice at all or, alternatively, he may give notice and say he is leaving at the end of the notice. But the conduct must in either case be sufficiently serious to entitle him to leave at once. Moreover, he must make up his mind soon after the conduct of which he complains: for, if he continues for any length of time without leaving, he will lose his right to treat himself as discharged. He will be regarded as having elected to affirm the contract.” The Equality Act 2010 - Discrimination and Harassment

[157]The Equality Act 2010 sets out the legislative provisions relevant to the complaints ofdiscrimination and harassment in this case.

[158]Section 4 of the Act lists the protected characteristics covered by its provisions, whichinclude age, sex and marriage and civil partnership.

[159]Direct discrimination is defined at section 13, which, insofar as is relevant states:(1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protectedcharacteristic, A treats B less favourably that A would treat others.

(2) If the protected characteristic is age, A does not discriminate against B if A can showA’s treatment of B to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. …. (4) If the protected characteristic is marriage and civil partnership, this section applies to a contravention of Part 5 (work) only if the treatment is because it is B who is married or a civil partner.

[160]As to harassment, that is defined in subsection 26(1) as follows: (1) A person (A) harasses another (B) if- (a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and (b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of(i) violating B’s dignity, or (ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B. …. (4) In deciding whether conduct has the effect referred to in subsection (1)(b), each of the following must be taken into account(a) the perception of B. (b) the other circumstances of the case. (c) whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect. The Burden of Proof

[161]Subsection 136(2) of the 2010 Act sets out the burden of proof that applies, it reads: If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the Court must hold the contravention occurred.

[162]However, subsection 136(3) continues: But subsection (2) does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the provision.

[163]Therefore, to determine whether the burden of proof has been discharged requires atwofold test.

[164]Firstly, the claimant must establish, on the balance of probabilities, facts from which theinference could properly be drawn by the tribunal that, in the absence of any other explanation, an unlawful act was committed.

[165]If so, the second stage is engaged, which shifts the burden of proof to the respondentwho is required to prove on the balance of probabilities, that the treatment in question was in no sense whatsoever on the grounds of the claimant’s protected characteristics.

[166]Guidelines on the burden of proof were set out by the Court of Appeal in Igen v Wong

[2005] IRLR 258

. At stage one, the burden is on the claimant, who must show there are primary facts from which the Tribunal could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that there has been unlawful conduct. All that is needed at this stage are facts from which an inference of prohibited conduct is possible. At this stage of the test, the employer’s explanation is disregarded.

[167]Once the claimant discharges the burden of proof it shifts to the respondents to prove,on the balance of probabilities, that the treatment was in no sense whatsoever on the grounds of the protected characteristic.

[168]The Court of Appeal in Madderassy v Nomura International plc

[2007] ICR 867

, a case brought under the then Sex Discrimination Act 1975, states: The burden of proof does not shift to the employer simply on the claimant establishing a difference in status (EG sex) and a difference in treatment. Those bare facts only indicate a possibility of discrimination. They are not, without more, sufficient material from which a tribunal “could conclude” that on the balance of probabilities, the respondent had committed an unlawful act of discrimination. Unauthorised Deduction from Wages

[169]By section 13 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, it is unlawful to make unauthorised deductions from wages, as defined below.168.1 The number of wages properly payable to an employee is based on the terms of the employee’s contract.

168.2 The terms of the contract of employment may be express, implied term or a combination of both.

168.3 A contractual term may only be implied in limited circumstances, for instance, if the term is implied by the parties’ custom and practice.

168.4 By the date an employee is due to be paid, if they have received less than the amount properly payable to them, the deficiency in pay amounts to an unlawful deduction of wages. THE TRIBUNAL’S CONCLUSION ON THE ISSUES

[170]We have applied the above law to the findings of fact that we have made in order to answer the questions raised by the issues, and in so doing, we provide our conclusions on those issues as set out below. Time limits Were the complaints made within the time limit in section 123 of the Equality Act 2010? Namely, within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the act to which the complaint relates?

[171]The Tribunal concludes that some acts complained of in respect of age and sexdiscrimination occurred within the three-month time limit, namely the claimant’s allegations that she was not moved up to the MPS 3 pay scale nor been awarded a 5% pay increase. This complaint relates to September to December 2022. It means this complaint is in time because the claimant’s resignation took effect on 31st December 2022, early conciliation started on 25th February 2023, ending on 7th April 2023, and she presented her claim on 3rd May 2023. If not, was there conduct extending over a period?

[172]The claimant maintains the acts complained of happened over an extended period. Inher statement of case, the claimant states: “Whilst still in their employment, they continued to discriminate and to cause harassment until I eventually resigned after giving the required two months' notice period.” If so, was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the end of that period?

[173]The claimant maintains the extended period within which the prohibited conduct tookplace ended on 31st December 2022 (see for instance paragraph 170 above). Therefore, on this basis, and allowing for early conciliation, the claim was presented within three months of the end of that period. If not, were the claims made within a further period that the Tribunal thinks is just and equitable?

[174]Alternatively, the Tribunal considers it would be just and equitable in all thecircumstances, to extend the time limit. The Tribunal’s decision is not limited to a consideration of any one single factor, such as the reason why a claim has been made late. In this case, the Tribunal has taken into account that complaints relating to sex and age discrimination based on pay have been brought within the time limit. The Tribunal also notes the claimant’s allegations regarding the lesson observation on 18th October 2022 are outside the time limit by weeks rather than months. And in any event, it forms part of the series of conduct which the claimant alleges occurred over an extended period of time.

