Employment Judge LumbyMr H Davies (instructed by counsel) for claimantMr R Bhatt (instructed by counsel) for respondentDate 30 September 2025
JUDGMENT
The claimant is ordered to pay a contribution towards the respondent's costs in the sum of £4,381.08.
REASONS
[1]In this case the respondent seeks its costs in relation to preparing for and attending the hearing on 12 September 2025, claiming £6,735.73.[2]The claimant originally brought various claims. A claim for unfair dismissal was withdrawn as the claimant had less than two years’ qualifying service. A claim for breach of contract was recast as a claim for a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence, using similar wording as that used in the withdrawn unfair dismissal claim. He also brought claims for breach of Regulation 7(1) of the TUPE Regulations and for holiday pay.[3]The respondent applied for the claims to be struck out and this was considered by me at this hearing. I determined as follows:a. the TUPE Regulations breach claim - it is clear from the Regulations that an employee with less than two years’ service cannot bring a claim under Regulation 7(1). It would therefore seem clear that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider that complaint. I noted that the claimant has chosen in the skeleton argument provided by his solicitors shortly before the hearing to recast this claim pursuant to section 104 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. I did not accept that this is the claim as pleaded and no amendment to allow it has been made. That argument was therefore rejected and i dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction. However, if I was wrong on that point, I also find that such a claim had no reasonable prospect of success and so would be struck out if the Tribunal had jurisdiction.b. breach of the implied term of trust and confidence – I found that this was clearly an attempt to circumvent the two-year rule for unfair dismissal and as such was bound to fail. Taken at its highest, the claimant said he was deprived of the opportunity to apply for other jobs. As a claim for breach of trust and confidence, I found that it had no reasonable prospect of success and so struck it out.c. the holiday pay complaint - the claimant's case was utterly unclear, he maintained at the hearing that he still claimed 7.8 days accrued but unpaid holiday pay without explanation and without deduction of an additional one day’s paid to him by the respondent (who had provided a detailed explanation via a witness statement of the amount it said was due). However, there appeared to me to be a genuine dispute which should be examined by the Tribunal. I did not therefore consider that it should be struck out on either limb advanced. Having discussed a proposed deposit order with parties, it was agreed instead that an unless order be made requiring the claimant to clarify his holiday pay claim within two weeks of the hearing. Submissions[4]Each party had provided skeleton arguments on the costs application prior to the hearing. I was also provided with some financial information relating to the claimant, comprising a Universal Credit statement, a financial statement from NCO Europe and a rent increase letter. In addition, both Mr Bhatt and Mr Davies addressed me at the hearing. It was understood that I could not make a determination at the hearing as this was not on the set agenda for the hearing. However, it was agreed by both parties that I could make a decision in writing without the need for a further hearing.[5]Mr Bhatt argued that the claimant’s claim had no reasonable prospect of success given the lack of qualifying service. As the claimant was legally represented, he should have been aware of this, including because of the respondent’s grounds of resistance and without prejudice cost warning letters sent on 4th, 8th and 9th September 2025 and an open letter sent on 10th September 2025. The claimant had not responded to any of these. Mr Bhatt argued that the claimant’s ability to pay could and should be ignored given the hopelessness of the case. He also questioned the quality of the financial information provided, pointing to the lack of supporting evidence or a witness statement. The claim directly related to the hearing, comprising his fee of £3,000 and solicitors’ fees of £3,735.73. VAT was not claimed. The solicitors’ hourly rates were £418 to £223.25 (for a paralegal). He therefore argued that ordering payment of the full amount was appropriate.[6]Mr Davies argued that the claims were not hopeless, pointing to the continuance of the holiday pay claim and the fact that no deposit order had been made in relation to this. Any cost order should be reduced by at least one third to reflect this. He also argued that the claimant’s financial circumstances were important, saying that the evidence provided showed that the claimant was living on benefits, that his monthly outgoings were over £1,000 more than his income and he had debts of over £57,000. He therefore contended that the amount awarded should be zero or at least a heavily reduced sum. The Rules[7]The relevant rules are the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure 2024.[8]Rule 74(2) provides that: "a Tribunal must consider making a costs order or a preparation time order where it considers that –(a) a party (or that party's representative) has acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in either the bringing of the proceedings, or part of it, or the way that the proceedings, or part of it, have been conducted; or(b) any claim, response or reply had no reasonable prospect of success.[9]Under Rule 75 a party may apply for a costs order or a preparation time order at any stage up to 28 days after the date on which the judgment finally determining the proceedings in respect of that party was sent to the parties. No such order may be made unless the paying party has had a reasonable opportunity to make representations (in writing or at a hearing, as the Tribunal may order) in response to the application. In this case, the claimant had the chance to attend the hearing but chose not to do so.