S-A Hylton v Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd: 2301744/2023
JUDGMENT
[1]The claimant’s complaint of constructive unfair dismissal is well-founded and succeeds.[2]The claimant’s complaint of harassment on the grounds of race is well-founded and succeeds with respect to allegations 12a – 12f in the list of issues.[3]The claimant’s complaint of harassment on the grounds of race is not well-founded and is dismissed with respect to allegations 12g – 12h in the list of issues.[4]The claimant’s complaint of direct race discrimination is dismissed. _____________________________ Employment Judge Liz Ord Date 17 November 2024 Case No: 2301744/2023 Notes 1. Reasons for the judgment having been given orally at the hearing, written reasons will not be provided unless a request was made by either party at the hearing or a written request is presented by either party within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision. If written reasons are provided, they will be displayed on the tribunal’s online register of judgments, which is visible to internet searches. Case Nos: 2301744/2023 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Claimant: Shellyanne Hylton Respondent: Network Rail Infrastructure Limited RECONSIDERATION JUDGMENT The claimant’s application dated 27 May 2025 for reconsideration of the judgment sent to the parties on 13 May 2025 is refused.REASONS
[1]In dealing with this matter, I have had regard to both the claimant’s application for a reconsideration and the respondent’s response of 30 June 2025.[2]By Rule 68 of the Employment Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure 2024, the Employment Tribunal may, either on its own initiative or on the application of a party, reconsider any judgment where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. On reconsideration, the judgment may be confirmed, varied or revoked.[3]The judgment will only be reconsidered where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. This allows the Employment Tribunal a broad discretion, which must be exercised judicially. This means having regard not only to the interests of the party seeking the reconsideration but also the interests of the other party to the litigation and to the public interest requirement that there should, so far as possible, be finality of litigation. Reconsiderations are therefore best seen as limited exceptions to the general rule that employment tribunal decisions should not be reopened and relitigated.[4]The claimant’s application is based on what the claimant says are errors of law and fact as follows. 4.1.The respondent’s alleged concession that, if the claimant’s race discrimination claim were upheld, her constructive dismissal claim would be deemed to have occurred on the grounds of race. 4.2.The tribunal’s alleged inconsistency between its liability and remedy judgment findings regarding the last straw event. Case Nos: 2301744/2023 4.3.The remedy judgment casting doubt on the severity and intention of the harassment by asserting that the conduct was “not purposeful”.[5]Taking the matter at 4.1, the respondent denies any such concession. In any event, the tribunal is not able to reach those conclusions on the constructive dismissal claim for the reasons of law set out in the remedy judgment.[6]With respect to 4.2, the tribunal found at the liability hearing that the claimant’s resignation letter stated that the last straw was the “harassment, bullying and discrimination” she had encountered. The tribunal noted that this was different to what the claimant said was the last straw in her list of issues, namely, the failure to arrange an alternative job placement for her. The tribunal did not make any findings as to what the last straw actually was in either the liability or the remedy judgment, as this turned out to be unnecessary.[7]Turning to 4.3, the tribunal was clear in its conclusions on liability that the successful allegations of harassment were on the basis of the effect of the conduct, which did not have an harassing purpose. This is a different matter to severity, and a harassing effect can still be serious or severe.[8]Accordingly, there is nothing in the claimant’s application which justifies a reconsideration.[9]Taking account of the overriding objective of dealing with cases justly and fairly, I conclude that it is not necessary in the interests of justice to reconsider the original remedy judgment as there is no reasonable prospect of it being varied or revoked.