[175]This allegation is relied on to support all but one of the complaints, namely it relates todirect age and sex discrimination, and age and sex related harassment. Accordingly, even if all the claimant’s allegations are not part of a series of conduct over an extended period, we consider it would be unjust and inequitable to prevent the claimant pursuing these causes of action when some were brought within the three-month time limit, and some were a matter of weeks outside the three-month time limit.

[176]We do not consider there would be any or any meaningful prejudice to the respondentsuch that would outweigh the justice and equity that lies in favour of extending the time limit. Accordingly, to the extent that it’s required, we consider it is just and equitable to grant an extension of the three-month period at section 123 of the Equality Act 2010. Were the unauthorised deductions made within the time limit in section 23 of the Employment Rights Act 1996?

[177]The claimant maintains there were a series of deductions resulting from the failure toannually increase her MPS pay scale relating to the period up to December 2022. She also complains of the failure to award her a 5% increase, relating to the series of deductions allegedly made from September to December 2022. These alleged deductions are within the 3-month time limit prescribed by section 23 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. The Claimant’s Factual Allegations In July 2020 Mr Casco called the claimant “Pretty Woman”.

[178]The Tribunal finds Mr Casco did not call the claimant “Pretty Woman.” (see paragraph 48 above). In September 2020 “Miss” rather than “Mrs” put on the claimant’s payslips.

[179]The Tribunal finds that in September 2020 “Miss” rather than “Mrs” was put onenvelopes containing the claimant’s payslips (see paragraph 50 above). Not providing the claimant with a laptop when needed during lockdown.

[180]The Tribunal finds that the respondent did not provide the claimant with a laptop duringlockdown (see paragraph 56 above). Failing to support the claimant with student behavioural issues, including not providing the claimant with a teaching assistant and the behaviour of Mr Barot on entering her classroom in December 2020.

[181]The Tribunal finds that there was no failure to provide support to the claimant (seeparagraphs 64, 69, 74 and 77 above). Not allowing the claimant to teach GCSE computer science or 6th form students, despite these being less challenging and demanding and being refused permission to utilise 3D Graphics and new technology, in contrast to younger colleagues.

[182]The Tribunal finds that the respondent did not allocate the claimant a GCSE computerscience class or a sixth form class and did not give permission to use the 3D graphics or new technology referred to (see paragraphs 80 to 85 above). In February 2022 a staff member (Mr Jordan Casco) using the term “motherfucker”.

[183]The Tribunal finds that Mr Casco used the term “motherfucker” in February 2022 (see paragraph 89 above). Purporting to extend the claimant’s probation from February 2022

[184]The Tribunal finds that the claimant’s probationary period began in September 2020,and that her probation was still continuing in February 2022 (see paragraph 95 above). Re-rooming the claimant’s classroom in April 2022 to the D&T classroom where there were knives in a round container on a raised surface such as a stool / table, and in September 2022 to room IT1 where there were sharp computer edges and broken sockets, both in breach of health and safety regulations.

[185]We find that the claimant’s classrooms were moved in April and September 2022. However, we do not consider there was a breach of health and safety regulations (see paragraphs 98 and 99 above). Dr Okola and Gail Harrison providing negative feedback in relation to a lesson observation on 18 October 2022, and the manner in which feedback was given, including making the claimant sit at a pupil desk.

[186]We find that the feedback Dr Angus-Okolo and Ms Harrison gave following theclassroom which the feedback was given to be negative (see respectively paragraphs 104 and 107 above). Not being moved to pay scale MPS 3 or being given a 5% pay increase between September and December 2022.

[187]We find that the claimant was not moved to pay scale MPS 3, nor was she awarded a5% pay increase between September to December 2022. (see paragraph 113 above).

[188]We do not find the claimant was prevented from applying for this role (see paragraph117 above).

[189]We find that the claimant was not given a timetable in excess of other NQTs (seeparagraph 119 above). Not being given payslips from April 2022 to December 2022

[190]We find the claimant was given payslips during this period, in that they were availableto her via her online account, and she had been provided with the information required to access her payslips (see paragraph 122 above). Not being given access to the intranet or stationery, notebooks for pupils, whiteboard pens or staplers.

[191]We find that the claimant was provided with the information required to access theintranet. As to issues regarding access to other stationary such as notebooks, we conclude the claimant did not have access to all the notebooks she required in 2020, and but had access to the notebooks required in 2022 (see paragraphs 129 to 130 above). Not confirming the claimant in her permanent role, not being provided with a contract of employment or particulars of her employment until after six months from the commencement of her employment.

[192]We find the claimant was provided with the particulars of her employment within sixmonths of the commencement of her employment, and that she was confirmed in a permanent role in around July 2021 (see paragraphs 138 and 140 above).

[193]We find that Mr Turner was offered a permanent position in May 2021, prior to theclaimant receiving confirmation of her permanent contract (see paragraph 143 above). In July 2022, refusing to hold a back to work meeting with the claimant after an illness due to being too busy with a younger colleague, Mr Jordan Casco.

[194]We find that in July 2022 Ms Harrison did not attend a pre-arranged meeting with theclaimant because she was busy assisting Mr Casco (see paragraph 147 above). Remotely controlling the claimant’s computer on 18 October 2022 so as to hinder her work.

[195]We conclude the respondent did not control the claimant’s computer remotely on 18th October 2022 (see paragraphs 151 above). Unfair (constructive) dismissal Was the claimant constructively unfairly dismissed?

