S Russell v The Other Hare Ltd (in creditors voluntary liquidation) and G Wynes-Devlin: 2301899/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2301899/2024

Between

Shannon RussellClaimant

The Other Hare Limited (in creditors voluntary liquidation) [R1] Georgina Wynes-Devlin [R2]Respondent

Date 26 April 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]Pursuant to Rule 22(2) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, the Claimant's claims against the First Respondent, The Other Hare Limited (in creditors voluntary liquidation), are upheld.

[2]The First Respondent has automatically unfairly dismissed the Claimant for a reason related to her maternity, contrary to Section 99 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

[3]The First Respondent has discriminated against the Claimant on the grounds of maternity, contrary to Sections 18 and 39 of the Equality Act 2010.

[4]A hearing will be fixed to determine remedy in respect of these claims against the First Respondent at the final hearing scheduled for 1-3 October 2025.

[5]The First Respondent is entitled to notice of any hearings and decisions of the Tribunal in relation to these proceedings but, pursuant to Rule 22(3) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, the First Respondent shall only be entitled to participate in any hearing to the extent permitted by the Tribunal.

[6]The claims against the Second Respondent shall proceed to a hearing on all issues of liability and, if appropriate, remedy, at the final hearing scheduled for 1-3 October 2025.

REASONS

[7]The Claimant, Ms Shannon Russell, commenced proceedings in the Employment Tribunal by presenting her claim form (ET1) on 7 February 2024. The claim alleges automatic unfair dismissal related to maternity and maternity discrimination under the Equality Act 2010 against her former employer, The Other Hare Limited (First Respondent), and Ms Georgina WynesDevlin (Second Respondent), who was the sole director of the First Respondent.

[8]Prior to submitting her claim, the Claimant engaged in ACAS Early Conciliation from 4 December 2023 to 15 January 2024, obtaining separate certificates for each Respondent.

[9]The ET1 claim form was acknowledged by the Tribunal on 13 February 2024, and notices of claim were sent to both Respondents on the same date, requiring responses by 12 March 2024.

[10]No response was received from either Respondent by the deadline. On 8 May 2024, the Claimant's representative applied for a default judgment.

[11]On 9 May 2024, the Second Respondent's solicitor (newly instructed) contacted the Tribunal stating their client had not received the claim form and objecting to the default judgment application.

[12]On 16 May 2024, the Second Respondent's solicitor submitted formal objections to the default judgment application. The objections raised were that: a) The claims were too complex for a simple liability determination; b) The Respondents were not correctly named in the claim form (as "The Other Hair Limited" rather than "The Other Hare Limited" for the First Respondent, and "Georgie Wynes-Devlin" rather than "Georgina Wynes-Devlin" for the Second Respondent); and c) The Second Respondent was unaware of the claim until the Tribunal sent a copy on 10 May 2024, as the claim had been sent to a business address (99 Mitcham Road, Tooting) that had been vacated on 15 January 2024.

[13]The First Respondent entered voluntary liquidation on 15 May 2024, with Mr Gary Steven Pettit appointed as liquidator. This was approximately two months after the deadline for responding to the claim had passed.

[14]On 7 June 2024, the Second Respondent submitted an ET3 response form and grounds of resistance, along with an application to file a response late. The Second Respondent's response was accepted by the Tribunal on 17 June 2024.

[15]A preliminary hearing for case management took place by video on 16 April 2025 before me. At this hearing, the Claimant was represented by Mr Edward Aston, Solicitor, and the Second Respondent was represented by Ms Sarah Harty, Counsel. The First Respondent was not represented.

[16]At the preliminary hearing, the Claimant's representative, Mr Aston, applied for a Rule 22 judgment against the First Respondent based on their failure to respond to the claim. He noted that the First Respondent was served with the claim on 13 February 2024, should have responded by 12 March 2024, but had not done so. He highlighted that the First Respondent did not enter voluntary liquidation until 15 May 2024, approximately two months after the response deadline had passed.

[17]Ms Harty, representing the Second Respondent, initially asked if she could take instructions from her solicitor on the Rule 22 judgment point as she had understood the claim against the First Respondent would have been stayed due to liquidation. I clarified that only an enforced liquidation would automatically stay proceedings, not a voluntary liquidation.

[18]After a short adjournment, Ms Harty indicated that the Second Respondent would like the opportunity to liaise with the liquidator to see what could be done in terms of putting in a defence for the First Respondent. She expressed her client's concern about possible implications for her as an individual if a default judgment was issued against the First Respondent.

[19]Mr Aston objected to further delay, stating that allowing the First Respondent to put in a defence now would not be in the interests of natural justice, although he confirmed he did not object to the Second Respondent's response being accepted out of time.