[10]Under Rule 76(1) a costs order may –(a) order the paying party to pay the receiving party a specified amount, not exceeding £20,000, in respect of the costs of the receiving party;(b) order the paying party to pay the receiving party the whole or a specified part of the costs of the receiving party, with the amount to be paid being determined, in England and Wales, by way of detailed assessment carried out either by a county court in accordance with the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, or by an Employment Judge applying the same principles …"[11]Under Rule 82, in deciding whether to make a costs, preparation time, or wasted costs order, and if so in what amount, the Tribunal may have regard to the paying party’s (or, where a wasted costs order is made, the representative’s) ability to pay. Note that this does not provide that the Tribunal must have regard to the ability to pay, rather may. Case Law[12]I have considered the following cases: Gee v Shell Ltd [2003] IRLR 82 CA; McPherson v BNP Paribas [2004] ICR 1398 CA; Monaghan v Close Thornton [2002] EAT/0003/01; Brooks v Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust [2019] WLUK 271, UKEAT/0246/18; NPower Yorkshire Ltd v Daley EAT/0842/04; Arrowsmith v Nottingham Trent University [2011] ICR 159 CA; AQ Ltd v Holden [2012] IRLR 648 EAT; Kapoor v Governing Body of Barnhill Community High School UKEAT/0352/13; Barnsley BC v Yerrakalva [2012] IRLR 78 CA; Shield Automotive Ltd v Greig UKEAT/0024/10; Jilley v Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Trust [2008] UKEAT/0584/06; Single Homeless Project v Abu [2013] UKEAT/0519/12; Vaughan v LB of Newham [2013] IRLR 713; Raggett v John Lewis plc [2012] IRLR 906 EAT; Ladak v DRC Locums Ltd [2014] IRLR 851 EAT. The Relevant Legal Principles[13]The correct starting position is that an award of costs is the exception rather than the rule. As Sedley LJ stated at para 35 of his judgment in Gee v Shell Ltd “It is nevertheless a very important feature of the employment jurisdiction that it is designed to be accessible to people without the need of lawyers, and that in sharp distinction from ordinary litigation in the UK, losing does not ordinarily mean paying the other side’s costs …” Nonetheless, an Employment Tribunal must consider, after the claims were brought, whether they were properly pursued, see for instance NPower Yorkshire Ltd v Daley. If not, then that may amount to unreasonable conduct. In addition, the Employment Tribunal has a wide discretion where an application for costs is made under Rule 76(1)(a). As per Mummery LJ at para 41 in Barnsley BC v Yerrakalva “The vital point in exercising the discretion to order costs is to look at the whole picture of what happened in the case and to ask whether there has been unreasonable conduct by the claimant in bringing and conducting the case and, in doing so, to identify the conduct, what was unreasonable about it, and what effects it had.” However, the Tribunal should look at the matter in the round rather than dissecting various parts of the claim and the costs application, and compartmentalising it. There is no need for the Tribunal to find a causative link between the costs incurred by the party making the application for costs and the event or events that are found to be unreasonable, see McPherson v BNP Paribas, and also Kapoor v Governing Body of Barnhill Community High School in which Singh J held that the receiving party does not have to prove that any specific unreasonable conduct by the paying party caused any particular costs to be incurred.[14]When considering an application for costs the Tribunal should have regard to the two-stage process outlined in Monaghan v Close Thornton by Lindsay J at paragraph 22: "Is the cost threshold triggered, e.g. was the conduct of the party against whom costs is sought unreasonable? And if so, ought the Tribunal to exercise its discretion in favour of the receiving party, having regard to all the circumstances?”[15]In Brooks v Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust the EAT confirmed that dealing with an application for costs requires a two-stage process. The first is whether in all the circumstances the claimant has conducted the proceedings unreasonably. If so, the second stage is to ask whether the tribunal should exercise its discretion in favour of the claiming party, having regard to all the circumstances. In the case of reasonable prospects of success, the first stage is whether that ground is made out, and if it is, then to apply the exercise of discretion as to whether or not to award costs. When exercising that discretion at the second stage a tribunal can take account of reliance upon positive legal advice which had been received by the unsuccessful claimant, but positive professional advice will not necessarily insulate a claimant against a costs award. In the absence of any evidence as to the actual advice given, and the basis on which that advice was provided, it would be reasonable for a tribunal to assume that a legally represented claimant has been properly advised as to the risks and weaknesses of his or her case, and of the potential for an adverse costs order. Where privilege has been waived, such evidence would ordinarily need to explain the instructions given, the context in which the advice was provided, and the evidence considered.