[196]The list of issues categorises the complaints as unfair constructive dismissal,discrimination, harassment and unauthorised deduction from wages. There is no separate category for breach of contract. Of the four allegations the claimant relies on to support the breach of contract complaint, all are also relied on in support of the constructive dismissal complaint. Therefore, the allegations of breach of contract will be dealt with alongside the constructive dismissal complaint.

[197]Of those allegations the claimant relies on to support the complaint of constructivedismissal, the Tribunal’s findings are as follows:

[198]The Tribunal finds that in September 2020 “Miss” rather than “Mrs” was put on envelopescontaining the claimant’s payslips and concludes the reason for doing so was an administrative error. Therefore, we consider it was not intended to or likely to destroy or seriously damage the implied term of trust and confidence between the parties.

[199]The Tribunal finds that the respondent did not provide the claimant with a laptop duringlockdown. While Ms Harrison authorised, a laptop being provided to the claimant during lockdown, if one was available, the claimant was not provided with one. We accept this was due to the respondent’s policy that when allocating laptops, administrative staff and students in need were prioritised, and that the availability of a laptop is relevant. Nonetheless, the claimant was not provided with a laptop during lockdown. This is dealt with further at paragraph 217 below.

[200]The Tribunal finds that there was no failure to provide the claimant with adequatesupport to manage pupil behaviour.

[201]The Tribunal finds that the respondent did not allocate the claimant a GCSE computerscience class or a sixth form class and did not give her permission to use the 3D graphics or new technology referred to.

[202]In her evidence Ms Harrison stated the claimant was allocated a year 9 computerscience class, which class she had intended the claimant to continue teaching when they started their GCSE year 10. However, that class were transferred to another teacher following complaints received regarding the claimant. Therefore, according to Ms Harrison, the reason the claimant did not have a GCSE computer science class was because of complaints made about her. We accept Ms Harrison’s evidence regarding the reason no GCSE computer science class was allocated to the claimant, because her evidence is supported by the documented complaints received regarding the claimant. Therefore, we consider the type of classes allocated to the claimant was not intended to or likely to destroy or seriously damage the implied term of trust and confidence between the parties.

[203]As to the claimant not being allocated a 6th form class, Ms Harrison states it would be unusual for an NTQ to be allocated a 6th form class. She added a considerable depth of knowledge is required to teach at this level. This evidence was reinforced by Mr Morrison who stated the school has a number of pupils applying to Oxford and Cambridge each year some of whom want to study computer science at university. He therefore said it was demanding to teach 6th form students. We accept the respondent’s evidence regarding the reason no 6th form class was allocated to the claimant because this evidence is corroborated by Ms Harrison and Mr Morrison. Accordingly, we consider the type of classes allocated to the claimant was not intended to or likely to destroy or seriously damage the implied term of trust and confidence between the parties.

[204]Also in her oral evidence, Ms Harrison accepted she did not give the claimant permissionto depart from the specification, thus refusing permission to use 3D graphics and new technology. Ms Harrison states she wanted the claimant to teach lessons according to the specification because at the time, she believed the students would be assessed. That was the reason she refused the claimant’s request to teach topics that were not on the specification. As the claimant’s line manager, it was within Ms Harrison’s discretion to decide whether to authorise a departure from the specification. Therefore, we do not consider this was a breach of the employment contract, and/or that it was intended to or likely to destroy or seriously damage the implied term of trust and confidence between the parties.

[205]The Tribunal finds that the extension of the claimant’s probation was continuing inFebruary 2022, but not that the extension was reinstated in February 2022. The terms of the claimant’s contract stated her probation would be for two school terms (i.e. ending in spring 2021) unless extended, for instance, due to exceptional circumstances. We accept the respondent’s evidence that the claimant and other affected employees were informed in January 2021 that their probationary period would be extended, and that the reason for this was because of the difficulties presented by assessing NQTs while they were teaching lessons remotely. Therefore, we consider this was not a breach of the claimant’s employment contract, and/or that it was intended to or likely to destroy or seriously damage the implied term of trust and confidence between the parties.

[206]We find that the claimant’s classroom was moved to the Design and Technology andIT1 rooms in April and September 2022. We consider appropriate health and safety measures were in place, so we do not consider there was a breach of health and safety regulations, nor was there a breach of any other term of the claimant’s employment contract.

[207]We find that the feedback Dr Angus-Okolo and Ms Harrison gave following theclassroom observation on 18th October 2022 was negative. We note the respondent does not dispute this. We accept Ms Harrison’s evidence that the feedback was negative because they both considered that was warranted based on what they observed. We note the feedback is contained in a written report, which appears to be objective, and so supporting the respondent’s evidence that negative feedback was warranted. However, we do not consider the manner in which the feedback was given to be negative. Therefore, we do not consider there has been a breach of any terms of the claimant’s employment contract and/or that the negative feedback was intended to or likely to destroy or seriously damage the trust and confidence between the parties.

[208]We find that the claimant was not moved to pay scale MPS 3, nor was she awarded a5% pay increase between September to December 2022. We consider there was no contractual entitlement to an automatic annual increase on the MPS pay scale based on the claimant’s written contract of employment. The claimant did not receive a 5% pay increase because it was awarded to teachers on the KFS pay scale, which the claimant had elected not to join. Therefore, we find there has been no breach of an express or implied term of the claimant’s contract. It follows we consider this was not intended to or likely to destroy or seriously damage the implied term of trust and confidence between the parties.

[209]We do not find the claimant was prevented from applying for the role of head ofdepartment.