[20]I directed that notice be sent to Mr Gary Steven Pettit, the liquidator of the First Respondent, Ms Shannon Russell -v- The Other Hare Limited (in creditors voluntary liquidation) [R1] & Georgina Wynes-Devlin [R2] [URN 2301899-2024] Page 2 of 6 indicating that unless good cause was shown within seven days, a default judgment under Rule 22 would be issued against the First Respondent.

[21]No response has been received from Mr Pettit within the specified timeframe, and no good cause has been shown as to why judgment should not be entered against the First Respondent.

The Law

[22]Rule 22 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 provides:(1) This rule applies where— (a) the Tribunal has not received a response by the time specified in rule 17(1) (response), or by an extension of time granted under rule 21 (applications for extension of time for presenting response), (b) any response received has been rejected and no application for a reconsideration is yet to be determined, or (c) the respondent has stated that no part of the claim is contested.

(2) The Tribunal must decide whether on the available material (which may include any further information which the parties are required by the Tribunal to provide), a determination can properly be made of the claim, or part of it. To the extent that a determination can be made, the Tribunal must issue a judgment accordingly, otherwise, a hearing must be fixed. [...]

(3) The Tribunal must provide the respondent with notice of any hearing or decision of the Tribunal but the respondent may only participate in any hearing on that claim to the extent permitted by the Tribunal.

[23]While Presidential Guidance on Rule 22 has not been promulgated, I note that similar guidance was previously issued on Rule 21 of the 2013 Rules (the predecessor to the current Rule 22). The principles set out in that guidance remain relevant to my consideration, particularly that I must examine whether the claim is clearly stated and whether there are any matters which might affect the Tribunal's jurisdiction to hear the claim. I must consider all details contained in the written materials before me, any obligation or burden on either party in relation to proving such matters, calculations provided by the claimant, any case management orders previously made, and any response. If I have any reasonable doubt as to the whole or any part of the matters contained in the claim, then a hearing should be listed.

[24]The Employment Appeal Tribunal in Limoine v Sharma [

UKEAT/0094/19

] confirmed that where a respondent has not entered a response, the Tribunal must still satisfy itself that the factual elements necessary to make good the claim in law are made out before issuing judgment. The EAT stated at paragraph 26: "...the Judge needs to be satisfied, on the information contained in the claim form and any other documents or materials before them, and, in view of the claim being undefended, treating what the party advancing the claim says as undisputed fact, that the factual elements necessary to make good the claim in law are made out."

[25]Under Section 99 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, the dismissal of an employee will be automatically unfair if the reason or principal reason for the dismissal is connected with the employee's pregnancy or maternity leave.

[26]Section 18 of the Equality Act 2010 prohibits discrimination because of pregnancy or maternity during the protected period. Section 39 of the same Act prohibits discrimination by employers against employees. Ms Shannon Russell -v- The Other Hare Limited (in creditors voluntary liquidation) [R1] & Georgina Wynes-Devlin [R2] [URN 2301899-2024] Page 3 of 6 Consideration of Objections to Rule 22 Judgment

[27]I have carefully considered the objections raised by the Second Respondent's solicitor to the application for a default judgment under Rule 22 against the First Respondent. The objections and my response to each are as follows:

[28]First objection: The claims are too complex for a simple liability determination. I do not accept this argument. While discrimination and automatic unfair dismissal claims can involve complex factual matrices, this does not preclude a determination under Rule 22. The rule specifically requires me to decide whether, on the available material, a determination can properly be made. Complexity does not automatically prevent such a determination if the factual elements necessary to make good the claim in law are adequately set out in the claim form and supporting documentation. In this case, the Claimant's ET1 and supporting materials provide a detailed account of the events leading to her dismissal and the alleged discrimination, with specific dates, actions, and statements attributed to the employer. These details, taken as undisputed fact against the non-responding First Respondent, are sufficient to establish the prima facie elements of both claims.

[29]Second objection: The Respondents were not correctly named. While I acknowledge there were minor errors in the names of both Respondents in the original claim form, these have now been corrected. The First Respondent was referred to as "The Other Hair Limited" rather than "The Other Hare Limited," and the Second Respondent as "Georgie Wynes-Devlin" rather than "Georgina Wynes-Devlin." These errors were readily apparent and easily correctable. There is no evidence that these minor misspellings caused any actual confusion about the identity of the Respondents or prevented the claim from reaching the correct entities. Indeed, the Second Respondent's representatives have acknowledged that their client is the same person referred to in the claim form, albeit with a slight variation in the name used. The First Respondent's correct identity is similarly clear. Therefore, this objection does not provide a good reason to refuse a Rule 22 judgment.