[16]The threshold to trigger costs is the same whether a litigant is or is not professionally represented, although in applying those tests, the EAT has held that the status of a litigant is a matter which the tribunal must take into account – see AQ Ltd v Holden in which Richardson J commented: “Justice requires the tribunals do not apply professional standards to lay people, who may be involved in legal proceedings for the only time in their life. As [counsel] submitted, lay people are likely to lack the objectivity and knowledge of law and practice brought about by a professional adviser. Tribunals must bear this in mind when assessing the threshold tests in [rule 76(1)(a)]. Further, even if the threshold tests for an order of costs are met, the tribunal has discretion whether to make an order. This discretion will be exercised having regard to all the circumstances. It is not irrelevant that a lay person may have brought proceedings with little or no access to specialist help and advice.” However, Richardson J also acknowledged that it does not follow from this “that lay people are immune from orders for costs: far from it, as the cases make clear. Some litigants in person are found to have behaved vexatiously or unreasonably even when proper allowance is made for their inexperience and lack of objectivity”. These statements were approved by Underhill P in Vaughan v London Borough of Newham.[17]With regard to costs warning letters, while it is good practice to warn a claimant of the weakness of his or her case where the respondents may be minded to apply for costs should they succeed at the end of the case, the failure to do so will not, as a matter of law, render it unjust to make a costs order even against an unrepresented claimant. In Vaughan v London Borough of Newham, the EAT upheld a substantial order for costs against the claimant, notwithstanding the absence of a costs warning letter, and in doing so had regard to the likely effect such a letter would have had. Underhill P pointed out that the claimant had never suggested that she would have discontinued her claim if she had received such a letter, and, even if she had, such an assertion would not have been credible. The claimant was “convinced, albeit without any rational or evidential basis, that she was the victim of a conspiracy and of a serious injustice, and it seems to us highly unlikely that a letter from the respondents, however well crafted, would have caused the scales to fall from her eyes.”[18]The EAT held in Growcott v Glaze Auto Ltd UKEAT/0419/11/SM that costs can be awarded if a reasonable offer is made to settle and a hopeless case is still pursued.[19]The same approach is to be taken in circumstances where the respondent has not applied for a deposit order. Underhill P in Vaughan also acknowledged that respondents do not always, for understandable practical reasons, seek such an order even where they are faced with weak claims, so that failure to do so “is not necessarily a recognition of the arguability of the claim.” On the facts of Vaughan, neither the failure to seek a deposit order nor the failure otherwise to warn the claimant of the hopelessness of her claims was “cogent evidence that those claims had in fact any reasonable prospect of success” and neither failure was “a sufficient reason for withholding an order for costs which was otherwise justified”.[20]Where a claim has been withdrawn, the question for the Tribunal is not whether the withdrawal of the claim is itself unreasonable, but whether the party concerned has acted unreasonably in the conduct of the proceedings, see McPherson v BNP Paribas. A tribunal should not therefore award costs simply because the claimant has withdrawn his or her claim. It should determine whether the conduct overall is unreasonable, and this includes the impact of the later withdrawal.[21]With regard to the paying party's ability to pay, Rule 82 allows the tribunal to have regard to the paying party's ability to pay, but it does not have to, see Jilley v Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Trust and Single Homeless Project v Abu. The fact that a party’s ability to pay is limited, does not, however, require the tribunal to assess a sum that is confined to an amount that he or she could pay see Arrowsmith v Nottingham Trent University which upheld a costs order against a claimant of very limited means and per Rimer LJ “her circumstances may well improve and no doubt she hopes that they will.” One reason for not taking means into account is the failure of the paying party to provide sufficient and/or credible evidence of his or her means. The authorities also make it clear that the amount which the paying party might be ordered to pay after assessment does not need to be a sum which he or she could pay outright from savings or current earnings. In Vaughan v LB of Newham the paying party was out of work and had no liquid or capital assets and a costs order was made which was more than twice her gross earnings at the date of dismissal. Underhill P declined to overturn that order on appeal because despite her limited financial circumstances, there was evidence that she would be successful in obtaining some further employment. Per Underhill P: “The question of affordability does not have to be decided once and for all by reference to the party’s means at the moment the order falls to be made” and the questions of what a party could realistically pay over a reasonable period “are very open-ended, and we see nothing wrong in principle in the tribunal setting the cap at a level which gives the respondent’s the benefit of any doubt, even to a generous extent. It must be recalled that affordability is not, as such, the sole criterion for the exercise of the discretion: accordingly, a nice estimate of what can be afforded is not essential.”[22]Insofar as it does have regard to the paying party's ability to pay, the Tribunal should have regard to the whole means of that party's ability to pay, see Shield Automotive Ltd v Greig (per Lady Smith obiter). This includes considering capital within a person's means, which will often be represented by property or other investments which are not as flexible as cash, but which should not be ignored.[23]VAT should not be included in a claim for costs if the receiving party is able to recover the VAT, see Raggett v John Lewis plc which reflects the CPR Costs Practice Direction (44PD).[24]In Ladak v DRC Locums Ltd HHJ Richardson held (by reference to the earlier 2004 Rules) that the definition of costs was sufficiently wide to enable an employer to recover costs in respect of time spent by a qualified in-house representative.