[210]We find that the claimant was not given a timetable in excess of other NQTs.

[211]We find the claimant was given payslips during this period, in that they were availableto her via her online account, and she had been provided with the information required to access her payslips. Accordingly, we do not consider there was a breach of an express or implied term of her employment contract.

[212]We find that the claimant was provided with the information required to access theintranet. As to issues regarding access to other stationary such as notebooks, we conclude the claimant did not have access to all the notebooks she required in 2020. The claimant did not have access to an adequate supply of notebooks in 2020 due to a widespread shortage during the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, we find the claimant had access to an adequate supply of notebooks in 2022 in that Ms Harrison delivered some of the notebooks needed to the claimant, and informed the claimant she could collect the remainder from Ms Harrison’s office as needed. Therefore, we find there has been no breach of an express or implied term of the claimant’s contract. It follows we consider this was not intended to or likely to destroy or seriously damage the trust and confidence between the parties.

[213]We find the claimant was provided with the particulars of her employment within sixmonths of the commencement of her employment, and that she was confirmed in a permanent role in around July 2021. We find the latter was in accordance with the terms of her employment contract, which therefore has not been breached.

[214]We find that the Mr Turner was offered a permanent position in May 2021, prior to theclaimant receiving confirmation of her permanent contract. We do not consider Mr Turner’s appointment affected the claimant’s employment contract, nor do we find that his appointment was a breach of an express or implied term of the claimant’s contract.

[215]We find that in July 2022 Ms Harrison did not attend a pre-arranged meeting with theclaimant because she was busy assisting Mr Casco in connection with GCSE examinations. Ms Harrison prioritised assisting Mr Casco because the issue was time critical, and we accept it was within her managerial discretion to prioritise this over an informal meeting with the claimant. Accordingly, we do not consider this was intended to or likely to destroy or seriously damage the implied term of trust and confidence between the parties.

[216]We conclude the respondent did not control the claimant’s computer remotely on 18th October 2022. Therefore, we find there has been no breach of an express or implied term of the claimant’s contract. It follows we consider this was not intended to or likely to destroy or seriously damage the trust and confidence between the parties. Was any breach a fundamental one?

[217]With one exception, we have found that the allegations relied on to support theconstructive dismissal complaint either did not happen, or if they happened, they did not amount to breach of an express or implied term of the claimant’s employment contract.

[218]The exception relates to the respondent’s failure to provide the claimant with a laptopduring lockdown. We consider that as the claimant was required to teach lessons online during lockdown, and her own computer had been hacked, providing a laptop was necessary for her to deliver lessons online. While noting that providing the laptop was authorised subject to availability, and that the respondent had a system for prioritising the allocation of laptops, providing a laptop during lockdown was essential to the method of teaching in place at the time, taking into account that the claimant’s computer had been hacked. We consider the respondent’s failure to provide a laptop was a fundamental breach of an implied term of the claimant’s employment contract. Did the claimant resign in response to the breach?

[219]The e-mail exchanges between Ms Harrison and the claimant show the latter requesteda laptop in January 2021. The Tribunal note that the claimant continued working for the respondent for almost 2 years after this: she resigned with effect from 31st December 2022. Furthermore, in July 2021, six months after she had requested the laptop, the claimant signed a permanent employment contract with the respondent.

[220]In the circumstances, we conclude that the claimant’s resignation was not caused bythe respondent’s failure to provide a laptop during lockdown, and the claimant treated her contract as if it was alive after that breach. Accordingly, the complaint of unfair constructive dismissal is dismissed. Remedy for unfair dismissal.

[221]In light of the above conclusions, a determination on remedy is not required. DISCRIMINATION Direct age discrimination (Equality Act 2010 section 13) In September 2020 “Miss” rather than “Mrs” was put on the claimant’s payslips.

[222]The Tribunal finds that in September 2020 “Miss” rather than “Mrs” was put onenvelopes containing the claimant’s payslips.

[223]In our judgment, the claimant has discharged the burden of proving it could be inferredthat this was an act of discrimination. Accordingly, the burden of proof shifts to the respondent. The respondent maintains that because payslips have an employee’s address on them, for privacy, printed labels with the employee’s name was placed over the envelope window to conceal their address, before placing the envelopes in the employee’s pigeonhole. We note copies of the payslips in the bundle do show an employee’s address. Therefore, we accept the respondent’s explanation. Accordingly, on a balance of probabilities, we conclude that the envelopes showing “Miss” rather than “Mrs” was an administrative error, and in no way whatsoever on the grounds of the claimant’s age. Failing to support the claimant with support with student behavioural issues, including entering the classroom in December 2020.

[224]The Tribunal finds that there was no failure to provide support to the claimant. Not allocating the claimant a GCSE computer science class or a sixth form class, and not giving her permission to use the 3D graphics or new technology referred.

[225]The Tribunal finds that the respondent did not allocate the claimant a GCSE computerscience class or a sixth form class, and did not give her permission to use the 3D graphics or new technology referred to Was that less favouarble treatment on the grounds of age?

[226]In our judgment, the claimant has discharged the burden of proving it could be inferredthat class allocation or being denied permission to use 3D graphics was

[227]The respondent’s explanations are that had it not been for the complaints it receivedregarding the claimant; she would have continued teaching the year 9 computer science class she was allocated into their GCSE year. The complaints received regarding the claimant are documented in the hearing bundle and provide a justifiable reason why the respondent decided to transfer the claimant’s year 9 class to another teacher when they entered their GCSE year 10.