[30]Third objection: The Second Respondent was unaware of the claim until 10 May 2024 because it was sent to a business address that had been vacated. This objection relates primarily to the Second Respondent's position rather than the First Respondent's. In any case, service of the claim was effected in accordance with the Tribunal Rules by sending it to the Respondents' last known address. If the Respondents had moved without providing updated contact information, the responsibility for non-receipt lies with them. More importantly, the First Respondent, as a limited company, had a registered office address for service of documents, and no suggestion has been made that service at that address was defective. The fact that the Second Respondent ultimately received and responded to the claim (albeit late) demonstrates that the service process was ultimately effective for her. The First Respondent, through its liquidator, has now also been notified of these proceedings again.

[31]Additional considerations: I note that the First Respondent entered voluntary liquidation on 15 May 2024, approximately two months after the deadline for responding to the claim had passed. The liquidation process cannot explain or excuse the earlier failure to respond. The Second Respondent, as the sole director of the First Respondent, ought to have been aware of the claim against the company and taken appropriate steps to ensure a response was filed before the deadline or, at the very least, that an application for an extension of time was made.

[32]Furthermore, following the preliminary hearing on 16 April 2025, I provided a further opportunity for the liquidator of the First Respondent to show good cause why a Rule 22 judgment should not be issued. No response has been forthcoming. This further reinforces my view that there is no substantial reason to withhold judgment under Rule 22.

[33]Ms Harty expressed concern at the preliminary hearing about possible implications for her client, the Second Respondent, if a default judgment were issued against the First Respondent. Ms Shannon Russell -v- The Other Hare Limited (in creditors voluntary liquidation) [R1] & Georgina Wynes-Devlin [R2] [URN 2301899-2024] Page 4 of 6 However, as I have made clear, this judgment against the First Respondent does not make any finding of fact that is binding in the proceedings against the Second Respondent. The Second Respondent will have a full opportunity to present her defence at the final hearing. Application of Law to Facts

[34]I am satisfied that Rule 22 is engaged in respect of the First Respondent, as no response has been received and the time for submitting one has expired. No application for an extension of time has been made by or on behalf of the First Respondent.

[35]Following the preliminary hearing before me on 16 April 2025, the Tribunal notified Mr Gary Steven Pettit, the liquidator of the First Respondent, of these proceedings and the intention to enter judgment under Rule 22 unless good cause was shown within seven days. No response has been received from Mr Pettit within that timeframe.

[36]I have considered whether, treating the Claimant's case as undisputed as against the First Respondent, a determination can properly be made of the claim against that Respondent.

[37]The Claimant's ET1 and supporting documentation set out a detailed account of the alleged unfair dismissal related to her maternity and discrimination on grounds of maternity. Taking the Claimant's account as undisputed as against the First Respondent, I am satisfied that the factual elements necessary to establish automatic unfair dismissal related to maternity and maternity discrimination by the First Respondent are made out.

[38]I note that the Second Respondent has filed a response denying the claims against her personally. The existence of this defence by the Second Respondent does not prevent a determination being made against the First Respondent under Rule 22(2), which creates a mandatory obligation to issue judgment where a determination can properly be made, as is the case here.

[39]I also note that the First Respondent only entered voluntary liquidation approximately two months after the deadline for responding to the claim had passed. This is not a case where the failure to respond can be attributed to the liquidation process.

[40]Having reviewed all the available material, I am satisfied that I have sufficient information to properly determine that the First Respondent has liability for the claims made. I do not have sufficient information to determine remedy at this stage, and that aspect will therefore be addressed at the final hearing.

Conclusion

[41]For the reasons given, I find that on the available material, taking the Claimant's account as undisputed as against the First Respondent, a determination can properly be made that the First Respondent has automatically unfairly dismissed the Claimant for a reason related to her maternity, contrary to Section 99 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, and has discriminated against the Claimant on grounds of maternity, contrary to Sections 18 and 39 of the Equality Act 2010.

[42]Rule 22(2) stipulates that where such a determination can be made, the Tribunal "must issue a judgment accordingly," which I now do.

[43]I emphasise that this judgment is made solely in relation to the First Respondent, based on its failure to respond to the claim. Nothing in this judgment makes any finding of fact that is binding in the proceedings against the Second Respondent, whose defence will be considered fully at the final hearing.

[44]In accordance with Rule 22(3), the First Respondent is entitled to notice of any hearings and Ms Shannon Russell -v- The Other Hare Limited (in creditors voluntary liquidation) [R1] & Georgina Wynes-Devlin [R2] [URN 2301899-2024] Page 5 of 6 decisions in these proceedings but may only participate in any hearing to the extent permitted by the Tribunal.

[45]The issue of remedy against the First Respondent, along with liability and, if appropriate, remedy against the Second Respondent, will be determined at the final hearing scheduled for 1-3 October 2025. APPROVED Judge M Aspinall (sitting as an