Analysis
[25]The Tribunal determines that the application has been properly made, and it has jurisdiction to consider it. It also determines that the claimant had advance notice of the hearing where the application was discussed. It was agreed that a further hearing was not necessary and that a written determination could be made. The Tribunal is therefore permitted under its Rules to make a costs order if it chooses to do so.[26]In deciding whether to make a costs order, I begin by considering the two-stage test referred to above.[27]The first stage of that test is whether in all the circumstances the claimant has conducted the proceedings unreasonably. In assessing this, I reviewed the pleadings in the case and the various bundles, skeleton arguments, authorities and the witness statement provided for the 12 September 2025 hearing. I also considered the submissions made at the hearing. Rather than focusing on specific points, I looked at the position in the round.[28]I concluded that the foundations of the claim, insofar as it related to the TUPE Regulations and the breach of the implied term of trust and confidence, were unreasonable. I have already concluded that they had no reasonable prospect of success.[29]I then considered whether the conduct of the case by the claimant was unreasonable. The claimant persisted with the TUPE and breach of contract elements of the case, despite the clear explanation in the respondent’s grounds of resistance and repeated cost warnings letters. They all put the claimant on notice as to serious issues with his case. It is important to note that he was legally represented and should have been given assessments of his prospects of success. I did not receive submissions or see any evidence whether it was the claimant or his solicitors (Portways) who argued for these complaints to be pursued or some combination. That may be the subject of a separate conversation between the claimant and Portways. In any event, the result was a pursuit of hopeless complaints in the face of clear warnings as to the consequence of continuing. Carrying on with these complaints was therefore unreasonable conduct.[30]Mr Davies argued that the case was not hopeless as one complaint remained, that relating to holiday pay. However, that is to disregard that it was the failure to explain this complaint that allowed it to continue. The claimant said he was owed 7.8 days unpaid leave but has never explained the basis of his calculation. Persisting with that level after being paid an additional day’s holiday was unreasonable conduct. The failure to explain the complaint may have meant that a deposit order was not made; however, it led to the highly unusual step of an agreed unless order instead. This does not therefore affect my finding that the claimant’s actions in persisting with the claim were unreasonable.[31]I therefore conclude that, taken in the round, the claimant did act unreasonably in bringing the claim and in its continued conduct, especially after the issue of the cost warnings letters. The first stage of the test is therefore passed, and the Tribunal should continue to the second stage.[32]The second stage is to ask whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion in favour of the claiming party, having regard to all the circumstances.[33]The claimant is represented in this case and has had access to professional advice throughout the course of the case. Portways should have made the claimant aware at the outset of the weaknesses in the case. Even if overlooked at that stage, they were aware of the issues following the receipt of the grounds of resistance and had already withdrawn one complaint due to lack of two years’ employment. The costs warning letters further emphasized the position. Even at the hearing, the claimant persisted in claiming 7.8 days unpaid leave, despite being paid an extra day by the respondent. As a result, and having regard to all the circumstances, I conclude that the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to make a costs order.[34]The respondent has claimed its costs relating to preparing for and attending the 12 September hearing. The previously withdrawn complaint of unfair dismissal is therefore irrelevant to this. I do find that the period claimed for is appropriate. However, a small adjustment is necessary to reflect the fact that the claimant did succeed in keeping the holiday pay claim alive for the time being. This, however, is only a very small part of the claim and so I consider an adjustment of only 10 percent is appropriate.[35]The fees claimed are divided between Mr Bhatt’s brief fee of £3,000 and solicitors’ costs of £3,735.73. I find Mr Bhatt’s fee to be reasonable. I have not been provided with a detailed schedule of the solicitors’ costs but do find the hourly rates and the resultant total unreasonable. I find that 50% would be an appropriate amount in preparing for the hearing, which is £1,867.87. Applying the 10 percent discount for holiday pay, this gives a total potentially recoverable amount of £4,381.08. VAT has rightly not been claimed.[36]I next turned to whether account should be taken of the claimant’s financial means. Portways argued in their skeleton argument that the effect of Rule 82 is I must take these into account. This is incorrect, the Tribunal may but is not obliged to take them into account.