[228]As to Mr Turner being allocated a GCSE year class, Ms Harrison explained that forcontinuity, he carried on teaching them into their GCSE years because he had previously taught them while he was a student teacher. The claimant did not dispute this. The respondent’s original intention that the claimant would keep her year 9 computer science class into their GCSE years is consistent with Mr Turner continuing to teach a GCSE class he’d previously taught as a student teacher. Therefore, if it hadn’t been for the complaints received, we accept Ms Harrison’s evidence that the claimant would have continued teaching the year 9 class allocated to her as an NQT into their GCSE years.

[229]As to the claimant not being allocated a 6th form class, Ms Harrison states it would be unusual for an NTQ to be allocated a 6th form class. She added a considerable depth of knowledge is required to teach at this level. This evidence was reinforced by Mr Morrison who stated the school has a number of pupils applying to Oxford and Cambridge each year, some of whom want to study computer science at university. He therefore said it was demanding to teach 6th form students. We accept the evidence from Ms Harrison and Mr Morrison, which is consistent. Therefore, rather than the claimant being treated less favourably by not being allocated a 6th form class, the position is it would have been unusual for the respondent to allocate such classes to her.

[230]Regarding Ms Harrison refusing to authorise the claimant departing from the teachingspecification, for instance, by using graphics, Ms Harrison dealt with this in her oral evidence. She stated she wanted the claimant to teach lessons according to the specification because at the time, she believed the students would be assessed. That was the reason she refused the claimant’s request to teach topics that were not on the specification. The claimant did not challenge this, and we accept Ms Harrison’s explanation provides a credible reason for her refusal.

[231]Therefore, on a balance of probabilities, we conclude that not allocating the claimant aGCSE or 6th form class and refusing her permission to use 3D graphics and other technology were for the reasons stated by the respondent. The claimant did not challenge Ms Harrison’s assertion nor did she adduce any evidence to undermine what Ms Harrison said. It follows we consider the decisions were in no way whatsoever on the grounds of the claimant’s age. Extending the claimant’s probation in February 2022

[232]The Tribunal finds that the claimant’s probationary period began in September 2020,and that her probation was still continuing in February 2022 and beyond.

[233]We find the claimant has discharged the burden of proving that it could be inferred thatthe (continuing) extension of her probation was discriminatory. Accordingly, the

[234]We accept the respondent’s evidence that the claimant and other NQTs were told inJanuary 2021 that their probationary period would be extended, and that the reason for this was because of the difficulties presented by assessing NQT while they were teaching lessons remotely. The claimant did not dispute that the probationary period for all NQTs was extended. As to the claimant’s extension continuing up to and after February 2022, the respondent explains this was due to the complaints it received regarding the claimant. Noting that the complaints were included in the hearing bundle, we accept the complaints were received, and that these would justify extending the claimant’s probation.

[235]Accordingly, on a balance of probabilities, the extension and/or continuation of theclaimant’s probation were related to her performance and were in no way whatsoever on the grounds of her age. given

[236]We find that the feedback Dr Angus-Okolo and Ms Harrison gave following theclassroom

[237]In our judgment, the claimant has discharged the burden of proving it could be inferredthat the feedback in respect of the 18th of October 2022 classroom observation, and the manner in which the feedback was given were acts of discrimination. Therefore, the burden of proof shifts to the respondent.

[238]Ms Harrison accepted that the feedback from her and Dr Angus-Okolo was negative,but she maintains that is based on what they observed. We note that Dr Angus-Okolo is an external consultant, who is well respected in her field of expertise. In fact, the claimant stated she has considerable professional respect for Dr Angus-Okolo. We also take into account that the written feedback had some positive as well as negative aspects, which supports it being an objective assessment. We also take into account that the negative feedback is broadly consistent with other reports the respondent received regarding the claimant’s performance. So, although the feedback was negative, we accept the respondent’s evidence that the feedback was justified.

[239]As to the manner in which the feedback was given, in particular, the claimant receivingthat feedback while sitting at a student desk. We consider that is capable of amounting to discriminatory conduct. However, the claimant did not dispute that Ms Harrison and Dr Angus-Okolo also sat at the same type of desks, nor the corroborated evidence from Mr Sear that student desks are standard and no different to desks that teachers sit at. Indeed, Mr Sear gave his evidence to the Tribunal remotely, while sitting at such a desk. We also consider that the feedback being given in a classroom rather than an office was justifiable for reasons of privacy. That is because the classroom was secure and private whereas the office would have been in use by other members of staff at the time the claimant’s feedback was scheduled.

[240]Therefore, on a balance of probabilities, neither the feedback nor the manner in whichthe feedback was given were in any way whatsoever on the grounds of the claimant’s age. The claimant was not moved to pay scale MPS 3, nor was she awarded a 5% pay increase between September to December 2022.

[241]We find that the claimant was not moved to pay scale MPS 3, nor was she awarded a5% pay increase between September to December 2022.

[242]In our judgment, the claimant has discharged the burden of proving it could be inferredthat she did not progress to MPS 3 or receive a 5% pay increase was

[243]We consider there was no contractual entitlement to an automatic annual increase onthe MPS pay scale. We note the claimant did not dispute Mr Morrison’s oral evidence that automatic progression on the MPS pay scale had ended. It had been replaced with a scheme of performance related pay, requiring employees evidence any claim for a pay increase. The claimant also did not challenge Mr Morrison’s evidence that the 5% pay increase was only awarded to teachers on the KFS pay scale, and she accepted she had elected not to transfer to the KFS pay scale.

[244]Accordingly, on a balance of probabilities, that the claimant did not progress to the MPS3 pay scale or receive a 5% pay increase were in no way whatsoever on the grounds of her age.

[245]We do not find the claimant was prevented from applying for this role.

[246]We find that the claimant was not given a timetable in excess of other NQTs.

[247]We find that Mr Turner was offered a permanent position in May 2021, prior to theclaimant receiving confirmation of her permanent contract.

[248]In our judgment, the claimant has discharged the burden of proving it could be inferredthat offering Mr Turner a permanent position in May 2021 while confirmation of her own permanent contract was pending were acts of discrimination. Therefore, the

[249]We have taken into account the respondent’s reasons for offering the claimant a fixedterm contract, as explained by Mr Sear. Although the claimant is well qualified, she does not have a degree or a formal qualification in computer science. She has a BSc in Economics and a Masters in Multimedia Design. We accept his evidence that, in those circumstances, offering a fixed term contract was in accordance with the respondent’s recruitment policy.

[250]As to Mr Turner being offered a permanent contract while the claimant’s permanentcontract was pending. We have found that the claimant was offered a oneyear fixed term contract from 1st September 2020 to 31st August 2021, with a review of the position being carried out in spring 2021. The claimant was offered a permanent contract commencing 1st September 2021, which was in accordance with the terms of her fixed term contract. The start date of her permanent contract was the same as Mr Turner’s start date.

[251]Therefore, on the basis that the claimant’s initial appointment was in accordance withthe respondent’s recruitment policy, and her being offered a permanent position was in accordance with the terms of her fixed term contract, we do not consider the difference in the way she and Mr Turner were recruited amounts to discrimination on the grounds of age. Nor, on a balance of probabilities, do we consider the circumstances in which Mr Turner was recruited, including while the claimant’s permanent employment was pending, were in any way whatsoever on the grounds of her age. In July 2022, refusing to hold a back to work meeting after an illness due to being too busy with a younger colleague, Mr Jordan Casco.

[252]We find that in July 2022 Ms Harrison did not attend a pre-arranged meeting with theclaimant because she was busy assisting Mr Casco

[253]In our judgment, the claimant has discharged the burden of proving it could be inferredthat Ms Harrison not attending a pre-arranged appointment with her because she was busy helping Mr Casco was discriminatory. Therefore, the burden of proof shifts to the respondent.

[254]Ms Harrison says she prioritised assisting Mr Casco because she was helping him withan issue that was time critical, and we accept it was within her managerial discretion to prioritise this over an informal meeting with the claimant. We also note that she was helping Mr Casco in connection with GCSE examinations, namely national external examinations.

[255]Accordingly, on a balance of probabilities, we find Ms Harrison not attending the prearranged meeting with the claimant was in no way whatsoever on the grounds of her age. Proportionality

[256]In the Tribunal’s judgment, the claimant has failed to establish that the conductcomplained of occurred due to her age. Accordingly, the issue of proportionality does not require consideration.

[257]For the reasons stated at paragraphs 221 to 255 above, the complaint of direct agediscrimination is dismissed. Direct sex discrimination (Equality Act 2010 section 13)

[258]Of the allegations relating to sex discrimination that are made out, our decision as towhether that amounted to less favourable treatment is as follows: Not allocating the claimant a GCSE computer science class or a sixth form class, and not giving her permission to use the 3D graphics or new technology referred to

[259]The Tribunal finds that the respondent did not allocate the claimant a GCSE computerscience class or a sixth form class and did not give her permission to use the 3D graphics or new technology referred to. Was that less favouarble treatment on the grounds of sex?

[260]In our judgment, the claimant has discharged the burden of proving it could be inferredthat the class allocations or being denied permission to use 3D graphics was

[261]At paragraphs 225 to 230 above, we provided our reasons for concluding the respondentdischarged the burden of proving decisions made regarding the claimant were in no way whatsoever connected to her age. Those reasons apply equally to her sex. Accordingly, for the same reasons, we conclude that the decisions were in no way whatsoever on the grounds of the claimant’s sex. Extending the claimant’s probation in February 2022

[262]The Tribunal finds that the claimant’s probationary period began in September 2020,and that her probation was still continuing in February 2022 Was that less favorable treatment on the grounds of sex?

[263]We find the claimant has discharged the burden of proving that it could be inferred thatthe (continuing) extension of her probation was discriminatory. Accordingly, the

[264]At paragraphs 232 to 234 above we provided our reasons for concluding the respondentdischarged the burden of proving the extension and/or continuation of the claimant’s probation were related to her performance. Accordingly, for the same reasons, we conclude that the decisions were in no way whatsoever on the grounds of the claimant’s sex. given.

[265]We find that the feedback Dr Angus-Okolo and Ms Harrison gave following theclassroom Was the negative feedback less favourable treatment on the grounds of sex?

[266]In our judgment, the claimant has discharged the burden of proving it could be inferredthat the feedback in respect of the 18th of October 2022 classroom observation, and the manner in which the feedback was given were acts of discrimination. Therefore, the burden of proof shifts to the respondent.

[267]At paragraphs 236 to 240 above we provided our reasons for concluding the respondentdischarged the burden of proving the content of the feedback and the manner in which the feedback was given was in no way whatsoever on the grounds of the claimant’s age. Those reasons apply equally to her sex. Accordingly, for the same reasons, we conclude that the content and manner of the feedback were in no way whatsoever on the grounds of the claimant’s sex. Not moving the claimant to pay scale MPS 3, nor awarding a 5% pay increase between September to December 2022.