[37]In this case, the financial information is limited and I cannot readily identify the basis on which the NCO Europe report supplied was prepared. The lack of a witness statement was a key omission. The claimant offered to answer questions at the hearing but without a sworn witness statement, this was not appropriate.[38]More importantly, the claimant has unreasonably persisted in a case that had no merit in almost every respect. Even the holiday pay claim has been conducted unreasonably. The respondent has unnecessarily and unreasonably been put to time and expense defending an unmeritorious claim. It is inappropriate that the claimant should escape liability for his actions by pleading impecunity. I noted that he also retained counsel for the hearing; it is unclear how Mr Davies is being paid.[39]Finally, as noted above, I have not had any evidence as to whether the claimant or Portways were instrumental in persisting with the case. If it was Portways, the claimant may have a case to recover the costs from them. If it was the claimant that insisted on persisting in spite of advice to the contrary, it is inappropriate he should receive a discount for his financial circumstances.[40]As a result, and taking all these factors together, I consider it inappropriate to take the claimant’s financial circumstances into account. 41.[42]Accordingly, the tribunal orders that the claimant pays a contribution towards the respondent's costs in the sum of £4,381.08. Approved by
Analysis
[1]The tribunal considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked for the reasons set out in this judgment.
Background
[2]The claimant originally brought various complaints. A claim for unfair dismissal was withdrawn as the claimant had less than two years’ qualifying service. A claim for breach of contract was recast as a claim for a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence, using similar wording as that used in the withdrawn unfair dismissal claim. He also brought claims for breach of Regulation 7(1) of the TUPE Regulations and for holiday pay.[3]The respondent applied for the case to be struck out and this was considered by me at a hearing on 12 September 2025. I determined that all the remaining complaints should be struck out, except for that in relation to holiday pay. That was made subject to an unless order and has subsequently been dismissed for noncompliance.[4]The respondent had also applied for its costs in relation to preparing for and attending the hearing on 12 September 2025, claiming £6,735.73. The claimant had sufficient advance notice of the application; evidence and a skeleton argument were both filed on his behalf. He was represented throughout the process by Portways Solicitors and was represented at the hearing by Mr Davies of counsel.[5]I heard representations at the hearing and considered the submissions and evidence submitted in advance. It was understood that I could not make a determination at the hearing as this was not on the set agenda for the hearing. However, it was agreed by both parties that I could make a decision in writing without the need for a further hearing.[6]I subsequently made a written decision which contained full written reasons. This was sent to the parties on 2 October 2025.[7]In my decision, I concluded that, taken in the round, the claimant had acted unreasonably in bringing the claim and in its continued conduct, especially after the issue of the cost warnings letters. I also concluded that, having regard to all the circumstances, the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to make a costs order. I assessed £4,381.08 to be an appropriate amount.[8]I considered whether the claimant’s financial circumstances should be taken into account. I concluded that it was inappropriate that the claimant should escape liability for his actions by pleading impecunity. In doing so, I set out that I had not heard any evidence as to whether the claimant or Portways were instrumental in persisting with the case. If it was Portways, I noted the claimant may have a case to recover the costs from them. If it was the claimant that insisted on persisting in spite of advice to the contrary, I concluded that it was inappropriate he should receive a discount for his financial circumstances. Reconsideration request[9]The claimant applied for reconsideration of the tribunal’s decision on 16 October 2025. This was within the 14 days’ time limit permitted for reconsideration requests. The request was accompanied by numerous documents evidencing his financial circumstances and a witness statement. On 27th October 2025 he also provided an Equifax credit report.[10]In his application, the claimant provided various reasons why he considered that the tribunal should reconsider its decision. These reasons can be summarised as follows:a. The claimant says that he is no longer retaining Portways, due to his current unemployment and mounting debts. He explains that he has defaulted on his credit cards, borrowed money and has received a priority bill from HMRC for apparently underpaying tax in the 2023/2024 tax year.b. As a result, he argues that the costs judgment will place him in a state of financial penury, serve as a detriment for pursuing unspecified legal recourse, is a punitive measure and potentially infringes his Article 6 Convention rights. He contends that this will lead to bankruptcy and is adversely affecting his physical and mental health.