[268]We find that the claimant was not moved to pay scale MPS 3, nor was she awarded a5% pay increase between September to December 2022. Was that less favourable treatment on the grounds of sex?

[269]In our judgment, the claimant has discharged the burden of proving it could be inferredthat she did not progress to MPS 3 or receive a 5% pay increase was

[270]At paragraphs 241 to 243 above we provided our reasons for concluding the respondentdischarged the burden of proving that the claimant did not progress to the MPS 3 pay scale or receive a 5% pay increase were in no way whatsoever on the grounds of her age. Those reasons apply equally to her sex. Accordingly, for the same reasons, we conclude that her not progressing to MPS 3 pay scale or receiving a 5% increase content were in no way whatsoever on the grounds of the claimant’s sex.

[271]We do not find the claimant was prevented from applying for this role.

[272]We find that the claimant was not given a timetable in excess of other NQTs.

[273]We find that Mr Turner was offered a permanent position in May 2021, prior to theclaimant receiving confirmation of her permanent contract. Was that less favourable treatment on the grounds of sex?

[274]In our judgment, the claimant has discharged the burden of proving it could be inferredthat offering Mr Turner a permanent position in May 2021, while confirmation of her own permanent contract was pending were acts of discrimination. Therefore, the

[275]At paragraphs 247 to 250 above we provided our reasons for concluding the claimant’sinitial appointment was in accordance with the respondent’s recruitment policy, and her being offered a permanent position was in accordance with the terms of her fixed term contract, and why we do not consider the difference in the way the claimant and Mr Turner were recruited amounts to discrimination on the grounds of age. For the same reasons, we conclude this was in no way whatsoever on the grounds of the claimant’s sex.

[276]Accordingly, for the reasons stated at paragraphs 257 to 274 above, the complaint ofdirect age discrimination is dismissed. Direct marriage and civil partnership discrimination (Equality Act 2010 section 13) In September 2020 putting “Miss” rather than “Mrs” on the claimant’s payslips.

[277]The Tribunal finds that in September 2020 “Miss” rather than “Mrs” was put onenvelopes containing the claimant’s payslips. Was that less favourable treatment on the grounds of marriage and civil partnership?

[278]In our judgment, the claimant has discharged the burden of proving it could be inferredthat this was an act of discrimination. Accordingly, the burden of proof shifts to the respondent. At paragraph 222 above we provided our reasons for concluding the respondent putting “Miss” instead of “Mrs” on envelopes containing the claimant’s payslips were in no way whatsoever on the grounds of her age. Those reasons apply equally here. Accordingly, on a balance of probabilities, we conclude that printing envelopes with “Miss” rather than “Mrs” was an administrative error, and in no way whatsoever on the grounds of the claimant’s marriage and civil partnership.

[279]We also do not accept the claimant’s argument as to why she found this to be lessfavourable treatment. During cross examination, the claimant maintained that “Miss” was a term that was less than “Mrs”, so the respondent using the former title was less favourable treatment. The Tribunal does not accept this premise and does not consider that referring to someone as “Miss” instead of “Mrs” is less favourable treatment.

[280]Accordingly, the complaint of direct marriage and civil partnership discrimination isdismissed. Harassment related to age (Equality Act 2010 section 26) Failing to support the claimant with support with student behavioural issues, including entering the classroom in December 2020.

[281]The Tribunal finds that there was no failure to provide support to the claimant. given.

[282]We find that the feedback Dr Angus-Okolo and Ms Harrison gave following theclassroom Was that unwanted conduct related to age

[283]Ms Harrison accepted that the feedback from her and Dr Angus-Okolo was negative.To this extent, the conduct complained of did occur, and we find it would have been unwanted, in the sense that it was unwelcome.

[284]However, we consider that negative feedback was given for reasons other than theclaimant’s age. That is because we accept Ms Harrison’s evidence that the feedback was negative because that reflected their assessment of the lesson they observed. We also take into account that the negative feedback is broadly consistent with other reports the respondent received regarding the claimant’s performance.

[285]We do not find the purpose of providing negative feedback was to violate the claimant’sdignity or create an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the claimant. The purpose of providing feedback was to report on what they observed, that is both positive and negative aspects of what was observed. The written feedback had some positive as well as negative aspects, which supports it being an objective assessment.

[286]We also do not consider the negative feedback would have had the effect of violatingthe claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the claimant. While we understand the claimant’s perception is that it did, considering the other circumstances of the case, we do not consider that it was reasonable for the conduct to have that effect.

[287]It is standard practice in many workplaces that an employee’s performance may beassessed. That is even more likely to be the case where an employee is newly qualified, as was the claimant. To be meaningful, feedback needs to be objective. Therefore, where warranted, it may be negative. Part of the negative feedback was due to the claimant’s nerves, and the claimant accepts she was nervous. Other aspects of the feedback echo other reports regarding the claimant’s performance. Dr Angus-Okolo is a respected education consultant, who is independent of the respondent. These factors lead us to conclude that the feedback given would have been appropriate. That the feedback may also have been negative, does not undermine its appropriateness.

[288]As to the manner in which the feedback was given, in particular, the claimant receivingthat feedback while sitting at a student desk. This is dealt with below.

[289]Ms Harrison explained the arrangements that had been made to provide the feedback.While others may have received their feedback in one of the offices, Ms Harrison explained that office was due to be in use by others at the time the claimant’s feedback was scheduled. Therefore, we find it would not have been appropriate for her to receive the feedback in the office where others would have been present.

[290]Ms Harrison explained a classroom was booked in order to provide the feedback. It wasa secure classroom, that could only be accessed with a key, meaning they would not be disturbed, which again would assist with privacy. It is accepted that the claimant was sitting at a student desk while the feedback was given, but Ms Harrison’s evidence was that she and Dr Angus-Okolo sat at similar desks, which are standard desks.

[291]Therefore, we do not find the manner in which feedback was given had the purpose ofviolating the claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the claimant. The purpose of providing feedback was to report on what they observed, that is both positive and negative aspects of what was observed. The written feedback had some positive as well as negative aspects, which supports it being an objective assessment. Arrangements had been made to provide feedback in a suitably secure and private environment, which was appropriate in light of the nature of the feedback necessarily given.

[292]In the circumstances, we do not find that the feedback or the manner in which thefeedback was given amounts to age related harassment.

[293]Accordingly, the complaint of age-related harassment is dismissed. Harassment related to sex (Equality Act 2010 section 26) In July 2020 Mr Casco calls the claimant “Pretty Woman”.

[294]The Tribunal finds Mr Casco did not call the claimant “Pretty Woman.” February 2022 a staff member (Mr Jordan Casco) using the term “motherfucker”.

[295]The Tribunal finds that Mr Casco used the term “motherfucker” in February 2022. Was that unwanted conduct related to sex

[296]The Tribunal considers the claimant is likely to have found Mr Casco’s use of this termunwelcome. However, we do not consider Mr Casco intended to violate the claimant’s dignity or create an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. Ms Harrison, who was present during the incident, states it was an illjudged use of highly inappropriate language, but that it was a spontaneous reaction to Mr Casco being told that there was a meeting at 5:00pm that evening which he apparently had forgotten about. The claimant accepted in cross examination that she did not know whether the comment was directed at her. In light of Ms Harrison’s and the claimant’s evidence, in our judgment, the comment was not aimed at the claimant, and was not intended to violate her dignity or create the adverse environment described. We accept that the claimant was unhappy about being exposed to such language. Nonetheless, in the context this comment was made, we do not consider Mr Casco’s comment would have had the effect of violating the claimant’s dignity or creating the environment described. given

[297]We find that the feedback Dr Angus-Okolo and Ms Harrison gave following theclassroom which the feedback was given to be negative. Was that unwanted conduct related to sex?

[298]We repeat the conclusions set out at paragraphs 282 to 291 above in respect of agerelated harassment. We consider those conclusions apply equally to the allegation of sex related harassment.

[299]In the circumstances, we do not find that the feedback or the manner in which thefeedback was given amounts to sex related harassment.

[300]Accordingly, the complaint of sex-related harassment is dismissed. Remedy for discrimination or victimisation.

[301]In light of the above conclusions, a determination on remedy is not required. Unauthorised deductions

[302]The claimant alleges the respondent made unlawful deductions from her wages byfailing to automatically move her pay up the MPS 3 pay scale each year, and the failure to increase her pay from September to December 2022 by 5%.

[303]For the reasons stated at paragraphs 108 to 113 above, we find the claimant had nocontractual right to be moved up to the MPS pay scale 3, or to receive the 5% increase.

[304]Therefore, we find that the claimant has not received less than the amount properlypayable to her, so there has been no unlawful deduction from her wages, and the complaint is dismissed. Employment Judge Tueje Date: 15th October 2024 . P Wing APPENDIX

THE LAW

[1]As regards findings of fact, the final list of issues on which the Tribunal made its findings isas follows: Factual allegations relevant to discrimination, harassment, constructive unfair dismissal

[2]Did the respondent do the following things1:2.1 Not confirm the claimant in her permanent role and not give her a contract of employment. (CD)

2.2 In July 2020 Mr Casco call the claimant “pretty woman”.(SH)

2.3 In September 2020 putting Miss rather than Mrs on the claimant’s payslips. (AD, MCP, CD)

2.4 Not providing the claimant with a laptop when needed during lockdown. (CD, BOC)

2.5 Failing to support the claimant with support with student behavioural issues, including entering the classroom in December 2020. (AD, AH, CD)

2.7 February 2022 a staff member (Mr Jordan Casco) using the term “motherfucker”. (SH)

2.8 Purporting to extend the claimant’s probation from February 2022 (AD, SD, CD)

2.11 Not being moved to level M3 or being given a 5% pay increase between September and December 2022. (AD, SD, CD)

2.12 Not allowing the claimant to apply for to role of Head of Department in comparison with Mr Young. (AD, CD, SD)

2.13 Being given a timetable in excess of other NQTs. (AD, SD, CD)

2.14 Not being given payslips from April 2022 to December 2022 (CD, BOC)

2.15 Not being given access to the intranet or needed stationery, notebooks for pupils, whiteboard pens or staplers. (BOC, CD) 1 Abbreviations: AD – direct age discrimination, AH – age related harassment, SD – direct sex discrimination, SH – sex-related harassment, MCP – direct marriage or civil partnership discrimination, BOC breach of contract, CD – constructive dismissal.

2.17 The employment of Mr Turner a much younger and less qualified person when the claimant was still awaiting confirmation of her permanent contract (AD, SD, CD)

2.18 In July 2022, refusing to hold a back to work meeting after an illness due to being too busy with a younger colleague, Mr Jordan Casco (AD, CD)

2.19 Remotely controlling the claimant’s computer on 18 October 2022 so as to hinder her work (CD,BOC)