[11]I read this as a request that the costs judgment be cancelled. Respondent’s submissions[12]I invited the respondent to make representations on the application before deciding whether to refuse the application under rule 70(2) of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024 (“the Rules”).[13]By an email dated 6th November 2025, the respondent’s solicitors objected to the claimant’s application, arguing that it was seeking to reargue points that have already been decided. They contend that it would not be in the interests of justice to allow the claimant a second opportunity to argue this matter. Tribunal consideration[14]The tribunal has carefully considered these submissions.[15]I have been asked to reconsider my costs judgment and to overturn it due to the claimant’s financial circumstances.[16]I begin by considering the relevant rules and law.[17]Schedule 12 of the Rules contains the provisions relating to reconsideration of decisions. Under Rule 69 an application for reconsideration under Rule 68 must be made within 14 days of the date on which the decision (or, if later, the written reasons) were sent to the parties. The application was therefore received within the relevant time limit.[18]Rule 70(2) provides that if the tribunal considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked, the application must be refused.[19]The grounds for reconsideration are only those set out in Rule 68, namely that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.[20]The earlier case law suggests that the interests of justice ground should be construed restrictively. The Employment Appeal Tribunal (“the EAT”) in Trimble v Supertravel Ltd [1982] ICR 440 decided that if a matter has been ventilated and argued then any error of law falls to be corrected on appeal and not by review. In addition, in Fforde v Black EAT 68/80 (where the applicant was seeking a review in the interests of justice under the former Rules which is analogous to a reconsideration under the current Rules) the EAT decided that the interests of justice ground of review does not mean “that in every case where a litigant is unsuccessful he is automatically entitled to have the tribunal review it. Every unsuccessful litigant thinks that the interests of justice require a review. This ground of review only applies in the even more exceptional case where something has gone radically wrong with the procedure involving a denial of natural justice or something of that order”.[21]More recent case law suggests that the "interests of justice" ground should not be construed as restrictively as it was prior to the introduction of the "overriding objective" (which is now set out in Rule 3). This requires the tribunal to give effect to the overriding objective to deal with cases fairly and justly. As confirmed in Williams v Ferrosan Ltd [2004] IRLR 607 EAT, it is no longer the case that the "interests of justice" ground was only appropriate in exceptional circumstances. However, in Newcastle Upon Tyne City Council v Marsden [2010] IRLR 743, the EAT confirmed that it is incorrect to assert that the interests of justice ground need not necessarily be construed so restrictively, since the overriding objective to deal with cases justly required the application of recognised principles. These include that there should be finality in litigation, which is in the interest of both parties.[22]This issue was considered at the hearing on 12th September 2025. The claimant had notice of the application and the benefit of legal representation, both solicitors providing ongoing advice and counsel on the day. There has been no material change since the hearing, either in terms of the law or facts that subsequently came to light. The claimant or its advisors chose not to provide a witness statement or more detailed financial information to the hearing. Based on the evidence before me and the submissions made, I concluded that the claimant’s financial circumstances should not be taken into account. The reasons for this were explained in my decision. There is no suggestion that I erred in law.[23]I conclude therefore that this application is simply an attempt to re-argue the case I heard on 12 September 2025. The claimant is trying to have “a second bite of the cherry”, based on the law and facts that were available at that hearing. Without any new law or argument that I have erred in law or material information that was not available then, it is not in the interests of justice or in accordance with the overriding objective to reconsider a decision that has already been made.[24]As a result, I conclude that there is no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked and must therefore refuse the application for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 70(2) of the Rules.[25]Accordingly, the judgment of the tribunal is that the claimant’s application dated 16 October 2025 for reconsideration of the judgment sent to the parties on 2 October 2025 is refused. Approved by